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MLC Global Property Fund
MLC Annual Review
June 2009
MLC Investment Management
Level 12, 105 –153 Miller Street
North Sydney NSW 2060
1
Important information
This information has been provided by MLC Limited (ABN 90 000 000 402) a member of the National Group, 105-153 Miller Street,
North Sydney 2060. This material was prepared for advisers only.
Any advice in this communication has been prepared without taking account of individual objectives, financial situation or needs.
Because of this you should, before acting on any information in this communication, consider whether it is appropriate to your
objectives, financial situation and needs. You should obtain a Product Disclosure Statement or other disclosure document relating to
any financial product issued by MLC Investments Limited (ABN 30 002 641 661) and MLC Nominees Pty Ltd (ABN 93 002 814 959) as
trustee of The Universal Super Scheme (ABN 44 928 361 101), and consider it before making any decision about whether to acquire or
continue to hold the product. A copy of the Product Disclosure Statement or other disclosure document is available upon request by
phoning the MLC call centre on 132 652 or on our website at mlc.com.au.
An investment in any product offered by a member company of the National group does not represent a deposit with or a liability of the
National Australia Bank Limited ABN 12 004 044 937 or other member company of the National Australia Bank group of companies
and is subject to investment risk including possible delays in repayment and loss or income and capital invested. None of the National
Australia Bank Limited, MLC Limited, MLC Investments Limited or other member company in the National Australia Bank group of
companies guarantees the capital value, payment of income or performance of any financial product referred to in this publication.
Past performance is not indicative of future performance. The value of an investment may rise or fall with the changes in the market.
Please note that all return figures reported are before management fees and taxes, and for the period up to 30 June 2009, unless
otherwise stated.
The specialist investment management companies are current as at 30 June 2009. Funds under management figures are as at 30
June 2009, unless otherwise stated. Investment managers are regularly reviewed and may be appointed or removed at any time
without prior notice to you.
Page 2
Contents
MLC Investment Management Team Recent Comments,
Updates and Articles
Market Overview
Global Real Estate Investment Trust Commentary
Appendix: Table of Investment Manager Returns
5
6-8
9-12
13
Page 3
This review provides
insights on the
performance of MLC
Global Property Fund.
It also provides an
update on our recent
research and
publications with the
latest views on
investment issues and
market events, and the
activity the research
team has undertaken
on your behalf.
Page 4
MLC Investment
Management Team
Recent Comments,
Updates and Articles
 The recent financial market chaos
and plunge in liquidity of credit
assets has helped focus
mainstream attention on the risk
posed by exposure to illiquid
assets. This is particularly
relevant to many Australian
Superannuation investors in
Industry Super funds with a high
degree of illiquid exposure (eg
Direct property, Infrastructure and
private equity).
Over the past 12 months, MLC
Investment Management has
undertaken 529 manager meetings.
The broad asset class breakdown of
these manager meetings is outlined in
the below chart.
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
Ot
he
r
De
bt
Ma
rk e
ts
erg
i ng
Em
l as
s
ali
an
Pr
op
er
ty
Au
s tr
as
se
tC
nc
y
0
Cu
rre
 Amanda Heyes, MLC Investment
Specialist, puts 'The Chaser'
under the microscope and finds
that the power of compound
interest over long periods of time
can have an incredible impact on
your clients wealth.
Manager meetings and
reviews
Mu
l ti-
 A summarized client friendly
commentary on the key drivers of
performance for the range of MLC
Multi-Manager funds over the year
to June 2009 is on the client
MarketWatch site.
 MLC Investment Management’s
views and analysis on 7 year
return potential for asset classes
and the range of MLC’s diversified
portfolios has been updated to
reflect end June 2009 market
valuations.
 Don't forget to have a look at the
Marketwatch site for an update on
the impacts of the financial crisis
and economic downturn on recent
income distributions for the MLC
MasterKey Investment Trust, Unit
Trust and Investment Service and
helping clients through tough
times.
Sh
ar
es
ali
an
Sh
ar
es
G lo
ba
lP
ro
pe
rty
 A fully scripted ‘Performance
Preview Pack’ for the year ended
30 June 2009 to help facilitate
more meaningful client
conversations around fund
performance in challenging
market environments, The pack
“lifts the lid” on the key drivers of
the current economic
environment, how this has
affected investment markets and
what this means for your clients.
