Download 05-The-Use-Theory

The Use Theory
PHIL 2610
Philosophy of Language
1st Term 2016
Ludwig Wittgenstein
• One of the richest people in
Europe at the time
• Gave away his entire fortune
• 3 of his brothers committed
suicide
• Fought in both World Wars and
hid that he was one of the most
famous philosophers in the
world
Language as Representation
Last time I suggested the “general structure” of a theory of meaning
involved a mental aspect that a word connotes, and a non-mental
object that the word denotes.
Connotes
Dog
Mind
Idea of a Dog
Dog
Denotes
Dog
Mind
Idea of a Dog
Dog
Wittgenstein vs. Representation
Wittgenstein thinks this
“representational view” of
language is incorrect.
The meaning of a sentence is how
we use it. Often there is no sense
to be made of which thing is
named or denoted by the word.
At the apple store…
I need 5 red apples please!
I need 5 red apples please!
“One!”
“Two!”
Some time later…
“Five!”
Wittgenstein vs. Representation
“But how does he know where
and how he is to look up the word
‘red’ and what he is to do with the
word ‘five’?”
--Well, I assume that he ‘acts’ as I
have described. Explanations
come to an end somewhere.
Wittgenstein vs. Representation
But what is the meaning of the
word ‘five’?
--No such thing was in question
here, only how the word ‘five’ is
used.
Dis-Solving Philosophical Problems
This is the general structure of
how the use theory attempts to
dis-solve philosophical problems.
STEP 1: Explain how we use some
particular bit of language. STEP 2:
Claim that “explanation has to
stop somewhere”: here.
Meaning Is Use
Importantly, every theory of
meaning thinks that how we use
our words plays some role in what
they mean. How could it not?
The use theory is importantly
different because it identifies use
with meaning.
The Use Theory of Meaning
In language we play games with words.
Language Games
• Wittgenstein thinks that
language is made up of a variety
of different language games,
with differing rules.
• To understand language more
generally, he looks at different
make-believe primitive
languages and ways of teaching
children language.
The Slab Language
The language is meant to serve for
communication between a builder
A and an assistant B.
A is building with building-stones:
there are blocks, pillars, slabs and
beams.
B has to pass the stones, in the
order in which A needs them.
The Slab Language
For this purpose they use a
language consisting of the words
"block", "pillar" "slab", "beam". A
calls them out; — B brings the
stone which he has learnt to bring
at such-and-such a call.
Conceive this as a complete
primitive language.
Displacement
Animals can communicate messages about things and events in their
current environment, but not:
• Things that are not around right now
• Events in the past
• Events in the future
• Things that don’t exist
Displacement
The Game Analogy
To understand Wittgenstein’s
analogy of language and games,
we need to understand two
concepts:
• Family Resemblance
• Criteria vs. Symptoms
Necessary and Sufficient Conditions
Some concepts have necessary
and sufficient conditions for
applying to things:
Necessary: If the concept applies,
then you meet the condition.
Sufficient: If you meet the
condition, then the concept
applies.
Example: Dogs
Being a mammal is a necessary
condition for being a dog, because
every dog is a mammal.
Being a Chihuahua is a sufficient
condition for being a dog, because
every Chihuahua is a dog.
Family Resemblance
But on Wittgenstein’s view,
“game” is not a concept like this:
there is nothing that all games
have in common.
Being a game is a matter of
“family resemblance”: you must
be similar enough to other games
to count.
Game Features
• Points/ score
• Winners and losers
• Enjoyable
• Involves skill
• Uncertain outcome
• Occurs at specific time and place
• Voluntary participation
• Rules
Language Games
[The representationalist
philosopher], we might say, does
describe a system of
communication; only not
everything that we call language is
this system.
Language Games
And one has to say this in many
cases where the question arises 'Is
this an appropriate description or
not?'
The answer is: 'Yes, it is
appropriate, but only for this
narrowly circumscribed region,
not for the whole of what you
were claiming to describe."
Language Games
It is as if someone were to say: "A
game consists in moving objects
about on a surface according to
certain rules..."
--and we replied: You seem to be
thinking of board games, but
there are others.
Criteria vs. Symptoms
There are different ways of telling
that a field goal has been scored
in basketball:
• Watching the scoreboard
• Listening to the crowd
• Hearing the announcer say “a
field goal has been scored”
• Seeing the ball go through the
hoop.
