Download READING 23 Social Categorization and Behavioral episodes

READING 23
Social Categorization and
Behavioral episodes:
Cognitive Analysis of the
effects of Intergroup Contact
Myron Rothbart and Oliver R John • university of Oregon
The effects of intergroup contact on stereotypic beliefs, it is argued, depend upon (1)
the potential susceptibility of those beliefs to disconfirming information and the degree
to which the contact setting "allows" for disconfirming events, and (2) the degree to
which disconfirming events are generalized from specific group members to the group
as a whole. To account for the generalization of attributes from a sample to a
population, we present a cognitive-processing model. The model assumes that
impressions of groups are most heavily influenced by the attributes of those members
most strongly associated with the group label. In order for group stereotypes to
change, then, disconfirming information must be associated with the group labels.
However, a number of powerful cognitive processes work against this association. As
a consequence, we predict that stereotype change will be relatively rare under
"normal" circumstances but may occur when disconfirming information is encountered
under circumstances that activate the group label (e.g., when disconfirming attributes
are associated with otherwise typical group members).
I
n an influential article summarizing the voluminous literature on intergroup contact, Amir
(1976) wrote: Despite a substantial amount of research on ethnic contact, our theoretical
understanding of what contact involves as a potential agent of change and what are the
underlying processes is still very limited .... The lack of basic theory is also exemplified in the
little interaction between studies in ethnic contact and general theories of attitude formation
and change, or theories in other psychological fields such as perception .... (p. 289) In this
paper, we attempt to address Amir's concern. We present a preliminary theoretical model
that may account for the effects of intergroup contact on stability and change in intergroup
perception. We consider the process of stereotype change produced through contact with
individual group members an example of the general cognitive process by which attributes of
category members modify category attributes. As we shall argue later, this issue is complex
and involves basic questions about the nature of categorization processes. More generally, we
propose a two-phase model in which disconfirmation will occur when (1) the stereotypic
beliefs themselves are susceptible to disconfirmation and the intergroup contact provides
experiences that disconfirm the stereotype,
and (2) those experiences become associated with the superordinate stereotypic category. The
secand phase requires a detailed examination of categorization processes. To convey what is
new about our model, it may be useful to consider it in the context of a traditional approach to
the effects of intergroup contact. The traditional approach characterizes intergroup perception
as a process of"autistic hostility" (cf. Newcomb, 1947), that is, a self-amplifying cycle of
antagonism, separation, and unrealistically negative attributions. Intergroup hostility leads to
avoidance, which in turn leads both to more extreme negative perceptions and to an inability
to test those perceptions against reality. Since avoidance and separation enable extant
(negative) perceptions to remain unchallenged, contact exposes those unrealistically extreme
perceptions to disconfirming evidence. It is assumed that experiences with individuals who
disconfirm the negative stereotype generalize to the group as a whole through the process of
"stimulus generalization" (cf. Cook, 1970). In short, the traditional approach seems to make
three major assumptions: (a) initial perceptions are unrealistic and potentially disconfirmable,
(b) contact provides the evidence necessary to disconfirm these unrealistic beliefs and (c) the
disconfirming attributes of memhers generalize to the group as a whole. However, each of
these three major assumptions, while plausible, seriously underestimates the complexity of the
processes of belief change. In contrast to these assumptions, we argue that (a) stereotype
beliefs differ dramatically in their susceptibility to disconfirmation; (b) intergroup contact may
either disconfirm or corroborate existing stereotypes, depending upon the nature of the
intergroup contact; and (c) even when contact with individual members does disconfirm the
group stereotype, cognitive processes basic to underlying category-exemplar relations may
isolate those instances from the group stereotype. Among these three assumptions, the second,
concerning the nature of the intergroup contact, has already been carefully examined (e.g.,
Amir, 1976; Cook, 1984a,b), and a number of aspects of intergroup contact, such as "equal
status," "intimate contact," and "cooperative atmosphere;' have been proposed to characterize
the type of contact that leads to favorable attitude change. Although we do not disagree with
these interpretations, we share Amir's concern that these types of contact have not been
closely tied to the basic psychological processes implicated in belief change. At the end of our
paper, we will attempt to relate the types of intergroup contact more closely to the processes of
belief change outlined in our model.
The Potential Disconfirmability of Stereotypic Beliefs
In general, we propose that belief change can be induced by direct personal experiences as
well as by indirectly obtained information. This distinction implies that changes in stereotypic
beliefs about groups may come from two sources: (a) direct contact with members, and (b)
indirect "atmosphere" effects. Atmosphere effects mean general, nonspecific changes in laws,
social norms, and expectancies, as well as images promulgated by parents, peers, gatekeepers,
and the media. Very roughly, they are what Sarnoff, Katz, and McClintock (1954) have
referred to as changes produced by the application of social rewards and punishments. The
rewards and punishments involved may be quite subtle, however, amounting to little more
than alterations in the media's portrayal of a particular group (e.g., the dramatic change in the
media's coverage of Mainland China after President Nixon announced his trip to that country).
Atmosphere effects may change people's attitudes and beliefs without any direct contact with
group members. Although a number of possible explanations exist for such atmosphere
effects, including sheer repetition and familiarity (e.g., Hasher, Goldstein, & Toppino, 1977),
we will focus here on effects of direct contact on stereotype change. If a contact episode is to
create belief change, it must first provide information that differs from the observer's initial
beliefs. According to the present model, such a discrepancy will occur only if both the
stereotypic belief is potentially susceptible to disconfirmation and the contact provides
disconfirming information. Figure 23.1 lists three characteristics of social beliefs that define
their susceptibility to disconfirmation and should, therefore, influence the probability of
stereotype change following direct contact with group members. Rothbart and Park (1986)
have argued that at least three dimensions affect the disconfirmability of trait attributions: (1)
the clarity and specificity of the relation between a trait and observable be-
havior, (2) the number of behavioral observations necessary to establish or disconfirm whether
a trait applies to a person or group, and (3) the number of occasions that allow for confirming
and/or disconfirming behaviors. In Rothbart and Park's (1986) study, judges rated 150 trait
terms on these three dimensions, as well as the frequency and social desirability (favorability)
of these terms. Each of the three dimensions is now examined in more detail.
