Download Sila — Ethical Behaviour — the Second Wealth

Sila — Ethical Behaviour — the Second Wealth
Assuming that most of you will be pretty familiar with the basic ethical precepts, this handout will
look at sila from a perspective reflecting developments in Buddhism over the last century or so.
Our discussions around ethics, though, will probably be focused on the third and fourth wealths,
i.e. hiri and ottapa.
A suggestion has been made to distinguish four distinctive styles of Buddhist ethics: discipline,
virtue, altruism, and engagement. These styles should be seen as overlapping and cumulative
emphases rather than as different types of ethics. One may even regard each later ‘style’ as a reformulation of the former after that had become narrowed down and codified to such an extent
that its original spirit was in danger of getting lost.
The ethics of discipline entails the avoidance of conduct that arises from the mental impurities of
hatred, greed, and delusion. Its focus is the purification of the individual, although the effects of
this are likely to be beneficial to society as a whole. This approach finds its classic expression in
the lists of five or ten precepts in their negative forms — as precepts of training in uprightness by
way of abandoning the unskilful. Along with the ti-sarana or three refuge formula (reverence
to the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Sangha), the pledge to observe the silas is perhaps the most
universal expression of Buddhist identity.
The first level of sila concerns the avoidance of two types of faults: natural faults that directly
harm others, such as killing; and conventional faults that abrogate ritual obligations, such as a
monk’s eating after the noon hour. While both failures of discipline engender negative karma for
the practitioner, the Tibetan lam rim tradition defines morality as the resolution to abstain from
harming others, and thus takes the commission of natural faults more seriously.
The ethics of virtue is less concerned with self-purification, and more with the cultivation of an
internally established ethical framework around which Buddhist practitioners might structure their
life. This view tends to include the cultivation of the precepts in their positive forms — the kusala
dhammas — as well as the brahma viharas (metta, karuna, mudita, upekkha) or the paramitas
(dana, shila, virya, kshanti, dhyana, prajna). All these are forms of personal cultivation that do not
necessarily entail specific behaviors in specific situations. Rather, they point to a quality of living
that is inherently valuable, free from suffering, and conducive to good deeds.
Unlike discipline and virtue, an ethics of altruism dispels the misrepresentation of Buddhism as
promoting self-concern. Rather, it is resolutely oriented toward others: nursing the sick, leading
the blind, helping the down-trodden, feeding those who are hungry, and providing lodging for
those who are needy. An ethics of this kind will not only develop a healthy concern for others,
but actually help them in practice. — Altruism does not entail self-denial or ignore selfcultivation, however. Rather, it is a fulfillment of our capacity for generosity, morality, courage,
patience, mindfulness, and wisdom — the virtues of the bodhisattva path. Here service becomes,
not the by-product of self-cultivation, but the means to it, the very manifestation of buddhahood.
— The first of the Four Great Bodhisattva Vows introduced by the founder of the Tiantai school
Zhiyi is the grandiose proclamation, “Beings are infinite in number. I vow to save them all! ”
building a comm unity of inquiry: www.DharmapalaCollege.org
It would certainly be wrong to argue that the first three styles of Buddhist morality are not
productive of a more peaceful and prosperous society, as well as happier individuals. In the light
of the widespread conditions of human misery in our world today, though, one may wonder
whether rule-based morality, mental cultivation, individualized good works, and generalized vows
to save all beings will be enough to prevent the spread of political tyranny, economic injustice,
and environmental degradation. Such a question itself seems to reflect a critical shift in thought
and practice that distinguishes Buddhist leaders and communities today from their predecessors in
traditional Asian societies. Not surprisingly, the ethics of engagement seems to have been
emerging since the 19th century and it can be seen as a by-product of dialogue between Buddhism
and Western culture over the past one hundred years. As the fourth style of Buddhist ethics, it
differs not only from the ethics of discipline and virtue, but likewise from the path of altruism
because it is directed to the creation of new social institutions and relationships.
A good illustration of this shift may be found in the contrast between the religious and political
attitudes of Mahatma Gandhi and B. R. Ambedkar, the Indian Untouchable leader in the 1930s
and 1940s. Gandhi advocated compassion and improved social services for India’s Untouchables,
while Ambedkar demanded the abolition of the caste system itself. As a devout Hindu, Gandhi
believed that each person is limited or empowered by the cumulative effects of his or her own
karma, and thus cannot be rescued by outside forces. In this respect, Gandhi separated his political
philosophy from his morality: India must struggle toward independence from the British, while
caste was seen as a cosmic law that could not be abrogated by human intervention. In this sense,
Gandhi’s Hindu worldview was compatible with an ethics of altruism as described above, while
his ascetic practices, such as fasting and celibacy were reminiscent of the Buddhist ethics of
discipline and virtue. While his compassion encompassed the Harijans (‘God’s Children,’ his
name for Untouchables) along with the members of other castes, Gandhi firmly rejected the idea
that religious identities, beliefs, practices, and morality itself were negotiable or subject to reform.
Ambedkar saw karma from the other side. If the collective, institutionalized expression of greed,
hatred, and delusion was India’s legacy of colonialism, bureaucratic corruption, and the religiously
based caste system, then all of these structures, fashioned by human hearts and minds, could be
repaired, remodeled, or removed. The key was the notion of collective action — both in the
genesis of human suffering, and in its relief. Ambedkar believed that democratic bodies, courts,
and schools were the proper tools of informed, engaged citizens. Such citizens speak out on
community issues, vote their conscience, file legal suits if necessary, and, as a last resort, agitate
for social change in the streets. He therefore sought to build a new India on humanistic principles
(embodied in the world’ s longest democratic Constitution, which he drafted).
There were indeed other harbingers of socially engaged practice in the annals of Buddhist history.
We can think of the public works projects of the Indian king Ashoka in the third century BCE, and
the free dispensaries, hospitals, bridge building, and tree planting campaigns of Buddhist temples
in the Sui and Tang periods in China. But all these are exceptions to the practices of individual
discipline, virtue, and altruism advocated in the tradition, rather than representatives of a
mainstream understanding of ethics.
(This handout includes extracts from Christopher Queen, Introduction: A New Buddhism; in
Journal of Buddhist Ethics 7 (2000), freeload: http://www.buddhistethics.org/7/queen001.html)
building a comm unity of inquiry: www.DharmapalaCollege.org