Download The time when interstate relations were able to fully manage the

The Sino-European energy and climate change cooperation
Author: xyz
University Affiliation: xyz
Please note that Paragraph 6 can be omitted in order to repsect the word limit
Abstract
The evolution of the energy market and the intrinsic worldwide scope of environmental
threats, such as climate change, are two elements which have pushed towards shared
approaches to global governance via bilateral institutions and international regimes.
In this paper, with the aid of an institutionalist approach, I briefly present the current status of
the EU-China relationship, which is itself characterised by high institutionalisation, and I
underline how it has progressively focused on energy and climate change-related issues.
I will then try to shed some light on the linkages between energy, environment and climate
change and how these have created the basis for the upgrade of the EU-China bilateral
relationship to its current strategic level. To do so I will underline some of the tools and some
of the outcomes of their bilateral cooperation.
Keywords: EU, China, Energy and Climate Change.
1
1. The EU-China relations from trade to climate change
The relations between China and the EU went through various phases. Snyder for example, in
its collection of official documents related to the EU-China relations, defined three
timeframes which could be seen as representing the evolution of the EU-China relationship
over time. In particular he identified a period of exploration and construction of their bilateral
ties (1995-2003), another focused on deepening and maturing of their partnership (20032006) and finally today’s period, in which the main challenge is managing partnership and
competition (2006-today)1.
Since 1978 the structural changes occurred in China with the advent of Deng Xiaoping and its
opening up policy, triggered a swift evolution of the EU-China partnership towards trade
which clearly became the driving force of their relation. The first key bilateral accord signed
by the two parties, soon after the establishment of their diplomatic relations, was in fact a
trade agreement in 19782. This was of key importance for two reasons: on the one hand it set
clearly which was the priority for their relationship in the early days, namely “to promote and
intensify” as stated in art.1. Trade was in fact of paramount importance at the time as it was
anticipated that would have helped the European countries to maintain their role in the global
markets (and thus their domestic wealth) by benefiting from low costs labour, and would have
allowed China to move towards its industrial modernisation, thanks to large investment from
Western Europe.
On the other hand, this agreement set the precedent for the development of EU-China
relations, as it created a new body to manage their relations on trade-related issues, the EEC–
1
Collection of Official documents. Snyder, Francis G. 2009. The European Union and China, 1949-2008: basic documents and commentary.
Portland, Or.: Hart Publishing. Page 309-654.
2
Trade Agreement between the European Economic Community and the People’s Republic of China OJ L123, 11.5.1978, p 2.
2
China Joint Committee, composed of both EEC (later EC and EU) and PRC representatives.
This body, which is still in place today, has been at the heart of their bilateral relations, and
might even remain so further the implementation of the new Partnership and Cooperation
Agreement, currently under negotiation3. The EEC-China Joint Committee can be considered
as the first institution created by the two parties in order to manage a common interest which,
according to art. 9 was “to monitor and examine the functioning and the implementation of
the agreement” as well as “evaluate new opportunities and make recommendations”. This
Trade Agreement was soon replaced by the Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation
(TEC)4 which was signed in 1985, and currently is the main reference point for the EU-China
relations. The TEC was a wider agreement which, as mentioned in art 1, included not only
trade but also encouraged “the steady expansion of economic cooperation”. In particular, as
mentioned in art. 10, their cooperation was to be boosted in the areas of: industry and mining;
agriculture, including agro-industry; science and technology; energy; transport and
communication; environmental protection; and cooperation in third countries.
As previously mentioned, in the coming years the TEC is expected to be replaced by a new,
wider agreement. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement has been under negotiation
since 2007, and aims at updating the overall framework of their bilateral relationship, which
in the meantime, had expanded to include 56 sectoral dialogues, as well as other high level
meetings and summits which will be discussed later.
Another set of trade-related agreements which should be mentioned are those on trade in
textile, which were concluded in 1979 and 1988 and renewed or amended at various
occasions until China’s accession to the WTO. These were then further integrated in the
Agreement on Textile and Clothing (ATC), also known as Multifibre Arrangement, which
3
According to the joint statement of the 10th EU-China summit held in Beijing in 2007, the same negotiation of the new Partnership and
Cooperation Agreement, which “will also update the 1985 EEC-China Trade and Economic Co-operation Agreement, (…) will be
administered in a relatively independent manner”.
4
Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation between the European Economic Community and the People’s Republic of China OJ L250
19.9.1985, p 2.
3
China joined in 1984. The ATC expired in 2005, even though it was finally phased out only in
2008 after the so called Bra War between the EU and China, due to the resistance of some
European Countries concerned by the flooding of cheap Chinese textile goods to the
European markets. Without going into excessive details, what it is interesting to observe for
the purpose of this study is that the accords on textile concluded between the EU and China,
were highly legalized, namely presented a high level of obligation under the form of
quantitative restrictions to import/export, a high level of precision with regards to which kind
of textile products were the object of those restrictions, and a certain level of delegation,
which increased when framed within WTO legislation. These parameters, which have been
used in IR literature to evaluate international agreements, are very relevant in order to
systematise the various institutional arrangements and frameworks which characterise the EUChina relationship5.
Other institutionalised elements of the EU-China relations which were trade related, even
though politically motivated, are the sanctions raised against the People’s Republic following
the Tiananmen incident (as it is called in China 六四 事件 literally June 4th incident), first
outlined at the European Council held in Madrid on 26-27 June 1989. While the majority of
the sanctions were soon lifted, such as the suspension of bilateral ministerial or the reduction
of programmes of cultural, scientific and technical cooperation, some remains under the so
called Arms Embargo, which was further detailed in the eight criteria of the EU Code of
Conducts on arms exports adopted on 8 June 1998.
5
For more details on this approach see Goldstein, Judith, Miles Kahler, Robert O. Keohane and Anne-Marie
Slaughter. 2000. "Introduction: Legalization and World Politics." International Organization 54(3):385-399.page
387 and 396.
4
In the meantime, several other document, such as summits joint statements and Memorandum
of Understanding were drafted, supporting China’s accession to the WTO, in the attempt,
among others, to “socialize” China to the market principles and benefits6.
This focus on trade was the result of the European Commission’s extensive competence on
trade issues and of its understanding that Asia would soon become the hub of the world’s
fastest growing economies in the coming decades: this belief was outlined in its Asia
Strategy7 which led it to start prioritising the rising of its profile in the region. Soon China
clearly stood out as the most promising economy, and thus became the main target of EU
policy efforts as demonstrated by the first China policy paper, which was calling for a
“relationship with China that reflects China’s worldwide, as well as regional, economic and
political influence.”8
From this perspective cooperating with Asia and in particular with China became a purpose in
itself, and the aim of “Raising the EU’s profile in China” became a recurrent theme in EU’s
policy papers9. To do so, since the 1980s the EU has been very much involved in proving
ODA to China (Official Development Aid), in order to boost the development of the Chinese
market by building infrastructures and fostering rural development. At the same time, thanks
to the reforms implemented since the late 1970s, and the increasing FDI to China from all
over the world, the PRC has become an economic power, and the EU-China economies are
more integrated than ever: today China is EU’s second major trading partner, while the EU is
Some scholars have explicitly studied the “socialisation” of China in international relations, and have considered socialisation as another
framework of analysis compared to, for instance, institutionalism or realism. See: Johnston, Alastair I. 2008. Social states: China in
international institutions, 1980-2000. Princeton, N.J. ; Oxford: Princeton University Press. In this work instead, socialisation is considered as
one of the long term effect of institutions.
7
Commission Communication, ‘Towards a New Asian Strategy’
8
Commission Communication, ‘A Long Term Policy for China–Europe Relations’ (1995)
9
‘Building a comprehensive partnership with China’, COM (1998) 181 final of 25.3.1998 and ‘EU Strategy towards China: Implementation
of the 1998 Communication and Future Steps for a more Effective EU Policy’, COM (2001) 265 final of 15.5.2001., European Commission.
2003. "A maturing partnership: shared interests and challenges in EU-China relations.", European Commission National Indicative
Programme, 2005–2006, China,
6
5
China main trading partner10. For instance 20,6 % of Chinese export went to the EU in 2007,
while 12,7% of imported products came from the EU. On the other hand 5,8% of EU exports
went to China and 16,7% of products were imported from China.
Following the success of the Sino-European trade relations, and since the entry into force of
the Maastrich Treaty, the EU started proposing for debate also a wide array of non-trade
related issues which today constitute a major share of the Sino-European partnership. Since
1994 their bilateral relationship started encompassing areas such as human rights,
environment, energy, development, technology and security-related issues, as the flourishing
of the sectoral dialogues has demonstrated. Trade maintained a key importance, however it
rather became the platform for their exchanges rather than the main object. This is true
especially since China’s accession to the WTO, which dramatically improved the climate for
foreign investors in China. Of course key issues remained on the agenda, such as the
protection of Intellectual Property Rights, Market Economy Status and market access in
certain sectors, however the discourse over the “strategicness” of the EU-China relations has
progressively shifted to other areas such as technology cooperation, energy, environment and
climate change as also recognized by various Chinese officials11.
China, by the end of the 1990s, started to be seen by the EU as a rising power which, as noted
in the 1998 EC communication12 “demonstrated [its] wish to be recognised as a world power”
by engaging itself in “an unprecedented series of summits between China and some of its key
world partners” 13. Its accession to the WTO in 2001, strongly supported by the EU, is a key
moment in their bilateral and multilateral relations, as it sealed China’s rightful place in the
international arena, in light of its market size and population. However the rise of China as an
10
European Commission. 2008b. "China: EU bilataral trade and trade with the world." ed. Directorate General for Trade. Brussels.
Personal discussion with two Chinese officials working at the Chinese Delegation to the European Union in Brussels (the authors of the
comments do not wish to be known).
12
Commission Communication, ‘Building A Comprehensive Partnership with China’ (1998)
13
Commission Communication, ‘Building A Comprehensive Partnership with China’ (1998)
11
6
economic giant and, increasingly, as a political power, has further shifted to east the power
balance between the EU and China, and also reshaped the kind support provided by the EU,
which between 2002-2006 shifted from ODA towards support for its social and economic
reforms, environment and sustainable development, good governance and rule of law14. Since
200215 the relations between the EU and the People’s Republic have been going through highs
and lows. For instance, the China’s EU Policy Paper in 2003, the first in its kind drafted by
China, described the relation between the People’s Republic and the European Union as “to
be better than at any time in history”16. However a few years later, scholars and think tanks
started talking about how the two players, initially on their honeymoon, had finally scale
down their expectations to those of an unhappy marriage, as “neither Brussels nor Beijing
gets what they want from each other and earlier rhetoric of allegedly ‘common values’ has
recently been replaced by a less fancy one suggesting ‘converging interests’.”17
A point that should be made, is that since China entered the WTO, which was one of the main
cards played by the EU to develop its relations with China, their relationship lost some
impetus. China was now recognized as a full member of the international community and the
EU had to find other carrots to engage China further. The Market Economy Status, the Arms
Embargo and the Science and Technology Cooperation together with EU’s flagship project
“Galileo”, were some good attempts which justified the definition of the EU-China
relationship as strategic in 2004 following the EU-China Summit in the Hague. However
these attempts to introduce a security dimension in their relationship, which also included
additional attention by the EU on China’s regional challenges, soon showed their limitations,
and either the EU or China realized that they their goals were not completely viable. This was
clear, for example, when China “acquired” the frequencies that are supposed to be used by
14
European Commission. 2002. "Country Strategy Paper: China (Commission Working document).". Page 4-5.
