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REAPPLYING WARFARE PRINCIPLES TO MARKETING
STRATEGY
PONOVNA UPORABA NAČEL VOJSKOVANJA PRI RAZVOJU
TRŽENJSKI STRATEGIJ
Tomaž Kolar
Faculty of Economics
University of Ljubljana
Kardeljeva ploščad 17
1101 Ljubljana
[email protected]
Abstract
Marketing often borrows strategic approaches from military field. Due to changed societal
context and nature of encounters immense transformations are taking place in military
warfare doctrine and strategy, yet they are not adequately reflected in marketing strategy
development. In order to suggest possible implications of these transformations for marketing
limitations of traditional marketing warfare are discussed first. Building on similarities with
recent military transformations a new framework for marketing strategy development is
proposed that encompass various aspects of strategy development. Possible applications of
proposed framework for marketing strategy and future research agenda are also discussed.
Keywords: Marketing strategy, Analogies, Marketing warfare, Effectiveness
Povzetek
Trženje pogosto uporablja vojaško terminologijo in enači trženjsko konkuriranje z
vojskovanjem. Vsled spreminjajočega konteksta s katerem se odvija sodobno vojskovanje so
zanj značilne pomembne spremembe vojaške doktrine in strategije, česar pa razvoj sodobnih
trženjskih strategij ne upošteva v zadostni meri. Zato je najprej predstavljen kritičnen pogled
na klasični pristop “trženjskega vojskovanja” Z namenom prikazati možne implikacije
transformacij sodobnih vojaških strategij v trženju, je zatem prestavljen konceptualni okvir za
razvoj trženjskih strategij, ki obsega različna področja razvoja trženjske strategije.
Predstavitev okvirja dopolnjujejo predlogi glede njegove potencialne uporabe na različnih
področjih trženja in razprava o možnih smereh nadaljnjega raziskovanja na tem področju.
Ključne besede: Trženjska strategija, Analogije, Trženjsko vojskovanje, Uspešnost
Introduction
In past two decades a lot of efforts had been devoted to the marketing theory and practice
enhancement at very fundamental level. Attempts to explore new ways of thinking about
marketing at various levels and in various fields (Brownlie et al., 1999). Among them, some
dramatic calls for saving marketing from premature death, or at least from growing
inefficiency of prevailing marketing practice, were noticeable - especially from post-modern
perspective (Brown, 1999). Less radical authors discussed issues like (new) role of marketing
in the corporations (Moorman and Rust, 1999, Webster, 1992) and adequacy of basic
marketing propositions (Sheth and Rajendra, 1999, Kumar et al., 2000). However
comprehensive and interesting were these efforts, most of them stays inside marketing field,
while according to the old wisdom “the way out of labyrinth can be fond only from the
outside”. Similarly, rejuvenation of marketing would be probably most successful from the
outside of marketing theory and profession. Today marketing seems lost in a labyrinth of its
own galleries, from which it cannot found the way out. And the most needed way out is the
way toward better effectiveness, based on development of marketing strategy, its more
efficient execution and on assuring closer touch with surrounding social context. Here
military approach can suggest some possible ways out of marketing labyrinth, serving as
source of positive contamination and as a source of fresh ideas for development of marketing
strategies.
Analogies of military and marketing are not new per se, as they are used for a long time.
Marketing seems to borrow its “warfare” terminology (campaigns, targeting, etc.) from
military area since ever. In this paper I argue that such transfer could be very beneficial for
marketing strategy developments when some weaknesses of traditional approach are
transcended. In order to accomplish this aim prevailing warfare approach in marketing is first
critically addressed, followed by proposal of new framework, which allows that military
doctrine and strategy can be reapplied to marketing strategy development. Paper concludes
with future research agenda that could further improve efficient knowledge transfer between
the fields.
Need to rethink warfare marketing
Classical “attrition warfare” approach used in marketing for decades, is in my opinion one of
the main causes of marketing fatigue that we are witnessing in past years. Such an approach is
not only of questionable usefulness, but it can be misleading according to basic premises of
marketing concept. A good example of such questionable proposition is for instance
suggestion that marketing should abandon customer orientation (and put more emphasize on
battle with competitors) (Ries and Trout, 1996).
