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Philia and Agape:
Defining Love Archetypes for the Theology-and-Science Dialogue1
Thomas Jay Oord, Ph.D.
Professor of Theology and Philosophy, Northwest Nazarene University
41st Annual Wesleyan Theological Society Meeting
Nazarene Theological Seminary, Kansas City, Missouri
March 2-4, 2006
Organized research on love has reemerged at the turn of the 21st century.
Theologians, biologists, ethicists, sociologists, biblical scholars, psychologists, neurologists,
philosophers, medical care-givers, and others are becoming increasingly interested in what
theology and science might contribute to understanding and promoting love. I call this
emergent field of scholarship, the love-and-science symbiosis.i Exactly how scholars
involved in this budding field believe that love, science, and theology should relate and/or be
integrated varies greatly. What they share in common is the belief that issues of love are of
paramount importance and that the various scientific disciplines – whether natural, social, or
religious – must be brought to bear upon how best to understand love.
Segments of this paper are part of a book I am writing currently called, A Turn to Love: The
Love, Science, and Theology Symbiosis.
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Virtually all people act – and often talk – as if they have some inkling about love.
We speak about loving food, falling in love, loving God, feeling loved, and loving a type of
music. We say that love hurts, love waits, love stinks, and love means never having to say
we’re sorry. We use the word and its derivatives in a wide variety of ways. The fact that
people talk of love in such varied ways prompted Sigmund Freud to note that “‘love’ is
employed in language” in an “undifferentiated way.”ii Theologian Mildred Bangs Wynkoop
concurs, calling love an ambiguous, multifarious “weasel-word.”iii
Although we often talk about love, few of us spell out what we really mean by the
word “love.” It may be that resources for love research have been scanty and researchers
have generally been reluctant to pursue love studies in part because so few of us have given
time and energy to provide an adequate definition of love. Why focus one’s scholarship
upon or financially support something vague, bewildering, and unspecified?
Many who consider love abandon any attempt to provide a normative definition.
They rest content instead in simply trying to figure out what “love” means given the context,
or language game, in which it is used. But this practice leaves central assumptions about the
nature of love unacknowledged, which in turn leads to incoherence and further ambiguity.
Confusion reigns.
At present, a small but growing number of scholars offer hypotheses pertaining to
love as it relates to particular fields of inquiry. For instance, neuroscientists suggest that
specific brain regions must function if creatures are able to express love. Biologists explore
the social interaction of species and suggest hypotheses about the altruistic or egoistic
motivations and/or impetuses behind such interaction. Psychologists consider what kind of
person is capable of love. Religious scholars in the theistic traditions suggest hypotheses and
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creeds about divine action as these pertain to love. And a few philosophers classify various
types of love according to their motivations and/or objects.
If scholars and researchers fail to define love clearly, the present surge in the study of
love will fail to produce the positive results that it otherwise might. When we are not clear
about what love is, it becomes difficult to judge the value or contribution of any particular
investigation of love. It is difficult to compare the theories and research of one discipline
with another when widely divergent definitions of love are employed. In light of this, one of
my major concerns has been to provide and defend a definition of love adequate for those
doing research in the love-and-science symbiosis.
My own definition of love is this: To love is to act intentionally, in sympathetic
response to others (including God), to promote well-being.iv To say the same thing
differently, loving actions are influenced by the previous actions of others, oneself, and God,
and these actions are executed in the hope of encouraging flourishing.
In various books and essays, most scholarly but some popular, I have explained in
greater detail what this definition entails. Providing an adequate definition of love for the
love-and-science symbiosis is crucial. But a good definition does not go far enough. In this
essay, I want to move beyond that general definition of love to explore two love archetypes:
philia and agape.
Agape
By far, agape is the form of love to which the love-and-science literature most refers.
Philip Hefner, for instance, argues that “the theological elaboration of agape should not shy
away from identifying it with altruism,” which means that “the most pressing question that
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arises in conversation with the sciences is . . . Can we entertain the hypothesis that altruistic
love is rooted in the fundamental nature of reality, including the reality we call nature?”v
Those who use the word agape believe it entails meanings and connotations beyond
what the simple word “love” entails. Many adopt agape as a way to distinguish their notion
of love from romantic or popular understandings. Some adopt agape because for them it
entails special reference to divine action. Others use agape to distinguish some acts from
other acts that promote well-being.