Clarity of Concept-Exemplar Relations Traits differ in the degree to which they imply clear
behavioral referents. We may be very clear about the behaviors that would confirm or
disconfirm the belief that a person is messy, neat, quiet, or talkative, but the behaviors that
confirm or disconfirm sly, treacherous, devious, or suspicious are less clear. Traits denoting
easily observable behaviors are expected to be amenable to disconfirmation, whereas traits for
which it is difficult to specify disconfirming behaviors may be quite resistant to change. It is
interesting that groups in conflict are particularly prone to ascribe to each other such traits as
untrustworthy and devious, which were the traits that Rothbart and Park (1986) found to have
the least clear behavioral implications, and are therefore probably the least likely to be
disconfirmed.
Criterion for Trait Inferences
A second dimension potentially related to the disconfirmability of trait concepts is the number
of relevant observations required to establish or disconfirm the belief that a group can be
described by a particular trait. Strong correlations were ohtained between the favorability of a
trait and the number of instances required for its confirmation (r = .71) and disconfirmation (r
=.70). In particular, the more unfavorable the trait, the fewer the number of instances required
for confirmation and the greater the number of instances necessary for disconfirmation. Thus,
favorable traits are difficult to acquire but easy to lose, whereas unfavorable traits are easy to
acquire but difficult to lose. This finding suggests that unfavorable characteristics, once
acquired as part of the stereotype, may be difficult to lose in part because of the large number
of observations necessary for their disconfirmation, particularly when the frequency of
intergroup contact is low.
Frequency of Occasions Allowing for Disconfirming Behaviors This dimension reflects
both the properties of social situations and the properties of trait concepts. Friendliness or
talkativeness refer to behaviors that can be expressed in most social settings, whereas
traits such as brave, heroic, or cowardly may never find occasion for expression across an
individual's lifetime. In our view, the frequency dimension is of considerable importance,
since even if trait-behavior links are clear as for heroic, the opportunities for engaging in
heroic behavior are few. Rothbart and Park (1986) found a low but significant correlation
between the favorability of a trait and the number of occasions available for disconfirmation,
suggesting that more occasions are available for disconfirming favorable than unfavorable
traits, in turn implying that unfavorable stereotypes resist change more than favorable
stereotypes. This dimension has particular importance for understanding the effects of
intergroup contact. In the Rothbart and Park research, global frequency ratings were obtained
across "typical" situations, yet different settings elicit different behaviors. Heroism and
cowardice would be more prevalent in wartime, for example, than during dinner with friends
(unless, of course, one is dining with Clint Eastwood or Charles Bronson). Highly structured
role relationships (e.g., employer to employee) are not as likely to yield information on
generosity, trustworthiness, or warmth than less-structured relationships (e.g., between
friends). For this reason, it is extremely important to categorize contact situations in terms of
the traits that might find expression. In a recent study on the perception of intergroup contact
episodes (John & Rothbart, in preparation) we asked students to describe situations in which
they had interacted with a member of an outgroup (e.g., Blacks, Asians, Fraternity Members,
Lesbians).1 The students first described the contact setring on 32 situation feature scales (such
as formal vs. informal, intimate vs. casual, pleasant vs. unpleasant), and then they rated
whether that situation had provided them with information about a number of traits of the
outgroup member. In an analysis of more than 300 such descriptions of contact episodes, we
found that in informal (compared to formal) situations the outgroup members were described
as showing more extroverted, loud, and impulsive behaviors; in intimate (compared to casual)
contact situations they appeared more intelligent, scientifically minded, and artistic. In other
words, characteristics of the contact situation were correlated with the observation of
particular kinds of behaviors. Thus, impressions of groups may depend, at least to some
extent, on the
situations in which one samples that group's behavior. In our study, subjects who interacted
with Asians (who are generally regarded as quiet and introverted) at a dance party rated them
as louder and as more impulsive than after interacting with them in a more formal setting.
Thus, for subjects' perceptions of Asians, informal contact provided information disconfirming
the stereotype. In contrast, observations of fraternity members in the same kind of informal
situation confirmed the traditional stereotype about that group's social behavior. Thus,
although some contact settings may permit the expression of a wide array of behaviors, we
cannot assume that the same kind of setting will always permit the observation of
disconfirming behaviors for all kinds of groups; rather, one's sample of disconfirming
information depends on both the behaviors elicited by the situation and the nature of the
observer's prior stereotypic beliefs. Another subtle issue in the perception of outgroup
behavior in typical contact settings derives from the so-called "fundamental attribution error"
(Ross, 1977). In intergroup relations based on unequal power, such as men and women or
whites and blacks, the less powerful group is often described as devious, sly, cunning, or
shrewd. Considering minority groups' relative lack or power to satisfy physical and
psychological needs, it is not surprising that their goals will often be achieved circuitously
rather than directly. Ruthless aggression, for example, may be effective when used by white
male corporate executives, but this "strategy" is typically not available to women or to blacks
of either sex and, if used, is less likely to be successful. Thus behaviors encoded by the
dominant group as devious or cunning appear to be behaviors elicited by powerlessness, rather
than inherent characteristics of the minority group. We have argued that not all traits are
equally disconfirmable, and that contact settings vary in the degree to which they permit the
observation of disconfirming behaviors. One way, therefore, to understand which contact
settings are most likely to promote stereotype change is to classify settings in terms of their
potential for eliciting confirming and disconfirming behaviors. Contact set-
tings may influence stereotype change in a variedety of other waysfor example, by making the
ingroup-outgroup distinction salient and by activating interactional goals that direct people's
attention to disconfirming information. These variedables will be discussed in the framework
of a cognitive model of belief change, which will now be presented. The final section will
consider how these variables relate to differences among settings and to the categories of
intergroup contact suggested by Amir (1976) and Cook (1984b).
