Download Moral Responsibilities and Extreme Poverty: Rethinking Our Affluent

1
Moral Responsibilities and Extreme Poverty: Rethinking
Our Affluent Lifestyle
Introduction:
Approximately 1.5 billion people – one-quarter of all human beings alive today –
live below the international poverty line.1 827 million people experience malnourishment.
114 million children do not attend elementary school. Each year, 10.8 million children
die under the age of five due to malnourishment and preventable diseases. 1.2 billion
people do not have access to improved water sources. 2.4 billion lack access to adequate
sanitation. Extreme poverty is by far the number-one cause of human misery. In 1998,
approximately 1.3 million deaths resulted from war, homicides, and violence, while
starvation and preventable diseases claimed 18 times that; deaths due to poverty-related
causes, such as malnutrition and diseases that can be prevented or cured cheaply, account
for one-third of all human deaths.2 And the problem is only worsening; according to
philosopher Thomas Pogge, “The number of persons who are poor… ‘rose from 1.2
billion in 1987 to 1.5 billion [in 1999] and, if recent trends persist, will reach 1.9 billion
by 2015.’”
Much philosophical, economic, and political debate has ensued over whether the
disparity between affluent nations and impoverished nations engenders moral obligations
for individuals to act. While it is possible that institutions have moral responsibilities to
alleviate extreme poverty, here I am primarily concerned with the responsibilities of
affluent individuals3 for several reasons: first, we are able to alter our individual
behaviors, if morally required, immediately in response to the urgency of the suffering
and death caused by extreme poverty, whereas changes within institutional settings are
2
often gradual and more complex; and second, to avoid hypocrisy, we should ask what
responsibilities we have before pointing to others to change. Some, such as Garret
Hardin, Herschel Elliot, and Rudiger Bittner, argue that we do not have a moral
obligation to alleviate extreme poverty. Hardin and Elliot argue that giving aid results in
more harm than good, arguing that the earth is like a lifeboat with limited resources,
“First, we must recognize the limited capacity of any lifeboat. For example, a nation's
land has a limited capacity to support a population and as the current energy crisis has
shown us, in some ways we have already exceeded the carrying capacity of our land”
(593). Bittner argues that “world hunger is a political problem” and cannot be adequately
addressed as a moral issue (27).
Others argue that we do have a strong moral obligation to give aid to those in
impoverished nations; yet they disagree on how much we are morally obligated to
sacrifice. Peter Singer, Jonathon Glover and Peter Unger argue that we are morally
obligated to “… give away most of [our] financially valuable assets, and much of [our]
income…”4 in effort to alleviate extreme poverty.5 While Mylan Engel and Raziel
Abelson, agree that we should give, they reject the high standards proposed by Singer,
Glover, and Unger. Abelson argues that due to our moral obligations to those who are
emotionally close, we are not morally obligated to give as much as Singer, Glover, and
Unger demand, arguing instead “I am willing to meet them partway, by conceding that
we can and should give more than we usually do to worthy philanthropic causes like
famine relief and Amnesty International, while still maintaining that we owe more to
intimates than to strangers…” (39). In an attempt to convince his audience that they
should give aid, Engel argues that we are obligated to give only a small amount of aid to
3
those living in extreme poverty: “If you can help reduce the amount of unnecessary
suffering in the world with minimal effort on your part, with no risk to yourself or others,
with no noticeable reduction in your standards of living or the standard of living of your
dependents, and without thereby failing to fulfill any other more pressing obligation, then
you ought to do so” (432).
Yet, each of these arguments is limited. The goal of this paper is to synthesize and
build upon previously made arguments to provide a cohesive and compelling argument
outlining why we are morally obligated to alleviate extreme poverty and how we should
fulfill this obligation. Influenced by virtue ethics, I argue that individuals of affluent
nations have a moral obligation to alleviate poverty that includes giving a significant6
portion of our income to poverty-relief organizations and changing our habits of
consumption in a salient7 way. To reach this conclusion, I argue that extreme poverty is a
moral issue, someone should do something to alleviate extreme poverty, and, more
specifically, affluent individuals are obligated to alleviate extreme poverty.
The first step to providing a compelling case for why we are morally obligated to
alleviate the burdens experienced by those in extreme poverty is to show that the issue of
extreme poverty is of moral concern. Bittner argues that world hunger is not a moral issue
because, he claims, 1) morality concerns only those who are close to us and 2) world
hunger is not imputable and morality does not deal with situations in which there is no
identifiable cause or agent whom is responsible. Bittner first argues that moral
obligations are restricted to those who are close to us. As those who are affected by world
hunger are not close to us, Bittner concludes that “there is no viable moral understanding
of world hunger” (27). Bittner does not give specific criteria for the term “close,” but
4
affirms that if he were to draw out specific criteria, those experiencing world hunger
would come out on the “not close” side (28). Bittner’s second argument is that world
hunger is not imputable, and thus cannot be a moral issue, but rather must be relegated as
a political concern.8 He claims that “nothing of even moderate political significance is
done in our day by just one or a few individual actors… The outcome, therefore, is not
clearly anybody’s doing in particular” (30). Bittner claims that we do not have a clear
understanding of who brought about world hunger or who is bringing it about, and thus it
cannot be assigned moral weight or addressed in moral terms.
