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Thucydides and Neorealism
Author(s): Daniel Garst
Source: International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Mar., 1989), pp. 3-27
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International
StudiesQuarterly
(1989) 33, 3-27
Thucydides and Neorealism
DANIEL GARST
University
of California,Los Angeles
ThePeloponnesian
Warhas long been viewedas an earlyexemplarof realist
thinkingin internationalpolitics.More recently,neorealistauthorshave
claimed thatThucydides'historyofferstimelessinsightsinto the importance of global anarchyin shapinginterstaterelations,and thattheseinsightsanticipateneorealistargumentson order and changein worldpolitics.This articlecriticizesthe neorealistappropriationof ThePeloponnesian
War. It presentsan alternative
readingofThucydides'history.In thisreading,the enduringcontribution
of The PeloponnesianWar lies in theinsights
into power and hegemonyembedded in the speeches and debates that
interruptitsnarrative.This analysisis thenused to criticizeneorealistunderstandingsof politicalpowerand hegemony.
The work of Thucydides has long occupied a privileged position among theoristsof
realpolitik. For example, Martin Wight (1978:24) writes,"One of the supreme books
on power politics is the historyof the great war between Athens and Sparta commonly called the Peloponnesian War." For modern-day structuralor neorealist theorists,Thucydides' work constitutes,to use Karl Marx's celebrated phrase from The
EighteenthBrumaire, one of those "spirits of the past" that individuals "anxiously
conjure up" to borrow "names, battlecriesand costumes in order to present the new
scene of world historyin time-honoured disguise" (1977:300). Thus Robert Gilpin
(1984:292) maintains, "Everythingthat the new realistsfindintriguingin the interaction of international economics and international politics can be found in The History
of thePeloponnesian War." Similarly, Kenneth Waltz (1979:66) argues that Thucydides' historyrepresents an early recognition of "the anarchic character of international politics," which "accounts for the strikingsameness of the quality of international life throughout the millenia"; hence, the "relevance of Thucydides in an era of
nuclear weapons." And Robert Keohane (1983:507-8) claims that The Peloponnesian
War can be seen as a Kuhnian exemplar within the tradition of realist scholarship
that embodies a number of the "fundamental" assumptions of structuralrealism.
In this article, I will present a sharply different interpretation of Thucydides'
history. In this interpretation, Thucydides is seen not as the father of realism or
neorealism but as a contested terrain for realist and critical approaches to international relations theory. In particular, I will argue that this tension is evident in
Thucydides' insights on political power and hegemony. I will begin by showing that
Author'snote: An earlier version of this article was presented at the 1985 Annual Meeting of the American
PoliticalScience Association.I wantto thankTerence Ball and MaryDietz fortheirencouragementand help witha
numberof earlydraftsof thisarticle.Later versionsbenefitedsubstantiallyfromthe commentsof Hayward Alker,
RobertKeohane, Dwain Mefford,John Ruggie,David Sylvan,Alexander Wendt,twoanonymousreferees,and the
editorsof International
StudiesQuarterly.
(? 1989 InternationalStudies Association
4
Thucydides
and Neorealism
careful scrutinyof Thucydides' approach to writinghistoryquickly infirmsthe interpretations of Thucydides' work put forward by Gilpin, Waltz, and Keohane. In
particular, I will show that these readings overlook the central importance of the
close interplay between Thucydides' narrative and the paired speeches that recur in
the text. To provide, then, an alternative reading of Thucydides' realism, I will
examine how the conventions of argument and action used to justify Athenian
imperialism change in these speeches. I will focus on the following six key verbal
exchanges: The Congress of the Peloponnesian Confederacy at Lacedaemon, the
firsttwo speeches of Pericles, the Mytilenian Debate, the Melian Dialogue, and the
debate between Nicias and Alcibiades preceding the invasion of Sicily. I will then lay
out the understanding of political power and hegemony embedded in these exchanges. Finally, I will argue that Thucydides' understanding of these concepts
directs attention to certain confusions underlying neorealist debates over political
power and hegemony.
Neorealist Interpretations of Thucydides
For neorealists the major and lasting contributionof The PeloponnesianWar lies in its
scientificcharacter. Hence Gilpin argues that Thucydides is "the firstscientificstudent of international politics" (1984:291). In this understanding of Thucydides'
work, his famous judgement on the "real" cause of the war between Athens and
Sparta-"the growth of Athenian power and the fear this produced in Lacedaemon"-is interpreted as a covering law explanation, pointing to the enduring
importance of international anarchy and the quest for power in shaping the relations
between states.
This scientificunderstanding of The PeloponnesianWar is suspect even if one uncriticallyaccepts-as R. G. Collingwood (1956:29) does-N. C. Cochrane's (1929)
argument that the chief purpose of Thucydides' historyis to affirmpsychological
laws. As Waltz has always argued, regularities in international politics stem from the
operation of higher-order,systemicconfigurationsassociated withthe "third image,"
and not from the psychological characteristicsof individuals. Moreover, Cochrane's
interpretationitselfis problematic: as de Ste. Croix (1972:6) argues, "To dispel such
speculations one has only to ask what those psychological laws are which it was
Thucydides' chief purpose to affirm.The answer is that there are none." Though
various sorts of "laws" are invoked in the speeches put forward by individual actors,
Thucydides makes no attemptto explain them in the course of his narration; indeed,
he rarely puts forward explicit laws of his own.
This is not to deny that Thucydides, on the basis of the actions and mentalityof his
characters, makes certain generalizations about human behavior. This he certainly
does. But these generalizations ought not be equated with the causal laws used by
scientiststo explain recurring phenomena in the natural environment. They instead
correspond to what Winch (1958) has called "rule-governed" behavior. For example,
when the Athenian Emissary argues during the Congress of the Peloponnesian
Confederacy at Lacedaemon that by "law" the strong rule over the weak, they preface the remark by observing that they have done "nothing contrary to the common
rule of mankind[emphasis mine] in accepting an Empire when it was offered to us"
(I:76:44).1 Because they are grounded in shared conventions and beliefs, Thucydides' psychological laws do not entail a singular and well-defined set of counterfacI All qulotationsfromThePeloponnesianWarare fromtbe Cr-awley
translation,revisedand updated byT. E. Wick
(New York: Modern LibraryCollege Editions, 1975).
DANIELGARST
5
tual conditions in the way that law-like generalizations in the natural sciences do.
Their explicans and explicandums refer, as it were, to the same object.
The same can be said for the generalizations Thucydides makes concerning the
social and natural environments in which individuals are situated. While Thucydides
makes note of recurring events and patternsof behavior, he does not commit himself
to drawing specificcausal connections between them. This is evident in the introduction to the History, when Thucydides insists that the Peloponnesian War was the
greatest recorded because of the earthquakes, droughts, famines,plagues, and other
catastrophes that accompanied it. Thucydides notes that such things had been reported in earlier wars, but this hearsay was insufficientlyconfirmed by the facts.
Now, Thucydides argues, these "[o]ld stories of occurrences handed down by tradition, but scantily confirmed by experience, suddenly ceased to be incredible"
(1:23:14). Nowhere does Thucydides explain why events like eclipses, earthquakes,
droughts, and other natural disasters should be more frequent at times of war in
Greece, even though he felt that the evidence indicated that they were. He merely
notes that these events occurred at the same time. As Cornford (1907:103) aptly puts
it, Thucydides "shows a completely scientificspirit, and also an equally complete
destitutionof a scientificview of nature."2 Thucydides records these events and the
growth of Athenian power that preceded the conflictso that posteritymight readily
identifysuch patterns of events should they recur in the future. Human knowledge
of the surrounding social and physical environment and ability to effect changes
withinit is anchored in the realm of praxis, of practical experience and observation.3
A second and more serious defect in the scientificreading of Thucydides by
neorealists is its inabilityto account for the speeches and debates that recur in The
PeloponnesianWar. Gilpin and Waltz make no comment on Thucydides' use of the
speeches, despite the fact that any modern reader must be struck by the central
position they occupy in The PeloponnesianWar. Keohane does make note of their use
by Thucydides, arguing that the speeches and debates exemplify the method of
"rational reconstruction." Both Thucydides and Morgenthau, Keohane argues, understand the actions of states by imagining themselves as rational individuals in
authoritative decision-making roles, and by reflectingon what they would do when
confronted with the same problems faced by actual statesmen. Thus Keohane claims
that both Thucydides and Morgenthau "assume that states will act to protect their
power positions, perhaps even to the point of seeking to maximize their power." And
both authors, he claims, "go beneath the surface of events to the power realities that
are fundamental to state action" (1983:507). Keohane maintains that Thucydides'
"reconstruction"of the speeches parallels Morgenthau's insistence that understanding foreign policy necessitates the analyst putting herself in the position of a statesman and using the concept of the national interestdefined as power to look over his
shoulder, retrace his steps, and in so doing understand his thoughts and actions.
The main difficultywith this reasoning, when applied to the speeches in The
Peloponnesian War, is that it conflicts with Thucydides' insistence that the verbal
exchanges of his historyare accurate accounts of actual speeches given on particular
occasions. To be sure, Thucydides does state that difficultiesof recollection forced
2 This is even more evident in Thucydides' discussion of the plague. He records the symptomsof'the disease
frompersonal observationso that posteritymay recognize the disorder shouLldit bh-eakout again (11:49:115-16).
But he does not make any effortto explain what caLlsedthe plague (11:48:115). Indeed, Thucydides observes,"As
a rule . . . ther-ewas no ostensiblecause" (11:49:115).
The originsof theoryand theoristgo back to the post-Homericwordsof theoria,
and theoros.
Originally,
theoremn,
a theoros
was an ambassador sent by the polis to another city-state
to witnessreligiouls and athleticfestivals(Euben,
1977:33-34). Thus, in the context in which Thucydides writes,theoreticalknowledge derives from practical
activityratherthan contemplation.
