Download Legitimacy of ethical norm and (dis)continuity of pedagogy of

Robi Kroflič
Legitimnost etične norme in (dis)kontinuiteta pedagogike moderne
(Draft Version)
Povzetek:
Splošno sprejeta hipoteza, da je pedagogika kot normativna znanost vzniknila iz
razsvetljenske filozofske antropologije in politične teorije, še posebej iz Kantovih
konceptov, postaja danes zanimiva v luči Lyotardove postmoderne filozofije. Lyotardova
teza o smrti velikih zgodb moderne filozofije in znanosti postavlja pod vprašaj
legitimnost temeljev pedagogike kot znanosti in eno najpomembnejših vprašanj je
vprašanje o legitimnosti deduktivno postavljenih pedagoških smotrov. Preprosta rešitev,
da je po padcu deontološke etike pravna teorija, zasnovana na Deklaraciji o človekovih
pravicah, postala orodje legitimiranja pedagoških ciljev in metod, je preprosto nezadostna
za pedagogiko in še posebej za argumentacijo na področju moralne vzgoje. Da bi našli
novo osnovo legitimiziranja v pedagogiki, bom raziskal možnosti izgradnje etične
argumentacije na Levinasovi etiki, in da bi našli novo osnovo etične argumentacije v
moralni vzgoji, bom predstavil osnovno idejo induktivnega vzgojno-disciplinskega
pristopa.
Ključne besede: razsvetljenska pedagogika, postmoderna pedagogika, normativnost,
Lyotard, Levinas, Hoffman, induktivni pristop
Legitimacy of ethical norm and (dis)continuity of pedagogy of modernity
Common accepted hypothesis that pedagogy as a normative science arouse from
enlightenment philosophical anthropology and political theory, specially from Kant’s
concepts, becomes interesting in the light spot of Lyotard postmodern philosophy.
Lyotard thesis about the death of great narratives of modern philosophy and science
points the question of legitimacy of millstones of pedagogy as science and one of the
most important questions is the question about legitimacy of main deductive pedagogical
goals. A simple solution that after the fall of deontological ethics law theory, based on the
Declaration on human rights, became a tool for legitimization of pedagogical goals and
methods, is simply insufficient for pedagogy and also for argumentation in the field of
moral education. To find a new basis of legitimization in pedagogy I will explore the
possibility to build ethical argumentation on Levinas ethics and to find a new basis for
ethical argumentation in moral education I will present the basic idea of inductive
approach.
Key words: pedagogy of enlightenment, pedagogy of postmodernity, normativity,
Lyotard, Levinas, Hoffman, inductive approach
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Common accepted hypothesis that pedagogy as a normative science arouse from
enlightenment philosophical anthropology and political theory, specially from Kant’s
concepts, becomes interesting in the light spot of Lyotard postmodern philosophy.
Lyotard thesis about the death of great narratives of modern philosophy and science
points the question of legitimacy of millstones of pedagogy as science and one of the
most important questions is the question about legitimacy of main deductive pedagogical
goals, or even more general question of normative character of pedagogy as a science.
But if we want to find more clear answers to these questions, we have to approach first
the question of (at least relative) unity of enlightenment philosophical anthropology and
political theory and second, the question if Lyotard description of two great narratives of
enlightenment describes the whole scale of different pedagogical concepts that were
inspired by enlightenment philosophy. After this task I intent to approach how can the
turn in the idea of ethical normativity in Levinas philosophy influence the search for new
approaches on the models of moral and civic education, and finally which are weaknesses
and benefits of the inductive approach, first described in late sixties of the twentieth
century as special parental discipline practice by M. Hoffman. My general hypothesis is
that even postmodern pedagogy (like ethics and developmental psychology) remains a
normative science but the turn of normativity is not only a political question of
participation of pupils/students and their parents to become more active in negotiation
about the content of pedagogical goals (basic principle of democratic education). It is also
the question of new understanding of normativity, of normative agency on the field of
moral acting, and of ethical responsibility that arise from the turn of responsibility to
follow societal norms and ethical principle of justice to the concept of responsibility to
treat fellow person in a respectful manner, which in the terms of postmodern philosophy
enables acceptance of otherness and differences as central values of the present time.