Bittner’s argument that we do not have moral obligations to give aid to those in
impoverished nations because they are not close to us is not convincing for several
reasons. First, one could argue that in our new globalized era, we are close to those living
in distant nations; we are highly dependent upon people in other nations and our actions
‘here’ have consequences for people living ‘there.’ Bittner anticipates that one could
argue that we are, in fact, close to those living in distant nations as the current state of the
world brings people closer through economic, political, and social exchange. Bittner
responds that this is not what he means by “close,” explaining that we do not experience
life with those who suffer from world hunger; “there is really no cosmopolis, no city of
the world, if by a city we mean the place of a shared life” (29). Yet, even if Bittner is
correct,9 one could still argue that despite the lack of proximity to those in distant nations,
we still have moral obligations toward them. We have moral obligations to refrain from
harming other human beings, regardless of their closeness to us. It is morally wrong to
send off and detonate weapons that kill innocent distant civilians, even if these civilians
are faceless and nameless individuals living thousands of miles away from us. Perhaps
5
what Bittner means is that we have different of moral obligations for those who are close
to us and those who are distant. If such a difference existed, our obligations to those in
distant nations would not be non-existent, but rather of a different nature.10 Thus, it
appears that Bittner’s argument concerning the proximity to us of those in distant nations
does not support the argument that extreme global poverty is not a moral issue.11
While Bittner may be correct in his claim that world hunger cannot easily be
attributed to the specific actions of specific individuals, it does not necessarily follow that
the issue of world poverty is not of moral concern. One could argue that instead of
concluding that world hunger is not a moral issue, we should look to principles other than
imputability to guide our moral judgment. In “Distributing Responsibilities,” David
Miller examines four different principles of moral judgment: causation, moral
responsibility, capacity, and community.12 Upon examination of these four principles,
Miller acknowledges that none of them are adequate on their own for distributing
remedial responsibilities. Thus, he concludes that an acceptable theory of remedial
responsibility would combine all four principles into one “mutli-principle theory” in
which “we should simply look to see which principle or principles apply in a particular
case, and if we find that more than one applies, we should weigh their respective
strengths” (464, 466, 467). Miller calls this approach the “connection theory,” meaning
that each of the four principles provides a way to identify the remedial connection
between an agent and a harmed individual (469). Miller argues that by providing multiple
criteria through the connection theory, it is ensured that there is always some agent who
can be assigned responsibility for remedying P’s condition (471).
6
Thus, while Bittner may be correct that it is difficult, if not impossible,13 to
attribute the situation of world poverty to specific individuals, implying that the principle
of causation is not helpful here, there are still other principles that may offer guidance for
who is morally responsible to alleviate extreme poverty, such as the principle of moral
responsibility, the principle of capacity, and the principle of community. For example,
while we may not know who pushed a drowning child into the lake, we can still look to
other principles to determine who is morally responsible to jump in and save the
youngster.14 I do not intend to flesh out each of the principles here, Miller provides an indepth analysis of each principle in his essay, but rather I hope to show that moral
responsibility is not solely dependent upon causation, and thus Bittner’s claim that we
cannot determine the specific responsible parties of world poverty does not necessarily
imply that world poverty is not of moral concern. Bittner’s two premises, that we do not
have moral obligations to those who are not close and we do not have moral obligations
for situations that are not imputable, prove to be unconvincing reasons for why the issue
of world poverty should be relegated as a political, rather than moral, issue. As world
poverty involves harm and suffering of other human beings, regardless of their distance
to us or the catalysts of the problem, and proves to be a moral issue, many moral
questions arise about what should be done and by who to alleviate such suffering and
remedy such harms.
Someone Should do Something to Alleviate Extreme Poverty
While those who have written on alleviating extreme poverty often disagree on
who should give and how much should be given, most agree that the moral seriousness
7
and urgency of extreme poverty indicate that someone should to something to alleviate
world poverty. Even Bittner claims that world hunger is important and should be
addressed as a political concern (31). As Mylan Engel claims, in “Hunger, Duty, and
Ecology: What we Owe to Starving Humans,” most of us believe that human suffering is
a bad thing, agreeing that it is bad when an innocent [person] suffers a slow painful death
from starvation (430). Furthermore, we agree that human suffering should be alleviated
or ended, and thus it follows that a moral obligation for someone to do something to
alleviate extreme poverty exists.
Yet, some reject this claim. Herschel Elliot, in “A General Statement of the
Tragedy of the Commons,” argues that while extreme poverty may be a moral issue, there
is no moral obligation to assist those suffering from extreme poverty because doing so
brings about more harms than if we were to let these people die. Because human
consumption and waste is beginning to exceed Earth’s finite biosystem, Elliot argues that
we are morally obligated to control the human population in order to minimize these
environmental pressures and destruction. Controlling human population, according to
Elliot, includes allowing those to die in impoverished nations. Elliot claims that those
who follow humanitarian ethics in effort to save human lives actually contribute to the
pressure on the earth:
Thus severally and in conjunction, people – from the selfish individualists who
seek to maximize personal wealth to the most self-sacrificing altruists who devote
their entire lives to the elimination of inequality, injustice, and human suffering –
all work together to take more land, more water, more fuels, and biological
resources away from all other living things (6).
8
Thus, we are not morally obligated to act to prevent suffering caused by extreme poverty,
according to Elliot; in fact, we are morally obligated to not act to alleviate those suffering
in distant nations as doing so brings about more harm than good.
Garret Hardin, whom Elliot writes in defense of, also argues that there is no moral
obligation to alleviate extreme poverty in distant nations. In, “The Case Against Helping
the Poor,” Hardin compares the earth to a lifeboat in which the rich are sitting in and the
poor are struggling to climb aboard. Hardin argues that if we start letting people into our
boat, which has a minimum capacity that is already near full, the boat will become
overcrowded and sink, resulting in everyone, rich and poor, drowning. Even if we did
pull some poor swimmers into our lifeboat, Hardin argues, the lifeboat would be quickly
overpopulated and sink in the near future, thus costing more lives than would be lost in
the present. In comparison to giving aid, Hardin and Elliot argue, if we save those who
are starving now, they will have many more children, as the birth rates of underdeveloped
countries are high, and then these children will not be able to be fed and even more
people will be starving in the future. While Hardin specifically refers to International
Humanitarian Aid organizations, such as a potential World Food Bank or the “Food for
Peace program” of the 1960s and 70s, his overall message pertains to all. He concludes
that those in impoverished nations (struggling to survive in the dark sea) should not be
“rescued” by those in affluent nations (those already in the lifeboat); thus institutions, and
one could infer individuals, should not give humanitarian aid to those in distant countries.