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Such “radical turnovers” namely turns focus away from changed nature of market interactions
that actually takes place in today’s markets. Assumption that companies are operating in
harmony with their customers and competitors is probably too idealistic at today’s markets,
but this of course does not mean that mutual satisfaction is not desirable and worthwhile
business goal. Still taking such idealistic assumptions as inputs for building strategy for
effective market competition is probably unrealistic. Companies and marketers should
confront themselves with fact, that they imposed “warfare” logic to the market, implying that
customers are a battleground for war with competitors. Customers are aware of this market
reality and this awareness can perhaps provide the best explanation, of growing customers
cynicism, their declining trust and loyalty and consumer resistance (Brabbs, 2000, Kozinets
and Handelman, 2004, Holt, 2002). This means, that instead of building on idealistic or
extremist assumptions, marketing strategies should be largely based on principles of
minimizing negative marketing impacts, conflict resolution, marketing diplomacy,
compromise finding, trust recovering and similar “conflict acknowledgement” principles.
According to framework for classification of marketing theories proposed by Saren (2000),
theories that are not based solely on harmony principle but instead placed along harmonyconflict dimensions would be probably more useful for this purpose.
The main problem with prevailing warfare logic in marketing is that authors from the
marketing field build on “historical” view on military doctrine, principles and approaches.
They builds on classical theorists of war like Von Clausewitz (Ries and Trout, 1996 Kotler
and Singh, 1981), or ancient Asian war wisdoms (Pheng and Sirpal, 1995) – both being
“centuries old”. Yet development of military doctrine and approaches in past years went
through immense transformations, making classic military theories and approaches largely
obsolete. Further decomposition of this problem shows that warfare marketing uses analogies
with war as phenomena but neglecting structural similarities of efficient and effective
strategy deployment. Analogies end on level of general goals (e.g. total annihilation) strategic
taxonomies (e.g. offensive vs. defensive strategies) or highly abstract metaphors, not probing
beneath the superficial similarities. Traditional marketing builds on warfare archetypes rather
than on transfer of key strategic principles and factors and as a consequence even classical
military strategy principles are often inappropriately interpreted and inconsistently applied to
marketing field. In addition war and marketing are societal activities what suggests that
strategy development should take into actual societal context where battle takes place, what
also seems neglected in marketing strategy. Alike to military campaigns, marketing one also
should take into account economic, political, societal and cultural factors of society at which
they operate. This for instance extends domain of market strategy beyond socially responsible
marketing activities, as we know them today – namely using them mainly as promotional tool.
In order to overcome weaknesses of traditional marketing warfare approach discussed above I
build on recent military transformation trends that are trying to abandon obsolete military
doctrine. Possible implications for marketing strategy developments are discussed within
proposed framework (presented in picture 1), consisting of four broad areas of marketing
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strategy development. These areas are marketing doctrine (which addresses marketing
purpose and strategic role inside and outside of the company), intelligence efficiency
leverages (which address principles and weapons of market impact), soft resources
deployment (particularly ideology and motivation on collective and individual level) and the
process of marketing strategy development (which is considered according to content and
procedural aspects).
Picture 1: Framework for reapplying warfare principles to marketing strategy
Marketing doctrine
Process of strategy
development
proces
Intelligence and
Efficiency leverages
Soft resources
deployment
Military and marketing doctrine
Even brief look into historical development of military strategy shows how profound changes
has taken place in warfare doctrine. Military strategy is a relatively new concept – the first
treatise on military strategy was written in 1799 by von Buelow, who defined strategy as an
art of conducting war not from a horse on the battlefield (a common practice at his time), but
from a war-room with the help of a map and a few basic strategic axioms. The art of strategy
for him and his more famous successor Antoine Henri Jomini who introduced some similar
concepts, was basically reduced to geometry (Van Creveld, 2000). Both thinkers were
therefore influenced by the enlightenment period emphasizing rational problem solving and
behavior. But war is not a rational activity, since a preparedness to die, in fact, contradicts and
negates rationality as such. What counts in the end is discipline and force of will; this at least
was the point made by German military thinker Georg Heinrich von Berenhorst. Karl von
Clausewitz’s united these opposing poles or “extremes” and thus conceptualized strategy as
we know it today. For him war is a primordial act of violence. War’s natural tendency is
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escalation of violence, making it dangerous and unpredictable. No amount of information,
maneuvering and deterrence can win the war but brute force is the decisive factor. The most
effective strategy according to classical war strategists is therefore to smash any opposing
armed forces with brute force. This philosophy is today largely replaced by more astute
thinking – which is also more applicable to marketing area.
