Download THE DARWINIAN SIDE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS The Role

THE DARWINIAN SIDE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
The Role of Evolutionary Theory in the Major Theories and Issues of International Relations
Name: Mike Berkenpas, B.A.
Student nr.: 1604597
Course: MA-Thesis
Credits: 20 ECTS
Supervisor: Dr. M.R. Kamminga
Date: July 28, 2011
Word Count: 45.004 words
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 4
- The Central Questions of the Thesis ............................................................................ 8
1. Chapter One: On Evolutionary Biology ............................................................................... 13
- Evolutionary Biology and its Disciplines .................................................................. 14
- Darwin‘s Revolution, a Theoretical Foundation ........................................................ 17
- Connecting Two Biological Schools: The Modern Evolutionary Synthesis ............. 22
- Countering Darwinian Selfishness: Evolutionary Ethics ........................................... 24
- Conclusion.................................................................................................................. 29
2. Chapter Two: Evolutionary Theory and Realism ................................................................ 31
- The Realist Theory, An Overview ............................................................................. 32
- Ultimate Causations: Egoism and Dominance in Realist Theories ........................... 34
- Evolutionary Theory and the Ultimate Cause for Egoism ......................................... 37
- The Strive for Ultimate Causations: Dominance and Evolutionary Theory .............. 40
- The Place of Realism in Evolutionary Ethics ............................................................ 44
- Conclusion.................................................................................................................. 47
3. Chapter Three: Evolutionary Foundations of Liberalism..................................................... 49
- Inside Liberalism ........................................................................................................ 50
- Neo-Liberal Institutionalism and Evolutionary Theory ............................................. 52
- The Role of Evolution Within International Cooperation .......................................... 56
- Liberalism, Ethics, and Universalism: The Roots of Morality .................................. 59
- Conclusion.................................................................................................................. 63
4. Chapter Four: Evolution, Warfare, and International Relations .......................................... 66
- The Nature of War Outside Evolution ....................................................................... 67
- An Evolutionary Explanation for the Origins of War ................................................ 70
- Selfishness in Primitive and Contemporary Warfare ................................................. 73
- Altruism, Warfare, and International Relations ......................................................... 77
- Conclusion.................................................................................................................. 80
5. Chapter Five: Evolution, Cooperation, and Foreign Aid ..................................................... 83
- Altruism, A Historic Overview .................................................................................. 84
- Biological Understandings of Altruism ..................................................................... 87
- Alliance Expansion Within the Biological Context of International Relations ......... 90
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- Evolutionary Theory and Foreign Aid ....................................................................... 93
- Conclusion.................................................................................................................. 96
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 99
- Answering Questions ................................................................................................. 99
- From a Body of Knowledge Towards a New Way of Thinking .............................. 104
Bibliography ........................................................................................................................... 108
Tables
1.1. Darwinism ......................................................................................................................... 18
1.2. Evolutionary Ethics ........................................................................................................... 25
2.1. Realist Key Assumptions .................................................................................................. 33
3.1. Neo-Liberal Institutionalists Key Assumptions ................................................................ 54
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INTRODUCTION
―Strange is our situation here on Earth. Each of us comes for a short visit, not
knowing why, yet sometimes seeming to divine a purpose. From the standpoint of
daily life, however, there is one thing we do know: that man is here for the sake of
other men – above all for those upon whose smiles and well-being our own
happiness depends.‖
Albert Einstein
There is a good reason to think that many people on this earth have wondered the exact same
thing Einstein describes in this passage. Why are we on earth, what is the purpose and
significance of life or our existence? Where people claim to have found the meaning of life,
like the influential group known as ‗Monty Python‘ in The Meaning of Life, other people
focus more on the aspect we seem to know, as if it is in our human nature: Einstein‘s notion
that we are here for the sake of others. Somehow, without actually knowing why, we
acknowledge the idea that we cannot survive on our own and need our fellow human beings—
who indeed seem to share the same faith—to make our lives worthwhile and fruitful upon
earth. It goes without saying that concepts as interaction, cooperation, competition,
compassion, sympathy, and all other human emotions and forms of intercommunication play
an important role in humanity. The question of good and evil is central in this idea, the idea of
morality; of ethics, and ultimately human nature. Human nature is probably the most
significant determinant in how human beings act, but while we know a fair share about our
own nature nowadays, its role on an international scale in how we deal with one another—the
role of human nature within international relations—is still a limited object of study.
When looking at most of the theories and research topics within the field of
international relations we will mostly encounter answers, reasons, and theories formed
through social science. Cultural and political reasons form the basis for most of the dominant
theories within IR: they explain warfare, economics, and cooperation. Indeed, these
researches contribute significantly to our understanding of international relations, but there is
still much to be explored. This is especially the case with regard to evolutionary biology, as
political scientist Bradley A. Thayer notes: the social sciences have largely ignored the
advances within the life sciences, creating a gap between the two and thus leading to an
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artificially limited social science.1 Of course, scientists have contributed extensively to our
understanding of human behavior without the application of evolutionary theory to humans.
Important phenomena such as the causes for warfare and the mechanisms of economics have
long been studied, far before Darwin and evolutionary theory, creating a process which makes
it hard for many political scientists—as Thayer points out—to see the self-evident value the
life sciences might bring to the discussion.2 International relations is subject to this limited
social science because it deals substantially with human interactions, a field in which
evolutionary biology can contribute significantly to our understanding of IR and its concepts
such as warfare, decision making, ethnic conflict, and cooperation. With this thesis I intend to
further close the gap between evolutionary biology and social science, to try and enrich the
social sciences with the life sciences as much as possible, so that human behavior is
understood at many different levels within IR: the genes, the mind, and the social actions.
Using the life sciences does not only complement, and possibly even improve, the
social sciences, it is also in no way posing a threat for the theories composed through social
science or in any way limiting our understanding of human actions. Using the life sciences
will balance the theories of IR. This is an argument made by American biologist Edward O.
Wilson since 1975: synthesizing evolutionary theory and social science is important to
explain significant aspects of human behavior.3 A central point in his research is that Wilson
identifies aspects of human behavior that are universal through evolution.4 Other notable
biologists and political scientists such as Roger D. Masters, Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt, and
Steven Pinker have followed this idea and lead the way of bringing the life and social sciences
closer together. Masters's idea that the origins of the state lies within evolutionary theory
shows the power of evolution within the social sciences.5 Eibl-Eibesfeldt is often credited by
being the founder of the specialized field of human ethology, the branch of general ethology
that deals with the behavior of human beings. Pinker, although he has written several books
that shows the link between the two sciences, makes his most important argument in The
Blank Slate in which he argues against the tabula rasa models of the social sciences and
1. Bradley A. Thayer, Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic
Conflict, Kentucky: The UP of Kentucky, 2009: 8.
2. Ibid.
3. Edward O. Wilson, Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge, New York: Knopf, 1998: 8-14, 197-228.
4. Edward O. Wilson, On Human Nature, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard UP, 1978.
5. Roger D. Masters, "The Biological Nature of the State," World Politics 35, no. 2 (1983): 185-189. This topic
is also central in Gary R. Johnson, "The Evolutionary Origins of Government and Politics," in Albert Somit and
Steven A. Peterson, eds., Research in Biopolitics, Vol. 3, Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1995: 243-305.
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claims that human behavior is substantially shaped by evolutionary psychological
adaptations.6
At this time, there are only a few studies of international relation issues that use
evolutionary theory to improve our understanding of human behavior significantly. These
include the theory of war by professor Van der Dennen, the idea of the human brain by
professor Pinker and the theory of aggression and selfishness by Bradley Thayer. Despite the
efforts of some notable scientists I mentioned above, many social scientists throughout the
twentieth century have only studied social events in terms of their social (environmental)
causes without looking at the possibility of evolutionary causes. Two main reasons for this
approach, according to Thayer, are first, the legacy of the renowned sociologist Émile
Durkheim and second, the abuse of the concept of "fitness" and other evolutionary ideas.7
Durkheim is often said to have established the basis for social science to study social events
only through social causes. In 1895 he advanced his famous argument that social facts may
only be explained by other social facts: "the general characteristics of human nature
participate in the work of elaboration from which social life results. But they are not the cause
of it, nor do they give it special form; they only make it possible."8 Durkheim continues his
argument when he claims that the general characteristics of human nature are the
"indeterminate material that the social factor molds and transforms," whose "contribution
consists exclusively in very general attitudes, in vague and consequently plastic
predispositions which could not take on the definite and complex forms which characterize
social phenomena."9 What this means for social science is that differences between societies,
individuals, and humans in general can be best explained through social causes.
The heart of this tabula rasa idea is that all individuals are born essentially the same, as
John Locke famously argued, like blank slates waiting to be defined through the effects of
social phenomena like culture and the politics of the state. No doubt human beings are born
almost exactly the same. Of course, social factors will determine how humans will behave and
will have an enormous impact on the life of individuals. There is, however, more to it. It is not
the case, as Thayer points out, that "culture rules once humans have passed through infancy,
childhood, and adolescence. Here is the flaw in the standard social science model: it does not
6. Steven Pinker, The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature, New York: Viking, 2002.
7. Bradley A. Thayer, Darwin and International Relations: 14-15.
8. Émile Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method, trans. by Sarah A. Solovay and John H. Mueller, New
York: Free Press, 1938: 105-106.
9. Ibid., 106.
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acknowledge Darwin's Revolution."10 As I already touched upon, Steven Pinker also argues
against Locke's tabula rasa model used in the social sciences. What is important for the social
science model is that it acknowledges the forces of evolution that are active within human
beings and thus human nature. Human behavior is simultaneously affected by the
environment (social phenomena) and by the genotype through evolution by natural selection,
a construction which needs us to understand both phenomena in order to completely grasp the
idea of human behavior.
The second reason why social scientists are reluctant to refer to evolutionary theory in
their researches is the abuse of the concept of "fitness" and related evolutionary ideas. Social
Darwinists in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries have used a Darwinian wordage
to support their own ideologies. This Darwinian rhetoric often provided an aura of scientific
certainty for racist immigration, education, ideas of ancestry, and other government policies,
especially in the United States of America.11 Probably no scholar will deny the link of social
Darwinism and racism throughout the history of the United States, this idea alone is sufficient
to make scientists wary to use evolutionary theory in their researches. And as if this is not
enough, social Darwinism also contributed to the Nazi policies prior and during the Second
World War. Social Darwinism's contribution to the horrendous eugenics policies pursued by
the Nazi's, and more importantly its ultimate contribution to the Holocaust itself, was for
many social scientists the main reason to discard the use of evolutionary theory on human
beings and the social Darwinian ideas became universally condemned.12 The abuse of the
concept of social Darwinism had such a negative impact on the whole of Darwinism that
many social scientists still feel reluctant to use evolutionary theory on Homo Sapiens.
The suspicion social scientists feel when looking at evolutionary arguments is
understandable, but more importantly their suspicion is also appropriate when looking at these
historical issues. For obvious reasons, using social Darwinism for one's own prejudiced
policies is not to be tolerated. Fortunately, however, the conditions have changed as the
knowledge of evolutionary theory has advanced. Again, what is important is that new
information and breakthroughs within evolutionary theory are crucial in order to produce a
non-prejudiced synthesis to explain human nature: human behavior is determined both by
evolutionary forces and social environmental forces. Masters captures this idea perfectly
10. Bradley A. Thayer, Darwin and International Relations: 15.
11. Richard Hofstadter, Social Darwinism in American Thought, Boston: Beacon Press, 1955.
12. Stephen L. Chorover, From Genesis to Genocide: The Meaning of Human Nature and Power of Behavior
Control, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1979: 77-109.
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when he writes that: "the first requisite for a rigorously scientific approach to human nature is
willingness to abandon the belief that answers are either/or: our behavior can be both innate
and acquired; both selfish and cooperative; both similar to other species and uniquely
human."13 In order to achieve this complete explanation of human nature, it is time for the
field of IR to upgrade its set of research tools permanently.
The Central Questions of the Thesis
International relations is subject to this limited social science because it deals substantially
with human interactions and therefore human nature. Evolutionary theory might then
contribute significantly to our understanding of IR, its theories, and the causes for warfare and
cooperation—the two most important concepts of the language of states. This is in essence the
topic I want to discuss in my master thesis.
The main question this thesis wants to answer is the following: to what extent can
evolutionary theory enhance and contribute to some of the major theories and issues in
international relations? To answer this question I will look at several secondary questions:
first, what is evolutionary biology? Second, how can evolutionary theory improve the theories
posed by realists in international relations? Third, to what extent is evolutionary theory able to
enhance the theories of liberalism within IR? Fourth, to what extent can evolutionary theory
help to understand the issue of warfare and ethnic conflict in human evolution and IR? Fifth,
how can we explain the ultimate cause of international cooperation and foreign aid through
evolutionary theory within international relations?
The fact that I apply evolutionary theory to the theories of realism and liberalism does
not mean that other theories cannot benefit from it. It simply means that I am limited in space
to discuss all of the major theories of IR. More importantly, realism and liberalism are the
most influential theories in the field of IR and portray the most extreme limits of human
nature within IR: from the self-centered, egoistic view on humans by realists, to the altruistic,
cooperative human behavior portrayed by liberals. Human behavior for other major theories
will almost certainly fall in between the two theories I will discuss. This does not mean that
any researches on the role of evolutionary biology for other theories will be fruitless, the
contrary. I discuss the issues of warfare and cooperation because they are the two most used
forms of the "language of states." Both issues depend on social interaction, an act in which
13. Roger D. Masters, The Nature of Politics, New Haven: Yale UP, 1989: 1.
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human nature plays a central role. By covering warfare and cooperation a great deal of the
international relations sphere is covered, and in turn explained through evolutionary theory.
My central hypothesis is that evolutionary theory can contribute significantly to
international relations, its theories, and to help understanding the causes of war and
cooperation. To gain the benefits of this interdisciplinary approach, I will first need to spread
out the fundamental basis to understand evolutionary theory in chapter one. As I stated earlier,
the central question of chapter one is the following: what is evolutionary biology? The
disciplines of evolutionary biology I discuss to answer this question are: genetics, cognitive
neuroscience, human ethology, human ecology, and evolutionary theory. I will briefly explain
these concepts and use them to study international relations. Of special importance is
evolutionary theory because it forms the intellectual basis for evolutionary biology and also
serves as the main intellectual foundation of many of my arguments throughout the paper.
Indeed, Darwin and his idea of natural selection is central within the discipline of
evolutionary theory. I will discuss his five theories—evolution, the common descent of life,
the gradualness of evolution, the multiplication of species, and natural selection—that form
the core of Darwinism in great detail, because they are the theoretical foundation upon which
I build my paper.
In order to complete the realm of evolutionary theory, I will also discuss the concept
of evolutionary ethics in chapter one. The seemingly selfishness character of the Darwinian
paradigm is complemented and counteracted by several principles of altruism. At first it may
seem ill-suited that evolution, driven by natural selection, could explain the feeling and
compassion human beings possess because it does not directly contribute to our survival or
preservation of genes. There are, however, circumstances in which genes ensure their own
survival by influencing organisms to behave altruistically.14 The circumstances fall into two
main categories: kin altruism and reciprocal altruism. These are the two main pillars of
evolutionary ethics and are the basis for two important secondary structures which rests upon
them: reputation and conspicuous generosity. These four concepts of altruism form the basis
of evolutionary ethics and will conclude the intellectual foundation for my research conducted
in the paper.
In the second chapter I will discuss how evolutionary theory could benefit social
science by answering the chapter's main question: how can evolutionary theory improve the
theories posed by realists in international relations? With this idea in mind, I will apply
14. Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion, London: Transworld Publishers Ltd, 2007: 247.
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evolutionary theory to the main theory used in international relations: Realism. Evolutionary
theory might contribute greatly to realism when it is able to explain the ultimate causes of
egoism and the strive for power realists of international relations build upon. An ultimate
cause of egoism is not likely to counter or deny the proximate causes often mentioned in
social sciences, they are perfectly in sync with each other. Secondly, evolutionary theory
could provide realists with a scientific basis for their argument.15 The ideas of famous realists
such as Niebuhr and Morgenthau are mainly based on noumenal ultimate causes which are
based on premises that do not use the senses (egoism and domination grounded in theology as
argued by Niebuhr, for example). In this respect I will also look at the moral elements within
realism, a topic which is not represented in Thayer‘s work. Evolutionary theory, if applicable,
might be a solid concept that could explain why egoism and domination evolved as human
traits, an idea which has the power to influence the realist theory of international relations.
Chapter three focuses on the second important instance in which evolutionary theory
might benefit social science and is build around the following main question: to what extent is
evolutionary theory able to enhance the paradigm of liberalism within IR? Here I will apply
evolutionary theory to the theory of liberalism in international relations. To determine how
evolutionary theory might contribute to liberalism, I will follow the structure laid out in
chapter one: I use evolutionary theory to find an ultimate cause of altruism and morality that
are central to the liberal view of international relations. Secondly, just as with realism,
evolutionary theory might be able to provide liberals with a new scientific foundation for their
argument of human and state behavior. Reputation and reciprocal altruism should be the
central elements in this discussion. If evolutionary theory proves to be able to explain why
these human traits have evolved and how they are visible within international relations, it will
most likely alter the ideas within the theory of liberalism significantly.
Furthermore, it is important in chapter three to search for universal morals that break
through geography, culture, and religion. If such common morals are indeed perceptible at the
base of human nature, liberals possess over solid evidence concerning their ideas about
morality. Following the evolution of ethics, we should be able to find some sort of universal
basis that the whole of humankind shares. Universal values are important because they lie at
the foundation of human behavior within liberalism and are an important aspect of an
evolutionary view of the liberal theory. Probably the best way to discover and reveal shared
values and morals is through game theory. In this way, morality is explained as ―universal
15. Bradley A. Thayer, Darwin and International Relations: 12.
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grammar‖ which, in such a form, might influence international relations from the inside out
within the liberal paradigm.
Chapter four discusses the first major issue of international relations and an important
part of the language between states: warfare and ethnic conflict. The main idea of chapter four
revolves around the question: to what extent can evolutionary theory help to understand the
issue of warfare and ethnic conflict in human evolution and IR? Evolutionary theory and
human ecology could provide an ultimate basis of why our ancestors fought wars, both for
offensive and defensive reasons: acquiring and protecting resources in the egoistic sense, and
kinship altruism and reputation in the ethical sense. Wars over resources were centrally
important in human evolution and remain so today. Although political, cultural, and economic
factors that are emphasized in present scholarship are still of utmost importance in studying
war, evolutionary theory is likely to allow a better understanding to comprehend the origins of
war and its role in human evolution and behavior. An evolutionary perspective is likely to
offer scholars a new and greater scope of grasping the issue of warfare within the domain of
international relations.
In chapter five I will look at the second major issue between states in international
relations: cooperation between states and foreign aid. While evolutionary theory could be an
explanation for warfare, it is fair to ask whether it is also able to explain cooperation between
countries and the increase of worldwide development aid. The main question is the following:
how can we explain the ultimate cause of international cooperation and foreign aid through
evolutionary theory within international relations? The need for resources is always present in
human evolution, so why should states cooperate and risk losing resources? In this chapter I
will look at the evolutionary ultimate cause for cooperation and development aid within IR.
Of central importance are the concepts of reputation and conspicuous generosity described in
the evolutionary ethics chapter. These two secondary structures of evolutionary theory might
give great insight in how and why human beings are willing to share (and lose) resources on a
global level, instead of the continuous hunt for them through warfare in order to ensure their
survival.
In my conclusion I will shortly go through the answers of all my sub-questions in
order to formulate the answer to the main question posed in this paper: to what extent can
evolutionary theory contribute to some of the major theories and issues in international
relations? I will emphasize again the need to incorporate the great advances in the life
sciences within social sciences so that both may benefit from this fusion. Furthermore, I will
11 | M a s t e r T h e s i s
look at other problems within IR that could benefit from an interdisciplinary approach through
evolutionary biology that I have not touched upon. Finally, I will end with a future note on the
role of evolutionary theory for the field of international relations.
12 | M a s t e r T h e s i s
CHAPTER ONE: ON EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY
"What can be more soul shaking than peering through a 100-inch telescope at a
distant galaxy, holding a 100-million-year-old fossil or a 500,000-year-old stone
tool in one's hand, standing before the immense chasm of space and time that is
the Grand Canyon, or listening to a scientist who gazed upon the face of the
universe's creation and did not blink? That is deep and sacred science."
Michael Shermer
Without a doubt, in this exquisite passage Shermer captures the deeper idea behind science
perfectly: the thrill for the search of something new, the possibilities that discoveries could
actually be soul shaking. There have certainly been discoveries throughout history that were
simply unbelievable and astonishingly groundbreaking that people had no other option than to
be awed by this new information. Examples which comes to mind are the elliptical orbits of
the planets within the galaxy, the laws of motion and universal gravitation, atomic theory, and
penicillin to name a few groundbreaking discoveries. Arguably the most soul shaking
discovery, however, is Darwin's theory of evolution through natural selection. Philosopher of
science Daniel Dennet captures Darwin's idea elegantly: "if I were to give an award for the
single best idea anyone has ever had, I'd give it to Darwin, ahead of Newton and Einstein and
everyone else" because "in a single stroke, the idea of evolution by natural selection unifies
the realm of life, meaning, and purpose with the realms of space and time, cause and effect,
mechanism and psychical law."1 In this chapter I will look at Darwin's ideas of evolutionary
theory in great detail because it serves as the intellectual foundation of evolutionary biology,
as well as of most of my research questions. The central question of this chapter, in order to
create a fundamental basis to understand evolutionary theory, is the following: what is
evolutionary biology?
To answer this question I will first look at five disciplines of evolutionary biology that
are important in my thesis: genetics, cognitive neuroscience, human ethology, human ecology,
and evolutionary theory. Especially the field of evolutionary theory is important in my
research, because it serves as the main intellectual foundation of the questions I want to
answer. Of special importance within evolutionary theory are the ideas of Charles Darwin that
1. Daniel C. Dennet, Darwin's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life, New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1995: 21.
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are still considered as the foundation of the theory of evolution. This "Darwinian
revolution"—the intellectual shift in common belief after his soul shaking discoveries—will
be explained in great detail. Since Darwin's original theory of evolution, modern science
greatly improved upon his theory. This advancement is discussed in the next paragraph where
I will discuss the modern evolutionary synthesis in which Mendelian genetics complements
Darwin's natural selection. While this Darwinian paradigm emphasizes the survival of
organisms in a seemingly selfish way, there is another side to evolutionary theory in which
genes influence organisms to behave altruistically: the concept of evolutionary ethics. I will
discuss this concept, with its four major theories, in detail because it shows the other side of
evolution and completes the field of evolutionary theory as a whole. I will end the chapter
with a conclusion, in which I will come back to the main question.
Evolutionary Biology and its Disciplines
At its simplest level, evolutionary biology is a sub-field of biology that is concerned with the
studies of the origin of species from a common descent and the descent of species, as well as
their change, multiplication of species, and their diversity over time. At a deeper
understanding, however, evolutionary biology consists of several related disciplines that taken
together may be seen as the life sciences. The disciplines I will discuss are genetics, cognitive
neuroscience, human ethology, human ecology, and most importantly evolutionary theory.
The ideas and concepts from these disciplines will be used extensively in my research to
analyze international relations, its theories, and its major issues.
Genetics, at its core, is the study of inheritance patterns of specific traits, heredity, and
the variation within living organisms.2 Although this idea of heredity was already used in
prehistoric times—mainly to improve crop plants and domesticated cattle through selective
breeding—the modern science of genetics began much later with the work of Gregor Mendel
in the mid-nineteenth century. Mendel observed that organisms inherit traits via discrete units
of inheritance but lacked the physical basis for heredity to complete the scientific basis for his
results.3 These discrete units that contain the inheritance patterns of specific traits are now
known as genes. The best way to think of a gene is that it is basically the holder of the
information that is needed to build and maintain an organism's cells, and that it is passing
2. William M. Griffiths, Jeffrey H. Miller, David T. Suzuki, et al., eds. "Genetics and the Organism," An
Introduction to Genetic Analysis, New York: W.H. Freeman, 2000.
3. Franz Weiling, "Historical Study: Johann Gregor Mendel 1822-1884," American Journal of Medical Genetics
40, no.1 (1991): 1-25.
14 | M a s t e r T h e s i s
genetic traits to offspring. According to political scientist Bradley Thayer the advancement in
genetics have led to three important scientific projects crucial for evolutionary biology: first,
the Human Genome Project which mapped all of the genes of the human genome. The
mapping of human genes is an important advancement within the discipline of genetics,
because it is a significant step in the development of medicines and other aspects of health
care and pharmaceuticals. Second, the project of cloning which potentially brings many
advancements in battling various terminal diseases in the future. And third, the advancement
within the field of human history which will greatly help us to understand how human beings
evolved.4 The genetic analysis of human DNA gives us a great insight in the guilt or
innocence of criminals, of establishing paternity, and for solving certain historical mysteries.
Indeed, genetic analysis comes close to being the real life version of CSI we know from
television.
Cognitive neuroscience is the second discipline of evolutionary biology that I will
briefly discuss. Cognitive neuroscience is an academic field that is concerned with the study
of complex structure of the human brain. It addresses the questions of how the brain develops,
the way it processes information, and how psychological and cognitive functions are produced
by the brain. Central in the idea of cognitive neuroscience is the view that specific cognitive
functions correspond to specific areas of the brain. Moreover, cognitive neuroscience also
helps to define the mind, as one of the leading scholars in the field Steven Pinker argues.
Pinker defines the mind as a "system of organs of computation, designed by natural selection
to solve the kinds of problems our ancestors faced in their foraging way of life understanding
and outmaneuvering objects, animals, plants, and other people."5 The idea and use of the term
natural selection in this definition suggests that the process of human evolution is important in
explaining the brain's workings. This means that by studying the brain, scholars can improve
our understanding of central human features such as intelligence, imagination, and emotions,
which in order leads to a better understanding of social policies, the origins of human culture,
and aesthetics, among other issues and behaviors.
Human ethology, as I already touched upon in the introduction, is the branch of
general ethology that deals with the behavior of human beings. The application of the
principles and arguments of general ethology to the human being helps to search for the
physiological causes of universal human behaviors. One such behavior, as is revealed by the
4. Bradley A. Thayer, Darwin and International Relations: 3.
5. Steven Pinker, How the Mind Works, New York: Norton, 1997: 21.
15 | M a s t e r T h e s i s
classic work of Eibl-Eibesfeldt, is the need for human beings to identify with a community. 6 It
goes without saying that such issues are important to fully understand how humans behave
within groups, states, and within societies in general. If certain behaviors are universal traits,
advancements within the specialized branch of human ethology can be extremely useful in
explaining state policies and its effects. Comparative cultural analysis will be far more
thorough and will help us to understand behavioral issues much better.