While Elliot and Hardin raise valid concerns about limited resources, such
concerns do not support the claim that we are not obligated to give aid to those that
would otherwise die in other nations. In fact, as I will show, it is possible to give aid
9
without overburdening the earth. First, we can give aid without overburdening the
environment because studies of trends on birth rates and gross national product show that
as living-standards within a nation increase, birth rates decrease.15. Elliot and Hardin’s
concern that saving those living in extreme poverty will lead to more births and therefore
more deaths in the future is not supported; in fact, if we gave aid to other nations and
increased their living standards, we would expect to see a decrease in population growth
while at the same time saving millions of lives. In addition, while saving more lives
within impoverished nations may potentially increase the demand on the earth’s system
of resources, this demand can be countered by a decrease in affluent nations’
consumption. In “A Special Moment in History: The Challenge of Overpopulation and
Overconsumption,” Bill McKibben claims that the average American consumes more
energy per day than the average human being, consuming at least six times more
calories.16 Thus, any increase in demands on the earth’s resources brought about by
aiding those in starving nations can easily be countered by a slight decrease in the
consumption habits of those in affluent nations. If we look at the earth’s finite system in
this way, in which we can counter increased demands by decreasing demands elsewhere,
we see that Elliot and Hardin’s concerns about giving aid to others can be addressed and
resolved, thus eliminating their claim that we should not alleviate extreme poverty.
Finally, Elliot and Hardin’s concerns of increased pressure on the earth due to increased
population size can be addressed by endorsing specific types of aid. Concerns of
population growth should not deter us from giving aid, but rather lead us to reconsider
what type of aid we are giving to those in impoverished nations, as Singer suggests,
“Instead of food handouts, it may be better to give aid that leads to a slowing of
10
population growth. This may mean agricultural assistance for the rural poor, or assistance
with education, or the provision of contraceptive services” (240). Thus, as Hardin and
Elliot’s concern of overpopulation can be resolved, appeal to the potential problems
raised by giving aid does not justify the argument that we should not give and the
argument that someone should do something to alleviate extreme poverty is not
rejected.17
Affluent Individuals’ Obligation to Alleviate Extreme Poverty
Once we have established that someone must do something to alleviate extreme
poverty, the question follows: “who should do something?” While there may be many
equally correct answers to this question, I am specifically concerned with arguing that
individuals of affluent nations, those like you and me who live in wealthy nations and
have our basic needs secured and live well above the international poverty line,18 must do
something to alleviate extreme poverty. One may object that affluent individuals do not
have a moral obligation to help those in extreme poverty, but rather those countries in
extreme poverty should be responsible for their own people. While governments,
organizations, and individuals in impoverished nations may have specific obligations to
those within their own political and cultural boundaries, they alone cannot alleviate the
burdens of extreme poverty. The Human Development Report 2003 emphasizes the need
of a Millennium Development Compact19 because structural impediments, such as
widespread disease, geographic isolation, fragile ecologies, overdependence on primary
commodity exports, and rapid population growth, keep poor countries trapped in poverty,
with low or negative economic growth (italics added, 17). Impoverished countries
oftentimes lack the necessary tools for escaping poverty and face numerous economic,
11
social, political, and physical occlusions. Because of this and for reasons I will expand
upon shortly, I conclude that affluent individuals do in fact have an obligation to do
something to alleviate extreme poverty.
To address concerns and arguments of other philosophers, understand why we
may have moral obligation to those in extreme poverty, and further define how we can
fulfill these obligations, I have found the principle of the “golden mean” from the theory
of virtue ethics to be insightful. The theory of virtue ethics holds that the proper function,
or purpose, of human20 life is to live in accordance with the best and most complete
virtues or excellence (191) Virtue pertains to excellence of the soul (or mind), not simply
excellence of the body (197), and can be divided into two types of virtue: intellectual and
moral (198). Intellectual virtues include theoretical wisdom, understanding, and practical
wisdom; moral virtues include generosity and self-control. When speaking of a person’s
character, we refer to the moral virtues. Here, I am primarily concerned with moral
virtue, as I am arguing for a moral obligation. To live in accordance with virtue implies
more than just possessing virtuous characteristics, “For a characteristic may exist without
producing any good result, as for example, in a man who is asleep or incapacitated in
some other respect” (193). To live in accordance with virtue requires that humans engage
in actions that conform to virtue (193). Moral virtue is developed by habit; in the same
way we learn bad habits through repeated action, we must learn and master virtuous
habits through repeated action (199). Thus, to fulfill our human purpose is to strive,
through repeated virtuous action, to become a virtuous person.
To determine what constitutes a virtuous action we must look for the mean of
moral qualities, as the “nature of moral qualities is such that they are destroyed by defect
12
and by excess” (200). To illustrate this claim, Aristotle provides an analogy of strength
and health, “excess as well as deficiency of physical exercise destroys our strength, and
similarly, too much and too little food and drink destroys our health; the proportionate
amount, however, produces, increases, and preserves it” (italics added, 200). Aristotle
claims every continuous entity, including characteristics and actions, has a median which
is “a point equidistant from both extremes” (203). For example, in feelings of fear and
confidence, courage is the median between recklessness (an excess of confidence and
complete deficiency of fear) and cowardliness (an excess of fear and deficiency in
confidence) (205). The extremes are vices and the medians are virtues. To become
virtuous individuals, we must avoid the excess and deficiency of characteristics and
actions and instead aim for the median (207).21 Keeping this principle of the median in
mind, as well as previous arguments, let us examine arguments for why and how we
should alleviate extreme poverty in distant nations.
