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Sparta Flash Card #12: Role of the Spartan Army
Historian
Ancient Sources
Evidence
Read through the following web pages and write a detailed account of the Spartan
Army using ancient sourcesThucydides
http://www.humanities.mq.edu.au/Ockham/y6701.html
http://history-world.org/spartans_and_thermopylae.htm
Xenophon
A History of Ancient Greece
Ancient History Sourcebook:
Xenophon (c.428-c.354 BCE):
The Spartan War Machine, c. 375 BCE
http://history-world.org/sparta%20war%20machine.htm
Modern
Sources
Read through the following web pages and write a detailed account of the Spartan
Army using ancient sources-
http://www.sikyon.com/sparta/history_eg.html
© 2000 Ellen
Papakyriakou/
Anagnostou
anonymous
http://history-world.org/pelopo.htm
The Spartan army and population decline
http://asmalltowninlaconia.tripod.com
/ASmallTowninLaconia/history/spartan_army_n_pop_decline.html
The Earthquake of 465 BC
The earthquake Sparta experienced in 464/65 BC. strongly directed politics of the time by
contributing to the rivalry between the Spartans and the Athenians and has been identified
as a significant cause of Spartan oliganthropia, or shortage of Spartiate males. Thucydides
writes that a single earthquake occurred and places the blame for the immediate slave revolt
on the Messenian helots, whereas Diodorus refers to multiple earthquakes and blames the
rebellion largely on the Laconian helots.
Relationship t
Syllabus dot
A comparison of Spartan military behaviour immediately before the earthquake and in the
years following it reveals a decline in aggressiveness. Thucydides acknowledges that they
were prepared to invade Attica in support of Thasos just prior to the earthquake. However,
the Spartans were unwilling to invade Attica at the urging of Megabazus, even though a
tremendous Athenian force was then engaged in Egypt (Thucydides 99; 1.109). Losses
experienced in the battle fought for over sixty days at Tanagra in Boeotia (Thucydides 98;
1.108) may have also contributed to this change in behaviour. Regardless, a population
problem existed arguably at the time of Pylos, where the Spartans were ready to sue for
peace over a mere 120 Spartiates, and certainly by the time of Leuctra, where there were
only 700 Spartiates altogether. The earthquake and subsequent revolt provides a finite time
period in which Spartan behaviour changes, and a significant population decline could have
occurred.
Can the decline of Spartan citizens be attributed to the earthquake alone. Diodorus' estimate
of 20,000 deaths is a pointer towards that. If even half of the 20,000 were Spartans rather
than helots or perioeci, this would have serious and immediate results and may be a reason
why Sparta petitioned Athens for help at Ithome. Thucydides writes, "The chief reason that
they asked for help was that the Athenians had the reputation of being good at siege
operations" (95; 1.102). He assures the reader that the Spartans would have long since taken
"the place (Ithome) by assault" if it were not for their lack of experience (Thucydides 95;
1.102). A. W. Gomme points out that not even the Athenians were especially good at sieges
and argues that Thucydides meant "an assault. . . on a palisaded camp" rather than a typical
siege of a walled fort (301; bk. 1, 102.1). He adds, "Sparta asked for help when in a difficult
position and not simply in order to convert a slow siege into a quick assault" (301; bk.
1,.102.1). A major loss of life may have contributed to this "difficult position" which the
Spartans would be unwilling to admit to the Athenians. Thucydides also has good reason to
downplay a loss of Spartan numbers. As this precedes the Peloponnesian War, a small
Spartan population would weaken his assertion "that the two sides were at the very height of
their power and preparedness" (Thucydides 35; 1.1).
Social and Economic problems
Sometime after the Peloponnesian War or early in the 4th C BC a law, the Epitadeus , was
passed which altered the rules of the entitlement to land of the homoioi. Previously under
Lycurgan law the kleros inherited by the Spartiate was inalienable, and this land along with
the helots who worked it was the basis of the economic support of the homoioi. This new
law permitted a Spartan to deed his land to any other Spartan during his lifetime and
bequeath it in his will freely. It was to be done in the guise of a gift for a gift of equal value,
but the gift could be money. The result was that over some time a minority began to possess
the majority of the land while another minority though growing more numerous were
without land (hypomeiones). Thus the number of Equals was reduced still further. This law
and its operation could only have been brought about if the Lycurgan prohibition against
coined money and its ownership by individuals was relaxed.