Unity or diversity of enlightenment philosophy
For Usher and Edwards (1994, p. 24) the very rationale of the modern understanding of
education is founded “on the humanist idea of a certain kind of subject who has the
inherent potential to become self-motivated and self-directing.” Consequently the main
task of education became that of bringing out this potential so that subjects could become
“fully autonomous and capable of exercising their individual and intentional agency”
(ibid., pp. 34–35). And according to Lyotard the supposition of autonomous subject is the
ultimate great narrative of enlightenment philosophy that became the grounding idea of
normative sciences like psychology, sociology, law theory, and also pedagogy.
But when we take a closer look to the greatest philosophers of enlightenment period we
can find different answers to two, for pedagogy crucial questions:


What forms the anthropological basis of autonomy?
How can we support a development of autonomy of individual by educational
endeavors?
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The biggest discrepancy to the first question can be found between Kant and Rousseau on
one side and Hume on the other side. While first two authors try to prove that rationality
is the ultimate founding of human ethical agency (categorical imperative in Kant’s
philosophy and human soul, will, and rationality at Rousseau), Hume is convinced that
human sympathetic emotions form the basis for compassion and are therefore the source
of autonomous morality. While Kant’s and Rousseau’s ideas became the basis for
development of psychology and pedagogy in nineteenth and the beginning of twentieth
century, Hume’s concept of sympathetic emotions started to influence seriously to
psychological and pedagogical ideas in last three decades by the discovery of importance
of prosocial and moral emotions for human agency.
We can find even bigger diversity in the enlightenment answers to the second question.
While Kant is convinced that autonomy can be developed through strict discipline and
cultivation of human understanding (the thesis that is later fully accepted in so called
authoritative assertive type of discipline practices and educational concepts), Rousseau
believes that strict discipline causes rebellion of youngsters so moral education should be
founded on control over the child, on the construction of educational environment where
the child has as little as possible opportunity to chose social contacts or activities that we
believe are not good for him, and on indirect influence of educator’s personality. In this
concept of natural education a child should feel the full freedom from directive
discipline, but as Rousseau directly explained in the fourth book of Emile, behind the
child’s sense of (fictive) freedom there lies a trick which can be bind with the concept of
hidden authority (more in Kroflič 1997 and 2005). This thesis was later developed in the
concepts of preventive discipline and permissive/progressive educational movement.
Although Hume didn’t leave us strong pedagogical cues how to cultivate “sympathy as a
natural communication of passions from person to person”, A. Baier (1998, pp. 232-233
and 236) stresses out further universal virtues which lead to compassionate behavior:
intelligent attention to the consequences of actions as desirable in a person that is object
of our activity, ability to listen to others, and imaginative powers which enable
transcending of particular personal viewpoints. The answer to a question, how to educate
described capacities successfully can not be deduced from the authoritarian – permissive
conceptual dichotomy, that was developed from thirties in twentieth century according to
the methodical discrepancy between Kant and Rousseau. Although we can find a notion
about importance of love and acceptance of a child “instead” of thinking about successful
education in terms of strict discipline and pedagogical authority in the closing chapter of
the study The Authoritarian Personality (In the last sentence of very extensive study we
read: “If fear and destructiveness are the major emotional sources of fascism, eros
belongs to democracy.” (Adorno et all 1969, p. 976)), more detailed answers about the
normative role of a parent or a teacher who want to foster empathic and compassionate
virtues of a child can not be found earlier than in late sixties in M. Hoffman approaches
on so called inductive discipline (Hoffman 2000).