The discipline of human ecology, or behavioral ecology, is sometimes seen as a subcategory of human ethology. Whereas ethology is the study of animal behavior, ecology is the
study of the relationship between organisms and their environment. Human ecology—as the
name already suggests—studies the relationships between human beings and their natural and
social environment. The most fundamental concept of human ecology is interaction. The
interaction between humans and their environment is the basis for analysis within human
ecology. This interaction is crucial in understanding human behavior according to Thayer:
"the scarcity of resources in the environments in which humans evolved significantly shaped
[our] behavior."7 By studying this connection we are able to understand the role of the
environment within the concept of warfare, cooperation, and ultimately international relations.
Finally, the most important discipline of evolutionary biology: evolutionary theory.
Evolutionary theory serves as the intellectual foundation of evolutionary biology, it acts as a
union of specialized biological ideas that provide a widely accepted account of evolution.
When stating that Darwin's theory of evolution is one of the most important discoveries ever
made, it is fair to say that this statement is not exaggerated. Despite all the new major
advances within the field of evolutionary theory, all the criticism and praise, all the additions
to Darwin's theory, he still remains the preeminent theorist of evolution. It is not surprisingly
when the distinguished biologist Ernst Mayr argues that the theory of natural selection as
developed by Darwin is the most revolutionary theory in history because of the ideas it
refuted, as well as those that it advanced.
According to Mayr, Darwin dispatched three important ideas with his theory of
evolution that would radically change the ideas of how we look at ourselves8: the first and
most important dispatched idea, Mayr argues, is the idea of creation. The belief that the
diversity of life on earth was the result of divine creation is rejected by Darwin when he states
6. Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt, Human Ethology, New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1989: 618-629.
7. Bradley A. Thayer, Darwin and International Relations: 6.
8. Ernst Mayr, Toward A New Philosophy of Biology: Observations of an Evolutionist, Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard UP, 1988: 193.
16 | M a s t e r T h e s i s
that diversity is the result of the process of natural selection. The second long standing idea
that Darwin defeated, according to Mayr, is Lord Kelvin's argument that life on earth was
relatively new. By successfully estimating life on earth to be at least several thousand million
years old, Lord Kelvin's idea lacked the scientific basis to sustain his arguments. Finally, as
Mayr argues, Darwin overcame anthropocentrism by showing that humans are not a separate
creation but rather the product of a common evolutionary process.
The most important idea Darwin advanced with his theory of evolution was the
seminal idea of evolution by natural selection. For Mayr this idea is centrally important
because Darwin primarily uses this process to explain the origins of life and human
evolution.9 Within a broader context evolutionary theory at its core explains why—and maybe
even more important how—life changes over time. It explains, as Bradley Thayer describes,
the "great diversity of life that now exists on this planet and all that has lived in the past, from
single-celled organisms and trilobites to dinosaurs and primates."10 Indeed, Darwin's
evolutionary theory is the most important facet within evolutionary theory. His ideas are
among the most important, if not most innovative, in human history. To completely
understand the importance of evolutionary biology and its use for the theories and issues
within international relations—Darwin's ideas are the theoretical foundation upon which my
paper builds—a thorough discussion of Darwin's thought is needed.
Darwin's Revolution, a Theoretical Foundation
Modern evolutionary theory begins with the ideas Charles Darwin proposed in his classic On
the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races
in the Struggle for Life published in 1859. Together with his other writings, Darwin proposed
several theories that form the core of Darwinism. Until now, I continually referred to the
evolutionary theory as proclaimed by Darwin—and I will continue to do so throughout my
thesis for reasons of simplicity. This simplification, however, is not entirely correct because
the Darwin paradigm actually consists of a total of five theories: evolution, the common
descent of life, the gradualness of evolution, the multiplication of species, and natural
selection.11 Table 1.1 summarizes Darwin's ideas that together form the core of Darwinism.
9. Ibid., 194.
10. Bradley A. Thayer, Darwin and International Relations: 22.
11. Ernst Mayr, The Growth of Biological Thought: Diversity, Evolution, and Inheritance, Cambridge, Mass.:
Belknap Press of Harvard UP, 1982: 505-510.
17 | M a s t e r T h e s i s
Furthermore, I will discuss each theory in turn to continue the theoretical foundation needed
for the arguments in my paper.
Table 1.1. Darwinism
The Core Idea of Darwinism
Mid-Nineteenth-Century Intellectual Thought
1. Evolution: The world is neither constant
nor perpetually cycling, and organisms are
transformed steadily over time. Mayr
describes this as the first Darwinian
Revolution.
1. Belief that the world is constant, ordered,
and young.
2. Common Descent: Every group of
organisms descends from an ancestral
species.
2. Belief in the essentially unchanging nature
of species perfectly adapted for the
environment.
3. Gradualism: Evolution proceeds relatively
slowly, gradually rather than in jumps.
3. Belief in no change or change by
saltations, Lamarckism, or orthogenesis.
4. Multiplication of Species: Great diversity
of life expected at present and in the past.
4. Belief that only the known extant species
have ever existed. Fossil evidence is proof of
the Great Flood.
5. Natural Selection: The mechanism of
evolutionary change. Heritable modifications
that assist its ability to survive and reproduce
are passed to subsequent generations. Mayr
terms this the second Darwinian Revolution.
5. Once Darwin's idea was advanced in 1859,
it met great popular and academic resistance.
Quoted from: Bradley A. Thayer, Darwin and International Relations: 23.
Sources: Ernst Mayr, The Growth of Biological Thought: Diversity, Evolution, and Inheritance, Cambridge,
Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard UP, 1982: 426-525; Ernst Mayr, Toward a New Philosophy of Biology:
Observations of an Evolutionist, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1988: 198-212; and Ernst Mayr, One Long
Argument: Charles Darwin and the Genesis of Modern Evolutionary Thought, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP,
1991: 68-107.
Although evolution proves to be a tricky concept to define and understand, its central
idea is rather straightforward. Mayr terms that its central idea is that the world is "neither
constant nor perpetually cycling but rather is steadily and perhaps directionally changing, and
18 | M a s t e r T h e s i s
that organisms are being transformed in time."12 Despite the fact that this idea is understood
as a scientific fact today, the concept of evolution that Darwin writes about in his classic On
the Origins of Species was a view on animal life that shook the world in his own time. The
idea that the inherited traits of a population of organisms changed through successive
generations was the complete opposite of the accepted theory in the mid-nineteenth-century
intellectual thought. The common belief was that the earth was constant, unchanging, ordered
(there was no room for evolution, species passed on an essence that did not evolve), and most
of all young: the idea of evolution simply had no place in this common belief. The scholarship
by Darwin and Alfred Russel Wallace, however, brought a major paradigm shift when debate
over Darwin's work led to the rapid acceptance of the general concept of evolution. For Ernst
Mayr this shift signifies the first "Darwinian revolution" because it replaced the common
belief that the earth, along with its natural life, was unchanging; moreover, it also deprived
"man of his unique position in the universe and placed him into the stream of animal
evolution."13
The second theory that made Darwin so important is his theory of common descent. It
was after his famous excursion to the Galapagos archipelago that Darwin proposed his theory
of universal descent through an evolutionary process. His famous closing sentence describes
this idea of common descent perfectly when Darwin writes: "there is a grandeur in this view
of life, with its several powers, having been originally breathed into a few forms or into
one."14 Darwin's basic idea was to trace an animal's ancestry into a higher taxonomic
category. By doing this he realized that he could determine a common ancestor. This process
is visible when Darwin writes that he views all beings as the "lineal descendants of some few
beings which lived long before the first bed of the Silurian system was deposited. Judging
from the past, we may safely infer that not one living species will transmit its unaltered
likeness to a distant futurity."15 With this idea Darwin further expanded and improved what
we now know as the Darwinian paradigm.
Third, Darwin proposed that the process of evolution is a gradual one: this idea is best
known as Darwin's theory of gradualism. Gradualism in the natural sciences is a theory, first
proposed by James Hutton in 1795, which holds that profound change within organisms is the
12. Ernst Mayr, Toward A New Philosophy of Biology: 198.
13. Ibid., 215.
14. Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured
Races in the Struggle for Life, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1964 [1859]: 490.
15. Ibid., 488-489.
19 | M a s t e r T h e s i s
cumulative product of slow and continuous processes. With this idea Darwin again took a
"drastic departure from tradition," as Mayr emphasizes the impact of Darwin's gradualism.16
The leading idea in the mid-nineteenth-century was one that argued that new species did not
change at all, could only be created by completely new origins, or are created by saltations.
Saltations, in this respect, are the sudden changes within an organism from one generation to
the next. Darwin rejected these ideas and argued that evolution must be gradual since such
sudden changes are not presently observed. Despite great criticism on gradual evolution and
the exact meaning of vague terms such as ―gradual‖ (what and how long is gradual?), Darwin
maintained his belief in gradualism as he shows in his comments in the fourth edition of his
classic:
"I believe in no fixed law of development, causing all the inhabitants of a country
to change abruptly, or simultaneously, or to an equal degree. The process of
modification must be extremely slow. The variability of each species is quite
independent of that of all others. Whether such variability be taken advantage of
by natural selection, and whether the variations be accumulated to a greater or
lesser amount, thus causing a greater or lesser amount, thus causing a greater or
lesser amount of modification in the varying species, depends on many complex
contingencies,—on the variability being of a beneficial nature, on the power of
intercrossing and on the rate of breeding, on the slowly changing physical
conditions of the country, and more especially on the nature of the other
inhabitants with which the varying species comes into competition. Hence it is by
no means surprising that one species should retain the same identical form much
longer than others; or, if changing, that it should change less."17
Regardless of all the criticism Darwin received, even of his close supporters such as the
English biologist Thomas H. Huxley—known as "Darwin's Bulldog" for his advocacy of
Darwin's theory of evolution—, the idea of gradual evolution is now largely accepted by
evolutionary theorists all over the world.
16. Ernst Mayr, Toward A New Philosophy of Biology: 203.
17. Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured
Races in the Struggle for Life, fourth edition, London: John Murray, 1866: 378.
20 | M a s t e r T h e s i s
The fourth major theory in the Darwinian paradigm is the theory of the multiplication
of species. This theory answers the question of why there is such a great organic diversity in
the world. In a way, the theory of multiplication is the theory of common descent in reverse:
whereas common descent traces back a universal ancestor, multiplication of species starts
with the ancestor and looks at its various types of offspring. As Ernst Mayr notes, the theory
of the multiplication of species "postulates that species multiply, either by splitting into
daughter species or by "budding," that is, by the establishment of geographically isolated
founder populations that evolve into new species."18 Darwin's theories of evolution,
gradualism, and more importantly natural selection allows him to explain the enormous
diversity of species found in the world. For Thayer, however, most important within Darwin's
idea of multiplication is that Darwin "understood that the extant species were only a portion
of the life that must have existed on earth. This insight provided a valid, scientific explanation
for the origins of the many and widely scattered dinosaur fossils that were often attributed to
the biblical Great Flood."19 In this way, Darwin rejected, again, the common belief at his time
with his idea of the multiplication of species. There is, however, one more theory that would
change the image of human beings forever.
The last theory is possibly Darwin's greatest contribution to science and completes the
Darwinian paradigm: the theory of natural selection. Natural selection is a key mechanism of
evolution and the change it accompanies. It is the process by which characteristic traits
become more or less common within a population of organisms due to consistent effects upon
the survival or reproduction of the organisms possessing these traits. Darwin recognized this
in his time as the struggle for life in a competitive world: "owing to this struggle for life, any
variation, however slight and from whatever causes proceeding, if it be in any degree
profitable to an individual of any species will tend to the preservation of that individual, and
will generally be inherited by its offspring."20 This struggle for life and the effect this has on
the heritable modifications of further generations is described by Darwin as the now famous
principle of "natural selection." Darwin continues: "for, of the many individuals of any
species which are periodically born, but a small number can survive. I have called this
principle, by which each slight variation, if useful, is preserved, by the term of Natural
18. Ernst Mayr, One Long Argument: Charles Darwin and the Genesis of Modern Evolutionary Thought,
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1991: 36-37.
19. Bradley A. Thayer, Darwin and International Relations: 25.
20. Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured
Races in the Struggle for Life, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1964 [1859]: 61.
21 | M a s t e r T h e s i s
Selection, in order to mark its relation to man's power of selection [artificial selection]." 21 The
key mechanism of natural selection is the idea that the relatively few individuals who survive,
mainly because they owe a well-adapted combination of inheritable characteristic traits, pass
on these heritable modifications to the subsequent generations. This theory is termed by Ernst
Mayr as the "second Darwinian revolution" because it provides us human beings with a
complete new way of explaining and observing the natural world.22
These five theories together form what is broadly understood as the Darwinian
paradigm. Darwin's theory of natural selection is central in this paradigm and remains
important in today's realm of evolutionary theory. Although evolutionary theorists still agree
with the core of natural selection as the main mechanism within evolutionary theory, the field
has experienced major advancements and refinements.
Connecting Two Biological Schools: The Modern Evolutionary Synthesis
With the Darwinian theory of natural selection, the basis for the modern evolutionary
synthesis was already present. The second school that would complete the modern synthesis
was being improved over the period of 1936-1947 which used the work of Gregor Mendel as
the intellectual foundation. As I already touched upon, Mendel was the most important
scientist in the field of modern genetics. Especially his study of inheritable traits, now known
as genes, brought Mendel posthumous fame when it showed that Mendelian genetics was
consistent with Darwin's natural selection and gradual evolution. By merging on the one hand
Darwin's basic ideas, and on the other hand the rediscovery of Mendel's genetics a new theory
was produced that combined two important schools within the biology field. Evolutionary
theorist Julian Huxley termed this synthetic theory as "the evolutionary synthesis." 23 The
combination of these two schools solved a lot of differences and confusion caused by the
specialization between biologists at the beginning of the twentieth century. Although this was
an important process for the life sciences, for Bradley Thayer the greatest value of adding
genetics to Darwinism was that it "introduced several new media through which evolution can
occur, principally migration, mutation, and drift."24 The ideas and theories concerning
genetics were largely developed after Darwin's death, theories in which Darwin's natural
selection remained of central importance.
21. Ibid.
22. Ernst Mayr, Toward A New Philosophy of Biology: 216.
23. Julian Huxley, Evolution: The Modern Synthesis, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1942.
24. Bradley A. Thayer, Darwin and International Relations: 26-27.
22 | M a s t e r T h e s i s
Modern evolutionary theorists recognize that evolution consists of several processes.
Next to the most important aspect of natural selection, as I have described, evolution occurs
also due to migration (also known as gene flow), mutation, genetic drift, and two other
aspects that can be significant, namely artificial selection and sexual selection.25 I will not
discuss them further in my thesis because I will most often refer to evolution by natural
selection in my research.26 Natural selection remains arguably the most important principle in
studying Homo sapiens and their behavior within international relations. Ernst Mayr captures
the significance of natural selection accurately when he states that "long-term evolution
without natural selection is inconceivable."27 The other mechanisms of evolution, however,
should be remembered at all times, for they remain highly important within evolutionary
theory.
It may be clear that natural selection is one of the most important mechanisms within
evolutionary theory. In combination with the field of genetics, genes are seen to ensure their
own survival by programming their carrying organisms to act in a way to win the struggle for
life. In this way natural selection seems to encourage the phenotype to behave selfish in order
to survive. This selfishness, however, carries a special Darwinian sense of the word that
people tend to forget easily. The renowned evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins addresses
this problem directly for his theory of the "selfish gene": "it is necessary to put the stress on
the right word. The selfish gene is the correct emphasis, for it makes the contrast with the
selfish organism, say, or the selfish species."28 Dawkins continues: "The logic of Darwinism
concludes that the unit in the hierarchy of life which survives and passes through the filter of
natural selection will tend to be selfish. The units that survive in the world will be the ones
that succeeded in surviving at the expense of their rivals at their own level in the hierarchy.
That, precisely, is what selfish means in this context."29 There are indeed many circumstances
in which the individual survival of an organism ensures the survival of the genes that it
carries, but exceptions are not rare at all. There are circumstances in which genes influence
25. Ibid., 28-29.
26. For further reading concerning the modern evolutionary synthesis and its primary mechanisms I recommend
the writings of several of its major figures such as: R.A. Fisher's The Genetical Theory of Natural Selection, 2nd
ed., rev. New York: Dover Publications, 1958; Theodosius Dobzhansky's Genetics and the Origin of Species,
3rd ed., rev. New York: Columbia UP, 1961; and J.B.S. Haldane's The Causes of Evolution, London: Longmans
Green, 1992, among others.
27. Ernst Mayr, Toward A New Philosophy of Biology: 140.
28. Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion: 246.
29. Ibid.
23 | M a s t e r T h e s i s
the organism to behave altruistically to ensure their own survival: this becomes clear in the
concept of evolutionary ethics.
Countering Darwinian Selfishness: Evolutionary Ethics
At first it may seem ill-suited that evolution, largely driven by natural selection, could explain
the feeling and compassion human beings (and other animals for that matter) possess because
it does not directly contribute to our survival or preservation of genes. There are, however,
circumstances in which altruistic behavior increases the chance for genes to survive. These
circumstances are now fairly well understood due to scholarship of major figures within the
field of biology such as W.D. Hamilton, John Maynard Smith, and Robert L. Trivers. The
circumstances, according to Richard Dawkins, fall into two main categories: kin altruism and
reciprocal altruism.30 These are the two main pillars of evolutionary ethics and are the basis
for two important secondary structures which rests upon them: reputation and conspicuous
generosity. Table 1.2 summarizes these four principles of evolutionary theory and I will
discuss each concept in turn.
The first and most obvious strategy in evolution that favors the reproductive success of
relatives, even at the cost of an organism's own survival or reproduction, is kinship altruism.
Kinship altruism, also known as kin selection, was formalized by the famous British
evolutionary biologist William Donald Hamilton who greatly expanded the field of altruism
by discovering a rigorous genetic basis for the existence of kinship altruism.31 The basic idea
of kinship selection is not particularly difficult. I discussed that natural selection ensures the
survival of characteristic traits encoded within a gene that enhances the survivability or
reproductive success of a phenotype by carrying these traits over to the next generation;
conversely, a gene that lowers the survivability or reproductive success of the phenotype is
likely to be eliminated. However, a gene that prompts behavior which increases the
survivability (or fitness) of relatives but lowers a phenotype's own fitness can increase its
frequency in the gene pool, because relatives most likely carry the same gene. The enhanced
fitness of relative phenotypes can at times more than compensate for the loss of survivability
and reproductive success by an individual phenotype, this is the fundamental basis of kinship
altruism. Looking after one's own children is the most obvious example, but a eusocial insect
30. Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion: 247-251.
31. For a detailed account of his research see: W.D. Hamilton, ―The Genetical Evolution of Social Behavior. I &
II,‖ Journal of Theoretical Biology 7, no. 1 (1964): 1-52.
24 | M a s t e r T h e s i s
colony (such as ants and termites) in which older siblings watch over younger siblings are
also examples of kinship altruism.
Table 1.2. Evolutionary Ethics
Theories
Main Pillars
1. Kinship Altruism
2. Reciprocal Altruism
Secondary Structures
3. Reputation
4. Conspicuous Generosity
Comments
Genetic kinship spawns a strategy in
evolution that favors the reproductive
success of relatives.
A strategy of giving favors in anticipation of
payback and the repayment of favors given.
The Darwinian survival value is enhanced
with a good reciprocator reputation which
could ensure cooperation.
Altruistic giving may be seen as an
advertisement of dominance or superiority.
A central mechanism within kinship altruism is the concept of a dominant hierarchy.
Dominance hierarchies are found in most social animal species, the most complex ones
arguably among primates. These organisms live in groups where a social organization that is
known as a dominance hierarchy is present. This dominance occurs in a group when
competition for resources leads to aggression. There are generally two different types of
hierarchy, a simple despotic hierarchy and a linear organized system. In the despotic version
of hierarchy one individual is dominant, while other organisms in the group are all equally
submissive. In a linear hierarchy each individual in the group's order dominates every animal
below him and are dominated by the individuals ranked above him. Following from these two
systems of domination there are commonly two principal types of behavior: dominant and
submissive. To reach the position of dominant leader—which are almost always male, the
alpha leader—aggression is usually necessary. Once an animal reaches the position of
dominant status, however, they have enhanced access to mates, food, and territory, which will
25 | M a s t e r T h e s i s
increase the chance of reproductive success.32 When a position of dominance is taken, the
individual leader of a social group can be challenged anytime to defend their privileged status.
It may be clear that this is an unstable condition for dominant individuals: constantly
defending its position against aggressive competitors, undoubtedly costing its toll. So why is
it then that dominant animals are willing to become and defend their dominant status? A clear
answer comes from evolutionary anthropologist Richard Wrangham and ethologist Dale
Peterson: "the motivation of a male chimpanzee who challenges another's rank is not that he
foresees more matings or better food or a longer life," rather those "rewards explain why
selection has favored the desire for power, but the immediate reason he vies for status is
simply to dominate his peers."33 This dominant behavior has evolved continuously in many
species, therefore it is likely that it contributes to the group's fitness.
As we have seen, an individual with a dominant position will receive more matings,
priority within the food distribution, and at night the safest place to sleep, all contributing to
its individual fitness. What is more important, however, is that dominance hierarchies are
improving a group's fitness. Ethologists strongly argue that these social organizations
continue to evolve because they help to defend the group against predators, help to promote
the harvesting of resources, and also reduce intragroup conflict. 34 A dominant animal within a
social group then brings, what E.O. Wilson calls, the "peace of leadership": "dominant
animals of some primate societies utilize their power to terminate fighting among
subordinates," Wilson continues, "if the dominant animal is removed, aggression sharply
increases as the previously equally ranked subordinates contend for the top position."35 Thus,
by creating a dominant position, an individual increases the fitness of its relatives by taking
risks that endanger its own individual fitness. In this respect, Richard Dawkins shows nothing
but praise for Hamilton's theory of kinship selection: "as my late colleague W.D. Hamilton
showed, animals tend to care for, defend, share resources with, warn of danger, or otherwise
32. Alexander H. Harcourt and Frans B.M. de Waal, eds., Coalitions and Alliances in Humans and Other
Animals, Oxford: Oxford UP, 1992.
33. Richard Wrangham and Dale Peterson, Demonic Males: Apes and the Origins of Human Violence, Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1996: 199.
34. This point is accurately made in: Joseph Lopreato, Human Nature and Biocultural Evolution, Boston: Allen
and Unwin, 1984: 161-176; and E.O Wilson, Sociobiology: The New Synthesis, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP,
1975: 287.
35. E.O. Wilson, Sociobiology: 287.
26 | M a s t e r T h e s i s
show altruism towards close kin because of the statistical likelihood that kin will share copies
of the same genes."36
The second main category within evolutionary ethics that has a Darwinian rationale is
the theory of reciprocal altruism. Reciprocal Altruism—first introduced to evolutionary
biology by Robert L. Trivers in 1971 to explain the evolution of cooperation as a strategy of
giving favors in anticipation of payback—suggests that altruism (defined as an act of helping
someone else although incurring some cost for this act) could have evolved since it might be
beneficial to incur this cost if there is a chance of being in a reverse situation where the person
whom I helped before may perform an altruistic act towards me.37 Unlike kinship altruism,
reciprocal altruism does not depend upon shared genes. It may even work better between
members of widely different species, according to Dawkins, as a kind of cooperation that is
often called symbiosis in the living kingdoms.38 Reciprocal altruism is also functioning as the
foundation of all trade (and arguably all barter) between human beings with its mechanism of
mutually altruistic acts. The warrior needs equipment, the smith needs protection. The cleaner
fish needs food, the carrier fish needs cleaning. The asymmetry in these circumstances sets up
the deal. Richard Dawkins describes these mutualistic relationships: "reciprocal altruism
works because of asymmetries in needs and capacities to meet them. That is why it works
especially well between different species: the asymmetries are greater."39
The idea and evaluation of altruism within these discussions is often questioned,
which led to the development of defining the true altruistic nature within mutual advantage.
Although his passage is used alongside the example of individual voluntary actions toward a
collective benefit, Russel Hardin captures the altruistic principle of mutual advantage clearly:
such actions can ―as well be considered altruistic in the sense that you lose more than you
gain from your own contribution, even though you may gain more overall from the
contributions of all than you contribute.‖40 This idea is also applicable in the case of
evolutionary ethics. Just as the field of evolutionary ethics (in particular the theory of
reciprocal altruism) strongly resembles the basic ideas of mutual advantage—which I will
discuss in greater detail in chapter five, it is also possible to share the theoretical
36. Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion: 247.
37. Robert L. Trivers, "The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism," The Quarterly Review of Biology 46, no. 1
(1971): 35-57.
38. Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion: 248.
39. Ibid.
40. Russel Hardin, ―Altruism and Mutual Advantage,‖ The Social Service Review 67, no. 3 (1993): 361.
27 | M a s t e r T h e s i s
underpinnings which justifies the use of altruism in contemporary moral discussions. Kinship
altruism and reciprocal altruism are together the twin pillars of altruistic behavior in a
Darwinian world. On top of these two pillars rest two secondary structures that are of equally
importance within evolutionary theory and complete the concept of altruism.
The first of the secondary structures concerns the principle of reputation. For altruism
to work, a good reputation is necessary. Especially in human society a reputation spreads fast
due to our distinct language and the gossip and stories that go with it. An individual with a
reputation for being generous and kind will, not surprisingly, find others to cooperate with
more easily than, say, someone who has a reputation for being unreliable and known to be
cheating. Reputation, for obvious reasons, proves to be very important among humans (one
does not to have suffered personally from someone's failure to live up to his promises to know
about the false promises) but reputation is also important among other species. The classic
example of reciprocal altruism of cleaner fish and their hosts is a case in point. In an inventive
experiment, small cleaner fish (Labroides Dimidiatus) that proved to be individual
persevering cleaners were more likely to be chosen by the observing host than the competing
cleaner fish that were negligent to clean.41 Cleaner fish in this experiment that find themselves
in an "image-scoring" situation—thus building up a reciprocator reputation—will find
themselves to feed more than in a "non-image-scoring" situation. Reputation can add to the
Darwinian survival value when organisms pursue a reputation of being a good reciprocator.