By the end of the war with Athens in 404 BC much Persian gold had been brought into
Sparta as subsidies, and after victory Lysander brought 470 talents on his return to Sparta.
Gyllipus who had been charged with the delivery of these subsidies was subsequently found
to have had his fingers in the till and was tried and exiled.
For Sparta to maintain its position as the dominant Aegean power, maintain a fleet and a
permanent presence abroad, the question of money would have to be settled. In a debate at
Sparta in 404 a compromise was reached where the laws against private possession were
upheld but were relaxed in the case of the state. However the machinery to enforce this was
probably non-existent or too weak. The influx of annual tributes from the old Athenian
Empire a sum of 1,000 talents per year was too much for the existing administration to cope
with and the influences of corruption began to be felt. Many sought to enrich themselves,
and there was no better way to do it than in the office of harmost where the use of extortion,
corruption and bribery were rife. It was as harmost at Samos that Thorax made his fortune,
he was eventually caught and executed. Clearchus at Byzantium was another example
though he was only exiled.
These problems became even graver in the ensuing decades, the state was ready to act
against individuals but could not cure the underlying causes and by Leuctra Sparta found
herself without sufficient manpower due to economic problems and insufficient allies due to
imperial corruption.
Population decline and Army organization.
The defeat at Leuctra can be easily explained in purely military terms as early as 390 new
tactics had caught the Spartans wrong footed, at Laecheum by Iphicrates at Tegyra by
Pelopidas in 375 and in 371 Epaminondas adopted even newer tactics. But one defeat hover
shattering cannot explain why Sparta was internally too weak to survive it as a great power.
By Leuctra the Spartan army consisted of 'Equals', Perioicoi and a number of hypomeiones,
the numbers of which are debatable. The neodamodeis served in separate units of whom
there were a large number. The Spartans during their period of hegemony also deployed
numbers of mercenary hoplites and peltasts. As seen the number of 'Equals' was declining
thus the number of 'Unequals' by the same token would be rising. Although they did not
belong to a kleros and could not pay their mess bills because they were landless they would
still have been part of the Spartan army organization and training although without the full
citizens rights. There were also a certain number of 'Spartans' who may have been adopted
by 'Equals' and sponsored by them. As well as these there were those of military age, either
sons with living fathers or younger brothers who could serve as a pool of reserves.
Lets look at the size of the army in the 5th and 4th centuries from the facts as given by the
classical writers. At Plataea in 479 5,000 Spartiates and 5,000 Perioicoi served separately,
Herodotus does not mention how they were organized except that there was a lochos of
Pitane of unknown size included among the Spartans. After 371 the army is described as
consisting of 12 units called lochoi by Xenophon. In between both Xenophon and
Thucydides describe an army of 6 units but they differ on the name of the unit, mora or
lochos.
In 425 the Spartans put 420 men onto Sphacteria drawn by lots from all of the lochoi. Those
who surrendered were 120 Spartiates and 170 non-Spartiates (Perioicoi and Hypomeiones).
In 418 at Mantinea Thucydides numbers the army at 3,072 on a 32 year call up consisting
of 6 lochoi each of 4 pentekostys of 4 enomotiai, not enough to make sense of the battle.
Xenophon mentions the mora first in 403 and in 390 and gives its strength at 600. At Nemea
the strength of the army was 6,000 in 5 units. In his Lakedaimonian Politeia Xenophon
describes an army of 6 mora consisting of 4 lochoi each of 2 pentekostys of 2 enomotiai. At
Leuctra 4 mora were present on a 35 year call up and according to Xenophon only 700 were
Spartiates. Now 700 Spartans could not make up 4 mora, so who were the rest? I believe the
Perioicoi were not expected to serve outside the Peloponnese except as volunteers.
Therefore the remainder must have been hypomeiones with Perioeci volunteers and that
these served as part and parcel of the Spartan field army. The Perioicoi must have always
been brigaded separately as attested by Xenophon in several passages where the Spartan
field army had advanced beyond the frontier only to have to wait for the perioicic
contingent. Pausanius in 395 specifically waited at Tegea for them and 8 years later
Agesilaus sent some of the hippeis to hurry them up. Another objection to the supposition
that both Spartans and Perioicoi were brigaded together is that they were amateurs and
unaccustomed to the day to day training in tactics and drill. Thus Xenophon in his Politeia is
describing a purely Spartan Mora undiluted by Perioicoi and Thucydides has in his
description of the Spartan forces at Mantinea missed out one whole level of organization,
the Mora and has given the numbers of the Spartans alone ignoring the Perioicoi.