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On normative character of postmodern ethics and pedagogy
In philosophy of education, history of pedagogical concepts, and curriculum theories we
can find several reasons why pedagogy remains a normative science, although it has to
legitimize normative goals by ethical (and later also legal) principles and norms. As long
as education means following anticipating goals by chosen pedagogical endeavors, there
are logical, scientific, political and economical, educational, and humanistic (ethical)
reasons for clear planning of educational goals as the basis of curriculum planning. If we
follow I. Sheffler, P. Hirst, and R. Peters, then teaching and learning are intentional
activities so it is logical that recognizing supposed intentions and educational goals
should be the basis of educational planning (Kelly 1989). This “logic” becomes even
more obligatory in the field of political, economical, legal, and ethical reasons. If
education is a common societal cost (of the tax-payers) and also an intervention into
human being, then the citizens have the right to know for what reasons and effects they
give their money; even more, when according to the Declaration on human rights
education becomes a primarily right of parents, then a state should get the permission to
have influence under the children minds from their parents according to their agreement
about aims, content, and methods of education (ibid.). To conclude, despite Lyotard
thesis about the fall of great narratives of enlightenment philosophy which have defined
basic goals of education, and despite “an emphasis on the process of (moral) education
which is more important than a product, postmodern pedagogy should not deny the
importance of clear definition of telos – at least basic system of common values” as
goals of education as intentional activity (Medveš 1991).
If we take into account described reasons, we can accept a hypothesis about an inherent
normativity of educational action which is legitimated through ethical, pedagogical, and
legal principles. But the answer to the question, if ethical reasons of the enlightenment
period are today still strong enough for legitimizing the right to educate a person in a
public space/institution, is not so easy to take. When we try to defend a thesis on an
inherent normativity of educational action on one side and the thesis about the need for
new arguments for legitimizing our right to educate, we have to presuppose an existence
of new normative concepts that fit better with postmodern time than enlightenment
deontological ethics and law theory.
One of the theorists in the field of ethics who is becoming more and more influential also
on the ground of pedagogical explications is for sure E. Levinas. His basic idea about
radicaly heteronymous character of ethical act is a concrete example of denial of Kant’s
ethical ideal (autonomous morality). On the critique of enlightenment deontological
ethics Levinas constructs not only a new view on basic ethical questions (about common
good, ethical principles, and personal sources of moral acting), but also a new concept of
moral responsibility that can be easily transformed to pedagogy as criteria of good
education.
The basic idea of Levinas ethics can be found in his article The I and the Totality
(1954/2006):
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“…the reciprocity of this respect (between two persons, R. K.) is not an
indifferent relationship, such as serene contemplation, and it is not the result, but
the condition of ethics. It is language, that is, responsibility. Respect attaches the
just man to his associates in justice before attaching him to the man who demands
justice.” (Levinas 2006, p. 30)
According to Levinas a responsible moral orientation is therefore not a consequence of
contemplative moral reasoning of autonomous person (“under the veil of ignorance”, as J.
Rawls presupposes in his Theory of Justice (1971)), but a respectful dialog, evoked by the
face of associate person. With this basic statement Levinas opens up a dialogical space
where pedagogy becomes an event rather than being a preprogrammed process; but an
event with clear enough normative idea that was in history of ethical ideas recognized as
an ethical principle of respectful attitude to all humans, and that can be also found in
Kant’s second definition of categorical imperative: “you should never treat the other
person a means but always as an aim”.
If Kant has already recognized an importance of respectful attitude to associate person,
where is the new dimension of Levinas ethics? Is it just in pointing out a new priority of
ethical demands (the principle of respect before the basic principle of justice)? Or does
Levinas anthropology open radical new insights into normative character of pedagogy?
Although the answer to the first question is positive (demand on respectful attitude before
contemplating about justice), Levinas concept of ethics opens also a new dimensions of
normative character of pedagogy, and also some concrete ideas about new possible
concepts of methodic of moral education. In the following paragraphs I will point out
some of the most important ideas of Levinas thought for further development of
postmodern pedagogy:

If Kantian autonomous subject could be a responsible agent of morality in a stable
(protestant) culture, where all rational persons could rich the agreement on just
relations, Levinasean moral agents meet associates as unique persons, different from
themselves. The critical objection of C. Chalier on Kants ethics looks very plausible:
“… (In Kantian ethics; R. K.) the other deserves my respect because of his or her
rationality, his or her capability of being an autonomous person like myself,” and not
because of “the otherness of the other” (Chalier 2002, p. 68). Or as Levinas speaks by
himself: “The Other as Other is not only an alter ego: the Other is what I myself am
not. The Other is this, not because of the Other’s character, or physiognomy, or
psychology, but because of the Other’s very alterity.” (Levinas 1987, p. 83)
One of the most well known dilemmas in recent time education that deals with described
theoretical thesis is the gap between cultural differences in describing the importance of
symbols of Islamic cultures like women scarf and prohibition of portraying God. Both
symbols are in Europe usually described as an attack to the basic human rights: to equal
rights of men and woman (scarf should be a symbol of deprivileged status of women in
Islamic cultures), and the protest against caricatures of Mohamed in Danish newspaper
should be a symbol of denying the right of free speech/expressing personal opinions.
