Download Climate Change, Human Activity, and World Population

GISS seminar, 1 July 2002
Climate Change,
Human Activity,
and
World Population
Gordon J. Aubrecht, II
Physics Education Research Group
Ohio State University
Abstract:
Malthus observed two centuries ago that population increased geometrically while food
resources increased algebraically. He was recognizing the forcefulness of exponential
growth in population. While the grim reaper has so far been kept from the door by
technological advances in agriculture, human growth potential on Earth is still limited.
Recognition of these limits involves posing of questions that are physical, technical, social,
and political (and sometimes all of these at the same time). Humans are “pushing the
envelope” in terms of their exploitation of the world’s energy resources.
We will try to address these related questions: How long will the fossil fuels last? What
could replace them? What is the known history of climate, and how well is it known? How
sensitive is climate to natural and anthropogenic forcings? What are the social and economic
costs and benefits of energy use? What regional differences in human activities (e.g.,
consumption and production of energy resources) can influence the climate, and how? Who
will be the winners and losers in different mitigation scenarios? Is the Kyoto Protocol fair to
the U.S.?
Thomas Malthus,
First Essay on Population
(1798)
I think I may fairly make two postulata.
First, That food is necessary to the existence of man.
Secondly, That the passion between the sexes is necessary, and will remain
nearly in its present state.
These two laws ever since we have had any knowledge of mankind, appear to
have been fixed laws of our nature; and, as we have not hitherto seen any
alteration in them, we have no right to conclude that they will ever cease to
be what they now are, without an immediate act of power in that Being who
first arranged the system of the universe; and for the advantage of his
creatures, still executes, according to fixed laws, all its various operations.
I do not know that any writer has supposed that on this earth man will
ultimately be able to live without food. But Mr. Godwin has conjectured that
the passion between the sexes may in time be extinguished. As, however, he
calls this part of his work, a deviation into the land of conjecture, I will not
dwell longer upon it at present, than to say, that the best arguments for the
perfectibility of man, are drawn from a contemplation of the great progress
that he has already made from the savage state, and the difficulty of saying
where he is to stop. But towards the extinction of the passion between the
sexes, no progress whatever has hitherto been made. It appears to exist in as
much force at present as it did two thousand, or four thousand years ago.
There are individual exceptions now as there always have been. But, as these
exceptions do not appear to increase in number, it would surely be a very
unphilosophical mode of arguing, to infer merely from the existence of an
exception, that the exception would, in time, become the rule, and the rule the
exception. Assuming then, my postulata as granted, I say, that the power of
population is indefinitely greater than the power in the earth to produce
subsistence for man.
Population, when unchecked, increases in a geometrical
ratio. Subsistence increases only in an arithmetical ratio. A
slight acquaintance with numbers will shew the immensity
of the first power in comparison of the second.
Putting $1 every day into the bank versus in
the mattress: the magic of exponential
growth.
This growth occurs because the amount added
depends on how much money we had at the
time—more money, more interest.
What does this have to do with population? The
number of people added depends on how many
there are at the time—more people, more births.
Last century
7000
Population (millions)
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
2000
1700
1990
1970
1600
1980
1960
1950
1940
1930
1920
1910
1900
0
1800
1900
2000
Date (years)
Last millennium
7000
Population (millions)
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
1000
1100
1200
1300
1400
1500
Date (years)
Last 12,000 years
7000
6000
Population (millions)
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
-10000 -9000 -8000 -7000 -6000 -5000 -4000 -3000 -2000 -1000
0
Date (years)
Census Bureau website (http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/worldhis.html) and Population
Division Department of Economic and Social Affairs United Nations, World Population
Prospects The 2000 Revision (United Nations, ESA/P/WP.165)
1000
2000
United Nations Population Division 1998a
1950-present
Human population growth—
could humanity ever mass as much as Earth?
N(mass of a typical person) = mass of Earth,
mass of Earth
N = mass of a typical person
6 x 1024 kg
= 80 kg
= 7.5 x 1022 typical people.
That’s a lot of people. How long will it take at the current
human growth rate?
We could speak about doubling times (or e folding times).
Let m be the number of times the population must double
from the current population to become the 7.5 x 1022.
N = 2mN0
22
N
7.5
x
10
2m = N =
0
6 x 109
= 1.25 x 1013
Knowing that
so that
so,
210 = 1024 ≈ 1000 = 103 we can say
1012 ≈ 240
1.25 x 1013 = 12.5 x 240
= 1.56 x 23 x 240
≈ 243.5
m = 43.5.