First, as many have previously argued, we are obligated to act to alleviate extreme
poverty because we have the capacity to do so (Singer, 230; Abelson, 39; Miller, 460;
Engel, 433). If an agent has the ability to help someone and chooses not to do so, that
agent is oftentimes judged as morally flawed. If an agent walked by a pond and saw a
small child drowning, and the agent happened to have a life-ring in her hands which she
could easily throw to the drowning child, she would be morally obligated to attempt to
save the child by at least throwing out the life-ring. In this scenario, the agent has the
capacity to save another human life without bringing about risk to herself or others; she
simply has to toss the ring to the child. The moral obligation of this situation may differ
from the moral obligation of a situation in which the agent did not have the life-ring and
13
swimming in to save the child may have endangered the agent’s well-being, and therefore
the agent’s capacity to help or get help, for example if the agent did not have the ability
to swim. Virtue not only requires that we move to the midpoint of two extremes, but also
that we act at the right time, toward the right objects, toward the right people, for the right
reason, and in the right manner (203). Thus in the case where one does not have the
capacity to swim, we would understand that to act to save the child would be reckless and
foolish, and thus the agent would not be excessive or deficient in her inaction. Yet, in the
situation where the agent does have the capacity to help, we can see that she should help
the child, regardless of whether she caused or was in other ways responsible for the
child’s situation.
In the case of extreme poverty, affluent individuals have the capacity to save
those in the life-threatening situation of absolute poverty. A donation of 15 cents can be
used to give a child living in extreme poverty a life-saving packet of oral rehydration
salts and a donation of 25 cents could be used to give a child life-saving antibiotics for
acute respiratory infection (Engel, 426). Each day, approximately 6,350 children die from
the dehydrating effects of chronic diarrhea and another 6,350 die from acute respiratory
infections. A donation of $10 per month, over the course of a year, would prevent 40
children from dying soon (Engel, 434). Those individuals in affluent nations clearly have
the capacity to give at least 10 cents to save one life; in fact our lifestyle provides us with
the capacity to give much much more. Just as we are morally obligated to save the
drowning child, our capacity to help those in impoverished nations also results in moral
obligation to do so.
14
Secondly, affluent individuals are now engaged in a new type of relationship with
global strangers involving stronger connections and a larger “community.” Through new
technologies, increased international trade, and increased mobility, we are now more
connected than ever before to those who live across the world. We are highly dependent
upon those living in other nations; most of our fruits and vegetables are grown in
Southern and Central America,22 most of our gasoline is produced by individuals in the
Middle East and East Africa, 23 and most of our clothes are made by individuals in
Southeast Asia.24 Also, our media is full of stories about people in distant countries; we
are aware of their daily widespread plight. More than ever are we connected to and
interactive with, through economic and political institutions, other individuals in our
global community.
In addition to becoming economically interconnected to those in distant nations,
we are also environmentally interconnected. We share the same air, water, and natural
resources with those living in distant countries. Air pollution, rapid deforestation, unsafe
water, and hazardous waste are not restrained by man-made borders that separate nations.
For example, increased emissions of greenhouse gasses in the United States affects those
in other countries just as much, and sometimes more, than those living here in the United
States. While different geographic regions contain different ecosystems, they are all
interconnected to create the larger global ecosystem of which we all rely upon and belong
to.
As we are economically and environmentally interconnected on a global scale,
our actions affect more people living in other countries. As a consumer of global
products, my purchasing affects producers in South and Central America, the Middle East
15
and East Africa, and Southeast Asia. As a consumer of global resources, my consumption
affects the environment of those living near and far. Our actions have consequences for
others living in distant nations and we are causally responsible for these consequences,
regardless of where they take place. For example, if I put a bomb on a plane that
detonates 15,000 miles away and kills complete strangers, I am responsible for the
consequences of my action. If our actions bring economic and environmental harm to
those in distant nations and we remain unconcerned about the pain and suffering inflicted
upon those distant individuals, it seems that we would be engaging in the vice of brutish
behavior.25 In contrast, to act virtuously would be to show compassion for those in
distant nations and act in ways that do not bring harm to our fellow community members.
As individuals of affluent nations have the capacity to help, are part of a new globalized
community in which our actions affect those in distant nations, and would be morally
vicious to fail to act, they must act to alleviate extreme poverty.
We Must Give a Significant Portion of our Income
To fulfill our obligation to alleviate extreme poverty, we, affluent individuals,
must give a significant portion26 of our income to organizations that work to mitigate the
suffering experienced by those in extreme poverty. As noted previously, many agree that
we have an obligation to give aid to those living in extreme poverty, though they differ
on the appropriate amount. In contrast to previous arguments, I propose that we need to
give a significant portion of our income, meaning not too much, as is proposed by Singer,
Unger, and Glover, nor too little, as is proposed by Engel and Abelson.