Recently various authors (Pech and Durden, 2003, Ho and Choi, 1997 and Clemons and
Santamaria, 2002) demonstrated how more up-to date military approaches like maneuver
warfare can provide important strategic implications for business decision making in
uncertain and unpredictable market conditions - suggesting approaches that not aims only for
maintaining of high efficiency in (in uncertainty and unpredictability) but utilizing these
environmental conditions for gaining competitive advantage. Maneuver warfare as prime
example of such approaches builds on paradigm shift in military thinking, which is
characterized by move from positional (attritional) warfare to “rapid movement” warfare,
where intelligence, economy of effort, elements of surprise and deception are basic principles
(Pech and Durden, 2003). This shift is reflected on all key factors of military strategy as
depicted in table 1.
Table 1: Shift from attritional to maneuver warfare
Concept
Strategy
Orientation
Targets
Planning
Structure
Orders
Understanding
Control
Tactics
Emphasis
Attrition
Direct
Terrain
Strengths
Centralized
Historical
Rigid
Detailed
Explicit
Centralized
Dominant
Firepower
Attrition
Discipline
Mass
Weight
Blood
Maneuver
Indirect
Enemy
Weaknesses
Decentralized
Anticipatory
Flexible
Mission based
Implicit
Decentralized
Guiding
Movement
Agility
Trust
Velocity
Surprise
Brains
Source: Pech and Durden, 2003
Ho and Choi (1997) as such key factors that should be considered at strategy development
suggest morality, environmental climate, terrain, generalship and doctrine. Lists of key
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strategic factors therefore differs between the authors, yet all of them suggest that holistic
view on marketing strategy should be taken, with multiple inside and outside factors
considered.
Today we can also see two opposing views of what the future of armed conflict is going to be.
First one is the technological view of future warfare known as the Revolution in Military
Affairs (RMA), supported by the US Army, emphasizing technological superiority with
factors such as battlefield awareness, precision strikes and information dominance as the key
to winning a conventional war. Enormous investments in new technology made US
predominance in conventional warfare so obvious, that conventional forces facing their attack
have only one strategic option – to disintegrate, blend into the civilian population and fight a
protracted guerrilla war. Second one is Low Intensity Conflict warfare (LIC) (e.g. guerrilla
war in Iraq, terrorist attacks), which emphasizes the fact that the social and political
framework in which wars are fought has changed so drastically, that modern conflicts bear
more similarity to medieval ones than battles fought in the 2nd world war (Van Creveld,
1991). The state is losing its power, so wars are not fought exclusively by states, but rather by
religious groups, terrorist cells, drug cartels and different bands, giving rise to revolutionaries,
freedom fighters and terrorists, thus emphasizing ideological, religious, political and cultural
factors as decisive in winning a modern war.
Conventional armies are trying to find a new solution for LIC types of conflict that are
characterized by blurring boundaries between soldiers and civilians, overburdened sensors,
information uncertainty, which are denying them ultimate victory (what seems appropriate
metaphor for marketing too!). The changed nature of societal context of warfare and of
conflict in general is therefore firstly characterized by the transition to a post-modern society
and secondly, by the inherent friction between intelligence/technology and ideological/human
factors as determinants of victors in the conflict. Marketing, like the military, operates in
growing complexity, unpredictability, and blurred organizational borders, being more and
more immersed with surrounding societal context. This puts prevailing marketing approaches
to strategy development – which take into account only economic forces and
vendors/customers dyad as only relevant players on clearly delineated markets rather than
whole society - in question. Marketing needs to be aware of these trends and search for
strategies and skills to cope with them. Here are some implications for such strategies.
Marketing should consider its interaction with broader societal issues, developments and
institutions, overcoming narrow “socially-responsible brand” horizon. Today consumers are
interested in who stands behind the brand and how corporations act within broader societal
context (Holt, 2002). This implies establishing closer relations with players from other fields
of modern societies like governments, universities, political institutions, civil institutions and
religion institutions.
Furthermore marketing should consider strategic approaches which are more suitable for
unclear inter-organizational and intra-organizational borders, known under the term the
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borderless organization (Ashekenas et al., 1995) In today’s markets real borders are often
borders between networks (alliances) rather than particular organizations, with a tendency to
closely integrate suppliers, distributors, customers and other stakeholders. On the other hand
some market players, previously considered as being independent allies, like retailers and
information technology providers, are today becoming the most dangerous competitors, as
they have conquered access to customers, forcing suppliers into inferior positions (Lambin,
2000). Efficient strategies for competing with competing networks or with “intermediary”
types of powerful market players are therefore much needed.