How long will that take? The current doubling time is 35
years, so it will take
43.5 x 35 years
= 1523 years.
That’s a long time, but ... not really that long.
In terms of e folding times, that of humanity is 50.5 years,
so if is the number of e folding times it would take to
make, then 1.25 x 1013 = e ; = 30.2; the result is 30.2 x
50.5 years = 1523 years again.
(Incidentally, it would take only 2165 years for the mass of
humanity to equal that of the solar system, and just 3444
years for the mass of humanity to equal that of the Milky
Way at this growth rate.)
Bartlett’s First Law of
Sustainability:
Population growth and / or
growth in the rates of
consumption of resources cannot
be sustained.
Bartlett’s Second Law of
Sustainability:
In a society with a growing
population and / or growing rates
of consumption of resources, the
larger the population, and / or the
larger the rates of consumption of
resources, the more difficult it
will be to transform the society to
the condition of sustainability.
(A. A. Bartlett, 2001 testimony to Science Committee Subcommittee on Energy)
Carrying capacity “refers to the limit to the
number of humans the earth can support in
the long term without damage to the
environment.” (M. Giampietro, S. G. F.
Bukkens, D. Pimentel, “Limits to population
size: three scenarios of energy interaction
between human society and ecosystems,”
Population and Environment 14, 1091
(1992).) This number is certainly less than
7.5 x 1022. How big is it?
The Sun supplies 7.2 x 1018 kilojoules per
day. An average person requires 8400 kJ/d,
so Earth could at most support
7.2 x 1018 kJ per day
8400 kJ per person per day
= 8.5 x 1014 people,
if it were a solid surface; but 75% is water,
and around half the sunlight is reflected.
In this case, m = 14.2. This population will
occur 496 years from now at current growth
rates, in 2498.
Humans use 32% of net primary productivity
(NPP).
Source: P. M. Vitousek, P. R. Ehrlich, A. H. Ehrlich, and P. A. Matson,
“Human appropriation of the products of photosynthesis,” BioScience 36,
368 (1986).
“Vitousek et al. estimated that human appropriation of NPP was 32% of the
land total with a conservative definition and 40% using the most reasonable
definition of human appropriation.
This is a huge fraction. If
we already control two-fifths of the land’s
productive capacity, then the prospects for
future increases are strongly constrained,
especially if there is to be anything left for
other species.”
Source: C. Field, “Sharing the garden,” Science 294, 2490 (2001).
Previous global estimates of the human impact on terrestrial photosynthesis
products depended heavily on extrapolation from plot-scale measurements.
Here, we estimated this impact with the use of recent data, many of which
were collected at global and continental scales. Monte Carlo techniques that
incorporate known and estimated error in our parameters provided estimates
of uncertainty.
We estimate that humans
appropriate 10 to 55% of terrestrial
photosynthesis products. This broad range reßects
uncertainty in key parameters and makes it difficult to ascertain whether we
are approaching crisis levels in our use of the planet’s resources. Improved
estimates will require high-resolution global measures within agricultural lands
and tropical forests.
Source: S. Rojstaczer, S. M. Sterling, and N. J. Moore, “Human
appropriation of photosynthesis products,” Science 294, 2549 (2001).
Since 1961, human demand on resources has
nearly doubled and today exceeds Earth’s
replacement capacity by 20%.
It takes at least 2.33 hectares of land to
sustain one average person on Earth,
although it takes twice as much to support
one European (5.4 hectares) and four times
as much (9.7 hectares) to support one
American.
“It would require 1.2 Earths, or one Earth
for 1.2 years, to regenerate what humanity
used in 1999.”
Source: M. Wackernagel et al. (Redefining Progress Group), “Tracking the
ecological overshoot of the human economy,” Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci. (to be
published)
“You can overdraw on nature’s accounts
and leave a debt. We are no longer living off
nature’s interest, but nature’s capital.
Sustainable economies are not possible if we
live beyond the means of nature.”
Source: Mathis Wackernagel, quoted in Gary Polakovic, “Humans consume
more than Earth can replace, study says,” The Los Angeles Times, 25 June
2002.
“Population growth in
our communities
never pays for itself.
Taxes and utility costs
must escalate in order
to pay for the growth.
