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Warfare and Society in Ancient Greece
Lecture 15
The emerging powers of the fourth century II
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i. The battle of Mantinaea and the new role of hoplites
Plutarch, Life of Pelopidas XXIII
In the battle, while Epaminondas was drawing his phalanx obliquely towards the left, in order that
the right wing of the Spartans might be separated as far as possible from the rest of the Greeks, and
that he might thrust back Cleombrotus by a fierce charge in column with all his men-at-arms, the
enemy understood what he was doing and began to change their formation; 2 they were opening up
their right wing and making an encircling movement, in order to surround Epaminondas and envelop
him with their numbers. But at this point Pelopidas darted forth from his position, and with his band
of three hundred on the run, came up before Cleombrotus had either extended his wing or brought it
back again into its old position and closed up his line of battle, so that the Lacedaemonians were not
standing in array, but moving confusedly about among each other when his onset reached them.
3 And yet the Spartans, who were of all men past masters in the art of war, trained and accustomed
themselves to nothing so much as not to straggle or get into confusion upon a change of formation,
but to take anyone without exception as neighbour in rank or in file, and wheresoever danger actually
threatened, to seize that point and form in close array and fight as well as ever. At this time, however,
since the phalanx of Epaminondas bore down upon them alone and neglected the rest of their force,
and since Pelopidas engaged them with incredible speed and boldness, their courage and skill were so
confounded that there was a flight and slaughter of the Spartans such as had never before been seen.
Therefore, although Epaminondas was boeotarch, Pelopidas, who was not boeotarch, and
commanded only a small portion of the whole force, won as much glory for the success of that
victory as he did.
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ii. Combining effort of cavalry and infantry: Sardis 395
Xenophon, Hellenica III.4.21-24
Agesilaus, however, did not belie his words, but, even as he had announced, marched straight to the
neighbourhood of Sardis. For three days he proceeded through a country bare of enemies, and had
provisions for the army in abundance, but on the fourth day the cavalry of the enemy came up. [22]
And their commander told the leader of the baggage-train to cross the Pactolus river and encamp,
while the horsemen themselves, getting sight of the camp-followers on the side of the Greeks,
scattered for plunder, killed a large number of them. On perceiving this Agesilaus ordered his
horsemen to go to their aid. And the Persians, in their turn, when they saw this movement, gathered
together and formed an opposing line, with very many companies of their horsemen. [23] Then
Agesilaus, aware that the infantry of the enemy was not yet at hand, while on his side none of the
arms which had been made ready was missing, deemed it a fit time to join battle if he could.
Therefore, after offering sacrifice, he at once led his phalanx against the opposing line of horsemen,
ordering the first ten year-classes of the hoplites to run to close quarters with the enemy, and bidding
the peltasts lead the way at a double-quick. He also sent word to his cavalry to attack, in the
assurance that he and the whole army were following them. [24] Now the Persians met the attack of
the cavalry; but when the whole formidable array together was upon them, they gave way, and some
of them were struck down at once in crossing the river, while the rest fled on. And the Greeks,
pursuing them, captured their camp as well. Then the peltasts, as was natural, betook themselves to
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plundering; but Agesilaus enclosed all alike, friends as well as foes, within the circle of his camp. And
not only was much other property captured, which fetched more than seventy talents, but it was at
this time that the camels also were captured which Agesilaus brought back with him to Greece.
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iii. Light armed troops and mercenaries: Lechaeum
Xenophon, Hellenica IV.5.11-18
Now it was in the following way that the disaster to the regiment happened. The Amyclaeans
invariably go back home to the festival of the Hyacinthia for the paean to Apollo, whether they
chance to be on a campaign or away from home for any other reason. Accordingly Agesilaus had on
this occasion left behind at Lechaeum all the Amyclaeans in the army. Now the polemarch in
command of the garrison there detailed the garrison troops of the allies to guard the wall, and
himself with the regiment of hoplites and the regiment of horsemen conducted the Amyclaeans
along past the city of the Corinthians. [12] And when they were distant from Sicyon about twenty or
thirty stadia, the polemarch with the hoplites, who were about six hundred in number, set out to
return to Lechaeum, and ordered the commander of horse to follow after him with the regiment of
horsemen after they had escorted the Amyclaeans as far as they themselves directed. Now they were
by no means unaware that there were many peltasts and many hoplites in Corinth; but on account of
their previous successes they contemptuously thought that no one would attack them. [13] But those
in the city of the Corinthians, both Callias, the son of Hipponicus, commander of the Athenian
hoplites, and Iphicrates, leader of the peltasts, when they descried the Lacedaemonians and saw that
they were not only few in number, but also unaccompanied by either peltasts or cavalry, thought that
it was safe to attack them with their force of peltasts. For if they should proceed along the road, they
could be attacked with javelins on their unprotected side and destroyed; and if they should undertake
to pursue, they with their peltasts, the nimblest of all troops, could easily escape the hoplites. [14]
Having come to this conclusion, they led forth their troops. And Callias formed his hoplites in line of
battle not far from the city, while Iphicrates with his peltasts attacked the Lacedaemonian regiment.