6
and Neorealism
Thucydides
him to make the speakers say what, in his view, the circumstances of the various
situations demanded they say. But it must be asked just what sort of advice Thucydides is giving his readers in this passage and surrounding comments in Chapter 22
of Book I. Thucydides emphasizes that he adhered "as closely as possible to the
general sense of what they [the speakers] really said" (1:22:13). Thucydides then
states that his description of events is not simply derived from the firstsource that
came to hand but instead "rests partly on what I saw myself,partly on what others
saw for me, the accuracy of the report being always tried by the most severe and
detailed tests possible" (1:22:13). What Thucydides tells us in these statementsis that
he has been as careful and accurate as possible in the acquisition and verificationof
his information. If it is true that the speeches cannot be recollected in the exact form
in which theywere originallydelivered, it is also the case that even first-handreports
of events are incomplete and biased.
The historicityof the speeches in Thucydides' work enables us to dispose of two
possible objections to the kind of analysis of The Peloponneisan War that will be
undertaken in this article. The firstis that certain speeches were never given at all, or
were never given in the form in which theyappear in the history.The shaky empirical basis of this frequentlyleveled charge against Thucydides has been discussed in
detail by Donald Kagan (1975). Beyond that,a more fundamental difficultywith this
allegation is raised by Marc Cogan (1981:xi), who argues: "Inasmuch as Thucydides
presents the speeches simply as speeches, and gives no indication that he has fabricated them in any material way, he has given the speeches the same guarantee of
their historicitythat he has given to every other aspect of his history,every other
event in his narrative." And since objective evidence that would make us doubt
Thucydides' basic reliabilityhas yet to be uncovered, there is no good reason to
doubt the fundamental veracityof the speeches, especially when Thucydides insists
that he treats them with the same care he gives to the events in his narrative.
This interdependence of the speeches and narrativeof events in The Peloponnesian
War infirmsa second possible and explicitlyneorealist objection to the present approach to Thucydides' history. This second objection is that the speeches in The
PeloponnesianWar must be distinguished from nonverbal behavior and are open to
dismissal as mere rationalizations of systemicallydetermined interests. If this were
indeed the case, it must be asked why Thucydides includes these speeches in such
detail. The answer, suggests White (1984: chapter 3), is that the speeches constitutea
"culture of argument" that defines the interactionamong cities and structurestheir
behavior. This is not to say that naked self-interestplays no role in actions of the
cities. It is to suggest instead that Thucydides is concerned with the language
through which this self-interestis articulated, the norms and conventions associated
with it, and whether or not they decay over time.
Thus Thucydides interrupts his narrative with paired speeches or debates whenever he reaches a turning point in the conflict,an event that signals a radical departure from earlier policies by the differentactors. Individual speeches are used to
clarifythe execution or extension of policies elucidated in earlier debates (Cogan,
1981:7-8). By using the speeches in this way, Thucydides emphasizes the deliberate
choices made by individuals and the close relationship between these choices and the
events of the history.Far from viewing historical figuresas driven by forces outside
their control, Thucydides sees them as the conscious initiatorsof events. As Cogan
(1981:194) argues, the speeches emphasize the direction exercised by human agents
over conflictsboth by drawing attention to the fact of deliberation and by setting
forthits content. In accounting for the actions of states,Thucydides does not begin,
as in the structuralrealism of Waltz, "by draw[ing] connections between the distribution of power in a system and the behavior of states" (Keohane, 1983:508).
DANIEL GARST
7
This is evident in the opening chapters of The Peloponnesian War. Keohane
(1983:534) argues that Thucydides follows in these chapters the "positive heuristic"
of looking for underlying power realities behind the actions of the differentparticipants. If this argument is correct, the chapters surrounding the celebrated judgement on the "truest cause" of the war should provide a broader description of
internationalrelations in Greece at the outset of the Peloponnesian War, focusing on
the physical capabilities of Athens and the other participantsin the conflict.In fact,
the chapters preceding the arguments on the "alleged" and "truest"causes of the war
are best characterized as an exercise in social anthropology, in which Thucydides
describes the movement of peoples, the development of customs and habits, and
their impact on political institutions.Thucydides then moves quickly to the firstof
the paired speeches of the history,dealing with the incidents at Epidamnus, one of
the "alleged" causes of the war. He provides just a brief explanation of the early
developments at Epidamnus. Thus whatever final meaning is attached to Thucydides' judgement on the "truest" cause of the war,4our understanding of the Peloponnesian War actually begins with the firstpair of speeches. We come to these
speeches, Cogan (1981:8) writes,"[w]ithout benefitof any other clarificationof the
circumstances or issues involved other than that provided by the speeches themselves." It is only after this firstverbal exchange that Thucydides provides detailed
informationon the existing relations between the major city-states.
This procedure is repeated whenever Thucydides comes to major events or turning points in the conflict. He uses the paired speeches not only to "lay bare what
stood behind the narrative, the policy, the possibilities and mistakes" (Finley,
1977:59), but to dispense with explicit precepts in outlining the political prescriptions of the history.The paired speeches build these prescriptionsinto the history's
very structureand mode of argumentation. This basic characteristicof Thucydides'
historydid not escape the attention of Hobbes (1839), who firsttranslated The PeloponnesianWar into English, and whose summary statementon the speeches in Thucydides' historycan hardly be bettered: "The ground and motives of every action he
settethdown before the action itself,either narratively,or else contriveththem into
the form of deliberative orations. . . . Digressions for instruction'scause and other
such conveyance of precepts which is the philosopher's part), he never useth; as
having so clearly set before men's eyes the ways and events of good and evil counsels,
that the narration doth secretlyinstructthe reader, and more effectuallythan can
possibly be done by precept" (E.W. VIII:xxi-xxii). "In sum," Hobbes concludes, "if
the truthof the historydid ever appear in the manner of relating,it doth so in this
history:so coherent, perspicuous and persuasive is the whole narration, and every
part thereof' (E.W. VIII:xxi).5
Thus, understanding The PeloponnesianWar necessitatesunraveling, to use White's
(1984:59) apt description, its "complex rhetorical universe" and "culture of argument," consisting of the "discourse, the conventions of argument and action" by
which the Greek city-states"maintain and regulate their relations withone another."
My analysis of discourse in The PeloponnesianWar will examine the changes in the
conventions of argument and action underlying Athenian imperialism. I will show
4 In fact, the word Thucydides uses repeatedly,prophais,has a range of referencethat extends well beyond
Hippocratic medicine, where it signifiesthe antecedent conditions of disease. In logic, for example, it means
"premise"; in Greek drama, it signifies"pretext,""ground," or "reason." In the second range of meanings,Ball
(1986:626) notes thatprophais"refersto 'causes' whichare linked to human actionby normsthatare widelyshared
by all parties to a dispute."
5 I am indebted to Terence Ball forthisparticularcitation.For an interesting
discussionof the parallelsbetween
Leviathanand The PeloponnesianWar, see Ball (1985).
8
and Neorealism
Thucydides
that Thucydides' insights into power and hegemony are embedded in the changing
Athenian discourse on the imperatives Athens faced as a great imperial power,
focusing on the link between speech and action in Thucydides' history.In examining
these changes, I choose the method of example and iterationas the mode of exposition because it seems closer to Thucydides' own conception of political knowledge, to
the way he embeds his teachings in the architectureof his work. I will focus on the
debates at the Congress of the Peloponnesian Confederacy at Lacedaemon, the first
two speeches of Pericles, the MytilenianDebate, the Melian Dialogue, and the debate
between Alcibiades and Nicias over the invasion of Sicily. I do so for two reasons.
First, these verbal exchanges occur at criticaljunctures in Thucydides' history: the
debate at Lacedaemon takes place prior to the widening of the conflict between
Athenian and Spartan client city-states;the speeches of Pericles are followed by
Athens's entry into the War and the plague; the Mytilenian Debate precedes the
vivid description of the Corcyrean Revolution; and the Melian Dialogue and the
debate between Nicias and Alcibiades precede the invasion of Sicily. Second, these
exchanges contain distinctpositions on the nature of Athenian imperialism.
Speech, Actionand AthenianImperialism
Thucydides' historyof the Peloponnesian War opens with the dispute between Athens and Corinth over the status of the satellite cities of Corcyra and Potidea. While
the account of these quarrels is preceded by thejudgement on the "truestcause" of
the war, the allegations at Epidamnus and Potidea are not simply mere pretexts for
the war. They are betterunderstood as the catalyststhat set the war in motion, as the
firstactualizations of its "truest cause." Thucydides recognizes that fear is a subjective emotion that requires certain political processes for it to be translated into a
collective motive that guides the behavior of a state. As is his custom throughout The
PeloponnesianWar, Thucydides chooses to exhibit these processes and the deliberate
nature of the choices made by actors through the medium of speech and debate. For
this reason, the historyof the Peloponnesian War begins with the debate over the
Corcyrian Alliance. This debate is followed by the narrativeof militarypreparations
and engagements between Athens and Corinth and the events at Potidea. Thucydides then moves once more into the realm of debate and deliberation. Aftera brief
introductorychapter, he records four speeches fromthe Convention of the Peloponnesian Congress at Lacedaemon. As throughout the history,these speeches speak for
themselves.
In the debate over the Corcyrian Alliance, Thucydides specifies the moment at
which the war begins; in the debate at Lacedaemon, he clarifiesthe way in which the
Peloponnesians go to war. Here Thucydides elaborates on the psychological implications of the growth of Athenian power and the range of choices that Sparta and its
allies have, or feel they have, in dealing with it. Jaeger (1945:395) writes that the
meeting "was supremely important: [Thucydides] marked it out by reporting no less
than four speeches made by the participants." These speeches constitute two debates: one between Corinthian and Athenian speakers for and against Spartan
action; another between Spartan speakers deliberating whetheror not to take action.
The debate begins with the Corinthian speech. This rhetorical tour de force contrasts "Spartan dullness and indolency, old-fashioned respectabilityand narrowminded conservatism" withAthens' "restlessenergy,marvellous elan in acting and in
planning" that make the Athenians "capable of meeting any situation" (Jaeger,
1945:395-96). The Athenians are "addicted to innovation," and are "born into the
world to take no rest themselves and given none to others" (1:70:40,41). The Spartans, on the other hand, are "old-fashioned" in their habits. While the Athenians
move swiftly,the Spartans "wait till the power of the enemy is twice its original size"
DANIEL GARST
9
(1:69:39). And while the Athenians have unlimited desires, the Spartans' "ideal of
fair dealing is based on the principle that if you do not injure others, you need not
risk your fortunes in preventing others from injuring you" (1:71:41).