China acceeded the WTO on the 11 December 2001
16
People’s Republic of China. 2003. "China's EU Policy Paper ", ed. Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
17
Berkofsky, Axel 2008. "EU, China: Honeymoon is over." ISN Security Watch.
15
7
Galileo in order to use them for its own, nonetheless very similar, satellite navigation system,
or when the EU failed to lift the Arms Embargo in place since 1989, following external
pressures from the US, thus uncovered EU’s inability to act as an independent foreign policy
actor18.
As it will be dealt with in the next paragraphs, the efforts to find new areas of cooperation
able to beef up the Sino-European partnership found in energy and environment, together with
the fight against climate change, some key elements. As I argue, such a shift was allowed by
the evolution of the climate change regime, which underlined and included the negative
effects of climate change on economic growth, development, domestic welfare, international
relations and diplomacy.
2. Structure of the EU-China cooperation
Before turning to the role of international energy and climate change regimes as the elements
that allowed the further development of EU-China relations, it is worth analysing the tools of
their bilateral relationship that have allowed it to flourish to date. The frequent changes in
expectations in their bilateral relations could have in fact seriously hampered the development
of their bilateral ties should a strongly institutionalised cooperational framework not be in
place. For this reason it is important to underline the role of the various institutions in keeping
up and running their bilateral exchanges. In IR literature, some of the main advantages of
institutions are considered to be their ability to reduce transaction costs, reduce uncertainty
and to increase credibility of the actors involved19. One of the clearest examples of how these
18
Another contingency was the proclamation by China of the Anti-secession Law.
It is not possible to review here all the institutionalist literature dealing with these issue, however it is possible to refer to: Jönsson, Christer
and Jonas Tallberg. 2001. "Institutional Theory in International Relations." In Institutional Theory in Political Science., eds. Guy
Forthcoming in Peters, Pierre Pierre and Gerry Stoker. Page 5, Kandori, Michihiro, Rafael Rob, Economics University of Pennsylvania.
19
8
have advantages have taken shape in the EU-China relationship is the development of the
sectoral dialogues. These in fact, have tended to be less subject to the high and lows of the
political climate, which often depends on contingencies such as a visit of the Dalai Lama,
statements by head of states or government, or by a European Parliament’s declaration. These
have rather affected high level meetings such as the EU-China summit, as it was the case in
2008 during the French EU Presidency, when a meeting by President Sarokzy with the Dalai
Lama led to the postponement of the EU-China Summit20.
The institutionalisation that characterise the EU-China relationship, has thus helped on the
one hand to grant stability to the EU-China relationship, partially protecting it from “political
interferences”, and on the other it has allowed, by keeping alive a constant exchange of views
among the two sides, to pragmatically find and develop new areas of cooperation, shaping
new frameworks. This has been the case for the development of new sectoral dialogues, some
of which have later on been upgraded to ministerial level, and for the flourishing of bilateral
partnerships on specific areas such as Climate Change.
According to their level of legalisation21 it is possible to classify the various institutional tools
of the EU-China relations into the following categories: Communications and Policy Papers,
Agreements, Memorandum of Understanding, Joint Statements, Sectoral Dialogues, Strategic
Dialogues and Summits. Due to the necessary limitation in the length of this paper, only the
actual cooperative frameworks will be dealt with here and not the Communications, Policy
Center for Analytic Research in and Sciences the Social. 1992. Evolution of equilibria in the long run : a general theory and applications.
Philadelphia, Pa.: University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research in Economics and the Social Sciences., Most of these issues are
reviewed in Keohane, Robert O. 1988. "International institutions: two approaches." International studies quarterly 32:379-396. Page
388.,Kahler, Miles. 2000. "Conclusion: The Causes and Consequences of Legalization." International Organization 54(3):661-683. and
Simmons, Beth A. 2000. "The Legalization of International Monetary Affairs." International Organization 54(3):573-602. Page 599
20
This assumption was confirmed by an official of the European Commission working for DG External Relations, who noticed that, while
the highest political dialogues might also register a setback following the postponement of a Summit, the pragmatic cooperation developed
through working groups or unrelated dialogues would continue rather smoothly.
21
In addition to the previously mentioned sources, for a definition of legalisation as “a move to law” or “as a particular form of
institutionalisation, [which] represents the decision in different issue-areas to impose international legal constraints on government” see
Goldstein, Judith, Miles Kahler, Robert O. Keohane and Anne-Marie Slaughter. 2000. "Introduction: Legalization and World Politics."
International Organization 54(3):385-399.page 386 and 396.. For a discussion over soft vs hard law see Abbott, Kenneth W. and Duncan
Snidal. 2000. "Hard and Soft Law in International Governance." International Organization 54(3):421-456.
9
Papers and Agreements, even though the reader should be aware of the fact that they might
have been the (legal) basis for the setting up of these frameworks.
Table x.x. Architecture of the EU-China Relations
Updated/Elaborated version of : European Commission, DG Relex, http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/china/docs/architecture.pdf
10
.
Figure x.x. represent the current status of the EU-China institutional setting, which is clearly
very complex, and it is composed by several hierarchical layers: head of states and
government, ministerial level, expert level and the sectoral dialogues (some of which are at
ministerial level too while other are at working level). These can be defined as
“institutionalised, periodic and more or less well-structured meetings between European and
Chinese authorities, involving staff at approximately the same levels in their respective
administrative or political hierarchies, and dealing with general subjects which cut across
EU–China relations as a whole”22. To such a framework an additional dimension could be
added, which is the bilateral relation that China maintain with the various EU Member states.
At the highest level there are the Summit which are held annually since 199823, together with
the Troika Ministerial Meetings which, until the entry into force of the Lisbon treaty, was
attended by the Foreign Affairs Minister of the MS holding the Presidency of the European
Council; the Secretary General/HR for CFSP, and the Commissioner in charge of external
relations and neighbourhood policy. Following the ratification of the Lisbon treaty the HR for
the Union foreign and security policy should participate to these meetings instead of the
Commissioner and the former HR, and it should be accompanied by the President of the
European Commission and the President of the European Council24.
In addition there are also meetings between the President of General Affairs and External
Relations Council (GAERC) and Chinese Ambassadors, between the Chinese Foreign
Minister and EU Heads of Mission in Beijing, and the EU-China Strategic Dialogue at Vice
Foreign Minister Level. Since 2008 there is also the High Level Economic and Trade
22
Snyder, Francis G. 2009. The European Union and China, 1949-2008: basic documents and commentary. Portland, Or.: Hart Publishing.
Page 710.
23
European Commission. 2006. "China Strategy Paper 2007-2013.". Page 2.
24
Following a conversation with an European Commission official working for DG External Relations, the roating precidency should not
affect the CFSP.
11
Dialogue Mechanism (HLM), which starred 8 Commissioners and 11 Ministers on its first
session. Other meetings include the Political Directors Troikas and Regional Directors
Troikas meetings. These high level political gathering are accompanied by technical
meetings, such as the “High-level consultations on illegal migration and trafficking in human
beings”, the “Human Rights Dialogue”, the meeting on “Asian Affairs”, on “NonProliferation” and on “Conventional Arms Exports”.
As previously mentioned, currently the reference agreement between the EU and China is the
Trade and Cooperation Agreement signed in 1985, even though negotiations are under way
for its substitution with a more encompassing agreement which will deal with both economic
and political issues in the same framework. The TCA upgraded the EU-China joint committee
and has later on sponsored exchanges in additional areas, later on framed in the “sectoral
dialogues”. According to a European Commission official, the new PCA will have a unique
joint committee to deal with the variety of issues that are dealt with in the EU-China strategic
partnership, and the current difficulties in obtaining a consensus on the PCA might be due to
such ambition.
According to a source in DG External Relations, the Sectoral Dialogues, which were until
recently though to be 24, were the object of a new “census” by the European Commission,
which actually counted 56 sectoral dialogues; each Directorate General has its own dialogues
with its own respective party in China. This means that, in addition to those that are at
Presidential level and at ministerial level, sponsoring respectively the presence of the EC
President and the Chinese Prime Minister, or the European Commissioner and a Chinese
minister, these can also be at deputy ministerial/Directorate General level, at Director level
and even at Unit level. It should also be noted that while sectoral dialogues at high level meet
generally once a year, working groups at director or unit level can meet 3 or 4 times a year,
12
and have additional exchanges of e-mail and correspondence25. This clearly allows a much
deeper cooperation and exchange of information, which is of key importance in increase
mutual understanding and in developing actual cooperation on specific issues.
In other words dialogues have developed their own dynamics and momentum, distinct from
that of summits or troika meetings26. Some have gained ministerial level during their lifespan,
such as the dialogue on “Agriculture” and the working group on “Energy”; the latter together
with the “Science and Technology Agreement” and the “Environmental Dialogue/Working
Group” are the backbone of the Joint EU-China Declaration Partnership on Climate Change,
which will be discussed later in this paper.
The flourishing of these dialogues on a wide array of issues shows EU’s keenness to frame its
relations with its partners, and especially with China, within new institutional frameworks
while their number clearly represent the dept of their bilateral exchanges. This, from an
institutionalist perspective, can be seen as an attempt to reduce the risks in their cooperation,
which might come from the frequent politicisation of certain events or decisions by a
European Institution (e.g. European Parliament statement on Human Rights in China) or by
one or more member states.
Finally, as highlighted by an European Commission official, since 2006 the EC also enjoys
the privilege of having a direct exchange with the State Council’s legislative office. In the
Chinese bureaucratic system the State Council (国务院 Guówùyuàn) is the leading governing
body, and it is chaired by the Prime Minister. The State Council has often looked for the EC
support with regards to the drafting of legislation, which has provided comments and inputs in
several areas (e.g. environmental related standards, energy legislation etc). This direct link
25
This information was provided by a personal conversation with an European Commission official working for DG Relex.
Snyder, Francis G. 2009. The European Union and China, 1949-2008: basic documents and commentary. Portland, Or.: Hart Publishing.
Page 710.
26
13
between the European Commission and the State Council is of key importance as it allows the
EU to lobby directly China to work towards common shared objectives, while increasing their
mutual understanding.