Now when the Lacedaemonians were being attacked with javelins, and several men had been
wounded and several others slain, they directed the shield-bearers to take up these wounded men and
carry them back to Lechaeum; and these were the only men in the regiment who were really saved.
Then the polemarch ordered the first ten year-classes to drive off their assailants. [15] But when they
pursued, they caught no one, since they were hoplites pursuing peltasts at the distance of a javelin's
cast; for Iphicrates had given orders to the peltasts to retire before the hoplites got near them; and
further, when the Lacedaemonians were retiring from the pursuit, being scattered because each man
had pursued as swiftly as he could, the troops of Iphicrates turned about, and not only did those in
front again hurl javelins upon the Lacedaemonians, but also others on the flank, running along to
reach their unprotected side. Indeed, at the very first pursuit the peltasts shot down nine or ten of
them. And as soon as this happened, they began to press the attack much more boldly. [16] Then, as
the Lacedaemonians continued to suffer losses, the polemarch again ordered the first fifteen yearclasses to pursue. But when these fell back, even more of them were shot down than at the first
retirement. And now that the best men had already been killed, the horsemen joined them, and with
the horsemen they again undertook a pursuit. But when the peltasts turned to flight, at that moment
the horsemen managed their attack badly; for they did not chase the enemy until they had killed some
of them, but both in the pursuit and in the turning backward kept an even front with the hoplites.
And what with striving and suffering in this way again and again, the Lacedaemonians themselves
kept continually becoming fewer and fainter of heart, while their enemies were becoming bolder, and
those who attacked them continually more numerous. [17] Therefore in desperation they gathered
together on a small hill, distant from the sea about two stadia, and from Lechaeum about sixteen or
seventeen stadia. And the men in Lechaeum, upon perceiving them, embarked in small boats and
coasted along until they came opposite the hill. Then the troops, being now desperate, because they
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were suffering and being slain, while unable to inflict any harm themselves, and, besides this, seeing
the Athenian hoplites also coming against them, took to flight. And some of them plunged into the
sea, and some few made their escape with the horsemen to Lechaeum. But in all the battles and in
the flight about two hundred and fifty of them were killed. [18] Thus it was that these events took
place.
After this Agesilaus departed with the defeated regiment, and left another behind him in Lechaeum.
And as he passed along homeward, he led his troops into the cities as late in the day as he could and
set out again in the morning as early as he could. When he approached Mantinea,24 by leaving
Orchomenus before dawn he passed by that city while it was still dark: so hard, he thought, would
the soldiers find it to see the Mantineans rejoicing at their misfortune.
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iv. Iphicrates: the new model general
Androtion, FGrHist 324, F48
The mercenary unit in Corinth. Conon first formed it. Later Iphicrates and Chabrias took it over. It
was used under the command of Iphicrates and Callias to cut down the Spartan mora.
Cornelius Nepos, Iphicrates I-II
I. IPHICRATES of Athens has become renowned, not so much for the greatness of his exploits, as
for his knowledge of military tactics; for he was such a leader, that he was not only comparable to the
first commanders of his own time, but no one even of the older generals could be set above him. He
was much engaged in the field; he often had. the command of armies; he never miscarried in an
undertaking by his own fault; he was always eminent for invention, and such was his excellence in it,
that he not only introduced much that was new into the military art, but made many improvements
in what existed before. He altered the arms of the infantry; for whereas, before he became a
commander, they used very large shields, short spears, and small swords, he, on the contrary,
introduced the pelta instead of the parma (from which the infantry were afterwards called peltastae),
that they might be more active in movements and encounters; he doubled the length of the spear,
and made the swords also longer. He likewise changed the character of their cuirasses, and gave them
linen ones instead of those of chain-mail and brass; a change by which he rendered the soldiers more
active; for, diminishing the weight, he provided what would equally protect the body, and be light.