 The Lottery Effect of Volatility –
MLC does not believe volatility
should be seen as the definitive
measure of risk. Risk, to clients, is
the likelihood they will not achieve
their financial objectives.
However, the dispersion of returns
(volatility) does impact whether
clients achieve their financial
objectives. This paper examines
the contribution the dispersion of
returns has on outcomes.
 Kerry Napper, MLC's Capital
Markets Research Analyst, looks
at what history can tell us about
the effect of banking crises on
developed and emerging
economies.
G lo
ba
l
Some of our recent updates include:
MLC has always taken the issue
of liquidity and equitable pricing
seriously, to ensure we provide
our investors with daily access to
their unit linked funds. To ensure
we can provide this access, MLC
has a formal approach to the
assessment of liquidity and
equitable pricing. For more
information on this issue please
refer to MLC’s White Paper
entitled: ”Liquidity and
Equitable Unit Pricing – March
2009”.
Au
s tr
Your investment
specialists
regularly
produce
commentary and
articles on
topical
investment
issues. These
are available on
mlc.com.au
 Traditional portfolio construction
approaches have been under
intense scrutiny throughout the
recent financial crisis. In his article
- The do's and don'ts of
portfolio construction, John
Owen, Senior Investment
Specialist for Australian shares
and global property provides
some insights on how NOT to
make the same mistakes.
Page 5
Market overview
Comments by Brian Parker
Investment returns over the past 12
months were very poor, with the
typical balanced fund likely to have
posted a -11% return for the year.
REIT and share markets were the
main culprits, while Government
bonds posted solid returns as
investors continued to seek safety,
and the world’s central banks drove
official interest rates down to
unprecedented levels. Within the
bond universe, the dispersion of
returns among the various subclasses was truly remarkable. While
Government nominal bonds in the
developed markets performed well,
every other debt securities sub-class
performed poorly in the December
2008 quarter. Corporate bond
spreads widened dramatically,
particularly after the failure of the US
investment bank Lehman Brothers in
mid-September 2008. Deflation fears
meant that markets had little interest
in inflation protection, and
consequently inflation protected
securities also performed extremely
poorly.
However the unbridled pessimism that
characterised market sentiment in late
2008 abated during 2009, and
markets became less pessimistic
about the outlook for the global
economy. The functioning of world
money and credit markets has
progressively normalised. The result
has been sharply higher share prices,
higher commodity prices, much tighter
credit spreads and higher
Government bond yields.
Economic conditions in the world
economy deteriorated over the course
of the year. All the world’s major
developed economies are now firmly
ensconced in recession. In the case
of Japan and the UK, the recession is
as severe as any in living memory.
Aust bonds
Global bonds
Cash
Global shares (unhedged)
Aust shares
Aust REITs
Global REITs (AUD hedged)
-50
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
Returns (%) for year to end-June 2009
The chart shows both the steep declines in Australian
and world share prices during the last half of 2008, and
also the solid recovery that has occurred since early
March 2009 in the case of the developed markets and
October 2008 in the case of emerging share markets.
Selected share price indices
End-June 2008 equals 100
110
90
70
50
Source: MSCI, Datastream
30
Jun-08
Sep-08
Australia
Dec-08
Developed markets
Here in Australia, economic growth
has slowed to a crawl over the past
year, and the economy has almost
certainly fallen into recession, despite
the fact that economic data released
in recent months have tended to
surprise on the upside. Retail
spending seems to have been
supported by the Government’s cash
hand-outs. Housing finance has
picked up – particularly for new
housing construction – spurred on by
extremely low interest rates, and the
Government’s grants to first home
buyers. However, we have yet to see
the full effect of the global recession
on exports or business investment.
Mar-09
Jun-09
Emerging markets
Moreover, every leading indicator of
employment is pointing to sharply
higher unemployment rates over the
coming year.
Hopes that the major emerging
market economies of China and India
could sail through this crisis relatively
unscathed appear to have been
dashed. Chinese growth in particular
slowed significantly – industrial output
growth fell to its slowest pace in a
decade. However, more recent data
out of China suggest that some pickup in growth may be underway.