Apart from the institutional formations mentioned above, other actors are also of key
importance in framing the EU-China relationship. As previously mentioned member states,
especially the largest one, have also their own bilateral agenda which often integrate the EU
one, as it is the case for Climate Change. However the European Commission and the EU
member states are not the only stakeholders in the EU-China relations: the European
Parliament, has exchanges with the National People’s Congress through the Group for
Relations with the European Parliament27, and the latter also has an ad hoc delegation for
relations with the People's Republic of China28. The Council secretariat also look after the
EU-China relations for example under the COASI working group, and the European
Economic and Social Committee has, for instance, recently concluded the first EU visit to
Tibet29, following the invitation by the Chinese Economic and Social Council (and the
backing of the president of the European Commission)30. Also the Committee of Regions has
similarly been involved in developing exchanges with the People’s Republic, including the
promotion of bilateral exchanges31, while specifically on monetary affairs, the president of the
European Central Bank, the Eurogroup president and the European Commissioner responsible
for Economic and Monetary Affairs (the so called eurozone Troika) 32, have framed bilateral
exchanges with the People’s Bank of China, showing their interest to strengthen
communication and coordination on monetary policies33.
27
National People's Congress. 2009. "Jiang Shusheng meets European Parliament delegation." ed. NPC Group for Relations with the
European Parliament.
28
European Parliament website dealing with the Delegation for relations with the People's Republic of China:
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/delegations/homeDel.do;jsessionid=A2B69B68B26CB1A1D968847B0365472A.node1?language=
EN&body=D-CN
29
European Economic and Social Committee. 2009. "President Sepi's Declaration on the EESC mission to Tibet." Brussels.
30
Willis, Andrew. 2009. "First EU institution head to visit Tibet." In EU Observer.
31
An example is the China-Europe Forum – 中欧社会论坛.
32
Euractiv.com. 2009b. "EU, China to ink clean coal deal at summit." Euractiv.com.
33
Xinhua. 2009c. "Chinese Premier: China hopes world's major reserve currency will maintain stable." Xinhuanet.com.
14
Other institutions that have a key role in the EU-China relations are the EU delegation to
China and the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China. These have a direct link with
Chinese authorities, and are often consulted with regards to prospective legislations, being the
closest voice of European interest in the PRC34.
Finally, even though they will not be dealt with in this paper, the EU and China have also
attempted to frame exchanges among the civil society through partnership and exchanges. For
instance they have set up the “China Window” in the Erasmus-Mundus Student exchange
program, the China-Europe International Business School, the China-EU School of Law, the
EU-China Managers Exchange and Training Programme and several EU centres in Chinese
Universities and Confucius Institutes in the EU.
3. Linkages among the energy, environmental and climate change regimes from an
institutionalist perspective.
It is thus clear that the EU-China relationship has been evolving over time, passing from
being a mainly trade-oriented relation, to becoming an all encompassing partnership. It is also
evident that it has benefited from a sound institutional framework which has allowed it to
prosper even in difficult times. In the following paragraphs I will discuss the context that have
allowed the intensification of their partnership in the energy and climate change-related fields,
and I will then present the structure of their cooperation in these specific field together with
the relative outcomes and challenges.
34
European Union Chamber of Commerce in China. 2009. "The European Business in China Position Paper 2009/2010." Beijing: European
Union Chamber of Commerce in China.
15
In the past 40 years some new themes have arisen in the security debate and since have been
recurrent in international relations. The oil crises of 1973 and 1979 uncovered the problem of
energy security35, while the environmental degradation due to the world’s rapid economic
growth, has spurred concerns on environmental security, following the negative effect
registered on both human health and natural diversity. To tackle those threats two sets of
institutions and organisations were set up, contributing to the rise of two new regimes. These
are the energy regime, attempting to reduce the condition of energy insecurity,
which
represent a very serious and direct threat to the welfare of importing countries; and the
environmental regime, which has focused on key areas such as the banning of substances
endangering the environment such as the Montreal protocol or on the protection of wildlife.
These two regimes present different levels of legalisation and have developed under two
separate paths which have led, arguable, to different degrees of success. Before the advent of
the science of climate change, the only common point between these two security threats was
the fact that they both have a negative effect on economic growth. On the one hand, energy
insecurity represent a cost in terms of the higher price paid for the same amount of supply,
due to the limited availability and to the setting up (and maintenance) of security reserves
aimed at eventually cover supply disruptions. On the other hand, environmental degradation
endangers human health, which represent a cost in terms of cures, hospitalisation and
reduction of active workforce. Of course there is also an effect on the environment itself due
to pollution, which could be translated in terms of opportunity-cost: the lack of revenues
coming for other activities that could have been carried out otherwise i.e. agriculture, tourism
etc, and the potential loss in natural diversity 36.
35
Keohane, Robert O. 1982. "The Demand for International Regimes." International Organization 36(2):325-355.
According to the Stern Report, the cost of global warming will rise to 5500 bn € between now and 2050. Stern, Nicholas. 2007. The
Economics of Climate Change: Cambridge University Press.
36
16
The rise of concerns related to climate change have dramatically changed the above
mentioned relation between the environmental regime and energy regime: climate change has
in fact strongly accentuated the linkages between energy security and environment security.
Energy is if fact considered one of the major sources of CO2 emissions, which are one of the
most detrimental substances inducing climate change; at the same time the climate change
regime has pushed developed countries to reduce their CO2 emissions and to focus on the use
of resources which contribute less in terms of emissions. Such an increased awareness had
several consequences: a rally for new rules and regulations both locally, regionally and
globally; a push towards energy efficiency and renewable energies; and pressures towards the
developed country to transfer clean technologies to developing nations. Major emerging
economies are in fact still largely reliant on coal, which is considered the most dangerous
fuel, due to its high CO2 content. To break that deadlock the climate change regime pushed
for the development of clean technologies able to reduce GHG emissions by increasing the
costs of polluting and by reducing the costs of clean investments through the implementation
of the Kyoto protocol. From a “rational choice institutionalism” perspective this can be seen
as how the creation of the climate change regime has modified the trade-offs through the
creation of tools such as the Emission Trading Schemes and of the Clean Development
Mechanism.
The climate change regime has thus influenced, if not shaped, the current energy mix of
developed and developing countries, by touching horizontally upon both the energy and
environment sectors. Some examples are the introduction of emission standards, efficiency
targets and other commitment to reduce emissions, either in absolute terms or as a proportion
of GDP. These measures have often been the object of high legalisation if we consider that
they have been incorporated in national legislations, as it is the case for the EU and China.
17
With regards to environment, the raise in the profile of the climate change regime, has also
allowed to strengthen the legitimacy of the environmental regime itself, even though it should
be noted that the two are not synonyms. It could in fact be argued that the climate change
regime deals with those issues that can be considered as causes and consequences of climate
change, and as such, these tend to include not only environmental but also other issues, such
as development, economic growth, international security and, in certain cases, even social and
political stability (e.g. for China). The UN report on Climate Change presented by the
Secretary General to the General Assembly in 2009, has in particular underlined the link
between climate change and security, arguing that climate change acts as a “threat multiplier”.
In particular it argues that it increases the vulnerability of states and people in terms of health
and food availability, it reduces the pace of development, it negatively affects migration and
hardens the competition for resources such as water or fuels, which might lead to increased
international conflicts37.
The climate change regime, in the process of its shaping and deployment, has also affected
the traditional trade regime, by introducing incentives and structures able to shape
international actor’s behaviour38 towards a more environmentally conscious direction. This,
as previously mentioned, was possible thanks to the adoption of the trade mechanisms, such
as the CDM at global level or of ETS at local or regional level, while additional measures
such as carbon taxes, tariffs or other BCAs (Border Carbon Adjustments) are still under
consideration. Finally, additional pressure has been put on major emerging countries, as
scientific studies on climate change have shown the potential disastrous effects which the
globe could face, should an action be insufficiently firm. Those countries are today among the
major contributors to climate change, and a modification in their development patterns is
37
UN Economic and Social Development. 2009. "Climate Change and Its Possible Security Implications: Report of the Secretary-General."
UN. The wording is strongly inspired by previous European communication on this topic, as also pointed out by a European official
38
Both private and public actors.
18
indispensable to avoid the temperature to rise over 2°C, which is considered the upper
threshold to avoid disastrous effects. However they are currently refusing any binding
commitment in light of their lower economic wealth and they are calling for their “right to
develop”. This has in the past years led to the definition of a new development-related
dimension of climate change, which has been one of the key elements restated at the latest
Conference of the Parties in Copenhangen.
It is thus clear that a strong link between the energy, environment and climate change regimes
have been unveiled, and which touches upon a wide array of issues: from economic growth
and poverty eradication to political stability, from energy consumption and pollution to
energy efficiency, and from renewable technologies to climate change. While we are far from
having a unique regime dealing with all those issues, it is important to recognize their links,
which constitute a system of interdependences at various levels, and affect how international
actors relate to one another and how they shape their own image.
4. The role of Energy, environment and Climate Change regimes in Sino-European
Relations
In the previous pages I have underlined how international regimes dealing with energy,
environment and climate change have evolved in the past years. This has certainly had an
important effect in shaping the EU-China bilateral relationship. This is true for several
reasons, and in particular because those regimes have somehow uncovered some costs which
were previously hidden, and, in so doing, modified some underling considerations vis à vis
the relevance of EU-China cooperation.
19
Climate change is becoming a prominent issue on the world stage: desertification, increase in
the sea level and drought are only a few of the possible consequences. Should these forecast
be correct, the economic and social impact of climate change could be economically serious39
and even destabilizing for countries such as the PRC whose legitimacy is liked to high level
of economic growth40, necessary to absorb the increasing supply of urban workforce. Thanks
to the above mentioned regimes and institutional frameworks, the fight against climate change
could transform the protection of the environment and energy security from being a challenge
to an opportunity, at least for China-EU bilateral relations.
Chinese environmental degradation could be traced back to the time of the “great leap
forward”, and more recently, to the effects of its export-led economy41 that has determined an
“import” of pollution from the rest of the world in the form of industries that have delocalised
to China to produce at lower costs goods deemed to be exported. To worsen the situation, the
country is heavily reliant on coal and it is expected to be so fr the foreseeable future.
However Chinese pollution, due to its amount and due to its linkages with western economies,
is a global problem42, which has allowed China to obtain a key position in the international
negotiations. China is in fact aware that no solution can materialize without its backing, this
was clearly highlighted in the 2001 EC Communication: “A country of the size of China is
both part of the problem and the solution to all major problems of international and regional
Various sources present different data: for China the environmental costs could reach 3% of GDP, for the EU those costs might jump to €
65 billion by 2080. Ash, Robert. 2007. "Resource pressures and China's environmental challenge." And Euronews. 2009c. "Obama pledges
US carbon cuts." In Euronews. For an account of the costs related to Climate Change and non sustainable development see: Centre for
European Reform and Charles Grant. 2008. "Can Europe and China shape a new world order?". Page 72, Moore, Scott. 2010. "Security in a
drier age." China Dialogue - 中外对话., Emerging Market Group and Development Solutions. 2008. "Trade Sustainability Impact Assessment
of the Negotiations of a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and China – Final Report." ed. European Commission DG
Trade: European Commission DG Trade. Page 37, 82.