In putting forward this opposition between innovation and tradition and action
and passivity,the Corinthians invent two opposite characters designed to bring about
Spartan action. While these characters fulfilltheir rhetorical purpose, they are not
necessarily the most accurate depictions of Athens or Sparta.6 The Athenians tryto
blunt the pointedness of the Corinthian remarks in two ways. First,they argue that
their empire was acquired by accident and necessity rather than innate impulsion.
They can claim that they are, in fact, quite moderate in their desires.
The firstAthenian defense is designed to counter the claim that their naturemade
them active. They tell the Spartans that their empire was acquired "by no violent
means, but because you were unwilling to persecute the war against the barbarians
and because allies attached themselves to us and spontaneously asked us to assume
command." They then state that necessity required them to hold on to it: "[W]hen
you had ceased to be the friends that you once were, and had become the object of
suspicion and dislike, it appeared no longer safe to give up our Empire, especially as
all who left us would fall into your hands" (1:75:44). The Athenians chide the
Spartans for taking up the "cry of justice," a "consideration which no one ever yet
brought forward to hinder his ambitions when he had a chance of gettinganything
by might." They argue that it was "not a very remarkable action or contraryto the
common practice of mankind, if we accepted an Empire that was offered to us, and
refused to give it up under the pressure of the three strongestmotives, fear, honor
and interest" (1:76:44). The Athenians claim here that all men-including the Spartans-act from fear, honor, and profit. Far from unique by nature, the Athenians
have simply done what all others would have done in the same circumstances.
In their second defense, the Athenians respond to the Corinthian charge that they
possess unlimited desires. They tryto show that, far from having unlimited ambitions,Athens unnecessarily imposes limitson itselfin dealing withallies over whom it
has complete control. The Athenians state that they are "not so superior to human
nature as to refuse domination" and yet,at the same time,"respectjustice more than
[their] situation compels them to do" (1:76:44,45). In the course of these remarks,
they stress the "fair title" to their possessions resulting from the "daring patriotism"
of Athens during the Persian invasion of Greece. This patriotism"had no competitors" and is contrasted with the belated entryof Sparta into the conflict(1:74:43).
The second debate recorded by Thucydides between Archidamus and Sthenelaides completes the analysis of how Sparta enters the conflictby settingforthSpartan attitudes toward Athens. The content of both speeches reflectsdifferentfacets of
the Spartan character. Archidamus argues for strategiccaution and claims that this
caution represents particularly Spartan virtues of moderation and obedience
(1:84:49). He remains unpersuaded by the Corinthian argument that the Athenian
threat is unique. Archidamus does express fear of Athens and believes that war will
eventually be fought between it and Sparta. But he maintains that the Athenian
threat is not especially pressing, and he counsels waiting at least two more years
before entering into war (1:82:47-48).
If Archidamus invokes values that the Corinthians have already argued are characteristicallySpartan-caution and attachment to tradition-Sthenelaides' speech is
6 For example, Kagan (1969:290-9 1) argues: "A people so sluggishand unimaginativeas the Spartan depicted
by the Corinthianspeech could har-dlyhave won masteryover the Peloponinese,leadership of the Greeks in the
successfulresistanceto Persia, and victoryin the firstPeloponnesian War.. . . The depictionof Athenianactions
and characteris even more remote fromthe facts."
10
Thlucydides
and Neorealismti
Spartan in its "Laconic" style.7Sthenelaides bluntlydismisses the Athenian defense
with the comment: "The long speeches of the Athenians I do not pretend to understand" (1:86:50). His short and bull-headed appeal for war against Athens is based
firmlyon mattersofjustice and injustice. While the Corinthians elaborately set forth
proof of Athens' unlimited aims, Sthenelaides simplyclaims that the Athenians have
acted wronglytoward Spartan allies and that Sparta must end this behavior. Though
the Athenians may have acted heroically during the Persian invasion, they have
"nowhere denied that they are injuring our allies and the Peloponnese." Thus the
Athenians "deserve double punishment for having ceased to be good and for having
become bad" (1:86:50).
Though Archidamus' proposals are more consistent with habitual Spartan responses to external threats, it is Sthenelaides' simple and inelegant reasoning that
sways the assembly. The outcome of the debate shows, then, that with regard to
Athens the Spartan character has changed. The Spartans now accept the Corinthian
argument that Athens poses a new and special threat. This acceptance was no doubt
encouraged by the Athenian speech, particularlyits arrogance and condescending
remarks on the morals of the audience it is supposed to persuade. But even though
the Athenian-sare unable to dissuade the Spartans from entering the war, their
speech does offer a challange to the Corinthian interpr-etationof their empire. Its
presen-cein the exchange mitigates any conclusions that might otherwise be drawn
about the necessityor inevitabilityof the war. The Spartans must choosebetween the
rival interpretations of Athens' empire advanced by the Corinthian and Athenian
speakers. As Cogan (1981:30) declares, "[I]nsofar as we can see the Athenian accoun-t as a possible representation-of the empire, we can also understand what
Thucydides meant by saying it was Spartanfear of the empire, and not the empire
itself,which was the true cause of the war."
Aside from furtherclarifyingthe choices and purposes for which the Spartans go
to war, the Athenian speech provides the firstsubstantial discussion of the interplay
between necessity and choice in Athenian imperialism and the sources of Athens'
hegemony. The Athenians readily acknowledge the importance of honor, fear, and
profitin the acquisition of their empire. These motives,theynote, are common to all
great powers and, as such, belong to the realm of necessity. But if the Athenians
concede the importance of necessityin their activity,they also maintain that Athens,
unlike other great powers, does not abandon the effort to act morally. In these
passages, Jacqueline de Romilley declares (1962:256): "Athens is shown as transcending human nature," which hadjust "served as an excuse for all human actions."
Athens differs from other imperial powers because its empire is not merely the
product of brute force.
What Thucydides establishes with these remarks is the basis of Athenian hegemony following the war with Persia. Athens acquires hegemony not through its
wealth and militarystrength,but through the consent of other city-states.And this
consent follows from Athens' deeds during the Persian invasion. Because of its
"daring patriotism,"the other city-statesvoluntarilyallied with Athens and asked it
to assume leadership of the Delian League. What stands out in all of this is that Thucydides makes no necessary connection between Athens' hegemony and its material
resources. The Athenians secure hegemony or leadership8 because they can persuade, on the basis of past deeds and services, other city-statesto follow them.
7
The "laconic" der-ivesfr-omLaconiia,the Spar-tanhomelanid.
8 Hegemoniycomes to us fr-om
the Greek word egemiosliol,
which means leader-or ruler. Anidwhile the termii
was
cuLstomarily
ulsecluLp to the late ninieteenthcenituLryto descr-ibethe political preclominaniceof onie state over
DANIELGARST
11
This aspect of Athenian hegemony is also stressed by Greek writersafter Thucydides. De Romilley (1958:97) notes that for the historian Isocrates, "The rise and fall
of a hegemony can always be explained by the fact that cities either respected justice
or ignored it," with the rise of hegemony occurring when "cities spontaneously
accept the other's direction." The argument thatjustice is necessary if cities wish to
retain power is also present in Xenophon's Hellinica and is invoked by Plato against
Callicles in The Gorgias. And its origins, de Romilley (1958:93) emphasizes, lie in
Thucydides' history,in the speech delivered by the Athenian envoys at Lacedaemon.
The monologue speeches that follow the meeting at Lacedaemon set forth the
strategiesgrowing out of the widening conflictbetween Athens and Corinth. Two of
these speeches, the firstspeech of Pericles and the Funeral Oration, are relevant to
the issues addressed here. Pericles' firstspeech deals with the relationship between
choice and necessity in Athens' behavior, the Funeral Oration with the social and
political bases of Athenian power.
In his firstspeech, Pericles urges the Athenians not to make concessions to the
Peloponnesians for the maintenance of peace. He maintains that giving in will only
lead to furtherdemands. The war is necessary to properly demonstrate Athenian
resolution (I: 140:8 1). Having argued for the necessity of war, Pericles advocates a
strategythat sustains choice within the boundaries of necessity. He tells the Athenians that the war will be a long one, and that Athens' best course is to rely on its
greater stayingpower (I: 141-43:82-85). He explains that victoryis certain as long as
they refrain from undertaking furtherconquests and avoid superfluous campaigns
(1:144:85). We know from both the Corinthian depiction of Athens' character and
from Thucydides' account of its operations against Persia in the Pentecontaetia
(1:89-117:57-66)
that this passive strategy will be difficultfor the Athenians to
follow. Thus Pericles places it within a context of action and maneuver by calling
upon the Athenians to think of themselves as "islanders." Even if Attica is lost,
Athens will retain its navy, which it can use to harass the Peloponnese and maintain
links to its empire (1:143:84-85).
Pericles is confident of a successful outcome to the conflict because of the far
greater experience of the Athenians in seafaring and naval operations (I: 14243:84-85). In making this point, he alludes to the broad differencesbetween Athens
and Sparta noted earlier in the speeches at Lacedaemon. Because the navy requires
rowers and because rowers mean democracy, Athens' maritime empire follows directlyfrom its political innovations (Edmunds, 1975:28-29). Thus when the Corinthians tell the Spartans that their habits are "old-fashioned," they state that in politics, as in art, "improvements ever prevail," and that "constant necessities of action
must be accompanied by constant improvement in methods." "The vast experience
of Athens," they claim, "has carried her further along the path of innovation"
(1:71:41). What makes these recommendations strikingis the Corinthians' illustration of them with the example of the Athenians, who have displayed the spirit of
technological innovation in the political realm.
Pericles' next speech, the well-known Funeral Oration, takes up this relationship
between Athens' habits, customs, and political institutionsand its activityand political power. The expressed purpose of this address is to strengthenAthenian determination to pursue the war and bolster support for the cautious and difficultstrategy
adopted by Pericles against the growing discontent caused mainly by the loss of
homes and property (11:21:100-1). Addressing this criticism,Pericles tries to convince the Athenians that Athens' existence is not defined by any specific material
kinld.
another,thereexistoccasional early uses of the termin English to indicate pr-edominanceof a more genler-al
of thingsgrowving
ulponthe earth," and
in 1567, to the "Aegonomic or suLfferaigntie
Referencesappear, startinig
from 1656 to "the supi-eamor Hegemoniickpart of the Soul." See Williams(1983:144).