We should credit theologian Anders Nygren for widespread contemporary references
to agape, although the word dates to antiquity. Nygren’s mid-twentieth-century book, Agape
and Eros, set off wide-ranging debate. That debate placed the word at the center of scholarly
attention. Nygren “so effectively posed issues about love,” Gene Outka claimed more than
thirty years ago, “that they have had a prominence in theology and ethics they never had
before. . . . Thus, whatever the reader may think of it, one may justifiably regard his work as
the beginning of the modern treatment of the subject.”vi More recently, Edward Collins
Vacek acknowledges that Nygren’s “insights are splendid, his mistakes are instructive, and
his views are still very much alive.”vii
Two features of Nygren’s understanding of agape greatly influence both scholarly
and popular understandings. The first feature is his complex theological and philosophical
hypotheses pertaining to agape. According to him, agape is rightly understood as

unconditioned, spontaneous, groundless, or unmotivated

indifferent to, but creative of, value

directed toward sinners

the sole initiator of creaturely fellowship with God
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in opposition to all that can be called self-love

sacrificial giving to others

and expressed only by God.viii
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Despite the influence of Nygren’s multifaceted understanding of agape, scholars have
criticized each facet.ix Some reject the argument that agape opposes all that can be called
self-love. Others reject Nygren’s claim that agape is the only genuinely Christian love
because it requires sacrificial giving. They argue that Christians can also love when
receiving gifts. Others note that Nygren’s argument that agape is exclusively divine love
implies some form of divine determinism or predestination. The emphasis upon agape as the
only appropriate Christian love, say other critics, neglects legitimate Christian philia and
eros.
Those familiar with the agape debate are typically aware of these and other
criticisms. Consequently, few people today fully endorse Nygren’s theological and
philosophical hypotheses.
Scholars and laity are typically less familiar with criticisms of the second feature of
Nygren’s concept of agape that influences love scholarship. That feature is his claim that
agape is the distinctively Christian understanding of love, because, Nygren believes, the
Bible proposes a relatively unique and uniform understanding of agape.
An examination of Christian scripture reveals that, contrary to Nygren’s argument,
biblical authors use the word agape to convey a wide variety and sometimes contradictory set
of meanings. For instance, biblical writers sometimes use agape to refer to ideal ethical
action and other times to refer to sinful action.x Sometimes biblical authors use agape to talk
about unconditional love and other times about conditioned, response-dependent love.xi We
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find biblical authors using the word agape to talk about self-sacrifice and others who use
agape to talk about non-self-sacrificial activity. The Apostle Paul – whom Nygren believes
most supports his theory that agape is opposed to all self-love – employs agape to talk about
appropriate self-love.xii
To complicate things even more, biblical scholars translate agape in ways that we
typically think that the word eros or philia would be translated. For instance, agape is
translated in ways that connote eros. It is rendered “to long for,” “to prefer,” “to desire,” “to
prize,” “to value,” and “to be fond of.”xiii Sometimes agape is used to convey meanings
traditionally assigned philia and, in many contexts, the two words are interchangeable.xiv
In sum, the New Testament is far from uniform in its understanding of agape.
Neither the narrow claim that agape possesses a single meaning in the Bible nor the broader
claim that one meaning of agape predominates in Christian Scripture find textual support.
To be true to Christian Scripture, we should not talk about the biblical understanding of
agape.
Despite the objections of Nygren’s critics and despite the diverse meanings of agape
found in Christian Scripture, many contemporary researchers – though not including most
biblical scholars -- consider this word to have privileged status or unique meaning. Those
aligned with the Christian tradition are especially prone to afford agape such high honor.
The meanings that scholars afford agape, however, vary greatly. Here are some
examples of this great variety:
Agape is . . .
to act “for the sake of the beloved.”xv (Edward Collins Vacek)
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“equal regard”xvi or “the attribution to everyone alike of an irreducible
worth and dignity.”xvii (Gene Outka)
self-sacrifice.xviii (Reinhold Niebuhr)
“God giving himself” or “divine bestowal.”xix (Irving Singer)
“the principle of benevolence, that is, of doing good.”xx (William Frankena)
“the overriding, unconditional claim of God’s utterly gracious yet utterly
demanding rule of righteous love.”xxi (John A. T. Robinson)
“x loves y independently of y’s merit, and any merit of y’s that plays a role
in x’s love is value that x attributes to or creates in y as a result of x’s
love.”xxii (Alan Soble)
“understanding, redeeming good will for all men.”xxiii (Martin Luther King,
Jr.)