In addition, growth
brings increased
levels of congestion,
frustration, and air
pollution.”
(A. A. Bartlett, “Reflections on sustainability,
population growth, and the environmentrevisited,” Focus 9, 49 (1999))
What’s happened to world energy
use?
It has increased substantially.
Energy history of the U.S. since 1635:
What’s happened to world oil use?
Where does it come from?
Where does it go to? A lot to the
U.S.
U.S. oil consumption projections for 2010
Source
Consumption estimate (Mbbl/d)
1950 Actual use
1990 Actual use
2000 Actual use
Department of Energy (AOOG91)
Gas Research Institute
Data Resources, Inc.
Wharton Econometric Forecasting Assoc.
National Energy Policy Development Group (‘01)
1984 to 2000 trend continued to 2010
1949 to 2000 trend continued to 2010
6.46
16.99
19.48
20.27
23.24
21.25
19.97
22.5
22.0
24.3
World oil consumption is about 75 Mbbl/d.
Imports
In 1968, M. King Hubbert
pointed out that for there to be
production in a given year, there
must have been a discovery of oil
in a particular area some time
earlier.
M. K. Hubbert, U. S. Energy Resources, a Review as of 1972, U. S. Senate
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs report, GPO, Washington, D.C.,
1974; M. K. Hubbert, Am. J. Phys. 49, 1007 (1981); M. K. Hubbert, Ch. 8 in
Resources and Man, (San Francisco: Freeman, 1969).
The known amount of crude oil
(proven reserves) first increases
as more discoveries are made,
then decreases as these
discoveries are used up and we
run out of crude oil altogether.
He applied this to the lower 48
and hypothesized that peak
output would occur in 1969.
It did—
Hubbert predicted 1969 would be the maximum production for the lower 48 states.
Applied to the entire U.S.:
The Hubbert prediction was what actually occurred. The above curve includes Alaskan oil.
We find for US data through 2000:
Q = 216.5 Gbbl
∞
T = 1975.3
= 26.65 years
(corresponding to a full width at half height
of about 63 years for the normal curve).
Can it describe the
World?:
Popular estimates of world oil reserves
(remaining oil):
Oil & Gas Journal: 1017 Gbbl
World Oil: 981 Gbbl
BP Amoco: 1050 Gbbl
Applied to the entire world:
Q∞ = 2 Tbbl, 3 Tbbl, 4 Tbbl
T = 2002, 2019, 2032
= 32 yr, 41 yr, 47 yr
Oil “runs out” in 2100, 2140, or 2160.
The fits suggest 2002
as the year of maximum
production if reserves plus
produced is 2000 Gbbl!
A. A. Bartlett was the first to point
out that “for every new billion
barrels of oil added to the
estimate of the world’s
[estimated ultimate recovery],
the date of the world peak
production is delayed by
approximately 5.5 days!”
A. A. Bartlett, “An analysis of U.S. and world oil production patterns using
Hubbert-style curves,” Math. Geol. 32, 1 (2000).
The Hubbert “blip”
Oil is generally low in price:
Source: BP America, BP statistical review of world energy June 2002
Electricity sources through the past 50 years:
Consequences of use of fossil fuels:
About half of air pollution is due to transportation.
PM 2.5
VOCs
Examples of the connection between exposure and
shortening of life due to air pollution
pollutant (amount), effect studied
effect per person per exposure
particulates (change in µg/m3)
lost life expectancy (years shortening)a
7.2 x 10 -4
hospital visits with respiratory symptoms b
2.07 x 10 -6
respiratory symptoms in adults with asthma (days)c
6.06 x 10 -2
chronic obstructive respiratory illness in adults d
5.4 x 10 -5
cases of chronic bronchitis in children e
1.61 x 10 -3
sulfur dioxide (change in µg/m3)
lost life expectancy (years shortening)f
5.34 x 10 -6
ozone (change 6-h concentration in ppb)
lost life expectancy (years shortening)g
8.7 x 10 -6
respiratory symptoms (days)h
6.60 x 10 +1
Source: Carbon emissions, 1751 to 1998. Source: G. Marland, T. A. Boden, and R. J. Andres, “Global CO2
emissions from fossil-fuel burning, cement manufacture, and gas flaring: 1751-1998,” in Trends: A Compendium
of Data on Global Change, Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center, Oak Ridge National Laboratory,
Department of Energy, 2001.