The second concept that rests upon the two main pillars of evolutionary ethics is
conspicuous generosity. The basis of this idea was first introduced by economist and
sociologist Thorstein Veblen in 1899 as "conspicuous consumption." Just as conspicuous
consumption, conspicuous generosity is used as a form of altruistic giving that can be seen as
"an advertisement of dominance and superiority."42 Although Veblen's conspicuous
consumption is rooted quite well in today's modern science, the Israeli biologist Amotz
Zahavi provided the evolutionary version of this idea rather late in 1975 and is recognized
only recently with the work of evolutionary biologist Alan Grafen. 43 Zahavi extensively
studied the Arabian babbler, a small brown bird which lives in social groups and was
considered to have altruist behaviors. The system behind the warning calls and food donations
within the babbler groups, however, is rather unexpected. Instead of being altruistic towards
41. R. Bshary and A.S. Grutter, "Image Scoring and Cooperation in a Cleaner Fish Mutualism," Nature 441
(2006): 975-978.
42. Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion: 250.
43. Alan Grafen, "Biological Signals as Handicaps," Journal of Theoretical Biology 144 (1990): 517-546.
28 | M a s t e r T h e s i s
close genetic relatives (kinship altruism) or expecting to be fed at a later date (reciprocal
altruism), dominant babblers assert their dominance by feeding subordinates and warn their
groups with signals to gain social prestige within the group: this behavior is now known as the
"handicap principle."44 Richard Dawkins captures the heart of this idea exquisitely when he
writes that "the essence of Zahavi's idea is that advertisements of superiority are authenticated
by their cost. Only a genuinely superior individual can afford to advertise the fact by means of
a costly gift."45 This means that the dominant phenotypes not only buys prestige but also
Darwinian success—for example by securing the survival of their apparent greater biological
fitness in attracting mates.
We now have four altruistic principles that explain altruistic behavior to ensure the
survival of particular genes and its correlative traits. Evolutionary ethics, in contrast to natural
selection, promotes the Darwinian reasons for individuals to be altruistic, generous, or
"moral" towards each other. By temporarily neglecting one's own fitness, an individual is able
to enhance the fitness of a relative or a group. At the genetic level, these behaviors are
competitive and egoistic—they enhance an individual's genetic interest—, at the phenotypic
level, however, these same behaviors may be cooperative and altruistic as well.46 Not only is a
particular gene ensured of its survival, often the individual will be repaid the favor and has its
fitness increased in turn. This principle of evolutionary ethics, together with the Darwinian
paradigm and the modern science additions of the evolutionary synthesis, are the most
important principles that form both the sub-field of evolutionary biology and the intellectual
foundation for many of the research questions in my thesis.
Conclusion
Chapter one looked at the most important aspects of evolutionary biology and in particular
evolutionary theory. The fundamental question that I posed here was: what is evolutionary
biology? I explained the most important sub-divisions of evolutionary biology, and paid extra
attention to evolutionary theory, for this division proves to be the intellectual basis for most of
the other sub-categories within evolutionary biology. Of central importance within
evolutionary theory are natural selection and evolutionary ethics: these biological principles
of evolution that determine human nature might have a great impact on the field of
44. Amotz Zahavi, "Mate Selection - A Selection for a Handicap," Journal of Theoretical Biology 53 (1975):
205-214.
45. Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion: 251.
46. Richard D. Alexander, Darwinism and Human Affairs, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1979.
29 | M a s t e r T h e s i s
international relations and should be able to pin down the two most important theories and
issues of IR on the theory of evolution. Natural selection, kinship selection, and reputation
might give a new dimension to the theory of realism and warfare; while reciprocal altruism,
conspicuous generosity, and natural selection might be useful to improve the theory of
liberalism and cooperation in the world. By enriching the social sciences with the
advancements in the life sciences, by combining international relations with evolutionary
biology, our understanding of IR will most likely be greater than ever before because this
approach has great potential to give us new insights in the field's most important principles:
its major theories of realism and liberalism, and its major issues of warfare and cooperation.
30 | M a s t e r T h e s i s
CHAPTER TWO: EVOLUTIONARY THEORY AND REALISM
"This insinuation of the interests of the self into even the most ideal enterprises
and most universal objectives, envisaged in moments of highest rationality, makes
hypocrisy an inevitable byproduct of all virtuous endeavor."1
Reinhold Niebuhr
Although Niebuhr's statement of hypocrisy may seem a bit harsh and relentless, it is this kind
of selfishness and egoism that became the main element behind the theory of realism within
the field of international relations. Although realism as a formal theory of international
relations did not arrive until the second World War, its general understandings and primary
presumptions have been expressed a long time before World War II ranging from the writings
of important philosophers as Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Thomas Hobbes to famous
military strategists such as Sun Tzu and Carl von Clausewitz. The central point of coherence
in all of these writings is that realism—also generally known as political realism—beliefs that
national interest and national security go over ideology. To ensure national security in this
competitive world, states need to seek economic and military power to compete with the other
states in our world's international system.2 The central element behind such policies, we read
in many realist theories, is the idea that individuals are egoistic and strive to dominate others.
Such human traits are obviously connected to our idea of human nature, the psychological and
social qualities that characterize humankind. It is this connection to human nature that might
reveal a link towards evolutionary biology. If states are driven by egoism and the drive to
dominate, one cannot help but wonder if evolutionary theory plays a role in realist theory. The
main question that needs to be answered in this chapter is: in how far can evolutionary theory
improve the theories posed by realists in international relations?
In order to come to a complete and satisfying answer to this chapter's main question I
will first explain the theory of realism by shortly discussing its primary assumptions and
ideas. I will focus on the ultimate causation of human behavior within the realist theory. It
1. Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study of Ethics and Politics, New York: Charles
Scribner‘s Sons, 1932.
2. Prominent works of the realist theory of IR include E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An
Introduction to the Study of International Relations, 2nd ed., London: Macmillan, 1946; Hans J. Morgenthau,
Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th ed., New York: Knopf, 1978; Robert Gilpin,
War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1981; and Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of
International Politics, Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979.
31 | M a s t e r T h e s i s
seems that realists widely use the characteristic human traits of egoism and dominance as
causes of behavior, but only two theorists tried to offer an ultimate causation: Reinhold
Niebuhr and Hans J. Morgenthau. I will discuss their theories in detail because their ideas are
recognized as the foundation upon which realism generally builds. I will end the paragraph
with the theory by Professor of Political Science Kenneth Waltz concerning the different
levels of realism in IR. Although these three explanations seems to go to the heart of realism,
it is important to look at the role of evolutionary theory within realist theory considering its
link to human nature. I will address the role of evolution in the third and fourth paragraph, in
which I intent to link evolutionary theory to the ultimate cause of egoism and dominance.
Next, I will discuss a realist's use of evolutionary ethics. When egoism is dominant within
realism, what, then, is the position of realism within the field of evolutionary ethics? Finally, I
will end the chapter with a conclusion and an answer to the chapter's main question.
The Realist Theory, An Overview
The theory of realism is one of the dominant schools, if not most dominant school, within the
field of international relations. Realism—which is also referred to as power politics,
Machtpolitik, Realpolitik, and raison d'etat—is associated in more recent times with people
such as George Frost Kennan, best known as the ideological father of the policy of
containment; Henry Kissinger, as the Secretary of State under President Nixon a famous
proponent of Realpolitik; and Hans Joachim Morgenthau, one of the leading twentieth-century
figures in the field of IR. Being the oldest and most frequently adopted theory of international
relations, realism has spawned several branches throughout history that makes it hard to
categorize it as one coherent theory. All the different interpretations and branches of realism,
however, share a clear family resemblance, as political scientist Jack Donnelly writes:
"realists emphasize the constraints on politics imposed by human selfishness ('egoism') and
the absence of international government ('anarchy'), which require the primacy in all political
life of power and security."3 Even though this may seem a very thin line that keeps all the
different branches of realism knitted together, it allows realist theories to share a wide range
of key assumptions and state policies. Several key ideas that have come to define realism in
this respect are the "three S's": first, statism: the state is the pre-eminent actor; second,
survival: the primary objective of all states is survival; and third, self-help: no other state or
3. Jack Donnelly, "Realism" (Chapter Two) in: Scott Burchill, Jack Donnelly, Andrew Linklater, et al, Theories
of International Relations, 4th ed., Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2009: 31-32.
32 | M a s t e r T h e s i s
institution can be relied upon to guarantee your survival.4 These three principles and the
emphasis realists cast upon selfishness and the drive to dominate in the international sphere
have led to a set of policies that are shared in every branch of realism. I will quickly
summarize some of these typical realist policies and assumptions in table 2.1.
Table 2.1. Realist Key Assumptions
Realist theories share the following key assumptions and policies
1. The international system is a system of anarchy. There is no official actor above states that
is capable of regulating their interactions and relations.
2. To achieve national security, a state needs to strive to attain as many military as well as
economic resources as possible. Relations between states are also determined primarily from
military and economic capabilities.
3. The state is seen as a rational unitary actor which mainly acts according to self-interest.
4. Due to states acting in accordance with their own interests, there is a general distrust of
forming international alliances or long-term cooperation agreements.
5. With the state as the main actors in IR, other actors such as international institutions, nongovernmental organizations, and multinational corporations are viewed as having little
influence on an international scale.
Sources: Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th ed., New York:
Knopf, 1978; Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1981; Kenneth N.
Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979; among others.
When looking at the core of realism, it is clear that the main element behind realist
theories and policies are the distinct human traits of egoism and dominance. This is true for
both classical and neo-realists, as I will show later on. Realists often argue that states act as
they do because states are composed of individuals who are egoistic and strive to dominate
others. These, according to Bradley Thayer, are the proximate causes of the realist argument:
they "focus on explanations of immediate occurrences."5 Proximate causes should be
4. Tim Dunne and Brian C. Schmidt, "Realism" (Chapter Five) in: John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens,
The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, 4th ed., Oxford: Oxford UP,
2008: 100-103.
5. Bradley A. Thayer, Darwin and International Relations: 61.
33 | M a s t e r T h e s i s
deductively derivable from ultimate causes, causes that are universal statements and explain
the proximate causes. Especially classical realists extensively use assumptions about egoism
and a drive to dominate others as direct causes of human behavior, however, only two
theorists have explained the ultimate cause of egoism and dominance: Niebuhr and
Morgenthau.
Ultimate Causations: Egoism and Dominance in Realist Theories
While many realist theorists build upon egoism and dominance, use it to explain and predict
state behavior within international relations, they are still proximate causes: assumptions on
which a dominant theory rests. Two (classical) realist theorists have tried to offer an ultimate
cause for this selfish behavior within the realm of realism. They wanted to explain egoism and
dominance as a universal trait in human nature: the first explanation is offered by the
American theologian and political theorist Reinhold Niebuhr and is grounded in theology, the
second ultimate cause is offered by German-born international relations theorist Hans J.
Morgenthau and is build upon the idea that human beings possess an animus dominandi.6
The first ultimate cause for the human behavior of egoism is offered by Reinhold
Niebuhr. Niebuhr is often seen as the archetypical American intellectual of the Cold War: he
strongly supported policies that confronted the Soviet communism in the world. While being
a powerful public speaker in favor of realism, Niebuhr also remained an influential Christian,
eventually combining realism and Christianity into the aptly named concept of "Christian
Realism" to try and explain the ultimate cause of human egoism.
Mainly due to his Christian background, Niebuhr's ultimate cause for the typical realist
behavior is grounded in theology. Humans, Niebuhr claims, are evil which manifests itself in
sin: humans possess "unlimited and demonic potencies of which animal life is innocent."7
These evil potencies are the primary cause of the human desire to dominate others. Niebuhr
holds that we are the only species that are aware of our finite mind, something which we
carefully choose to ignore. Our refusal of these inherent limitations, however, leads us to seek
power: "man is the only finite creature who knows that he is finite and he is therefore tempted
to protest against his fate."8 Niebuhr continues by arguing that: "one form which this protest
takes is his imperialistic ambition, his effort to overcome his insignificance by subordinating
6. Hans J. Morgenthau, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946: 192
7. Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man: A Christian Interpretation, 2 Vols., New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1941, 1943: 179.
8. Reinhold Niebuhr, Christianity and Power Politics, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1940: 156.
34 | M a s t e r T h e s i s
other lives to his individual or collective will."9 By linking his idea of human evil to central
state policies as imperialism, Niebuhr acknowledges that human sinfulness also manifests
itself in the field of international relations.
The idea of mirroring individual egoism, rationality, and dominance toward a higher
level of analysis, say, the state is nothing new within the theories of realism. By recognizing
human sinfulness within international relations, Niebuhr argues that states also possess a
sense of pride and a desire for power. The magnitude of the egoism and pride of states is
much greater than of the individual, and therefore capable of bringing about greater evil.10 To
keep all these different national prides of states in order, Niebuhr relies on a traditional realist
mechanism that is seen as the only force that can bring stability in our world: the balance of
power. Niebuhr uses the need for power (and, of course, the egoistic cause that goes with it)
to explain not only individual behavior, but also state policies. What is important is that
Niebuhr explains the ultimate cause for egoism and dominance as people being evil and
unwilling to accept our finite nature, a view unmistakably grounded in theology.
The second explanation is offered by another leading twentieth-century figure in the
study of international politics: Hans Joachim Morgenthau. He is often credited as being one of
the founding fathers of political realism. This is not surprising if we look at the impact his
Politics Among Nations had—and in contemporary times still has—as being one of the most
used textbooks in the United States concerning the field of IR. In this classic work,
Morgenthau emphasizes the importance of national interest and power when he writes: "the
main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of
international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power."11 Moreover,
Morgenthau also explains the ultimate cause for this egoistic and dominant behavior.
Whereas Niebuhr seeks the ultimate cause for the predicted human behavior within
realism in theology, Morgenthau explains the human behavior of egoism and strive for power
and dominance through the concept of animus dominandi. Morgenthau believes that human
beings possess an inherent animus dominandi, a "desire for power" which manifests itself
within a human as the desire to dominate others.12 This idea of human nature and its desire for
9. Ibid., 156-157.
10. Reinhold Niebuhr, The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness: A Vindication of Democracy and a
Critique of its Traditional Defence, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1944: 20-21.
11. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th ed., New York: Knopf,
1978: 5.
12. Hans J. Morgenthau, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, 1946: 192.
35 | M a s t e r T h e s i s
power was already provided centuries earlier by the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes. In
his 1651 classic Leviathan he writes: "I put for a generall inclination of all mankind, a
perpetuall and restlesse desire for Power after power, that ceaseth onely in Death."13 This lust
for power in human beings has created a state of war, as Hobbes famously argued, in which
humans live in a permanent fear of violent death in a state of a war of all against all.
Although the idea that humans possess an inherent animus dominandi is not a new one
by posed by Morgenthau, he was the first to use it as the ultimate cause for human behavior.
For Morgenthau, the desire for power begins with the individual and focuses on one's own
interests: an individual's "desire for power concerns itself not with the individual's survival
but with his position among his fellows once his survival has been secured," this lust for
power would be satisfied "only if the last became an object of his domination, there being
nobody above or beside him, that is, if he became like God."14 Of course this egoism and
strive to dominate is not confined to the individual level. As is the case in most realist
theories, the role of egoism is so fundamental that the tendency to dominate is "an element of
all human associations, from the family through fraternal and professional associations and
local political organizations, to the state."15 This egoism and desire to dominate, Niebuhr,
Morgenthau, and most realists believe, is inherent in people and is the basis for our human—
and therefore also of the state—selfish behavior.
Another explanation that builds the theory of realism from the ground up deserves to
be mentioned here. Although the explanation does not offer an ultimate solution to egoistic
behavior, something on which realism heavily relies, the idea of neorealism by Kenneth N.
Waltz had a great impact on the principles of realism and places it on a more scientific
foundation. Waltz uses the concept of anarchy, the ordering principle in our international
structure, as the most important and ultimate factor (the other factor consists of the
distribution of capabilities) to determine state behavior. This means that there is no
international government above the separate state governments that can regulate transactions
or provide protection for citizens.16 Having no formal central authority, states act according to
the logic of self-help, where states seek their own interest. The system of anarchy allows
Waltz, as Thayer notes, to "argue that international relations is dangerous and states must rely
on the balance of power and behave much the way Morgenthau or Niebuhr expected. And he
13. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. C.B. Macpherson, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985 [1651]: 161.
14. Hans J. Morgenthau, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics: 193.
15. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: 37.
16. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979: 114-116.
36 | M a s t e r T h e s i s
advances these arguments without arguing that individuals or individual states are evil or
possess an animus dominandi."17 Although Waltz's theory seems to go to the heart of realism,
it evades the ultimate explanation of egoism within humans themselves, an explanation which
could complement and enhance his theory significantly.
At the time of Waltz‘s writing, evolutionary theory was not yet capable of
scientifically explaining human nature in a detailed way to clarify particular human behavior.
Without lifting his theory to a (social) scientific level, Waltz would have most likely relied on
human nature and ultimately created the third noumenal explanation. The concept of anarchy,
however, forms a solid scientific explanation without getting into the details of human nature.
While this is a well defined ultimate cause for international relations, largely formed due to a
lack of authority on the international level, it does not, by definition, affects state behavior.
That is to say, a ―dangerous‖ state of anarchy is not simply there, rather it is defined by the
participants within the state of anarchy. The void created by the lack of authority is filled in
with the actions of these participants, which are essentially regulated by human nature. It is
not unthinkable that the priority of state security can be traced down along the human traits of
egoism and dominance. Bringing in the life sciences within Waltz‘s theory will most likely
complement his original theory: new discoveries within evolutionary theory might be able to
explain the human nature Waltz tried to avoid. While Niebuhr and Morgenthau did offer
different causations for human nature in the theory of realism, they lack a solid scientific basis
and are outside the realm of what science can investigate. Evolutionary biology might be able
to solve this problem.
Evolutionary Biology and the Ultimate Cause for Egoism
As I showed above, the traditional realist argument of egoism and dominance rests on rather
fragile and noumenal foundations. With the exception of Kenneth Waltz's anarchy and
distribution of capabilities, which in their own right form a more social scientific approach to
realism, the ultimate causations for predicted realist behavior offered by Niebuhr and
Morgenthau are outside the realm of science. It is simply not possible for scientists to test the
arguments that humans are evil or are constantly motivated by a desire for power.
Evolutionary theory might provide such a scientific explanation when it proves to be able to
explain particular aspects of human nature. In this respect, both egoism and domination need
to be explained by evolutionary theory. The major advancements in the field, especially the
17. Bradley A. Thayer, Darwin and International Relations: 64.
37 | M a s t e r T h e s i s
linking of Mendelian genetics to the Darwinian paradigm, have provided scientists with new
information that is likely to complement—the usual social science based—international
relations field with theories based in the life sciences.
First of all, the human trait of egoism. The realist theories use egoism extensively in
their view on international relations. As we have seen, many state policies are explained
through egoism, as well as the whole international system. Evolutionary theory offers two
scientific explanations for the trait of egoism that consummates Niebuhr's arguments
concerning human evil as the ultimate cause for egoism.
The most obvious and straightforward argument is a classic Darwinian argument.
Darwin argued that phenotypes are concerned with their own survival if resources are scarce.
This idea is described as the struggle for life, as I already described in Darwin's revolution,
and spawns a selfish behavior to ensure that the organism meets is physiological needs. 18 As I
noted earlier, the struggle for life is pinned down on the theory of natural selection which is
the main factor behind the preservation of species. To ensure the preservation of favored traits
in a hostile environment, an individual organism generally places his own survival before that
of other phenotypes of the same group. Egoistic behavior in this context is contributing
greatly to an organism's fitness.
A second, more scientific argument for the trait of egoism is the selfish gene theory of
the famous evolutionary theorist Richard Dawkins. Dawkins's theory of the selfish gene is a
gene-centered view of evolution. This view holds that evolution occurs through the
differential survival of competing genes, since heritable information is passed along almost
exclusively by genetic material, instead of the classic historical view that evolution is
organism-centered. The theory of the selfish gene, first coined by Dawkins in the book that
bears the same name in 1976, begins with chemicals in a "primeordial soup" in which
different types of molecules accidentally started forming and from which eventually efficient
copy makers would emerge.19 These so-called "replicators" could reproduce themselves using
the limited constituents of the "soup"—carbon, nitrogen, hydrogen, and oxygen—ultimately
competing for them. The most efficient replicators emerged from this competition. Due to the
competition, however, molecules sometimes made mistakes that contributed to its fitness, as
Dawkins describes: one such mistake might have been the creation of a membrane, or a
division of the cell into even larger components such as organs and so on. These processes
18. See page 20-21 for Darwin's second revolution and the theory of natural selection.
19. Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, new ed., Oxford: Oxford UP, 1989: 258.
38 | M a s t e r T h e s i s
created extremely efficient "survival machines" that got "bigger and more elaborate, and the
process was cumulative and progressive."20 Such developments were so complex and cells
became so specialized to the point that they ultimately created organs and entire animal
bodies.
It may be clear that for Dawkins the gene is the most appropriate unit of selection.
This idea is evident when he writes that "they created us, body and mind; and their
preservation is the ultimate rationale for our existence."21 It must be noted, however, that from
the perspective of genes there is no intention to create or inhabit people, but due to evolution
the process continued. What is important is that in the gene-centered view of evolution the
phenotype is nothing more than just the ephemeral vehicle of the gene, and that the (selfish)
actions of the gene increases its fitness. By this increasing fitness, the gene further spreads the
selfish behavior which is mainly exerted by reproduction and food consumption. By satisfying
its own wants, Thayer explains, the gene "creates an instinctual or genetic basis for egoism,"
and because the "organism evolved largely to satisfy the wants of the gene, in a similar
manner egoism evolves through a population."22 In this way egoism becomes a trait within
animals that contribute to their fitness.
The works of both Darwin and Dawkins have contributed greatly to our understanding
of egoism. Not only can they explain how animals (including humans) act through proximate
reasoning, they also offer a scientific basis that accounts for the ultimate cause for egoistic
behavior. Although Darwin lacked the scientific knowledge of genetics in his time, he
managed to accurately describe the complex social behavior through his theory of natural
selection. Dawkins refined this view through his new gene-centered view combined with
genetics to solidify Darwin's original argument and anchor the evolution of animal traits on a
scientific foundation. Consequently, evolutionary theory can explain egoism and is able to
serve as an ultimate cause for the behavior realists distinguished centuries ago. Behind the
egoism Niebuhr and Morgenthau saw in human beings, a trait which leads to many realist
policies of power politics, exists a solid scientific ultimate explanation: not that people are
necessarily evil which spawns egoistic behavior, rather our egoistic behavior originates from
our genes through evolution.
20. Ibid., 19.
21. Ibid., 20.
22. Bradley A. Thayer, Darwin and International Relations: 70.
39 | M a s t e r T h e s i s
Evolutionary theory thus provides a solid scientific explanation for human egoism.
This means a significant enhancement for the theory of classical realism. Without changing
the actual predicted realist behaviors, evolutionary theory is able to replace the noumenal
ideas regarding human egoism grounded in theology and the concept of animus dominandi.
Furthermore, evolutionary theory can be used to complement Waltz‘s theory of neo-realism.
On the one hand, Waltz‘s theory of anarchy which is based in the social sciences will still
hold and function as an ultimate cause. On the other hand, the theory of evolution will provide
evidence for the actual behavior of the participants within the realm of international anarchy,
and is able to account for the scientific explanation of human behavior which Waltz tried to
avoid in his original theory. In this view, egoism is more than just an assumption on which
realism builds: egoism is a trait which is deeply rooted in human evolution. Stemming from
this egoistic trait in animals—again, this includes humans—is the strive for dominance. Like
egoism, the desire to dominate is a trait and therefore highly likely to have its roots in
evolution.
The Strive for Ultimate Causations: Dominance and Evolutionary Theory
Unlike egoism, dominance is not in the first place considered an introvert individual trait. For
the trait of dominance to show, one needs other organisms over which an individual can
dominate. This is also the case for the trait of domination in the context of evolutionary
theory, where domination usually means that particular individuals in social groups may exert
control over others and have regular priority of access to resources in competitive situations.23
Just as is the case with the concept of egoism, the strive for dominance is a primary
assumption of human nature on which realism builds. Likewise, evolutionary theory might
play an important role in enhancing the realist theory by trying to ground dominance in the
life sciences. Surprisingly, the trait for domination stems from the field of evolutionary ethics.
As we have seen in chapter one, a dominance hierarchy improves a group's fitness. By
affecting a gene's survival rate successfully it continues to evolve within organisms and,
therefore, the dominance hierarchy became the central type of organization within
evolutionary theory to explain the origins of the desire to dominate.
For primates, and especially humans, dominance hierarchies had a profound effect on
evolution as cognitive psychologist Denise Dellarosa Cummins writes: "the fundamental
components of our reasoning architecture evolved in response to pressures to reason about
23. T.E. Rowell, "The Concept of Social Dominance," Behavioral Biology 11 (1974): 131-154.
40 | M a s t e r T h e s i s
dominance hierarchies."24 Humans and primates evolved a mental architecture to address the
problems and difficulties they encountered in dominance hierarchies that have contributed
significantly to the evolution of the mind. To survive the difficulties of a subordinate position
in a social group, subordinates used different strategies than challenging the dominant animal,
something which produced a fortuitous result: great intelligence. To address the problems of a
subordinate position, which "directly impact survival rates and reproductive success,"
individuals use two general approaches: "the necessity to recognize and respond appropriately
to permissions, obligations, and prohibition;" and "circumvent[ing] the constraints of
hierarchy by dint of guile, particularly through successfully forecasting other's behavior."25
Such behavior strongly suggests that belonging to a group is better for one's chances of
survival than existing alone, even if belonging requires subordination. This is even more so
when considering E.O. Wilson's argument that a lack of domination will increase aggression
significantly, compromising the group's security.
Indeed, when we take a closer look at the organization of dominance hierarchies, a
species that lives communally generally has two choices. Individuals can either accept an
organization with some centralization of power in the form of a dominant animal, or engage
in perpetual conflict over scarce resources or over a dominant position—which could easily
result in serious injury—that deprives the social group of the benefits of a communal
existence. In this respect, international relations closely resembles the animal world.
An alpha male in the animal world provides stability to the group, brings organization
to food harvesting, and contributes to the ability of a group to defend itself from predators. In
the same way a hegemon in international relations may provide stability for lesser
"subordinate" states in the realm of international security and for international political
economy. This connection to modern politics is not surprising when considering the role
dominance hierarchies played in human evolution. Because the human mental architecture
was created through evolution, it remains part of our behavior today. An important result of
the evolution of this architecture is the essential biological question of indoctrinability and the
study of politics. For E.O. Wilson the answer to this question is straightforward: "human
beings are absurdly easy to indoctrinate—they seek it."26 The three main causes for this
statement could all stem from the enormous impact dominance hierarchies had on human
24. Denise Dellarosa Cummins, "Social Norms and Other Minds," in Cummins and Colin Allen, eds., The
Evolution of Mind, New York: Oxford UP, 1998: 30.