“simple yet profound recognition of the worthiness of and goodness in
persons.”xxiv (Bernard Brady)
“self-giving” or “a person’s spending himself freely and carelessly for the
other person.”xxv (Paul Fiddes)
“unconditional willing of the good.”xxvi (Timothy Jackson)
“identification with the neighbor and meeting his needs.”xxvii (Daniel Day
Williams)
“self-less altruism.”xxviii (Mike Martin)
“letting-be.”xxix (John Macquarrie)
“ordinary human affection and compassion.”xxx (Don Cupitt)
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“[a representation of] the divine extravagance of giving that does not take
the self into account.”xxxi (Colin Grant)
The foregoing illustrates well Gene Outka’s observation that “the meaning ascribed in
the literature to love, in general, and to agape, in particular, is often characterized by both
variance and ambiguity.”xxxii Robert Adams notes the diverse understandings of agape that
have been offered, and concludes that “agape is a blank canvas on which one can paint
whatever ideal of Christian love one favors.”xxxiii I suggest that this variance and ambiguity
has to do with the theological, ethical, anthropological, scientific, and metaphysical
commitments of those who use agape to identify something unique about this form of love
compared with others.
So is the word agape redeemable? Should we toss it in the garbage pile of over-used,
worn-out, and ambiguous words?
Given that Scripture offers no uniform meaning for agape and scholars of love offer
divergent definitions, one might be tempted to pass over agape altogether in an attempt to
step beyond the variance and discord. This is the same temptation to which many have
succumbed, however, when avoiding the even more general word, “love.” Yet love remains
a uniquely powerful word in religious, scientific, and secular settings. Agape also carries
significant rhetorical weight. It seems unwise to squander the vast “cash value” the word has
accumulated.
Those who employ the word agape – and I count myself among them – seem
obligated to be careful about their use of the word. They should (1) define clearly what they
mean by agape and then employ that meaning consistently, (2) show how this meaning
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differs from the meanings of other love forms (e.g., philia, eros) and, perhaps most
importantly, (3) show how their definition of agape fits with and does not contradict their
definition of love in general.
I find that all the definitions of agape listed above have merit, but, for one reason or
another, few are finally adequate. The main reason for this inadequacy pertains to the three
obligations I noted above.
Some definitions of agape are inadequate, because they make it difficult to see how
other versions of love are forms of love at all. For instance, some equate agape with doing
what is good or promoting the good. Equating agape with acting for the good implies that
the other forms of love (philia, eros, etc.) are not actions that promote good. In which case,
these other words aren’t forms of love – at least not love as I define it and as usually
understood.xxxiv
Some definitions of agape are inadequate, because they equate this love form with
self-sacrifice or altruism. In fact, this is the most common use of agape in the love-andscience research. There are a host of problems with this equivalence, however.
First, if two persons tried always to act self-sacrificially toward one another, neither
could act self-sacrificially. “In a completely self-sacrificing community,” argues Vacek, “we
would want to give to and not receive from persons who would want to give to and nor
receive from us.”xxxv Neil Cooper illustrates this problem by imagining two altruists in the
desert who find a cup of water. The two pass the cup back and forth, each insisting that the
other drink first, until the water evaporates and both die of thirst.xxxvi Just as we want others
to satisfy themselves by receiving our gifts, so we ought to receive gifts given us. If the
satisfaction that comes from such give-and-take relations is thwarted because all parties
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insisting on acting altruistically, Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s retort seems appropriate: “too much
altruism is a bore.”xxxvii Love sometimes shuns altruism.
Second, equating agape with self-sacrifice or altruism denies what seems obvious:
sometimes we must not sacrifice ourselves so that in the long run we can promote well-being.
Love sometimes requires self-realization – a form of self-affirmation. Feminists in many
disciplines have brought to our awareness the fact that love sometimes demands that the
individual avoid self-sacrifice and act instead in self-authenticating ways – for the good of
the individual and the whole.xxxviii Becoming a doormat on which others can walk, for
instance, is negative enabling that fails to promote well-being.