Page 6
Trade and production data in some of
the world’s most trade dependant
economies – including Japan, nonJapan Asia, and Germany – have
been notably worse than elsewhere in
the last few months. Much of this
weakness appears to reflect the
collapse of trade finance activity, and
indeed world trade, in the wake of the
Lehman Brothers failure (see charts
below). There remains considerable
debate as to whether the Lehman
Brothers failure represents an
unavoidable consequence of the
financial crisis or a policy blunder. We
lean towards the latter interpretation.
The chart shows
industrial output in less
trade dependant
economies:
The chart shows
industrial output in
highly trade dependant
economies:
In March 2008, another US
investment bank, Bear Sterns, was
facing failure, and because of the
institution’s pivotal role in the US and
global financial system, the US
Treasury and Federal Reserve
engineered a bail-out of the institution
by JP Morgan, under which the
business of Bear Sterns was
absorbed into JP Morgan, and the
troubled assets of the institution were
taken on and guaranteed by the
Federal Reserve. In the wake of that
operation, market participants felt that
the rules of the game were
reasonably clear: viz, any institution
that occupied such a pivotal position
in the system would have the support
of US Treasury and Federal Reserve
if it faced difficulties. As a
consequence, market participants felt
relatively confident in acquiring the
short-term debt obligation of such
entities, continuing to utilise them as
counterparties for a range of
transactions, and holding their equity.
By allowing Lehman to fail, the rules
of the game appeared to collapse,
and with it, confidence in the system.
The failure of Lehman Brothers
followed a period where key US
institutions such as the investment
bank Merrill Lynch, the world’s largest
insurer AIG, and key US mortgage
lenders Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
had been taken over, nationalised, or
sent into bankruptcy. Institutions in
the UK and Europe have faced similar
difficulties. It is now clear that during
the aftermath of the Lehman Brothers
failure, the world financial markets
and economy stood on the edge of an
abyss. Flows of credit that are the
lifeblood of the world economy in
many cases ceased. For exporters
and importers, trade finance was
extremely difficult to obtain. Corporate
debt markets became dysfunctional,
and in the case of high yield
securities, there was no market to
speak of. Interbank lending markets
were severely restricted, and cost of
funding for the world’s banks soared.
In response, the world’s monetary
authorities stepped up their injections
of liquidity and asset purchases. Later
in the year, further capital injections
were made into US banks by the US
Treasury, and by year’s end, the
major US car makers were in line for
emergency funding from the same
program that had been set-up to aid
troubled financial institutions.
President Obama’s much anticipated
$789 billion stimulus package passed
through the US Congress in February.
Additionally, a $275 billion housing
plan aimed at preventing foreclosures
and attempting to stabilise the
housing sector was introduced.
During the past year, policymakers
have continued to take steps to
address this crisis that are
unprecedented in both their nature
and scope. Fiscal policy measures
have been taken in many countries,
including here in Australia. The
world’s central banks have reduced
official interest rates aggressively, and
injected huge amounts of liquidity into
the financial system in a bid to get
money and credit markets working
again. These efforts are critical,
because in the absence of properly
functioning markets for credit, and
financial institutions willing to lend,
traditional monetary policy is close to
impotent, and generating a
sustainable recovery in private
demand will be close to impossible.
At the time of writing, conditions in
money and credit markets have
continued to improve, although they
have yet to return to anything that
might be described as normal trading
conditions. Share prices, while still
sharply higher than their recent lows,
have fallen across the globe. While
there has been some improvement
evident in the economic data released
across the world so far this year, the
recession is far from over. Share
markets seem to have gotten ahead
of themselves in the latter stages of
the financial year, and consequently,
their partial retreat appears entirely
justified.
Page 7
At MLC, we spend a good deal of time
assessing the medium to longer-term
outlook for economies and investment
returns. Before this rally began in
early March, prospective investment
returns for domestic and global
shares, and for non-Government
securities looked very favourable –
significantly higher than historical
averages. Given the size and speed
of the recovery so far, those
prospective returns have come down
sharply, but are still reasonably
favourable.
In the short term, we believe the
pathway towards sustainable recovery
– both in the economy and investment
returns – remains highly uncertain.
What kind of news would we need to
hear, what questions need to be
answered and what developments
would we like to see in order to
become more optimistic?
Here is a list, but by no means an
exhaustive one.