“If a philosopher asks, ‘Why does the fact that the ball went through
the basket show that a field goal has been scored?” a natural reply
would be, “That is what the rules of the game say; that is the way the
game is played
Criteria
“Once we understand the rules for
playing chess, the question
whether a player has won when
he has achieved checkmate
cannot arise.”
Criteria
The ball going through the hoop is
criterial of a goal being scored.
There is a logical or conceptual
connection between the two.
BUT: This doesn’t mean going
through the hoop always counts
as scoring a basket!
Satisfying Criterion Not Sufficient
First scenario: the ball must be “in
play”– for example, not after the
buzzer has sounded, not shot
from out-of-bounds, etc.
Second scenario: the ball must be
in a situation where “the rules
apply”: not flying around the
stadium and changing shape.
Relation Between Criteria and Symptoms
A symptom is “a phenomenon of
which experience has taught us
that it coincided in some way or
other, with the phenomenon
which is our defining criterion.”
Symptoms are correlations
between criteria and non-criteria.
Relation Between Criteria and Meaning
Giving the criterion for someone
else having a toothache “is to give
a grammatical explanation about
the word ‘toothache’ and, in this
sense, an explanation concerning
the meaning of the word
‘toothache’.”
Satisfying Particular Criterion Not Necessary
“[I]n different circumstances, we
apply different criteria.”
Satisfying Criterion Not Sufficient
Wittgenstein on the Meter Rod in Paris
“There is one thing of which one
can say neither that it is one
metre long, nor that it is not one
metre long, and that is the
standard metre in Paris. –But this
is, of course, not to ascribe any
extraordinary property to it, but
only to mark its peculiar role in
the language-game of measuring
with a metre-rule.”
Changing Criteria is Changing Meaning
If we introduce a new criterion for
being a meter (as we now have),
we can measure the rod in Paris,
and determine whether it is or
isn’t one meter.
In this language-game, ‘meter’
means something different.
Fodor and Chihara’s Summary
X is a criterion of Y in situations of type S if the very meaning or
definition of ‘Y’ justifies the claim that one can recognize, see, detect,
or determine the applicability of ‘Y’ on the basis of X in normal
situations of type S.
In a normal situation, the problem of gathering evidence which justifies
concluding Y from X simply does not arise.
The Use Theory vs. The Problem
of Other Minds
The Problem
We know that we have sensations, desires, and beliefs because we
experience them.
But we don’t experience other people’s mental states, so how do we
know that they have them?
Russell and the Argument From Analogy
Only A’s cause B’s
I observe a B.
Therefore, I know that B was
caused by an A.
Russell and the Argument From Analogy
Only lightning causes thunder.
I hear some thunder in the
distance (but I didn’t see any
lightning).
Therefore, there must have been
some unobserved lightning that
was the cause of the thunder.
Russell and the Argument From Analogy
Premise 1: Only the sensation of
thirst causes water-drinking
behavior.
Premise 2: That other person is
drinking water (but I don’t
experience their thirst).
Conclusion: Therefore, that
person’s water-drinking behavior
was caused by an unobserved
thirst.
The Other Argument From Analogy
All A’s cause B’s.
I observe an A (but can’t observe
B).
Therefore, there was an
unobserved B
The Other Argument From Analogy
Premise 1: Walking through the
desert for four hours with no
water causes a sensation of thirst.
Premise 2: That person walked
through the desert for four hours
with no water.
Conclusion: That person is thirsty.
Problems for the Argument
In general, we can’t infer from what happens in our house / our society
/ our planet to what happens elsewhere. Why is this any different for
minds?
Wittgenstein on the Problem
Now one may go on and ask:
“How do you know that he has got
a toothache when he holds his
cheek?”
The answer to this might be, “I say
he has a toothache when he holds
his cheek because I hold my cheek
when I have a toothache.”
Wittgenstein on the Problem
But what if we went on asking:
“And why do you suppose that his
toothache corresponds to his
holding his check just because
your toothache corresponds to
your holding your cheek?”
Wittgenstein on the Problem
You will be at a loss to answer this
question, and find that here we
strike rock bottom, that is we have
come down to conventions.
Wittgenstein on the Problem
Basic idea: “holding your cheek” (for someone else) is criterial for them
having a toothache.
This is compatible with there being other criteria, e.g. crying out.
This is compatible with none of the criteria being satisfied, in abnormal
situations.