40
This issue is also supported by a variety of scholars. For example: Holzer, Constantin and Haibin Zhang. 2008. "The potentials and limits
of China-EU cooperation on climate change and energy security." Asia Europe Journal 6:217-227.
41
About 50% of Chinese economy is due to exports. Wenmu, Zhang. 2006. "Sea power and China's strategic choices." China
Security(Summer 2006):17-31.
42
As Peter Mandelson said at Tsingua University on 7 November 2006, “In a nutshell – and this is the core of my remarks – you could
identify any global problem we face and you will find that China is an essential part of the solution, with a role in framing the international
agenda and assuming new leadership responsibilities as it does.” In Crossick, Stanley. 2009. "China, EU & US: Holy Trinity or Ménage à
Trois?" In Blogactiv.eu.
39
20
co-operation”43. Chinese relevance was already reflected in the course of the Environmental
and Climate Change negotiations in the 1990s, when it framed its discourse around three key
issues: the “West’s historical responsibility”, its right to development 44 and its status of a
developing country45. These, thanks to Chinese input, have been reformulated in the principle
of “common but differentiated responsibility”46 which was included in the UN climate change
regime, and since it has significantly influenced any further international negotiation as a core
principle of the two-tracks Climate negotiations47. More in details it has determined a shift
towards a system that gives China the right to ask for preferential agreements over technology
transfer, while avoiding any effective multilateral commitment48 in terms of emission
reduction and, potentially, to even justify a waiver of IPRs protection49 which otherwise
would need to be protected (or paid for).
It is fair to assume that China is aware of the fact that those technologies, together with its
mass production capabilities, will allow it to keep a steady growth in the coming years and the
amount of current investment in this field might even allow it to leapfrog developed nations.
Following this reasoning, and observing its behaviour in the international fora, it could be
argued that China is trying to “maximise the benefits” the current system, which it has
actively contributed to set up. This can be observed at various levels: in terms of improving
43
COM (2001) 265 final, EU Strategy towards China: Implementation of the 1998 Communication and Future Steps for a More Effective
EU Policy, p. 7.
44
Literally in September 1995 the developing nations gathered in Beijing and agreed that: “The Beijing Declaration asserts that poverty,
underdevelopment and overpopulation are the main causes of environmental degradation; the developed countries have the main
responsibility for the environmental problems facing the world; the developing countries have the right to develop”. Heggelund, Gørild,
Steinar Andresen and Sun Ying. 2005. "Performance of the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) in China: Achievements and Challenges as
seen by the Chinese." In 46th ISA Conference. Hawaii.
45
The issue of historical responsibility was also high on the agenda in the preparation of the Cop15. For example see: Jun, Ma. 2009. "To
seal a deal, we need justice." China Dialogue - 中外对话.
46
The “common but differentiated responsibility” principle is one of the outcomes of the Rio convention, also known as Earth Summit, held
in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. For more information on this point Kérébel, Cécile and Jan Horst Keppler. 2009. La gouvernance mondiale de
l'énergie IFRI. Page 176.
47
According to China “The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol should serve as the main channel for the
international community to address climate change […] The principle of the Common But Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) is the
universally recognized basic norm for tackling the issue," […] "The Bali roadmap clearly identifies the requirement and direction for
international cooperation on climate change." Li, Xianzhi. 2009. "China hopes to see positive outcome from UN Conference on Climate
Change " Xinhua.
48
In the words of Premier Wen Jiabao: “Developing countries should, with the financial and technological support of developed countries,
do what they can to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to climate change in light of their national conditions”. Jiabao, Wen. 2009.
"Premier expresses China's sincerity at UN climate conference." Xinhuanet.com.
49
China and India before the Copenhagen negotiation have argued that green technologies should be given to developing countries under
“compulsory licensing” as it currently happens only in certain cases for some medicines. Euractiv.com. 2009a. "China, India push for 'patent
free' green tech." In Euractiv.com.
21
its image by showing its willing to cooperate as a “responsible stakeholder”50; in terms of
attract investments and technology fundamental for its future development; and in terms of
diplomatic profile, as it has had the opportunity to lead developing nations in the various fora
such as the G-20, and the G77, often obtaining similar preferences by shielding itself from
negotiating individually less preferential agreements51.
According to the current environmental regime i.e. Kyoto Protocol, China is in fact
assimilated with the other developing countries, and thus it does not have any binding CO2
reduction commitments. This position which was challenged during the Copenhagen Summit
in December 2009 by some of the poorest developing countries and by the EU, has not
changed. The EU instead, due to its status of developed economy is invited to bare the
“historical responsibility” of the current “Climate emergency” by sharing its technology and
capital in order to help developing countries to fight climate change. EU’s role in setting up
this framework has been remarkable and it has definitely allowed to rise also its international
profile in the international arena.
In other words it could be argued that thanks to the energy and environmental regimes China
could kill three birds with one stone: it could improve its domestic economic conditions
which will allow it to keep the necessary consensus among its people; it could ameliorate its
international image and it could increase its energy security which is a major challenge to
Chinese economic growth52.
On this point Us deputy secretary of R. Zoellick said: “China to become a ‘responsible stakeholder’ in the international system1 Meidan,
Michal. 2006. "China's Africa policy: business now, politics later." Asian Perspective 30(4). Page 76. Also the same issue has been raised in
other papers such as: “China's wish to be viewed as responsible.” And “What becomes more salient is China's concern for its international
image and a desire to be regarded as a cooperative and responsible great power.” And “China had to join such and such a treaty or process
[…] because it would help improve China's image” Foot, Rosemary. 2001. "Chinese Power and the Idea of a Responsible State." The China
Journal(45):1-19.
51
The latter advantage however started to fade away during the Copenhagen negotiations, where division among developing countries started
to arise.
52
As mentioned by Li Junru, Vice president of the Central Party School: “Energy is a factor that could affect China’s peaceful rise and
international pre-eminence, more efficiency and cooperation less pollution”. Page 6, or “Energy is a factor that could affect China’s peaceful
rise and international pre-eminence” Page 8. Also “According to Zhang Guobao, Vice President of NDRC (National Development and
Reform Committee), China’s energy policy for the 21st century must emphasize energy conservation, through the increase of energy
efficiency, in order to improve energy security and protect the environment.” And “At the G8 meeting in Saint Petersburg in July 2006, Hu
50
22
However in order to carry out such strategy it needs a partner in the international community
which has the technology, the financial capabilities and the interest in sharing those with an
emerging power. Currently only a few are the options: the US, Japan and the EU. While the
first two countries have been reticent in transferring their technology to China, in view of
their different geostrategic perspectives, while the EU has acted differently proving to be a
more appropriate partner especially on technology cooperation53.
The EU due to its current structure54 has often found difficult to present a coherent and strong
position at the international level on issues which were not directly related to trade. However
European energy import dependency and its need to increase its energy security pushed the
EU to be more assertive on those issues, focusing on international cooperation as well as on
energy efficiency, renewable sources and better regulation. With the development of the
energy and environmental regimes at international level, the measures experimented by the
EU, including the widest Emission Trading Scheme, gave it an increasing say and credibility
also on international fora. Also, the fact that it has been quite successful in speaking with one
voice on those issues55, and that the US did not join the Kyoto protocol gave the EU a
temporary, but remarkable, competitive advantage56.
In this perspective it could be argued the EU has found in environment and energy two areas
in which it can play a leading role and currently it is investing on them in order to try rising
the social ladder of great powers.
Jintao proclaimed a ‘new’ energy security policy for China consisting of strengthening energy cooperation and research as well as
implementing development programs with other countries.” In: Niquet, Valérie. 2007. "Energy Challenges in Asia: Definition of energy
security in China and in Japan." Note de l'IFRI.
53
The EU is the main source of high technology for China says Feng Zhongping in Grevi, Giovanni; de Vasconcelos, Alvaro. 2008***.
"Partnerships for effective multilateralism:EU relations with Brazil, China, India and Russia." ed. EU Institute for Security Studies;.
54
The new positions of permanent President of the European Council and High Representative of the Union Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy might increase the EU capabilities to act at the international level, which is something that even some Chinese analysts hope to see.
Jian, Lu and 卢鉴. 2009. "中欧峰会:提升战略互信 引领务实合作." Xinhua.
55
As it has been the case in the management of the latest Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis or in the negotiations and ratification process of the
Kyoto protocol.
56
On this point see for instance: Schreurs, Miranda A. and Yves Tiberghien. 2007. "Multi-Level Reinforcement: Explaining European Union
Leadership in Climate Change Mitigation." Global Environmental Politics 7(4):19-46. Also, According to some scholars: “European
leadership only became viable once the US was removed from the emissions trading debate, and it could escape the trap that its past rhetoric
had created”. Cass, Loren. 2005. "Norm Entrapment and Preference Change: The Evolution of the European Union Position on International
Emissions Trading." Global Environmental Politics 5(2):38-60.
23
From this perspective it seems clear that the rise of the climate change regime has had
remarkable effects on both their bilateral and multilateral relations. It has given them the
opportunity to move away from the mere discourse of the mutual recognition of rising
powers, that has been the leitmotiv of their relations until the mid 1990s and allowed them to
raise/improve their international profile. These new areas of concerns have given them
something that can be rightly defined as “strategic” and which can find a key place on their
negotiation table. Both the EU and China face similar challenges with regards to energy and
environment: they both wish to increase their energy security, they share some common
energy suppliers in the Middle East and Russia57, they are both interested in Central Asian
resources58 and they both aim at tackle environmental degradation (and the related costs).
From this point of view China and the EU have a broad potential cooperation, leading them to
work on energy efficiency, policy coordination and alternative energy sources in order to curb
their respective demand and reduce their emissions, as the current regimes require.
In other words it could be argued that the energy and environmental challenge gave a new
pragmatic reason to the EU and China to cooperate59 which is something that has been
missing in their relations since China’s entry in the WTO or the debate over the lifting of the
arms embargo. Such a pragmatic side in their cooperation, which instead has always been a
characteristic of the US-China relationship60, is even more important as energy and
57
Currently the majority of Russian pipelines are directed to Europe so there is no threat in the short/medium term of a substitution of the
European market with the Chinese/Asian one, even if Russia is trying to reduce its dependence from the European market while trying to
increase European dependence from its own resources. It is in this light that the new Russian projects could be looked at: the new South
Stream pipeline rivalling the EU sponsored Nabucco, as well as the new Russian Eastern-Siberia-Pacific Ocean oil pipeline going to Daqing,
China.
58
For example Kazakh oil is flowing to China via the Kazazhastan-China oil pipeline, while the EU has turned to Central Asia in order to fill
its foreseen Nabucco pipeline Euronews. 2009b. "No Uzbek, Kazakh, Turkmen gas for EU." In Euronews.