25. Ibid.
26. E.O. Wilson, Sociobiology: 562.
41 | M a s t e r T h e s i s
evolution. First, survival in an anarchic and dangerous realist world dictates membership in a
group and a fear of exclusion from it; second, conformity to a status quo lowers the risk of
conflict within a dominance hierarchy; and third, conformity helps keeping groups together.27
As Wilson notes: "when conformity becomes too weak, groups become extinct."28
These understandings have great consequences for the study of modern politics. Not
only can it explain the hegemony model, it also explains why human beings readily give
allegiance or submit to the state: Wilson, Eibl-Eibesfeldt, and Campbell, among others,
already suggested that evolution has produced a need to belong to a dominance hierarchy.29
Not only the international sphere can be conceived of as being a dominance hierarchy, the
modern state and its institutions, the military, and political parties are all examples that typify
dominance hierarchies. In this way the evolution of our mental architecture has an enormous
impact on both our ancestors in actual survival, and in more contemporary times when we are
ruled by governments and its dominant individuals.
Another important explanation of dominance in international relations is the ingroup/out-group distinction. The strive for dominance is also fundamental in this idea. The
basic idea is that humans (and many primates) divide their worldview into several groups.
One group is the "Us" group, or the in-group; the other group consists of outsiders, the
"Them" group or out-group. The members of the in-group are positively biased towards each
other and an individual sees the group as one's own group, like a family, tribe, or even a state.
Psychologists argue that the in-group serves to give people meaning, a sense of community,
and help defining what they are not—the out-group. Research shows that people almost
always privilege members of the in-group over out-group members, even when the in-group
possesses no actual social value; for example, a group of people that wear shirts of the same
color when the other group wears another color.30 The out-group is also more generally a
family, tribe, state, or organization, towards which an individual often feels contempt,
opposition, or a desire to compete against.
The in-group/out-group distinction has its roots in evolutionary theory and is useful to
explain realist behavior in international relations. When the out-group is another state, the in27. Donald T. Campbell, "On the Genetics of Altruism and the Counter-Hedonic Components in Human
Culture," Journal of Social Issues 28, no. 3 (1972): 21-37.
28. E.O. Wilson, Sociobiology: 562.
29. Wilson, Sociobiology; Eibl-Eibesfeldt, Human Ethology; and Campbell "On the Genetics of Altruism and the
Counter-Hedonic Components in Human Culture."
30. Meagan M. Patterson and Rebecca S. Bigler, "Effects of Physical Atypicality on Children's Social Identities
and Intergroup Attitudes," International Journal of Behavorial Development 31, no. 5 (2007): 433-444.
42 | M a s t e r T h e s i s
group (most likely also a state) could easily see the out-group as a threat to its own resources
and territories. Moreover, such an out-group could prove to be a danger for the in-group's
political and economic interests. To ensure that this threat becomes and remains contained,
the in-group needs to win the competition with the out-group. As we have seen, dominance—
as evolved in our human architecture—is of fundamental importance to render possible
opponents and competitors harmless. This is also the case in the in-group/out-group
distinction, which functions much like the dominant behavior dominance hierarchies equipped
us with.
According to Thayer, humans make these group distinction for three different reasons:
first, humans seek resources to care for themselves and relatives, and they seek mates to
reproduce their genotype; second, living and evolving in dangerous environments, humans,
like other animals, need the ability to assess threats rapidly; and third, humans also learned to
assess quickly whether the outsider forms a threat in the long run to the in-group.31 Taken
altogether, this means that humans behave egoistically for the reasons advanced by Darwin,
Dawkins, and other evolutionary theorists, as I discussed above. This behavior is not at all
surprising when we look at the evolutionary roots for the creation of in-groups and outgroups. Humans behave in these ways, Thayer argues, because resources were scarce in the
late-Pliocene, Pleistocene, and Holocene environments in which we, as human beings,
evolved.32 It is not hard to imagine why people in such an environment preferred more
resources over less resources. By discriminating between self and others, humans made sure
that they acquired enough resources in prehistoric times when there was too little to go around
for everyone. This behavior has evolved through humans and remains today, where people
still make continuous distinctions between the "Us" versus "Them" groups. Whether this
distinction is between families, tribes, organizations, or states, is subject to the level of
analysis and particular circumstances. The evolutionary origins of this distinction, however,
produces a fear of out-groups that together with the indoctrinability of human beings has a
profound impact on modern (international) politics.
It seems that the two most important traits upon which realist theory is built, egoism
and domination, are more than just assumptions within human nature. Evolutionary theory
provides a better, more scientific ultimate explanation of realist behavior than the theories
Niebuhr and Morgenthau proposed, and the environment in prehistoric times produced typical
31. Bradley A. Thayer, Darwin and International Relations: 77-78.
32. Ibid., 77.
43 | M a s t e r T h e s i s
human behaviors including the in-group/out-group distinction and identification mechanisms.
For classical realism this means that evolutionary theory is capable of replacing the two
noumenal explanations offered regarding human nature. Neo-realism, in turn, could also be
improved by using the theory of evolution. The existing theory of anarchy complemented
with the scientific, evolutionary explanation of ―realist‖ human behavior makes for a
complete, integrated theory of realism in which both the social sciences, as well as the life
sciences are clearly represented to form a new theory: evolutionary realism. Evolutionary
realism is able to explain why people are egoistic, strive for power and dominance, and
discriminate between groups, and therefore explain why people behave the way realist
theorists predict. Evolutionary biology, however, suggests another type of behavior through
evolutionary ethics, as I explained in chapter one.
The Place of Realism in Evolutionary Ethics
The Darwinian paradigm, Dawkin's selfish gene theory, and the modern evolutionary
synthesis all suggest a selfishness which looks a lot like a Hobbesian war of all against all. As
we have seen, however, effective competition is not always a solitary enterprise. This is also
the case in the theory of realism. While egoism and dominance play an important role in
realism—two traits that are indeed scientifically grounded in realism, as I discussed—our
mental architecture which evolved through dominance hierarchies and in-group/out-group
distinctions also contributes to ethical considerations within the theory.
On the question if realism contains moral principles, proponents of the theory will
often state that realism indeed possesses ethical concerns and point to the "dual moral
standard" which divides morality between the standard for individuals living in the state and
one standard for the state in its external relations with other states.33 This different standard is
seen, although in different contexts and on different levels, throughout the length of human
evolution.
As I discussed in chapter one, humans bond to one another for the ultimate reasons of
gene survival—there are generally advantages across generations of kin (kin selection) or
within generations of kin or non kin (reciprocity). Both dominance hierarchies and ingroup/out-group distinctions serve as the mechanisms to identify threats and opportunities and
draw a line between possible enemies and reciprocators, this is not different for realism or
33. Tim Dunne and Brian C. Schmidt, "Realism" (Chapter Five) in: John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia
Owens, The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations: 92-93.
44 | M a s t e r T h e s i s
liberalism. Where we have seen that group distinctions stimulates dominance over out-groups
within human beings, they also promote ethical considerations for the in-group, just as is the
case concerning dominance hierarchies. Cooperation within these groups brings intragroup
peace, stability, organization, social value, identities, and defenses for out-groups. For realists
the in-group on an international level exclusively consists of the state. This is not surprising
when considering that the state is the primary actor in international relations for realists.
Within a nation, individuals often pursue enduring patterns of cooperation. Such "relatively
enduring alliances become families, clans, businesses, professional associations, and whole
societies."34 These groups are partly formed through kin selection (i.e., families, tribes, and
clans), and partly formed by reciprocity in which the exchange of altruistic behavior is
mutually beneficial (i.e., businesses and associations). The organized collectivities of ethnic
groups we commonly refer to as states then have the potential to engage in enduring alliances
and cooperation on the international level. Contrary to the in-group position, however, the
idea of international cooperation is different between realism and liberalism.
While realism is not unknown to organized ethical considerations within the state, they
pursue an egoistic policy on an international level without much notion for ethics. This is the
second realist moral standard which concerns the external actions of the state on the
international level. Realists are rather pessimistic about international cooperation. A central
reason for this hesitance stems from Kenneth Waltz's theory of anarchy as I discussed earlier.
By stating that there is no international government above the separate state governments that
can regulate relations between states, Waltz claims that a state's security could be
compromised.35 Without a proper organization or institution which acts as an authority on the
international level, states can never be certain of another state's future intentions. This lack of
trust is further justified by realists through human nature. Egoism and the strive for
dominance are central traits within the early tradition of realism. With these features of human
nature pinned down on evolutionary theory, as I have argued above, there seems to be little
ground within the theory of realism for international cooperation and alliances in general.
In terms of evolutionary ethics, one could say that realists cannot discern a visible
reciprocator reputation behind another state in the international sphere. A pessimistic view of
international relations by realists, fueled by a system of anarchy and a characteristically
34. Gary R. Johnson, The Roots of Ethnic Conflict: An Evolutionary Perspective (Chapter Two), in: Patrick
James and David Goetze, eds., Evolutionary Theory and Ethnic Conflict, Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2001: 21.
35. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics: 1979: 114-116.
45 | M a s t e r T h e s i s
egoistic human nature, has two major influences within the field of ethics in terms of
reputation. On the one hand, realist ideas are creating a reputation for their own state which
proves to be a burden for cooperation. By continuously emphasizing the self-help system and
the need to survive in this integral organization, realists create for themselves a nonreciprocator reputation which could have a great negative impact on the possibility of
international cooperation and alliances with other, more willing states. On the other hand
realists presume that other states will act in the same way, for the anarchy system combined
with human nature requires national and international policies as proposed by realists. In this
way realists place, through a pessimistic idea concerning cooperation on an international
level, a burden upon the reputation of other states that stems from their own theory. In a way,
this creates a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy to the extent that realists form an idea about
other states that spawns from their own theories, and then use this self-created concept as the
basis for their own foreign policies.
Realists in general are no strangers to ethics as a whole. The concepts of kinship
altruism and reciprocal altruism are clearly represented in a realist state, it keeps the state
together as a whole. Human nature can be regulated within the state through official
authorities and cooperation under just conditions is guaranteed. On an international level,
however, these views change dramatically. Without an international central authority realists
are rather pessimistic about ethics. Just and legal cooperation are not guaranteed and human
nature takes over: a drive for power and egoism creates a world ruled by anarchy. This view
undermines the potential for cooperation between organized states. For realists there is no
room to build up a reputation, both for themselves and other states. The characteristically
pessimist view therefore forms a basis on which cooperation is problematic at best, and ethics
play a minor role. In terms of biology this means that the ideas realist theorists propose are
not completely coherent and consistent with the concept of evolutionary ethics. While
evolutionary theory is able to enhance the substructure of realist theory in terms of egoism
and dominance, it is not able to account for their view on cooperation. I hasten to add that this
does not mean that the theory of realism completely dismisses ethical considerations. As we
have seen, the nation-state within realist theory functions as an actor in which both egoism
and altruism are important factors to form an organized, strong state.
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Conclusion
In this chapter I discussed the theory of realism and the benefits evolutionary theory might
have for one of the most influential theories within international relations. Central in this
discussion is the question: to what extent can evolutionary theory improve the theories posed
by realists in international relations? In my discussion of realism, it becomes clear that egoism
and the desire for power are two of the most important traits within the realist school. Realists
explain international relations in terms of power and egoism, which prevents states from long
term cooperation. Fundamental for these kind of policies, according to realists, are the human
traits of egoism and dominance. Only two ultimate explanations have been given for these
two concepts to explain realist behavior. These explanations by Niebuhr and Morgenthau
provided realism with a noumenal foundation: both explanations are not testable and outside
the realm of science.
Evolutionary theory is able to drastically change this noumenal foundation. It explains
why people are egoistic, how people adapt and seek control over their environment, why
particular individuals are looking to dominate others, and why people discriminate between
groups. In sum, evolutionary theory provides a scientific basis for the assumptions made by
realists concerning human nature. Without changing the fundamental theory of realism,
evolutionary theory can change the substructure of realism and by doing so improving the
theory significantly. Evolutionary theory is able to replace the noumenal causations with a
solid scientific account for human behavior within classical realism. Instead of the
assumptions made by realists about human egoism and dominance, the theory of evolution
explains exactly why human beings behave like realists expect. The effect of evolutionary
theory is even more important when realizing that realists have been turning away from
human nature in the last decades.
With the theory of Kenneth Waltz's neorealism, realism acquired a more scientific
basis grounded in social science. By using evolutionary theory, however, realists also possess
over a solid scientific ground that explains the egoist and dominant behavior they expect in
international relations. Moreover, by pinning down the realist idea of human nature on
evolutionary theory, Waltz's neorealism is not only grounded in social science but its structure
is also firmly fixed in the life sciences. The theory of evolution accounts for the particular
realist behaviors within the concept of anarchy. This means that evolutionary theory
complements Waltz‘s original theory of anarchy by scientifically explaining the one thing
Waltz, in his time, tried to avoid and could not explain: human behavior. By embracing the
47 | M a s t e r T h e s i s
information of the life sciences and accepting the enhancements evolutionary theory has to
offer, realists possess over a fully integrated and complete theory of international relations:
evolutionary realism.
Within the sphere of evolutionary ethics, evolutionary theory is able to help realists
explain why the state is suitable as the most important actor. Both kin selection and reciprocal
altruism are at the basis of a strong, coherent state. Alliances and cooperation formed within a
realist state have the potential to cross the borders and establish regional and international
cooperation. For realists, however, the international level is one in which ethics are of
secondary concern. Human nature which is egoistic and dominant has the ability to rule in a
world which lacks a central authority, something that is regulated properly within the state.
For this reason realists have maintained their pessimistic view on the potentially interesting
international cooperation. This means that, for realists, convincing social structures are a
reason to consciously dismiss the opportunity of international cooperation, while evolutionary
ethics unconsciously provides the basis on which such cooperation is possible. Realism, in
this sense, can only partially benefit from evolutionary biology. Is it then fair to say that the
notion of an egoistic human nature is enough to dismiss the possibility of cooperation on an
international level entirely? According to the theory of liberals this is not the case, as I will
explain in chapter three which discusses the role of evolutionary theory within liberalism.
48 | M a s t e r T h e s i s
CHAPTER THREE: EVOLUTIONARY FOUNDATIONS OF LIBERALISM
"Only through international cooperation can we effectively address the common
security problems facing all countries."
Li Zhaoxing
Li Zhaoxing instantly points out the most important difference between realism and liberalism
in this quote: the view on international cooperation. Whereas realism is largely based on
egoism and the human drive for power to ensure a state's security on the international level,
liberals emphasize that the interaction between states is also active on the level of "low
politics" (most often associated with economic and cultural policies) and that a state can
acquire absolute gains by cooperation and interdependence on an international level. While
liberalism is mainly considered an approach to government that emphasizes individual rights
and democracy, it is also an important model within the field of economics in which market
capitalism is seen as the best way to promote the welfare of everyone involved. There are
many different strands within the theory of liberalism, all, however, share one central
ideology: the spread of democracy after the Cold War and the globalization of the world
economy through international cooperation and alliances.1 Liberalism, in this sense, is the
complete opposite of the theories realists propose within international relations. Instead of the
realist pessimistic view of human nature on the international level, liberals emphasize the
potential to cooperate and strive for globalization. The central element behind such liberal
policies are the concepts of altruism and morality that are inherited in our human nature. If
ethics play a role within the theories of liberalism—in particular reciprocal altruism and
morality—evolutionary theory should be able to reveal these ethical considerations and by
doing so improving the theory of liberalism. Following this line of thought, the central
question this chapter tries to answer is the following: to what extent is evolutionary theory
able to enhance the paradigm of liberalism within IR?
This question requires to be answered by first discussing the theory of liberalism. I
will explain the primary assumptions, ideas, and different strands of the liberal view on
international relations in the first paragraph. The next paragraph will focus on an influential
1. Prominent works of the liberal theory of IR include Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and
Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1977; Robert O. Keohane,
After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1984;
and Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, New York: Perennial, 1993.
49 | M a s t e r T h e s i s
strand of liberalism: neo-liberal institutionalism. I will discuss the theory of neo-liberalism in
detail because it is a significant variant within the predominant strand of liberal
institutionalism, especially in the United States. Moreover, it has the requirements to be the
most complete and coherent theory within liberalism in evolutionary terms. In the third
paragraph I will use evolutionary theory to explain the ultimate cause of altruism and morality
which are central in the liberal theories of international relations. Can we really say that that
liberals are less pessimistic about international cooperation and hierarchies than their realist
counterparts. The following paragraph will focus on the optimistic character of liberals and
searches for an ethical universal basis among mankind. If the evolution of ethics is indeed
visible within the theories of liberalism, we should be able to find some universal ethical
considerations and behavior within human beings. Finally, I will end chapter three with a
conclusion that includes the answer to the chapter's main question.
Inside Liberalism
Whereas realism is seen as the first and most dominant school of international relations,
liberalism is considered its historical and ideological antithesis. The liberal tradition goes as
far back as the ideas of the English philosopher John Locke—who is regarded as one of the
most influential people of the Enlightenment era and is often credited as the "Father of
Liberalism"—in the late seventeenth century.2 Liberal ideas have been reshaped, rethought,
and developed ever since. More recently, people such as Francis Fukuyama, Robert Keohane,
David Held, and Joseph Nye are associated with the theory of liberalism. While liberalism
may hint at a single coherent theory within international relations, it actually consists of
several different strands. Professor of World Order Studies David Baldwin distinguishes
between four varieties of liberalism that are of central importance in contemporary
international relations: first, commercial liberalism; second, the theory of republican
liberalism; third, sociological liberalism; and finally, liberal institutionalism.3
Commercial liberalism is the branch within liberalism that focuses primarily on
globalization through free trade and economic interdependence. By advocating free trade,
private property rights, and free markets, advocates of the commercial liberalism theory use
the concept of a capitalist economy towards peace and prosperity. These measures will lead to
2. Dick Taverne, The March of Unreason: Science, Democracy, and the New Fundamentalism, New York:
Oxford UP, 2005: 18.
3. David Baldwin, Neo-Realism and Neo-Liberalism: The Contemporary Debate, New York: Columbia UP,
1993.
50 | M a s t e r T h e s i s
a world in which countries will be richer, more innovative in their policies, and generally
more tolerant due to the growing economic interdependency. Today, this view is advocated
and pursued by many global financial institutions and multinational companies. Indeed,
commercial liberalism is one part of the foreign policy core of many Western states.
The core of the Western foreign policy ideology is completed by the second branch of
liberalism: republican liberalism. Republican liberalism is the theory within liberalism which
claims that democratic states (or liberal democracies) are inclined to be more peaceful
between each other on the international level than towards other nation-states. Advocates of
the theory explain this as a result of the existence of similar domestic political cultures,
common moral values, and the economic cooperation between democratic states.4 By sharing
many political and historic features, democracies are less likely to go to war with each other.
Within the current scholarship, this theory is more generally known as the democratic peace
theory.
The third central theory within liberalism is sociological liberalism. As its name
already suggests, sociological liberalism is mostly concerned with the notion of community
within international relations. Sociological liberals state that individuals will eventually be
united in one international community, or global community, through the increasing
transnational activities. They believe that transnational relations could help create new forms
of human society because people in distant lands are now linked and state governments
become more interdependent.5 In a way, this idea is very similar to the concept of
cosmopolitanism, which promotes an ideology in which people of all ethnicities belong to a
single global community that is based on a shared morality.
The fourth, and most important, theory within liberalism is liberal institutionalism—or
neo-liberal institutionalism. Neo-liberal institutionalism is the most dominant strand in liberal
thinking today and many scholars consider it the most convincing challenge to the realist and
neo-realist theories.6 Proponents of the theory acknowledge and share many key assumptions
of neo-realism. Like realists, neo-liberal institutionalism promotes the state as key actors and
agree on the idea that the international level is a competitive one. Neo-liberals, however, see
4. Robert Jackson and Georg Sorensen, Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches, 3rd
ed., Oxford: Oxford UP, 2006: 111.
5. Ibid., 100.
6. Steven L. Lamy, Contemporary Mainstream Approaches: Neo-Realism and Neo-Liberalism (Chapter Seven)
in: John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens, The Globalization of World Politics: 131.
51 | M a s t e r T h e s i s
institutions as the mediator and the means to achieve international cooperation.7 This is
radically different from their neo-realist counterparts, who hardly see common ground for
international cooperation, as I discussed in the previous chapter. The main point here is that
(international) institutions are needed to help govern the anarchic international system and
promote cooperation to increase a state's tolerance, national security, and its national interests.
Despite the different strands within the theory of liberalism in international relations,
they all contribute to two main concerns that are visible throughout all liberal policies: the
pursue of an increasing globalization and the spread of democracy. This could be seen as an
"inside-out" approach to international relations in which liberal democratic states are looking
to transcend their domestic liberal policies into the international sphere. Scott Burchill
captures this idea as follows: "[the liberal] challenge is to extend the legitimacy of domestic
political arrangements found within democratic states to the relationships between all nationstates. To put it another way, liberals believe that democratic society, in which civil liberties
are protected and market relations prevail, can have an international analogue in the form of a
peaceful global order."8 With these ideas in mind, all different strands of liberalism pursue the
same international political agenda. While some liberal ideas proved to be too idealist (think
of Woodrow Wilson's League of Nations, for example), other policies offer more substance
and prove to be very influential in the field of international relations. Especially (neo)liberal
institutionalism is considered an important and convincing challenge to realist thinking.
Neo-Liberal Institutionalism and Evolutionary Theory
Considering the width of the liberal paradigm, I will make use of the Neo-Liberal view on
international relations to acquire focus. First of all, because it is the most dominant—and also
often labeled as the most incoherent, from a philosophical position—strand within the
paradigm of liberalism, which emphasizes the complex nature of neo-liberal institutionalism.
Secondly, Neo-Liberals acknowledge certain realist ideas concerning international politics,
which greatly expands the scope of their liberal perspective and make the Neo-Liberal strand
the most diverse within the paradigm. Singling out Neo-Liberal Institutionalism should offer a
good and, maybe even more important, broad understanding of how evolutionary theory is
reflected in the liberal paradigm.
7. Ibid.
8. Scott Burchill, Liberalism (Chapter Three) in: Scott Burchill, Jack Donnelly, Andrew Linklater, et al, Theories
of International Relations: 84.
52 | M a s t e r T h e s i s
Neo-liberal institutionalism is the predominant strand of contemporary liberalism
which focuses, as I discussed above, on international institutions as mediators to achieve
international peace and prosperity. Central in this international peace is the need to enhance
globalization and to further spread democratic principles around the globe. What makes neoliberal institutionalism so important is the diversity the theory brings forth. Instead of holding
on to the often idealistic ideas liberalism pursues, liberal institutionalism offers realistic
assumptions on both national and international levels. From a biological perspective, neoliberal institutionalism probably is the most coherent and significant theory considering the
use of human nature—although without conscious intent—in liberal policies: on the one hand
the theory advocates cooperation on an international level and argue for some sort of
universal morality among humankind; on the other hand, neo-liberals acknowledge the neorealist ideas about the state being the most important actors in IR and their concept of
anarchy, along with the egoistic and dominant realist features.
The roots of liberal institutionalism can be found in the integration scholarship of the
1950s and 1960s. After the Second World War people accepted the idea that independent
nation-states needed to be arranged into integrated communities to enhance economic growth
and to respond properly and forcefully to regional problems. An important development in
this time was the promotion of integration theories that were "less idealistic and more
pragmatic" than the liberal propositions and measures after the First World War.9 One
example was the multilateral cooperation in the production of coal and steel: the European
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Indeed, the European Union grew out of this integration
program, something which highlights the significance of cooperation on the international
level.
The real face of neo-liberal institutionalism, however, arrived only in the 1970s and
1980s with theorists such as Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, who argued that the world had
become more pluralistic and more interdependent. As a result of this process, Keohane and
Nye argue, we experience an increasing globalization that has four characteristics: first of all
the increasing linkages among states and non-state actors; second, a new agenda of
international issues with no distinction between low and high politics; third, a recognition of
multiple channels for interaction among actors across national boundaries; and fourth, the
9. Steven L. Lamy, Contemporary Mainstream Approaches: Neo-Realism and Neo-Liberalism (Chapter Seven)
in: John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens, The Globalization of World Politics: 132.
53 | M a s t e r T h e s i s
decline of the efficacy of military force as a tool of statecraft. 10 Despite the ideas of
globalization, neo-liberal institutionalism shares many of the assumptions of neo-realism. The
core assumptions of neo-liberal institutionalism are summarized in table 3.1.
It may be clear that the theory of neo-liberal institutionalism promotes a diversity of
international policies and assumptions. On the one hand they agree with realists and neorealists on the international system of anarchy and the idea of an egoistic human nature in that
states always look first at their own self interests, even in cooperation. On the other hand, neoliberal institutionalism promotes international institutions as the mediators to achieve
cooperation in a competitive world which will eventually lead to peace and prosperity. This
means that despite taking our egoistic human nature in consideration, neo-liberals do not rule
out the potential of cooperation on an international level. The diversity within neo-liberal
institutionalism makes it a convincing challenge to neo-realism indeed.
Table 3.1. Neo-Liberal Institutionalists Key Assumptions
Neo-Liberal Institutionalism includes the following key assumptions
1. States are key actors in international relations, but not the only significant actors. Within
IR, states are rational or instrumental actors, always seeking to maximize their interests in all
issue-areas.
2. Neo-liberals agree with neo-realists that the international system is anarchic. In this
competitive environment, states seek to maximize absolute gains through cooperation.
Rational behavior leads states to see value in cooperative behavior. States are less concerned
with gains or advantages achieved by other states in cooperative arrangements.
3. The greatest obstacle to successful cooperation is non-compliance or cheating by states. In
this respect, it will be easier to cooperate in areas where states have mutual interests.
4. Cooperation is never without problems, but states will shift loyalty and resources to
institutions if these are seen as mutually beneficial and if they provide states with increasing
opportunities to secure their international interests.
Sources: David Baldwin, Neo-Realism and Neo-Liberalism: The Contemporary Debate, New York: Columbia
UP, 1993: 4-8; Steven L. Lamy, Contemporary Mainstream Approaches: Neo-Realism and Neo-Liberalism
(Chapter Seven) in: John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens, The Globalization of World Politics, 4th ed.,
Oxford: Oxford UP, 2008: 132.
10. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, Boston:
Little, Brown and Company, 1977.