When scholars talk of Spartan population decline they are not talking about the population
of Lacedaemon which would have retained a healthy growth in the 5th and 4th centuries,
the perioicic communities were as healthy as any other but of the decline in the number of
Spartiates or 'Equals'. The losses from the earthquake of 465 were soon restored, the losses
of 400 at Leuctra could be replaced. Economic factors and the loss of the Messenian kleros
combined with a declining birth rate among Spartans caused by the laws of inheritance, a
general unwillingness to produce children and the inadequacy of the public kleros were
contributing factors in this decline. The loss of perioicic territories in Laconia and allies in
the Peloponnese after Leuctra further reduced the pool from which Sparta could build an
adequate force with which to play in the first division nor had she enough money to make
up the difference by hiring enough mercenaries.
The mirage of equality
Equality was supposed to be secured by a land apportionment that assigned 9,000 equal lots
to full Spartiates and 30,000 to the larger population of perioikoi. The lots were defined not
by size but by productivity. Scholars have endlessly debated whether there ever was such an
equal distribution and whether it worked. On the whole, I think the evidence shows that
equality of land was the Spartan ideal, as it was in several other Dorian states originally.
This equal distribution impressed political theorists like Plato (D.M. MacDowell, Spartan
Law. Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1986).
The insistence upon equality created several problems. In the first place, it meant that those
who became unequal, that is fell below a certain minimum standard of wealth, were no
longer citizens, because they could no longer make their contribution to the common
messes. Since Sparta refused to recruit new citizens from the perioikoi, this meant a steady
diminution in the citizen body.
Some non-Spartiate boys admitted to troops and later to the men’s messes—mothakes:
These might be children of foreigners like Xenophon, illegitimate sons of citizens, or sons
of families that had lost their citizenship status, typically for lack of money. In general they
could never become full citizens.
Obviously, a system in which lots are fixed will inevitably discourage large families. The
optimum family size at Sparta must have been one boy—and no girls to pay dowries for.
Greeks at this time did not typically practice abortion—though we hear of a mythical
Spartan Queen who offered to abort her child, the future king of Sparta if a male, if
Lycurgus would marry her—or expose healthy children. But various effective means of
contraception were available. Let us suppose three generations of a 5th-century family in
which only 1-2 sons are born to a married couple. What is the likelihood, after the Persian
Wars and the Peloponnesian War, that the third generation has a male heir? Failing a male
heir, property ended up in the hands of daughters, who if married took it out of the family
but if single retained it, which tended to increase further the power and liberty of women.
So for all these reasons, Sparta was doomed, and after her defeat by Thebes at the Battle of
Leuctra in 371 B.C., she lacked the manpower resources to recover her shattered prestige,
and although in the 3rd century Agis IV and Cleomenes III tried to restore the old Sparta by
promoting deserving periokoi to citizenship and redistributing the land, they were prevented
from carrying out their reforms the first by internal opposition and the second by external
opposition.
Aristotle has the benefit of hindsight. Had he lived 100 years earlier, when the Spartan
system functioned reasonably well, he might have been a good deal less skeptical. He does
say in a previous chapter that the Spartan model mixes, as a true politeia ought to, the
elements of monarchy (the kings), oligarchy (the Council of elders), and democracy (the
ephors and the assembly). Near the end of the Politics (VII.13), he grudgingly concedes
them one great advantage: Their superiority does not lie in the fact that they have a different
conception of what things are the greatest goods, but their conviction that these goods are to
be obtained by applying the virtue of courage. That, at the very least, is a useful lesson to
take from the Spartan model.
BOS NOTES
1

Role of the Spartan army
-
Keep the helots in check and put down rebellions
Defend Laconia and Messenia
Be constantly ready for warfare particularly with its strong enemy Argos to the
north
Maintain its leadership of the Peloponnesian League
Support oligarchies and defend Greek liberty
Maintain its hegemony of Greece after the Peloponnesian War
-
BOS NOTES
2
Spartan Army
- The whole of Spartan Society was aimed at producing a strong fighting force of
great warriors who were willing to die for Sparta
- Throughout the 6th century to the beginning of the 5th century, the army was
composed of all Spartan citizens. Towards the end of the 5 th century, nonSpartiates began to perform military duties
- Divisions of the army
o Mora – regiment
o Lochos – battalion
o Pentekostys – company
o Enomotia – platoon
- Another group was the Hippeis (knights) consisting of 300 men who’s main
purpose was to guard the kings
- Hoplite
o Was a heavily armed infantryman, named after the shield he carried – the
Hoplon
o Most hoplites dropped their shields if they fled the battlefield, however
Spartans saw this as a loss of honour.