Processing Information About Groups and Group Members The two traditional
assumptions examined in the first part of this paper concern (a) whether the stereotypic
concepts are amenable to disconfirmation and (b) whether the nature of a contact setting
permits the observation of disconfirming information. Another general issue is whether
information disconfirming a group stereotype obtained through contact with a sample of group
members generalizes to the group as a whole. In our view, such generalization cannot be taken
for granted, and in fact can probably be assumed not to occur. Similarly, Cook (1984b) finds
that generalization of attitude change from a sample to a population does not always occur; he
argues for the introduction of"a sort of 'cognitive booster' for generalization from.., individuals
to... groups" (Cook, 1984b, p. 20). A recent elaborate study on the effects of integrating
women into the Marine Corps concludes that "men are not harassing the women they know in
their groups, but rather are harassing women in general, those they do not know personally ....
Women are generally accepted in their groups as individuals; change in esteem for women as
a class has not yet occurred" (Royle, 1983, p. 113). In an attempt to discover why
generalization from individuals to the group is so difficult to achieve, we will now examine
some of the processes governing category-exemplar relations. To understand how
disconfirming exemplars of a category are integrated into or isolated from that category, it is
necessary to consider the dynamic relation between the attributes of a category and the
attributes of category members. Thinkers as diverse as Lippman (1922/1961) and Piaget
(1952/ 1963) have noted that our existing concepts (categories, beliefs, or stereotypes) structure the perception of events relevant to these concepts.
The process of assimilation, through selective encoding of the stimulus event, increases the
"goodnessof-fit" between a category and its members. But Piaget noted that categories also
accommodate the attributes of category members, implying that at some point the attributes of
category members different from, or incompatible with, the category are no longer
"assimilated" but serve to reconstruct the category itself. This interaction between a category
and its members is a fundamentally important, albeit complex process. Many of Piaget's
examples come from the perception of the physical word, where discrepancies between an
expected and an ohserved event are often clear and unambiguous, But, as discussed earlier,
social beliefs can be notoriously fuzzy and difficult to disconfirm. Moreover, social beliefs are
typically complex; even when exceptions are clearly perceived, they may be functionally
isolated from the relevant category. Freud's compartmentalization (Freud, 1961), Abelson's
differentiation (Abelson, 1959), and Allport's refencing (Allport, 1954) all describe
mechanisms that serve to protect beliefs from disconfirming information by dividing a
category into functionally isolated components.
Matching Category and Individual Members: A Prototype View Our current model
assumes that the perceiver derives the attributes of a particular social category by integrating
those episodes from memory that he or she most strongly associates with (i.e., retrieves via)
that category (cf. Hintzman, 1984, for a prototype model based on retrieval of individual
episodes). For example, if a subject is asked to describe the characteristics of Sorority Women,
it is assumed that activation of the category Sorority Women leads our subject to retrieve
instances of specific sorority women, whose attributes are then integrated into a single
impression. Two points require clarification. First, an episode is considered to be any specific
event that has left a trace in memory; there could be many episodes for a given person, and
many individuals could be included in a single episode. Second, we do not make any precise
claims as to the nature of the weighting rule used to integrate individual episodes into a
composite judgment; however, following findings
in other domains of categorization (Anderson, 1980; Posner, 1974), we assume that episodes
most representative of the category will receive greater weight than will unrepresentative
episodes. Obviously, the characteristics of the weighting rule are important, but this issue need
not be resolved here. Since the attributes of a category are derived from the attributes of the
episodes already associated with that category, a fundamental question arises as to which
episodes are likely to become associated with a particular social category. We answer this
question as follows: The likelihood of a new episode becoming associated with any given
category is a function of the goodness-of-fit between that category and the episode. Once
again, the question of exactly how this match is computed (i.e., whether it is the number of
features in common or some weighting of the centrality of the common features) has not been
resolved. It should be noted, however, that this similarity matching principle presupposes a
prototype view of categories, rather than one based on defining features, and this assumption
has important implications for social categorization. Consider, for example, some social
categories that would become associated with a hypothetical black male, John Smith, who is a
highly educated, famous biochemist: Blacks, Men, Scientists. In terms of defining attributes,
this person's dark skin and negroid features should make him strongly associated with the
category Black Person but, for an observer holding traditional stereotypes about blacks, the
overall fit to this category is poor, given the presence of the attributes "highly educated" and
"biochemist" (assuming that the traditional stereotype of blacks does not include these
attributes). Thus, for this observer, John Smith is more prototypic of the category Scientist
than of the category Black Person, and we would expect the former category to be more
strongly associated with this episode than the latter category. Logically, of course, the
attributes of John Smith represent an intersection of the categories Blacks and Scientists, but
the model assumes that the two categories, because they are not themselves associated, are
treated as functionally independent. Although physical characteristics, such as skin color or
primary sex characteristics, logically constitute the basis for deciding whether an individual
belongs to the category Blacks or Women, these characteristics may only be necessary but not
sufficient attributes for category membership. Rosch
(e.g., 1978), Smith and Medin (1981), and others have argued that categories of natural objects
do not conform to the classical Adstotelian model, which assumes the existence of defining
attributes. According to the Aristotelian model, objects either do or do not belong to a
particular category, and those that do belong are all equally "good" members of the category.