Also marketers should rethink role and impact of marketing function inside the organization.
There has been some attempts to define new role of marketing, suggesting that marketing
should play spanning role between organization and its customers, but also between
organizational functions (Day, 1994). However, it seems that marketing has lacks mandate,
informational competencies and power to enforce such strategic and organization-wide impact
(Aaby and McGann, 1989, Harris, 2000). Marketing as business function should therefore
consider approaches and strategies that are based on political and persuasive power. Today’s
importance of “Machiavellian” approach to marketing discussed by Harris and Lock (1996)
and Thomas (2000) is therefore highly relevant.
Another strategic issue that should be re-thought is organizational structure, unit size and
decision authority of marketing departments and business organizations as a whole. Big
organizational departments and centrally controlled marketing operations are subject to
similar (friction, uncertainty) weaknesses as in big military formations. Smaller, more
independent units, with local knowledge and decentralized decision authority, linked in
network structures should therefore be seriously taken into consideration, as they can be
efficient for coping with uncertainty and disorder (Clemons and Santamaria, 2002). Here
networking structures are not interesting just in terms of external networks, but predominantly
in terms of internal networks of organizational units.
Intelligence and efficiency leverages
Traditional strategic wisdom suggests: “the best strategy is always to be very strong, first in
general and then at the decisive point” (Clausewitz, 1989). But how to find a decisive point in
a situation where our opponent is actively misleading us? Modern militaries who strive to
achieve total battlefield awareness and information dominance by fighting a “war of sensory
systems” (Cebrowsky, 2002) are thus experiencing new levels of friction and uncertainty.
Friction is the difference between rehearsal and real performance, where small mistakes
inevitably happen, possibly resulting in an unexpected combination of malfunctions leading to
failure of the entire complex system (Perrow, 1999). Uncertainty on the other hand is related
to battlefield awareness (knowing where friend and foe is). Soldiers face an enemy
determined to kill them, trying to deceive them and increasing their uncertainty. In response,
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the modern military increasingly relies on communications which allow senior commanders
in headquarters to literary see the situation on the frontline (via real time image processing)
and aid with their advice and professional judgment.
Similar to military trends, the marketing function might need similar transformations in the
area of intelligence. The need to provide market information to corporate headquarters is not a
new idea per se, yet still not fully accepted in practice. Aaby and McGann (1989) state that
marketing lacks navigational influence on corporate strategy. According to Cowan (1994),
market research reports mainly down the organization to functional departments, disabling the
use of consumer information for strategic purposes. It seems that in marketing there is a
constant problem with bottom-up flow of information and that business generals (companies
CEO’s) are simply not interested in information from the battlefield (e.g. competitive position
in customers mind), but rather only in final outcome of the battle (profit). Companies
therefore, instead of ad hoc, annually presented summaries of market research reports, need
precise, real time sensor capabilities that will convey information from the frontline to the
board level. Extensive discussion of what exactly encompasses the “frontline intelligence” in
marketing is beyond the scope of this paper, but even considering this issue can be fruitful
starting point for improvements in this area. It addresses the question on how precise
information are readily available for top-managers on customer-company interactions across
all elements of interface and competitive position of the company and its brands. Despite
abundant knowledge produced in marketing on differentiation and positioning in their
effective implementation is namely increasingly hard to achieve (Dolliver, 2001). In times
when consumers’ decisions are increasingly impulsive and unplanned (Kacen, Lee, 2002)
even understanding of their preferences can be immense problem (Cova, 1999). In light of
such considerations the bottom up-flow of insightful market-related information to executive
level is crucial, so more attention should be devoted to it, but also to more specific
intelligence issues.
In the future, marketing intelligence should for instance provide information about the market
sensing capacities of competitors. In order to accomplish this function Walle (1999) suggests
that competitive intelligence should be a “freestanding” discipline that will (among other
activities) monitor competitive market research and strongly rely on qualitative research
techniques.
Another implication arising from related transformations in the military for marketing is that
it should rethink the nature and leverages of its effectiveness. Marketing is facing declining
effectiveness in classical marketing approaches and weapons, like massive “frontal”
campaigns based on one-way mass media communications (Forrest and Mizerski, 1996).