 So far, the loan and securities
losses faced by banks and other
financial institutions have mostly
been related to the US housing
market collapse. Just how bad will
the non-housing credit losses be in
this recession, and do the banks
have enough capital to cushion
against those losses? The US
Federal Reserve suggests that the
major US banks need to raise
relatively little capital to provide
that cushion. For our part, we
think US banks need to raise
considerably more capital than the
$75 billion or so identified by the
Fed.
 In the US and elsewhere in the
English speaking world,
households have increased their
saving. In Australia, this has been
achieved (so far) with very little
weakness in consumer spending,
but the US and UK have not been
so lucky, and consumer spending
in those economies has fallen
sharply. Sharply lower household
wealth has triggered higher rates
of saving – a reversal of the trend
of the past decade or more. It
remains unclear how far this trend
has to go – we have no way of
knowing in advance just how high
the saving rate will need to rise in
these economies (and hence how
weak, and for how long, consumer
spending will be).
 While the problems in the world’s
banking system have restrained
the supply of credit, the demand
for credit from the private sector
has been very weak. We need to
see signs of a pick-up in credit
demand. Just when will the private
sector’s appetite for credit improve
– not the kind of voracious,
unsustainable appetite for credit
that led the world to financial
obesity, just normal, garden variety
demands for credit for home
building and business investment?
Thankfully for world bond markets,
this lack of appetite for debt has
allowed Governments to have the
field all to themselves when it
comes to borrowing money. Even
after their recent sell-off, long bond
rates are still very low historically.
At some point however, the
competition for funds between
Governments and a resurgent
private sector is likely to be
problematic for bond markets.
At the end of the day, the share
market is a snapshot of the
businesses that comprise the
economy. Over time, those
businesses profit from meeting the
needs of their customers, pay
dividends, and reinvest in order to
grow. Share markets mostly reflect
that reality. Extended periods where
share markets fail to deliver are rare,
but they have happened.
Consequently, not everybody can or
should have all their eggs in the
basket labelled ‘shares’.
Our best defence against not knowing
the unknowable is to diversify our
investments as widely as possible,
take enough risk in our portfolios to
enable us to meet our clients’ return
objectives and, to as much as
possible, fully understand the risks
attached to every investment we
make.
Page 8
Global Property Fund
Commentary
The MLC global property strategy is
expected to outperform the UBS Real
Estate Investors Trust Index (AUD
hedged) over rolling 5 year periods.
However, as part of our focus on
growing your wealth, we won’t chase
risky returns when markets are very
strong. This means your returns are
likely to lag or underperform the
benchmark return in strong markets.
At other times, and particularly when
markets are weak, we expect to
outperform the market’s return.
The table outlines performance of MLC Global Property
Strategy.
Performance Overview to 30
June 2009
3 years
1 year
3 mths
MLC Global Property Strategy (AUD
hedged), Gross
-14.9% pa
-36.8%
31.8%
UBS Real Estate Investors Trust Index
(AUD hedged)
-18.5% pa
-42.5%
23.5%
N/Av
-37.2%
35.7%
Median (Mercer Retail IDPS – Global
Property (Hedged))
-19.0% pa
-43.4%
24.0%
Quartile Ranking (Mercer IDPS Global
Property)
N/Av
1st
1st
Percentage of time above Median (IDPS
universe, since inception)
N/Av
79
N/Av
MLC Wholesale Global Property Fund
Class A, Net
Note: Inception is January 2007.
Executive Summary:
 As we saw in most global equity
markets during the June quarter,
Global Real Estate Investment
Trust (“GREIT”) markets also
performed strongly. The UBS Real
Estate Investors Trust Index (AUD
hedged) returned 23.5% in the
June quarter. However, while this
is a welcome development for
GREIT investors, the one year
return remains significantly
negative with the UBS Index down
by 42.5% to 30 June. This poor
return reflects in part the issue that
has dominated the performance of
the Australian REIT market. That
is, the indebtedness of many
REITs which, in the difficult credit
market and economic environment
of the last year and a half, has
required them to undertake drastic
measures (equity raisings,
property sales, etc) to repair their
financial position. Thankfully, there
is evidence that these measures
are working.