59
The negotiations on the PCA are very much related to areas of sustainability, energy efficiency, social issues and the preservation of
biodiversity and natural resources. Emerging Market Group and Development Solutions. 2008. "Trade Sustainability Impact Assessment of
the Negotiations of a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and China – Final Report." ed. European Commission DG
Trade: European Commission DG Trade.
60
Due to common interests in the region, such as Taiwan or the nuclear proliferation in the Korean Peninsula.
24
environmental issues encompass a wide number of other topics both at bilateral and
multilateral level.
5. Bilateral Cooperation on energy and climate change
At the beginning of this century, China found itself at a crossroad: on the one hand it had the
opportunity to continue towards its export lead development, whose environmental, social and
economic costs would increasingly undermine, the legitimacy of its ruling class. On the other,
it had the opportunity to switch to a more considerate economic development, less based on
exports and polluting energy resources. As shown above, the latter choice was clearly
supported by the evolution of the energy and climate change regimes. The policies that have
been implemented in the recent years, as well as the amount of funding provided to green
technologies in the 2009 “stimulus package”61 seem to show a gradual shift towards the actual
attempt to boost a more harmonious62 growth.
However it can be argued that the motives behind Chinese engagement in the international
regimes, (as well as bilateral cooperation) are partially different from those of the
international community. First of all it could be noted that China had to join the above
mentioned international regimes, and contribute to their definition, as it anticipated that those
could have hampered its autonomy with regards to the definition of its economic policy,
which still finds in economic development the key priority63. A similar approach is proved by
the fact that China, even when puts forward some ambitious targets towards the reduction of
61
Freeman, Duncan; and Jonathan; Holslag. 2009. "Climate for Cooperation: The EU, China and Climate Change." In BICCS Report.
Brussels: Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies. And Economic Observer - 经济观察网. 2009. "China's Stimulus Package: A
Breakdown of Spending." In Economic Observer - 经济观察网. Beijing.
62
Some of the major concepts in the Chinese discourse are described in Rabinovitch, Simon. 2008. "The Rise of an Image-Conscious China."
China Security - 中国安全4(3):32-47.
63
Euronews. 2009a. "Chinese attitude on climate before Copenhagen." In Euronews.
25
its emissions, as it was the case during the Copenhagen summit, it never linked them to
international commitments. Rather it always underlined how these were unilateral pledges 64,
so to avoid any strings attached by the international community. Secondly, it can be argued
that Chinese leadership is less concerned by the global effects of climate change or
environmental degradation than it is of its local ones65, which directly affect agriculture and
the health of its population and, consequently, its economic performance (these include
desertification as well as the pollution of lands, waters and air).
These issues make
environmental management, energy efficiency and more broadly climate change, a strategic
priority especially in certain Chinese provinces. The energy, environmental and climate
change regimes are thus key tools to develop bilateral and multilateral partnership with
developed countries such as the EU, which have expertise and financial capacity to help
China to tackle its domestic challenges.
The EU is the leading investor in China by project size and value, the main provider of
technology and the main trading partner. In addition its industry is one of the most
competitive with regards to energy efficiency, while it enjoys a comparative advantage vis à
vis its main partners in this fields. Compared to Japan, the EU has much bigger market size
and financial capabilities, while compared to the US, the EU has stronger autonomy to deal
with Climate Change related issues, without being hostage of the Congress66. In addition, as
previously noted, the EU is implementing the Kyoto protocol and has been a key player in the
quest for its entry into force, a fact that also increase EU’s credibility in this field. An
additional element which could allow potentially smoother cooperation, and which was
pointed out in the China’s EU policy paper67, is the fact that the European and Chinese
64
An. 2009. "Quotable quotes of Chinese premier at Copenhagen conference." Xinhuanet.com.
In particular it seems that China focus more on energy rather than environment, and more on pollution rather than biodiversity..
Heggelund, Gørild, Steinar Andresen and Sun Ying. 2005. "Performance of the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) in China:
Achievements and Challenges as seen by the Chinese." In 46th ISA Conference. Hawaii. Page 18.
66
This point was also highlighted by a Chinese official working at the delegation of the People’s Republic of China to the EU.
67
People’s Republic of China. 2003. "China's EU Policy Paper ", ed. Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
65
26
leadership agree that they do not have any bilateral security concern, differently from the USChina relations.
All these factors, together with the density of the institutionalisation of the Sino-European
relationship, have given the EU a direct or indirect capability to influence Chinese
policymaking process. In the coming paragraphs I will focus in particular on the bilateral
frameworks that have been set up in order to deal with energy and climate change-related
issues.
5.1. Energy, environment and climate change as strategic issues
The strategic role covered by energy and climate change in the EU-China relationship has
been underlined on several recent studies68, but it has also been stated by EU and Chinese
officials; for instance the former Commissioner for External Relations it is reported to have
said that: “Fight against climate change, [...] is an issue that will sour or cement relations
between the EU and China”69. The Chinese Vice-Premier in a visit to Europe instead
underlined how “cooperation on energy conservation and environment protection should be
further strengthened to make it one of the shining points of the trade and economic ties
between China and Europe”70.
For instance see: Scott, David. 2009. "Environmental issues as a ‘strategic’ key in EU–China relations." Asia Europe Journal 7(2):211-224.
Page 215, Feng Zhongping position in Grevi, Giovanni; de Vasconcelos, Alvaro. 2008***. "Partnerships for effective multilateralism:EU
relations with Brazil, China, India and Russia." ed. EU Institute for Security Studies;. Page 83. and Centre for European Reform and Charles
Grant. 2008. "Can Europe and China shape a new world order?". Page 69 et al., and Men, Jing. 2009. "The EU and China: climate change
and development " EU-China Observer(5):13-18.
69
Friends of Europe. 2009. "Europe and China." In Report of the international high-level Strategic Dialogue summit. Brussels: Friends of
Europe and the Security & Defence Agenda (SDA).
70
Xinhua. 2010. "Chinese vice premier hails Sino-Swiss economic ties, outlines priorities for future co-op." Xinhuanet.com.
68
27
The “strategicness” of their cooperation on sustainable development was also explicitly
mentioned on occasion of the 9th EU-china summit 2006 in Helsinki71 and at the External
Relations Council in 2006, where it was noted that:
“Energy security, climate change and protection of environment are top priorities
for the EU in achieving sustainable development and are key elements in its
relations with China. Collaboration on energy security should be intensified, with
a view to creating a stable, secure, efficient and clean energy environment and to
promoting open and competitive energy markets. The EU attaches the highest
importance to its climate change partnership with China, which should develop its
full potential based on the work plan agreed on 19 October 2006. […] China and
the EU should also collaborate as closely as possible on multilateral climate
change issues, in particular on the further development of the multilateral climate
change regime ensuring a broad participation of countries, in accordance with
their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. The
EU also looks forward, as part of UN reform, to continue constructive discussions
with China in the process to reinforce international environmental governance,
including the possible transformation of UNEP into a UN agency for the
environment.” 72
Also the Commission President Barroso and European Council President Van Rompuy
believe that these issues are of key importance in the 21st century73 and, as such, are the core
of the EU’s revamped 2020 strategy74. Others have noted that climate change is of key
71
Andreosso-O'Callaghan, Bernadette; Nicolas, Francoise. 2007. "Complementarity and Rivalry in EU–China Economic Relations in the
Twenty-First Century." European Foreign Affairs Review 12.
72
Council, European. 2006. "Press Release: General Affairs and External Relations ", ed. External Relations. Brussels.
73
For instance the main challenges are meant to be: climate change, cyber crime, nuclear proliferation and terrorism. Euractiv.com. 2010c.
"EU wants a new Atlanticism." Euractiv.com.
74
The main objectives are set to be employment, R&D, energy and climate action, education and poverty and the fight against social
exclusion. Euractiv.com. 2010b. "EU leaders delay deal on '2020' targets." Euractiv.com.
28
importance75, and, as other “new security issues” it has the opportunity to create “win–win
situations through international cooperation”76.
As noted by various scholars, there are several drivers behind Europe’s interest in the energy
partnership with China: economic interests which could be hampered by soaring of Chinese
energy demand, EU’s comparative advantage in the field and the opportunity to use it to gain
diplomatic leverage, the development of a potentially profitable export market, and the
necessity to avoid confrontation on energy supply by pushing China to diversify its energy
demand77. On the other hand, as previously noted, China also have several reasons to engage
with the EU, as:
“The European public and private sectors have great experience and expertise to
offer in these areas [energy, environment and sustainable development], and the
Chinese side increasingly recognizes how much needs to be done to secure energy
resources, reverse its environmental degradation, and implement more sustainable
growth strategies.”78
These are important elements that have boosted the EU-China relationship to focus on these
fields, and explain the fact that following the postponement of the EU-China summit in 2008,
at the time to resume it in Prague in 2009, Energy and Climate Change cooperation where the
only issues that made substantial progresses. In the Joint Press Communiqué of the 11th EUChina Summit the leaders “expressed their determination to strengthen cooperation, […] to
Page 216 Scott, David. 2009. "Environmental issues as a ‘strategic’ key in EU–China relations." Asia Europe Journal 7(2):211-224.
Holzer, Constantin and Haibin Zhang. 2008. "The potentials and limits of China-EU cooperation on climate change and energy security."
Ibid. 6:217-227. Page 219. A similar position was explained by Xinning Song, a famous Chinese scholar, during a private conversation held
in Beijing in 2008.
77
Freeman, Duncan; and Jonathan; Holslag. 2009. "Climate for Cooperation: The EU, China and Climate Change." In BICCS Report.
Brussels: Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies. Page 27. Other elements considered important are the level of economic
integration, the potential gains in terms of economics and image; for these see: Holzer, Constantin and Haibin Zhang. 2008. "The potentials
and limits of China-EU cooperation on climate change and energy security." Asia Europe Journal 6:217-227.
78
Gill, Bates, Melissa Murphy and Charles W. Freeman III. 2008. "China-Europe Relations: Implications and Policy Responses for the
United States." Washington D.C.: CSIS Freeman Chair in China Studies.
75
76
29
address global challenges including the financial crisis and climate change”
79
and took the
occasion to sign the final agreement on the establishment of the Europe-China Clean Energy
Centre in Beijing.
5.2. Energy cooperation
From the energy perspective the Sino-European cooperation started in 1994 when the relative
dialogue was set up and involved the European Commission (DG Energy, formerly DG
Energy and Transport) and the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST). The first
outcome was the establishment of a biannual Energy Cooperation Conference with the aim of
gathering all interested parties in energy-related issues including scholars, enterprises,
universities. The next session which will take place in Shanghai, according to a EC official
working for DG Energy, will focus on the post economic crisis and on how to deal with
energy in these new circumstances80. The cooperation on clean coal and CCS (carbon capture
and storage) have been of key importance in their bilateral relaionship, which is proved by the
drafting in 2005 of the Memorandum of Understanding on Near-zero Emissions Power
Technology between the EC and MOST. This MoU, aimed at fostering “co-operation on the
development, deployment and transfer of low carbon technologies”81 and planned to develop
and demonstrate advanced near-zero emission power generation technology in China and in
the EU by 2020. On the sidelines of the 12th China-EU Summit in Nanjing in 2009, the EC
. “Joint Press Communique of the 11th EU-China Summit”, retrieved from http://www.eu2009.cz/en/news-and-documents/pressreleases/joint-press-communique-of-the-11th-euchina-summit-23664/ on the 25 July 2009.
