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MAPPING AFRICAN HISTORY PERIODS AND REGIONS Gareth Austin 07/03/2013 Purpose of the lecture 2 To offer a broadly chronological overview Drawing your attention to some key points while largely deferring discussion of the 6 controversies that I will introduce in the next 2 sessions 1. Problem of Periodization in African History 3 Limits of traditional tripartite, extroverted division pre-colonial / colonial / post-colonial divide Is a non-Europcentric periodization possible for Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole? ‘Pre-colonial’ is most of African history Need for sub-divisions, even in colonial & post-colonial periods 2. RELATIONS WITH EXTERNAL WORLD Flows of goods, trade, ideas, selective adoption of exotic cultigens: not so isolated Perpetual trend of successively greater incorporation in world market? Yes, mostly Terms of incorporation in world market partly determined by Africans – – 4 rulers, merchants, producers Even to some extent during colonial rule Choice of production technique not explicable by ignorance World religions and Sub-Saharan Africa Long history of Christianity and Islam south of the Sahara Important phases of widespread conversion – Jihads in west African savanna C18th-C19th – 5 Including creation of Sokoto Caliphate (1804-1903) Further spread of both Christianity and Islam in C20 Key role of African agency in these processes 3. PRECOLONIAL NINETEENTH CENTURY: key processes Southern Africa: formation of Zulu kingdom and its consequences for the region – East Africa: enlargement of states, extension of trade networks, & intensified slaving West Africa: ‘legitimate commerce’ from 1807 – 7 Debate about causes of mfecane This the beginning of the modern economic history of West Africa (Hopkins 1973)? European Scramble for Africa 1879-c1910 4. SETTLER, PLANTATION & ‘PEASANT’ COLONIES The differences and why they mattered Defined by land differences in land ownership & use Nature of a particular colony could change: not fixed but contested – 8 Cases of Gold Coast, Ivory Coast, Kenya Type of colonial economy affected welfare, politics, & prospects of industrial growth Contrasting Legacies ‘Peasant’ (or rural capitalist) economies better for African real wages and welfare – Settler and plantation economies better for growth of manufacturing – – 10 See Bowden et al, Frankema Southern Rhodesia, Belgian Congo as well as South Africa Not least, for political reasons Contrasting Legacies (cntd) Mode of decolonization: threat or reality of armed revolt in the settler economies – Scope for African entrepreneurship: repressed in settler/plantation colonies – though partly constrained (by govt tolerance of European business cartels) in peasant ones too Land tenure: individual land ownership on former settler lands, e.g. in Kenya – 11 not in the ‘peasant’ (or even plantation) colonies See Bates, Beyond General distinction between legacies and continuities 12 Not everything ‘inherited’ in 1960 was a result either of colonial or even late precolonial changes And changes during the colonial period were not always the result of colonial rule 2. ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE SINCE INDEPENDENCE Revisiting the ‘Growth Tragedy’ Before Getting Too Gloomy… Note that most figures for African income per head are misleadingly low – – And that mortality and literacy rates have greatly improved since 1960 (Sender 1999) – 14 purchasing power parity: ‘PPP’ means that one international $ has the same purchasing power over domestic GNP as the US$ has over US GNP. For 1999, e.g., taking PPP rather than current US dollar terms nearly triples the ratio of African GNP p.c. from 1.6% to 4.7% of the US level. underestimation of unmeasured economic activities (surely greater in poorer than in richer countries) And still more since 1945 And Further Warning About Quality of the National Income Accounts 15 Accurate data-collection requires substantial state administrative capacity In economies with a preponderant ‘informal’ sector, both in agriculture and outside, the GDP estimate depends very much on assumption about the size of that (and the so-called ‘subsistence’) sector. E.g.: in the following Tanzania graph, the drastic discontinuities shown in the 1980s are very little to do with actual change & mostly to do with decisions on what data to include (inclusion of informal sector in 1987, & then downward revision of agriculture estimates from 1988) chain index 20 00 19 98 19 96 19 94 19 92 19 90 19 88 19 86 19 84 19 82 19 80 19 78 19 76 19 74 19 72 19 70 19 68 19 66 19 64 19 62 19 60 TANZANIA Real GDP (Penn World Tables) 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 5. LATE COLONIALISM AND DECOLONISATION, 1945-60 From ‘Developmental Colonialism’ to a Scramble out of Africa Post-1945 Colonialism: bigger budgets, more urgency re development 18 Pressures within the colonies, from the metropoles & internationally, to be more actively