Source: Shell International , Energy Needs, Choices and Possibilities, Scenarios to 2050 (2001) Green trend line mine
Source: BP America, BP statistical review of world energy June 2002
Causes of Long-Term
Climate Change
Biological change
the carbon cycle
Geological change
Volcanic eruptions
Orbital change (Milankovitch cycles)
Cosmological change (e.g., changes in the
solar constant)
Anthropogenic change
Desertification and deforestation
Release of carbon dioxide
Release of greenhouse trace gases
Release of aerosols
Source: G. Marland, T. A. Boden, and R. J. Andres, “Global CO 2 emissions from fossil-fuel burning, cement
manufacture, and gas flaring: 1751-1998,” in Trends: A Compendium of Data on Global Change, Carbon Dioxide
Information Analysis Center, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Department of Energy, 2001.
Source: U.S. Department of State, U.S. Climate Action Report 2002 (GPO: Washington, D.C., 2002).
Source: C. D. Keeling et al., in Trends: A Compendium of Data on Global Change, Carbon Dioxide
Information Analysis Center, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Department of Energy, 2001.
Methane concentrations, 1860 to 1994
The effect of trace gases—small concentrations
of various gases can overwhelm the climate
system; better payoff for reducing these gases,
according to Hansen et al.
Radiation balance—incoming radiation must
equal outgoing radiation; otherwise Earth
heats up or cools off; Stefan-Boltzmann law
leads to TEarth ~ 255 K. Actual T = 287 K.
Reason—the greenhouse effect.
Earth climate during the last millennium—
fluctuating, interesting evidence from Europe
Earth climate during the last half millennium—
more evidence of effects of volcanism and
natural rhythms
Earth climate during the last century and a
half—Earth was cooler, then warmer (each
about half)
Temperatures over the last millennium
Temperatures over the last century
Earth’s climate during the last decades—very warm
Thermal energy stirred into Earth’s oceans, in
the top 3 km, 5-year running averages. This is
clear evidence for recent warming.
Source: S. Levitus, J. I. Antonov, T. P. Boyer, and C. Stephens, “Warming of the world ocean,” Science
287, 2225 (2000). extended at URL: http://www.sciencemag.org/feature/data/1046907.shl ©AAAS, 2000.
The glacier Qori Kalis in the Peruvian Andes,
pictured at left in 1983 and at right in 2000.
Source: L. Thompson, Ohio State University
Earth’s climate during the last decade—very warm
Ten warmest years,
United States and world
through 2001
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
U. S.
Temperature
(°C)
1998
12.74
1934
12.73
1999
12.52
1921
12.50
1931
12.42
2001
12.37
1990
12.36
1953
12.33
1954
12.29
1987,
12.27
1986, 1939
World
Temperature
(°C)
1998
2001
1997
1995
1990
1999
2000
1991
1987
1994,
1988, 1983
14.55
14.42
14.40
14.32
14.31
14.30
14.29
14.26
14.24
14.23
Source: U. S.: NOAA/NCDC, “Climate at a glance”; World: NOAA/NCDC, “Global Surface Temperature Anomalies”
The fact that the years cluster in the last decade is not clear
evidence of human-caused warming, but it is clear evidence of
warming.
Ancient CO2 concentrations—evidence of
correlation between temperature and
concentration in ancient past
Vostok ice cores (Antarctica)
Note how CO2, methane, and temperature correlate. While correlation is not
causation, this is suggestive.
A warmer future
Source: German Climate Computing Center
General Regional Effects(1)
Sources (1 is the source unless otherwise noted):
1. R. T. Watson (USA), M C. Zinyowera (Zimbabwe), R H. Moss (USA), R E. Basher
(New Zealand), M Beniston (Switzerland), O F. Canziani (Argentina), S M. Diaz
(Argentina), D J. Dokken (USA), J T. Everett (USA), B. B Fitzharris (New Zealand), H
Gitay (Australia), B P. Jallow (The Gambia), M Lal (India), R. Shakespeare Maya
(Zimbabwe), Roger F. McLean (Australia), M.Q. Mirza (Bangladesh), R Neilson (USA), I
R. Noble (Australia), L A. Nurse (Barbados), H. W. O. Okoth-Ogendo (Kenya), A. B.
Pittock (Australia), D. S. Shriner (USA), S. K. Sinha (India), R. B. Street (Canada), S. Jilan
(China), A. G. Suarez (Cuba), R. S .J. Tol (The Netherlands), L. V. W. McGrory (USA),
M. Yoshino (Japan), in R. T. Watson M. C. Zinyowera, R. H. Moss, and D. J. Dokken,
eds., The Regional Impacts of Climate Change: An Assessment of Vulnerability, A special
Report of IPCC Working Group II (Geneva, Switzerland: IPCC, 1997).
