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Week 6: From World War Two to 1963
Intelligence co-operation
Nov 1940 Intelligence agreement signed: US has virtually no Intelligence capability
1943 BRUSA (Britain-USA) agreement
 ULTRA material from Enigma decrypts formally exchanged
 Co-operation in signals and personnel
1947 UKUSA agreement links signals intelligence
 GCHQ responsible for Eastern Europe, Russia east of Urals, Africa
Nuclear co-operation, discord and dependence
Britain ahead in nuclear research at the start of the war; unwilling to share with US
1942 USA ahead; unwilling to share with Britain
 FDR and WSC agree Britain will participate in Manhattan Project
1943 Quebec Agreement
 GB and USA agree not to use the bomb against each other
 No use against a third party without the consent of the other
 No sharing of atomic secrets with another nation
 Post-war commercial developments to be shared with Britain only with the consent of
the President
Sept 1944 Hyde Park agreement between WSC and FDR: co-operation to continue after the
war
15 Nov 1945 US-GB Agreed Declaration
 proposes establishment of UN Commission on Atomic Energy
 memorandum promises “full and effective co-operation in the field of atomic energy”
August 1946 McMahon Act
 forbids US Administration to pass atomic information to any other government
8 Jan 1947 British Cabinet decides to build a British nuclear bomb: tested 1952
 US appears to be reverting to isolation: can’t be relied on to defend Europe
 Britain retains conscription in peacetime (until Sandys Defence Review)
 By 1947 US troops in Europe reduced from 3.5m in 1945 to 200,000
USA reluctant to co-operate with Britain
 Britain has nothing to offer USA
 US mistrustful of Britain after capture of spies, especially Klaus Fuchs, 1950
 May 1951 defection of Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean
 USA develops h-bomb (tested 1952); Britain’s h-bomb 1957
US nuclear-armed bombers in Britain from 1947-48 Berlin Crisis onwards
 Issue of whether Britain has a veto over their use left vague
 Both powers accept that US free to use them in an emergency
Late 1950s: USA worried about Soviet missile technology
 Oct 1957 Sputnik launched: ICBM developed
1951 McMahon Act amended: limited transfer of fissile material permitted
1954 McMahon Act amended again: US and GB permitted to share data of the specifications
of each other’s nuclear devices
March 1957 Ike agrees to supply Britain with 60 medium-range (1,500 miles) Thor missiles
 Dual key firing system (both US and UK in control)
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Week 6: From World War Two to 1963
Impact of Sputnik
USA worried about ICBMs
24 Oct 1957 Eisenhower agrees to full restoration of nuclear information exchange with
Britain
1958 McMahon Act repealed
July 1958 US-UK Defence Agreement legalizes Eisenhower’s Oct 1957 concessions
March 1960 Macmillan in Washington
 US agrees to supply GB with Skybolt to replace British Blue Streak
 Skybolt prolongs the life of British V-bombers
 Britain gives US Holy Loch Polaris base
December 1962 Macmillan and Kennedy at Nassau
 US supplies Britain with Polaris missiles to carry British warheads
 British nuclear fleet assigned to NATO except if needed to defend “supreme national
interest”
Cuban Missile Crisis accelerates desire for international agreement on nuclear weapons
July 1963 Test Ban Treaty
 Testing of atomic weapons in space, under water and in atmosphere banned
Economics and trade
US anxious to use Britain’s wartime dependency to break imperial preference and sterling
area
 Wish to create a multilateral liberal world economic order
 Bretton Woods
o fixed exchange rates linked to the dollar as the reserve currency
o creates International Monetary Fund and International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development
1945 US economic muscle evident to British
September 1945 Truman ends Lend-Lease: Britain must now pay cash for goods
Keynes in Washington
 Refused a grant for Britain
 Negotiates loan deal
o US agrees to write off Britain’s Lend-Lease debt of $15bn, except for $650m
o Loan of $3.75bn at 2%, repayable over 50 years, starting in 1951
o requires convertibility of sterling within a year of loan: 1946
1947 Convertibility Crisis: Britain suspends convertibility to end run on the pound
USA increasingly accepts that it must live with the Sterling Area to allow Britain to recover
Post-War world
WSC wants traditional balance of power arrangements
 Britain at the centre of a series of regional pacts
 Maintenance of British Empire and Commonwealth supported by USA
 Anglo-American united front against Stalin
 Oct 1944 Percentages agreement with Stalin to tie him down
FDR wants a Wilsonian internationalist world order
 Creation of the UNO
 Stalin’s security anxieties must be acknowledged
 FDR anxious to avoid alienating Stalin by being too close to WSC at Teheran and
Yalta
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Week 6: From World War Two to 1963
March 1946 Churchill’s Iron Curtain speech
 Warns against Soviet Iron Curtain in Europe
 Calls for Anglo-American co-operation
The Truman Doctrine
 February 1947 British decided to pull out of Greece where they had been supporting
the royalists against the Communists because they could no longer afford it
 Communists likely to win power: supported by Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria
12 March 1947Truman outlined his new policy: the Truman Doctrine, to Congress
I believe that it must be the policy of the US to support free peoples who are resisting
attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.