Third, the idea that a loving person always engages in self-sacrifice may actually keep
those at the margins or bottom of society from experiencing justice. If the poor and
oppressed were always to act self-sacrificially, they would likely remain in their
impoverished and unjust state of existence. To think that all people, even the poorest of the
poor, ought always to act self-sacrificially is to fall victim to what Arthur McGill calls “the
illusion of perpetual affluence.”xxxix
If agape is a form of love, it must be an action that promotes rather than prevents the
attainment of well-being. While I believe that self-sacrificial, self-subordinating, or altruistic
action can be expressions of love, these actions can also be actions that generate overall illbeing. Agape, if it is to be understood as a form of love, does not generate overall ill-being.
Still others place a great deal of emphasis upon agape as having some unique
identification with God. Some argue that only God can express agape. Others contend that
agape is the recognition that God gives love to the world.
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Both arguments are finally unconvincing. The first places into jeopardy the biblical
claim that God wants us to love God, others, and ourselves. How can we love with agape if
only God can express this type of love? The second argument – that agape should be defined
as God’s bestowal of love upon creatures – suggests that God does not give or express other
forms of love (philia, eros, etc.). According to the Christian Scriptures, however, God both
inspires creatures to love with philia and eros and expresses these forms of love for creation.
(I will expand upon the claim that God expresses multiple forms of love [what I call “fullorbed love”] in the final chapter.)
While many of the agape definitions listed fail to meet the three obligations necessary
for an adequate definition of agape, I intend for my own definition to meet these demands.
Before looking at it, however, I should note that I do not claim that my definition is the only
one that could possibly be adequate. I should also note that although I believe my definition
fits well with some ways biblical authors employ agape and that my definition reflects
important themes in Christian ethics, I do not claim it is the only biblical or only Christian
understanding of agape.
Having made these qualifications, I offer my definition. I define agape as acting
intentionally, in sympathetic response to others (including God), to promote well-being when
responding to acts, persons, or structures of existence that promote ill-being. Or, to put it
more concisely . . . agape is intentional sympathetic response to promote well-being
when confronted by that which generates ill-being.
As I define it, agape repays evil with good, to use a biblical phrase. When we love
our enemies and pray for those who persecute us, we express agape. In an effort to promote
well-being, agape often turns the other cheek. Agape acts to promote well-being in spite of
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the ill-being or evil – whether directed toward the lover, the lover’s community, or society at
large – that it confronts.
Acts that rightly bear the label agape range from the exceptional to the mundane.
Many who risked their lives to save Jews during the Nazi Holocaust expressed agape. They
responded intentionally to promote well-being when confronted with the ill-being generated
by Nazi ideals, structures, and activity. A mother who puts a band-aid on her child’s papercut also responds intentionally to promote well-being when confronted by unnecessary pain.
The teacher who refuses to take revenge when a student unjustly accuses her is also likely
expressing agape.
As soon as we offer concrete examples, of course, we wonder about the intentions of
the ones deemed loving. These questions are legitimate, because motives matter. Instead of
responding intentionally to promote well-being, perhaps the rescuers of Jews were motivated
more by reputational gain or wished to avoid divine wrath. Perhaps the mother responding
with band-aid merely wants her child healthy so that their genetic lineage will continue.
Perhaps the teacher refuses to retaliate because she relishes abuse.
While these are all possible motives, they may not be plausible. We typically judge
on a case-by-case basis, given the information we have, what a person’s motives might be.
Unless one claims that people never act to promote well-being when confronted by ill-being,
it seems plausible that at least some if not most rescuers, mothers, and teachers in the
situations noted above express agape. Those acting in these ways often have a good idea
what their motives are, and onlookers can come to plausible judgments given a reasonable
amount of observational data.
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I believe that my definition fulfills the obligations necessary for an adequate notion of
agape. First, I offer what I hope is a reasonably clear definition. There are surely additional
questions to resolve (e.g., What motivates one to express agape? What role, if any, does God
play in expressing or inspiring agape? What kind of person expresses agape?). But it should
be reasonably clear that I believe agape promotes well-being in response to that which
generates ill-being.
Second, what makes agape a unique form or version of love is its response to illbeing. This will become clearer as I examine and define philia and eros. These other forms
of love are not responses to ill-being; they are intentional responses to something else.
I meet the third obligation by defining agape as one form of love. Agape is one way
that we might respond intentionally to others (including God) to promote overall well-being.
Eros and philia, as I will define them, are other ways in which we might respond
intentionally to promote well-being.