developmental Modification/abandonment of doctrine of fiscal selfsufficiency Top-down approach Failure of the big projects, on the whole, most notoriously in the case of the Tanganyika Groundnut Scheme Changing Treatment of African Labour: from ‘peasants’ to ‘workers’ Acceptance of permanence of African ‘workers’: – Labour ‘stabilisation’ in mines: could be very delayed – promotion of ‘responsible’ trade unions Abolition of forced labour within French empire – 19 contrast Katanga, Zambia, & South Africa Change of policies on trade unionism: – no longer seen as peasants temporarily selling their labour (Cooper 1996) 1945 law, proposed by Houphoet-Boigny Decolonisation: suddenly brought forward 20 In 1945, Independence had been widely seen as decades away Why the much accelerated pace of change: pressures from below and outside Ghana set the pace (1948 riots): nationalism became a mass movement for the first time in tropical Africa But Not All Colonists Were Ready to Go White settlers hold out against Macmillan’s ‘winds of change’: – Portugal under Salazar held out against the trend – 21 with varying degrees of effectiveness from Kenya, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) to (independent since 1910, but white-minority rule) South Africa Wars for independence began 1961; following revolution in Portugal, independence of colonies recognised 1975 6. A POST-COLONIAL ‘GROWTH TRAGEDY’? 22 Rough Periodisation of SSA Economic Growth Since 1960: Before 1973: mostly slow but positive growth per capita (between 1 & 2% p.a.) From 1973 (oil shock) or c.1975 to early 1980s: contraction in the majority of countries From early 1980s to mid-1990s (the decade of Structural Adjustment): Africa’s real ‘growth tragedy’ From 1995-7 to c2008: pretty steady growth, usually about 2% per head p.a. All this is aggregated for the whole of SSA: but there was much variation & even contrast in the records of individual countries Collier & O’Connell 2008 Variations Between Countries in Economic Polices & Performance Performance of some hurt by war A few did relatively badly before Structural Adjustment but much better afterwards – Many others did relatively well in the first 13-20 years after independence, and badly later – 24 especially Ghana, Uganda Most dramatically Côte d’Ivoire Only Botswana grew steadily from Independence to now (well, to 2008 at least) GDP figures tend to understate African real income 7. Post-Independence Politics: A Very Rough Periodisation C1960: Independence of French & British colonies, with formally democratic constitutions Followed by shift towards civilian one-party states (Kenyatta, Houphoet, Banda, Nyerere) and/or a series of military coups (Nigeria, Ghana) 1990s-2000s mixture of internal & external pressures for effective democracy – 25 changes of power via ballot box, e.g. Benin, Zambia, Ghana And something of a proliferation of civil wars Why Military Coups, And Why Then Renewed Democratization? 26 Contrasting trends in, roughly, the first and second halves of the half-century since Independence Specifically: Why proliferation of military coups in 1960s-80s? Why democratic revival, stronger than ever, in some countries in 1990s-present? Why? Responses to internal economic conditions, to social changes, and/or to external pressures? Wars Some countries were involved in independence /liberation wars in much of 1960s-70s – A few were involved in wars of secession for much of the 1960s-90s – esp. Ethiopia/Eritrea) or later (Sudan) Or internal disorder, violence & eventually civil war in 1967-2000s – 27 Portuguese colonies, Zimbabwe Nigeria, Uganda; &, starting later, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire; also in 1990s-2000s Rwanda, Burundi and Zaire-Congo) Wars in SSA: first steps in analysing their political economy Many countries have been essentially free of them: so they need explanation, they are not routine Their comparative frequency owes much to: – – 28 (a) Change in military technology (from 1940s) has made it easier for warlords & rebels to defy governments: cheap but powerful weaponry the assault rifle & self-propelled artillery (b) Failure of many governments to secure control over rural areas and deliver services to them (Herbst) 8. GENDER DIVISION OF LABOUR: ‘female farming systems’? 29 Traditional view of Africa (Boserup) Precolonial divisions: female farming and spinning, male weaving and long-distance trading? Generalisations, to which there were important qualifications, regional variations and exceptions Colonial-period modifications: cash crops and (where applicable) ploughs led to alterations in gender relations Male migrant labour Legacies re distribution of income and access to resources FINALLY: LEGACIES IN THE MIND 30 Present conceptions of the possibilities and sources of development in Africa are arguably affected by views of past E.g. of whether independent African (precolonial) economic history was purely static, or determined by external relations