54 | M a s t e r T h e s i s
Whereas neo-liberal institutionalism uses social science to create a scientific basis for
the international anarchic system—just as neo-realism does—and international cooperation
(mainly through institutions), evolutionary theory might be able to give the theory an extra
dimension. And by doing so provide liberals with a possible scientific foundation for their
argument of human and state behavior. In evolutionary terms, neo-liberal institutionalism
arguably portrays the most coherent and complete form of human nature in international
relations. By turning away from idealistic liberal views of cooperation and international
peace, neo-liberals created the space for a convincing foundation which liberalism was
lacking before. Human nature becomes more important within this basis. In chapter two,
concerning the scientific foundation of realism, I discussed how human nature is indeed much
like realists claimed it to be: human nature can be explained as egoistic and dominant through
evolutionary theory. This idea is incorporated within neo-liberal institutionalism. By
accepting the international system of anarchy, as described by Kenneth Waltz, neo-liberals
indirectly take on board a part of the realist idea of human nature.11 From an evolutionary
perspective, this move is significant to create a proper scientific foundation based on the life
sciences since biology is now advanced to such a level that it has the ability to back up the
notion of an egoistic human nature, as we have seen in the previous chapters. Just as with
realism, this enhances the theory of neo-liberal institutionalism on a scientific level without
changing the actual theory. What is more important—and makes neo-liberal institutionalism
the most coherent theory in terms of biology—is the idea that ethics (the other side of
evolutionary theory and human nature) also plays an important role in international relations,
something which realists tend to ignore.
By embracing evolutionary ethics, neo-liberals address both sides of evolutionary
theory. Although neo-liberal institutionalism promotes international cooperation through a
social scientific level (through institutions as mediators), evolutionary theory can enhance
neo-liberal theory on cooperation significantly, as we will see in the next paragraph. As I
discussed in the previous chapter, humans are able to make distinctions between possible
enemies and reciprocators through the mechanisms of dominance hierarchies and in11. Although Waltz tried to move away from human nature at the time since biology could not properly explain
human egoism, his anarchic system can be derived from the human traits of egoism and the strive for dominance
as described by classical realists. As I explained in chapter one, the concept of anarchy does not necessarily
explain why nations would behave egoistically in maximizing their security, rather than cooperate with other
nations in order to survive in the anarchic system. I argued that this maximizing could be derived from human
egoism and dominance, and that human nature provides the essential foundation of how this anarchic
international state is perceived.
55 | M a s t e r T h e s i s
group/out-group distinctions, something which is not different for realism or liberalism. This
means that evolutionary theory is able to replace the assumptions of selfishness and egoism
(and account for the anarchic international system) within the theory of neo-liberalism, very
much the same as is the case for realism. Furthermore, I argued that these identifying
mechanisms led to the creation of cooperation through human evolution, both within kinship
relations and between non-related individuals. These groups, as a state, then have the potential
to cooperate on an international level with other states. Whereas realists do not realize this
potential and maintain their pessimistic view on international relations, neo-liberals are
willing to cooperate and see institutions as the mediators to achieve this cooperation.
Although I use the strand of Neo-liberal institutionalism as a case in point to illustrate
the role of altruism in international relations, I should hasten to add that this is also visible
within the whole range of the liberal paradigm. Altruism, in this sense, is the act of
temporarily taking risks in trusting other nations and temporarily abandoning a nation‘s selfinterest by helping another nation-state. This means that evolutionary theory can support
every theory within the liberal paradigm which is both fully or partly based upon the principle
of altruism. While this may or may not be scientifically significant in the sense of the social
sciences, evolutionary theory is able to explain the ultimate cause of this internationally
altruistic behavior in which neo-liberals keep emphasizing the self-interest of nation-states.
The Role of Evolution Within International Cooperation
The mechanisms of identifying allies and enemies must have worked quite well for most of
human existence, especially in ancient times when humans lived in relative small groups.
Resources were scarce in the late-Pliocene, Pleistocene, and Holocene environments and ingroup/out-group distinctions were of the utmost importance in our survival. While these
distinctions are important concepts in explaining cooperation between smaller groups and
intrastate cooperation, as I explained in the previous chapter, they are also of central
importance for cooperation on a greater scale. The mechanisms that made group distinctions
possible have "preadapted humans for building larger, more complex alliances" (a trait is a
preadaption in biological terms when it may be put, with or without refinement by natural
selection, to uses other than those for which it originally evolved).12 This means that the
concepts of in-group/out-group distinctions and the effects of dominance hierarchies have
12. Gary R. Johnson, The Roots of Ethnic Conflict: An Evolutionary Perspective (Chapter Two), in: Patrick
James and David Goetze, eds., Evolutionary Theory and Ethnic Conflict: 29.
56 | M a s t e r T h e s i s
more far-reaching effects than the immediate survival of genes. This is hardly surprising when
we consider the living conditions of our ancestors.
As I described in chapter one, our ancestors united in small groups to solve the
problem of food scarcity by altruistic behavior. We lived in small bands of roving individuals
which were partially isolated from neighboring bands. For Richard Dawkins, these bands had
plenty of opportunities for kin altruism to evolve: "most of your fellow band members would
have been kin, more closely related to you than members of other bands."13 He continues:
"whether kin or not, you would tend to meet the same individuals again and again throughout
your life - ideal conditions for the evolution of reciprocal altruism."14 These are also ideal
conditions for reputation and generosity to evolve: genetic tendencies towards altruism made
individual survival much easier and would have been favored in early humans. After this
immense development had the earth widely populated with small organized hunting-andgathering bands at least 12.000 years ago, the groups in which our ancestors lived began to
increase.15 Together with the steady grow of units was the grow of more complex and
complicated bonds, especially between groups that lived apart. For the American social
evolutionist Robert Carneiro this is no surprise: these developments were a response to the
population pressure, ecological change, and hostilities with other groups.16 The creation of
new alliances reshaped the environments in which they formed radically. Overlapping
interests required all sorts of new tasks that needed some sort of regulation, mainly through
the growth of government, which eventually created tribes, chiefdoms, states, and empires.
This process of ―alliance expansion‖ emphasizes the enormous potential liberals see for
cooperation on an international level.
Of course, the easiest allies to make in this process are those who are connected
through kinship or through the mechanisms of kin recognition. This includes other groups into
which kin are married. Prior association is an important aspect in the strengthening of bonds
between groups, this is also the case if groups are closer to a common ancestor. As Professor
of Political Science Gary R. Johnson notes: "groups more recently fissioned from a common
ancestor group would probably be more similar in language and in a wide variety of cultural
13. Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion: 251.
14. Ibid.
15. Gary R. Johnson, The Roots of Ethnic Conflict: An Evolutionary Perspective (Chapter Two), in: Patrick
James and David Goetze, eds., Evolutionary Theory and Ethnic Conflict: 29.
16. Robert L. Carneiro, "A Theory of the Origin of the State," Science 169 (1970): 733-738.
57 | M a s t e r T h e s i s
characteristic than groups that had been separated longer."17 This does not mean that alliances
are only formed through prior association or kinship, something which could be problematic
on an international scale. Groups can achieve cooperation and create alliances with other
groups through a process that manipulates recognition mechanisms. A central example of this
process is the case of patriotism in which kin terms are fictively used to help create emotional
attachments to those toward whom one would not be naturally bonded by personal
experience.18 Within this process people will be more likely to be drawn to the other group's
phenotypic similarities rather than their phenotypic differences. As a result, groups will be
faster to cooperate with each other, as well as identifying with the out-group in question. In
the case of international relations, states will create a positive (more reciprocator) reputation
which improves the chances of altruism in evolutionary terms. I therefore propose that this
evolutionary process of alliance expansion can be centrally important to the potential of
international cooperation humans acquired through the evolution of dominance hierarchies
and in-group/out-group distinctions.
From a biological perspective, international cooperation between different states could
be considered the result of active alliance-building in which kin recognition and reciprocity
mechanisms play important roles. The continuous growth of cooperation units was
accompanied by the need to regulate the increase of overlapping interests within and between
the groups. On an international level this is not any different. By calling on institutions neoliberals want to form an authority which could act as a sort of international government. If
such authorities are in place, liberals are more at ease to use kin recognition techniques to
emphasize phenotypic similarities to achieve actual cooperation. One example is the
democratic peace theory within the liberalism paradigm, in which states point at their shared
political and historic features. Reputation also plays an important role in this process, as it
helps to create a bond with other nation-states. Altruism is visible in the reciprocity-based
mechanisms on the international level: neo-liberals state that nation-states will shift loyalty
and resources to institutions if these are seen as mutually beneficial and if they provide states
17. Gary R. Johnson, The Roots of Ethnic Conflict: An Evolutionary Perspective (Chapter Two), in: Patrick
James and David Goetze, eds., Evolutionary Theory and Ethnic Conflict: 29.
18. Johnson, Ratwik and Sawyer, "The Evocative Significance of Kin Terms in Patriotic Speech," in: Reynolds,
Falger and Vine, eds., The Sociobiology of Ethnocentrism: Evolutionary Dimensions of Xenophobia,
Discrimination, Racism, and Nationalism, London: Croom Helm, 1987: 157-174.
58 | M a s t e r T h e s i s
with increasing opportunities to secure their international interests. 19 Seeing that alliances are
often instruments to pursue the interests of the people involved, it is not a surprise that neoliberals see cooperation at its best with mutual benefits.
Despite arguments of the most altruistic liberals, this sort of cooperation is seen
throughout the whole spectrum of the liberal paradigm. Altruism within liberal theory is
indeed an act of helping others: a nation-state knowingly accepts the risks of cooperation and
abandons their self-interests, thus exposing itself in order to help another state. Following this
altruistic act, however, is the expectation of mutual benefit since alliances pursue the interests
of the parties involved. This, of course, raises questions about the role of altruism within the
field of development aid. I will look at the mechanisms of altruism within development aid in
chapter five. What is important to note here, is that this notion of altruism emphasizes the role
of human nature in the liberal paradigm of international relations. Evolutionary theory in this
respect offers an ultimate explanation of the social concept of international cooperation within
the theory of liberalism. International cooperation can be explained through evolutionary
theory and the way kin recognition and reciprocity-based mechanisms are utilized in this
process.
Liberalism, Ethics, and Universalism: The Roots of Morality
Based on the principles of liberalism, even within the most critical strand of neo-liberal
institutionalism, we can say that liberals are less pessimistic about international cooperation
than their realist counterparts. Indeed, evolutionary theory—and especially the process of
alliance expansion—suggests that there is no reason why human beings, in particular realists,
cannot make use of the potential to cooperate on an international level organized in nationstates. Liberals, in this respect, possess over a theory which is more consistent with the
behavior we expect from human beings in general. Considering that the concepts of altruism
and our moral sense are rooted deep in our Darwinian past, we should be able to find some
sort of ethical universal basis among mankind that breaks through geographical and cultural
barriers. These universal values are important because they form the foundation of human
behavior within the theory of liberalism and complete the ultimate cause of altruistic human
behavior.
19. Steven L. Lamy, Contemporary Mainstream Approaches: Neo-Realism and Neo-Liberalism (Chapter Seven)
in: John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens, The Globalization of World Politics: 132.
59 | M a s t e r T h e s i s
The best way to discover and reveal such human values and morals is through wide
ranging experiments with real people, instead of the common thought experiments of moral
philosophers. One of the most extensive experiments in this respect is developed by Harvard
biologist Marc Hauser in his book Moral Minds: How Nature Designed Our Universal Sense
of Right and Wrong. Hauser's study draws evidence from evolutionary biology, moral
philosophy, and anthropology to explain morality as a universal grammar. A hypothetical
moral dilemma is posed and the difficulty (or the oversimplification) we experience in
answering it reveals important information about our moral sense. What makes this book
valuable, Dawkins argues, is that Hauser goes "beyond the philosophers [in] that he actually
does statistical surveys and psychological experiments, using questionnaires on the Internet,
for example, to investigate the moral sense of real people."20 The results of all these
experiments are not surprising from a biological perspective: most people reach the same
decisions and come to the same answers when faced with Hauser's moral dilemmas.
Moreover, people seem to be entirely sure about their decisions, but are not able to explain
their reasons properly. According to Hauser this is exactly what we should expect if we
indeed have a universal moral sense: "driving our moral judgments is a universal moral
grammar, a faculty of the mind that evolved over millions of years to include a set of
principles for building a range of possible moral systems. As with language, the principles
that make up our moral grammar fly beneath the radar of our awareness."21 As becomes clear
from the study, the way people responded seems largely independent from geographical
positions, culture or other dissimilarities in the phenotype. Such a universal morality is
extremely useful for liberals in backing up their optimism about the possibility of
international cooperation in a competitive world.
In Moral Minds, Hauser generally uses artificial moral dilemmas for his experiments
to reach the initial intuition of people. In real world moral dilemmas (such as the discussions
about abortion and euthanasia, among others) people will already have formed an idea and
moral judgment on the subject. This prejudiced effect is not only circumvented with the use of
hypothetical moral dilemmas, it also allows Hauser to modify and elaborate the dilemmas to
observe the effects on moral judgments. Typical of Hauser's moral dilemmas are variations
and elaborations on the classic "trolley" problem:
There is a trolley and its conductor has fainted. The trolley is headed toward five
20. Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion: 255.
21. Marc D. Hauser, Moral Minds: The Nature of Right and Wrong, New York: Harper Perennial, 2007.
60 | M a s t e r T h e s i s
people walking on the track. The banks of the track are so steep that they will not
be able to get off the track in time.22
For all of the experiments the above problem is the starting point. Within this initial
circumstance Hauser offers six classical cases of moral dilemmas. All of these cases are
modified in subtle ways to test our moral sense. The six cases are described below.
1. Bystander. Hank is standing next to a switch, which he can throw, that will turn
the trolley onto a parallel side track, thereby preventing it from killing the five
people. However, there is a man standing on the side track with his back turned.
Hank can throw the switch killing him; or he can refrain from doing this, letting
the five die. Is it morally permissible for Hank to throw the switch?
2. Footbridge. Ian is on the footbridge over the trolley track. He is next to a heavy
object, which he can shove onto the track in the path of the trolley to stop it,
thereby preventing it from killing the five people. The heavy object is a man,
standing next to Ian with his back turned. Ian can shove the man onto the track,
resulting in death; or he can refrain from doing this, letting the five die. Is it
morally permissible for Ian to shove the man?
3. Loop Track. Ned is standing next to a switch, which he can throw, that will
temporarily turn the trolley onto a loop side track. There is a heavy object on the
side track. If the trolley hits the object, the object will slow the train down, giving
the five people time to escape. The heavy object is a man, standing on the side
track with his back turned. Ned can throw the switch, preventing the trolley from
killing the five people, but killing the man. Or he can refrain from doing this,
letting the five die. Is it morally permissible for Ned to throw the switch?
4. Man-in-front. Oscar is standing next to a switch, which he can throw, that will
temporarily turn the trolley onto a side track. There is a heavy object on the side
track. If the trolley hits the object, the object will slow the train down, giving the
people time to escape. There is a man standing on the side track in front of the
heavy object with his back turned. Oscar can throw the switch, preventing the
trolley from killing the five people, but killing the man. Or he can refrain from
doing this, letting the five die. Is it morally permissible for Oscar to throw the
switch?
22. Ibid.
61 | M a s t e r T h e s i s
5. Drop Man. Victor is standing next to a switch, which he can throw, that will drop
a heavy object into the path of the trolley, thereby stopping the trolley and
preventing it from killing the five people. The heavy object is a man, who is
standing on a footbridge overlooking the track. Victor can throw the switch,
killing him; or he can refrain from doing this, letting the five die. Is it morally
permissible for Victor to throw the switch?
6. Collapse Bridge. Walter is standing next to a switch, which he can throw, that
will collapse a footbridge overlooking the tracks into the path of the trolley,
thereby stopping the train and preventing it from killing the five people. There is a
man standing on the footbridge. Walter can throw the switch, killing him; or he
can refrain from doing this, letting the five die. Is it morally permissible for
Walter to throw the switch?23
Although all the cases have the same setup, killing one individual to save the five
persons on the track, people who participated in the experiments came to different judgments
on whether throwing the switch is permissible or not. Not surprisingly, however, is the fact
that people all over the world appear to share the same judgments on the cases. As reported by
Professor of Law John Mikhail and biologist Marc Hauser, the judgments for the trolley
problem appear to be widely shared among diverse demographically populations: 1. The
bystander case is permissible; 2. The footbridge case is impermissible; 3. The loop track case
is impermissible; 4. The man-in-front case is permissible; 5. The drop man case is
impermissible; and 6. the collapse bridge case is permissible.24 What is intriguing, and
important to distinguish a universal moral basis within human beings is that morality breaks
the barriers of culture and geography. A good case in point is the adaption of the trolley
problem to the Kuna, a small Central American tribe with little to no connections to the
Western world. Hauser and his colleagues changed the "trolley problem" moral thought
experiment into more locally suitable equivalents, such as crocodiles swimming towards
canoes, and the Kuna showed the same moral judgments as the rest of the participants. 25 For
liberals, this could prove that human nature is indeed moral and altruistic next to the more
generally accepted traits of egoism.
23. All these classic cases are worked out in great detail in Marc D. Hauser, Moral Minds: The Nature of Right
and Wrong (2007).
24. John Mikhail, "Universal Moral Grammar: Theory, Evidence, and the Future," Trends in Cognitive Sciences
11, no. 4 (2007): 143-152; and Marc D. Hauser, Moral Minds: The Nature of Right and Wrong (2007).
25. Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion: 258.
62 | M a s t e r T h e s i s
By establishing a universal morality, Hauser could be of special importance regarding
the theories of liberalism. Morality in a form that is similar to grammar in language,
something which is continuously active in human beings under the radar of our awareness, is
perfectly able to influence international relations from the inside out as is indeed the case
within the liberal paradigm. By stating that all human beings indeed share a similar moral
sense, a more solid reputation is created on a scale that we have seen never before. Following
these moral thought experiments, the optimism of liberals throughout their paradigm over
international cooperation is not without a scientific basis. Whereas human nature could indeed
be termed egoistic and dominant, liberals (especially neo-liberals) are right to emphasize that
there is a limit to the extent in which people dismiss morality and altruistic behavior—as is
clearly evident within the theory of realism.
Conclusion
In this chapter I discussed the paradigm of liberalism, with special attention for the dominant
strand of neo-liberal institutionalism, and how evolutionary theory could contribute to the
scientific grounds on which liberalism is build. The main question that needed to be answered
to determine this influence was the following: to what extent is evolutionary theory able to
enhance the paradigm of liberalism within IR? By discussing liberalism and its different
strands it becomes clear that liberals are much more optimistic than their realist counterparts
on the subject of international cooperation and alliances. This optimism, however, is not
always resulting in a realistic view on international relations. Stepping away from idealism is
the theory of neo-liberal institutionalism. By accepting several realist notions, most
importantly the anarchic international system, on the one hand, and looking for international
cooperation through institutions on the other hand, neo-liberals offer a wide diversity of
policies. From a biological view, neo-liberal institutionalism could very well be the most
coherent and complete theory of international relations because it addresses both sides of
evolutionary theory. The concept of human nature is not only reflected in neo-liberal policies,
but throughout the whole liberal paradigm, as is the concept of altruism in the policies of
international cooperation. Just as realists extensively used social science to explain the deeper
idea of human nature, liberals use social science to explain their ideas of cooperation.
Evolutionary theory, however, is able to offer the ultimate cause of international cooperation.
As I discussed in the realism chapter, humans are able to make distinctions between
possible enemies and reciprocators through the mechanisms of dominance hierarchies and in63 | M a s t e r T h e s i s
group/out-group distinctions. These distinctions are important concepts in explaining
cooperation between smaller groups and intrastate cooperation but they are also of central
importance for cooperation on a greater scale. The mechanisms that made group distinctions
possible have preadapted humans for building larger, more complex alliances: the concept of
alliance expansion. From a biological perspective, international cooperation between different
states could be considered the result of active alliance-building in which kin recognition and
reciprocity mechanisms play important roles. It explains why people are altruistic within
continuously growing units, why neo-liberals need institutions, and why people are focusing
on similarities between phenotypes within the liberal paradigm.
While alliance expansion offers an excellent ultimate causation for international
cooperation and solidify the optimism of liberals, the roots of morality completes the
scientific basis for liberalism. By doing extensive moral experiments, using actual people and
gathering empirical evidence, Hauser reveals a universal morality among human beings which
could help liberals expanding their ideas. The optimism that became central in liberal theory
is not a trait without a scientific cause anymore. By emphasizing the concept of alliance
expansion, backed up with a grammar of morality within people, liberals have an excellent
opportunity to substantially enhance the substructure of their theory and benefit from the
scientific basis evolutionary theory provides on human behavior. Not only can scholars
account for the foreign policies of self-interest among states, as realists do, they now also
possess over a solid scientific basis grounded in the life sciences.
To come back to the main question of this chapter, we can say that for most liberal
theories within the paradigm evolutionary theory is able to enhance the substructures. The
extent in which this is possible depends on their use of altruism. Since human behavior is not
purely altruistic, idealistic liberal theories and ideas are less likely to find complete support
from a biological perspective: the theory of evolution itself consists of the two integrated parts
of selfishness and altruism, the extremes of human behavior. This is also true the other way
around: theories based on merely selfish traits (most likely realist theories and ideas) are
similarly less likely to be fully supported by evolutionary biology. Indeed, both egoism and
altruism can be explained through evolutionary theory and are supported by scientific
evidence. Humans, however, possess both concepts. Selfishness and morality are deeply
rooted within our nature, intertwined at their cores: we are both egoistic and helpful, strive to
dominate while being willing to share, and able to be simultaneously self-interested and
altruistic.
64 | M a s t e r T h e s i s
This duality is the reason why evolutionary biology is able to provide a more solid
basis for liberalism than it is for realism: realists, as I argued in chapter two, are pessimistic
towards international cooperation whereas liberals are open to it. This means that evolutionary
biology can assist realists on only one end of the spectrum and liberals, if they acknowledge
particular realist traits, on the whole spectrum of human nature. Especially neo-liberal
institutionalism can be identified as one of the most complete theories from a biological
perspective. By recognizing the anarchic system, the competitive behavior of human beings
and simultaneously believe in a universal morality among mankind which could be at the
basis of international cooperation; neo-liberalism can be considered the leading theory within
a new field of evolutionary liberalism.
Following from these chapters, evolutionary theory proves to be quite beneficial to the
major theories within international relations by providing them with a scientific basis which
has its roots in the life sciences. Combined with the social sciences, this makes for a wellresearched, complete field of scholarship in terms of science. Moreover, scholars are able to
criticize certain theories in terms of morality and ethics with a clear and strict framework in
the form of evolutionary theory. Next to the beneficial addition to the major theories of
international relations, we should ask ourselves if evolutionary theory is also able to enhance
the theories of the two major issues of war and cooperation within international relations. I
will look at these concepts in the following chapters.
65 | M a s t e r T h e s i s
CHAPTER FOUR: EVOLUTION, WARFARE, AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
"Essentially, combat is an expression of hostile feelings. But in the large-scale
combat that we call war, hostile feelings often have become merely hostile
intentions. At any rate, there are usually no hostile feelings between individuals.
Yet such emotions can never be completely absent from war."
Carl von Clausewitz
War is one of the key issues of the practice of international relations in our world, and has
always been a central focus of study. The nature of war is an important concept within
scholarship and has generated a large number of explanations grounded in several disciplines,
including politics, culture, and economics. Clausewitz, an influential German military
theorist, in his most notable work On War states that hostile feelings and hostile intentions are
essentially important in war.1 Whether this statement is true or not, it implicates a relation
between human nature and war. Scholars have offered many theoretical approaches to the
study of the origin of war, including the theories proposed by Samuel Huntington, Sigmund
Freud, and Kenneth Waltz. Although these studies are immensely valuable to understand the
mechanisms of war in specific circumstances, they do not answer the most fundamental
question of why Homo sapiens fight wars. I believe that Clausewitz is right in his original
idea of bringing the life sciences into the concept of war to discover its most basic origin. In
this chapter I will look at the role of evolutionary theory, and a great deal of human ecology,
in the concept of warfare. By introducing the life sciences into the concept of war, we should
be able to discover the nature of warfare in human history. Wars have been, and still are,
centrally important in human evolution and revealing its evolutionary origins could offer
scholars a greater scope of grasping the issue of warfare within the field of international
relations. The main question that needs to be answered in this chapter is the following: to
what extent can evolutionary theory help to understand the issue of warfare and ethnic
conflict in human evolution and IR?
The best way to answer this question is to begin with a quick summary of the origins
of war through the perspectives of other disciplines. Not only does this give a good overview
of the interdisciplinary emergence of war, it also shows the complexity of the origins of
1. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Project
(http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1946/1946-8.txt)
Gutenberg
eBook,
1908
[1873]:
Book
II.
66 | M a s t e r T h e s i s
warfare. In the next paragraph I will use evolutionary theory to explain the origins of war.
With war being one of the most researched issue of international relations, an evolutionary
perspective might help scholars understand war in its most basic form and predict the nature
of war more fully. The following two paragraphs will look at the role of war on an
international level and the effect of an evolutionary perspective on the origins of war on
international relations. I will examine if evolutionary theory is able to explain both the selfish
and altruistic characters we expect in evolutionary terms of war. I will end the chapter with a
conclusion in which I will point out the importance of culture in addition to evolution and will
answer the chapter's main question.
The Nature of War Outside Evolution
It should be no surprise that warfare has one of the most extensive researches among the wide
range of topics in international relations. War, after all, plays an important role in human
evolution, the creation of states, in the forming of a state's policies, and the structure of the
earth in general. The magnitude of war is not to be underestimated and its origins are of
crucial importance to reveal and understand if we are to survive in this world. Many have
studied and analyzed the origins of war from different perspectives and through various
disciplines. The most important perspectives include those of anthropology, psychology,
regime types, and the international system.2 These studies expanded the insight in the origins
of war significantly and help us to understand the mechanisms of warfare better. I will look at
the different disciplines and their explanation of the origins of war to give an indication of the
interdisciplinary emergence of war.
Anthropology is probably one of the first disciplines that took on the subject of
revealing the origins of war. Considering the basic questions of human behavior—and,
equally important, its effect on social organization—within the field of anthropology this is no
surprise. An important research in the anthropological field of warfare is the scholarship of
Professor Paleolithic Archaeology and Prehistoric Warfare Dr. Lawrence H. Keeley. In his
book War Before Civilization: The Myth of the Peaceful Savage, Keeley examines the history
of warfare in primitive societies. By thoroughly analyzing primitive strategies, tactics, and
prehistoric weapons, Keeley argues that pre-modern types of war were in fact more frequent
2. Bradley A. Thayer, Darwin and International Relations: 97.
67 | M a s t e r T h e s i s
and relatively more deadly than modern warfare between nation-states.3 By moving away
from the fixed beliefs of many anthropologists, who, according to Keeley, are holding on at
straws to explain away unambiguous evidence of warfare in North America and Europe,
Keeley is looking to put an end to the "noble savage" myth by revealing violent, warlike
behavior in prehistoric times.