First, the standard proposed by Singer, Unger and Glover is problematic because
it is excessive. This standard is identified as the standard of marginal utility, Singer
16
presents this standard in his argument, “… it follows that I and everyone else in similar
circumstances ought to give as much as possible, that is, at least up to the point at which
by giving more one would begin to cause serious suffering for oneself and one's
dependents - perhaps even beyond this point to the point of marginal utility, at which by
giving more one would cause oneself and one's dependents as much suffering as one
would prevent in Bengal.27” Those who endorse the standard of marginal utility argue
that we must give most of our wealth to those living in extreme poverty if we are to
escape moral guilt. Peter Unger writes, “On pain of living a life that’s seriously immoral,
a typical well-off person, like you and me, must give away most of her financially
valuable assets, and much of her income, directing the funds to lessen efficiently the
serious suffering of others” (134). According to Jonathon Glover “It is arguable that we
would have to give money to fight starvation up to the point where we needed it more
than those we were helping: perhaps to the point where we would die without it. For not
to do so would be to allow more people to die and this would be like murder” (93).
This guideline is problematic because instead of showing concern and giving
within the mean, Unger and Glover demand that we give an excess, to the point where we
ourselves may almost need assistance. According to Aristotle, such excess, though
perhaps well intentioned, does not constitute virtuous action. Aristotle describes the vices
and virtues of money:
With regard to giving and taking of money the mean is liberality, the excess and
the defect prodigality and meanness. In these actions people exceed and fall short
in contrary ways; the prodigal exceeds in spending and falls short in taking, while
the mean man exceeds in taking and falls short in spending. With regard to money
17
there are also other dispositions- a mean, magnificence (for the magnificent man
differs from the liberal man; the former deals with large sums, the latter with
small ones), an excess, tastelessness and vulgarity, and a deficiency,
niggardliness; these differ from the states opposed to liberality, and the mode of
their difference will be stated later
In giving, the two vices would be to give an excessively large amount or a deficiently
small amount. To give an excessively large amount would be to give so much that we
ourselves would be in need of assistance. While Singer, Glover, and Unger do not claim
we should give so much that we ourselves need assistance, they do claim that we should
give almost up to that point. Clearly, this large amount is not the median of giving
because it is much closer to the line of excess than the midpoint. To give up to the point
where we ourselves would need assistance would leave us in financially unstable
conditions and increase the chances of us being unable to meet our basic needs, thus
putting ourselves in potential danger of falling into poverty. For example, this happens
often for those living in or near poverty in the United States. For those who live from
pay-check to pay-check – which seems to be what Singer, Glover, and Unger are
endorsing – small things, such as medical bills or a cut back in hours at work can push a
person into poverty or homelessness. Furthermore, because of this potential harm, we
cannot be considered morally guilty if we do not follow this standard. Perhaps it is
morally problematic if we do not at least give something to those in extreme poverty, but
we are not necessarily comparable to murders if we do not give most all. Because
following the standard of marginal utility increases greatly the risk of being unable to
meet our basic needs, this standard for giving is not desirable or satisfactory. To act in
18
such a way is excessive and far from the median of giving and thus is not a compelling
argument for how much we ought to give.
Engel and Abelson are also critical of the demanding standard proposed by
Singer, Unger, and Glover, though for different reasons than the vice of excessive giving.
Engel claims that such demanding standards are not compelling enough to motivate
people to act, and thus he proposes a “more plausible principle:” “Other things being
equal, if you can prevent an innocent person from dying with minimal effort, with no
noticeable reduction in your standard of living or the standard of living of your
dependents, with no risk to yourself or others, and without thereby failing to fulfill any
other more pressing obligation, then you ought to do so” (432). Clearly, this claim asks
very little of us. Specifically, Engel argues that we must give approximately 2% of our
annual income to famine-relief organizations, as doing so would reduce suffering and
cause no noticeable difference to our standard of living. Engel claims that this “modest
principle” is sufficient and appealing because those who hold common beliefs, such as
“human suffering is bad” and “a decent person would help someone who was suffering,”
must accept this principle on the grounds of consistency.
Abelson finds the demands of Singer, Unger, and Glover problematic because
they do not take into account the special obligations we have to those who are close to us.
He claims that most of us could afford to sacrifice luxuries in effort to relieve world
suffering, though if we don’t, we are not to be considered murderers, as is argued by
Unger, Glover, and others. Though he claims that the demanding utilitarian argument to
give to the standard of marginal utility is “overblown,” Abelson argues that we can and
should give more to strangers through international organizations, but still maintains that
19
we have stronger obligations to those of higher emotional closeness, and therefore should
not sacrifice what we owe to the latter to help the former.
While the standards proposed by Singer, Unger, and Glover are problematic, the
standards of giving proposed by Engel and Abelson are also problematic. In contrast to
the vice of Singer, Unger, and Glover’s excessive demand, the standards proposed by
Engel and Abelson are deficient; they require too little of us and allow us to continue to
engage in our greedy, and thus vicious, ways. Aristotle characterizes the deficiency of
giving money as the vice of meanness and selfishness. While Engel and Abelson
recognize that we have a large capacity to help those in impoverished nations, they argue
that we are not obligated to give so much that our standard of living would significantly
change; if an agent were to give more, he would be exceeding his moral obligations.28
This emphasis on maintaining our living standard is problematic because it leads Engel
and Abelson to greedily limit the amount that we should give. While we may have the
capacity to give 10 percent, 20 percent, or even 50 percent of our income, Engel only
advocates 1-2 percent while Abelson simply encourages us to give more than we
currently do, which may still be a small amount. Giving such amounts, though potentially
helpful to some, is still stingy. In the same way that Singer, Glover, and Unger approach
the excessive vice of giving too much, Engel and Abelson approach the deficient vice of
giving nothing at all.
In contrast to proponents of giving most all of our income and proponents of
giving only a small amount, I argue that we are morally obligated to give not a small, nor
large amount, but rather a significant amount. To give a significant amount means that we
give more than would be unnoticeable to us, but less than would put ourselves on the
20
edge of poverty. For example, as a college student with a very small income, perhaps if I
gave 20 percent of my income, I would be on the edge of poverty, but I could give one
percent of my income with no noticeable change in my standard of living. Either of these
would be near extreme, and thus not the appropriate amount to give. Thus, I would
conclude that I should give 10 percent of my income, which would be a significant
amount.