Marshall Aid
By 1947 US politicians regard the communist threat to Western Europe as threat to the
security of the USA
 communist control of Eastern Europe was being firmly established;
 economic problems in Western Europe made Italy and France vulnerable to
communism;
 British politicians were warning that their economic difficulties were threatening their
ability to continue administering their zone of western Germany
5 June 1947 US Secretary of State, George Marshall, announced an aid package for Europe in
a speech at Harvard. The Marshall Plan had two aims
 political: the containment of communism in Europe;
 economic: increase the prosperity of European countries to enable them to buy US
goods
Marshall insisted that, to receive American aid, the European nations must co-operate and
draw up a comprehensive economic recovery programme
 Ernest Bevin, British Foreign Secretary, was quick to respond;
 organised 16 European nations into the Committee on European Economic Cooperation which drew up the European Recovery Programme in September 1947
The European Recovery Programme
 lasted for four years;
 by 1952 the US had provided $17 billion in aid;
 It was shared out by the Organisation of European Economic Co-operation (OEEC)
 Western European economic co-operation was extended by the founding of the
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952
 its members were Benelux, France, Italy and W. Germany
 this was the forerunner of the European Economic Community, established in 1958
The Berlin Blockade, 1948-49
Currency reform in Germany
 the West wanted a new Deutschmark to replace the almost worthless Reichsmark;
 the USSR feared the effects of a new currency in East Germany;
 the USSR also opposed the Western plan to establish a capitalist, democratic state in
West Germany
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Week 6: From World War Two to 1963
April 1948 the Soviet authorities began to disrupt road and rail communications between
Berlin and the West
24 June 1948 all land links to western Berlin were cut together with coal and power supplies
Stalin’s aims were to force the Western allies to abandon their plans for a separate West
German state and the western zones of Berlin
By early August 1948 the land blockade of West Berlin was complete
 West Berlin’s 2.5 million inhabitants seemed likely to starve
 Stalin hoped that the West would abandon the city
The Berlin Airlift, 1948-49
 USA (with British assistance) mounted a massive supply operation by air
 At one stage this meant planes landing in Berlin at intervals of less than two minutes
 July 1948 the US stationed B29 bombers (capable of delivering nuclear bombs) in
Britain
May 1949 Stalin lifted the blockade
The Berlin blockade made the formation of two German states inevitable
 15 Sept 1949 the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) created;
 7 Oct 1949 the German Democratic Republic (DDR) (East Germany) established
The formation of NATO, April 1949
US, for the first time in its history, undertook binding peacetime commitments to Europe
Article 5 of the NATO treaty
The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North
America should be considered an attack against them all.