Although here, direct analogies with military weapons are questionable, we think that at least
two military principles regarding the origin of efficient impact, are well worth consideration.
The first is a shift to a low frequency - high amplitude principle (Leonhard, 2003). It suggests
that instead of the prevailing emphasis on frequency of hits, marketing tools should be more
focused on the effect (amplitude) of a particular hit. While some approaches like memetic
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marketing (Williams, 2002) acknowledge this principle as paradigmatic shift in marketing, in
terms of strategy this approach is still in its infancy. On the other hand there are some
approaches known as Stealth (or Undercover) marketing (Kaikati and Kaikati, 2004) that
effectively applies this principle in practice. Although “low frequency-high amplitude”
principle has profound implications for marketing, many specific manifestations are yet to be
discerned - they may be derived for advertising strategy, measuring marketing effectiveness,
optimization of promotional budgets, customer relations’ management and other issues.
The second effect-oriented military principle is the deter forward principle which emphasizes
“activities before the first shot”, aiming to alter the initial conditions of the encounter
(Cebrowski, 2002). Some concepts and approaches in marketing like expectations
management (Pitt and Jeantrout, 1994) and permission marketing (Godin, 1999) seem to
follow this principle, yet they are only vaguely integrated with marketing strategies. Shaping
the market before launching a marketing campaign seems a good idea and it has important
implications for establishing relations with allies and with the deterrence principle, both being
under-exploited issues in formulating competitive marketing strategies.
Deploying human and soft resources
Next area of military transformations that is interesting for marketers is human resource (and
organizational culture) management. Military is perhaps the best example of skillful, purpose
based and performance-oriented profession regarding training of the “employees”. They
provide many different skills (physical, psychological, moral, knowledge-based) that are
necessary for successful human performance. Katzenbach and Santamaria (1999) shows how
marines “mission-values-pride” path can lead to emotionally engaged, committed and highperforming workforce in business area too. While this notion is not particularly new and
surprising, it is often overlooked, that contrary to prevailing view military is not immoral. Its
coherence, discipline and performance are grounded on trust, pride and discipline. Without
them soldiers become morally too vulnerable as none cannot survive moral dilemmas
encountered at warfare without their ideological justification.
The key problem of conventional armies with new breed of fighters (terrorists, civilian
freedom fighters) is exactly their powerful moral, political and religious motivation, which
fosters a deep commitment to the reference groups, country and ideological principles. Deep
commitment to ideology is their key fighting leverage or center of gravity. In order to win,
their enemies must kill their will to fight. Hearts and minds are therefore again the decisive
factors of conflict. This notion is important for marketing, showing that customers’ and
competitors’ socio-cultural background should be utilized, not ignored or treated as a
(defeatable) obstacle. A good example of such utilization in the marketing field is the success
of Mecca-Cola, a product that builds on religious and political symbolism and anti-American
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attitudes (Johansson, 2004). In the area of “hearts and minds management”, possible
implications for marketing strategy are:

An increased need for information regarding ethically and politically driven
consumption in today’s markets. Such research is largely qualitatively based, often using an
ethno-methodology and interpretive research approach (Gummesson, 2004). However, we
think that some alternative methodological approaches like meme’s analysis can also be very
useful for these purposes as they aim at understanding the position of the product/brand in a
network of shared meaning (Marsden, 2002) and as it provides important implications for
“social infection strategies” (Williams, 2002).

Military experiences with ideology, morality and motivational factors are useful for
human resources management implications in marketing. Contrary to the prevailing view, the
military is not immoral - its coherence, discipline and performance are grounded on trust,
pride and discipline. Emotionally engaged, committed and high-performing workforce is key
for high performance in the marketing area too and calls for redeployment of internal
marketing approaches as we know them today.

Military transformation also shows that contribution of the individual will count more in
the future, because adapting to ever-changing complex situations require innovation and
creativity at an individual level (Leonhard, 2003). The military approach to treatment and
training of people confronts marketers with the question: can we expect high-performance
results from “accidental”, poorly trained and solely economically motivated employees,
whose individuality and morale is totally neglected? Human resource practices toward
employees who are working in critical customer-encounter positions like those in Call-centres
or tellers are specifically often described not just as poor, but as “sacrificial”, leading to high
turnover and low morale (Wallace et al., 2000). Contrary to this, the US Marine motto Semper
Fidelis (Always Faithful) (USMC, 2004) confirms that workforce effectiveness should be
largely based on a respect for moral values.