2. C. D. Harvell, C. E. Mitchell, J. R. Ward, S. Altizer, A. P. Dobson, R. S. Ostfeld, and M.
D. Samuel, “Climate warming and disease risks for terrestrial and marine biota,” Science
296, 2158 (2002).
3. T. Egan, “Alaska, No Longer So Frigid, Starts to Crack, Burn and Sag,” The New York
Times, 16 June 2002.
4. T. Egan, “As Trees Die, Some Cite the Climate,” The New York Times, 25 June 2002.
•Large shifts of vegetation boundaries into higher latitudes
and elevations can be expected.
•Large regions show drought-induced declines in vegetation,
even when the direct effects of CO2 fertilization are
included.
•A global average of one-third, varying by region from oneseventh to two-thirds, of the existing forested area of the
world likely would undergo major changes in broad
vegetation types—with the greatest changes occurring in
high latitudes and the least in the tropics.
•Climate change will further exacerbate the frequency and
magnitude of droughts in some places.
•The main direct effects will be through changes in factors
such as temperature, precipitation, length of growing
season, and timing of extreme or critical threshold events
relative to crop development, as well as through changes in
atmospheric CO2 concentration (which may have a
beneficial effect on the growth of many crop types).
•An estimated 46 million people per year currently are at
risk of flooding from storm surges. Climate change will
exacerbate these problems, leading to potential impacts on
ecosystems and human coastal infrastructure. Large
numbers of people also are potentially affected by sea-level
rise—for example, tens of millions of people in Bangladesh
would be displaced by a 1-m increase in the absence of
adaptation measures. A growing number of extremely large
cities are located in coastal areas, which means that large
amounts of infrastructure may be affected.
•Human health could be adversely affected.
•Animal health could be adversely affected.(2)
Africa
•Africa is the continent most vulnerable to the impacts of
projected changes because widespread poverty limits
adaptation capabilities.
•Many organisms in the deserts already are near their
tolerance limits, and some may not be able to adapt further
under hotter conditions.
•Arid to semi-arid subregions and the grassland areas of
eastern and southern Africa as well as areas currently
under threat from land degradation and desertification are
particularly vulnerable.
•Variable climatic conditions may render the management
of water resources more difficult both within and between
countries.
•In most African countries, farming depends entirely on the
quality of the rainy season—a situation that makes Africa
particularly vulnerable to climate change.
•The coastal nations of west and central Africa (e.g.,
Senegal, Gambia, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Cameroon, Gabon,
Angola) have low-lying lagoonal coasts that are susceptible
to erosion and hence are threatened by sea-level rise,
particularly because most of the countries in this area have
major and rapidly expanding cities on the coast.
•The main challenges likely to face African populations will
emanate from extreme climate events such as floods (and
resulting landslides in some areas), strong winds, droughts
and tidal waves.
•Increased morbidity and mortality in subregions where
vector-borne diseases increase following climatic changes
would have far-reaching economic consequences.
Arctic and Antarctic
•Frozen areas close to the freezing point will thaw and
undergo substantial changes with warming.
•Substantial loss of sea ice is expected in the Arctic Ocean.
•As warming occurs, there will be considerable thawing of
permafrost.(1,3)
•In the sea, marine ecosystems will move poleward.
•Animals dependent on ice may be disadvantaged in both
polar areas.
•Some small northern extension of farming into the Arctic
may be possible.
•Marine ecological productivity should rise.
•The Arctic Ocean could become a major global trade route.
•Reductions in ice will benefit offshore oil production.
•Increased erosion of Arctic shorelines is expected.
•Vulnerability of plants to attack by “encouraged”
species.(4)
Middle East and Arid Asia
•Small increases in precipitation are projected, but these
increases are likely to be countered by increased
temperature and evaporation.
•Grasslands, livestock and water resources are likely to be
the most vulnerable to climate change in this region because
they are located mostly in marginal areas.
• Wheat production in Kazakstan and Pakistan would
decline under selected scenarios of climate change.