The first members of NATO were:
 Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States;
 Greece and Turkey joined in 1952;
 West Germany joined in 1955;
 Spain in 1982
1950 Supreme HQ Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) established in Paris
Dwight D. Eisenhower was the first Supreme Commander of NATO forces
The Chinese Revolution
1 Oct 1949 October
 People’s Republic of China proclaimed by the Communist leader, Mao Zedong
 Chiang Kai-shek fled to Formosa (Taiwan) and established a nationalist regime there
The significance of the Chinese Revolution
 increased American hysteria about the spread of communism
 ‘China Lobby’ in Congress accused Truman of losing China and demanded stronger
US policies to prevent the spread of communism in East Asia
 contributed to America’s decision to fight the Korean War
 US politicians formulated the ‘domino theory’ to explain the spread of communism
 USA refused to recognise the Communist regime in China
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Week 6: From World War Two to 1963
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Taiwan regime continued to represent China in the UN until 1971
US became determined to prevent the overthrow of the Taiwan regime
January 1950 US annoyed by Britain’s recognition of Communist China
 Britain concerned that Hong Kong vulnerable
The Korean War, 1950-53
25 June 1950 Communist North Korea invaded non-communist South Korea
 North Korea was declared an aggressor by the UN
 President Truman dispatched US troops to assist the South
The Americans were successful in driving the North Koreans back
 15 Sept 1950 MacArthur’s successful Inchon Landings
 1 Oct 1950 US and South Korean troops invaded the north to try to reunite the
country
 20 Oct Pyongyang, North Korean capital, captured
26 Nov Chinese intervention on behalf of the North Koreans
Dec 1950 the Americans had been driven back to the 38th parallel
1951-53 the Korean War stalemate
July 1953 armistice was signed at Panmunjon
 US troops: 5,700,000, including 37,000 dead
 British troops: 90,000, including 1,000 dead
 Military contributions from Commonwealth
South-East Asia
1949 Puppet French-backed Vietnamese government recognised by Britain and USA
Imminent French collapse creates US dilemma
 French defeat will make Vietnam communist: Domino Theory 1954
 Unilateral US intervention will make US imperialist
Dulles wants Asian version of NATO to resist communists
Eden refuses to join until after peace conference
April 1954 Geneva Conference opens
May 1954 French defeat at Dien Bien Phu
July 1954 Geneva Accords
 Vietnam divided at 17th Parallel
 Laos and Cambodia to be independent
Dulles angry with Eden for failing to agree to resist communism
The 1956 Suez Crisis
Background to the crisis
Oct 1888 Constantinople Convention
 guarantees freedom of navigation in the Canal in peace and war
Jan 1899 Anglo-Egyptian Condominium
 establishes joint control over Sudan
Aug 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty
a) formally ends British occupation
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Week 6: From World War Two to 1963
b) British troops gradually to be withdrawn to Suez Canal Zone and Sinai
c) Britain given right of re-occupation in time of war
d)1899 Condominium re-affirmed
The background to the creation of the state of Israel
 1917 Balfour Declaration promised “the establishment in Palestine of a national home
for the Jewish people.”
 1919 Palestine became a British mandate
Jewish immigration into Palestine
 Increased as a result of Hitler’s rule in Germany
 By 1939 there were 430,000 Jews in Palestine (29% of the population)
1939 British immigration restrictions
 Britain fearful of Arab support for Hitler
 Jewish immigration limited to 10,000 a year for five years
 Arabs must consent to any further Jewish immigration after five year period
The impact of the Holocaust
 Creates widespread sympathy for the Jewish people, especially in the USA
 Oct 1946 Truman supports demand for 100,000 Jews to be admitted
 British attempts to prevent illegal immigration unpopular: Exodus
 July 1946 Jewish terrorist group Irgun blow up King David Hotel – the GB army HQ
in Jerusalem: 91 killed
Feb 1947 British government decides to hand Palestine issue over to the UN
March 1948 Anglo-Jordanian Treaty
joint defence board created, responsible for strategic planning
November 1947 UN Partition Plan
 Palestine to be divided into separate Jewish (55%) and Palestinian states (45%)
 Jerusalem to be under international control
 Jews accept the Plan; Arabs reject it
Nov 1947 to May 1948: inter-communal violence