12
Thucydides
and Neorealism
possessions. His statements all tend to emphasize that Athens is unique in Greece
and that this uniqueness does not reside in its material wealth or monuments, but in
singular qualities of habit and intellect. These qualities are described in detail in
chapters 37 through 40, which emphasize the unityof deliberation and action made
possible by Athens' settled habits, democratic political institutions,and national character. Unlike the inhabitants of other city-states,Athenian citizens,"though occupied
with the pursuits of industry, are still the fair judges of public matters." Their
participation in civic affairs, particularlyin the debates during the meetings of the
Assembly, is seen by Pericles as the key element behind Athenian activity:"[W]e
Athenians are able tojudge all events . . . and instead of looking upon discussion as
a stumbling block in the way of successful action, we think of it as an indispensable
preliminary to wise action at all." Thus Athenian enterprises are described as a
"singular spectacle of daringand deliberation[emphasis mine]," and those who fail to
participate in civic affairs are not merely "unambitious" but "useless" (11:40:110).
Pericles attempts in these remarks to show the Athenians that the citythey defend
exists in the way of life they lead, not in any of their material possessions. He argues
that the power of Athens, what makes it unique in the Greek world, is the subjective
nature of Athenian democracy (11:37:108). By providing each citizen with the opportunityto participate in public life, in debate and deliberation, Athenian democracy produces a unity of will among its citizens far stronger than that resulting from
blind obedience to the state. Pericles contrasts the bravery of the Spartans, which
results from a "painful discipline" inculcated from childhood, withthe self-conscious
patriotismof Athenian citizens, who are able to live as they please and yet are just as
ready to act bravely when theymust (11:39:109). As Edmunds (1975:67) perceptively
observes, "Patriotismof this sort is a release from fortune,because the cityis considered itselfto embody the values of the individual citizens." Thus, when speaking of
the fallen soliders, Pericles tells the Athenians that their lives and sacrifice have
significance, and that their memory will endure not in stone tablets, but in the'unwrittenmemorial that lives with the survivors (11:43:112). The polis compensates
individual citizens for particular shortcomings and protects them against chance by
standing between them and whims and uncertaintiesof nature (Edmunds, 1975:6 170; Euben, 1977:41-42). This enables the Athenians, unlike the Spartans, to view
chance interventionsas both objective and subjective, as at least partiallyamenable to
human intelligence. While Archidamus argues that wars are decided by "freaks of
chance not determinable by calculation" (1:84:49), Pericles equates the arbitrariness
of events withthe plans of men; he claims, "[T]his is whywe usually blame chance for
whatever does not happen as we expected" (I: 140:87).9
For Thucydides, then, the basis of political power is the existence of a public realm
in which individuals have the opportunity to voluntarilyspeak and act together. As
White (1984:84) declares, "[T]he nature of power is social, not material, and the
realities of power should never be confounded with such appearances as a city
chooses to build." More specifically,political power rests on the intersubjectivesocial
conventions and institutionsregulating the interplaybetween speech and action. For
this reason, political power in Thucydides' historyis very much potential in character: the exercise of political power is contingent upon the existence of well-defined
and widely accepted social conventions and institutions.The same kind of argument
is present in the writingsof Hannah Arendt. In his discussion of Arendt's "Communications Concept of Power," Habermas (1977:4) observes, "The fundamental
phenomenon of power is not the instrumentalizationof will, but the formation of a
commonwill in a communication directed to reaching an agreement." Like Thucy9 For a masterfuldiscussion of the differentoutlooks of Athensand Sparta on chance and the abilityof human
reason to masterit, see Edmunds (1975).
DANIEL GARST
13
dides, Arendt urges us to understand political power as a "power potential," linked
to the ability of individuals to act in concert. And like Thucydides, Arendt sees no
necessary connection between political power and material resources. Power is actualized not by the presence of material resources, but in political environments
"where word and deed have not parted company, where words are not empty and
deeds are not brutal, where words are not used to veil intentions but to disclose
realities, and deeds are not used to violate and destroy but to establish and create
new realities" (Arendt, 1985:200).
If political power is potential in character, hegemony rests on the acquisition of
leadership, in particular on the ability to persuade and carry out singular accomplishments.Thus, unlike political power, hegemony presupposes some formof activityin the form of both persuasion and deeds. But as withpolitical power, Thucydides
draws no necessary connection between hegemony and the possession of material
resources. This is not to say that possession of material resources is unimportant in
the acquisition and maintenance of hegemony. Nevertheless, hegemony is defined in
the firstinstance by the ability of a state to combine such material resources with
political strategies that make other states recognize and consent to its leadership.
And since the effectivenessof hegemonic strategiesmay vary in particular situations
and openand maintenanceof hegemony
and time-spans, theestablishment
is a contingent
endedprocess.
In the Athenian speeches and events that follow the Funeral Oration, Thucydides
describes how Athens is transformed from an environment in which "words are not
empty and deeds are not brutal" to one in which words lose their meaning and in
which sentimentsof decency, moderation, and justice are obliterated by necessity.As
if to underscore the contingent nature of the political environmentin which political
power and hegemony are actualized, Thucydides follows the Funeral Oration with
his description of the Plague, which "entirelyupset" normal burial rites and induced
various forms of "lawless extravagance" (11:52:117, 118). Though Pericles is able, in
his third and final speech, to rekindle Athenian resolve, he succumbs shortlythereafter to the plague. And following his death, the leadership of Athens falls into the
hands of men who choose to "[o]ccupy themselves with private cabals for leadership
of the commons, by which they not only paralyzed operations in the field, but also
firstintroduced civil discord at home" (11:65:126).
The symptoms of this rot firstappear in the next major debate of Thucydides'
history,between Cleon and Diodotus over the fate of the Mytilene, which had rebelled unsuccessfully against Athens. The deterioration of Athenian political life is
personified by Cleon, "the most violent man in Athens" (Cornford, 1907:110), who is
responsible for the massacre at Scione, and possesses, as Gomme (1962:108) acidly
puts it, "a vulgar mind, acute in a second-rate manner, without intelligence or humanity."Cleon calls for the execution of all Mytilenians,regardless of whether or not
they participated in the rebellion. "Democracy," he bluntlyargues, "is incompatible
with empire because you entirely forget that your empire is a despotism and your
subjects are disaffected conspirators whose obedience is insured not by your suicidal
concessions but by superiority given you by your strength and not their loyalty"
(111:37:172). Diodotus, Cleon's foil in this debate, begins his response by statingthat,
like Cleon, he has no desire to be "influenced" by "pityor indulgence" (111:48:180).
The cornerstone of his argument for leniency is an elegant sophistry on human
nature. Diodotus accepts Cleon's premise that human nature is incorrigible; he then
uses it to demonstrate that fear will never prevent rebellion. The execution of all
Mytilenians will only make others who rebel more intransigent in their rebellion
rather than deter them from it (111:45-6:178-9).
The nature of this rebuttal has led some commentators to argue that, unlike
Diodotus, Cleon at least makes an argument based on justice, even if thisjustice is a
14
Thucydides
and Neorealism
rough kind in which injury is repaid with injury.'0 While this argument has some
merit,it cannot be squared with Diodotus' insistence, toward the end of his speech,
that the Athenians must recognize the different sympathies of the oligarchs and
demos in the subject states. In the case of the Mytilene, the oligarchs had led the
rebellion while the demos remained sympatheticto Athens (111:27:167). As Cogan
(1981:56-7) perceptively argues, the basic thrustof the policy advocated by Diodotus is to make use of this distinction to pacify rebelling satellites. For this reason,
Diodotus does indeed offer in his argument a "principle to direct action toward the
allies and other states 'before the fact'-that is, an actual and uniform policy to
maximize allied sympathyand cooperation, not merely a case-by-case expedient to
return rebellious allies to Athenian control" (Cogan, 1981:56).
Diodotus' argument, adopted by the audience, represents a significantturning
point in Athenian policy. Both prior to the outbreak of the war and through its early
stages, the Athenians refrained from consistentlysupporting democratic factions
within individual city-states.Diodotus urges the Athenians to cultivate new bonds
within and outside their empire based on the ideological alliance of democracy in
Athens with the democratic factions in other city-states.Diodotus offers,in effect,a
new strategyof maintaining Athenian hegemony within its empire. Drawing upon
the "eunoia," or "good will,"" that the democrats in the cities feel toward Athens
offersthe Athenians a means of control over theirempire more effectivethan fear to
replace the earlier and by now eroded basis of Athenian hegemony in Greece.
But if this new Athenian strategymade militarysuccess more frequent, as Athens'
military power was not augmented by ideological support,'2 it also extended the
scope of the conflictbetween Athens and Sparta. Democratic and oligarchic factions,
bent on seizing power, could now secure the interventionof the great powers. In the
new wartime environment: "Revolution . . . ran its course from cityto city,and the
places which it arrived at last, having heard what had been done before, carried to a
stillgreater excess the refinementof their convention, as manifested in the cunning
of their enterprise and the atrocityof their reprisals." Thucydides follows this observation with his vivid description of how "[w]ords had to change their ordinary meanings" during the Corcyrian rebellion: "Reckless audacity came to be considered the
courage of a loyal ally; prudent hesitation,specious cowardice; moderation was held
to be a cloak for unmanliness; abilityto see all sides of a question, inaptness to act on
any. Frantic violence became the attributeof manliness, cautious plottingajustifiable
means of self-defense.The advocate of extreme measures was trustworthy;his opponent a man to be suspected" (111:82:199).
It is against this backdrop of growing political polarization in the Greek world that
the Melian Dialogue takes place. Unlike other small islands, Melos had managed to
preserve its independence and stay outside both the Athenian and Spartan blocs,
even though its inhabitants were colonists from Sparta. The Athenians had attacked
the island in the early stages of the war (in 426) but abandoned the campaign as not
worth the time or effort(Kagan, 1981:148). The marked contrast between this early
10This claim is put forwar-d
most provocativelyin White (1984:74-77). For a critiqueof it thatdiffersfromthe
one puLtfor-wardhere, see Ball (1986:672-78).