Philia
While classic understandings of eros emerge from Plato, Aristotle greatly shapes how
we think of philia. One rarely finds the word philia in the love-and-science literature,
however, although its connotation is often present.xl
This love form is typically thought of in terms of friendship. Friendship “is very
necessary for living,” argues Aristotle, and “no one would choose to live without friends.”xli
He follows this bold statement with relatively complex explanations of how friendship
emerges, is sustained, and with whom one can be a friend.
Philosophers and theologians since Aristotle often speak of “special” relationships as
a way of accounting for philia.xlii These special relationships are ones in which those
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involved are attached in some unique way and express some degree of cooperation. By
speaking of special relationships, scholars can analyze a wide array of personal bonds
between those of differing age, gender, intellect, socio-economic status, and even species.
Edward Vacek is a leader in the contemporary emphasis upon the priority of philia.
He argues that philia is the foundation and goal of the good life.xliii “In philia,” says Vacek,
“persons give themselves over to the relationship . . . and thereby create a good that they
could not separately achieve.”xliv
We would do well to identify the special relationships of philia with the categories of
mutuality, reciprocity, and cooperation. Philia understood in this broader sense is evident in
varying levels or degrees. Those who cooperate for long periods of time to promote wellbeing express richer forms of philia. Understanding philia as having primarily to do with
mutuality, reciprocity or cooperation also proves beneficial for understanding this form of
love as important for love-and-science research.
Mutuality, reciprocity, and cooperation are not always entered into with the purpose
of promoting well-being. We can cooperate with or befriend others intending to wreak havoc
and cause evil. Thieves, thugs, and murderers can join together to do dastardly deeds.
Coalition and solidarity are not good in themselves. If philia is truly a form of love, it must
be expressed with the purpose of promoting well-being.
With this brief introduction, I turn to offer what seems an adequate definition of
philia. I define philia as acting intentionally, in sympathetic response to others (including
God), to promote overall well-being when working to establish deeper levels of mutuality,
reciprocity, or cooperation. Or to put it more concisely, philia is intentional sympathetic
response to promote well-being when cooperating with others.
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In the community of philia, says Linell E. Cady, persons “share a commitment to the
continued well-being of the relational life uniting them.”xlv Philia expressions secure a level
of well-being that individuals could never secure acting alone. This cooperative work to
promote well-being occurs often in both human and nonhuman communities. And the nature
of one’s relations with others -- especially within specific communities -- greatly influences
what kind of persons love and what specific acts of love are required.
The emotional or affective tone of philia expressions vary. Philia can involve warm
and tender feelings for the one or ones with whom we cooperate. But philia does not require
such warmth and tenderness. Sometimes a deep sense of collegiality emerges amongst those
who express philia when working cooperatively. But philia does not require great depth.
While greater warmth, tenderness, and depth may be important goals in a long-lasting
relationship of cooperation, philia can be expressed when accompanied by much milder
feelings.
I aim for my definition of philia to meet the obligations of an adequate definition.
What makes philia an act of love is its intentional response to promote well-being. What
distinguishes it from the other forms of love is its cooperative aspect. While agape and eros
may benefit from cooperation from others, these forms of love do not require cooperation.
Philia is a form of love that expresses one’s intentional response by cooperating with others
to promote what is good.
Of course, philia, agape, eros, and other forms of love are often mixed together in a
single expression of love. Our motives are often mixed and the relations we have with others
are complex. An agape response when confronted by evil, for instance, often also entails
cooperating with others (philia) to promote well-being in response to evil. People might
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work cooperatively to combat prostitution and the forces the support it, for instance, and
thereby express both agape and philia. In an interrelated universe, the forms of love are
often mixed in our intentional responses to promote well-being.
Admitting that more than one form of love might be present in a work of love does
not preclude the possibility that one form may predominate. It may be that sometimes the
overwhelming sense of solidarity to cooperate to make the world a better place (philia) may
predominate over the agape form of love also present. response to promote well-being, one
form may and often does predominate.
In fact, I find it difficult to imagine an enduring and abundant life that did not include
the three forms of love: agape, eros, and philia. Edward Vacek put it this way, “human life
typically includes all three loves in rhythmically occurring ways.”xlvi
Acknowledging that more than one of these love forms can be present in the
promotion of well-being allows one to overcome some paradoxes that arise in the scientific
and religious discussions of egoism and altruism. For instance, affirming the value of oneself
or one’s feeling of satisfaction when doing good can accompany one’s primary intention to
promote well-being in others at some cost to oneself. And understanding that the loves can
be mixed overcomes the paradox of altruistic psychological hedonism.