But, the intermediate amount will differ for each individual. This is why I do not
say we are all obligated to give X percent our income. Instead, I argue that we should all
give a “significant portion,” which may slightly differ from individual to individual.
Aristotle explains that the intermediate is not the same for all, and therefore we cannot set
objective standards:
…if ten pounds are too much for a particular person to eat and two too little, it
does not follow that the trainer will order six pounds; for this also is perhaps too
much for the person who is to take it, or too little- too little for Milo, too much for
the beginner in athletic exercises. The same is true of running and wrestling. Thus
a master of any art avoids excess and defect, but seeks the intermediate and
chooses this- the intermediate not in the object but relatively to us.
Perhaps to some, a significant portion of income is 40 percent; to others, a significant
portion may be 5 percent. For example, while I conclude that 10 percent is the
“significant portion” that I could give, a billionaire, like Bill Gates – the world’s richest
man – would still be greedy if he only gave 10 percent of his income. If Bill gates gave
10 percent of his income, he would have $45 billion remaining and most likely notice no
21
change to his standard of living. Thus, giving 10 percent for someone like Bill Gates
would be deficient while for myself it would be the median.
In short, to fulfill our obligation to alleviate extreme poverty we must give a
significant portion of our income to poverty-relief organizations because we would be
morally excessive to give most all of our wealth and would be morally deficient to give
little to none. Thus, the appropriate mean for giving is to give to the extent that we notice
a significant change in our lifestyle, but also not so much that we ourselves are almost
insecure in our meeting our basic needs.
We are Morally Obligated to Change Our Consumption Habits
While we are morally obligated to give financial aid to those living in extreme
poverty to fulfill our moral obligation to alleviate extreme poverty, giving aid alone will
not alleviate extreme poverty if we continue to consume in an affluent manner. Thus, we
are also obligated to change our habits of consumption in a salient way. While we will
inevitably decrease the amount we consume if we give aid, it is also necessary that we
change the way we consume in addition to the amount we consume. Previous arguments
for our moral obligations to alleviate extreme poverty have so far been incomplete as they
lack analysis of the inherent problems of our consumption.
Again, referring to the golden mean, virtue ethics compels us to consume in
moderation, avoiding extremes. Our environmental and health problems show that we are
consuming an excess of what is needed for good individual as well as environmental
health. Numerous affluent individuals, for example those in America, suffer from health
problems which largely result from excess consumption of food. Harms to the
22
environment also mainly result from our overconsumption of natural resources and
overproduction of land.
Some may object: “if I decide to give aid to those in extreme poverty, why am I
also morally obligated to change my consumption habits?” Maria Mies explains that if
those in affluent nations continue their habits of consumption it will be impossible to
increase the living standards of others, thus making any aid that we give useless. As we
know, the world is a finite biosystem. There is a limited amount of global resources and
space; it would be impossible to raise the living standards of distant nations while
continuing our current consumption habits because the world would quickly run out of
resources and space. For example, If per-capita consumption of beef in China, currently
only 4 kgs. per year, were to match the U.S.'s 45 kgs., and if the additional beef came
from feedlots, this would take almost 350 million tons of grain, equivalent to the entire
U.S. grain harvest. If China were to seek extra animal protein through seafood at the percapita level of Japan, it would need 100 million tons, more than today's entire ocean fish
catch. If China were ever to match the U.S. for per-capita cars and oil consumption, it
would need 80 million barrels of oil per day, whereas current global output is 65 million
barrels per day (International Institute for Sustainable Development (Brown et al., 1999)).
Thus, while we give aid to those in extreme poverty so that they may meet their basic
needs and increase their standard of living, our affluent consumption habits will counter
such efforts as we quickly deplete the world’s resources.
Yet, even if there were enough resources for everyone to live at a decent and
adequate living standard, impoverished nations would still remain behind. The “catchingup” theory, explained by Mies, claims that impoverished nations can catch up to
23
developed nations if they correctly utilize certain social, political, and economic
resources. Yet, Mies points out that catching-up is impossible because everyone is
progressing; “catching-up” is a myth. If rich nations are at point B and poor nations are
working for development from point A, by the time poor nations reach point B, affluent
nations will be at point D. In other words, by the time impoverished nations gain access
to the social, political, and economic resources of today, such resources will be useless
because they will be archaic compared to the new and improved social, political, and
economic resources in Northern countries.
While we must change our consumption habits because not doing so will obviate
our giving aid, we must also change our consumption habits because they currently bring
harm to those in impoverished nations. Here, I mean that we must change the type of
products we buy and be conscious in whom we are purchasing from more so than how
much we are consuming. Our affluent lifestyle brings many harms to the environment,
which in turn harms those living in impoverished nations. For example, during 1998,
Americans, 5% of the global population, contributed 25% of the buildup of carbon
dioxide in the global atmosphere. Our 270 million people accounted for more than the
emissions of China's 1.2 billion people (cf. Dietz, 1995). At least 85 percent of iron and
steel are consumed by the 20 percent richest of humankind. The average American
consumes 115 times as much paper as the average Indian. And the average American
consumes 230 times as much gasoline as the average Indian.
Similarly, our affluent lifestyles bring harms to workers in under-developed
nations. Many businesses from affluent countries rely upon the cheap labor of sweatshops
in impoverished nations, enforcing abhorrent working conditions for workers who get
24
paid only a pocketful of change per day. Typical labor conditions for those working in
U.S. run sweatshops include wages such as 41 cents an hour and $16.36 a week, Grueling
mandatory 14 to 15.8-hour shifts, six and seven days a week, being forced to work 36
hours of overtime each week, but cheated of legal overtime pay; being housed in
primitive dorms and fed food the workers describe as awful, being exposed to health
hazards, such as plastic fumes that pervade the factory, and other conditions that violate
workers and human rights.
