Download Formulation

When Myth Meets Reality: The Role
of Third Parties in International
Conflict
Jonathan Wilkenfeld
Department of Government and Politics
Center for International Development and Conflict Management
University of Maryland
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
December 2009
Myth
• Diverse societies are culturally dynamic, facilitating individual
and collective identity, and fostering creativity, imagination,
and invention.
Reality
• Diverse societies are culturally dynamic, facilitating
individual and collective identity, and fostering
creativity, imagination, and invention.
• But 1 in every 7 people is a member of an ethnic
minority suffering some form of discrimination
(political, economic, social or cultural).
Conditions Conducive to Ethnic Terrorism
• Organizations professing a democratic ideology are
significantly less likely engage in terrorism
• Organizations with the following characteristics are
more likely to engage in terrorism:
–
–
–
–
Separatism
Rhetoric justifying violence
Foreign Support
State Repression
• Organizations that do not have a democratic
ideology and have all the factors above have an 89%
likelihood of engaging in terrorism
Global Ethnic Militancy
Countries with at least one militant, ethnically based organization
Myth
• The international community has played an
increasingly important role in the settlement of
armed conflicts.
Global Trends in Active Conflict, 1946-2007
Number of Conflicts
Reality
• The international community has played an
increasingly important role in the settlement of
armed conflicts.
• But of the 39 conflicts that became active in the last
10 years, 31 were conflict recurrences – instances of
resurgent, armed violence in societies where conflict
had been largely dormant for at least a year.
New and Recurring Conflict, 1946-2007
Number of Conflict Onsets
Recently Terminated Conflicts and Prospects for
Recurrence, 1946-2007
Number of Recently Terminated Conflicts
Myth
• The international community has been successful
both in increasing the pot of international
development aid, and in directing it to the places
where it is needed the most.
Reality
• The international community has been successful
both in increasing the pot of international
development aid, and in directing it to the places
where it is needed the most.
• But development aid is outpaced by the economic
cost of state instability, fragility, and failure by a
factor of almost 4 to 1.
Costs of State Failure
Global estimated cost of state failure: $270 billion*
* Anke Hoeffler, Peace and Conflict 2010
Ranking States on Risk of
Instability, 2008-2010
Highest Risk
High Risk
Moderate Risk
Some Risk
Low Risk
Crisis Vulnerability
Myths
• The significant increase in the number of
democracies among the states of the international
system, coupled with a decrease in the number of
autocracies, bodes well for a more tranquil
international system – the democratic peace.
Reality
• The significant increase in the number of
democracies among the states of the international
system, coupled with a decrease in the number of
autocracies, bodes well for a more tranquil
international system – the democratic peace.
• But the transition from autocracy to democracy is
the period most fraught with potential instability and
conflict.
Trends in Democratization, 1946-2007
Number of Countries
Prescriptions
• Monitoring and early warning
Peace and Conflict Ledger
• What does the Peace
and Conflict Ledger
measure?
• The risk of an instability
event occurring in a
country in the next
three years.
Some Key Details
• The focus is on how structural attributes of
states influence the risk of instability
• Four domains of government activity
(economics, politics, security, and social)
• Estimated a statistical model on data from
1950-2003 (training data)
• Obtain country risk estimates by inputting
2007 values for all countries
Indicators – The Usual Suspects
Economics
Politics
Security
Social
GDP per capita
Extent of factionalism
State repression of
citizens
Male secondary
enrollment
GDP annual growth
rate
Citizen participation in
selecting gov’t
Size of military budget
Infant Mortality
GDP 3-year growth
rate
Gov’t revenues as % of Number of active
GDP
armed personnel
Access to water
supplies/ sanitation
CPI annual change
Duration of present
regime
Peace Duration
Youth literacy rates
Primary commodity
dependence
Regime Consistency
Conflict in contiguous
states
Immunization rates
Ratio of trade to GDP
Level of Democracy
Conflict in region
Male/female literacy
ratio
Poverty rates
Executive Constraints
Number of IDPs
Cultural or religious
discrimination
Change in foreign
investment
Legislative
Effectiveness
Intensity of internal
armed conflicts
Male/female life
expectancy ratio
Risks of Instability, 2008-2010
Significant Increase in Risk
NIGERIA
• Renewed fighting in neighboring
Chad
(2005) andREPUBLIC
Niger (2007)
DEMOCRATIC
OF CONGO
• Transition to partial democracy
• Poor performance on other
indicators
MAURITANIA
• Tenuous democratic
transition
BURUNDI
begins
in 2005 transition begins in
• Democratic
• Continued
low-intensity violence
2005
in •Mali
and Algeria
Renewed
fighting in neighboring
DRC (2007)
Sources of Increased Risk?
Democratization
Recurring Armed
Conflict
New and Recurring Conflict, 1946-2007
Number of Conflict Onsets
Recently Terminated Conflicts and Prospects for
Recurrence, 1946-2007
Number of Recently Terminated Conflicts
Conclusion
• Devastating costs of state failure
• Diagnostic tools for policy-makers to support
effective policies to mitigate conflict risks
Prescriptions
• Monitoring and early warning
• Intervention matching circumstances
Third Party Intervention
• Mediation as a special case
Mediation in Crisis - Styles
• Facilitation: act as a channel
– Helps reduce uncertainty
– Helps reduce perceptions of mutual hostility
• Formulation: suggest/coordinate solutions
– Helps by setting focal points
– Helps by highlighting areas of compromise
• Manipulation: offer incentives (+ and -)
– In particular: security guarantees
– Helps by changing real costs and benefits
Mediation in Crisis
• Outcomes of interest:
– Mutual compromise
– Formal agreement
– Post-crisis tension reduction
Results: Mediation Style, Compromise, and
Agreements
• Manipulation has largest positive effect on
crisis termination point outcomes
– Especially when it involves arrangements for or
provision of security guarantees
• Formulation has slightly lesser but still
powerful positive effect
• Facilitation has little effect
– Pure facilitation has negative effect on
compromise
Results: Mediation Style and Post-Crisis
Tensions
• Formulation has largest positive effect on
post-crisis tension reduction
• Facilitation has lesser but still significant
positive effect
• Manipulation is ineffective at reducing
tensions, post-crisis
– Even when security guarantees are involved. This
finding contrasts w/ previous studies.