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Was Longstreet solely responsible for the Confederate defeat at
Gettysburg? If not, who was?
I am General James Longstreet, and I was born on January 8, 1821 and am graduate of
West Point. I was one of the prominent Confederate generals of the American Civil War, serving
in the Confederate Army from the commencement of the war, from Manassas to Appomattox. I
made great contributions to the Confederate victories at Fredericksburg, Second Battle of
Manassas, and Chickamauga. But perhaps my most controversial performance was at the Battle
of Gettysburg. I was accused of purposely delaying an assault due to my disagreement with
General Lee's orders. The delay caused the assault to fail, and my support of Grant and the
Republican Party after the war earned me the hate of many southerners. I was often solely
blamed for the Confederate defeat at Gettysburg.
My project seeks to answer if Longstreet was indeed the only general to blame for the
defeat at Gettysburg. As I was researching about Gettysburg, I found that many blamed
Longstreet solely for the defeat, and became interested in whether this was true or not. I knew
that he supported Grant after the war, so I was curious whether he was unfairly blamed by the
South. It is true Longstreet contributed toward the defeat with his reluctance to follow orders.
However, he is not the only general to blame. Many factors were responsible for the Confederate
defeat, including not only Longstreet's reluctance to follow orders, but also the political situation
at the time, and J.E.B. Stuart's late arrival and failure to scout Union positions.
Lee's decision to commit to the battle was one of the main reasons for the Confederate
defeat, not solely due Longstreet's disobedience. The Confederacy needed to end the war as soon
as possible, as the Union blockade was taking its toll on the southern economy. The southern
leaders knew that they could not fight a prolonged war with the Union, and needed to bring the
Union into negotiations soon. All the major southern victories had been in the South, and so the
Confederacy had to win a major battle in the North to put fear into the hearts of the Union
population, putting pressure on Lincoln, and bring European attention, and possibly aid, to the
Confederacy. Consequently, Lee was under increased pressure to go on the offensive, as even the
victory at Chancellorsville had been largely defensive. Once Lee's Army of Northern Virginia
advanced into Pennsylvania, he needed a quick victory. So when Lee engaged Union forces at
Gettysburg on July 1st, 1863, he committed all his available forces to battle. The Confederate
victories on the first day of battle (July 1st) only served to strengthen his resolve to fight out the
battle.
Once it became apparent after the first day of battle that this was going to be a major
engagement, Longstreet tried to convince Lee to flank the Union positions and secure a well
defensible position between Meade and the capital, which would make the Union forces attack
the entrenched Confederate army. Longstreet knew that attacking a heavily entrenched army in a
highly defensible location was impossible, due to his experience at Fredericksburg, where
entrenched Confederates held off 16 Union assaults. Now, Longstreet was on the offensive, and
the Union defenders had the high ground as well as the benefit of cover behind a stone fence. He
knew that it would be practically impossible to dislodge the Union defenders with the forces at
hand, and said so to Lee. However, Lee replied with, "If the enemy is there tomorrow, we must
attack him." Lee's decision was probably heavily influenced by the pressure for victory outlined
before, as a retreat, however strategically beneficial it may be, would lower morale and perhaps
mark another defeat for the Confederacy.
Most of Longstreet's post-war criticism stems from that Longstreet seems to have sulked
after Lee's refusal to pull back, and so allowed his disagreement with Lee to affect his
performance. Longstreet was responsible for an attack on the Union left flank on July 2nd, but he
seems to have deliberately taken his time to assemble his forces for the attack. However, this
delay was mainly caused by Longstreet waiting for one of his brigades to arrive. Lee had given
permission for Longstreet to wait, and Longstreet seems to have deliberately taken more time
than necessary to attack. All these delays let General Meade reinforce his left flank, which
repulsed the Confederate assault launched 5 hours after the initial order by Lee. Longstreet
probably did let his personal feelings affect his decisions, but he did not purposely delay for 4
hours because of it. The delay was caused by a combination of multitudes of factors, including,
simply, bad luck.
J.E.B. Stuart, a skilled Confederate cavalry general, also received heavy criticism for his
performance at Gettysburg. His cavalry acted as the "eyes and ears" of the Army of Northern
Virginia, but at the time of Gettysburg, he was raiding Union supplies, too far from Lee's
position to supply information. Thus, Lee had to fight blind, with no idea of the enemy strength
or positions, until Stuart's return on July 2nd. This put the Confederate forces at a extreme
disadvantage, but Stuart is not entirely to blame. Lee's orders to Stuart were vague and left open
for interpretation, as it was his commanding style. Stuart, unfortunately for the Confederacy,
misinterpreted his orders to mean that he should place more importance on raiding than
reconnaissance, and so the fault is neither solely due to Lee or Stuart.
The same reasoning applies on a larger scale to the Confederate defeat. No one person
can be blamed for the defeat, as it was the result of a combination of several factors, like the
increased pressure on Lee for a victory, the Confederate forces being left blind by the absence of
cavalry due to misinterpreted orders, and in Longstreet's case, the reluctance to follow orders
combined with bad luck.