•Heat stress, affecting human comfort levels, and possible
spread in vector-borne diseases are likely to result.
Small Island States
•Some critical ecosystems, such as coral reefs, are very
sensitive to temperature changes.
•Changes in the patterns of rainfall may cause serious
problems to states that depend heavily on rainwater for
their source of water.
•Higher rates of erosion and coastal land loss are expected
in many small islands as a consequence of the projected rise
in sea level. In the case of Majuro atoll in the Marshall
Islands and Kiribati, it is estimated that for a 1-m rise in sea
level as much as 80 per cent and 12.5 per cent (respectively)
of total land would be vulnerable.
•Low-lying island states and atolls also are expected to
experience increased sea flooding, inundation and
salinization (of soils and freshwater lenses) as a direct
consequence of sea-level rise.
•Vital infrastructure and major concentrations of
settlements are likely to be at risk, given their location at or
near present sea level and their proximity to the coast (often
within 1–2 km; e.g., Kiribati, Tuvalu, the Maldives, the
Bahamas).
•Shore and infrastructure protection costs could be
financially burdensome for some small island states.
•Climate change is projected to exacerbate health problems
such as heat-related illness, cholera, dengue fever and
biotoxin poisoning, and would place additional stress on the
already overextended health systems of most small islands.
•Many island nations depend on tourism for over half their
revenues. Climate change and sea-level rise would affect
tourism directly and indirectly: loss of beaches to erosion
and inundation, salinization of freshwater aquifers,
increasing stress on coastal ecosystems, damage to
infrastructure from tropical and extra-tropical storms, and
an overall loss of amenities.
Australasia
•Impacts on aquatic ecosystems from changes in river flow,
flood frequency, and nutrient and sediment inputs are likely
to be greatest in the drier parts of the region.
•Tropical coral reefs, including the Great Barrier Reef, may
be able to keep pace with sea-level rise—but will be
vulnerable to bleaching and death of corals induced by
episodes of higher sea temperatures and other stresses.
•Freshwater supplies on low-lying islands are vulnerable.
•More frequent high-rainfall events may enhance
groundwater recharge and dam-filling events, but they also
may increase the impacts of flooding, landslides and erosion,
with flood-prone urban areas being heavily exposed to
financial loss.
•There will be an increase in coastal flooding and erosion
from sea-level rise and meteorological changes. Indigenous
coastal and island communities in the Torres Strait and in
New Zealand’s Pacific island territories are especially
vulnerable.
•Increases are expected in heat-stress mortality, vectorborne diseases such as dengue, water and sewage-related
diseases, and urban pollution-related respiratory problems.
Europe
•The northern boundaries of forests in Fennoscandia and
northern Russia would likely expand into tundra regions,
reducing the extent of tundra, mires and permafrost areas.
•High-elevation ecosystems and species are particularly
vulnerable because they have nowhere to migrate.
•Precipitation in high latitudes of Europe may increase, with
mixed results for other parts of Europe.
•Water supply may be affected by possible increases in
floods in northern and northwest Europe and by droughts
in southern portions of the continent.
•Up to 95 per cent of Alpine glacier mass could disappear
by 2100, with subsequent consequences for the water flow
regime—affecting, for example, summer water supply,
shipping and hydropower.
•Risks of frost would be reduced in a warmer climate,
allowing winter cereals and other winter crops to expand to
areas such as southern Fennoscandia and western Russia.
•Potential yields of winter crops are expected to increase,
especially in central and southern Europe, assuming that
neither precipitation nor irrigation are limiting and that
water-use efficiency increases with the ambient atmospheric
concentration of CO2.
•Increasing spring temperatures would extend suitable
zones for most summer crops.
•Decreases in precipitation in southern Europe would
reduce crop yields.
•Coastal areas most at risk include the Dutch, German,
Ukrainian and Russian coastlines; some Mediterranean
deltas; and Baltic coastal zones.
•Storm surges, changes in precipitation, and changes in
wind speed and direction are of concern.
•Infrastructure, buildings and cities designed for cooler
climates will have to be adjusted to warming, particularly
heat waves, to maintain current functions.
•Heat-related deaths would increase under global warming
and may be exacerbated by worsening air quality in cities;
there would be a reduction in cold-related deaths.
Latin America
•Mountain ecosystems and transitional zones between
vegetation types will be extremely vulnerable.