By May 1948 Jews had captured some towns awarded to Palestine: Tiberias, Haifa, Jaffa
The Arab-Israeli War of 1948-49
14 May 1948 David Ben Gurion proclaims the existence of the state of Israel
15 May Israel attacked by Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Transjordan
 Arabs fail to co-ordinate their strategy
 Israeli Defence Force (IDF) well equipped with Czech arms
 Jordanians capture east Jerusalem
 Egyptian forces pushed out of Negev Desert
Results of the 1948-49 War
 Israel controlled 90% of Palestine
 Jerusalem divided between Israel and Jordan
 Israel has long frontiers, difficult to defend
 750,000 Palestine fled from Israeli-controlled territory and became refugees in
neighbouring Arab states
 1950 Transjordan (renamed Jordan) annexed the West Bank, occupied by its troops in
the war
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Week 6: From World War Two to 1963
May 1950 Tripartite Declaration
a) Britain, USA, France
 acknowledge Arab states and Israel needed armed forces for defence
 leads to creation of Near East Arms Co-ordinating Committee in 1952
b) de facto recognition of Middle East frontiers pending final Arab-Israeli settlement
c) any violation of these frontiers to be opposed by the 3 powers within or without the UN
July 1952 Egyptian Revolution
 Army officers, including Nasser, overthrow monarchy
 blame corrupt monarchy for defeat by Israel in 1948-49 war
new regime in Egypt
 willing to renounce claims to Sudan
 ostensible British reason for maintaining troops in Egypt withdrawn
Oct 1954 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty
a) confirms 1888 Convention
b) withdrawal of British troops from Canal Zone within 20 months
c) Canal maintained in peace time by British and Egyptian technicians
d) British troops to return to Suez Canal Base if an Arab state or Turkey attacked by any other
power (excluding Israel)
November 1954 Nasser becomes sole ruler of Egypt
 Egyptian nationalist anxious to make Egypt the dominant power in the Middle East as
leader of Pan-Arab movement
 The Philosophy of the Revolution (pub 1954) suggests Egyptian leadership of Arab
and Black African world but Nasser’s ‘Hitlerian’ ambitions probably more rhetorical
than real
 Wants to end vestiges of British imperial rule
 Regards Israel as an outpost of Western imperialism
 Sponsors Fedayeen raids against Israel from the Gaza Strip
April 1955 Baghdad Pact
a) extends defence pact signed by Iraq and Turkey in Feb 1955 by the accession of Britain
b) Pakistan joined in July and Iran in November
Project Alpha (circa Jan 1955 to circa March 1956)
 secret Anglo-American plan for a comprehensive Arab-Israeli settlement
American policy towards the Middle East prior to the Crisis
a) lingering suspicions of British imperialism
b) promote Arab unity as barrier to Soviet influence
c) pursuit of Project Alpha
d) aiming to create a regional security pact
US plans for a security pact
either a ‘Northern Tier’ of client Islamic states: Turkey, Iran, Pakistan
 without Arabs to avoid complications with Israel
or a pan-Islamic security pact to include all the Arab nations and the Northern Tier
 success of Project Alpha regarded as a prerequisite
American opposition to the Baghdad Pact: anxious not to drive Nasser into Soviet orbit US
felt that Baghdad Pact would do this if
 it was established before a comprehensive Arab-Israeli settlement were achieved
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Week 6: From World War Two to 1963
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if Nasser saw the Pact as merely a device for continued British influence in the
Middle East
Americans dislike British attempts to get its client-state Jordan to join the Pact
British policy towards the Middle East prior to the Crisis
a) Baghdad Pact designed to maintain British influence in the area
 aim to get Jordan and USA to join
b) promote Project Alpha
c) reluctant to get drawn into a Middle Eastern war on the Arab side
 Anglo-Jordanian Treaty
 Tripartite Declaration
d) suspicious of Nasser’s ambitions
 Egyptian propaganda in support of Mau Mau nationalists in Kenya
 regarded as the Hitler of the Middle East
 regarded as a potential client of the USSR
e) Eden’s domestic agenda
fears trouble from right-wing Suez Group opposed to 1954 Treaty with Egypt
criticised for lack of ‘firm government’ in Daily Telegraph article, 3rd Jan 1956
French policy towards the Middle East prior to the Crisis
a) hostile to Nasser because of his support for the Algerian rebels
b) France the principal supplier of arms to Israel
Egyptian policy prior to the Crisis
a) opposed to the Baghdad Pact as an instrument of British imperialism