80
The 2008 one focused on energy efficiency, renewable energies, hydrogen energy and fuel cells, gas hydrates, carbon capture and storage
and nuclear energy. European Commission. 2008a. "7th EU-China Energy Conference: Strengthening Energy Cooperation ", ed. DG TREN.
Brussels.
81
Memorandum Of Understanding Between The Ministry of Science and Technology of the People’s Republic of China And The European
Commission On Cooperation on Near-zero Emissions Power Generation Technology through Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage. Beijing
5 September 2005. For some updates on the progresses see: Euractiv.com. 2009b. "EU, China to ink clean coal deal at summit."
Euractiv.com.
79
30
also pledged €57 millions for the Near-Zero Emission Coal (NZEC) project82 which aimed at
evaluating the feasibility of CCS for power generation. On the same priority line was the
creation of the Institute for Clean and Renewable Energy (ICARE)83, and of the EU-China
Clean Energy Centre, which opened at the end of April 2010, following the visit of President
Barroso to Beijing and its meeting with Zhang Guobao, the Vice Chairman of the NDRC.
Since 2005 the European Commission has in fact also hold contacts with the National
Development and Reform Commission, and established a high level energy dialogue. The
Commission has carried out annual meetings at Deputy-Ministerial/Director General level.
The agenda has mainly focused on issues ranging from clean coal, energy forecast, and lately
it has included energy security, smart grids and renewable energies. In 2005 another energyrelated
memorandum of understanding was signed with the NDRC on the EU-China
Dialogue on Energy and Transport Strategies.
As pointed out by a European Commission official, at the beginning the relation with the
NDRC was mainly to build up trust among the parties, but since 2009 their cooperation has
started delivering concrete results by developing projects and fostering capacity building.
What it should also be noted is that Chinese energy bureaucracy has changed several times
since the 1990s, when the Energy ministry was abolished and some energy-related ministries
were transformed into state owned companies with ministerial status84. One of the latest of
82
Xinhua. 2009b. "China welcomes EC's pledge of 57 mln Euros for NZEC project " Xinhuanet.com. The EU is not the only actor involved
in this kind of projects and lately also the US and other players have increased their involvement. For an overview on these other partnership
see: Xi, Liang and Li Jia. 2010. "Capitalising on capture." China Dialogue - 中外对话.
83
Friends of Europe. 2009. "Europe and China." In Report of the international high-level Strategic Dialogue summit. Brussels: Friends of
Europe and the Security & Defence Agenda (SDA).
84
Following the recent creation of the National Energy Commission (NEC) the new framework foresee the following organisation: Vice
Premier Li Keqiang will act as the NEC’s deputy head; Zhang Ping, head of the National Development and Reform Commission, will work
as the head of the general affairs office of NEC, and Zhang Guobao, head of National Energy Administration will serve as the office's deputy
head. Li, Xianzhi. 2010. "China sets up national energy commission headed by Premier." Xinhuanet.com. For a background on the structural
changes occurred in the Chinese bureaucracy with regards to energy and environment in the past: “A Ministry of Energy was established in
1988 but it was disbanded five years later because its administrative functions overlapped with other departments. Facing increasing energy
shortages, the government set up an Energy Bureau under the NDRC during administrative reforms in 2003.The National Energy
Administration (NEA) was set up in 2008 but it lacks the power to carry out many of its assigned tasks as responsibility for the energy sector
is currently spread among a number of departments. For instance, prices of petroleum products and electricity are still decided by the
NDRC.” Zhihong, Wan. 2010. "Wen heads 'super ministry' for energy." China Daily. On the environmental side, the Ministry for
Environmental Protection result still to be understaffed. Emerging Market Group and Development Solutions. 2008. "Trade Sustainability
Impact Assessment of the Negotiations of a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and China – Final Report." ed.
European Commission DG Trade: European Commission DG Trade.
31
such changes was the creation of the NEA (National Energy Administration) which currently
falls under the NDRC framework. These changes have also affected the EU-China
relationship that, since the beginning of 2005, has found in the NEA the EC’s new counterpart
in dealing with energy related issues instead of the NDRC. Also, following the agreement to
work on smart grid, the Commission had the opportunity to approach directly the State Grid
Corporation, a state owned enterprise, and organising capacity building events and projects.
For the Commission, as noted by the European Commission official, this is the first time that
it works with a company rather than a ministry or an agency, and, currently, no other
government is known to be working directly with the State Grid Corporation.
In addition, at the inaugural meeting of the High Level Economic and Trade Mechanism
(HLM) in April 2008, “a new joint body that aims to enlarge and deepen cooperation on trade
and economic issues between the EU and China”, energy85 was indicated as the first priority
area for their cooperation, followed by trade in high technology, IPRs and trade facilitation.
The HLM is a ministerial level body which in its first meeting was Chaired by Chinese Vice
Premier Wang Qishan and EU Trade Commissioner Mandelson, accompanied respectively by
10 Ministers and 8 Commissioners.
Another energy related field of cooperation was outlined during the November 2009 Summit
in Beijing, when the European Commission signed a MoU with the Ministry of Housing and
Urban-Rural Development to discuss the issue of energy efficiency in buildings. As
underlined during a private conversation with a European official, it took a long time before
having this cooperation up and running due to contingent reasons i.e. reticence to open this
sector to international scrutiny and the Sichuan earthquake. The EC is one of the very few
partners on this specific sector for China, which to contain Chinese reluctances only focus on
85
In particular cooperation on standards and technology transfer, market access, energy efficiency and feed-in tariff policies.
http://www.delchn.ec.europa.eu/Upload/News/1209127467.38847.pdf
32
energy efficiency and capacity building as for how to draft standards, regulations, legislations,
and training but will not deal with commercial issues. China has long ago showed interest in
EU’s leading position in this field and, according to some sources in the former DG Energy
and Transport, China has extensively copied our standards on efficiency in buildings86.
Another key framework for cooperation has been the EU-China Trade Project (EUCTP)
which ended in 2009 after the successful implementation of over 300 technical assistance and
training activities. These were primarily designed to support China in meeting its WTO
commitments87, but were also linked to energy and environmental concerns. The EUCTP had
a key role in supporting policy, legislative and regulatory reform efforts and in boosting the
exchange of regulatory practices. For what concerns this paper, it featured a ‘EU-China
Sustainable Trade Task Force’ and the ‘NDRC-EUCCC Forum: Energy Efficiency and
Industrial Clustering’ and saw the participation of the NDRC, the European Chamber of
Commerce, the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), the Ministry of Environmental
Protection, the Ministry of Finance, and State Forestry Administration, as well as the EC
Directorate-General for Trade and the EC Delegation to China.
Finally, as mentioned elsewhere in this paper, since 2006 the European Commission has a
cooperation with the legislative office of the State Council, which has been of particular
relevance as China is in the process of drafting its new energy laws. In particular China
appears to have contacted the EC on various occasions in order to obtain support and
comments, which were provided through workshops and other. The developing of such a
special framework is to be considered as a key element for the EU as it allows the EC to
directly share its concerns and proposals to the heart of the Chinese bureaucracy.
86
As noted by Pirjo-Liisa Koskimaki, Head of unit, DG TREN, China copied EU building efficiency. In Koskimaki, Pirjo-Liisa. 2009.
"European Energy efficiency policies." In EUSEW 2009: Third EU Sustainable Energy Week, ed. DG TREN. Brussels. (minute 6)
87
EU-Chiana Trade Project 中国 - 欧盟世贸项目. 2010. "EU-China Trade Project concluded after six years contribution to China's trade
reform."
33
Apart from the previously mentioned creation of the EU-China Clean Energy Centre and of
innumerable projects, some of the other tangible outcomes of their bilateral partnership in the
energy field have been the implementation in China of legislations similarly drafted in the
EU. This is the case, for example, of the efficiency labelling system applied to Chinese
electrical appliances, which followed strictly the European Eco-Design directive88. Another
example is the implementation of the European Emission Standards for car exhaust gas:
Beijing already uses Euro4 standards since 200889 and this should be progressively extended
to those cities that currently use lower ones.90
China has also sought inspiration from the EU in developing other policies and requirements
such as a tax on SUV91, standards for building efficiency92, or the EU system for registration,
evaluation and authorisation of chemicals (REACH)93
88
On labels see Hollis, Rosemary, Richard Tarasofsky, Nick Mabey, Jennifer Morgan, Jiahua Pan, Kejun Jiang, Lawrence Tubiana, Michel
Colombier and Antonella Battaglini. 2007. "Changing Climates: Interdependencies on Energy and Climate Security for China and Europe."
Chatham House. Page 62.
89
AutomotiveWorld.com. 2008. "China: Beijing launches Euro 4 standards." AutomotiveWorld.com.
90
For reference see: Shijin, Liu, Dai Yande, Yang Fuqiang, Jin Yuefu, He Kebin, Hal Harvey, He Dongquan, Tang Wanjin, Wu Yong, Wang
Xuejun, Liang Xiuying, Hu Zhaoguang, Feng Fei, Liang Zhipeng and Tang Yuan. 2003. "China’s National Energy Strategy and Reform." In
China Development Forum 2003. Development Research Center of the State Council, Beijing. And Hollis, Rosemary, Richard Tarasofsky,
Nick Mabey, Jennifer Morgan, Jiahua Pan, Kejun Jiang, Lawrence Tubiana, Michel Colombier and Antonella Battaglini. 2007. "Changing
Climates: Interdependencies on Energy and Climate Security for China and Europe." Chatham House. Page 36. and Freeman, Duncan; and
Jonathan; Holslag. 2009. "Climate for Cooperation: The EU, China and Climate Change." In BICCS Report. Brussels: Brussels Institute of
Contemporary China Studies. Page 17-18.
91
The Climate Group. 2008. "China’s Clean Revolution."
92
Ibid. and: Energy Efficiency In Industry: As the 2008 report noted, the energy intensity of the Chinese economy has allen by over 60%
since 1980, China is already one of the world’s largest users of supercritical and ultra-supercritical generation technology, renewable energY:
95% of core technology patents on solar water heaters were developed by Chinese companies.urban design and sustainable cOnstructiOn:
China’s Energy Conservation Regulation, smart cities eco cieties The Climate Group. 2009. "China’s Clean Revolution II: Opportunities for
a low carbon future."
93
For this specific issue see: European Commission. 2009. "Working with China on the Environment: The role of the European." ed.