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Defenders of this kind of judgments usually forget, that in at least some Islamic cultures
many women deliberately wear scarf as a way to protect the view on themselves as mere
sexual objects; and that even in European cultures we are condemning hate speech as an
example of verbal attack following Locke’s argument of limiting principle of tolerance
when intolerant person attack tolerant one despite her willingness to be open to her
different arguments, although we usually don’t understand comical caricatures of
Christian God as an assault on our religion.

Levinas ethics does not open only the possibility of moral communication in a world
of differences. S. Todd claims that the Other of E. Levinas is “infinitely
unknowable”, but anyway susceptibility to absolute difference defines how we relate
to each other; even more, learning from the unknowable Other tells us who we really
are (Todd 2003, p. 3 and 34): “When I think I know, when I think I understand the
Other, I am exercising my knowledge over the Other, shrouding the Other in my own
totality. The Other becomes an object of my comprehension, my world, my narrative,
reducing the Other to me. What is at stake is my ego. But if I am exposed to the
Other, I can listen, attend, and be surprised; the Other can affect me, she ‘brings me
more than I contain’ (Levinas, Totality and Infinity 1961).” (Todd 2001, p. 73)
In classical pedagogical (and also psychological) concepts understanding the logic of
other is the basic condition of successful communication and also education. And despite
Freud’s notions on the importance of unconsciousness, even listening to the other was
focused to the topics of understanding and uncovering shadows of unconsciousness by
the rational tools of comprehension of other’s identity and of our own inner obstacles that
block successful relationship. In contemporary understanding of principles of pedagogy
of listening the emphasis on dialog with children or youngsters is “...giving value to the
other...” (Rinaldi 2006, p. 114) and opening ourselves to the narrative of the other in a
dialog, that becomes transformative for my own identity (ibid., p. 76). What we should
add to the famous advocates of pedagogy of listening like C. Rinaldi, classical
enlightenment conception of normativity where a teacher as autonomous subject is an
ultimate criteria of truth and morality, can not be accepted anymore as epistemological
basis of educational dialog in before described terms of pedagogy of listening.

However even Levinas admits that in life there are situations when meeting with
other’s face as ultimate ethical criteria becomes impossible. Levinas himself became
a victim of Nazi anti-Semitic regime, so he experienced that in concentration camp
the executioner of evil calls for violence and no longer has a Face. In that case,
“…there is a certain measure of violence necessary in terms of justice (that must be
regulated by a state). But, on the other hand, it is in terms of the relation to Face …
that we can speak of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the state. A state in which the
interpersonal relationship is impossible … is a totalitarian state. So there is a limit to
the state.” (Levinas 1987, p. 90)
As we can see, even in (postmodern) emphasis on openness to the dialog with the other
as different, the idea of importance of accepting limitations for possible violence in
public space in terms of universal human rights that we became aware in enlightenment
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period is still important. What changes in the theoretical frame of Levinas ethics (and
also in some other postmodern theories) is the believe that the spirit of human rights and
living in just and caring community can be strengthened more successfully with the
emphasis on respectful relation to the other’s face than with models of disciplining and
cultivating moral reasoning of autonomous subject. This methodical turn is developing in
the most clear and (in pedagogical sense) applicable form in the concept of inductive
moral education, which I will present in the following section of the paper.
Normativity in inductive moral education
The concept of inductive approach was introduced in late sixties by M. Hoffman as a new
concept of parent’s discipline practice, and what is for most common classifications of
educational approaches important, as a concept in opposition to authoritative-assertive
type of education on one side and emotional conditioning (permissive type of education)
on the other side. According to Hoffman with inductive discipline, we:



Express our disapproval of the child’s act and indicate implicitly or explicitly that the
act is wrong and that the child has committed an infraction (this dimension is present
also in other two discipline concepts);
Call attention to the victim distress and make it salient to the child;
Point up the role of the child’s action in causing that distress, what creates the
condition for feeling empathy-based guilt, which is a feeling of intense disesteem for
oneself for wrongfully harming another (Hoffman 2000, p. 151).