"The eunoia of Greece is largelyon the side of Sparta
l l De Romilley(1958:92) claims thatin Thucydides' histor-y,
and againstAtheins.Diodotus is the onlyone who souLght
to make use of the eunoza whichthe democratsin the cities
felttoward Athenis."These claims ar-esuLspect on two grounds. First,Diodotus' argumentsar-eaccepted by the
majorityof Athenianisin the debate over-the fateof the Myteline.Second, the claim thatthe eunoia of Greece is on
the side of the Spartans is simplyfalse. As de Ste. Croix (1954:1) observes,"The general mass of the population of
the allied (or suLbject)states,far frombeing hostile to Athens,actuallywelcomiied
her-dominance anid wished to
remain within the Empire, even-aind perhaps more particularly-dUring that last thir-ty
years of the Fifth
Century, when the tyrannyof Athens,whichbulks so large in the traditionalview,is supposed to have beeil at its
height."
12
See Kagan (1974: chapter 9).
DANIEL GARST
15
behavior and later Athenian words and deeds at Melos underlines the growing
political polarization within the Greek world; for the Athenians now deny, even
during a period of nominal peace, that any space exists for free movement between
the Athenian and Spartan blocs. It is thisdenial and how the Atheniansjustifyit that
makes the Melian Dialogue so exceptional, marking it as another turning point in
Thucydides' history.The Dialogue does not, as is often alleged, constitutea demonstration of Athens' growing cruelty and depravity (Finley, 1942:208-12; Strauss,
1964:211-17). The problem withthisclaim is that the harshjudgement meted out to
the Melians had already been used against the Scionians in 420. Thucydides passes
over without comment the Athenian decision here to put all men of militaryage to
death and sell the women and children into slavery(V:32:318). Moreover, the conditions Athens firstoffersto Melos are in fact quite reasonable: alliance and payment
of tribute.
The debate at Melos is about whether the Melians can maintain their neutrality.In
rejecting the neutral status of Melos, the Athenians betraya new and urgent anxiety
about their control over their allies and empire. When the Melians warn them that
their"fall would be a signal for the heaviest vengeance and an example for the world
to meditate upon" (V:90:351), the Athenians respond by statingthat their main fear
is not defeat at the hands of the Spartans: "[A] rival empire like Lacedaemon, even if
Lacedaemon is our real antagonist, is not so terrible to the vanquished as subjects
who by themselves attack and overpower their rulers" (V:91:351). And later in the
debate, the Athenians state once again that "islanders like yourselves" and "subjects
still smarting under the yoke" (V:99:352) are the people whom they fear the most.
Thus, for the firsttime in Thucydides' history,the Athenians indicate that their
empire is a greater threat to their security than the Spartans are. They have now
accepted Cleon's contention that their Empire is a "tyranny"and its subjects are
"disaffected conspirators." The new ideological orientation of Athenian policy initiated by Diodotus has only temporarily prevented the empire from becoming the
weak link in Athens' defenses.
Once this has happened, the energy, innovation, and generosity that had earlier
played such an important role in Athenian imperialism gives way to weary realism
and abdication to base necessity.The Athenians choose not to "trouble" the Melians
with "specious pretences either of how we have a right to our Empire because we
overthrew the Mede (the Persians), or how we are attacking you because of the
wrong that you have done us" (V:89:350). They maintain that such a "long speech
would not be believed" and instructthe Melians to "aim at what is feasible" because
justice "is in question only between equals in power, while the strong do what they
can and weak sufferwhat they must" (V:89:35 1). They cynicallyand correctlypredict that the Spartans will not aid Melos (V: 105-9:353-54). And theytell the Melians
that there is even less reason to base their hopes on those "invisible prophecies and
oracles that delude men with hopes to their destruction" (V: 103:353). Indeed, the
structureof the entire Dialogue is such that from beginning to end it is the Melians
who put forward the ideas and proposals while it is the Athenians who reply. Because they have a response to everything,the Melians are constantlyfoiled and sent
off to find another argument. As de Romilley (1962:293-94) observes, it is this
characteristicof the Dialogue thatcontributesmost to the "impression of overwhelming power against which resistance is useless: in fact, the more attempts that are
made to find a defect in it, the more invincible does this power appear, and the
demonstration of the futilityof Melian resistance acquires an almost mathematical
certainty.""3
13 De Romilleyobservesthat
the Melian proposals and Athenianrebuttalsmap out the structureof the dialogue,
whichcan be divided into threeparts: "A preliminarysectioncontainsa discussionof the fundamentalmoral thesis
of the relationshipbetweenjustice and force. Then, in paragraph 91, the Athenians put forwardtheirpolitical
thesis,assertingthatit is in the interestof the Melians to surrenderwithouta struggle;then up to paragraph 100,
16
and Neorealism
Thucydides
But while the Athenians are certainlyin holding to the belief that they can crush
Melos alone and without immediate danger to themselves, Thucydides clearly suggests through the dialogue that the brutallyimperialisticpolicy pursued by Athens
carries the seeds of its own destruction. The continual demonstrations of Athens'
strength, now seen by the Athenians as necessary to maintain control over their
empire, only serve in the long term to increase the number of Athens' enemies and
thereby heighten its insecurity.By ruling out as "specious pretences" discussion of
how their empire was acquired, the Athenians have destroyed the rhetorical culture
through which their interestsas an imperial power were intelligiblyexpressed in the
early speeches of the history.As White (1984:79) declares: "Athens is leftwith selfinterestalone, the desire for power without culture to give it bounds and meaning.
Not only is ambition of this sort unlimited,it is incoherent and irrational; for without
a comprehensible world there can be no way of reasoning about it or acting withinit.
One cannot be self-interestedwithouta language of the self; one cannot have power
without community."
The limitationsof this kind of self-justificationare fullyrevealed in the debate at
Camarina, during the invasion of Sicily, when Athens unsuccessfully attempts to
renew an alliance with Camarina against Syracuse. Here too the Athenians bluntly
state, "We make no fine professions of having a right to rule because we overthrew
the barbarian single-handed, or because we risked what we did risk for the freedom
of the subjects in question any more than that of all." Save for naked self-interest,the
Athenians make no effortto justify their conduct: "If we are now here in Sicily,it is
equally in the interestof our security,with which we perceive that your interestalso
coincides" (VI:84:408). It comes then as no surprise that Camarina opts for neutrality,for the Athenians have given them no good reason to believe that their interestis
limited to dividing Sicily rather than ruling it. And Alcibiades, at least, thought that
Athens should conquer not only Sicily but Carthage as well (VI: 15:367).
There is a strong sense in which the master-slavedialectic of power obtains in this
Athenian behavior. As the idea of Athens' liberalityand merit disappear as the
source of Athenian action, all that remains is base necessity,the alleged fact that
men, "by a necessary law of their nature rule whatever they can." This "common
rule," firstelucidated by the Athenian Emissary during the debate at Lacedaemon,
has now become, de Romilley (1962:288) declares, "somewhat abstract, and each
enterprise taken separately acquires a strikinglygratuitiousquality. The actions they
envisage are valid only as pure examples, and which may well obey the rule, but in a
unsatisfactoryway." Given the disparitybetween their physical capabilities and those
of the city-states(like Melos) they subjugate, the Athenians can seemingly afford to
dispense with earlier rationalizations for their behavior. Like the master, they can
arbitrarilycoerce other weaker city-states.But also like the master,the Athenians are
caught in a trap, for they can get no satisfactionfrom their power over people they
treat as mere objects.'4 Such conquests only make it necessary for Athens to undertake additional conquests. Far from enhancing Athens' power by adding to its territoryand wealth, such activitycircumscribesits autonomy and abilityto make intelligent choices.
theytryto prove, against the objectionsput forwardby the Melians, thattheymuLstobtain the suLrrender
of their
island; and fromparagraph 101 onwards thatthe Melians have no hope of success. This correspondsto saying,in
the firstplace, thatAthens needs to conquer and, in the second, thatshe can do so." I should like to thank Mary
Dietz for bringingde Romilley'sbook to my attention.
14 The dilemma faced by the master is ably summed up byJon Elster (1978:261): "To the extent the master
treatsthe slave like cattle,he gets no non-economicsatisfactionover him; to the extenthe treatsthe slave like a
human being, he has no power over him." That the Atheniansare caught in a similarbind is evidenced by the fact
thatpleasure or advantage in rulingand extendingtheirauthorityis onlyan additional or subordinateargument
in the Melian Dialogue which theymentionsolely in passing.
DANIEL GARST
17
This becomes evident in the next and last major debate of the historybetween
Alcibiades and Nicias over the invasion of Sicily. Prone to extravagance and boasting,
Alcibiades is perpetually demanding more for both himself and his city; scornfully
rejecting Nicias' "do nothing" policy, he argues: "[W]e cannot fix the point at which
our Empire must stop." Alcibiades claims that if Athens fails to undertake fresh
conquests in Sicily, it will "wear itself out and its skill in everything [will] decay"
(VI: 18:370). The Athenians' acceptance of these statementsindicates that they have
finallycome to resemble the portrait of them drawn earlier by the Corinthians at
Lacedaemon. They have become uncontrollable in their activityand limitlessin their
desires; they have forgotten Pericles' warning that their lack of moderation would
lead to defeat. To be sure, Pericles also had warned them not to give up theirempire.
But the argument "not to give up," as he states it, is a precise law, with one possible
application in the circumstances the Athenians confronted at the outset of the war.
The law upon which Alicibiades bases his call to invade Sicilyis far broader and more
uncertain: there is nothing to prove that the dangers Athens will allegedly face if it
fails to make further conquests will come from Sicily. This new undertaking is not
justified in its own terms but as an answer to the demands of purely external necessity. "When it reaches this point," de Romilley (1962:289) writes, "the imperialist
motto condemns what it set out to defend: it advocates a policy which has no place
for rational deliberation, but which is the blind observance of necessity: non ill vult,
sed proteststare."
If Alcibiades embodies the excesses of Athenian culture, the pious and cautious
Nicias is to a large extent removed from it. Although Nicias does have a sense of the
impending disaster, he lacks Pericles' eloquence and his abilityto frame arguments
against further activityin an idiom that suits Athenian culture. Nicias' clumsy and
ill-conceived ploy to head off the expedition by extravagantly overstating its requirements only spurs Athenian enthusiasm for it, and his inaction and blunders at
Syracuse are largely responsible for the catastrophe that overtakes Athenian forces.