b) policy towards Israel
 committed, like all Arab states, to the elimination of Israel
 support for Fedayeen terrorist raids into Israel from Gaza
 alarmed by accession of hawkish David Ben-Gurion to power in Israel in 1955
 shows some interest in Project Alpha, possibly more to string the Americans along
rather than because he was genuinely interested in the idea
c) anxious to build Egyptian economy and armed forces
 wants Anglo-American aid for building of Aswan Dam
 turns to the Eastern bloc for arms since the West unwilling to supply them, hence
Czech arms deal of September 1955
Israeli policy prior to the Crisis
a) worried that Jordan too weak to survive as a state and that Iraq will seize part of it
 Israelis possibly contemplating a pre-emptive strike in 1956 to seize the West Bank
b) anxious to stop the Fedayeen raids into Israel from Egyptian-controlled Gaza Strip
 raids had been stepped up in 1955-56
c) anxious to gain control of Sharm el-Sheikh
 controls access to the Gulf of Aqaba and the Israeli port of Eilat
d) unwilling to surrender territory to the Arabs in return for a peace treaty and recognition
 suspicious of GB-US attempts to sponsor this policy: Project Alpha
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Week 6: From World War Two to 1963
The Development of the Crisis
1955: Britain ambivalent in attitude to Nasser
a) need his support if
 Project Alpha is to succeed
 Egypt to be kept out of the Soviet orbit hence willingness to finance the Aswan Dam
with the USA: agreed 16 December 1955
b) fearful of Nasser
 ambitions in the Middle East
 his anti-colonial rhetoric and actions
USA/Britain/Israel harden their opposition to Nasser during late 1955, early 1956
a) Project Alpha collapses because
 Israelis will not surrender Negev Desert (hard-line Ben Gurion Israeli PM, Nov 1955)
 Western suspicions that Nasser had only toyed with it to gain Dam loan
 announcement of Czech arms deal
b) September 1955 Czech Arms deal announced by Nasser
 upsets arms balance achieved by Tripartite Declaration
 West fearful that Nasser now firmly in the Soviet camp
 Israel worried that arms deal signals attempted renewal of Arab war against Israel
c) British hostility to Nasser increased by
 Egyptian influence exerted on Jordon to stay out of the Baghdad Pact
 March 1956 Lt-Gen Sir John Glubb dismissed as c in c of Jordanian Army: wrongly
attributed by Eden to Nasser’s influence
USA and Britain not completely in step
a) US not keen on Baghdad Pact
 regard it as a vehicle for continued British influence in Middle East
 don’t want Iran and Jordan to join it
b) willing to leave the road open to Nasser to return to Western orbit
 Eden wants him overthrown
c) US angered by British seizure of Buraimi oasis for Trucial Sheikhdoms of Abu Dhabi,
Muscat, Oman from Saudi Arabia in Oct 1955
 Saudi Arabia’s claims supported by the US
The Crisis, 1956
19 July 1956 Dulles formally withdraws the Aswan Dam loan offer
a) doubts about Egyptian ability to finance the Dam
b) austerity in Egypt caused by higher taxes to finance Dam will be blamed on the US
c) doubts about Congressional approval
d) concern among US allies that Nasser’s blackmail gets him more aid than their friendship
e) annoyance at Nasser’s recognition of Red China, 16 May
26 July 1956 Nasser nationalises the Suez Canal Company
(Lord Blake argues that he would have done this anyway, loan withdrawal merely an excuse)
 free passage through the Canal promised
 shareholders to be compensated
British policy decided by six-man Egypt Committee
a) ‘our immediate purpose was to bring about the downfall of the present Egyptian
government’ (Egypt Committee minutes, 30 July)
b) summon conference of maritime nations to present Nasser with an ultimatum
c) military operation to follow within two weeks of the rejection of the ultimatum
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Week 6: From World War Two to 1963
Complications for Britain
a) Britain’s legal case weak
 Suez Canal Company was Egyptian: GB had insisted on this to avoid international
control; HQ in Paris; British government the principal shareholder
 Cabinet recognises Britain’s weak legal position: Cabinet minutes, 27th July 1956
b) military operation would take at least six weeks to prepare and launch
c) US government policy different from Britain’s
 Less concerned about unseating Nasser
 wants to distance itself from British imperialism
 concerned to guarantee international supervision of the Canal
 but willing to allow Egyptian control
 force only to be used as a last resort and if Nasser violates 1888 Convention
10 August British military plan Operation Musketeer presented to the Egypt Committee