Further empirical approaches confirmed that inductive discipline has statistically
significant impact on faster development of empathy and pro-social attitudes in children
(if we compare this impacts with “Kohlbergian” authoritative-assertive discipline
practices; e.g., Krevans and Gibbs 1996, Eisenberg 2003). The researchers of inductive
discipline had more difficulties with distinguishing of empathy-based guilt from oedipal
guilt, and of inductive approach from emotional conditioning (Krevans and Gibbs 1996).
Concerning the first distinction we have to mention later approaches of S. Tood (2003),
who confirmed Hoffman’s thesis about existence of guilt in early childhood prior to
solution of oedipal crisis. Furthermore K. Kristjansson (2004) philosophical investigation
of Hoffman’s concept, where he affirmed the importance of sympathetic distress and prosocial emotions like compassion, indignation, and empathic guilt, and who despite
reproach on theoretical indistinctness of concepts of emphatic distress and sympathetic
distress ended his investigation with thesis, that “…philosophers have probably much
more to learn about children and morality from psychologists of Hoffman's standing than
psychologists have to learn from philosophers.” (Ibid, p. 304)
What is new in Hoffman’s inductive approach?
As we can already see from this short survey, in description of inductive discipline
Hoffman is following Hume’s concept of normative agency on the field of moral acting,
derivating from human’s sympathetic emotions toward well-being of a relative person. In
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his complex theory of the development of empathy, Hoffman confirmed arise of prosocial motivation from empathic guilt and he also mentioned the possibility of positive
educational endeavors when we confirm and therefore strengthen child’s considerate
behaviors (Hoffman 2000, p. 151).
But if we want to defend thesis about the possibility to build a new educational concept
on the basis of inductive approach, we have to widen Hoffman’s approaches on several
theoretical and methodical questions, like:




What could be the profound anthropological basis of inductive educational
approach?
How can we define basic educational goals (and therefore a new concept of
pedagogical normativity)?
Which are the principles of a new educational methodic?
How can we define active role of educator in inductive educational approach?
As many theorists of so called liberal pedagogy have already emphasized, one of the
basic anthropological ideas of inductive approach is the thesis about equal importance of
pro-social emotions (personal virtues) as well as cognitive competencies (rational tools
for ethical reasoning) for morality. So R. S. Peters (1998) stressed out the importance of
authenticity, rational reflection, and strength of will for the development of autonomy,
and among personal virtues that are important for moral reasoning and acting, he
mentioned courage, integrity, and determination, while K. Strike (2003) is speaking about
the importance of critical capacity, but also of virtues like courage, temperance,
compassion, and considering the needs of others. In this place I would like to mention
also the idea of H. Gardner (2007) about necessity of the development of two relatively
separated sets of competencies of our mind – respectful mind and ethical mind – that are
important for our moral reasoning and acting. If we add to this list of prominent theorists
already mentioned notion of K. Kristjansson about the importance of pro-social emotions
like compassion, indignation, and empathic guilt, we see that more and more theorists are
becoming aware of the importance of different personal dimensions for moral reasoning
and acting which were not in the spot light of interest in models of moral development
that were built on the Kantian concept of man as autonomous moral subject.