Directorate General for Environment. Bruxelles: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
34
To conclude, even thought it is not the object of this paper, it is worth noting that cooperation
has also evolved in multilateral frameworks beyond the UN; these include for instance:
EURATOM for research in the area of peaceful use of nuclear energy, the ITER-programme
for the development of the new fusion reactor94 and the IEA for discussion on energy related
issues such as oil stocks95.
5.3. Environment and Climate change cooperation
Already in 2003, as noted by Snyder96, the European and Chinese leaders were keen to
strengthen their cooperation on environmental issues, which led to the creation of the
Environmental Policy dialogue, headed by the European Commissioner for Environment and
the Minister of the State Environmental Protection Administration, and the approval of the
Energy and Environment Program (EEP)97. Before, other ad hoc activities were in place
including the Liaoning EU Integrated Environment Project, the EU-China Environmental
Management Project and the EU-China Automobile Exhaust Pollution Control Project which,
respectively, aimed at improving energy efficiency, environmental management and policy
formulation98.
However the backbone of the EU-China cooperation on Climate Change is the EU-China
Partnership on Climate Change which date back to the 2005 Summit. On that occasion the
leaders underlined that their new partnership was “to address climate change issues through
94
On these points see: Umbach, Frank. 2009. "EU-China energy relations and geopolitics: Challenges for cooperation." In The Newsletter.
and Hollis, Rosemary, Richard Tarasofsky, Nick Mabey, Jennifer Morgan, Jiahua Pan, Kejun Jiang, Lawrence Tubiana, Michel Colombier
and Antonella Battaglini. 2007. "Changing Climates: Interdependencies on Energy and Climate Security for China and Europe." Chatham
House. Page 34.
95
As noted by a European Commission official working for DG Energy.
96
Snyder, Francis G. 2009. The European Union and China, 1949-2008: basic documents and commentary. Portland, Or.: Hart Publishing.
Page 827.
97
Freeman, Duncan; and Jonathan; Holslag. 2009. "Climate for Cooperation: The EU, China and Climate Change." In BICCS Report.
Brussels: Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies. Page59.
98
Source: Minutes of the Meeting between Mrs. Margot WaIlström (Commissioner for Environment, European Commission) and Mr. Xie
Zhenhua (Minister, State Environmental Protection Administration, China)
Beijing, 12 November 2003 Collected by Snyder, Francis G. 2009. The European Union and China, 1949-2008: basic documents and
commentary. Portland, Or.: Hart Publishing. Page 828.
35
the promotion and development of more environmentally friendly energy technology and
sources”99. The key areas identified for cooperation were: energy efficiency, energy
conservation and renewable energy; clean coal; methane recovery; Carbon capture and
storage; Hydrogen/fuel cells; and power generation/transmission100.
The 2005 Joint Declaration on Climate Change foresaw the creation of a bilateral discussion
framework to deal with both the environmental and the energy aspects of Climate Change,
which was later created under the so called Bilateral Consultation Mechanism (BCM). The
partnership also included the China–EU Action Plan on Clean Coal and the China–EU Action
Plan on Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energies. In 2009 a declaration which followed the
annual summit, stated that their Partnership on Climate Change would have been the object of
an update at ministerial level, so to underline the importance of their relations in this field.
The importance of the BCM was also due to the fact that it brought together not only the
Commission, but also the Presidency and the Member states101, which are very active in the
environment and climate change cooperation, as pointed out by a European Official working
in the newly established DG Climate Action.
Another key aspect of the Partnership is the Clean Development Mechanism Facilitation
project that was decided in 2006 for the period 2007-2010 and which was provided of a
budget of €2.8 million. The CDM Facilitation aimed at helping Chinese industries to benefit
from the CDM mechanism under the Kyoto protocol. As reported in various studies, China
soon became the main beneficiary of the CDM, and EU countries accounted for about 60% of
the total CDM initiatives in China102. These measures allowed the PRC to tackle local
99
See the Joint Declaration on Climate Change of the 8th EU-China Summit in 2005.
See the Joint Declaration on Climate Change of the 8th EU-China Summit in 2005.
101
I will not have the opportunity in this paper to go in the details of the activities of the Member States.
102
As noted during a personal discussion with a manager at Ecosecurities. Other sources are those by the Office of National Coordination on
Climate Change quoted in Scott, David. 2009. "Environmental issues as a ‘strategic’ key in EU–China relations." Asia Europe Journal
7(2):211-224. Page 216.
100
36
challenges, such as environment degradation which is increasingly worrying Chinese people,
while obtaining some key technologies. Nonetheless the CDM is currently under scrutiny as
its effects in reducing CO2 emissions are questionable, mainly because the ‘additionality
principle’ is hardly enforceable. The result is that the CDM are mainly an offsetting
mechanism, which tends to simply allow the transfer of CO2 emission not produced in China
to Europe (or other Annex I country), which can buy them as certified emission reduction
(CER) and used them to fulfil the Kyoto targets. The European Commission currently
proposes that countries that have higher capability (e.g. China), should implement a new
system based on sectoral crediting. Such a system would still have an offsetting part, but
would push for actual reduction of CO2 emission compared to the business as usual scenario
identified on a sectoral basis.
Another major element of their bilateral cooperation in this field is that China had the
opportunity to use part of the funding provided by the 6th and 7th EU Framework Research
Programs. These are the EU’s largest scientific research projects, the latter of which will run
until 2014 and has a budget of €53 billion. China was already heavily involved in the FP6
(which expired in 2006), and participated in over 200 S&T projects, receiving €46 million
over five years103. These FP, have also become a foreign policy tool in the hand of the EU in
order to push cooperation in specific fields, and in particular in the those related with the
environment, energy and development104 as it is the case for the cooperation on CCS power
plant under the COACH program105. These funds should be added to those allocated in the
103
Gill, Bates, Melissa Murphy and Charles W. Freeman III. 2008. "China-Europe Relations: Implications and Policy Responses for the
United States." Washington D.C.: CSIS Freeman Chair in China Studies.
104
Lequeux, Gilles. 2007. "International Co-operation: Concrete Opportunities " In Info Days Energy. Brussels: Directorate General Energy
and Transport. And Hollis, Rosemary, Richard Tarasofsky, Nick Mabey, Jennifer Morgan, Jiahua Pan, Kejun Jiang, Lawrence Tubiana,
Michel Colombier and Antonella Battaglini. 2007. "Changing Climates: Interdependencies on Energy and Climate Security for China and
Europe." Chatham House. page 48.
105
COACH is one of the two feasibility studies under the NZEC project, and it is partially funded by the 6 th Framework Program. COACH.
2008. "COoperation Action within CCS CHina-EU."
37
various National Indicative Programs, or dedicated to the EU-China Science and Technology
Cooperation, which for instance sponsored the China-EU S&T year in 2006106.
The EC is also engaged, together with UNDP and Norway, in improving the implementation
capacity of local administrations under the "Provincial programmes for Climate Change
Mitigation & Adaptation in China" which was launched on June 2008 and include 14 Chinese
provinces. This program aims “at translating China's National Climate Change Programme
into local action in provincial level” and it is also expected to “improve the capacity of local
government to adapt to climate change negative impacts.”107 Several parties were involved in
this program, including the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the
Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and
the China Meteorological Agency(CMA).
Finally, as noted by Runge-Metzger, the EC work on climate change is also supported by two
other major EU-China environmental cooperation programmes: the River-Basin Management
Programme, with an EU contribution of €25m, and the EU-China Biodiversity Programme,
with an EU contribution of €30m.108
Clearly, as climate change is a global challenge it is not only dealt with bilaterally but also in
multilateral fora in which both the EU and China have a key role. It will not be possible to
deal in this paper with those institutional frameworks, nonetheless it should be noted that,
apart from the well known UNFCCC and the Kyoto protocol, other fora are the Major
Economies Forum on Climate Change (MEF)109 and the G20: the first dealing with
“Some 130 joint research projects involving a total investment of around €850 million have been initiated with over 150 Chinese
participants”. For additional information: Launch of the ‘China-EU Science and Technology Year’: Cooperation for Sustainable Mutual
Benefit, Policy Forum, Brussels, October 11, 2006 and Gill, Bates, Melissa Murphy and Charles W. Freeman III. 2008. "China-Europe
Relations: Implications and Policy Responses for the United States." Washington D.C.: CSIS Freeman Chair in China Studies.Page 69.
107
National Developmentand Reform Commission. 2008. ""Provincial programmes for Climate Change Mitigation & Adapatation in China"
Project Launched." ed. Department of Climate Change: Climate Change Info-Net.
108
Runge-Metzger, Artur. 2010. "The Eu-China Partnership On Climate Change." EU-China Observer(1):1-7.
109
The MEF was launched on March 2009 and include 17 Major economies including the European Union and China. The importance of this
forum was highlighted by a European Commission official working for DG Climate Action during a personal conversation. For additional
information see: MEF. "Major Economies Forum on Climate Change."
106
38
technological issues and the latter on the financial ones. China has shown some reticence in
using smaller framework than the UN to deal with Climate Change related issues, as this
would mean to limit its bargaining power, which was constructed within those wide
multilateral institutions, for instance becoming a leader in the G77+China grouping.
Nonetheless, during a personal conversation with Chinese officials at the Chinese delegation
to the EU, there was some openness on this point, noting that in principle China would be
willing to use smaller fora such as the G20, except taking at a later state the issue to the wider
UN-led fora.
6. Challenges and potential competition (Please note that this paragraph can be omitted to
respect the word limit)
Even though the two sides have high potential for cooperation, some challenges remains and,
as noted by some researchers: “There is no other area that has so much potential for fruitful
cooperation between the EU and China. But there is also no area where the room for
confrontation and conflict is so great.”110 At the bilateral level very high on the agenda is the
extent to which China is able and willing to protect European economic interests by
establishing a level-plain-field in which European companies can operate111. This will
increasingly influence the extent to which the EU and its companies will be in the condition to
deploy their technology in China without fearing intellectual property theft and other
commercially harmful practices. Should China fail in doing so it might profit of short term
gains, but in the long run it might fail in finding keener partners, leading arguably to a
slowdown in its path towards modernisation. It is clear that the more products goes up in the
110
Centre for European Reform and Charles Grant. 2008. "Can Europe and China shape a new world order?". Page 77.
Wen Jiabao proposes more protection of IPRs during the EU-China summit in Nanjing Tong, Xiong. 2009. "China urges EU to relax
export control over high-tech products." In Xinhuanet.com.
111
39
value chain the more European companies will be reticent to produce in a business unfriendly
China, whose developing image is slowing fading away for the benefit of a new image: the
one of great competitor (at least) in the world market. This is true not only on low and
medium technology products but increasingly also for those green technologies which were
supposed to give European companies a competitive hedge in the coming years, such as
efficient light bulbs, solar panels and water heater112.
At the multilateral level Chinese energy diplomacy carried out both via its national oil
companies or via ad hoc international institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation
Organisations or the ASEAN (and ARF) might also determine a more competitive approach,
unless China increase its awareness of other players’ interest in the various regions.