Objects differ, however, in the degree to which they are viewed as prototypical examples of a
category. For example, robins and eagles are highly prototypical exemplars of the Bird
category because their attributes correspond to our beliefs about what "birds in general" are
like. Penguins, however, although technically birds, do not seem to really belong because of
the many attributes they do not share with other birds (e.g., swimming and diving, rather than
flying and sitting in trees). By extension, individual blacks may differ as to how prototypical
they are as examples of Black People. What would be the criteria for determining the
goodness-of-fit of an individual to a social category such as Blacks? We suspect
prototypicality for that group is not strongly related to variations in "defining" attributes, such
as skin color, but rather to stereotypic attributes already associated with the category. This
means, of course, that "typical" blacks are the ones most likely to be associated with that
category, and thus when we think of Blacks, we tend to think of the typical members of the
category, rather than of the individuals who are inconsistent with that category's attributes.
This reasoning is supported by cognitive research on attribute listing and category
name-production tasks (Gernsbacher, 1985), which suggests that "bad" examples of natural
object categories are not stored under the category node (or are difficult to retrieve under that
node). Thus, when people are asked to imagine an "animal" or to list the characteristic
attributes of that category, they do so by imagining some particular category memher of high
prototypicality, such as a dog, rather than a spider ora mole (Anderson, 1980; Posner, 1974).
In summary, we assume that pairing an individual with a social category is determined by the
degree to which the individual's attributes match those of the category rather than by the
logical set-inclusion relations between the category and its members. If this assumption is true,
our model has general implications for hypothesis testing and
belief change because it implies a mechanism by which disconfirming exemplars can be
isolated from the stereotypic category. More specifically, the model rejects the assumption that
social categories represent the "node" under which all relevant (i.e., confirming and
disconfirming) exemplars are stored. That is, rather than assuming that all relevant blacks,
Jews, and women are stored under the category nodes Blacks, Jews, and Women, respectively,
this model suggests that the category nodes Blacks, Jews, and Women mainly store
stereotypically "good" examples of those categories; bad examples tend to be stored under
alternative category labels. The above assumptions, if correct, have extraordinary implications
for social perception. These assumptions reintroduce, in effect, the ultimate form of the
stimulus error: a person who is in reality a Black may not be mentally represented as a Black;
a person who is in reality a Woman may not be mentally represented as a Woman. Even
though we are tempted to think that the defining features of the category Blacks and Women
are relatively unambiguous, the model states that it is the overall goodness-of-fit to the
stereotype, and not just a few defining features, that determines whether a person (or episode)
becomes associated with a given category.
Typicality and the Impact of Disconfirming Attributes . We argue that two general factors
determine which particular social category becomes associated with a given episode. One
determinant, already discussed as the goodness-of-fit principle, is the "strength of activation"
of a category produced by the episode itself. A second determinant, which we label
exogenous, refers to the strength of activation of a category produced by the social context.
This second source of activation has been studied in priming research, and will be discussed
later. Given that goodness-of-fit (or typicality) determines the episode-category match, we can
make the following general prediction: The more a particular episode disconfirms a
stereotypic category of which it is an instance, the more likely it is to be associated with a
different, possibly counterstereotypic category. In the example cited earlier, John Smith, a
black biochemist, was more strongly associated with the category Scientist than with
the category Black. This prediction implies that when people are asked to judge the
characteristics of Blacks, John Smith is unlikely to be retrieved as an example of that category,
just as a penguin is unlikely to be retrieved as an example of Bird; consequently, John Smith's
attributes are unlikely to influence people's judgments about the general category of Blacks.
Notice that John Smith's attributes are not lost, and that they are retrievable from a category
that does fit his attributes more closely, namely Scientist. As stated earlier, the prediction of
interest is that the more disconfirming (or atypical) a member is of a category, the less likely it
is that the person will be associated with that category. It is apparent that this process enhances
the tendency of stereotypic beliefs to confirm themselves. However, the model also specifies
how disconfirming events can become associated with the category. Since we have argued that
it is the overall goodness-of-fit between an episode and a category that contributes to the
strength of association, disconfirming attributes can become associated with the stereotype if
they belong to an individual who otherwise is a very good fit to the category. Support for this
prediction comes from a study by Weber and Crocker (1983, Experiment 3), who presented
subjects with information about a sample of corporate lawyers; a portion of that information
was disconfirming of the general stereotype of corporate lawyers (e.g., frequently wearing
ill-fitting clothes, having difficulty analyzing problems and developing logical conclusions).
Weber and Crocker, however, paired the disconfirming information in two different ways: if it
was paired with lawyers who were otherwise good examples of the category (e.g., those
described as white, married, and rich), it was more likely to affect subjects' beliefs about
corporate lawyers in general than if the same information was paired with bad (atypical)
members of the category (e.g., those black, single, and poor). Thus, although the current
model may seem to predict stability rather than change in people's stereotypic beliefs, it does
predict change when disconfirming information is embedded in an episode that otherwise
represents a good fit to the stereotypic category. Perhaps this good fit is one of the "cognitive
boosters" sought by Cook. This cognitive mechanism may also explain why individuals like
Martin Luther King, Jr., are unlikely to be retrieved as examples of Blacksthey would
be seen as too different on too many features traditionally associated with blacks. In summary,
then, we would expect that fraternity jocks who happen to support the nuclear freeze
movement, and sorority queens who work diligently for women's and minority rights, would
be the type of persons most likely to change the stereotype that fraternity and sorority
members are politically conservative.