Whereas Pericles' caution is based on a humanist self-relianceand rationalityrooted
in Athenian political institutionsand life, Nicias' caution grows directly out of his
piety,which can take the form of disastrous superstition.For example, Nicias warns
the Athenians that if the invasion of Sicilyis to succeed, theymust have "much good
counsel and more good fortune[emphasis mine], a hard matter for mortal men to
aspire to" (VI:23:373). This argument has far more in common with the outlook of
Archidamus and the Spartans on chance interventionsthan it does withPericles' firm
belief that such interventionsare to some degree amenable to human intelligence.
And later, in his final despairing exhortation to the Athenians at Syracuse, Nicias
attemptsto revive the flagging morale of his men by presenting himselfas an example of one who is as badly off as they but who expects a favorable turn of events
because of his justice and piety (VI:61:461-62). Nothing could be furtherremoved
either from the cool rationalism of Diodotus, who insists that "fortune . . . by the
unexpected aid it sometimes lends, tempts men to venture with inferior means"
(111:45:178), or from hardheaded realism the Athenians display in the Melian Dialogue.
Unable to prevent the invasion of Sicily,Nicias is forced to lead an expedition he
opposes, in which the Athenians are "destroyed, as the saying is, with total destruction" (VII:87:481). This outcome supports the oft-statedview that Thucydides' historyhas the form and meaning of a tragic drama, in which Athenian hubris, exemplified by Athens' behavior at Melos, is properly punished at Sicily.'5 While this
15 This interpretationis forcefullyadvanced by Corniford(1907) as part of his broader contention that The
see Edmunds
War reflectsThuLcydides'religiousbeliefs.For a critiqueof Cornford'sinterpretation,
Peloponnesians
(1975:3-6).
18
Thucydides
and Neorealism
interpretation has much validity, Thucydides' narrative of the Sicilian expedition
and the subsequent course of the war should discourage any strong conclusions
along such lines. The Athenians come veryclose to achieving victoryin Sicilyand are
defeated only after Alcibiades is expelled from Athens and manages to convince the
Spartans to come to the aid of Syracuse. And it is Nicias' hesitation that prevents the
Athenians from successfullyevacuating theirforces. Finally,in spite of the disaster in
Sicily,the Athenians manage to fighton and inflictnumerous reverses on the Spartans and their allies. Kagan (1987:23) declares that even after this setback: "If the
Athenians could keep their nerve, limitexpenditure, and keep control of their allies,
they need not give in, even though the defeat in Sicily provided an invitation for
Persian involvement." This opinion is shared by Thucydides: "Yet after losing most
of their fleetbesides other forces in Sicily,and with faction already dominant in the
city,they [the Athenians] could stillfor three years make head against their original
adversaries, joined not only by the Sicillians, but also by their own allies nearly all in
revolt, and at last by the King's son" (11:65:126).
What ultimatelycauses Athens' defeat in Thucydides' view is the breakdown of its
democratic institutions,the "private cabals for leadership of the commons" caused by
the growthof factionalism"which not only paralyzed operations in the field,but also
firstintroduced civil discord at home" (11:65:126). Thucydides concludes that the
Athenians did not "succumb till they fell victims of their own intestine disorders"
(11:65: 126-27).16 These disorders cause the Athenians to abandon Pericles' policy of
prudent restraint and to mismanage the Sicilian campaign by putting Nicias in
charge of it and then recalling Alcibiades, and they lead to Athens' eventual defeat.
Thus if Thucydides' historyhas a unifyingthread, it is the contingentand problematic nature of the political institutionsand environmentsustaining Athenian political
power and hegemony.
Implications for Neorealist Theory
Political Power and Hegemonyin Neorealism
Neorealists define political power as either a simple possession of material resources
and capabilities or the ability of a state to bring about observable changes in the
behavior of other states. The firstunderstanding of political power is most prominent in the writings of Gilpin and Waltz: for Gilpin (1981:13), political power is
simply "the military,economic, and technological capabilities of states"; for Waltz
(1979:192), "to be politically pertinent, power has to be defined in terms of the
distribution of capabilities." This distribution of capabilities the main ordering
principle within the anarchic structure of the "Third Image" yields the hypo16 Kagan (1987:418-21) points out that
Thucydides' conclusion thatinternaldiscord caused Athen-s'defeat is
somewhat ambiguous. One common interpretationis to view it as part of a broader-condemnationof Athenian
democracy.This is suLrely
false. Such an inter-pretation
is difficuLltto square withPericles'celebrationof Athenian
political institutionsin the Funeral Oration. And while Thucydides certainlybecame more criticalof Athenian
democr-acy
as the war progressed,his favorablecommentson the rule of the Five ThouLsand(VIII:96:546) indicate
that he remained a moderate democrat. Thucydides' judgement can also be read as a vindicationof Per-icles'
leadership and anl attack on the shortcomingsof his successors. This reading is certain-ly
more in line with
Thucydides' inten-tions.However, Kagan (1974:350-62 and 1987:418) conicludesthat Pericles' str-ategy
couLld
never have bl-ouLght
Athens victory:Athenian resources wouldlhave been inadequate to last even through the
ArchidamianWar had not Pericles'successorsabandoned his policyof caultiousrestraint.ThuLcydides'criticismsof
Pericles'successorsreston more solid ground. In particular,the bitterr-ivalries
and factionlal
disputessurrounding
Alcibiades certainlydicdimmense damage to Athens an-dhad much to do withits loss of the war. In addition to
con-tribuLting
to the Atheniandisasterat Sicily,Alcibiades' disgracer-emovedhis verycapable friendsand associates,
Theramens an-d ThrasybulLs, from positions of commancdwhen their militaryand political skill were badly
needed. For a discussion-of this,see Kagan (1987:420).
DANIEL GARST
19
thetico-deductive models of the motivations and behavior of states. Thus Waltz
argues that multipolar, not bipolar, distributionsof capabilities lead states,following
the underlying motivation of self-help, to engage in power-balancing.'7 Likewise,
Gilpin uses the distribution of capabilities to formulate hypotheticalgeneralizations
concerning the ascent and decline of so-called hegemonic powers and the outbreaks
of systemicwarfare said to accompany these cycles. Finally, other neorealists have
applied this model to the issue-areas of trade (Lake, 1984) and the New International
Economic Order (NIEO) (Krasner, 1985).
A second neorealist understanding of power is present in the criticismsof Waltz
and Gilpin put forward by Keohane (1983:520-27). Keohane argues that the distribution of capabilities can, at best, only be used to construct parsimonious theories
that generate testable hypotheses. It cannot, however, be used to yield accurate
predictions of state behavior and outcomes, because power resources are not fungible across issue-areas. In putting forward this critique, Keohane applies pluralist
notions of power withinindividual communities and states to interstaterelations. His
critique embraces the basic pluralist assumption that agents have power only when
theyare able to cause things to happen and when the object is observable actions by
other agents. Thus Keohane and Nye employ Dahl's "intuitive idea of power" in
defining it as "the abilityof an actor to get others to do
Power and Interdependence,
something they would otherwise not do" (1977:13). While this appropriation of
pluralist arguments is never explicitlyacknowledged, it is evident in Keohane's insistence that the failure of states with relativelyhigh capabilities to prevail in conflicts
withother, weaker states necessitates employment of "issue structuretheories." As in
the pluralist critique of power-elite arguments, power is seen as being diffused
among states across differentissue-areas; while asymmetriesof power between states
may exist in specific issue-areas, they are viewed as potentially cross-cuttingrather
than mutually reinforcing.
While neorealists disagree over the precise nature of political power, they generally agree about what constitutes hegemony in the international arena. Neorealists
invariably use the term hegemony to refer to a preponderance of economic and
militarycapabilities. Hegemonic powers, they argue, use this preponderance to construct and maintain liberal regimes regulating international trade and monetary
affairs.As Krasner (1983:357) puts it, "The most common proposition [among structural realists] is that hegemonic distributionsof power lead to stable, open economic
regimes." These regimes are treated as collective goods: their provision by a hegemon stems from its own self-interestand ability to provide the material incentives
needed to persuade other states to follow its leadership. This logic is neatly stated by
Keohane (1980:136): "Both hegemonic powers and smaller states have incentives to
collaborate in maintaining a regime-the hegemonic power gains the abilityto shape
and dominate its international environment,while providing sufficientflowof benefitsto small and middle powers to persuade them to acquiesce."
Power and Hegemonyin Neorealism:A Critique
Despite their disagreements on how to measure political power, neorealists are basically agreed on the objective that definitions of political power should aspire to.
17 As a number of sympathetic
criticsof neorealismhave noted, Waltz'stheorypredictsthatpower balancingwill
occur but failsto predictexactlywhichbalances willform(Keohane, 1983:512-55; Ruggie, 1983b:267-68). In his
Politics,Waltz denies thathe ever
response to thisand other more fundamentalcriticismsof TheoryofInternational
argued that structuresdeterminebehavior. "Structures,"Waltz (1986:343) argues, merely"shape and shove." In
this formulation,structuressimply set broad constraintson agency. This account of agency and structureis
problematic,for as Giddens (1979) emphasizes, structuresnot onlyconstrainbut facilitateaction. For an in-depth
reviewof the agent-structureproblem and internationalrelationstheory,see Wendt (1987).
20
and Neorealism
Thucydides
Gilpin, Waltz, and Keohane all argue for an operational definitionof political power,
in which power can be precisely measured and then can be used to account for
observable regularities in the behavior of states. In the view of Gilpin and Waltz,
power is operationally defined by the presence of physical capabilities; in the view of
Keohane, by observable changes in the behavior of states. Unlike Thucydides, these
authors do not define political power as a power potential, dependent on the existence of a certain political environment.
Thucydides does not, of course, deny the importance of capabilities, be they economic wealth or militarymight,in enhancing the political power of states. However,
his account of the decline of Athens tells us that such capabilities cannot serve as the
sole basis of the political power of states. If such capabilities are to enable an actor to
exercise political power, they must be deployed in an environment of well-defined
and widely held social conventions regulating speech and action. Otherwise, the use
of physical capabilities to achieve certain ends involves violence and force, not the
exercise of political power. An obvious corollary to this argument is that power
relations should not be limited to an observable act or signaling event of some kind.