Many of us are aware of such environmental and economic conditions, yet remain
disconnected from the situation. We may think, “what can I do? I am not the manager or
owner of such a factory. Or “I do not cut down forests in Brazil.” But, we are supporters
of the system which brings about these harms. We purchase the products that are
produced in other countries. If we did not purchase these products, the demand for them
would be eliminated, and then such harms would not take place. If we only purchase
products that are environmentally friendly and produced in safe and fair working
environments, then companies that showed concern for the environment and workers
would thrive and those that didn’t would go out of business. In a lot of ways, consumers
of affluent nations are currently responsible, though perhaps indirectly, for environmental
and economic harms in other nations. As virtuous people, we would not want to cause
harms to others and thus we would stop our actions that brought about such harms.
Again, we have the capacity to do so; as consumers of global products, we have more
power to change the situation than we may think. For example, according to the National
Labor Committee “If the American retailers paid only 25 cents more per garment, the
total in Bangladesh would be $898 million- more than eight times current US aid.”
25
If we are going to seriously help alleviate extreme poverty, we must do more than
give monetary aid. We must also be considerate and aware of the way we consume and
what the effects of our consumption are. Oftentimes, we are unknowingly supporting
companies that intentionally harm those living in extreme poverty. As virtuous people,
we would not support those harms and thus must consciously consume in ways that
ensure that we are not encouraging the exploitation of people and the environment. Virtue
ethics compels us to consume in moderation. The fact that our consumption results in
harm only makes our obligation to change this habit of consumption more urgent and
compelling.
Conclusion
The suffering of those in distant impoverished nations is severe and worsening.
While some philosophers have attempted to guide us on how we should – or shouldn’t –
act to alleviate this suffering, each of the arguments so far presented is somewhat limited.
Those who argue that we do not have a moral obligation to help those living in extreme
poverty fail to recognize the existence of moral obligations to those who are distant from
us or raise concerns, such as overpopulation, that can be sufficiently addressed through
different means. Furthermore, keeping in mind the virtue of the golden mean, we see that
the previous arguments presented to alleviate global poverty are extreme; these
arguments are either excessive and potentially dangerous, such as those presented by
Singer, Glover, and Unger, or deficient and greedy, such as those presented by Engel and
Ableson. Here, I have argued that to alleviate the suffering experienced by those in
distant impoverished nations, we must give a significant portion of our income, guided by
the principle of the golden mean. Yet, giving monetary aid will not be sufficient for
26
significantly reducing the amount of suffering experienced; consumption habits of those
in affluent nations will counter monetary efforts. Also affluent consumption currently
results in harm to those living in distant nations and thus, as virtuous persons, we are
required not only to give aid, but also to change the amount and type of products we
consume. Individuals living in affluent nations have a large capacity to alleviate the
suffering of others in distant nations. Upon rethinking our affluent lifestyle, we see that it
engenders vices rather than virtues. According to Aristotle, we are to avoid vices, such as
callousness and selfishness and instead strive to be compassionate and generous; it is
apparent that we must change our affluent lifestyle. Yet, only when we are willing to
make significant changes to our lives will we see significant changes for those who suffer
most in the world.
27
Notes
Defined as “that income or expenditure level below which a minimum, nutritionally adequate diet plus
essential non-food requirements are not affordable.” Pogge, Thomas. "Priorities of Global Justice."
Metaphilosophy 32.1/2 (2001): 7
2
Ibid,. 9
3
While affluent individuals living in non-affluent countries may have responsibilities, I am specifically
concerned with individuals of affluent nations.
4
Unger, Peter. Living High and Letting Die. 134
5
Other philosophers also endorse a similar position, though these three are most often referred to.
6
Significant portion is further defined elsewhere in this paper.
7
Salient way is further defined elsewhere in this paper.
8
Bittner defines imputable in a neutral sense, explaining “Imputability here covers the smaller domain of
those things which can readily, or perhaps unmistakably, be put down to some particular agents’ account”
(29).
9
Though I explain later that we are more connected than Bittner assumes (pg 15).
10
Abelson (Moral Distance, 35) gives a detailed discussion of the different nature of obligations for those
who are distant and those whom we are emotionally close to.
11
Also, in response to an appeal to closeness, Peter Singer, in “Practical Ethics” argues it is difficult to see
any sound moral justification for the view that distance, or community membership, makes a crucial
difference to our moral obligations. He argues, for instance, that we would not endorse racial affinities,
such as helping people of European origin before those of African origin. People’s need for food has
nothing to do with their race and it would be a violation of equal consideration to give preference to one
group over the other. In the same way, Singer claims, favoring fellow citizens or those who are “close” to
us in some way is unfair and unfounded.
12
The principle of causation holds that an agent that caused harm to another individual is responsible to
some extent to remediate the harm. The principle of moral responsibility holds that an agent has
responsibility to remediate harm if the agent intended the outcome, foresaw it, if his behavior violated some
standard of reasonable care, and so forth (456). The principle of capacity holds that an agent has
responsibility to remediate harm if the agent has the capacity to do so. And the principle of community
holds that an agent has a responsibility to remediate harm if she has communal ties with the harmed
individual
13
I will argue later in this paper that we can see how our past and present actions contribute to the situation
of extreme poverty. Thus, Bittner’s claim that we do not have a clear understanding of the contributing
factors of world hunger is not persuasive.