Another anthropological basis of inductive educational approach can be found in the idea
of developmental priority of personal competencies for morality, based on empathic guilt,
in relation to rational competencies for moral reasoning. Discovery of so called empathic
guilt in very early childhood by M. Klein and S. Tood, and the discovery of early
development of empathy as a source of pro-social emotions by M. Hoffman confirms the
thesis, that we have much more possibilities for fostering moral development than pure
discipline practices which help young child to act responsible according to set of social
and moral rules in the developmental period when a child is yet not capable to understand
the meaning of social and moral obligations. As we will see later, formation of personal
virtues and pro-social emotions based on empathy can begin in very early childhood by
motivating a child to step into interpersonal relations and to become sensitive for
emotional reactions to those relationships and mutual activities. Therefore discipline
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practices that are based on rewards and punishment of child’s behavior and on our efforts
to enable child’s internalization of social and moral rules, that were the basis of moral
education in Freud’s, Piaget’s, and Kohlberg’s concepts of moral development, are simply
not the only answer to moral education. According to R. S. Peters one of the biggest
paradoxes of moral education is, that while we aim at “the intelligent adaptability of a
rational code” with “spontaneous delight in practising it” (Peters 1998 a, p. 32), “the
brute facts of child development reveal that at the most formative years of a child’s
development he is incapable of this form of life and impervious to the proper manner of
passing it on.” (Ibid., p. 38)
The third anthropological idea that is important for inductive educational approach is the
recognition of the special value of so called relational goods and virtues, like love and
friendship for the development of pro-social and moral orientation as important part of
the child’s identity. According to M. Nussbaum (1986) we can trace this idea in
Aristotle’s ethics in notion that more than a content of teaching the personal relationship
between pupil and a teacher is important for pupil’s ethical development. If we mention
again Klein’s and Tood’s idea about arise ob emphatic guilt from the early relation
between the child and important other, we can confirm thesis of many proponents of so
called ethics of virtue that moral and identity development is growing from encumbered
interpersonal relations and activities, so the quality of this social space is the most
important educational factor (MacIntyre 1981).
Second necessary element of inductive educational paradigm is the question about
possible changes of basic educational goals. Although educational goals were in history
usually described in terms of basic values or ethical norms, to describe specific of
inductive educational paradigm I will use the question, in what terms we can describe the
core of moral responsibility?
According to changes of shifts in Kant and Levinas ethics, we can describe the distinction
between responsibility in modern and post-modern pedagogy, which accepts basic
principles of Levinas ethics. If the former concept defined ethical responsibility as the
demand to follow societal norms (in so called conventional phase of morality) and ethical
principles (in so called post-conventional phase of autonomous morality), today we can
define ethical responsibility as primarily respectful ethical response to an existential call
of the other, as personal commitment to respectful being and acting, and as care for our
life mission and consistent identity (see more in Kroflič 2007).
When we speak about the shift in normative idea, we have to consider also the
importance of anthropological thesis about the priority of respectful relationship before
ethical principle of justice. This last thesis contains two dimensions: we can speak about
the priority of respectful relationship before ethical principle in epistemological sense (of
“competing” ethical criteria for moral reasoning), and also about the priority of respectful
relationship before ethical principle in the developmental sense. The last thesis simply
means that personal qualities for respectful attitude can be developed before child’s
capabilities for ethical reasoning.
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Ethical and anthropological ideas lead us to the basic structure of inductive educational
methodic which can be described in three phases:



If ethical consciousness demands complex cognitive capacities, child is even in
first years capable to step to relations of love and friendship, through which
he/she develops relational response-ability and normative agency for pro-social
activities in most authentic way;
because personal encumbered relation may be harmful when empathic overarousal, empathic bias, pity and paternalism arise, next step is development of the
sense of respect toward concrete persons or activities;
the last step of moral education is to become aware of ethical principles and
humanistic demands, concerning specially human rights and ecological values,
and learn how to use them as basis for democratic negotiation in cases of
interpersonal conflicts (ibid.).
What is important to add to this short description is that proposed model should not be
understood as classical linear developmental step model (like Kohlberg’s model of the
development of moral reasoning) because every phase of the model remains important for
morality even when next developmental step was reached. As we have already seen
through the short analysis of conflicts about the meaning of Muslim cultural symbols,
keeping in mind the principle of respect while we are trying to apply logic of justice in
public space is especially very important in multicultural societies. And second notion,
that the best way of using inductive model of moral development is – inclusive school
environment and not only an abstract learning of solving moral dilemmas in the
classroom.
We finally reached the last question that is important for the development of inductive
approach of pro-social and moral education - how to define an active role of educator?