For Thucydides, then, attributions of power are conditional: that is, they do not
necessarily follow from possession of physical resources or observable changes in the
behavior of actors but are instead tied to intersubjectivelydefined social conventions
and the institutionsassociated with them that delimit the conditions under which
political power is held and exercised. This understanding of power is consistentwith
the definitionof power embedded in ordinary language. "Power" comes to us by way
of the latin potestasor potentia,meaning ability. It ordinarily describes a property,
ability,or capability to affect things, given certain conditions (Ball, 1975:212). The
same can be said for the Greek equivalent to the Latin potentia,dynamis,and the
German macht,which derives from mogenand moglich,not from machen (Arendt,
1958:200).
Gilpin and Waltz are, therefore, at least on the right track in defining power as a
possession and not an event. Where theyerr is in confusing power with strengthand
force. "Power," Arendt (1958:200) writes,is "not an unchangeable, measurable, and
reliable entity like force and strength." While strength is a natural quality of an
individual, attributionsof power to human agents involve some recognized convention or rule, and not mere possession of physical capabilities. For example, the power
of the President to veto legislation is not intrinsicto the person in the office but is
rather part of his role as defined by constitutionalrules. It is certainlytrue that the
possession of certain intrinsicqualities, like the abilityto communicate persuasively,
will enhance this power. But what defines political power in the firstinstance are the
rules delimiting the responsibilities of the Executive and Legislative branches and
the extent to which they are recognized by the relevant political actors. And while a
President possesses the power to veto measures and persuade members of Congress
to back such vetoes, he may not make use of it when the opportunity arises. By
contrast,saying that inanimate objects or things have the power to do something is
equivalent, Haare (1970:85) argues, to the conditional statement: "If X is subject to
stimulior conditions of an appropriate kind, then X will do A, in virtue of itsintrinsic
nature." The power of a hydrogen bomb to destroy a cityis intrinsic;when dropped
on a targetand detonated, it will destroyit. The error made by Gilpin and Waltz is to
confuse this kind of explanation of power with those warranted for human agents.
As Ball (1975) argues, the former are causal and licensed by universal law, while the
latter are contingent and licensed by intersubjective social conventions, rules, and
institutions.Given these differences,it should come as no surprise that the distribution of capabilities often yields inaccurate predictions of state actions and outcomes.
For this reason, Keohane is certainly correct in arguing that what he calls "basic
force" models, in which power is defined in terms of physical resources, will be
DANIEL GARST
21
inaccurate predicters of actual outcomes. But Keohane's critique and his call for
"disaggregated" power models, in which physical resources influence outcomes in
general while having differentimpacts across particular issue-areas, rest on the mistaken assumption that actors have power only when they are able to induce observable changes in the behavior of other actors. Thus Keohane argues that "power
resources" are not fungible across particular issue-areas on account of the failure of
great powers like the United States to prevail in conflictswith smaller powers over
the past two decades (1983:522). Political power is therebyredefined to refer not to
potentialitiesbut to actual events. The problem with this line of argument is that it
restrictsattributionsof political power to one location, that of "power over," in the
belief that scientifictheories of international politics involve the detection of behavioral regularities. In political discourse, however, "power over" is by no means the
only or even the most important kind of power. Actors also have "power to": they
may have the capacityor abilityto do certain things if they so choose. Moreover, they
may have this power without ever overtlyor observably using it.18 Keohane's arguments on political power fail, then, to distinguish between the possessionand the
exerciseof political power. An actor may tryto exercise her power but, through lack
of skill,fail to alter behavior in the way she wants. And far from being a defect,'9 this
possibilityof slippage is what saves arguments linking outcomes to political power
from triviality:it means that a frameworkexists for explaining successes and failures
in the effortsof agents to modify the actions of others.
Thus, far from focusing on "underlying power realities" as defined by neorealists,
Thucydides' historydirects attention to the confusion underlying neorealist debates
over power in international politics. In particular, Thucydides' understanding of
political power underscores the pitfallsof viewing power as a concrete and measurable entityor in terms of control over observable behavior. Both Waltz's and Gilpin's
conceptions of power and Keohane's critique of their accounts rest on the mistaken
presumption that power, defined in terms of physical capabilities, should be causally
related to regularities in observable behavior and outcomes. On the other hand,
Thucydides urges us to see power as a property whose effectsare contingent upon
the structure of social institutionsand conventions that delimit the use of both the
tangible and intangible resources that enable actors to establish relations of psychological control. Thus, the oft-noted "true cause" of the conflict, "the growth of
18 Waltz recognizes thisaspect of politicalpower. He
(1979:192) notes, "In politics. . . powerfulagents fail to
impresstheirwillson others in just the ways theyintend to. The intentionof an act and its resultwill seldom be
identicalbecause the resultwillbe affectedby the person or object acted on and conditionedby the environment
withinwhich it occurs." But he then goes on to argue, "an agent is powerfuLl
to the extentthat he affectsothers
more than theyaffecthim. . . . Because of the weightof our capabilities,American actions have tremendous
impactwhetheror not we fashioneffectivepolicies and consciouslyput our capabilitiesbehind them in order to
achieve certainends" (1979:192). The problem withthisline of argumentis thatit conflatesthe exercise of power
withinfluence.One can influencesomeone's behavior intentionallyor unintentionallyor be influentialwithout
intendingor even knowingit. Unlike influence,which can be both a noun and a verb,power always requires the
presenceof a verb.Thus we say thatan individualexercises
power and influences
behavior.And since the actionword
has intention"builtinto" it,we cannot say thatthe exercise of power is unintentional.For a broader discussionof
intentionality
and power, see Ball (1975:211 and 1978:613-15).
19As Brian Barry (1978:71) forcefullyargues: "Weber-and Dahl close the logical gap [betweenthe possession
and exer-ciseof power] by equating power withthe probability
of one actor's being able to change the behavior of
someone in the direction desir-ed.To say that A got B to do somethingthat B would not have otherwisedone
because A had power over B becomes as vacuous as sayingthatsomeone became angryon a givenoccasion because
he had an irascible temperment,or that opium makes people sleepy because it has the virtusdormativa."Thus
Keohane's (1983:523-24) complaint that taking seriouslythe slippage between the possession and exercise of
power makes power explanations of outcomes degenerate restson the mistakenassumptionthata decline in the
political power of an agent is to be equated with its failure to exert control over observable behavior. For an
excellentcr-itiqueof thiskind of argument,as applied to the alleged decline of U.S. power and hegemonyduring
the 1970s, see Stran-ge(1987).
and Neorealism
Thucydides
22
Athenian power and the fear this inspired in Lacedaemon," must not be viewed as a
covering-lawexplanation of systemicwar. When Thucydides speaks of the growth of
Athenian power, he is not simply referringto disparities between the physical capabilitiesof Athens and Sparta. As the debate at Lacedaemon makes abundantly clear,
Thucydides' celebrated judgement on the "true" cause of the conflictrefersas much,
if not more, to the vastly different character of Athenian and Spartan political
institutionsand the rules and conventions undergirding them.
By focusing on rules and institutions,it could be argued that this reading of
Thucydides' conception of political power conflates power with Weber's notion of
legal/procedural authority. And as neorealists emphasize, the latter inheres in domestic society and is absent in the anarchic realm of international politics. This
objection poses two problems. First,Weber's notion of legal/procedural authorityis
problematic: it conflates the conditions underpinning the possession of authority
with those of power. The concept of "authority" comes to us by way of the Roman
notion of auctoritas,which derives from the verb "augere,"or "augment." Romans in
authority constantly augmented the foundation of Rome. They did so and were
endowed with authoritynot because they held particular officesbut because of their
descent and by transmission (tradition) from those who founded Rome. As Arendt
(1980:122) writes: "Authority, in contradistinctionto power, had its roots in the
past." The second problem withthis possible neorealist objection is that it rests on the
questionable assumption that the international realm is anarchic, lacking any order,
rules, or authority,save for that associated with hierarchical distributionsof capabilities.20But as Keohane has emphasized in AfterHegemony,the decline of U.S. economic and militarycapabilities need not be described as anarchic in the sense of
lacking rules or cooperative regimes.
In addition to clarifyingthe confusion underlying neorealist debates on political
power, The PeloponnesianWar provides a far richer understanding of hegemony in
the international arena than that of neorealism. It is true that a superficial resemblance exists between the accounts of hegemony put forward by Thucydides and the
neorealists. Both equate hegemony with leadership. But in neorealism, this leadership lacks the moral dimension so heavily emphasized by Thucydides.2' Hegemonic
powers lead because it is in their narrow self-interestto do so; they persuade others
to follow their leadership by providing material side-payments. In Thuycidides'
history,whether or not a state is hegemonic depends on the moral authorityit is able
to wield. As leader of the Delian League, Athens' coercive power, based on its
militarycapabilities, is armored by the moral claims stemming from its role in the
Median War and its eschewal of pure force in governing its subjects. And later,
during the conflict itself, the Athenians are partially successful in reconstructing
their hegemony by developing new bonds withinand outside their empire, based on
the ideological alliance of democracy in Athens with the democratic factionsin other
cities.
What is noteworthyabout the conception of hegemony embedded in Thucydides'
historyare the broad parallels between it and Gramsci's arguments on the subject.
To be sure, the writingsof Thucydides and Gramsci are informed by very different
concerns tied to the particular historicalcircumstancesin which theylived. Nevertheless, both emphasize the importance of persuasion and leadership in the form of
20
Neorealistsdiffer,of course, in theiracceptance of this postulate.See Alker-(for-thcoming).
21 This
applies to both the neorealistar-guments
on hegemonyancdthe more recentemphasis on norms,conventions,and r-ulesin the work on regime formation.As Kratochwiland Rtuggie(1986) note, while the constittutive
basis of regimesin thiswor-khas a stronginterstubjective
quiality,the positivistic
epistemologicalpositionin regime
analysisinspiredby game theory,exchange theory,and the like entailsa radical separationof stubjectand object in
which intersulbjective
meaning is inferredfrombehavior.