 Bronze greaves for protection of the lower leg
o They also carried a long spear used for thrusting, and an iron sword
o They were trained to fight in formations, not as individuals
- The success of the army depended largely on the discipline of the troops in the
massed hoplite formation or Phalanx, which were usually 8 or more ranks deep.
The aim was to break the opposition’s line by deploying a group-and-shove
technique
- Role of Helot
o They were bag carriers
o The Lakedaimonian state used them as fighters
o Dressed in skin caps and wore animal skin
- Battle procedure
o While still in Sparta, the king sacrificed to Zeus Agetro to ensure that the army
had fire to cook with at all times
o The army was ordered to engage in athletic exercises while on campaign, and
this took place both in the morning and the evening.
- Marching songs were important because the army could advance in line and keep
in good timing. This was done so the ranks won’t be broken
- Began to use cavalry in 442 when the Lakedaimonians received a dangerous threat.
It was financed by the state
- Archery was despised as the right way to fight was with heavy infantrymen at close
quarters; any other from of warfare was cowardly
As a result of the Persian invasions of 490 and 480 BCE, the Greek citystates organized themselves into a defensive alliance called the "Delian
League." Athens was the strongest naval power among the Greek city-states
and it contributed the most men and ships to the naval effort. Sparta was the
strongest of the land military powers, and it played a dominant roll in the
organization of the army. The other city-states each contributed what they
could to the alliance, which meant in practice that those near the coast
provided ships and sailors while those from the interior provided soldiers,
food and other forms of wealth to support the navy.
Although the Greeks were outnumbered by the Persians in both campaigns,
they used their knowledge of geography and the winds to position their
forces and gain victories. They had no way of knowing after the defeat of the
second invasion that the Persians would not return, so they kept the Delian
League in existence. Skirmishes with remnants of the Persian forces
continued for another thirty years and seemed to confirm that they still posed
a danger.
As long as there was a Persian threat, the Delian League operated fairly
smoothly. But as time passed and the Persian raids subsided, other Greek
city-states resented the fact they were expected to make payments to resist
an invasion that never came. Resentment was particular strong among
interior states who believed that the Delian League became a device that
enabled Athens to tax everyone else. As resentment mounted, two factions
developed around Athens and Sparta, and their rival social and political
organizations developed into ideologies that influenced politics in every
city-state. Athens maintained only a part-time military organization, directed
by councils of its citizens, many of whom were traders and artisans. Sparta
maintained a full-time military with generals for leaders. The Spartan
population contained a higher percentage of free farmers and slaves.
The first war between Athens and Sparta, fought from 459- 445 BCE, ended
in a draw. The second war between 431-404 BCE became known as the
Peloponnesian War and was described in great detail by an Athenian general
named Thucydides. This second war involved all of the Greek city-states,
and ended with a Spartan victory and the total destruction of Athens. Sparta
emerged unchallenged as the most powerful Greek city-state by the
beginning of the fourth century BCE, but the other Greek city-states came to
resent the Spartans as much as they had resented the Athenians. In 371 BCE,
Thebes led a coalition of Greek city-states that conquered Sparta, and
fighting erupted periodically between the Greek city-states for the next forty
years.
Questions
1. How did the Spartan treatment of the defeated town of Mantinea
make their control of the conquered people secure?
2. Did Xenophon think that the Spartans were successful in Mantinea?
Explain your answer
BOS NOTES
3
ARMY

Spartans were known for their excellence in warfare and to be in the army ages
ranged from 18 to 60. Hoplites (heavily armed infantry men) had large concave
shields and a 2.5m spear. They were needed to fight the helots and the messenians
and they had excellence defensive tactics in the right conditions (eg plains). The
army was organised into age divisions and their massed formation was known as a
phalanx (group and shove technique). Men were expected so show courage,
discipline, obedience, respect, athleticism and devotion. Their role was to keep the
helots in line and protect the state.