The discipline of psychology takes a different approach in studying the concept of
war. Instead of focusing on the study of humanity, psychology emphasizes the study of the
mind. Many international relations scholars build upon the psychological approach to war laid
out by the Austrian neurologist Sigmund Freud. Freud argued that war results from various
motives, "some of which are openly declared and other which are never mentioned," but "a
lust for aggression and destruction is certainly among them."4 Building on Freud's work is for
example Professor of International Affairs Robert Jervis, who looks at the role of perceptions
in international relations in his book The Logic of Images in International Relations. Jervis
argues how international actors use perceptions (and maybe even more important,
misconceptions) to draw conclusions of assumed premises about the behavior of other nationstates, and how this could cause wars.5 This is also labeled the first image by Professor of
Political Science Kenneth Waltz, which operates on the level of the individual. 6 Within this
psychological approach, the most important aspect is how states frame their view on
international political issues.
The third discipline concerns the perspective of regime types within the international
sphere. This view from the level of the nation-state on international relations is known as the
second image in Waltz‘s theory.7 Scholars within the discipline of regime types emphasize the
importance of particular regimes and its effect on international relations. This means that
authoritarian states, democratic states, capitalist or socialist states, to name a few, all have
their own significant impacts on relations between nation-states and the causes of war
between them. Valuable examples are the researches of Professor of International Relations
Jack Snyder and Professor of International Affairs at Harvard Stephen Walt, that reveal how
3. Lawrence H. Keeley, War Before Civilization: The Myth of the Peaceful Savage, New York: Oxford UP,
1996.
4. Sigmund Freud, "Why War?" in Melvin Small and J. David Singer, eds., International War: An Anthology,
Homewood: Dorsey Press, 1985: 162.
5. Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton UP, 1970; and Robert
Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton UP, 1976.
6. Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War, New York: Columbia UP, 1959.
7. Ibid.
68 | M a s t e r T h e s i s
specific features of states play important roles in their decisions to go to war. Snyder focuses
directly on regime type and argues that especially authoritarian states, rather than democratic
states, are more fixed in the belief that it can gain national security through international
expansion.8 Walt's study concentrates on the effect of mass revolutions on interstate wars. He
argues that states with a revolutionary ideology (for example during the French and Russian
revolutions) seem more threatening to other countries on the international level, something
which contributes to the outbreak of wars and possibilities of interventions.9
From the perspective of the international system, we can discern some important and
influential theories which explain the origins of war: this international level is termed Waltz‘s
third image of international relations in which Waltz also describes the concept of warfare.10
The most influential systemic perspective can be found in Kenneth Waltz's Theory of
International Politics, in which Waltz argues, among other ideas, that the distribution of
power in international relations determines whether countries are more or less likely to engage
in a great power war.11 The concept of anarchy, which I discussed extensively earlier, could
be derived from human nature and in turn serves as the main factor in determining power
balances. Another central systemic perspective is thought out by the American Professor of
Political Science John Mearsheimer. Mearsheimer is best known for his idea of "offensive
realism" in which he argues that the international system forces states to maximize their
military power in order to secure its own survival.12 The effect of these security measures then
contribute to intense security competition that can escalate to war.
It may be clear that the origins of war are explained through many perspectives in
different fields of study. This makes war one of the most extensive researched topics in
international political issues and gives us a good overview of its enormous impact within
international relations. While these explanations are of vital importance in grasping the
complex and intricate structure of war, they do not fully explain the widespread actions of
warfare in human history. Modern warfare is not principally caused by developments of, for
example ideology or imperialism. Although these relatively new concepts are vital to
understand the scope of warfare, they cannot account for the wars humans fought which
predates historical records. Evolutionary theory might fill this theoretical gap by tracing back
8. Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition, New York: Cornell UP, 1991.
9. Stephen M. Walt, Revolution and War, New York: Cornell UP, 1996.
10. Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War.
11. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics: 1979.
12. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York: Norton, 2001.
69 | M a s t e r T h e s i s
the origins of warfare within the field of human evolution, and by doing so offering scholars a
greater scope of grasping the issue of international warfare and international relations.
An Evolutionary Explanation for the Origins of War
Although war is one of the major issues international relations scholars deal with and studies
on the concept of war could easily fill a small library on its own, the evolutionary study for
warfare is one that is not fully recognized and utilized among the perspectives in which war is
studied. This does not mean that there are no significant studies which combine evolution and
warfare, the contrary. Scholars such as Peter Corning, Vincent Falger, John Strate, and,
arguably the most important, Dr. Johan M.G. van der Dennen have provided well-received
studies on the evolutionary side of war.13 Despite this scholarship, however, the evolutionary
origins of war play little to no role in the understanding of war within international relations.
As is the case with the major theories I discussed, the concept of war is primarily building on
principles grounded in social science. Again, these explanations are centrally important in
grasping the complex and intricate structure of war, but they do not fully explain the
widespread actions of warfare in human history.
Evolutionary theory provides a perspective on the origins of warfare that the major
perspectives I described above fail to emphasize: evolutionary theory acknowledges that
"warfare is an ancient human activity, predating historical records."14 This may seem a
statement of little importance, yet it reveals to be a significant notion which could improve the
concept of war within IR notably. The major implication this idea brings with it is that
evolutionary theory is able to provide an ultimate causal explanation for the origins of warfare
among groups of phenotypes. As an ultimate explanation, the perspective of evolutionary
theory improves upon the theory of, for example, Freud, where evolution is able to explain the
origin of war in our history without depending on "lusts" for destruction; and improves upon
13. A few important publications include the following: Peter A. Corning, "The Biological Bases of Behavior
and Some Implications for Political Science," World Politics 23, no. 3 (April 1971): 321-370; Vincent S.E.
Falger, "The Missing Link in International Relations Theory?" Journal of Social and Biological Structures 14,
no. 1 (1991): 73-77; John Strate, "The Role of War in the Evolution of Political Systems and the Functional
Priority of Defense," Humboldt Journal of Social Relations 12, no. 2 (1985): 87-114; Johan M.G. van der
Dennen, and V. Falger, eds., Sociobiology and Conflict: Evolutionary Perspectives on Competition,
Cooperation, Violence and Warfare, London: Chapman and Hall, 1990; Johan M.G. van der Dennen, The Origin
of War: The Evolution of a Male-Coalitional Reproductive Strategy, 2 Vols., Groningen, The Netherlands:
Origin Press, 1995; and Johan M.G. van der Dennen, "Human Evolution and the Origin of War: A Darwinian
Heritage," in Johan van der Dennen, David Smillie, and Daniel R. Wilson, eds., The Darwinian Heritage and
Sociobiology, Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999: 163-185.
14. Bradley A. Thayer, Darwin and International Relations: 99.
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ethological studies of aggression, because evolutionary theory focuses directly on the question
of evolution and warfare rather than on instincts for aggression.15 In order to provide an
ultimate causation for war, I will look at individual selection and group selection as
evolutionary explanations for warfare in Homo sapiens. The use of resources within this
explanation show how warfare is anchored in Darwinism and allow me to introduce the
evolutionary side of war to the field of international relations.
For the most part in history, humans have faced competitive environments in which
resources were scarce. The environments of the Pliocene, Pleistocene, and Holocene which I
discussed in chapter one are central to understand conflicts within and among species. In this
respect, the origin of warfare could be seen as an adaptation to the competitive environment
Homo sapiens found them in: natural selection serves as the most powerful reason why
humans preserve themselves and warfare suits this purpose very well. Successful warfare is
most likely improving a phenotype‘s survivability because it would increase the absolute
fitness of a group through acquired resources. As Hamilton suggests in his text ―The
Genetical Evolution of Social Behavior,‖ we measure not only individuals on their
reproductive success but also their genetic relatives.16 This means that groups may go to war
to acquire resources to ensure, or at least improve, the survival and reproduction of relatives
as well as the individual animal.
Indeed, resources are the key elements in the evolutionary discussion of the origins of
warfare. For both individual and group selection, warfare could be seen as the main activity to
ensure a group‘s resources and in this way secure its survival in our competitive world.
Resources in this idea are not only common materials acquired through war such as water or
food, but also concepts such as territories (for example free of predators or certain diseases),
shelter, and status are considered biological resources and are central elements to maintain the
right circumstances in which individuals are able to survive.17 I should haste to add that
warfare and the acquiring of these resources is not unique to human beings, all animals in the
animal kingdom possess the instinct for preservation of oneself and one‘s offspring. This
desire for self-preservation is able to explain the origins of warfare prior to historical records.
From the Pliocene until very recent history the majority of resources were scarce for
all humans (and indeed, we still witness product scarcity in contemporary times), this is not
15. Ibid.
16. W.D. Hamilton, ―The Genetical Evolution of Social Behavior. I & II: 17-52.
17. Bobbi S. Low, ―An Evolutionary Perspective on War,‖ in William Zimmerman and Harold K. Jacobson,
eds., Behavior, Culture, and Conflict in World Politics, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993: 24.
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only due a certain amount of resources but also includes the availability through tolerance of
other groups which makes scarcity both relative and absolute.18 Among stretching one‘s own
resources, seeking alternative resources, or acquiring resources outside one‘s territory through
migration, warfare is one of the major strategies adopted to expand a group‘s available
resources. In the right circumstances, which most of the time consists largely of success in
attack and winning a battle or war, an individual (but also a group) becomes fitter by taking
resources of others in war.19
While this aggressive concept of war is the most common one, it also works the other
way around. Warfare can also be waged for various defensive reasons, for example the
defense of one‘s own resources from the advances of other groups. This is no surprise if we
follow E.O. Wilson‘s point when he states that humans will fight wars when ―they and their
closest relatives stand to gain long-term reproductive success.‖20 This means that warfare is
most likely when the possible reproductive rewards are high, for example in battles which are
expected to be won or in simply defending one‘s own acquired resources from aggressive
intentions fueled by the desire for self-preservation in other groups. For Wilson this is an
example that ―despite appearances to the contrary, warfare may be just one example of the
rule that cultural practices are generally adaptive in a Darwinian sense.‖ 21 Evolutionary
theory, then, according to Thayer, expects that humans would ―possess specific behavioral
traits that contributed to fitness in the past, such as a desire to fight to gain the resources
necessary so that the individual, his family, and extended family group would continue to
survive, or to defend those resources from others.‖22 In this context, warfare could be
explained through evolutionary theory, which functions as an ultimate causal explanation.
Although the acquiring and protecting of resources is one of the key evolutionary
explanations for the origins of war, this idea does not, of course, exhaust Darwinism fully.
Other important ideas, as I already touched upon in previous chapters, are exponential brain
and intelligence expansion, mating system, altruism and sociality, in-group/out-group
distinctions, and alliance expansion. All of these ideas are important developments which
might easily lead to war, or other forms of external aggression. These and similar
18. R. Brian Ferguson, ―Introduction: Studying War,‖ in Ferguson, ed., Warfare, Culture, and Environment,
Orlando, Fla.: Academic Press, 1984: 1-81, 38.
19. This idea is taken up in detail in: David M. Buss and Todd K. Shackelford, ― Human Aggression in
Evolutionary Psychological Perspective,‖ Clinical Psychology Review 17, no. 6 (1997): 605-619.
20. E.O. Wilson, On Human Nature: 112.
21. Ibid.
22. Bradley A. Thayer, Darwin and International Relations: 109.
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considerations have convinced Van der Dennen, just as E.O. Wilson argued, to develop an
―integral scenario of the evolution of hominid/human warfare which emphasizes phylogenetic
[the development or evolution of a particular group of organisms] continuity between humans
and nonhuman primates, and which does not stipulate that war is a one-time cultural
invention.‖23
Following the evolutionary perspective on warfare, evolutionary theory is able to help
us understand why humans fight over the resources they need to survive and ensure their
reproducibility. It is important to note, however, that the concepts of ecology and culture are
crucial to the evolutionary explanation. Different ecological conditions, bound to specific
areas and time periods of the human evolutionary environment had a great impact on shaping
human behavior. Culture plays an important role in understanding why groups maintain war
and how they perceive war. Aspects such as history, religion, and rituals are able to drastically
change the meaning of a war for a group. Evolutionary and cultural motivations for warfare
are intertwined and show how the problem of war, both its reasons and efforts to solve them,
is deeply anchored in general human behavior.
When evolutionary theory indicates the ultimate cause for human warfare, we should
be able to discern its two major aspects—the traits of egoism and altruism—within the area of
international relations. In the following two paragraphs I will examine the role of both egoism
and altruism within the concept of war in the field of international relations. This view on
warfare could be one that offers scholars a different view on international conflicts and
improve upon the basic understanding of warfare in general.
Selfishness In Primitive and Contemporary Warfare
Alongside the cultural and economic explanations for warfare, evolution proves to be another,
less utilized, causal explanation for warfare. Considering the idea that these cultural and
evolutionary motivations to wage war are closely connected to each other, there is a good
possibility that we would find a certain pattern within the concept of war which shows both a
selfish and altruistic character. I will first focus on the selfish character of war and how this is
reflected in primitive warfare and finally the field of contemporary international relations.
Following the evolutionary explanation for war, it becomes rather clear that the origins
of war are largely grounded in one‘s egoism. The human desire to gain and defend resources
23. Johan M.G. van der Dennen, "Human Evolution and the Origin of War: A Darwinian Heritage,": 18,
definition and emphasis added.
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to ensure survival and improve reproducibility of individuals, family, and one‘s group is
paramount in this statement. This idea is also evident in Johan van der Dennen‘s investigation
of the evolutionary origins of intergroup conflict in social carnivores and primates, which
identifies the capability to form polyadic coalitions (selfish and opportunistic cooperation
with more than one conspecific) as the necessary precondition.24 In essence, this means that
individuals are willing to form a group—with members who belong to the same species—to
increase their own chance of survival should they win the war, which in turn brings with it a
positive survival effect on the group itself. From an evolutionary perspective such motivations
could be considered the egoistic character of warfare.
In premodern societies, warfare was largely motivated by the need for resources and
by the protection of resources, as I discussed above. Again, I want to stress that the causes of
warfare through evolutionary theory are not the sole reasons humans will go to war, but I will
focus on this one set of origins here. Ethnographic studies offer an excellent documentation of
the selfish character of war which we expect from the evolutionary origins of war: almost
every tribal society has a record of warfare, they go to war frequently, and evidence shows
that premodern tribes go to war to gain resources, predominantly in the form of land, food, or
mates.25 A good case in point is the study by anthropologist Andrew P. Vayda, who studied
both the tribes of the Iban of Borneo and the Maori of New Zealand.
In these studies, Vayda examines the relationship between population size and warfare
in premodern societies. His most important finding is the chain reaction which follows the
strive for resources: in acquiring resources ―group A might expand into the contiguous
territory of group B, which in turn might lead group B to expand into the contiguous territory
of group C—and so forth until finally there would be a displacement of a group having
territory contiguous to virgin land.‖26 This theory supports the idea that conquering neighbors
was easier than actually expanding into new areas to cultivate resources. Vayda arrives at the
same conclusion: ―if the time and effort required for clearing new virgin land were
24. Johan M.G. van der Dennen, The Origin of War.
25. Keeley found that 90 to 95 percent of the primitive societies had some past or present record of warfare, in
Lawrence H. Keeley, War Before Civilization: 27-8. Among others, the study conveyed by Ember and Ember
show that 73 percent of forty-nine preindustrial societies went to war at least once every two years, in: Carol R.
Ember and Melvin Ember, ―Resource Unpredictability, Mistrust, and War,‖ The Journal of Conflict Resolution
36, no. 2 (1992): 250. In their examination of 186 preindustrial societies, Ember and Ember find that they go to
war to take resources from adversaries, especially when the society fears a natural disaster, in: Carol R. Ember
and Melvin Ember, ―Resource Unpredictability, Mistrust, and War.‖
26. Andrew P. Vayda, ―Expansion and Warfare among Swidden Agriculturalists,‖ American Anthropologist 63,
no. 2 (1961): 350.
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considerably more than were necessary for conquest and the preparation of previously used
land for cultivation, it follows that territorial conquests…would have added more efficiently
to the prosperity of particular groups than would peaceful dispersion.‖27 Following this
statement, it seems that the (selfish) process of natural selection is observable in the concept
of primitive warfare: in order to greatly increase the survivability of oneself and its kin, recall
the concept of kin selection discussed in chapter one, primitive tribes use warfare as a major
tool to acquire and defend resources. Successful wars then increase the inclusive fitness of the
surviving victors. In this sense, warfare could indeed be favored and passed on through
natural selection within the premodern societies, something which we should be able to
discover in contemporary times.
As I already touched upon earlier, we are indeed able to see the scarcity of resources in
more recent times. Most notable are the conflicts in Africa, in which food and water are the
subject of many difficulties, and the Middle East, where large reserves of oil and gas are
major reasons for political instability. In this respect, the motivations for warfare have
changed very little. Just as primitive tribes, modern states still wage war for resources. Many
of these scarce resources have stayed essentially the same: resources such as territory, water,
food, or vital geographic points still are important reasons for a state to engage in war. Other
resources, of course, have changed and are adaptive to the Zeitgeist. Critical natural resources
such as oil, gas, and petroleum were of little use to premodern societies, but are subjects of
great strategic interest in contemporary times. What cattle, trophy wives, and pandanus nuts
meant for primitive tribes, can be compared to what oil, natural gas, and other fossil fuels
mean for us.
Just as the selfish character of evolutionary theory is reflected in primitive warfare,
more recent conflicts also show why we fight over resources as is expected through the
evolution of warfare. Conflicts over territory are still common among modern nation-states. In
1969, for example, El Salvador and Honduras fought a war, which became known as the
―Football War‖ (or the ―Soccer War‖ in American English), which implies that the war was
caused due to a football game. Having analyzed the war, however, biological anthropologist
William H. Durham determined that the causes of the war go much deeper and has its
fundamental cause in the problem of land scarcity.28 Despite this instance, among others,
27. Ibid., 348.
28. The roots of the war were issues over land reform in Honduras. This caused many immigration and
demographic problems in El Salvador, which was more than five times smaller than Honduras, but had a
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territorial conflicts are often more complex than in premodern times. By using the strategy of
alliance expansion—in which groups can achieve cooperation with other groups through a
process that manipulates recognition mechanisms, as I described in chapter three—modern
states are able to link territory to concepts such as ideology, nationalism, or the history of a
state. This development led to more complicated warfare for land, such as Hitler‘s desire for
Lebensraum as a major reason to invade the Soviet Union in 1941; the war between Egypt
and Syria against Israel in the ―1973 Arab-Israeli War‖ over territorial differences; and
conflicts and terrorism in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Northern Ireland, and Spain,
which are for the most part anchored in disputes over land.29
Next to the precious resource of land, the demand for energy becomes more important
in recent times. This process is clearly reflected through evolutionary theory in the realm of
international relations, where the control of fossil fuel resources plays an important role in
acquiring scarce resources. To improve a nation‘s survivability, states need a solid supply of
energy in order to keep their economy running. In this hunt for fossil fuels, three regions are
of notable concern due to their proven (and suspected) oil and natural gas reserves: the
Caspian Sea, the Persian Gulf, and the South China Sea, where more than fifty percent of the
world‘s oil reserves are located.30 Next to the widespread availability of fossil fuels, the
regions also experience a widespread availability of political instability and conflicts.
Conflicting interests in the Caspian Sea area are evident in the disputes and fighting between
Russia, Iran, and Azerbaijan over its critical resources. The Persian Gulf region was the focus
of war in the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, in which both sides aimed at total oil control, and still
is a territory of political tension, where the United States military presence suppresses
regional conflicts. The South China Sea is regarded as Asia‘s most potentially dangerous
point of conflict due to the fact that its undersea oil and gas reserves are subject to territorial
claims of virtually every country in the region, including China, Indonesia, Taiwan, Vietnam,
and Malaysia.
The selfish character of the evolutionary explanation for warfare is systematically
reflected in international relations, where resources remain an important source of
international conflict in virtually every war. The selfish behavior we expect when looking at
population that was more than double of that of Honduras in 1969. A detailed account of the war can be found
in: William H. Durham, Scarcity and Survival in Central America: Ecological Origins of the Soccer War,
Stanford, Calif.: Stanford UP, 1979.
29. Bradley A. Thayer, Darwin and International Relations: 149.
30. ―World Proved Reserves of Oil and Natural Gas,‖ U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2007.
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the theory of evolution is clearly reflected in contemporary international relations where states
still wage war for resources, very much the same as we discovered in premodern societies.
The selfish character of war in terms of evolution could give scholars a broader understanding
of war, in which cultural explanations are closely connected to evolutionary causes. The
ultimate evolutionary explanation for warfare could prove to be an important tool in
identifying area‘s in which war is more likely to emerge, mainly due recurring patterns of the
selfish behavior to acquire and defend critical resources.
Altruism, Warfare, and International Relations
Here, I will examine the altruistic principles of war. Alongside the selfish and egoistic aspect
of war, we should be able to discern some sort of morality and altruism within warfare when
following the theory of evolution. As I showed above, warfare is most of the time an
aggressive act in which the evolutionary selfish character within individuals is clearly
reflected in the way war is waged, but war also entails altruistic behavior in order to achieve
cooperation and alliance. Almost all definitions of warfare imply that there are conflicts
between certain groups or parties. This means that altruism plays a central role for all wars
being fought, since the creation of a group requires altruism and cooperation between
individuals.
Within evolutionary theory this kind of altruism, the fact that an individual would
jeopardize one‘s own life to help others instead of following one‘s self-interest, can be
explained through the concepts of inclusive fitness and kin selection I discussed in chapter
one. Recall that individuals are motivated to maximize inclusive fitness rather than personal
survival and reproducibility to enhance the fitness of close relatives who share the same
genes, through natural selection, by common descent.
Of course, the first instance in which altruism can be found is among every individual
in the combating groups. The ideas of inclusive fitness and, more specifically, kin selection
―provide an ultimate, evolutionary rationale for anticipating origins of ―self-sacrifice to the
death.‖‖31 The motivation to fight for one‘s country, however, could also have its roots in the
concept of alliance expansion, an idea that complements both inclusive fitness and kin
31. R. Paul Shaw and Yuwa Wong, Genetic Seeds of Warfare: Evolution, Nationalism, and Patriotism, New
York: Routledge, 1989: 31.
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selection in terms of group selection.32 While the role of altruism within a nation‘s army is
certainly one of great importance, I will examine the concept of altruism on an international
level, more accurately the degree of reciprocal altruism between tribes and modern nations in
times of warfare.
We have seen that contemporary warfare is still very much the same as the wars
fought in primitive societies in terms of interests and strategies. Just as premodern societies
were very much aware of their own interests, they are also acutely perceptive of their relative
power as well as those of their neighbors. In order to increase their relative power, tribal
societies seek allies to improve the chance of success in certain wars and conflicts, very much
like contemporary states do in international relations today.33 An example of such a creative
alliance can be found among the Mae Enga of the western highlands of New Guinea. In his
study of the Mae Enga, anthropologist Mervyn Meggit identified a mechanism in which the
Mae Enga enter into an alliance with another, often related, clan to divide the territory of the
targeted clan between them.34 This approach shares a lot of ideological notions with our
concept of Realpolitik, in which politics (or diplomacy) is largely based on power
considerations. Indeed, this type of altruism is geared towards a form of reciprocal altruism in
which the group who initiated the alliance will reap the benefits in the end, so that temporarily
giving up one‘s self-interest will improve the survivability of his or her clan. R. Paul Shaw
and Yuwa Wong capture the spirit of altruism within evolution distinctively when they note
that this is a ―rationale for apparent altruism within groups,‖ as we indeed came to expect
through the process of natural selection, which is also explained in chapter one.35
Just as in premodern societies, alliance formation to tackle problems caused by
warfare is still an important altruistic principle within contemporary international relations.
This is most notably reflected by instances based on military agreements such as the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which is an intergovernmental alliance where member
states sacrifice certain self-interests—for instance by shaping regional laws to which national
laws must concede—and by doing so form a solid union and work close together in times of
32. As I already touched upon in chapter three, the concept of alliance expansion is especially useful in the
understanding of nationalism and patriotism. The motivation to die for one‘s country could very well be ignited
through alliance expansion, in which nation-states create an ideology which unites its inhabitants under one ingroup.
33. Bradley A. Thayer, Darwin and International Relations: 100.
34. Mervyn Meggit, Blood is Their Argument: Warfare among the Mae Enga Tribesmen of the New Guinea
Highlands, Palo Alto, Calif.: Mayfield Publishing, 1977: 34-36.
35. R. Paul Shaw and Yuwa Wong, Genetic Seeds of Warfare: 25, emphasis added.
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warfare. Another important instance in which altruism is present within war, is the concept of
humanitarian intervention, where third party nation-states are acting altruistically towards the
oppressed (or otherwise challenged) country. Within the concept of war, altruism largely
works in the same way. Whereas the Mae Enga used some sort of ―divide and conquer‖
strategy by forming alliances with other clans (and thereby taking risks knowing that their
allies may be disloyal or treacherous), modern states also look for allies in times of war which
could compromise their self-interests. These compromises are largely the reason that
humanitarian interventions are rather rare endeavors within international relations. Although
the problem of trust always remains an issue for cooperation, this problem gains more
substance through the evolutionary altruist trait of reputation.
Reputation, as I discussed in chapter one, is a secondary construction within
evolutionary ethics. It is able to indirectly enhance the Darwinian survival value, in the sense
that a good reciprocator reputation could ensure cooperation. This is a significant reason for
nation-states to recognize that their reputations with their allies are an important factor for
international cooperation. Altruistic behavior in times of war could pay off in terms of further
cooperation or a better reciprocator reputation, something which will eventually have a
positive effect on a nation‘s survival rate, but also brings with it the altruistic characteristic of
jeopardizing its own self-interest in order to help others. A nation could, for example, be
forced to act against their preferences by risking its own men to back up a feeble ally. Among
the countless events in international relations, one of the best examples of such policies is the
United States decision making considering the Vietnam War.