Conclusion
Allow me to bring this paper to a swift conclusion. I have suggested that organized
research on love might be expanded and deepened if love, in general, and agape and philia,
in particular, are defined clearly and adequately in light of research in theology and science.
My hope is that the definitions I have offered and defended in this paper will prove adequate
for those doing research in the love, theology, and science symbiosis.
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Thomas Jay Oord, Science of Love: The Wisdom of Well-Being (Philadelphia: Templeton
Foundation, 2004).
ii
Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents (New York: Random House, 1994), 49.
iii
Mildred Bangs Wynkoop, A Theology of Love: The Dynamic of Wesleyanism (Kansas City:
Beacon Hill, 1972), 9.
iv
Stephen Post provides this definition: “The essence of love is to affectively affirm as well
as to unselfishly delight in the well-being of others, and to engage in acts of care and service
on their behalf; unlimited love extends this love to all others without exception, in an
enduring and constant way. Widely considered the highest form of virtue, unlimited love is
often deemed a Creative Presence underlying and integral to all of reality: participation in
unlimited love constitutes the fullest experience of spirituality. Unlimited love may result in
new relationships, and deep community may emerge around helping behavior, but this is
secondary. Even if connections and relations do not emerge, love endures” (Unlimited Love,
vii.). Post’s definition provides helpful language and amplification. My own definition is
more concise – although it shares many similarities with Post’s.
v
Philip Hefner, The Human Factor: Evolution, Culture, and Religion (Minneapolis: Fortress,
1993), 208-209.
vi
Gene Outka, Agape: An Ethical Analysis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), 1.
vii
Edward Collins Vacek, Love, Human and Divine: The Heart of Christian Ethics
(Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1994), 159.
viii
Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros, tr. Philip S. Watson (New York: Harper and Row, 1957
[1930]), 27-240.
ix
Among the many scholars who disagree with aspects of Nygren’s thesis are Paul Avis, Eros
and the Sacred (Harrisburg, Penn.: Morehouse, 1990), ch. 15; John Burnaby, Amor Dei
(London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1938), 18 and elsewhere, and “Amor in St. Augustine” in
The Philosophy and Theology of Anders Nygren, ed. Charles W. Kegley (Carbondale, Ill.:
Southern Illinois University Press, 1970), 174-186; Martin C. D’Arcy, The Mind and Heart
of Love; Carter Heyward, “Lamenting the Loss of Love,” Journal of Religious Ethics 24.1
(Spring 1996): 23-28; Douglas N. Morgan, Love: Plato, The Bible, and Freud (Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964), ch. 2; Stephen G. Post, A Theory of Agape: On the
Meaning of Christian Love (Lewisburg, Va.: Bucknell University Press, 1990), ch. 3; John
M. Rist, “Some Interpretations of Agape and Eros,” in The Philosophy and Theology of
Anders Nygren, 156-73; George F. Thomas, Christian Ethics and Moral Philosophy (New
York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1955), 54; Paul Tillich, Love, Power and Justice, ch. 2;
Vacek, Love, Human and Divine, ch. 5, and “Love, Christian and Diverse,” Journal of
Religious Ethics 24.1 (Spring 1996): 29-41; Victor Warnach, “Agape in the New Testament,”
in The Philosophy and Theology of Anders Nygren, 143-155; Daniel Day Williams, The
Spirit and the Forms of Love (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), ch. 4.
x
Although Nygren clams that Paul “knows nothing of any distinction between true and false
agape”(Agape and Eros, 156), Paul does speak of false agape when he speaks of Demas,
who deserted him because he was “in love (agape) with this present world” (2 Tim. 4:10).
Paul implies that false agape is possible when he twice urges his readers to have sincere
agape (Rm. 12:9; 2 Cor. 8:8) and also urges them to express genuine agape (2 Cor. 6:6).
i
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Writings attributed to other authors and biblical figures also refer to inappropriate agape.