Sparta – Military and the Culture of War
(1) Welch (p.184) briefly outlines how and when Spartans “became the
best”. List the significant points made here.
 More than any other aspect of culture, Spartans were known
for excellence in war.
 Their tactics, esp. in mastery of the hoplite phalanx were
legendary by the beginning of the 5th century.
 When the Athenians did overcome them at Sphacteria in 425
BC, they defeated them by using light-armed mercenaries to
harass them on uneven ground, not as hoplite against hoplite.
 It is hard to know when and how Sparta gained this reputation.
 Part of the answer must lie in the final victory over Messene in the mid 7 th
century BC.
 Once victorious, Sparta was able to divide the rich Messenian land into
extra allotments to be farmed by Helots.
 The newly acquired wealth of Messene allowed the privileged class in
Sparta to become a full-time army, unlike the farmer-soldiers of other
city-states in Greece.
 This wealth also allowed the state to institute a system of providing equal
weaponry of high quality for all the members of the phalanx.
 Cartledge uses this institution to explain what he thinks ‘Equals’ really
meant in Sparta: the fact all Spartans carried the same weapons.
 Pericles in Thucydides’ Funeral Oration overtly criticizes the aspect of
Spartan life (men eating together and acting under military law at all
times), but many admired it.
(2) Using HSC Online and the information below, sketch and label a diagram of
Spartan army Organisation.
 Organized according to age divisions specified in the agoge.
 Originally 5 divisions called ‘Morai’ drawn from 5 tribal regions or Obai
of Sparta.
 Later this was increased to six Morai.
 Sources differ on exactly how many men comprised a Mora (between
500-900).
 The Mora was divided into of basic unit composing of groups of eight
men.
 Another group within the Spartan army was composed of Hippies
(knights) – picked group of 30 men whose main purpose seems to have
been to guard the kings (references include: Thucydides V, 72.4 and
Herodotus VIII, 124.3). (Believed to have been chosen annually on the
basis of the age classes).
(3) Why did the Spartans lose the battle of Leuctra in 371 BC?
 The Thebans were alarmingly growing their strength in Greece.
 Jason of Thessaly became allies with Thebes.
 Most part of the Spartans was relying on size, battle experience, and a
reputation for winning.
 The Spartans were perhaps overconfident by their reputation and so
therefore foolish in the implementation of their attack.
 Their battle plans evolved into one simple plan – to show up with a large
enough forces, to begin fighting, and to wait. Inevitably, enemy soldiers
lost heart, their lines broke, and they ran.
 The Spartans expected to take casualties at the start of a battle, but early
losses were not enough to shake the confidence which came from
repeated victories.
 The Spartans were believed to have been around 11,000 against 6,000
Thebans.
 Thebes did not rely on the same military tactics as Sparta had come to
expect from her other components. And therefore the Thebans in this
battle followed a different tactic (due to change in society) and marched
against the Spartans (unchanged military tactics).
 The Spartans at the site of the Theban army got shocked but thought it
was just a wishful thinking from the Thebans.
 The Thebans had reorganized their whole society and government
structure, including changes in the military formation of the hoplite
phalanx. Conventionally Spartans set at 12 rows deep, the Thebans made
their lines 50 rows in depths.
 The Thebans were also convinced by their leader that they can defeat the
Spartans.
 An immediate tactical problem for the Spartans was the superiority of the
Thebans cavalry. Before the Spartans could reorganize their attack, the
Thebans had driven the Spartan cavalry to its own lines.
 In the moments of confusion of this failure, the Thebans ordered the
Sacred Band to advance. At this the Spartan officers were confused and
didn’t know what to reply. Was this the main attack or just a feint?
 The Spartans were savagely attacked and Spartans were falling numbers
as quickly as never seen before.
 The Thebans at this stage could hold their ground till they won the battle.
 The Spartan king and his 300 body guards were wiped out.
 The realization finally came to Spartans that to continue, with the same
battle plan, was to risk even more of their army. The Spartans felt
compelled to ask for a truce to bury their dead. Some 400 Spartans and
600 allied soldiers had been killed.
 After the Spartans had asked for truce, they publicly acknowledged a
battlefield reversal and sent a message to Sparta for extra backup soldiers.
 The Thebans sent for Jason and were in no hurry of finishing Spartans off.