In line with their containment doctrine to stop the spread of communism during the
Cold War, the US policy decisions to enter (and during) the Vietnam War were ones largely
based on reputation. First of all, the decision to enter the war secured US reputation as a
reciprocator and powerful, decisive capitalist democracy. As a leading Western country, the
United States were under pressure by the international community to intervene in Vietnam not
only to stop the spread of the communist ideology but also to establish their reputation as a
state which value the relations with their allies. This is also reflected in the second important
instance, in which the United States refused to leave Vietnam despite a great number of
military losses and resistance at the home front. The decision to stay could be seen as one to
save and maintain their reputation: leaving would expose the United States as weak within the
international sphere (and would possibly add another David and Goliath example to the
already huge David&Goliath-database—as indeed became the case as we know now). In this
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view, the decisions made by the US are in favor of a good international reputation where the
US is determined to help Vietnam, and by doing this show that they value the relations of
their allies, in order to build and preserve a good reciprocator reputation. Indeed, without
these policies the United States would have hurt itself in terms of reputation, thus reducing the
options of cooperation on an international scale. Something which is labeled as a negative
development in political spheres because cooperation, more often than not as we will see in
the next chapter, is used to ensure a country‘s self-interest.
Following these ideas and processes it becomes clear that the altruistic character of
evolutionary theory is clearly evident within the concept of warfare in both primitive and
contemporary times. Evolutionary theory, through the concept of altruism, is able to account
for the ultimate cause of cooperation within times of warfare, particularly the field of
reputation. The trait of altruism is best visible within a group involved in war and in the
relations of nation-states in international alliances. Whereas reciprocal altruism is an
important factor in intragroup relations, that is, soldiers, warriors, and all other combatants are
inspired to back each other up and form a solid force that is to be reckoned with; reputation
forms one of the most important altruist factors on an international level, where states
recognize the importance of a good reciprocator reputation which improves its Darwinian
survival value by ensuring cooperation with other states. By acknowledging both the selfish
and altruistic sides of war, the ultimate evolutionary origins of war, scholars are offered a
greater scope of grasping the issue of warfare within the domain of international relations.
Conclusion
In this chapter I discussed the evolutionary origins of warfare, how this affected human
evolution and how this is portrayed in contemporary international relations. The main
question this chapter wants to answer is the following: to what extent can evolutionary theory
help to understand the issue of warfare and ethnic conflict in human evolution and IR? The
first part of the answer concerns the ultimate evolutionary origins of warfare. Evolutionary
theory offers a different perspective on war, a perspective which is underutilized in the field
of international relations. Next to the settled views on war of, for example, psychology and
regime types which explain war from various cultural phenomena, the view of evolutionary
theory allow us to understand why individuals and groups engage in conflicts. The fight for
resources is able to explain war in times before written records, throughout tribes, premodern
societies, and eventually among modern nation-states. The effect of these different
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perspectives grounded in the social sciences and the life sciences on the origins of war offer
scholars a deep and complete understanding of warfare, something which is of great value
within IR.
The second part of the answer of this chapter‘s main question revolves around the idea
that evolutionary theory is able to identify areas in which war is more likely and explains how
alliances will react regarding international conflicts. As I discussed in this chapter, states still
wage war over resources such as food, water supplies, and land. These problems will become
more acute as the world‘s population keeps growing and the development of medical
technologies continue to reduce death rates. The problem of land becomes clear when we look
at the figures of the growing world‘s population. The American biologist Paul R. Ehrlich, in
his book Human Natures: Genes, Cultures, and the Human Prospect, writes that by the year
2015 land will become a more precious resource in many countries and will remain a cause of
war.36 This is especially the case in Third World countries, and specifically Africa.
The expected population grow in parts of Africa forms a central cause for human
migration in the region because it will increase the scarcity of critical resources. A pressing
problem which is expected to follow human migration in Africa is political instability in
certain regions, where ―in some cases it will even spark war by heightening competition over
scarce resources and upsetting the cultural or ethnic order within a country or region.‖37 The
fight over resources then forms the platform for dangers of a Third World environmental
conflict in which, in this example, African states are pushed and forced to direct competition
with neighboring states over shrinking water supplies, an increasing food scarcity, and a
decrease in available land.
The use of evolutionary theory as the ultimate cause for warfare should be able to help
us understand the concept of warfare to such an extent that we can even foresee the ignitions
in both intragroup and international conflicts. Of course, scarcity is not only visible among
land, food, or water, but also in concepts such as environmental degradation and the demand
for energy such natural gas, oil, and petroleum. Despite critical differences in cultural
perspectives which help to explain the particular form that resource wars take for a state,
evolutionary theory offer scholars the ultimate causal explanation which should be fully
36. Paul R. Ehrlich, Human Natures: Genes, Cultures, and the Human Prospect, Washington, D.C.: Island Press,
2000: 277.
37. John Podesta, Peter Ogden, Leon Fuerth, and Sharon Burke, ―Security Implications of Climate Scenario 1,‖
in Kurt Campbell, ed., Climactic Cataclysm. The Foreign Policy and National Security Implications of Climate
Change, Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2008: 97.
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utilized in order to foresee, regulate, and ultimately avert some warfare. For when we know
the points of ignition, measures could be implemented: knowledge still is power after all.
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CHAPTER FIVE: EVOLUTION, COOPERATION, AND FOREIGN AID
―True development requires far-reaching fundamental changes in governance and
institutions, human capacity and economic structure, so that countries can sustain
further economic and social progress without permanently depending on foreign
aid.‖
- Randall Tobias
While the concept of war may be one of the most important issues within international
relations, international cooperation and, more specifically, development aid are arguably good
contenders and also among the most discussed, complex issues at the global level. It is the
altruistic behavior on an international level which can be called strikingly fascinating.
Throughout my thesis I argued that natural selection favors behavior in which the fitness of
individuals increases, or, in the worst case scenario, does not fall behind unrelated individuals.
Even in times of war, cooperation and alliance expansion hints at certain points of selfinterest, as we have seen in the previous chapter. International cooperation, then, could be
labeled as fascinating—especially for evolutionary biologists—because altruism, by
definition, incurs a fitness cost for certain individuals. With its anchors in evolutionary theory,
it is fair to ask whether cooperation between nation-states could be explained by evolutionary
theory, just as is the case with the concept of warfare. The need for resources is always
present in human evolution, so why would states cooperate and risk losing resources? In this
chapter I will look at the evolutionary explanation for cooperation and foreign aid within the
realm of international relations. International cooperation and foreign aid have been, and still
are, centrally important in the survival of certain states. To reveal the evolutionary incentives
for global cooperation, I propose the following main question for this chapter: how can we
explain the ultimate cause of international cooperation and foreign aid through evolutionary
theory within international relations?
In order to properly answer the main question I will first offer a historic overview of
the history of altruism. The development of altruism in several philosophical discussions
might give a good insight in how the concept of altruism has evolved and what this means for
altruism in a biological sense. The next paragraph will look at the concept of altruism from
the perspective of evolutionary theory. I will explain how altruism works within evolution by
using the theories explained in chapter one, which might be able to help to understand the role
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of altruism within international cooperation and foreign aid. The following two paragraphs
will directly focus on international relations. First, I will examine global cooperation from a
biological perspective by looking at instances such as the European Union and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, and their connection to the secondary structure of reputation
concerning evolutionary ethics. Secondly, I will look at the issues of foreign and development
aid from a biological perspective. Why do First World countries spend considerable amounts
of money helping the Third World? The theories of conspicuous generosity and reputation
might be able to explain the incentives for foreign aid and the willingness to lose precious
resources. Finally, I will end the chapter with a conclusion in which I will answer the
chapter‘s main question and look at the future of international cooperation.
Altruism, A Historic Overview
Altruism is considered a traditional virtue in many cultures and a core aspect of various
religious traditions. It focuses on the motivation to help others without expecting a particular
reward. In this sense altruism can be defined as the opposite of selfishness and egoism. This
means that true altruistic acts in any interaction of an individual is a pure conflict of interests:
―to make the other better off, I must make myself worse off. Both elements must be there.‖1
Moreover, there should be no expected reward in the future which acts as an individual‘s
motivation at the time of a pure altruistic act. This, then, would not be an altruistic act, rather
it is a self-interested action in which I will benefit you today in order to receive benefits for
my actions at a later time from you or someone else. Throughout history this principle of
altruism has changed significantly in terms of meaning. Philosophical discussions had a great
impact on this change, where new ideas led to the development of mutual advantage.
Stemming from the original concept of true altruism I described above, contemporary
writers widely use the term altruism to cover the concerns of what was historically referred to
as charity, while the preferred term in the nineteenth-century English philosophy was
beneficence.2 Such changes in terminology are hinting at changes in actual meanings and
principles within the concept of altruism. This gradual change becomes evident when
considering that charity was a major part of moral philosophy several centuries ago. As I
already noted above, charity in these times was considered a virtue. Following the
1. Russel Hardin, ―Altruism and Mutual Advantage,‖ The Social Service Review 67, no. 3 (1993): 358.
2. Ibid., 359.
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philosophical discussions of for example Aristotle and leading church thinkers, what was
considered right for people held to be what gave one a good character: charity, in this idea,
was a virtue, whereas avarice was considered the contrary vice.3 Major changes in
governmental actions, however, were accompanied by the rise of beneficence, a process
which would eventually ignite the philosophical discussions concerning mutual advantage.
Due to the revenues from increasing trade opportunities, largely spawned by the
outcomes of war, and the possibility of collecting taxes directly from incomes, states created a
problem in which large groups of the population were in need of financial help. The rise of
state capacity to systematically resolve this problem was accompanied by the rise of
beneficence: governments made it their task not only to help out lower classes of society
financially, but also to protect the larger populace from crime and similar threats. This holds
that the growth of heavily urbanized, large societies led to the process in which the state took
over the functions of charity—large numbers of needy people require a system of help instead
of the original one-on-one charity actions—which can be channeled through whatever
medium might be most effective. To the extent that welfare policy is motivated by such
concerns, Professor of Politics Russel Hardin argues, it is for mutual advantage. 4 First of all
through the idea of taxing the wealthy to a margin which little affects their welfare, and
redistribute these funds to the poor which would improve their condition significantly;
secondly through the notion that the benevolent (in this case the most taxed people) can
expect a safer and more esthetic society due to the state welfare programs.
It may be clear that the original meaning of altruism has been changed in recent
decades. The concept of mutual advantage, however, is not new. The most important preeminent theorists of mutual advantage are writing as early as Thomas Hobbes to David Hume
and Adam Smith.5 Mutual advantage in Hobbes‘ Leviathan is based around the idea that the
best way to secure the personal interests of the people is to secure the general mutual interest
through establishing and maintaining general order.6 The need for an orderly government was
of such importance for Hobbes that religion actually became of secondary concern in his
ideas.
3. John of Salisbury, Policraticus: The Statesman’s Book, ed., Murray F. Markland, New York: Frederick Ungar,
1979 [1159]: 118-119.
4. Russel Hardin, ―Altruism and Mutual Advantage,‖ (1993): 360.
5. Russel Hardin, Liberalism, Constitutionalism , and Democracy, Oxford: Oxford UP, 2003: 1.
6. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. C.B. Macpherson, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985 [1651]: chapters 14, 15.
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Just as Thomas Hobbes argued almost a century earlier, the Scottish philosopher
David Hume considered the social order as an important actor to coordinate the disparate
interests of large societies: ―sometimes the interests of society may require a rule of justice in
a particular case; but may not determine any particular rule, among several, which are all
equally beneficial.‖7 It must be noted, however, that Hume argues against an egalitarian
distribution, which would be generally destructive. Instead of increasing the welfare of a
nation-state‘s citizens, egalitarian redistribution would actually reduce welfare and could
eventually lead to tyranny.8
While coordination by a sovereign plays an important role in Hobbes‘ argument, the
theories concerning mutual advantage undergo a shift after Hobbes. The ideas of the Scottish
social philosopher and pioneer of political economy Adam Smith already takes a legal order
for granted. Instead, Smith mainly focuses on the exchanges between individuals in which
mutual advantage plays an important role: people typically take part in an exchange when
every party expects to be better off after the exchange—the exchange serves our mutual
interest. This change in focus is for a large part grounded in the Zeitgeist, where Hobbes
wrote in times of chaos and Smith in a relatively stable period. What is important is that both
writers are central in the philosophical process in which mutual advantage rises at the cost of
virtue theory and true altruism.
This process is still visible in contemporary times. The most influential proponent of
mutual advantage in our time was the American philosopher John Rawls, who put forth a
theory of justice which is partly grounded in mutual advantage. Rawls theory of justice, very
briefly, means that a national economy, together with the system of distribution of wealth,
income, and privilege is essentially a joint creation by all the citizens. Therefore it must be
beneficial for everyone in order to be motivational and, eventually, just.9 I should haste to add
that this does not mean that Rawls‘s theory expects an egalitarian distribution of wealth,
rather it should be of the greatest benefit to the least-advantaged members of society. Another
recent and important process which is changing altruism from its very basis are the
sociobiological ideas which entered the discussions on morality and justice. Sociobiological
understandings of altruism and cooperation are likely to reconsider the concept and meaning
7. David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed., L.A. Selby-Bigge and P.H. Nidditch,
Oxford: Oxford UP, 1975 [1751]: 195.
8. Ibid., 193-194.
9. The theory of justice is explained in great detail in: John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard UP, 1971.
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of altruism again, which, this time, might have an impact on the understanding of
international relations.
Biological Understandings of Altruism
The principles of altruism seem to change constantly. The most obvious change, both in
meaning and practice, concerns the shift from the virtue of one-on-one charity to a principle
of universal altruism which includes oneself: the concept of mutual advantage. The extent to
which this idea is really altruism is under constant discussion. Regardless of its level of pure,
old-fashioned altruism, mutual advantage has found its place in many political, moral and
economic theories. While this concept is extensively used within economic understandings
(largely based on the theories of Adam Smith, a pioneer of mutual advantage in exchanges),
recent biological ideas have also adopted the basic ideas of mutual advantage.
As is commonly known, evolutionary theory—and in particular the process of natural
selection—always favors the genes, and thus certain phenotype behavior, which benefits the
survival of individuals. Although this may seem to favor selfish actions and behavior which
contributes to the preservation of genes, natural selection also produces helping behavior, as I
explained in chapter one. The circumstances in which altruistic behavior increases the chance
for genes to survive fall in two main categories: kinship altruism and reciprocal altruism.
Remember from chapter one that kinship altruism is the strategy in which natural selection
selects altruistic behavior that initially lowers the fitness of an individual but enhances the
survival rate of one‘s kin relations which also possess this particular gene; and reciprocal
altruism describes the process in which altruism could have evolved because it enhances an
individual‘s survivability to first incur a cost in helping others, but improves its gene survival
when the other individual returns an altruistic act.10 Especially the concept of reciprocal
altruism largely shares its basic ideas with mutual advantage. Whereas mutual advantage
possesses a solid scientific ground in the social sciences, especially the work of Adam Smith
is important in this area, it is also gradually developing scientific theories which are grounded
in the life sciences. Evolutionary theory, in particular the field of evolutionary ethics,
promotes the Darwinian reasons for individuals to behave altruistically.
10. Both processes are part of the strand of evolutionary ethics within evolutionary theory. For a more detailed
and complete explanation of the main and secondary structures concerning the concept of evolutionary ethics see
chapter one (pages 23-28).
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Evolutionary theory seems to select helping behavior and self-sacrificing actions of
individuals through natural selection. Within biological terms this means that individuals most
likely will receive some sort of benefit on a long-time process, or at least will benefit the
survival rate of its group members who, in turn, are able to secure the survival of a particular
gene set. Indeed, these premises are troublesome and not directly compatible with the
essential idea of altruism in which charity (without the expectance of any kind of reward) is
the central element. This is an important reason why the extent in which evolutionary ethics is
considered altruistic is contested. Because the biological understandings of altruism shares its
basic ideas with the concept of mutual altruism—both principles generate distinct additional
benefits for the self-sacrificing individual in one way or another—the moral questions about
the value and interpretation of altruism within these topics are also resembling each other.
The idea that the true altruistic act takes place the moment an individual practices
certain behavior, which could have a negative impact on its own survivability or self-interest
(and in the case of both mutual advantage and evolutionary ethics receiving particular benefits
for oneself at a later time, as we have seen), is also present in a biological context. Instead of
taking advantage from, to follow Hardin‘s example, a collective benefit through voluntary or
law-abiding actions, individuals within the field of biology are taking risks in order to benefit
in terms of fitness. Within the realm of kinship altruism this is seen, for example, in the
dominant hierarchy mechanisms. To reach the position of dominant status within a group of
phenotypes, an individual is required to take certain risks which places it in a reasonably
unstable position, even when the dominant position is acquired: aggression and fighting
among other group members and, when in a dominant position, the constant defending of the
alpha leader position are circumstances in which an individual incurs many risks which
threaten its fitness.11 The benefits of this self-sacrificing behavior are visible when an
individual successfully takes over the dominant position, an alpha leader has enhanced access
to mates, food, shelter, and territory which all contribute to its fitness due to an increased
chance of reproduction.12 This means that kinship altruism follows the same theoretical
direction as described by Russel Hardin in which individuals gain more from the contributions
of all (group stability, improved harvesting of resources, reproductive success) than they
initially lost from their own contribution (the task of defending one‘s own position).
12. A more detailed explanation of the mechanics of dominance hierarchies can be found in chapter one, pages
24-26.
13. Alexander H. Harcourt and Frans B.M. de Waal, eds., Coalitions and Alliances in Humans and Other
Animals.
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Within the field of reciprocal altruism this idea works largely the same way. The
major difference with kinship altruism are the phenotypes who are at the receiving end of the
altruistic act of an individual. Instead of taking risks and displaying self-sacrificing behavior
for group members that share the same genes because they are close kin relations, reciprocal
altruistic acts do not depend upon shared genes. This is an important reason why reciprocal
altruism closely resembles the theory of mutual advantage. Just as mutual advantage,
reciprocal altruism works because the initial individual which reduces its own fitness expects
to be better off when this gesture is returned by others. The American evolutionary biologist
Robert Trivers was the first who introduced the idea of reciprocal altruism to explain the
evolution of cooperation as a strategy of giving favors in anticipation of payback. 13 The
altruistic act in this principle is the same as with kinship altruism: the individual at the
moment of the altruistic behavior is threatened more in terms of fitness than it improves its
survivability. In the long term, however, the individual will likely be in a reverse situation and
will have its fitness increased through mutual altruistic acts. A clear example of such
reciprocity is seen among vampire bats, Desmodus rotundus, which maintain a system of food
sharing in which an individual bat is willing to regurgitate blood to needy bats in anticipation
of being the recipient when it find itself in critical need of blood.14 In this process, sharing
blood at cost with recipient bats has no direct apparent benefits for the altruist bat. Rather, the
donor acquires the benefits of receiving blood at a later date from other bats, which will
greatly enhance its fitness.
Evolutionary theory thus explains why group selection of an altruistic trait could have
evolved throughout history. This is reflected in the idea that groups, whose members develop
altruistic traits, may be more likely to survive than groups without such altruistic traits. As I
already discussed in chapter one and in more detail in chapter three, this is also the case for
humans, especially when considering that our ancestors united in small groups to overcome
the challenges of scarcity. Altruism could have played a central role in this process according
to Hardin: ―for the overwhelming bulk of human evolutionary history, humans may have
lived in small kin groups in which altruistic traits may have been selected through the
prevalence of more cooperative over less cooperative communities.‖15 Following these ideas,
the sociobiological understandings of altruism—kinship and reciprocal altruism—which are
14. Robert L. Trivers, "The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism," The Quarterly Review of Biology 46, no. 1
(1971): 35-57. For a more detailed account of reciprocal altruism see chapter one, page 26.
15. Gerald S. Wilkinson, ―Food Sharing in Vampire Bats,‖ Scientific American 262 (1990): 76-82.
16. Russel Hardin, ―Altruism and Mutual Advantage,‖ (1993): 361.
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central in contemporary discussions of moral and ethical theory have a great impact on human
behavior. As I touched upon in chapter three, these altruist mechanisms have preadapted
humans for building larger and more complex alliances.
Alliance Expansion Within the Biological Context of International Cooperation
The changes within the concept of altruism are clearly visible throughout human history. In
the context of the social sciences these changes largely occurred in terms of meaning and
economic (trade) advantages. Alternately, the development of an evolutionary theory of
altruism resulted in major changes on the view of phenotypic behavior. The most significant
idea which stems from this process, as we have seen, is the theory of group selection.
Evolutionary theory has become the main foundation in which altruism within
animals—including human beings—is explained. As I explained throughout this thesis,
individual traits such as egoism, dominance, and altruism spawned behavioral mechanisms
(particularly dominance hierarchies and in-group/out-group distinctions) which are central to
determine threats and opportunities to draw a line between possible enemies and
reciprocators. This means that group identification and its impact on behavior is a primordial
condition since altruism is anchored in evolutionary theory. For human beings this claim is
supported by the scientific evidence that our ancestors united in small bands, as I discussed in
chapter three, and the favoring of certain altruistic traits which maintain primary social groups
as discussed above.
The main question for the field of international relations would be why and how the
individual attachments to primordial groups, which are favored by natural selection, extends
towards greater and more complex alliances. In the paragraph concerning evolutionary theory
and international cooperation within the liberal paradigm, I already touched upon the theory
of alliance expansion. I proposed that alliance expansion could be centrally important to the
potential of international cooperation human beings acquired through certain selected
altruistic traits by natural selection—especially the evolution of group discerning
mechanisms. Here, I want to focus more on the gene-determined processes of international
cooperation.
While the mechanisms of group distinction were centrally important for our ancestors,
increasing their survival rate incredibly, it is important not to misstate the reach of natural
selection. The favoring of altruistic traits, mainly in order to maintain group structures, have
preadapted humans to operate in complex alliances. In the first place group selection has its
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use in the survivability of individuals, a process we come across again and again, but it also
enhances the emotional attachment of its group members. This emotional mechanism is an
important feature within groups, mainly because it is needed to appeal to a vague ―we-ness‖
of the group to activate moral norms [indeed, the larger the group the larger the vagueness]
according to Paul C. Stern.16 He continues by stating that group members then ―make
contributions altruistically; that is, the moral imperative outweighs or preempts considerations
of self-interest.‖17 These emotional bonds are clearly visible within groups when people risk
their own lives to save relatives, neighbors, and strangers from immediate danger.
As can be expected, these actions are rather straightforward in small groups of humans
but become more complex when the group increases in size. Several theories, including those
of Johnson, Ratwik, Sawyer, and Stern, have tilted these ideas to a national level. Central in
these ideas are the role of fictively created kin terms, often generated by state leaders, which
serve the main goal of manipulating the group identification mechanisms of people. In short,
the idea is to parallel the nation-state symbolically with family and small community
structures (which are primordial and evolved in human history), and to use this parallelization
to produce similar emotional attachments and behavior which are seen in the process of group
selection in primordial groups. Paul Stern captures this strategy convincingly: ―a function of
such metaphorical equations is that people who come to see their fellow nationals as kin or
members of a tight community feel empathy for them and sacrifice for them as they would for
real kin or community members, even to giving their lives.‖18 This means that natural
selection, through favoring group distinction mechanisms, has a great impact on modern
societies.
There is no reason why this in biologically rooted process of alliance expansion—that
is, the expansion of the members of a particular group in which people are ready to act
altruistically towards each other—cannot be lifted to the international level. Indeed, a
collaboration between different nation-states entail many different ethnicities (and therefore
different cultures, ideas, and religions), but this is not any different within the nations
themselves. Here, people are triggered so that a ‗national identity‘ wins over other identities
which are rooted, for example, in the fields of religion or race. I propose that this process is
also evident on an international level and throughout the whole spectrum of international
17. Paul C. Stern, ―Why Do People Sacrifice for Their Nations?‖ Political Psychology 16, no. 2 (1995): 228.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid., 230.
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relations: the selection of particular altruistic traits which in other circumstances were, or are
useful, are the central elements on which international cooperation is based.
To clearly explain this statement, it is useful to first illustrate the by-product idea by
using Richard Dawkins‘ ―moths-suicide‖ analogy. ―Moths fly into the candle flame,‖
Dawkins writes, ―and it doesn‘t look like an accident. They go out of their way to make a
burnt offering of themselves. We could label it ‗self-immolation behaviour‘ and, under that
provocative name, wonder how on earth natural selection could favour it.‖19 The suicides,
however, occur due to a by-product (or side effect) of the evolution of something else. In the
moth‘s case, Dawkins argues, this is their nervous system which navigates by maintaining a
fixed angle to light rays: ―insects are known to use celestial objects, such as the sun and the
moon to steer accurately in a straight line, and they can use the same compass, with reversed
sign, for returning home after an foray.‖20 Until recently the moon and bright stars were the
only sources of light in the night scene. With the addition of artificial light, in this case a
candle, moths could steer into the flame as though it were the moon at optical infinity. The
moth‘s rule of thumb, according to Dawkins, is still a good one because ―for a moth, sightings
of candles are rare compared with sightings of the moon…it never was right to call it suicide.
It is a misfiring by-product of a normally useful compass.‖21 I want to apply this by-product
idea to international cooperation.
First of all, I want to stress that the concept of international cooperation is by no
means a misfiring of a normally useful selected trait. Rather, international cooperation is a
positive development that stems from certain selected traits. To answer the question of what
these traits may be, I want to pose the hypothesis about altruism. As we have seen, human
beings needed to unite in small bands to survive the environmental and individual challenges
they faced. Evolutionary ethics played an important role in this enormous process which
would change the lives of our species forever. Cooperation increased due to the selected
mechanisms of group distinction and identification—both steered from the level of the gene—
which I propose are the particular traits central to the concept of international cooperation
This means that international cooperation could be seen as a by-product of the
altruistic traits favored through natural selection within our ancestors. Although it might seem
rather improbable that an object as small as a gene could influence something as massive and
20. Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion: 201.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
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extensive as international relations, I want to recall that the very same genes account for the
evolution of primates to Homo Sapiens. Where primordial emotions and behavior are
manipulated on a national level, our genes are also central on the international level where the
selection of altruistic traits have preadapted humans for more complex alliances. Two
important organizations in which the exploitation of genes are visible are the European Union
(EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Instead of creating an
―international identity‖, nations focus on the same ―we-ness‖ as state-leaders do only on an
international level. For both the EU and NATO this is evident in, for example, the regime
types, political and historical features of the nation-states involved. The focus on similarities
and the manipulation of gene-level altruistic traits create an external, largely socially
constructed urge to cooperate on a level in which the initial selection of altruism plays an
important role but was not originally selected for.
Following the general theory of evolution, the selection of these traits are likely to
contribute in some way or another to an individual‘s fitness, otherwise what is the point of
selecting such traits. For international cooperation these benefits are largely the same as
cooperation on smaller scales: cooperation on the international level also works with a system
of mutual advantage. Nation-states united in the European Union dynamically cooperate in
terms of politics, economics, and law without being exploited, very much like Vampire Bats
regurgitate blood. There may be no direct financial benefits for a country, nevertheless the
willingness to incur costs to help other EU countries will be rewarded at a later time when the
initial altruist needs help. Moreover, such altruistic acts of cooperation will greatly assist the
reciprocal reputation of a nation, something which is important for future cooperation.