Examples include love of darkness (Jn. 3:19), prestige (Lk. 11:43; Jn. 12:43), wages of
unrighteousness (II Pt. 2:15), and the world (1 Jn. 2:15; 2 Tm. 4:10).
xi
Nygren suggests that at least Paul reserves use agape to talk about unconditional love when
he says “no words are too strong for [Paul] to use in order to press home [agape’s]
spontaneous and unmotivated character” (Agape and Eros, 155). However, Paul’s
admonition to give cheerfully grows out of his reasoning that God agape loves those who do
so (2 Cor. 9:7). In other words, Paul claims that God’s love is motivated by the activity of
humans, and this is not unconditional love.
xii
Nygren says that a feature “especially characteristic of the Pauline idea of agape” is its
“opposition to all that can be called “self-love” (Agape and Eros, 130). He then quotes Paul’s
words in 1 Corinthians 13:5: “Love seeketh not its own.” Paul, however, is not opposed to a
healthy self-love and even uses the word “agape” to speak of it. He commands those in
Ephesus, for instance, to agape their own bodies (Eph. 5:28, 33).
xiii
See the use of agape in the following biblical passages: 2 Tm. 4:8, 2 Tm. 4:10, Jn. 3:19
and 12:43, Hb. 1:9, Rv. 12:11, and Lk. 7:5.
xiv
On this, see James Moffatt, Love in the New Testament (London: Hodder and Stoughton,
1929), 51-56.
xv
Vacek, 157. Vacek writes elsewhere, “Agape is directed to the beloved’s full value for the
beloved’s own sake” (179).
xvi
Gene Outka, Agape, 9-12.
xvii
Ibid., 260.
xviii
Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2 (New York: Charles Scribner’s
Sons, 1964), 82.
xix
Irving Singer, The Nature of Love, vol. 1, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1987), 269.
xx
William K. Frankena, Ethics (Pearson Education, 1988), 44.
xxi
John A. T. Robinson, Christian Morals Today (London: SCM, 1964), 12.
xxii
Alan Soble, Agape, Eros, and Philia: Readings in the Philosophy of Love (New York:
Paragon, 1989), xxiv.
xxiii
Martin Luther King, Jr., A Testament of Hope: The Essential Writings of Martin Luther
King, Jr., ed. James Washington (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1986), 19.
xxiv
Bernard V. Brady, Christian Love: How Christians Through the Ages Have Understood
Love (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2003), 268.
xxv
Paul Fiddes, The Creative Suffering of God (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 170.
xxvi
Timothy Jackson, Love Disconsoled: Meditations on Christian Charity (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 15.
xxvii
Williams, The Spirit and Forms of Love, 262.
xxviii
Mike W. Martin, Love’s Virtues (Lawrence, Ks.: University Press of Kansas, 1996), 14.
xxix
John Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology, 2nd ed. (New York: Scribner’s, 1977),
349.
xxx
Don Cupitt, The New Christian Ethics (London: SCM Press, 1988), 57.
xxxi
Colin Grant, Altruism and Christian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2001), 188.
xxxii
Outka, Agape, 257-58.
Oord: Philia and Agape
19
Robert Merrihew Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1999), 136.
xxxiv
Of course, one might respond to my criticism and say that love is best defined simply as
acting (proper/improper tradition) or being in relation (relational tradition). What makes
agape unique, they might contend, is that agape promotes what is good. But as I argued in
the previous chapter, this use of “love” is counter-intuitive and contributes to the general
confusion pertaining to the meaning of love. When we say that Mother Theresa expressed
love, we don’t typically mean that she simply acted or was related to someone else. We
mean that what she did was good; her actions promoted well-being. And to say that only
agape promotes good is to disparage other forms of action – like friendship (philia) – that
also promote good.
xxxv
Vacek, Love, Human and Divine, 184.
xxxvi
Neil Cooper, The Diversity of Moral Thinking (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 274.
xxxvii
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison (London: Collins, 1953), 96.
xxxviii
One of the first to make this claim was Valerie Saiving (“The Human Situation: A
Feminine View,” Journal of Religion 40 [1960]: 100-12).
xxxix
Arthur C. McGill, Death and Life: An American Theology (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987),
89.
xl
An exception to this is my discussion of philia in chapter five of my book, Science of Love:
The Wisdom of Well-Being (Philadelphia: Templeton Press, 2004).
xli
Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, Christopher Rowe, trans. (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2002) 1155a.
xlii
For an especially powerful argument for the role of philia in Christianity, see Gilbert
Meilaender, Friendship (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981).
xliii
Vacek, Love, Human and Divine, 280.
xliv
Ibid., 288.
xlv
Linell E. Cady, “Relational Love,” Embodied Love, Paul Cooey, et. al., ed. (San Francisco:
Harper and Row, 1987), 141.
xlvi
Vacek, Love, Human and Divine, 310.
xxxiii