 Asian REIT markets continue to be
the best global performers. Hong
Kong’s REIT market was the best,
falling by 11.6%, where stable
office and residential property
fundamentals, the best REIT
balance sheets on a global basis
and growing confidence based on
China’s economic resilience have
helped. Japan’s and Singapore’s
REIT markets weren’t as firm as
Hong Kong’s but were nonetheless
superior performers compared to
the Australian, US, UK and
European REIT markets.
 The MLC GREIT strategy
outperformed the GREIT market
return by a substantial 8.3%,
bringing the 1 year excess return
to 5.7%. The strategy’s significant
ownership of Asian REITs was
very beneficial to your returns
versus the GREIT index. While
your return for the year is negative,
we are pleased that the strategy
we have built has helped
cushioned you from the worst of
the market’s fall.
 Both Resolution Capital and
Morgan Stanley have produced
considerable excess returns, and
while La Salle has
underperformed, we retain our
conviction in the manager to
deliver strong long-term
performance.
Page 9
We are
particularly
pleased with the
strategy’s rolling
one year return
at the end of
June, which was
5.7% better than
index.
9.0
6.0
3.0
0.0
-3.0
-6.0
-9.0
1 Year Rolling Excess Return
This satisfactory excess return
outcome was achieved in what has
probably been the most challenging
and difficult year in the history of the
global REIT market. The result is due
to the stock selection of the managers
that we have appointed on your
behalf. The global REIT market
contains over 220 REITs scattered
across many different countries. As
you would appreciate, not all are
equally attractive in terms of quality or
their prospective return. Some are
worthy investments for you but there
are a lot that aren’t. An excess return
of 5.7% in the year suggests that your
appointed managers have done a
good job in a very difficult
environment, choosing between the
REITs that are investment grade and
the ones that should be avoided.
Jun-09
Apr-09
Feb-09
Dec-08
Oct-08
Aug-08
Jun-08
Apr-08
Feb-08
Dec-07
Oct-07
Aug-07
Jun-07
Apr-07
Feb-07
Dec-06
Oct-06
-12.0
Aug-06
As you can see from the graph, your
strategy has produced better than
index returns with a high degree of
consistency. While there is a limited
performance history, as the strategy
was only launched in 2005, the rolling
three year excess return has been
consistently positive. Rolling one year
excess returns have mostly been
positive as well.
12.0
Jun-06
Excess returns are shown on a rolling
1 and 3 year basis, rolling through
time from 2005 to 30 June 2009. The
return of the market index is
represented by the intersecting
horizontal line. This means that if the
rolling excess return line is above the
horizontal line, the strategy has
“outperformed” the index, and vice
versa. This is a better way for you to
assess the returns you are receiving
from MLC, rather than looking at
returns at a single point in time (as in
the earlier table).
The graph shows how well the MLC Global REIT strategy
has performed compared to the market index (“excess
return”) to 30 June 2009.
% in excess of index*
Market Relative Returns
3 Year Rolling Excess Return
We do acknowledge that this
outperformance may provide you with
little comfort when the strategy’s
absolute return for the year (-36.8%)
is distinctly negative. However,
outperformance is a good outcome in
such a difficult market and certainly
preferable to underperforming.
Page 10
Your Managers
Irrespective of the market
environment, MLC believes that
appointing a number of different,
experienced managers is far
preferable to a strategy that relies on
just one or a small number of
managers for country, sector and
stock selection. We don’t believe it is
appropriate for you to be dependant
on a narrow range of insights,
especially if it is from just one firm,
when our research has identified a
number of managers with exceptional
global REIT skills. We also aim to
reduce your dependence on one or a
narrow range of investment styles.
This is why we have appointed three
managers who are responsible for
stock selection – the REITs to own
and, just as importantly, the REITs to
avoid.
The diversity of the MLC global REIT
strategy is evident from the table
above which shows the investment
style of each manager and the
allocation we have made to each
manager. All of the managers we
have appointed are providing you with
tailored portfolio arrangements as
well. This is an example of how MLC
uses its significant scale on your
behalf, in this case negotiating with
your managers to provide special
portfolio arrangements that we believe
will deliver superior return outcomes
for you.
A summary of your appointed managers is in the table.
Style
Tailored
mandate
?