Process of marketing strategy development
The military understands strategy development as a science and an art – taking both very
seriously. Generals meet personally in war-rooms and seminars to combine analytical skills
with personal intuition, using different methods for envisaging the most probable stream of
future events and coping with complexity and unpredictability. They carefully plan each
phase of the strategy – what seems one of the major weaknesses in marketing strategy
preparation as they are often conceived as genial idea about superior product or its position on
the market. In addition they adapt planning process to the goals and specifics of the task.
Powerful offensive strikes and “military operations other than war” (Shalikashvili, 1995) are
for instance two distinctively different phases of military operations. Both phases may
specifically emphasize different factors of success and require different strategies. In the
offensive phase informational dominance and high-tech weapons have proven immensely
effective, implying that offensive marketing strategies should be proactive and intelligence
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based, incorporating the “high amplitude effects” and “deter forward” principles, discussed in
the second part of this paper. This also implies that in offensive attempts, marketing should
rely more on driving the market instead of being responsive and utilizing a “market driven”
approach (Kumar et al., 2000) On the other hand, stabilization phase should be more focused
on the issues discussed in the third part of the paper, dealing with socio-cultural and
individual factors. In this phase, the focus should be on “immersing with market”, implying
efficient solving logistic and maintenance problems, simultaneously paying great attention to
symbolic and human interaction between the company, its products and customers. Despite
the fact that these elements are tactical by definition, they are of strategic importance in
securing long-term survival in the market.
Taken together the implications considered above and in previous sections show that
marketing strategists should devote more attention to strategy craftsmanship. Pech and
Durden (2003) noted that relying on linear planning, “firepower” tools and “attrition”
strategies in today’s business landscape, which is characterized by uncertainty and
unpredictability, is a mistake. In addition they draw some meaningful parallels between
business and military failures that are of interest for marketing field too. Key of them are:
 Fundamental conservatism and adherence to outworn traditions
 A tendency to reject or ignore information that is “unpleasant” or that conflicts with
preconceptions
 A tendency to underestimate the enemy and overestimate one’s own capability
 An obstinate persistence in a given task despite strong evidence against it
 Failure to exploit ground gained and a tendency to “pull punches rather than push
home an attack”
 Inadequate reconnaissance
 A predilection for frontal assaults, often against the enemy’s strongest point
 A belief in brute force rather than the clever ruse
 Failure to make use of surprise and deception
This list of common mistakes can be easily applied to process of marketing strategy
development, while it is much less evident how to avoid them in practice. In general it might
be suggested that instead of the prevailing marketing management model (fitting within a
logical empiricist paradigm), which can be considered as rationalistic and mechanistic (Saren,
2000), marketers should therefore systematically deploy “new science” tools like
visualization, mental models, scenario building and intuition (Sanders, 1998, Kaplan and
Norton, 2000). Such approaches seem better suited to today’s business landscape,
incorporating both - intelligence and ideology factors - ensuring their synergy not
exclusiveness.
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Future research agenda
Analogies with regard to structural and content similarities between warfare and marketing
strategy development were discussed in the paper. Despite useful and profound implications
for marketing field many issues related to such an approach remains unexplored, hence can
serve as starting point in future endeavors in this area – be they theoretical, methodological or
practical by nature. Some of the most challenging are questions regarding:
 Further comparisons of key principles, factors and approaches (e.g. basic assumptions,
mental models, goal hierarchies) in order to detect opportunities for additional
knowledge transfer.
 Assessment of historical development phase on which is marketing strategy currently
if we compare it with recent military transformations.
 Comparison of marketing and military practices in most promising domains like
intelligence gathering, strategy development and personal training.
 Marketing implications of dialectics of opposing principles that can be often found in
military strategy (e.g. terrain vs. enemy, light/fast vs. strong/stable and positional vs.
maneuver focus)
 Justification and verification of relevance and validity of using warfare analogies and
metaphors as a research method.
 Assessment of extent to which war metaphor is implicitly and explicitly present in
marketing theory, strategy and practice.
 Exploration and assessment of victims and damage caused by offensive vs. defensive
marketing practices on various levels (i.e. individual, segment, market, society).
 How various societal aspects and institutions (e.g. politics, state, religion, culture)
impacts marketing strategy preparation and its subsequent effectiveness.
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