DANIEL GARST
23
concrete activityin enabling actors be they great powers like Athens in the case of
Thucydides or dominant classes and labor movements in the case of Gramsci to
obtain and retain hegemony. According to Gwyn Williams' (1960:587) early but still
useful summary of Gramsci's outlook, hegemony signifies "an order in which a
certain way of life is dominant, in which one concept of realityis diffused throughout
societyin all its institutionaland private manifestations."22To establish hegemony, a
dominant class or state must do more than simply impose its supremacy; it must also
demonstrate its claims to "intellectual and moral leadership," and this involves continual ideological activity(Laclau, 1977:161). As Raymond Williams (1977:109) argues, such leadership is grounded, in Gramsci's arguments, in "conscious ideas and
beliefs [i.e., ideology]" as well as the "whole lived social process as practicallyorganized by specificand dominant meanings and values." For both Gramsci and Thucydides, then, the establishment and maintenance of hegemony is an essentiallyopenended process that requires continual activity in the form of persuasion and
negotiation.
The greater richness of this understanding of hegemony can be illustrated by a
briefconsideration of the cases of nineteenth-centuryBritish and twentieth-century
U.S. hegemony. These cases are especially appropriate for this purpose because of
the role they have played in providing neorealists with empirical grounding for the
"common proposition" that hegemonic distributionsof power will be associated with
stable, open economic regimes (Krasner, 1976; Keohane, 1980; Gilpin, 1981; Lake,
1984).23This so-called theoryof hegemonic stabilityhas recentlybeen subjected to a
series of quite damaging critiques (McKeown, 1983; Stein, 1984; Snidal, 1985;
Strange, 1987). My objective here is simply to suggest that the problems of hegemonic stabilitytheorystem in some measure from neorealism's impoverished understanding of hegemony, and that the richer understanding of these concepts present
in Thucydides' historycan shed better light on the roles actually played by Britain
and the United States in bringing about open international economic orders.
It is certainlycorrect to argue, as McKeown and Stein do, that Britain was unable,
even during the peak of its economic dominance from 1815 to 1850, to successfully
bring other states to accept a lowering of trade barriers. In this respect, Britain was
indeed never really "hegemonic." Nevertheless, it can be argued that Britain did
exercise hegemony by demonstrating,through its early industrialization,the advantages of laissez-faire. By the 1850s, Britain's impressive econoomicdevelopment provided a potent argument for economic liberalism and served as the model that other
European states feltcompelled to follow to achieve industrialization.This, at least, is
what Charles Kindleberger (1978) argued in his classic general sketch of the spread
of free trade across Europe during the third quarter of the nineteenth century.The
same argument is also made, in more global terms,by Eric Hobsbawm (1975: chapter 13) in his account of how the bourgeoisie "ruled" throughout this period. Hobsbawm (1975:275) declares: "There was no alternative to capitalism as a mode of
economic development, and at this period this implied the economic and institutional program of the liberal bourgeoisie." Thus all statesmen, even those like Bis-
22 Exegecies of Gr-amsci
are now legion. For an excellentsL1ummar-y
of the existinginiter-pretative
see Eley
wvork,
(1984).
23 In cor-responiden-ce
in the revisionof the article,Keohane com-plainsthatthisstatemenit
ulsefuLl
misr-epresenits
his earlier thinikinig
on this matter.While Keohanie acknowledges inIhis 1980 article the inidifferent
fitbetween
hegemuonic
stabilitytheoryand regime chan-gein the areas of trade, energy,and imionetary
issues, he (1980:155)
nievertheless
conlcludesthatthe argument"is clearlyulsefuLl
as a firststep; to ignor-eitsconglrLuen-ce
withreality,and
itsconsiderableexplanator-y
power-,wouLld be foolish."In Keohanie's(1984) compellingaccouLnt
of post-WorldWar
II initer-nationial
cooper-ation,hegemonlicstabilitytheor-y
is deniotedto an "iinter-pr-etative
framework,"whiclhser-ves
as a usefuLl
descr-iptionbuLtniotan explanation-of regime formationi.
24
and Neorealism
Thucydides
marck who opposed the bourgeoisie, "were liberal in the economic sense, because
there was no workable alternative policy" (Jones, 1977:87). In a similar vein, John
Ruggie (1983a) has persuasively argued that the post-World War II liberal international economic order grew out of changes in the hegemonic forms of state-society
relations, from "laissez-faire liberalism" during the nineteenth century to "embedded liberalism" following 1945, in which liberalism in foreign economic relations was
combined with activistwelfare-orientedpolicies in the domestic realm. And while the
effortsof the United States to use its resources to press for greater openness in the
world economy certainly promoted "embedded liberalism," so too did, as Russett
(1985:229) suggests, "the near-global acceptance of American culture . . . [which]
shaped people's desires and perceptions of alternatives so that their preferences in
international politics were concordant with those of Americans."
This cursory sketch of Anglo-American hegemonies indicates that major differences exist in both their content and the institutionaland social structure of nineteenth- and twentieth-centurycapitalism to which they were tied. While we can say
that the United States and Britain exercised hegemony in Gramsci's and Thucydides'
sense, this hegemony and what it entailed can only be specified withinthe appropriate historical context. This is something to which neorealists are not blind. For
example, Gilpin's (1975) early investigationof the U.S. and British cases displays a
great deal of sensitivityto the differenthistoricalsettingsthat shaped theirrespective
strategies. And Keohane's (1984) important analysis of cooperation in the world
political economy displays a similar acute awareness of the differencesbetween British and American hegemonies. But if neorealists do acknowledge the importance of
historical context when engaged in actual research, their theories ahistoricallylink
systemic causes and effects via perceived law-like regularities in the behavior of
states.24It is this ahistorical mode of theorizing that leads neorealists to treat Thucydides' historyas a naturalisticnarrative that sets forththe basic systemicimperatives
driving the behavior of states and makes the underlying anarchic structureof international politics similar across widely separate historical epochs.
This is most evident in Gilpin's insistence that Thucydides' historycontains "everything that the new realists find intriguing about the interaction of international
economics and international politics." When neorealists discuss this interaction,they
emphasize the two-waydetermination or merger of international economics and
international politics (Ashley, 1983:470). Thus Gilpin (1981:219) writes,"[I]f somehow Thucydides were placed in our midst,he would (followingan appropriate short
course in geography, economics, and modern technology) have littletrouble in understanding the power struggle of our age." Gilpin (1981:218) furtherargues that
"Thucydides tells us that an act of economic warfare, the Megara Decree, was a
precipitator of the Peloponnesian War." In fact, de Ste. Croix (1972: chapter 7)
shows in his painstaking study of the origins of the Peloponnesian War that the
Megara Decree had very littleto do with economics: the main purpose of excluding
24
Waltz (1979:5-6) argues that the purpose of theories is to explain laws, defined as invariantor probable
associations.Thus Waltz (1979:66) concludes that "the textureof internationalpoliticsremains highlyconstant,
patternsrecur-and eventsrepeat themselvesendlessly"becaulseof the endur-inganarchiccharacterof international
politics. Likewise, Gilpin (1980:210) con-tendsthat the "law of uneven growth"redistributespower, generating
similarcyclesof hegemonic ascent,decline, and global warfare.And like Waltz,Gilpin (1980:211) concludes, "the
natureof internationalrelationshas not changed fundamentallyover-the millenia."In both theseoutlooks,history
is frozen.This is also the case in the game theorymodels of cooperation developed by Keohane and others,even
thoughthese models serve the veryuseful functionof overtuLrning
the pessimisticconclusionsof Waltz and Gilpin
on internationalcooperation in the absence of a hegemonic power. In the game theorymodels of regime formation,cooperationdepends on the numberof game players,theiractuallydiscountediteratedgame futures,and the
degree to which theirinterestsconflict.These variables provide a deductive and "parsimonious"explanation of
cooperation by passing over the preexistingsocial structuresand precedentsthatsurelyinformthe strategiesof
real-lifegame players.
DANIEL GARST
25
the Magarians from the Athenian Agora was simply to humiliate them, to put them
in the same class as men convicted of disgraceful crimes or suspected of being
carriers of pollution. It is also difficultto make any connection between the pattern
of Athenian imperialism and Athens' need to protect its supply routes for grain or
acquire more wealth. Thucydides' silence on these matters is criticized in the commentaries of Cornford (1907: chapters 3-4) and Grundy (1948:187), but the connection drawn by these authors between commercial and economic imperatives and
Athenian imperialism has been discredited by modern research. The pattern of
Athenian expansion is simply too unsystematicto support such claims (de Romilly,
1962:71-74; de Ste. Croix, 1972). This is not at all surprisingin view of the fact that
trade and commerce were far less important in ancient Athens than in modern-day
capitalist societies.25As a product of this environment, Thucydides wrote political
history;at no point does he argue for a reciprocal relationship between international
politics and international economics.
Concluding Remarks
In writingThe PeloponnesianWar, Thucydides hoped to create a work "for all time."
This article has argued that Thucydides' enduring insightson internationalrelations
were primarilypolitical rather than scientific.Thucydides' historydoes not point to
general laws explaining international conflict,nor did its author intend it to do so.
What The Peloponnesian War does provide are timeless insights into the basis of
political power and hegemony. Thucydides reminds us that power and hegemony
are above all bound to the existence of political and social structuresand the intersubjective conventions associated with them. Nothing could be more foreign to Thucydides' way of thinking than neorealism's ahistorical treatmentof these concepts.
And nothing could be more pernicious to Thucydides than neorealism's insistence
that the quest for power is an underlying and enduring systemicimperative that
exists independently of social structurescreated and maintained by human agency.
What the trajectoryof Athenian imperialism ought to make abundantly clear is that
prediction and control are the last things this "scientific"understanding of international politics provides when put into practice. If this is the case, then Thucydides'
work remains relevant in an era of nuclear weapons because it underscores the
necessityof thinkingabout political praxis in the studyof internationalrelations that
are both realistic and critical.
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Powerand
Community:
Understanding
International
Collaboration, edited by H. R. Alker and R. K. Ashley.
ARENDT, H. (1958) The Human Condition.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
ARENDT, H. (1980) What is "Authority?"In Between
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