 assault on Alexandria to overthrow Nasser
 to be launched by 15th September
16 August to 23 August: Lancaster House Conference of 22 maritime nations (24 invited)
 calls for an International Board to run the Canal
 only opposed by USSR, Ceylon, Indonesia, India
 Menzies (Australian PM) to present case to Nasser
9 Sept Nasser rejects Menzies’ proposal
10 Sept Egypt Committee endorses ‘Musketeer Revise’
 three days bombing of Egyptian air force
 seven days of disruption of Egyptian economy, morale, armed forces from the air
 campaign of psychological warfare
 military occupation of the Canal Zone
Occupation force might have to enter Cairo
 to install new government
 eliminate opposition to new government
British forces
 BAOR to lose one division
 strategic reserve committed to Egypt
 conscription retained
12 Sept Dulles suggests Suez Canal Users’ Association (SCUA)
a) SCUA to provide pilots and collect tolls
b) Egypt to receive compensation
Dulles may well have proposed SCUA simply to keep negotiations open and avoid conflict
British searches for invasion pretext
a) Eden hopes that SCUA scheme to take tolls from Nasser’s control will provoke him into
refusing to allow ships through the Canal and that this will provide a pretext for force
b) Operations ‘Pile Up’ and ‘Convoy’ developed
 European pilots leave the Canal, 15 Sept
 ships re-routed to Canal and Red Sea to cause congestion
 warships to force a passage when Egyptian pilots prove incompetent
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Week 6: From World War Two to 1963
Eden accepts SCUA Conference because
a) he lacks an invasion pretext
b) US hostility to the use of force
c) Labour pressure in Parliament for UN Security Council approval before force used
d) public opinion in Britain divided over the use of force
e) Commonwealth opposition to the use of force
f) Monckton (Min of Defence) uneasy in Cabinet over the use of force
19-21 Sept Second London Conference creates SCUA
British problems and complications
a) Dulles unwilling to allow SCUA to withhold dues from Nasser
 US willing to re-route ships round the Cape if Nasser won’t co-operate with SCUA
b) Egyptians prove capable of getting increased traffic through the Canal without trouble
c) Israeli raids against Jordan liable to bring Britain into war against Israel
 Defence Co-ordination Committee considers plans for simultaneous war against
Israel and Egypt
22/23 Sept British Government refers the dispute to the Security Council of the UN
Egypt prepared to be accommodating
 Nasser under financial pressure: loss of tolls of two-thirds of Canal traffic
 pressure on Nasser from Tito, India, USSR, Arab oil exporters
5 Oct UN Security Council begins consideration of Suez Crisis
10 Oct Israeli raid at Qalqilya increases the danger of Israeli-Jordanian conflict
13 Oct Tory Conference gives Eden’s firm speech an enthusiastic reception
13 Oct The Six Principles agreed at the UN
(l) There should be free and open transit through the Canal without discrimination, overt or
covert – this covers both political and technical aspects;
(2) the sovereignty of Egypt should be respected;
(3) the operation of the Canal should be insulated from the politics of any country;
(4) the manner of fixing tolls and charges should be decided by agreement between Egypt
and the users;
(5) a fair proportion of the dues should be allotted to development;
(6) in case of disputes, unresolved affairs between the Suez Canal Company and the Egyptian
Government should be settled by arbitration with suitable terms of reference and suitable
provisions for the payment of sums found to be due
Collusion with the Israelis
14 Oct Albert Gazier (Acting French Foreign Minister) and General Challe visit Chequers
16 Oct meeting of Egypt Committee at 10 Downing Street (no minutes kept)
 possibly informed of collusion plan
22 Oct Lloyd sent incognito by Eden to negotiate with the Israelis and French at Sèvres
a) Lloyd wants 48 hours between Israeli attack and British bombing of Egyptians so that
collusion is not evident
b) Ben Gurion not happy to be branded aggressor and then have Israel exposed to Egyptian
bombers
c) Lloyd willing to reduce gap to 36 hours provided Eden agrees
23 Oct British Cabinet
a) told by Eden of secret talks in Paris with the Israelis
b) but indicates that Israel now unlikely to launch a full scale attack on Egypt on her own
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Week 6: From World War Two to 1963
c) Lloyd reports that a negotiated settlement possible that ‘would give us the substance of our
demand for effective international supervision’.