Europeans pay particular attention to their neighbours for energy reasons, as it is the case of
Central Asia and Russia, and for historical and ideational reasons in the case of African
countries. Chinese pragmatic policies towards the latter ought to be carried out more
discretely and avoiding interference with its partners’ objectives; currently however this is not
the case as the “Beijing consensus”113 tend to undermine EU’s efforts to boost good
governance and the respect of human rights.
Also Russia and Central Asia could be areas of contention or of partnership according to the
extent to which EU-China relations with the other regional powers modify the status quo in a
positive or negative way with regards to China or the EU. As it has happened for the EUChina dialogue on Africa, an increased dialogue over Chinese and Europeans policies in
China’s Suntech Power has grown into the world’s third-largest solar energy company. Freeman, Duncan; and Jonathan; Holslag. 2009.
"Climate for Cooperation: The EU, China and Climate Change." In BICCS Report. Brussels: Brussels Institute of Contemporary China
Studies. Page 28. For Beijing’s subsidies and state aid policy to enter European markets and for Chinese alleged “duping practices” see:
Scott, David. 2009. "Environmental issues as a ‘strategic’ key in EU–China relations." Asia Europe Journal 7(2):211-224. and Deklerk, Rudi
and Jing Men. 2010. "The Eu And China: Cloudy Weather For Solar Energy?" EU-China Observer(1):14-20.
113
On this issue see for instance: Joshua Ramo, ‘TheBeijing consensus’, Foreign Policy Centre, May 2004 in Centre for European Reform
and Charles Grant. 2008. "Can Europe and China shape a new world order?". Page 84, Suzuki, Shogo. 2009. "Chinese Soft Power, Insecurity
Studies, Myopia and Fantasy." Third World Quarterly 30(4):779 - 793., Soroos, Marvin S. 1994. "Review: Confronting Global
Environmental Change." Mershon International Studies Review 38(2):299-306. and Mingjiang, Li, David M. Lampton, Suisheng Zhao,
Albert Keidel, Wu Jianmin, Evan Medeiros, Yuan Peng, Shen Dingli, Da Wei, Peter Van Ness, Hu Xijin, William Tow and Sidney
Rittenberg. 2008. "Debating China's Future." China Security - 中国安全4(3):3-33.
112
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Central Asia and vis-à-vis Russia, focusing on energy resources, could increase their mutual
understanding as well as the chances of long lasting cooperation. This approach, which could
put in question an EU membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, or the creation
of ad hoc fora to discuss energy related and environmental issues, could contribute at
avoiding negative spin-offs on more successful bits of their relation (i.e. energy efficiency,
trade).
In other words there are areas in which China and the EU have high probability of keep
cooperating effectively, and others on which they must be keen to coordinate their policies
instead of act strategically as in a zero sum game. Since Deng Xiaoping “reform and opening
up policy”, China has tried to keep a low profile in IR, founding its external action on the
renowned principle of “peaceful development”114 and non intervention, convinced that in so
doing it would have had the opportunity of focusing on its own local challenges. However the
size of its population and economy, its different political system as well as its elevation to the
rank of global power have been highly destabilizing for the international system, even though
this was probably not aimed by Deng’s progressive reform policy. Under this reading the
Westphalian principles of non-intervention and state sovereignty, often held by Chinese
leaders as those that should lead the relations among states, can hardly be consistently
claimed if we take into consideration that the rise of China as an emerging power has directly
affected the majority of the other members of the international community115.
For a discussion on this concept see: Lee, John. 2008. "China’s Insecurity and search for Power." Issue Analysis(101)., Richards, Judith.
2009. "China Has Little Interest in Peaceful Development." 4 March 2009 Edition: Atlantic Community., Rabinovitch, Simon. 2008. "The
Rise of an Image-Conscious China." China Security - 中国安全 4(3):32-47. and People’s Republic of China. 2008. "China's National
Defense." ed. Information Office of the State Council Of the People's Republic of China. Beijing. Page 7.
115
From here also stems the interest of the international community to engage China in the majority of International Organisations. However
this should be done at due time, otherwise the risk is of having a member which is very powerful but still not acquainted with the norms that
it is supposed to implement.
114
41
Energy and environment are two key horizontal issues116 which will prove Chinese and
European abilities to cooperate at bilateral and international level. Their success is to be
proportional to the efforts that will be put in non challenging excessively the other members
of the international community, while using the system for their own purposes, being it
economic development or the improvement of national image.
Finally a note should be made with regards to the role of international regimes in framing
bilateral relations into partnership or competition. Recent studies have pointed out that the
there are tensions over which regime should deal with what and how, aware of the fact that
energy, environmental and trade regimes deal with cross cutting issues but with different
gradients of legalisation117 presenting the risk of “venue hopping” (e.g. G20, UNFCCC,
WTO, UNSC?).
As previously noticed in fact, the three regimes deal with issues which have a “security side”,
be it in terms of energy security, environmental degradation, public health or political
stability. This element has already influenced the development of the energy regime, which
has been in a impasse for several years since the stall of the Energy Charter Treaty and the
wave of nationalisations of energy resources. A similar sort could lie in front of the
environment and climate change regimes, should their security relevance be further
recognized but an ad hoc fora fail to materialize. These increased difficulties faced by
“security regimes118” can be explained by the fact that they touch upon issues which are
As such they have already been the object of the “mainstreaming” of these issues across policy areas both in China and the EU as
mentioned by a EU official working in DG Climate (as far as the EU is concerned) and in: Hollis, Rosemary, Richard Tarasofsky, Nick
Mabey, Jennifer Morgan, Jiahua Pan, Kejun Jiang, Lawrence Tubiana, Michel Colombier and Antonella Battaglini. 2007. "Changing
Climates: Interdependencies on Energy and Climate Security for China and Europe." Chatham House.Page 67
117
For example see: Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, Steve Charnovitz and Jisun Kim. 2009. "Book Review: Global Warming and the World Trading
System." Foreign Affairs 88(6):156-156., Tarasofsky, Richard. 2007. "Linking trade, investment and climate change policies." In Briefing
Paper. London: Chatham House. and Kérébel, Cécile and Jan Horst Keppler. 2009. La gouvernance mondiale de l'énergie IFRI.
118
A definition of security regime is: “Principles, rules and norms that permit nations to be restrained in their behaviour in the belief that
other will reciprocate”. In Jervis, Robert. 1982. "Security Regimes." International Organization 36(2):357-378. Page 357. For the
charachteristics of the security regimes i.e. not related to the immediate self interest, binding and unanbigious rules and the preference for the
status quo, see page 371, 273
116
42
considered strategic (or of vital interest) by certain governments, and thus obstacle the
framing of any kind of common approach119.
A first step towards a shift in the nature of the climate change regime towards a security
regime has already been done, via the presentation of the previously mentioned UN report,
which unsurprisingly highlighted Chinese opposition, probably fearing of an upgrade of the
UN Security Council as the appropriate fora for climate change negotiations. This would in
fact seriously dismantle Chinese climate change negotiation policy which has been drawn
around its ability to “lead and hide” behind the G77+China grouping. On the contrary the
report’s conclusions were strongly backed by the EU, as the respective contributions to the
UN Report have uncovered.
On the same line the BASIC countries have opposed any shift of the climate change regime
towards a more legalized one, as the EU and the US would have hoped in Copenhangen. In
particular they have excluded the use of the trade regimes to deal with climate change-related
issues120 and have opposed the introduction of any sort of BCAs, fearing that those measure
would hamper their economic development121 and, especially for China, its related political
stability122 (thus underlining the link between climate change and national security).
In light of these events it seems that both the energy and climate change regimes are in a
limbo between a security and a trade regime. The former has by now failed in transforming
itself in a fully fledged regime, due to its fragmentation and diverging interests of the main
actors. In particular it still lacks a clear organisation and some unifying institutions, while its
market is torn between national ownership of national resources, which are often used
119
Ibid.
International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development. 2010. "India’s Khullar says Trade and Environment Should Not Mix."
Bridges Trade BioRes 10(3).
121
For example, Yao Jian, spokesman of Ministry of Commerce of China, has said that "carbon tariffs" are not only in violation of the basic
rules of the World Trade Organization but also run against the principle of "common and differentiated responsibilities." Mu, Xuequan.
2009. ""Carbon tariffs" cloud efforts to combat climate change." In Xinhuanet.com. See also: Euractiv.com. 2010a. "Carbon tariffs resurface
in Copenhagen aftermath." Euractiv.com. and Xinhua. 2009a. "China repeats stance against proposed carbon tariffs." Xinhuanet.com.
122
I will come back on the link between economic security and political stability in China in the next Chapters.
120
43
politically, and multinational companies. Also the energy “quasi-regime” has been escaping
from the trade regime, which could have easily improved the global energy security
conditions123. Climate change instead is becoming an increasingly important issue, due to the
urgency of the actions needed to mitigate and to adapt to its effects. This is pushing the
supporters of a strong climate change regime to try to shift it towards more legalized regimes,
probably better able to deliver results i.e. the trade regime and the security-like regimes.
However as things stands now, emerging countries are not ready to give up their policy
discretion, which is considered fundamental to allow their economies to grow.
7. Conclusions
In this paper I have argued that the cooperation between the EU and China has reached a new
level thanks to the development of the energy and climate change regimes. The two actors
face comparable challenges, and those regimes have partially reshaped their preferences and,
in so doing, fostered the reasons for them to cooperate. These have thus moved their relations
from trade to more security relevant areas, allowing them to overcome their discourse over
their mere recognition of each-other global power status which was typical during (and soon
after) the Cold War. The energy and climate change regimes have also helped them to gain in
terms of international image and to push towards the deployment of new technologies and
higher standards, which have positive effects in terms of economic growth and, indirectly,
on political legitimacy via high growth rates.
123
The assumption that a high gradient of legalisation (at least for trade) lead to a reduction of its use for strategic political behaviours is also
discussed in: Abbott, Frederick M. 2000. "NAFTA and the Legalization of World Politics: A Case Study." International Organization
54(3):519-547.
44
The lack of effective regimes and institutions in the energy sector is arguably the main
potential cause of friction among the EU and China, especially given their increasingly
reliance on similar “energy basins” i.e. Russia and Central Asia. Nonetheless, as it has been
underlined in the paper, the value of their overall cooperation on energy, environment and
climate change issues is overwhelmingly important, and it largely offsets the risk of actual
confrontation.
Climate Change, in both its energy and the environmental dimensions, is by definition an
horizontal issue, and it touches upon several other policy areas, not only domestically but also
internationally. The extent to which China and the EU will be effective partners or
competitors will be increasingly affected by their willingness (and ability) to shape their
bilateral partnership, as well as the international regimes, so to reduce uncertainty and to share
the relative benefits, as in an actual “win-win” cooperation124. Under this understanding,
energy, environment and climate change are set to have an increasing relevance in cementing
their bilateral partnership.
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