Familiarity with an Individual and Level of Categorization Until now we have been
discussing the kind of social category that an observer would "choose" to associate with a
person about whom he or she may know rather little. In a sense, the choice is between
domains of category, such as gender, occupation, ethnicity, etc. Would the same processes be
apparent if we considered the effects of increasing amounts of information about a single
individual? Before answering this question, it may be useful to consider a distinction offered
by Rosch (1978). Category systems can be conceived as having both a vertical and a
horizontal dimension (Rosch, 1978). The vertical dimension refers to the level of inclusiveness
of the category (e.g., Politician vs. Democrat vs. Democratic Presidential Candidate, or
European vs. Italian vs. Sicilian), and the horizontal dimension refers to the domain of
category (e.g., occupation, nation, race, gender). In the domain of social categories, horizontal
categorization seems particularly relevant for understanding how a given person initially
becomes associated with a category. Vertical categorization is particularly helpful for
conceptualizing changes in the "level of categorization" used when increasing amounts of
more specific information become available about an individual person. Since one of the
major effects of intergroup contact is an increase in the amount of information about a given
individual, it is critical to know whether that information is capable of altering perceptions of
the attributes of the general social category. As we view it, the same basic processes operate in
vertical as in horizontal categorization, except that with additional individuating information
about a particular individual, the perceiver will shift from superordinate to more subordinate
levels of categorization (i.e., it becomes more useful to think of Mary Jones as a Female Nurse
than as
a Woman). This prediction is in accord with Rosch's view that, up to a point, lower levels of
categorization are more useful than higher levels. However, the category eventually used to
represent the person in memory depends on the compatibility between the initial
categorization and subsequent information. To the degree that additional subordinate
information shows a good fit with the initial superordinate categorization (as Nurse does for
Woman), the initial superordinate categorization will be strengthened. However, if the more
specific information shows a poor match to the superordinate category (for example, if we
learn that Mary Jones is a Mechanical Engineer), then the superordinate, stereotypic
association will be weakened, leaving the more specific category (Mechanical Engineer) as
relatively strong and the superordinate category (Woman) as relatively weak. Once again, the
appearance of disconfirming attributes within the same stimulus person can result in isolation
from the perceiver's stereotypic category. This prediction is interesting for a number of
reasons. First, it allows for the possibility that individuating information can "release" the
exemplar from the attributes of the superordinate category (cf. Locksley, Borgida, Brekke, &
Hepburn, 1980; Locksley, Hepburn, & Ortiz, 1982), and at the same time renders the
stereotype immune from the attributes of the exemplar. Second, it can account for some of the
dynamic changes in the importance of particular attributes in perceptions of people. For
example, when a white (who is unfamiliar with blacks) first meets a black person, "blackness"
(an attribute associated with a superordinate category) may be the most salient feature, and the
one that becomes most strongly associated with relevant behavioral episodes. With increasing
familiarity, the black person becomes "individuated" and is encoded under more specific
categories (Artist, Scientist, Extrovert, etc.), with "blackness" losing its salience.2 The
interesting implication, however, is that as the person loses his or her "blackness" s/he is less
likely to be stored under the category Black People, and his/her counter-stereotypic attributes
may therefore become isolated from the stereotypic category. 2One of us (MR) had an
experience with a southern colleague at a conference, who expressed less than flattering
sentiments toward Blacks: when MR asked him about his obviously intelligent and scholarly
co-author, who was black, he responded. "I never think of him as black!"
Some experimental evidence lends at least indirect support to these conjectures. Since one of
the important differences between ingroup and outgroup observers is the amount of
information they have available about group members, differences in the way ingroup and
outgroup observers categorize group members is relevant to our argument. Park and Rothbart
(1982) examined the "levels of categorization" used by subjects when making judgments
about ingroup and outgroup members. In their second experiment, men and women were
asked to make predictions about groups described by both gender and occupational categories,
such as Female Physics Majors or Male Dance Majors. When the two categories conflicted
with the cultural stereotype (as in these examples), it was hypothesized that opposite-sex
judges (outgroup members) would be more likely to base their predictions on gender
(superordinate category) than on occupational (subordinate category) information, whereas
same-sex judges (ingroup members) would be more likely to rely on occupational than on
gender information (i.e., subordinate rather than superordinate categories). As predicted,
women viewed female physics majors primarily as physics majors, whereas men viewed them
primarily as women. Similarly, men viewed male dance majors primarily as dance majors
whereas women viewed them primarily as men. Subjects thus used different levels of
categorization when making judgments about groups, and one predictor of these choices was
the subject's status as an ingroup or outgroup member. Whereas this experiment focused on
the use of categorical information, Park & Rothbart's fourth experiment investigated the level
at which information about a stimulus person is encoded. In this study, men and women were
given news-storylike information about a male or female stimulus person, including a
description of the person's occupation. Two days later, subjects' memory of the person's sex
and occupation was assessed, using both free and cued recall. Paralleling the results of the
earlier experiment, the more specific category (occupation) was recalled less well by outgroup
than by ingroup members. We began this section with the argument that, for most purposes,
Nurse will be seen as more informative or predictive of behavior than the superordinate
category Woman. More important, however, we suggested that when the subordinate category
is consistent with the superordinate category, encoding by the superordinate category is probably strengthened or at least not
weakened. However, when the subordinate category contradicts the superordinate category (as
Mechanical Engineer "contradicts" Woman), encoding by the superordinate category is
weakened, and the perceiver more strongly associates the person to the subordinate than to the
superordinate category. In summary, we have argued in this section that (a) contact and
familiarity permit a more differentiated encoding of a stimulus person, and (b) this very
process of individuation serves to insulate the attributes associated with the category from
those of the individual. This process leads to the unhappy prediction that inferences from the
individual to the group should decline with increasing familiarity with that individual,
particularly when the individual is perceived as atypical of the group. Once again, the
processes of categorization may isolate disconfirming instances from the superordinate
category.