Evolutionary Theory and Foreign Aid
Our genes are important within the realm of international cooperation. Particular selected
altruistic traits have preadapted humans to cooperate in complex, and as we have seen, still
growing alliances. While evolutionary theory is able to explain the concept of international
cooperation both in terms of selfishness and altruism, there is another major international
issue which also revolves around evolutionary ethics but works entirely different: foreign aid.
Foreign aid is most of the time considered a form of international cooperation. It
usually consists of ―economic, technical, or military aid given by one nation to another for
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purposes of relief and rehabilitation, for economic stabilization, or for mutual defense.‖22 The
main ideological difference between foreign aid and international cooperation in terms of
altruism, is that the altruist nation-state—in the case of foreign aid—acts without the
expectance of future physical benefits. In other words, reciprocity cannot directly explain why
nations are willing to share (and actually lose) resources on a global level without obtaining
benefits for themselves. Since evolutionary theory does not select pure altruistic, nor egoistic
acts, there is reason to suspect that the concept of foreign aid serves a particular role for the
altruist state. I want to address this matter and will look at the role of evolutionary theory
within the concept of foreign aid.
Development and foreign aid are fundamentally different in comparison with
international cooperation in terms of reciprocity and intentions. Or at least, this is how we
generally perceive it to be. Instead of creating an alliance in which every party will receive
particular benefits at various times, the modern concept of foreign aid is built on the idea of
assistance from industrialized nations to underdeveloped nation-states without the expectance
of repayment in wealth or power. This concept and process of assistance has its roots in the
post-World War II reconstruction: ―the success of the Marshall Plan in channeling resources
from the US to war-torn Europe convinced Western leaders that a similar transfer of resources
to newly independent countries in Asia and Africa would likewise lead to rapid
development.‖23 While this procedure appears to be rather noble and ignited by pure
altruism—the better off help the poor without future benefits, indeed much like the concept of
charity—foreign and development aid might be given in relation to other purposes. Aid, as
Professor David A. Baldwin critically points out, is just one weapon in the foreign policy
arsenal of leaders.24
Projects of foreign aid, in this sense, can be used to suit the objectives of the altruist
state. For example, people view underdevelopment in Third World nations as a result of
exploitation by sophisticated nations and see development aid as a kind of compensation; or
aid can be given as a means of supporting an ally in international conflicts. The latter
argument is evident within the project which forms the foundation of modern foreign aid: the
Marshall Plan. Here the United States sought to pull European nations toward capitalism and
23. As the term is described in the Random House Dictionary: foreign aid, Dictionary.com, Dictionary.com
Unabridged, Random House, Inc., http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/foreign aid.
24. Brent Copley, Bernard Wood, and Roger Ehrhardt, ―Foreign Aid‖, The Canadian Encyclopedia
(www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com, accessed April 24, 2011).
25. David A. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft, Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1985.
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protect them from the influence of communism, the ideology of the enemy: the Soviet Union
(who, indeed, similarly used aid to influence the politics of East-European nations). In
addition to these questionable motives of foreign aid, African Professor S.K.B. Asante lists
several other specific motives a donor may have for extending foreign aid: defense support,
market expansion, foreign investment, missionary enterprise, and cultural extension.25 Many,
if not all, of these motives are discernable to a certain extent in the history of foreign aid.
Taking this criticism of foreign and development aid into account, it is hard to
conclude whether foreign aid is actually helping underdeveloped nation-states. What we can
say, however, is that these types of aid are in no way pure altruistic acts. But, unlike common
international cooperation, foreign aid is not based on reciprocity either since donor states do
not receive direct benefits by sharing their critical resources. Reciprocity cannot directly
explain why nation-states are willing to incur fitness costs by giving to non-reciprocators such
as Third World nations. Although the use of foreign aid could prove beneficial in terms of
social science, how does the concept work within biological terms?
Clearly the altruistic act consists of the decision by advanced nation-states to assist
underdeveloped countries by sharing critical resources. Whether this is because of a feeling of
guilt or some other motive is not important. Evolutionary theory serves as the foundation for
selected behavior in which social constructions are useful to describe and explain particular
cases within such behavior. This means that foreign and development aid serve a general role
for the donor states next to the self-interested motives I described above. I propose that giving
to non-reciprocator countries, which are unable to directly return the altruistic acts of donor
states, lead to indirect benefits in biological (Darwinian) terms.
The first important indirect benefit concerns reputation building—the first substructure
of evolutionary ethics. For altruism to work properly, a good reputation is vital. As I
described in chapter one, an individual with a reputation for being generous and kind will find
that others are more willing to cooperate with. For obvious reasons, this is no different on an
international level. Foreign aid can be an important tool in acquiring such a reciprocator
reputation. Knowingly sharing critical resources as money, food, water, and technology
without the ability of the recipient to return these resources materially could be seen as an act
of charity and benevolence. For a nation-state, these kind of policies are effective in building
26. S.K.B. Asante, ―International Assistance and International Capitalism: Supportive or Counterproductive?‖, in
Gwendolyn Carter and Patrick O‘Meara, eds., African Independence: The First Twenty-Five Years,
Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1985: 251.
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up a positive reputation on an international level. The mechanism works largely the same as
on the level of the individual: a nation in an ―image-scoring‖ position shows a good portion of
goodwill and willingness to correct the wrongs on this earth, thereby potentially increasing
future cooperation through a good reputation. This means that reciprocity concerning foreign
aid takes a slightly different form in comparison with general international cooperation.
Recipient countries within the concept of foreign aid are indeed non-reciprocators in terms of
directly returned benefits, the benefit for the donor nation, however, consists of an enhanced
reciprocator reputation.
A second way in which foreign and development aid can offer indirect benefits for
nation-states is through the concept of conspicuous generosity. As described in chapter one,
conspicuous generosity is the second substructure of evolutionary ethics which promotes the
use of altruistic acts as advertisements of superiority. Within the realm of international
relations this concept of conspicuous generosity can be ascribed to foreign aid. Only the most
prosperous countries in the world are able to afford, strategically, such a costly ―gift‖ in terms
of resources. Conspicuous generosity, in this respect, can be seen as some kind of competitive
altruism in which advanced industrialized nations are taking a competitive stance towards
other wealthy nations in order to achieve social prestige in the international realm. Just as the
Arabian babbler assert their dominance by feeding subordinates and warn their groups with
signals to gain prestige within the group26—facing considerable dangers and costs towards
one‘s own fitness—nations share their tough earned resources with underdeveloped countries
to show their quality through this handicap principle. Within the handicap principle costs are
inherent and could explain the apparent squandering of fitness involved in altruistic acts. I say
apparent because acts of conspicuous generosity are generally rewarded with indirect benefits.
Conclusion
Chapter five focused on the second major issue in international relations: international
cooperation and foreign aid. To determine the role of evolutionary theory in international
cooperation I posed the following main question: in what way can we explain the issue of
cooperation and foreign aid through evolutionary theory within international relations? To
illustrate the impact of evolutionary theory I first discussed the changing concept of altruism.
Various philosophical discussions have changed the idea of altruism significantly, including
socio-biological understandings of cooperation and mutual aid. It are these biological
27. As described in chapter one, page 26.
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understandings that have radically changed the way we think about altruism and have an
enormous impact on human behavior. Evolutionary theory does not only explain why
altruistic traits could have evolved in humans, it also serves as the foundation of international
cooperation and foreign aid.
The element of altruism is clearly visible in small groups of cooperating human
beings. The tasks are rather straightforward and geared to achieve an enhanced survival value.
In the first place this process is seen among relatives in the concept of kinship altruism.
Cooperation, however, has also expanded to collaboration between non-related phenotypes.
This is generally known as reciprocal altruism. Whereas both forms of altruism are selected to
increase an individual‘s Darwinian survival value, generally by ensuring the survival of
particular genes, the way in which this is done is entirely different. While kinship altruism
emphasizes the shared genes within several generations of phenotypes (therefore sacrificing
themselves in order to enhance the survival of one‘s offspring or other group members who
possess the same genes), reciprocal altruism is based around the theory of mutual advantage.
Mutual advantage, commonly used in several economic theories and processes, explains why
individuals are willing to incur fitness costs to help other, unrelated individuals.
These two substructures of evolutionary ethics are firmly rooted in our nature, being
selected for thousands of years in order to ensure the survival of our precious genes. We
cannot turn off these instincts or consciously revolt against such behavior, it has become an
internal part of being human. Considering this idea, our genes play an important role in
national and international relations. Social constructions such as patriotism and nationalism,
as explained in several theories, make use of the selected mechanisms of group distinction and
identification in order to create a system similar to primordial groups, in which humans are
expected to act altruistically. This ―manipulation‖ of genes is also visible on the international
level.
Being preadapted for more complex alliances, together with the parallelization of
primordial groups, humans are also connected in organizations that operate internationally,
alliances between multiple nation-states. Organizations like the European Union and the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization function very much the same as the small bands in which
our ancestors united: reciprocal altruism is apparent both in direct benefits (finances and
resources) and indirect benefits (enhanced reputations). I want to stress that it is wrong to
think that the EU and NATO are direct consequences of evolution, rather they are institutions
97 | M a s t e r T h e s i s
which could be formed through particular genes that were favored by natural selection. In this
way, genes have great consequences for the realm of international relations.
This is also true for foreign aid. While there are no direct benefits involved for nationstates, something which makes the loss of resources almost unexplainable in biological terms,
foreign aid is used as a policy tool to create a system in which indirect benefits could be
expected. These benefits are expected in the field of evolutionary ethics and is twofold: first
of all nations are active in the process of reputation-building in order to create a more
reciprocator reputation; second, nation-states are establishing their position and improving
their prestige in the international world by taking part in conspicuous generosity. Both of
these concepts are important to improve future cooperation and thereby acquire direct benefits
after the loss of critical resources.
Evolutionary theory is thus able to explain not only why people cooperate in the first
place, but also accounts for the foundation of more complex institutions in which cooperation
between humans and nations plays a central role. Evolutionary theory, however, is not able to
precisely explain particular conflicts or forms of aid, instead it explains their core, their
theoretical foundation. The life sciences in this way complete the realm of international
relations. Whereas the theories of international relations are mostly explained through social
science and social constructions, it is important to keep in mind at all times that the power of
natural selection plays an important role in these ideas: for without evolution, these types of
behavior would have not taken place at all.
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CONCLUSION
International relations, it gives the impression of an enormous field of study, and not only
because it sounds kind of distant—as if individuals are way too trivial to actively contribute to
its processes. The field of international relations is indeed one of the major fields of study the
last decades, including many different disciplines and theories. Individuals, however, play
important roles in the theories of IR. The main actor in this respect is the essential topic on
which my thesis is built: evolution.
Throughout my thesis I focused on the role of evolution within the field of
international relations since IR is subject to, and deals substantially with, human interactions.
The main question which cements my theories together is the following: to what extent can
evolutionary theory contribute to some of the major theories and issues in international
relations? To answer this question I posed several secondary questions throughout each
chapter: first, what is evolutionary biology? Second, how can evolutionary theory improve the
theories posed by realists in international relations? Third, to what extent is evolutionary
theory able to enhance the theories of liberalism within IR? Fourth, how can evolutionary
theory help to understand the issue of warfare and ethnic conflict in human evolution and IR?
Fifth, can we explain the issue of cooperation and development aid through evolutionary
theory as an ultimate cause? The combination of these answers will ultimately show the
importance of evolution within the domain of international relations.
Answering Questions
In order to generate a clear and scientifically correct connection between evolutionary
biology and international relations, a strong and precise theory of evolution is paramount. In
the first chapter I explained the theory of evolutionary biology and its most important subdivision: evolutionary theory. What is important, and should be remembered at all times, is
the idea that evolution is not solely an egoistic enterprise. Of course, the process of natural
selection—as we have seen, the most important process within the concept of evolution—
works largely through the traits of egoism and dominance, in which natural selection seems to
encourage the phenotype to behave selfish in order to increase its Darwinian survival value.
Next to this selfish behavior, there are particular circumstances, as evolutionary biologist
William Donald Hamilton argues, in which genes are more likely to survive when the
phenotype behaves altruistically. This construction ultimately shows the complex character of
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us human beings: we are capable to be simultaneously selfish, but also cooperative; we are in
many ways similar to the animal world, but at the same time uniquely human; we exert
primitively rooted behavior and have acquired state-of-the-art technology at the same time.
Only if we accept and understand this complex principle of evolution, we are able to benefit
from this immensely important theory and can determine its effect on international relations.
The first instance in which I examined the influence of evolutionary theory and its
effect on international relations is within the theory of realism. When discussing the theory of
realism, it becomes clear that the human traits of egoism and dominance are central aspects
within realist theories and determine how realists perceive human and state behavior. This
behavior is first explained in classical realism, where Reinhold Niebuhr and Hans Morgenthau
argue that humans are evil from respectively theories grounded in theology and animus
dominandi—a desire for power. Although this is the first time scholars tried to explain the
international system through an ultimate causation concerning human behavior, both theories
are based upon a noumenal foundation: it is impossible for science to test whether humans are
evil. To avoid the question of human nature, Kenneth Waltz explains human behavior by
using the international system of anarchy in his theory of neo-realism: hereby creating the
first solid (social) scientific foundation within realism.
Even though Waltz moves away from human nature and grounds his theory in social
science, evolutionary theory is able to greatly enhance the ideas about human nature within
realist thinking and complement Waltz‘s theory. It is able to explain why people behave
egoistically and strive for dominance within groups. The theories of Richard Dawkins, W.D.
Hamilton, and Charles Darwin show how our genes determine phenotypic behavior in order
to survive in a competitive world. This means that evolution is able to provide realists with a
scientific basis for the assumptions made concerning human nature that is grounded in the life
sciences. Consequently, the assumptions and noumenal theories concerning human nature in
classical realism could be replaced by the scientific and ultimate explanation evolutionary
theory offers. For Waltz, this means that evolutionary biology is able to complement his
theory of neo-realism in two ways. Either the theory of evolution could be used as
complementary evidence for Waltz‘s ultimate cause of anarchy (and serve as evidence for
human nature which Waltz tried to avoid), or actually replace the socially constructed
international system of anarchy and use evolutionary theory as the essential and ultimate
cause of both the state of anarchy and realist behavior. What is important, in both cases, is
100 | M a s t e r T h e s i s
that these biological contexts account for human nature and, by doing so, create a fully
integrated theory of the life sciences and social sciences.
Without changing the essential theories, evolution complements the ideas of both
classical and neo-realists by adding scientific evidence to the substructure of realism. Within
the field of evolutionary ethics humans are preadapted to interact and cooperate in large and
complex alliances. For realists, however, cooperation is a concept with a negative
connotation: the emphasis in their ideas are on the social construction of international
anarchy. This means that realists do not fully exhaust human nature in terms of behavior, they
consciously dismiss the potential for international cooperation, while natural selection
unconsciously selects traits which provide the basis on which such cooperation is actually
possible. In order to come to a solid, complete theory of evolutionary realism this notion of
altruism is rather problematic. Evolutionary biology is able to account for the egoistic and
dominant behavior realists expect, provide a solid scientific basis for these traits, but is also
offering certain theories of altruistic behaviors which are simply ignored within the realist
paradigm. Realism, in this way, is able to benefit from evolutionary theory only partially and
for this reason enables scholars to view realism in a new light, but also shows that there is
much potential to improve its secondary structures in a biological context.
The second major theory I examined from a biological perspective is the liberal
paradigm. Liberalism is based on the other end of the international relations spectrum. Its
emphasis lies on altruism. This is one of the main reasons why liberalism is often labeled as
one of the most important competitors against realism. Liberals are optimistic about
cooperation in general, largely led by their ideas of interdependence and international
institutions. This means that liberals, very much like realists, explain their ideas of
international relations through social science and social constructions. Evolutionary theory is
able to explain the ultimate cause for cooperation within human beings. Central in this theory
are the identification mechanisms of group distinction and dominance hierarchies. These
mechanisms explain the emergence of cooperation among our ancestors in times of scarcity,
but also preadapted humans to build larger and more intricate alliances. This process of
alliance expansion has been expanded to the national level—most notably by creating a
national identity which closely resembles primordial groups—in which our selected
identifying mechanisms are manipulated. There is no reason why this process cannot be
expanded further to the international realm. Our genes have been of central importance in kin
and reciprocal altruism, something which could influence international relations from the very
101 | M a s t e r T h e s i s
first level of analysis—the gene. Together with the universal basis found in human beings all
over the world, from people in modern metropolises to primitive tribes living in the jungle,
liberals have a strong scientific basis concerning their optimistic ideas about cooperation.
In terms of egoism and dominance, liberals state that certain social constructions (in
this case interdependence) will control these traits: through cooperation everyone will be
better off. This line of thought is one of the main reasons why liberals maintain their emphasis
on altruism. Within the theory of neo-liberal institutionalism, however, the selfish side of
evolution is clearly visible and fully utilized by adapting the international system of anarchy.
Neo-liberals in this way take the middle ground and combine the evolutionary behaviors of
selfishness and altruism in their ideas. Although this theory is considered the most incoherent
theory on philosophical terms, it proves to be the most diverse theory of international relations
in terms of utilizing human nature and arguably the most accurate theory following
evolutionary biology.
Following these arguments, evolutionary theory proves to be quite beneficial for the
two major theories that dominate the field of international relations. Evolution is able to
scientifically explain the assumptions on which both theories are build. Liberalism proves to
be the most complete theory of the two. Human behavior, from the individual level to the
international level, can be explained by carefully examining biological evolution and the
effect of this process on human nature. This most significantly results in majorly enhanced
substructures for both realism (partially grounded in biology) and liberalism (in which neoliberalism is fully grounded in biology): both theories are now grounded in the social sciences
as well as the life sciences, something which creates a well-researched and complete field of
scholarship in terms of science. Moreover, scientists now possess over a clear framework—in
the form of evolutionary theory—within international relations in which they are able to
criticize, discuss, and argue about human behavior such as selfishness, morality, and ethics.
After having examined the two major theories of international relations, I focused on
the most important issue on the international level: warfare. While the subject of war knows
an extensive research database, the origins of warfare from a biological perspective are still
under scrutinized within the realm of international relations. Next to the established views of
war, most of them settled in the social sciences, the evolutionary explanation for warfare is
able to explain why individuals and groups engage in conflicts without the help of social
structures and focus directly on the origins of warfare. Central in this explanation are active
reputation building and the fight for resources which evolved in our ancestors in prehistoric
102 | M a s t e r T h e s i s
times. Without these critical resources human beings are not able to survive. War is one of the
most common ways to acquire these resources, both in offensive sense (invading and
attacking other countries in order to acquire their critical resources) and defensive sense
(defending one‘s resources against attackers). By adding this biological context of war to IR,
it becomes clear that evolutionary and cultural motivations for warfare are intertwined and
show how the concept of war is deeply rooted in general human behavior. Another important
benefit that can be distinguished by using evolutionary theory is the ability to predict wars.
Both intragroup and international conflicts, just as almost every war, are battles for resources.
This means that evolutionary theory can be important to such an extent that we should be able
to foresee the ignitions of conflicts by looking at the availability of land, water, food and other
critical resources. In this way evolutionary theory offers scholars the ultimate causal
explanation for warfare which fully utilizes the life sciences as well as the social sciences into
a single integrated theory.
In addition to warfare I also examined the second most important language of states on
the international level: international cooperation and foreign aid. These concepts, together
with warfare, cover most of the international issues within IR. Socio-biological
understandings of altruism have greatly changed the way we look at altruism and how we
perceive human behavior. Important in this respect is the idea that cooperation and foreign aid
always possesses hints of self-interest. Evolutionary theory does not only explain why
altruistic traits could have evolved in human beings, but also functions as the theoretical
foundation of international cooperation and foreign aid. Through the preadaption by
identification mechanisms and the evolution of kin and reciprocal altruism, our genes are
central in human cooperative behavior. In this respect international cooperation and foreign
aid can be seen as the result of alliance expansion where primordial group formation is
reflected on the international level. This is even more so considering that the selfish character
that was visible in ancient times is portrayed by active reputation building and acts of
conspicuous generosity between nations. The far reaching power of natural selection shaped
human behavior in such a way that even international relations could be seen as a
parallelization of individual behavior.
By using evolutionary theory, scholars posses over a new scope to study international
cooperation and foreign aid to the extent they can improve the process of alliance building.
This allows for a more transparent and just way of cooperation since the ethics concerning
reputation and self-interests are evident within cooperation and can be anticipated upon. The
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smallest unit of selection proves to be the most important and influential one: something as
small and delicate as genes are able to persuade and determine something as massive and
widespread as international relations.
From a Body of Knowledge Towards a New Way of Thinking
When we combine all these influences of evolutionary theory on the major theories and issues
within the field of international relations it becomes clear that biology, more broadly put the
life sciences, play an important role in the theories, activities, processes and ideas that we find
in IR. Evolutionary theory, in this respect, is able to structurally enhance the substructures of
both realism and liberalism without changing the actual theories; explain and predict more
precisely the origins of warfare and cooperation in order to offer scholars a complete view on
IR; and brings back the level of analysis towards the level of the gene instead of the
international level in which social structures are central. In this way evolutionary theory
complements the already existing theories and concepts which are substantially grounded in
social science within international relations. This makes for a more complete, inclusive field
of international relations which offers scholars a broad range of understanding the actions,
policies and phenomena that we constantly experience in the world.
By incorporating the advancements of the life sciences in the field of IR, we will see
that evolutionary theory complements the social sciences so that both may benefit from this
fusion. First of all, a biological context is fundamental in explaining human behavior. Human
behavior is simultaneously affected and formed by the environment, mainly through social
phenomena such as class and education, and by the genotype through the process of
evolution. In order to understand the processes within international relations we need to
emphasize the synthesis of these two major forces that determine human behavior and define
us as humans. For social science this role is rather clear: many theories in IR use social
structures to explain how nations behave on an international level—think of the system of
anarchy of Waltz and international institutions of liberals. While this approach is essential to
understand and explain the processes that are visible on the international level, a biological
approach will ultimately enhance the meaning of these social inventions. Especially
evolutionary theory will be able to explain why certain behaviors are evident in humans and
how this is reflected in international relations. By emphasizing on these biological
foundations we will create a complete explanation of human nature and human behavior.
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The second idea that plays a central role in the biological context of international
relations is a new level of analysis. The influence of Kenneth Waltz‘s Man, the State, and
War and his classic Theory of International Politics have led the theories of international
relations away from human nature. The most important outcome of this development is that
we explain IR from an international level of analysis, mostly through the social constructions
of regime types. While this is an effective way of specifying particular wars, alliances and
policies, it is not very effective in determining the ultimate cause for these issues or even
explain why nations belong to a specific regime type. Anarchy serves as the ultimate cause for
Waltz, but evolutionary biology is able to explain the behavior which essentially leads to this
state of anarchy and why states are driven to maximize their security: the traits of egoism and
the strive for dominance. Instead of this top-down approach championed by Waltz, the life
sciences offers a bottom-up approach which is built around a gene level of analysis. Natural
selection is the main process within this approach, it explains why particular behaviors have
been selected and forms the basis for many of the social structures on the international level,
including Waltz‘s system of anarchy. Such foundations are important scientific concepts
which complements the social scientific approach.
This is also the case for Waltz‘s theory. Advancements in biology are now able to
account for human behavior which leads to Waltz‘s system of anarchy. Evolutionary theory
even goes beyond Waltz‘s theory by providing a basis on which humans could cooperate on
an international level: both the selfish and cooperative aspects of human nature are explained
within the realm of Waltz‘s ideas. Without changing the essential theories grounded in the
social sciences, the life sciences can be used to benefit the field of IR as we know it. This is
also true the other way around. Whereas our genes provide the basis for human behavior and
explain the ultimate causes for the concepts in international relations, the social sciences are
crucial in explaining particular cases. Cultural, political, and economic understandings are
able to explain what different conflicts, alliances, cooperation, and hostilities mean for
different cultures and countries. In this way both sciences are forming a synthesis which
complement each other and benefits the field of international relations from top to bottom and
bottom to top.
For obvious reasons, evolutionary theory will be a permanent enhancement for
international relations scholars. In hindsight we are able to explain historical conflicts and
past alliances with the new advancements in biology. What is more important, is the fact that
our genes will continue to evolve and therefore retains its continuing influence on
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international relations. This means that we can use the life sciences to predict where conflicts
are more likely to ignite by closely monitoring critical resources, and are able to understand
the concept of different alliances more broadly. With time it is highly likely that we will
develop our understanding of evolution further. Being part of the important IR synthesis,
chances are that we will also improve our understanding within the realm of international
relations alongside new genotypic discoveries. The prospect of these developments are
thrilling. The idea that we are able to unravel more mysteries of human nature, revealing more
and more of our past which will disclose parts of our future, are processes that will have an
enormous impact on international relations. In this sense the biological context will be an
internal part of how we perceive and understand the rest of our world.
International relations is dominated by two opposite theories where selfishness stands
directly across cooperativeness. Realists and liberals are separated by their ideas and take
their stance on both ends of the international relations spectrum. There is, however, one
concept which reaches out to both sides: biology. Evolutionary theory shows that both realists
and liberals are right in their assumptions, theories, and ideas. The emphasis in both theories
are different but there is the potential of a complete and scientifically correct theory, based on
evolution, which could combine the different ideas in both camps. This means that we can
create a new theory in which both realist and liberal traits form one collective in an
completely integrated theory that is based in the social sciences, as well as the life sciences:
the evolutionary synthesis of IR. The theory employs a bottom-up approach in which our
genes functions as the most important determinants that establish human behavior and
ultimately determines international relations. In order to do this, the advancements of the life
sciences need to be accepted and incorporated in the field of international relations. This
means that we need a new way of thinking, a new way of approaching international
phenomena. Instead of only looking at theories grounded in the social sciences, we need to
remember at all times where these theories come from and what spawned this human
behavior. The IR synthesis is needed to close the gap between social and life science that is
visible within international relations studies. It is needed as a way to upgrade a body of
knowledge towards a new of thinking, as the late Dr. Carl Sagan memorably noted: ―science
is more than a body of knowledge; it is a way of thinking. A way of skeptically interrogating
the universe.‖ Only when we accept this radical change in approaching IR, the theories and
issues of international relations will be enhanced significantly and only then can we rely on
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the evolutionary synthesis of IR. International relations scholars, it is time to upgrade your set
of research tools permanently.
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