•Arid and semi-arid areas are particularly vulnerable to
changes in water availability.
•Hydropower generation and grain and livestock production
are particularly vulnerable to changes in water supply,
particularly in Costa Rica, Panama and the Andes
piedmont, as well as adjacent areas in Chile and western
Argentina between 25°S and 37°S.
•Decreases in agricultural production—even after allowing
for the positive effects of elevated CO2 on crop growth and
moderate levels of adaptation at the farm level—are
projected for several major crops in Mexico, countries of
the Central American isthmus, Brazil, Chile, Argentina and
Uruguay. Livestock production would decrease.
•Extreme events (e.g., floods, droughts, frosts, storms) may
adversely affect rangelands and agricultural production
(e.g., banana crops in Central America). The livelihoods of
traditional peoples, such as many Andean communities,
would be threatened if the productivity or surface area of
rangelands or traditional crops is reduced.
•Losses of coastal land and biodiversity (including coral
reefs, mangrove ecosystems, estuarine wetlands, and marine
mammals and birds), damage to infrastructure, and
saltwater intrusion resulting from sea-level rise could occur
in low-lying coasts and estuaries in countries such as those
of the Central American isthmus, Venezuela, Argentina and
Uruguay.
•Vulnerable groups include those living in shanty towns in
areas around large cities, especially where those settlements
are established in flood-prone areas or on unstable hillsides.
for some Latin American populations.
•The geographical distributions of vector-borne diseases
(e.g., malaria, dengue, Chagas’) and infectious diseases (e.g.,
cholera) would expand southward and to higher elevations
if temperature and precipitation increase.
•Pollution and high concentrations of ground-level ozone,
exacerbated by increasing surface temperature, would have
the potential to negatively affect human health and welfare,
especially in urban areas.
North America
•Northward shifts of forest and other vegetation types,
which would affect biodiversity by altering habitats and
would reduce the market and nonmarket goods and services
they provide.
•Declines in forest density and forested area in some
subregions, but gains in others.
•More frequent and larger forest fires.
•Expansion of arid land species into the great basin region .
•Drying of prairie pothole wetlands that currently support
over 50 per cent of all waterfowl in North America.
•Changes in distribution of habitat for cold-, cool- and
warm-water fish.
•Increased runoff in winter and spring and decreased soil
moisture and runoff in summer.
•Warmer climate scenarios (4–5°C increases in North
America) have yielded estimates of negative impacts in
eastern, southeastern and corn belt regions and positive
effects in northern plains and western regions.
•More moderate warming produced estimates of
predominately positive effects in some warm-season crops.
•During the next century, a 50-cm rise in sea level from
climate change alone could inundate 8,500 to 19,000 km2 of
dry land, expand the 100-year floodplain by more than
23,000 km2 and eliminate as much as 50 per cent of North
America’s coastal wetlands.
•Increased risks to property and human health and life as a
result of possible increased exposure to natural hazards
(e.g., wildfires, landslides and extreme weather events).
•Increased demand for cooling and decreased demand for
heating energy—with the overall net effect varying across
geographic regions.
•Adverse health effects due to thermal stress and extreme
weather/climate events.
•In high-latitude regions, some human health impacts are
expected due to dietary changes resulting from shifts in
migratory patterns and abundance of native food sources.
Temperate Asia
•Warming is expected top be sufficient to trigger structural
changes in the remaining temperate forests.
•Under doubled CO 2 climate there would be a large
reduction in the area (up to 50 per cent) and productivity of
boreal forests (primarily in the Russian Federation),
accompanied by a significant expansion of grasslands and
shrublands.
•Most 2CO2 equilibrium scenario simulations show a
decrease in water supply, except in a few river basins.
•Equilibrium climate conditions for doubled equivalent CO2
concentrations indicate that a decrease of as much as 25 per
cent in mountain glacier mass is possible by 2050.
•The most critical uncertainties are the lack of credible
projections of the effects of global change on the Asian
monsoon or the ENSO phenomenon.
•China projections across different scenarios and different
sites are that changes for several crop yields by 2050 are
projected to be: rice, -78 per cent to +15 per cent; wheat, -21
per cent to +55 per cent; and maize, -19 per cent to +5 per
cent.
•A northward shift of crop zones is expected to increase
agricultural productivity in northern Siberia but to decrease
(by about 25 per cent) grain production in southwestern
Siberia because of a more arid climate.