Exogenous Sources of Category Activation Earlier we stated thai the likelihood of a given
category being paired with a behavioral episode is a joint function of the strength of
association between the episode and that category, and the independent activation of that
category from "exogenous" sources. Such exogenous factors include the distinctiveness of a
contrasting environment (e.g., when visiting a foreign country, it is difficult not to attribute
people's actions to their national character), competitive group interactions (in which the
category divisions between ingroup and outgroup are paramount), or other contextual factors
activating particular categories. Similarly, the recent work on priming of social categories
(Bargh & Pietromonaco, 1982; Higgins & King, 1981; Higgins, King, & Mavin, 1982; Srull &
Wyer, 1979; Snail & Wyer, 1980) has emphasized the importance of exogenous events in
activating social categories. Thus we will now discuss some of the ways in which contact
settings and/or goals during intergroup contact activate particular categories. Distinctiveness
and Salience. Categories related to perceptually distinct aspects of a setting are likely to be
activated, and may then serve as "magnets" for causal attributions. For example, a visitor to a
foreign country, such as Germany, becomes very much aware of the "German-ness" of the en-
vironment. The category German becomes very salient (or activated), at least during the initial
phase of a visit. Research by Taylor and her colleagues (Taylor, 1981) on the perception of a
single woman in a group of men, or a single black in a group of whites, suggests that
distinctive attributes disproportionately influence observers' causal judgments. In our view this
may occur because these "solo" individuals activate the category that defines their uniqueness
(i.e., their "femaleness" or blackness), increasing the likelihood that this category will be
associated with behavioral episodes. It is not difficult to see that settings that reinforce the
ingroup-outgroup dimensions, such as those based on competition for limited resources,
almost continually activate the outgroup category. In a series of experiments, Brewer and
Miller (1983) found that contact between ingroup and outgroup did not lead to attitude change
toward specific outgroup members if the nature of the contact reinforced the dimension along
which the groups differed. Brewer and Miller created interacting groups using the
minimal-group procedure developed by Tajfel (1970), in which an arbitrary dimension
(underor over-estimating dots) served as the basis for mutually exclusive categorization. Once
ingroups and outgroups were established, the researchers created intergroup contact of either a
cooperative or a competitive nature. Most importantly, Brewer and Miller introduced several
types of cooperative interaction. For example, the basis for selecting members for intergroup
contact was either connected with, or independent of, the original basis for categorization.
According to their prediction, cooperation was more likely to lead to favorable attitude change
toward specific outgroup members when the selection procedure was independent of the initial
basis of categorization.3 According to Brewer and Miller, cooperation will not have a
significant or lasting impact on intergroup perceptions as long as the social category
membership of those on a cooperating team remains a salient or distinctive feature of the
setting. (p. 3) In slightly different terms, as long as the setting reinforces the activation of the
outgroup category, it is unlikely that individual group members will be perceived (and treated)
as anything other than members of the outgroup category. In principle, this could be quite
desirable, since cooperative
behavior associated with an outgroup should lead to attitude change, but it is not clear from
the Brewer and Miller report whether the behavior of the outgroup members was perceived
unambiguously as favorable; in short, assimilation to the more negative outgroup category was
possible in this context. In light of Brewer and Miller's findings, however, it is interesting that
attempts to redress social inequality by a quota system use a procedure in which the basis for
intergroup contact is totally correlated with category membershiphardly an optimal strategy
for promoting intergroup harmony, although it might be desirable as a means for redistributing
resources. Category Accessibility. Individual differences in category accessibility are another
source of exogenous activation. Higgins and King (1981)report stable individual differences in
the accessibility of trait categories in describing others. Trait concepts and social categories
are quite similar in: many aspects, and we would expect that the accessibility of social
categories also differ from one individual to another. The classic research by Allport and
Kramer (1946) on the difference between high and low anti-Semitic subjects in their
recognition of Jewish faces assumed that the category Jewish was more meaningful, salient, or
accessible for prejudiced than for nonprejudiced subjects. The predilection for government
officials to use the concepts of Marxism, communism, and terrorism rather than the concepts
of nationalism or national character as explanations for revolutionary movements testifies to
the pervasiveness of differences in category accessibility. Priming and Self-Confirmatory
Expectations. The priming literature has other relevance for our model. If a social category has
already been activated by an exogenous source, the threshold of activation necessary for
associating that category with a relevant episode should decrease correspondingly. Since the
likelihood of association between a category and an episode is proportional to the total
activation of the category, from both episodic and exogenous sources, it follows that as
activation from the exogenous source increases, the amount of activation from the episode
itself
(i.e., the goodness-of-fit) required to associate the episode and the category is reduced. This
process implies that when a stereotypic category is already activated by context, less evidence
from the behavioral episode is required to represent that episode in a stereotypic manner. This
mechanism explains the process of assimilation, in which an ambiguous stimulus is
interpretated in accord with an already primed category. It should be noted, then, that priming
a stereotypic category can have very different effects on stereotype change, depending on
whether or not the behavioral episode is ambiguous. Until now, it has been assumed that
disconfirming episodes are unambiguously disconfirming. However, if the event is ambiguous
and subject to alternative interpretations, the category priming will structure the interpretation
of the event in a way that is consistent with that category, and thus will serve to corroborate,
rather than disconfirm the stereotype. lnteractional Goals. An important exogenous source of
activation that influences the level of vertical categorization is the goals of the observer. One
of Rosch's most important contributions is her finding that categories at some levels of
abstraction are more useful than categories at other levels. Rosch (1978) also pointed out,
however, that the level at which categorization is particularly useful depends upon the
perceiver's experience or expertise, as well as on the context in which the categorization is
made. The specificity of the category used depends upon the nature and goals of the intergroup
contact. If, as men, we interact with a woman with the goal of collaborating on a chapter, we
would be highly attentive to her creativity, verbal fluency, reliability, and other attributes
relevant to that goal. Although the original encoding category may have been Woman, it may
soon become Psychologist or Fluent Writer or Creative Person. However, the transition from
global to differentiating categories may also be influenced by the match between the category
and the individual's behavior during the contact episode. That is, the more the interaction
elicits behaviors highly stereotypic of the original category, the more that category is
reinforced, making it unlikely that more differentiating categories are invoked. For example, a
sexist male professor may well elicit sex-stereotypic behavfor from a female graduate student,
thus reinforcing his initial gender categorization. Thus, the processes that affect category
differentiation cannot
be conveniently separated from the characteristics of the individual, the goals of the observer,
and the setting in which the interaction takes place. Cognitive approaches to intergroup
perception are frequently criticized for neglecting the social settings and goals of social
interaction. One way in which social context affects stereotyping is by influencing the kinds of
categories activated and the level of categorization used (cf. Higgins & McCann, 1984).