II. He made war upon the Thracians, and restored Seuthes, the ally of the Athenians, to his throne.
At Corinth he commanded the army with so much strictness, that no troops in Greece were ever
better disciplined, or more obedient to the orders of their leader; and he brought them to such a
habit, that when the signal for battle was given them by their general, they would stand so regularly
drawn up, without any trouble on the part of the commander, that they seemed to have been
severally posted by the most skilful captain. With this army he cut off a mora of the Lacedaemonians;
an exploit which was highly celebrated through all Greece. In this war, too, he defeated all their
forces a second time, by which success he obtained great glory.
Artaxerxes, when he had resolved to make war upon the king of Egypt, asked the Athenians to allow
Iphicrates to be his general, that he might place him at the head of his army of mercenaries, the
number of whom was twelve thousand. This force he so instructed in all military discipline, that as
certain Roman soldiers were formerly called Fabians, so the Iphicrateans were in the highest repute
among the Greeks.
Going afterwards to the relief of the Lacedaemonians, he checked the efforts of Epaminondas; for,
had not he been drawing near, the Thebans would not have retreated from Sparta until they had
taken and destroyed it by fire.
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iv. Timotheus: the new model admiral
Isocrates, Antidosis 107-114
The facts, then, about Timotheus I can put most concisely and in the most comprehensive terms by
saying that he has taken more cities by storm than any other man has ever done, and I include all
generals who have led armies into the field whether from Athens or from the rest of Hellas. And
among these cities were some whose capture compelled all the surrounding territory to make terms
with Athens; so great was their importance in each case. [108] For who does not know that Corcyra
has the best strategic position among the cities in the neighborhood of the Peloponnese; Samos,
among the cities of Ionia; Sestos and Crithôte, among those in the Hellespont; and Potidaea and
Torône among the settlements in Thrace?
All these cities he has taken and presented to you, with no great outlay of money, without imposing
burdens upon your present allies, and without forcing you to pay many taxes into the treasury. [109]
Indeed, for the voyage of the fleet around the Peloponnese, Athens allowed him only thirteen talents
and fifty triremes, and yet he captured Corcyra, a city with a fleet of eighty triremes, and about the
same time he won a naval battle over the Lacedaemonians and forced them to agree to the terms of
the present peace—a peace which has so changed the relative positions of Athens and of
Lacedaemon [110] that from that day to this we celebrate the peace with sacrifices every year because
no other treaty has been so advantageous to our city; while, as for the Lacedaemonians, no man since
that time has seen a ship of theirs voyage this side of Malea nor any land force advance beyond the
Isthmus, and anyone can see in this fact the cause of their disaster at Leuctra. [111]
After these exploits he led an expedition against Samos; and that city which Pericles, renowned above
all others for his wisdom, his justice, and his moderation, reduced with a fleet of two hundred ships
and the expenditure of a thousand talents, Timotheus, without receiving from you or collecting from
your allies any money whatsoever, captured after a siege of ten months with a force of eight
thousand light-armed troops and thirty triremes, and he paid all these forces from the spoils of war.
[112] And if you can point to any other man who has done a like thing, I stand ready to admit my
folly in attempting to praise superlatively one who has done no more than others.
Well, then, from Samos he sailed away and captured Sestos and Crithôte, forcing you, who up to that
time had been careless of your interests in the Chersonese, to give your attention to that territory.
[113] And finally he took Potidaea, upon which Athens had in times past squandered twenty-four
hundred talents, and he met the expense from money which he himself provided and from
contributions of the Thracians; and, for full measure, he reduced all the Chalcideans to subjection.
To speak, not in detail, but in summary, he made you masters of twenty-four cities and spent in
doing so less than your fathers paid out in the siege of Melos. [114]
I could wish that just as it has been quite easy to recount his exploits, so it were possible to picture
briefly the circumstances under which each of them was accomplished—what the situation was in
Athens in each case and what the strength of our foes—, for you would then have been made to
appreciate much more highly the worth of his achievements and of the man himself. As it is, the
subject is so large that I must leave it untouched.
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