Since I started to develop inductive approach as a complex educational paradigm from
Hoffman’s notions of specific discipline practice, it is obvious that in discipline practices
a teacher has very active role which is connected with specific normative idea how to
stop child’s not acceptable behavior. In inductive discipline a teacher has to demand
child’s responsibility for the effects of his act, call attention to the victim distress, and
make it salient to the child. This simply means that a teacher should not allow the child to
“look away” and avoid the recognition of the damage, his behavior has produced. But
with careful observation we can notice an important shift in his normative position
toward the child. A teacher is no longer in a position of ultimate criteria of morality in
terms of calling attention to the ethical value, norm, or principle. The ultimate normative
criteria lie at child’s obligation to look at the face of the victim, which we have already
recognized as pre-ethical criteria of morality in Levinas philosophy.
Although an educator’s role in inductive approach remains active, described shift in
relation toward ultimate criteria of morality changes the character of educator’s authority.
While describing the basic structure of pedagogical authority I propose two important
features:
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

authority is a dialogical and not a substantial concept, that could be described in
terms of a set of personal (or formal) features of an educator, a pupil, and/or
educational setting (Kroflic 1997 and 2005; see also Bingham and Sidorkin 2004,
Bingham 2008);
authority is (like concept of transfer in psychoanalysis) a concept that enables
educational effects but on the other hand it is a main obstacle to reach the ultimate
goal of moral education – development of personal responsibility and critical
moral reasoning (Kroflic 1997 and 2005).
The solution of this last paradox can be described in terms of creating a type of
educational authority that is constructed through the relationship between teacher and
pupil with the following maxim: “The good teacher is therefore a person who is always
working himself out of a job.” (Hirst and Peters 1970); a maxim that was developed from
similar principle of Aristotle: Amicus Plato, magis amica veritas. It is a type of authority
that I defined as self-limiting authority (Kroflic 1997), similar to C. Bingham (2008, p.
95) hypothesis about possible deliberating dimension of authority: “Students need to
think of teachers and schools as centres of authority, authority they can use to increase
their own agency.”
According C. Bingham (ibid.), a traditional concept of authority as substance leads us to
an educational (or better say discipline) situation that is similar to Kafkean novels, where
teacher as the doorkeeper doesn’t allow students to step behind the wall where the
ultimate source of the moral truth suppose to lie. And possible deliberation lies in a
changing role of a teacher in an educational relation. Inductive teacher is no more
pointing a finger to imaginary ultimate source of moral law and describing himself as a
guard at the gates of wisdom. He is stressing out the importance of the face of a person
who was a victim of conflict and this person is a kind of witness that somebody has
crossed the line of respectful relationship. Self-limitation of teacher’s authority in
epistemological sense opens the possibility of activating moral sentiments and reasoning
which leads to a possibility to restore damage. Combining elements of emotional distress,
of pro-social emotions, moral reasoning, and moral acting is the way how we draw moral
education near to the principles of experiental learning and realistic educational approach
(Korthagen 2001).
Conclusion
If we started discussion with hypothesis that pedagogy as a normative science arouse
from enlightenment philosophical anthropology and political theory, specially from
Kant’s concept of morality, we first discovered a heterogeneity of enlightenment ideas
about ultimate source of autonomous morality, and second even bigger heterogeneity of
pedagogical ideas how to foster moral development in education. All described ideas had
a big influence on understanding of pedagogical normativity, and question of different
normative moral ideas became even more clear in a spotlight of Kant’s and Levinas
ethics. Binding principles of Hume’s and Levinas ethics with Hoffman’s investigations in
inductive discipline and Kristjansson’s arguments on the importance of pro-social
emotions we found a confirmation of hypothesis, that shift in basic vision on moral
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responsibility (toward respectful relationship) opens possibilities for development of
complex inductive approach to moral education. This shift of normativity in a way
refreshes old antiquity debate between Plato and Aristotle about how to draw moral
principles from the sky to the ground, from abstract societal norms and ethical principles
to the responsibility for human interrelations, which is brilliantly visualized in Rafael’s
painting School of Athens (Vatican 1510-1511).
And finally we saw that shift in moral normativity can be connected with the possibilities
of structuring new type of pedagogical authority (which we described as self-limiting
authority) which can strengthen pupil’s moral agency, a goal that can be characterized as
one of the most complex questions in the history of pedagogy.
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