Key role in
strategy
LaSalle
Relative Value
Yes
33.3%
Morgan Stanley
Absolute
Value
Yes
33.3%
Resolution Capital
Quality Value
Yes
33.3%
Manager
As we mentioned earlier, the strategy
outperformed the market index return
by 5.7% in the year. This pleasing
outcome was due to Resolution
Capital’s and Morgan Stanley’s
substantial outperformance. Morgan
Stanley was the best performer,
outperforming by 16.6% while
Resolution Capital’s outperformance
was by a margin of 15.1%. Morgan
Stanley’s portfolio has a significant
bias to selected REITs in Hong Kong,
Japan and Singapore because the
REITs in these markets tend to have
superior balance sheets and better
earnings potential than REITs
elsewhere in the world. Another
notable but rewarding feature of
Morgan Stanley’s portfolio is their low
exposure to the US REIT market
where there are expectations of a
30% - 40% drop in real estate
property values (though Morgan
Stanley believe this is already
factored into US REIT prices).
Resolution Capital’s deliberate
strategy of focussing stock selection
on well managed, conservatively
geared property vehicles with strong
operating cashflows continues to
benefit your return.
LaSalle’s returns lagged those of
Resolution and Morgan Stanley. Their
5.4% underperformance was due in
part to their smaller exposure to Asian
REITs and a higher exposure to US
and Australian REIT markets. MLC
has been constructing multi manager
strategies for nearly 25 years and we
know in any multi-manager strategy it
is normal for some managers to
underperform. Often it is because
their style is out of favour or the
market prefers companies that the
managers have chosen not to own.
We retain our conviction in LaSalle.
Page 11
Country and Sector
Exposures
The global REIT strategy is well
diversified. At the end of June, the
strategy comprised 88 REITs chosen
mainly from eleven different country
REIT markets (shown in the pie chart
on the right).
As you can see from the lower
diagram, the strategy owns
significantly more in Hong Kong,
Japanese and Singaporean REITs
and less in US, Australian and
Canadian REITs compared to index.
We have listed some of the largest
REIT investments in the strategy with
a description of each for you.
Hong Kong Land Holdings: One of
Asia's leading property investment,
management and development
groups. Founded in Hong Kong in
1889, the Group has business
interests across the region. In Hong
Kong, the Group owns and manages
some five million square feett of prime
commercial space that defines the
heart of the Central Business District.
In Singapore, it is helping to create
the city-state's new Central Business
District with the expansion of its joint
venture portfolio of new
developments. Hongkong Land's
properties in these and other Asian
centres are recognised as market
leaders and house the world's
foremost financial, business and
luxury retail names.
The chart shows the global REIT strategy country
exposures as at 30 June 2009.
France
5%
Netherlands Sweden Switzerland
Canada
1%
2%
1%
0%
Singapore
7%
United States
41%
Australia
9%
Hong Kong
10%
United Kingdom
11%
Japan
13%
The chart shows the major country exposures of the
global REIT strategy versus the index composition as at
30 June 2009.
United States
Australia
Canada
United Kingdon
Singapore
Japan
Hong Kong
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
%
Mitsubishi Estate: Mitsubishi Estate
Company, Limited is a Japan-based
real estate company engaged in
various property related business
activities, including the development,
leasing, operation and management
of buildings, the operation of parking
lots and housing construction and
management.
Mitsui Fudosan: Based in Tokyo,
Mitsui Fudosan is Japan’s leading
property company engaged in a range
of property related businesses,
including property investment,
development and management.
Starwood Hotels: One of the world's
largest hotel companies, it owns,
operates, franchises and manages
hotels, resorts, spas, residences, and
vacation ownership properties under
its nine owned brands.
Page 12
Appendix: Table of Investment
Manager Returns
Investment
Manager
15 year
% pa
10 year
% pa
7 year
% pa
5 year
% pa
3 year
% pa
1 year
%
3 months
%
Gross Total Returns for periods ended 30 June 2009
G-REIT Managers
LaSalle Investment
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
-22.21
-36.59
12.62
Morgan Stanley
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
-10.61
-7.32
31.33
Resolution Capital
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
-16.09
13.20
Note all total returns quoted above are before the deduction of fees & taxes and are to periods ended
30 June 2009.
Page 13
MLC Investment Management
For more information call
MLC on 132 652 8am-6pm EST
Monday to Friday, or contact
your financial adviser.
For details on MLC’s range of
products and services visit our
website mlc.com.au
Page 14