Although Rothbart and Park's (1982) Experiments 2 and 4 suggested that outgroup members
(e.g., men) are unlikely to encode a stimulus person's (e.g., a woman's) subordinate attributes,
their subjects had no goals visa-vis that person, and the social context was that of a psychology
experiment. As we stated before, we would fully expect that a male who had to collaborate
with a female on an important academic assignment would not fail to encode his partner's
intellectual interest and characteristics, a view wholly consistent with the work of Locksley
and her colleagues (1980, 1982) on the power of individuating information. Contact settings
may elicit vastly different interactional goals. For example, settings in which there are large
power differences among the interactants do not usually require the person of greater power to
encode the subordinate attributes of those of lesser power, whereas it is adaptive for powerless
individuals to discriminate among the powerful (e.g., professors tend to know less about
students than students do about professors). Within traditional subcultures, the same power
relationships may extend to differences between men and women. Even aside from power
differences, different interactional goals encourage encoding at different levels; we use
different categories when approaching people to sign a political petition than we do in
deciding with whom we might enjoy dinner, hiking, or love-making. Figure 23.2 provides a
schematic overview of the factors included in pairing disconfirming information with a
stereotypic category, and illustrates both endogenous and exogenous sources of category
activation.
How Do Disconfirming Instances Alter the Stereotype? Since we have argued that (1)
repeated contact and increasing familiarity lead to a "recoding" of the individual in more
specific, differentiated, and id-
iosyncratic terms, and (2) such recoding is likely to prevent the characteristics of that person
from generalizing to those of the category, we must return to the critical question: How does
contact lead to stereotype change? Assuming that the other necessary conditions for
disconfirmation outlined in Figures 23.1 and 23.2 have been met (i.e., stereotypic beliefs are
disconfirmable, settings allow for disconfirming behaviors, disconfirming information
originates from otherwise typical members), we suspect that the process of disconfirmation
involves both a change in the kinds of episodes associated with the general (stereotypic)
category and a concomitant shift toward the use of more specific categories in encoding the
stimulus person. In other words, a decrease in the predictive utility of the superordinate
category leads to the use of more differentiated and predictive categories. Suppose, for
example, a person stereotypes women as passive, and then repeatedly encounters assertive
women under the conditions optimal for change outlined above. Eventually, episodes
involving assertive women become attached to the superordinate category Women. At that
point the
category Women is represented by a node attached to numerous assertive episodes as well as
the earlier passive episodes. When then asked about the characteristics of women, a person
holding the stereotype should answer so that the perceived "average" shifts toward the
assertive end; at the same time, the variance should increase (assuming the original passive
episodes have not been forgotten). The increase in perceived within-group variability implies
that membership in the category Women is less predictive of passive versus assertive
behaviors than it used to be; if the person wishes to make judgments related to passivity, he or
she must use information that is more differentiating than gender, such as occupation, college
major, membership in social organizations, or specific personality characteristics.
Taylor.(1981) and Weber and Crocker (1983) have argued that the accumulation of such
disconfirming information should lead to the formation of a subtype of women that
differentiates assertive women from women in general. We do not disagree with that position,
but in our view continual subtyping should effectively lead to the dissolution of the stereotype.
To the degree that
the category Women no longer predicts passivity, intuitiveness, and so on, this lack of
predictability should eventually lead people to rely on information more specific than gender
when making predictions about behavior; the more frequent use of such specific categories is
equivalent to a loss in meaning of the broader stereotypic category. This somewhat optimistic
analysis of the abolition of superordinate stereotypes has to be qualified by two considerations.
First, it assumes that there is little predictive value to the stereotype when in fact there may be
some degree of predictive utility. Second, even if the incidence of a stereotypic trait (e.g.,
passivity) is no greater for women than for men, there will be some women who are passive,
and it is likely that these few, albeit nonrepresentative, cases may disproportionately reinforce
the stereotype. Both these concerns are problems of psychological inertia and reflect the
self-perpetuating nature of prior beliefs (Peterson & DuCharme, 1967; Ross, 1977; Rothbart,
1981). To the degree that social norms and settings elicit even slight amounts of stereotypic
behavior from a group, an existing stereotype might persist, if for no other reason than that
people may be insensitive to small changes in contingencies. There is good evidence for the
"feature-positive" effect (Fazio, Sherman, & Herr, 1982), which indicates that people are
disproportionately sensitive to the presence rather than the absence of events. With our
position now qualified, what is the prognosis for stereotype change? Although we would like
to be optimistic about the possibility of change, it seems more realistic to conclude that the
conditions leading to change through contact are quite restricted. Even Cook (1984a), one of
the researchers most optimistic about the ameliorative effects of intergroup contact, lists five
conditions necessary for favorable attitude change: (1) equal status in the contact setting, (2)
personal attributes that disconfirm the stereotype, (3) mutual interdependence, (4) a setting
that promotes individual (rather than categorical) perception, and (5) a contact setting that
promotes egalitarian norms. However, if one considers the typical contact settings in which,
say, blacks and whites interact, it seems that most violate all of Cook's conditions necessary
for favorable attitude change. In other words, in a society where there is enormous social
inequality between groups and many behavioral differences associated with that inequality, it
is extremely difficult to satisfy, under normal conditions, either Cook's five criteria or the
conditions outlined here.