•Any increase in production associated with CO2
fertilization will be more than offset by reductions in yield
from temperature or moisture changes.
•Induced land subsidence in delta areas.
•Saltwater intrusion would become more serious. A sea-level
rise of 1 m would threaten certain coastal areas.
•Increased temperatures and increased seasonal variability
in precipitation are expected to result in increased recession
of glaciers and increasing danger from glacial lake outburst
floods.
•A reduction in snowmelt water will put the dry-season flow
of these rivers under more stress than is the case now.
•Increased population and increasing demand in the
agricultural, industrial and hydropower sectors will put
additional stress on water resources.
•Pressure on the drier river basins and those subject to low
seasonal flows will be most acute.
•Densely settled and intensively used low-lying coastal
plains, islands and deltas are especially vulnerable to coastal
erosion and land loss, inundation and sea flooding, upstream
movement of the saline/freshwater front and seawater
intrusion into freshwater lenses. Especially at risk are large
delta regions of Bangladesh, Myanmar, Viet Nam and
Thailand, and the low-lying areas of Indonesia, the
Philippines and Malaysia.
•International studies have projected the displacement of
several millions of people from the region’s coastal zone,
assuming a 1-m rise in sea level.
•An increase in epidemic potential of 12–27% for malaria
and 31–47% for dengue and a decrease of schistosomiasis of
11–17% are anticipated under a range of GCM scenarios as
a consequence of climate change.
•Waterborne and water-related infectious diseases, which
already account for the majority of epidemic emergencies in
the region, are expected to increase when higher
temperatures and higher humidity are superimposed on
existing conditions.
Source: Energy Information Administration, Office of Integrated Analysis and Forecasting,
U.S. Department of Energy, Analysis of the Impacts of an Early Start for Compliance with
the Kyoto Protocol (Washington, DC: GPO, 1999), SR/OIAF/99-02
Source: Energy Information Administration, Office of Integrated Analysis and Forecasting,
U.S. Department of Energy, Analysis of the Impacts of an Early Start for Compliance with
the Kyoto Protocol (Washington, DC: GPO, 1999), SR/OIAF/99-02
Why we should support the Kyoto Treaty
Monetary cost of compliance
Many strands of evidence say—
We can achieve many goals at a cost of zero or savings to industry!
Various costs of noncompliance
costs for air conditioning of southern cities grows, disease may spread farther, there will be
more and severer storms, more floods, sea level will rise, and the historical evidence is that
weather and climate have led to the rise and fall of civilizations
Is it worth it to pay real money, “insurance money,” to prevent the
unwanted consequences of global warming?
Equity issues
Developed countries caused the current situation
Equity says that them as made the mess should have to pay to clean it
up, even if it costs something.
Stewardship issues
we have a moral duty to preserve Earth for future generations, a moral obligation to the
many species of plant and animal that will be affected
We have a moral/religious obligation to those injured as a result of our
actions, even if it costs us to address the injuries or prevent them.
A short parable
Ub Samuel, who owns a disposal business, comes into a
suburban community with tons of sewage sludge and dumps it
over all the lawns. Ub says he sees it as fertilizer, and anyway
he’ll make a lot of money disposing of all that undesirable
material. It’s for everyone’s good, because it will fertilize the
lawns eventually, and the problem will go away anyway in a
few months because it will stop stinking (but of course by then
he’ll have returned dumping another load)—and, worst of all,
Ub says, it would harm his company’s economy if he were
forced to clean up the mess or even to stop fouling the lawns, so
he simply won’t do it.
After more complaints, Ub says he could stop adding to the
sludge heaps. But Ub demands that each homeowner pay him to
stop adding to the heaps to compensate him for the losses
sustained because he’ll lose business if he stops dumping.
Explanation
The Kyoto Protocol will not provide any remedy to the real
problem of the past abuse at all. It would simply stop the growth
in the problem (or reduce it slightly). In my analogy, it would be
like stopping Ub Samuel from dumping more sludge into the
streets and lawns of the suburb. It would not clean up what had
already been dropped there.
We Americans are trying to make others pay our costs for us,
trying to weasel out of responsibility. It is only from the most
selfish and greedy perspective, the one adopted by many
politicians, that it could even appear that adherence to Kyoto
is unfair to us. We have already taxed the less-developed
countries by putting them at risk in this warmer world. It
would be immoral to ask them to pay a second time.