Download NOTES ON SINGER LECTURE 1

PHILOSOPHY 104 – FALL 2008 (TED STOLZE)
NOTES ON SINGER LECTURE 1
Singer begins by making a distinction between relative and absolute poverty.
He argues that there is a question today not just of global poverty but also incredible global wealth.
In his previous writings and in these lectures Singer is not offering a general theory of equality or justice—this would be a luxury, too; he is primarily
concerned with the practical question of how to reduce extreme poverty.
He revisits his earlier article “Famine, Affluence, and Morality”
The example of drowning child suggests too much sacrifice (although Singer thinks it is justifiable nonetheless)
But he now uses as well Peter Unger’s example of Bob’s Bugatti automobile parked on the railway—>helpful because it generates common intuition
that Bob acted wrongly
Singer doesn’t want his argument to rest on such intuitions, however, and in his earlier article he offered a formal argument:
Premise 1: Suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad.
Two possible versions of the second premise or AID PRINCIPLE:
Premise 2a (Strong Version): If it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable
moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it.
Premise 2b (Weak Version): If it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing something morally significant,
we ought, morally, to do it.
The drowning child thought experiment illustrates the weak version of the second principle (2b)
The earlier article has nothing to do specifically with famine relief, giving food, or humanitarian emergencies but concerns the reduction of extreme
poverty.
Singer leaves open exactly what we ought to do.
Singer’s argument was and is addressed to individuals—what obligations or duties we have to the poor, open question whether satisfied through
governments’ taxation policies and foreign aid.
A common objection: Singer is locked into a charity or philanthropy model.
But he allows that we are obligated not just to give money but also our time to changing unjust international economic and political order
(E.g., the three roles of Oxfam: emergency relief, development aid, advocacy work for fair trade)
Singer’s responds to libertarians (like the Canadian philosopher Jan Narveson, author of “We Don’t Owe Them a Thing”) by offering two strategies to
persuade them:
(a) We do have a duty to aid those to whom we have nothing wrong (Singer’s own preferred approach)
(b) We have indeed harmed the world’s poor
There are three ways to justify strategy (b):
(1) PAST HARM: Effects of colonialism/imperialism, e.g. establishing artificial borders that have made governance difficult.
(2) PRESENT HARM: Imperialism continues in the form of economic globalization, e.g., Thomas Pogge’s argument that we in the developed world
have profited from practices that harm the poor, e.g. the “resources curse,” according to which corporations deal with corrupt governments, in a way
analogous to dealing in stolen goods; this behavior provides an incentive to coups and civil wars.
(3) PRESENT HARM: damage caused by developed nations against developing nations that arises from climate change; “We broke it, so we should
fix it.” “We didn’t know” excuse is increasingly flimsy; a strong case for compensation based on climate change is parallel to the obligation to aid the
poor.