23 Oct Christian Pineau (French Foreign Minister) flies to London to urge British acceptance
of collusion plan
 indicates that the Israelis were still interested (Dayan had overcome Ben Gurion’s
doubts)
 wants British officials to come to Paris to secure the deal
24 Oct Patrick Dean (Deputy Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office) and Donald Logan
(Assistant – Private Secretary to Selwyn Lloyd) sent to Paris to agree collusion terms with the
Israelis in the Sèvres Protocol
 Israeli forces to launch invasion of Egypt on 29 October
 GB and France demand ceasefire on 30 October 1956
 Egypt expected to refuse to comply
 Anglo-French forces to Egyptian forces on 31 October
 Israelis occupy the western shore of the Gulf of Akaba
 Israel undertakes not to attack Jordan
24 Oct British Cabinet identifies its choice
a) frame demands impossible for Nasser to accept
 take military action to overthrow him once he had refused
b) accept negotiated settlement
 abandon hopes of curbing Nasser’s influence
29 Oct Israeli forces attack the Egyptians in Sinai
30 Oct British and French Governments issue ultimatum to Israel and Egypt
a) to cease fighting
b) withdraw forces to a distance of 10 miles from the Canal (Israeli forces still 30 miles away)
30 Oct USA introduces Security Council resolution
 demanding Israeli withdrawal from Egypt
 calling on all UN members not to use force
 resolution vetoed by Britain and France
31 Oct
a) USA and USSR combine to call emergency meeting of the UN General Assembly
b) Egypt rejects the Anglo-French ultimatum
c) Egyptian air force destroyed by French and British air raids
d) British invasion fleet leaves Malta
 Eden had insisted that it did not leave until the ultimatum expired to avoid the
appearance of collusion with the Israeli invasion of the Sinai
2 Nov
General Assembly of the UN votes 65:5 for
 ceasefire
 withdrawal of British, French, Israeli forces
Britain agrees to creation of UN peace-keeping force to protect the Canal
Israelis complete their occupation of Gaza and Sinai
3 Nov
Israel accepts ceasefire conditions provided Egypt does the same
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4 Nov
a) Egyptians block the Canal by sinking ships
b) Nasser withdraws troops from Canal zone to protect Cairo
 makes allied airborne landings possible
c) Egypt indicates willingness to accept ceasefire, rendering invasion unnecessary
 Israeli conditional reply means that invasion can go ahead
d) Soviet forces take Budapest to crush Hungarian uprising
5 Nov
a) British and French paratroopers land at Port Said and Port Fuad
b) Soviet threat of military action against Britain, France and Israel
6 Nov
a) Eisenhower re-elected President of the USA
b) Anglo-French seaborne force invades Port Said and meets little resistance
c) Eden decides to bow to US pressure and accept ceasefire
 Eden announces to H of C at 6.00pm that ceasefire will come into force at midnight
Eden’s reasons for capitulation
a) pressure on sterling worries Chancellor of Exchequer, Harold Macmillan
b) Eisenhower’s messages condemning action (Dulles in hospital)
c) threats from the USSR
d) hostility to Britain and France in the UN
e) Israeli acceptance of the ceasefire
Eisenhower uncompromising in his hostility to Britain and France
 refuses to see Eden or Mollet
 demands unconditional withdrawal
 refuses US financial aid until unconditional withdrawal accepted
15 Nov UNEF arrives in Egypt
3 Dec Britain and France announce unconditional withdrawal from Egypt
4 Dec UNEF moves into Sinai
10 Dec Britain receives $561.5m from IMF
21 Dec US Export-Import Bank grants $500m credit to Britain
22 Dec Britain and France complete withdrawal from Egypt
5 Jan 1957 Eisenhower Doctrine
 US will use force against Communist or Soviet aggression in Middle East
9 Jan Eden resigns and is replaced by Macmillan
7-8 March Israeli troops withdraw from Gaza and Straits of Tiran
10 April Suez Canal re-opened
The impact of the Suez Crisis
Suez was decisive in hastening the end of the British Empire
 rebels in Algeria encouraged
 Nasser the hero of colonial nationalists
 USA brought into African affairs
 Egypt moves decisively into the Soviet orbit
 1957 Sandys Defence White Paper
 Macmillan becomes aware that Britain has no choice but to withdraw
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Week 6: From World War Two to 1963
The significance of Suez can be overrated
 Suez does not indicate a sharp break in imperial policy
 Iraq remains an anti-Egyptian ally until 1958
 Britain’s east of Suez defence role continues
 Macmillan and Wilson continue to assume that Britain is a great power
Suez reinforces existing policies and assumptions
 Britain must not diverge too sharply from USA
 Britain must avoid isolation in the UN
 independent military operation without US support is impossible
 any assertive foreign policy must be carefully managed
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