 When there was no sign of any additional backup troops from Sparta and
they were faced by two armies, so the Spartans asked for a second truce
and by Jason persuasion to Thebans, they were allowed to go back to
Sparta.
(4) How can the loss be seen as a reflection on Sparta as a society?
 The Battle of Leuctra in 371 BC saw the Spartans lose their military
supremacy – the sort of supremacy evidenced at Thermopylae and
Plataea.





The loss at the battle of Leuctra represented through Spartan society by
demonstrating how the act of an unchanging or stable society can bring to
the downfall of its society as a well as its rise.
Also, the Spartans created all Greeks as their enemies and so therefore
they lost all their allies and friends.
In conclusion, we can say that the Spartan society brought her own end by
its government system.
The loss/defeat served as a signal to her enemies that Sparta was weak
and her administration was thrown out.
The unchanging and stable society of Spartans imprisoned the Spartans to
their own downfall in the end.
(5) Notes on Hoplite Warfare – (e.g. their dress, armor, philosophy, bonding, battle
drill/information/tactics, communications [and its problems] and etc).
 The classical hoplite phalanx (battle formation) was a massed formation
made up of ranks or lines (usually 8-12 deep) of heavy armed infantry
soldiers.
 They held a large round bronze shield (hoplon) on their left arm and a 2.5
metres thrusting spear in their right.
 The formation advanced with shields interlocked and pushed together
against a similarly armed opponent.
 Whoever could push hardest and most cohesively would break the
opponent’s line.
 Their culture of a warrior community also reinforced the spirit of
maintaining the line against all comers and standing together with totally
trusted companions.
 The Spartans relied upon hoplite armies.
 Their shields were made of wood in inside and bronze outside. It weighed
7 kg.
 The classical hoplite wore: a cloth tunic covered by a bronze breastplate; a
Distinctive red cape; a helmet made of thin bronze, often decorated with a
crest of horsehair – though it protected the face, the helmet had no ear
holes so the hoplite must have been virtually deaf on the battlefield (not
hearing orders or attacks?); bronze greaves for protection of the lower leg.
 Apart from the hoplon, the hoplite carried a long spear (almost 3 metres)
used for thrusting not throwing, and an iron sword.
 They bonded with each other with dancing or otherwise known as
marching tactics on the battlefield.
 The success of the Spartan army depended largely on the discipline of the
troops in the massed hoplite formation with the aim of breaking the
opponents’ line by developing a group-and-shove technique.
 Another group within the Spartan army was composed of Hippies
(knights) – picked group of 30 men whose main purpose seems to have
been to guard the kings (references include: Thucydides V, 72.4 and
Herodotus VIII, 124.3). (Believed to have been chosen annually on the
basis of the age classes).
 Welch – There were other contingents in the army besides these
professional warriors. The Perioikoi provided up to half the hoplites at
Plataea and there were many units of light-armed Helots. Sparta had no
cavalry until the 4th century BC.
(6) Evidence – Using “Sparta and Culture of War part 2 sheet + the Xenophon handout
and Plutarch’ Lives (Lycurgus) complete the following:
Source
Context/Reference to
Features of Spartan warfare
Persian Wars 490-479 BC
Herodotus
C7th BC – maybe around 2nd Messenian
Tyrtaeus
War
Plataea 480-479 BC
Simonides
c. 375 BC
Xenophon
Plutarch
Lycurgus
(7) Bury – The Messenian Wars – Section 2.
 Why did Messenia “excite the covetousness” of Sparta?
I.
 Outline what is known of the First Messenian War c. 736-716 BC.
 What caused the Second Messenian War? (650 BC)
 Explain Tyrtaeus’ role in the war and Sparta’s eventual success.
 What was the result of the war for Messenia? For Sparta? How did the
war affect Spartan warfare and politics?
(8) Bury – Section 3.
 What picture is given of early C7th Sparta? (prior to the 2 nd Messenian
War).
 As you have seen this war caused a re-organization of Spartan warfare.
How was a similar transformation seen in Spartan society?
ARCHIDAMUS
son of
Zeuxidamus
(King, 469427):

-In the Peloponnesian War (431-421), when his allies sought
to know hoe much money would be needed, and said that it
was only fair that he should set a limit on their contributions, he
said "War does not feed on fixed rations."

-When he saw the missile shot by a catapult (which had been
brought then for the first time from Sicily), he exclaimed,
"Heracles! The valor of men is lost!"