Previous Analyses of intergroup Contact and the Current Model The five conditions
suggested by Cook (1984a) as necessary for attitude change fit reasonably well with our
model. Equal status, stereotypedisconfirming attributes of outgroup members, and
interdependence are all likely to promote episodes that disconfirm a group stereotype.
Although this may be less true for Cook's dimension of mutual interdependence (e.g., Brewer
& Miller, 1983), negative images of outgroups are more likely to be contradicted under
conditions of interdependence rather than independence. Cook's fourth requirement, that the
setting promote individual rather than categorical perception, will, according to our view,
release the individual from the group stereotype, and should lead to favorable attitudes toward
that individual. However, there still is the troublesome question, as Cook acknowledged, about
whether or not attitude change generalizes from the individual to the group. Finally, the
requirement that the setting promote egalitarian norms relates to change promoted through
atmosphere effects rather than through direct, beliefdisconfirming information. Amir (1976, p.
288) lists eight factors thought to promote favorable attitude change, many of which overlap
with Cook's five variables. Again, most are factors that increase the likelihood of
stereotype-disconfirming information (particularly for outgroup stereotypes based on
differences in power or status).
Conclusions
Our model has several implications about stereotype change. First, the model emphasizes the
difficulty of producing stereotype change by positing that (a) many stereotypic beliefs resist
disconfirmation, (b) most typical contact situations do not provide disconfirming information,
and (c) disconfirming episodes tend to be associated only weakly with the stereotypic
category, but more strongly with alternative categories of which they are more typical.
Second, it emphasizes the difficulty of produc-
ing stereotype change by extensive contact with a few individuals, since the process of
increasing individuation decreases the likelihood of associating the individual with the
stereotypic category. This process can explain the often autonomous relationship between
category attributes and the attributes of individual category members. Third, the model is
consistent with evidence about the use of different categorical levels by ingroup and outgroup
members. Fourth, since the model recognizes the predictive utility associated with different
categorical levels, it can account for the initial strength andwith increasing contact and
familiaritythe ultimate fading of distinctive attributes, such as skin color, ethnic origin, and
religion. Fifth, consistent with recent experimental findings, the model helps define settings in
which contact is most likely to lead to attitude change. In particular, these are settings that (a)
permit the observation of disconfirming behaviors, (b) keep the ingroup-outgroup distinction
salient, and (c) foster goals that require the encoding of subordinate attributes of outgroup
members. Finally, our theoretical analysis may help resolve a dispute over interpersonal versus
intergroup determinants of social behavior. Brown and Turner (1981) criticize the contact
hypothesis on the grounds that it constitutes an interpersonal approach to an intergroup
problem. They argue that intergroup behavior cannot be understood as a simple extension of
interpersonal processes. They consider attempts to modify intergroup perception and behavior
through interpersonal techniques as implied, for example, by the contact hypothesis (and by
research on belief similarity), misguided, since the factors that influence intergroup processes
remain in effect even after attitudes and beliefs regarding particular individuals have changed.
Although we agree with many of Brown and Turner's (1981) ideas, the distinction between
interpersonal and intergroup behavior is not as absolute as they suggest; in fact, the distinction
rests precisely on the question of whether particular individuals are viewed in individualistic
terms or as members of broad social categories. We have tried to define the conditions under
which persons are encoded in terms of broad categories or along more specific, idiosyncratic
dimensions. This difference in the "level of categorization" used to encode individuals is, in
fact, an important psychological phenomenon. Simply declaring that one level is irrelevant to the analysis of the other is
not sufficient. In summary, we have argued that impressions of groups are heavily influenced
by the attributes of those group members most strongly associated with the group label. If
stereotypic impressions are to change, diseonfirming information must become associated
with the group label. But, as we have argued, a number of cognitive processes work against
such an association. Probably our central point is that the objectively verifiable attributes of a
person (such as gender or race) are the ones a perceiver uses to mentally represent that person.
Thus, in American society, a particular woman engineer of any race may be more strongly
associated with the category Engineers than with Women, and a particular black scientist may
be more strongly associated with Scientists than with Blacks. In order to achieve changes in
stereotypic beliefs, it is necessary to attach the disconfirming attributes to the superordinate
category label, instead of the more natural subordinate category. This mechanism must have
been known to Sojourner Truth, a former black slave and feminist, who spoke to a convention
on women's rights in 1851. Sojourner Truth presented herself as a woman who did not fit
society's image of women. Since she knew she would be thought of as a black rather than as a
woman, it was necessary for her to continually remind the audience that she was a member of
the latter category as well as of the former: That man over there says that women need to be
helped into carriages, and lifted over ditches, and to have the best place everywhere. Nobody
ever helps me into carriages, or over mud-puddles, or gives me any best place! And ain't I a
woman? Look at me! Look at my arm! I have ploughed and planted, and gathered into barns,
and no man could head me! And ain't I a woman? I could work as much and eat as much as a
manwhen I could get itand bear the lash as well! And ain't I a woman? (Schneir, 1972, pp.
94-95) Sojourner Truth recognized that stereotypes about women would change when people
realized that powerful qualities such as her own should be associated with the category
Women, and she also realized that people would be more likely to consider her as a black
rather than a woman. By continually activating the category Women, she ira-
plicitly recognized the importance of associating attributes with the appropriate social
category, and used a technique that, in accord with the arguments of this paper, may have
some success in modifying stereotypic beliefs.