14
The analogy of a drowning is popular within the discussion of moral responsibilities to alleviate extreme
poverty. This analogy is present in the arguments of Singer (Practical Ethics, 229), Miller (Distributing
Responsibilities, 461), Engel (Hunger, Duty, and Ecology, 432), and others.
15
A 1998 report on Population and the Environment published by the Congressional Quarterly Researcher
explains that “fertility rates have fallen in much of the world, especially where women have gained access
to education and economic opportunities that make bearing large numbers of children less attractive” (5).
Singer further explains “according to United Nations estimates, in 1965 the average woman in the third
world gave birth to six children, and only 8 percent were using some form of contraception; by 1991 the
average number of children had dropped to just below four, and more than half of women in the third world
were taking contraceptive measures” (240)
16
If we consider that the average individual living in extreme poverty consumes much less than the average
modern human being, it becomes clear that the average American consumes a significant amount more than
the average individual living in extreme poverty. If my consumption equals that of at least six individuals
living in extreme poverty, I only have to decrease my consumption by a small percentage in order to
compensate for the one life being saved.
17
One may still object to giving aid if the religious majority of a specific nation leads the particular nation
to refuse aid designed to limit population growth, such as promotion of contraceptives. Singer
acknowledges this objection and concludes that it may be acceptable to refuse aid to such nations, arguing
we are not obligated to help when our help is guaranteed to fail. Yet, I disagree with Singer’s conclusion
and argue that there are still other ways in which we can promote population control without infringing
1
28
upon individual’s religious beliefs. Population growth can still decline and be stabilized without
contraceptives, for example, by promoting economic opportunities for women and education programs on
natural birth control.
18
Those identified as living under the international poverty line earn less than $380 annually, while those
identified as living under the U.S. poverty line earn less than $9,570 annually.
19
The Millennium Development Compact is a Compact through which the world community can work
together to help poor countries achieve the Millennium Development Goals, Goals that emerged from the
2000 UN Millennium Declaration. The Goals are specific, measurable targets and aimed at reducing the
conditions of extreme global poverty significantly by 2015.
20
Aristotle only refers to the proper function and excellence of man, though I extend his principle to both s.
men and women. Thus, when discussing his theory, I use the term “human” or “person” instead of “man.”
21
Aristotle acknowledges that the median is relative to each individual and circumstances. I discuss this
further elsewhere.
22
In 2001, the United States imported $5.5 billion in fruits and vegetables, mostly from Mexico, Chile, and
Costa Rica (Source: United State Horticulture Import Situation: Foreign Agricultural Service, Horticulture
and Tropical Products Division. March 2002).
23
The United States imports approximately 13 million barrels of oil per day, accounting for most of our
consumption of 20 million barrels per day (CIA World Fact Sheet). Most of that oil comes from Canada,
Mexico, Saudia Arabia, Venezuela, Nigeria, Iraq, and Angola (Energy Information Administration).
24
The United States imports approximately $76 billion in clothing annually, mostly from China, India,
Pakistan, Cambodia, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Nicaragua, and Peru (Source: Progressive Policy Institute).
25
Aristotle uses the term brutish in several contexts. I am specifically referring to the context in which a
person shows no regard for the pain and suffering of others (228). While, Aristotle provides highly
grotesque examples to exemplify brutishness, such as cannibalism, it appears that the overall point is that
brutish persons are willing to bring harm to others to satisfy their pleasures.
26
I will expand upon this term “significant portion” throughout this section.
27
Singer is referring to nine million refugees in Bengal who suffered due to constant poverty, a cyclone,
and a civil war in 1971.
28
Abelson’s main point is that we have stronger obligations to those who are emotionally close to us; he
does not explicitly argue that our standard of living should be maintained. Yet, his arguments concerning
those emotionally close to us appear to be mostly concerned with financial obligations, for example, he
concludes that he is morally justified in spending $2,000 on his child’s piano lessons rather than sending
that money to a famine-relief organization. This decision is part of an affluent lifestyle that Abelson seems
to find valuable.
29
Works Cited
Abelson, Raziel. “Moral Distance: What Do We Owe to Unknown Strangers?”
Philosophical Forum; Spring 2005, Vol. 36 Issue 1, p31-39, 9p
Bittner, Rüdiger. "Mortality and World Hunger." Metaphilosophy 32.1/2 (2001): 25.
Elliot, Herschel. “A General Statement of the Tragedy of the Commons.” 1997.
Engel, Mylan Jr. “Hunger, Duty and Ecology: On What We Owe Starving Humans.”
Environmental Ethics, ed. Louis Pojman: California; Wadsworth/Thomson, 2005.
Glover, Jonathon. Causing Death and Saving Lives. Harmondsworth; New York:
Penguin, 1977.
Hardin, Garrett. “Lifeboat Ethics: the Case Against Helping the Poor” Psychology Today,
September 1974.
Mies, Maria. “Deceiving the Third World: The Myth of Catching-Up Development,”
Environmental Ethics. ed. Louis Pojman: California; Wadsworth/Thompson,
2005.
Miller, David. “Distributing Responsibilities.” Journal of Political Philosophy, Dec
2001, Vol. 9 Issue 4, p453, 19p
Pogge, Thomas. “World Poverty and Human Rights.” Ethics & International Affairs,
Volume 19, No. 1 (Spring 2005)
Singer, Peter. “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” Philosophy and Public Affairs. Vol. 1,
No. 3 (Spring 1972), pp. 229-243.
Singer, Peter. Practical Ethics. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press,
1979.
30
Unger, Peter. Living High and Letting Die. Oxford University Press; 1996.
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). (2003). Human Development Report:
Millennium Development Goals: A compact among nations to end human
poverty, 2003. New York: Oxford University Press
World Bank. 2006. World Development Report Overview 2006. New York: Oxford
University Press