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SPQR
Great Battles of the Roman Republic
3rd Edition
SCENARIO BOOK
BENEVENTUM, 275 BC
Pyrrhus of Epirus vs. Roman Consul M. Curius Dentatus—p. 3
BAGRADAS PLAINS, 255 BC
Xanthippus vs. Roman Consul M. Atilius Regulus—p. 8
CANNAE, 216 BC
Hannibal Barca vs. Consul G. Terentius Varro—p. 10
ZAMA, 202 BC
Hannibal Barca vs. Proconsul P. Cornelius Scipio—p. 16
CYNOSCEPHALAE, 197 BC
King Phillip V of Macedon vs. Consul T. Quinctius Flamininus—p. 20
GMT Games, LLC
SPQR
SCENARIOS
scenario design
mark herman
richard h. berg
game development
alan ray
art director
rodger macgowan
P.O. Box 1308, Hanford, CA 93232–1308
www.GMTGames.com
©©2008
2008GMT
GMTGames
GamesLLC
LLC
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SPQR Scenario
Scenario Book
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RULES FOR COMPETITIVE PLAY
We have designed the following battles/scenarios to be as historically
accurate (within the limits of available research materials) as possible.
While this allows them to be excellent tools for study and solitaire play,
some of the battles, because they were not balanced historically, will
fall short of that gamer’s paradise of “perfect” game balance.
We understand that many of you prefer an “I Want to Win” approach to
wargaming, as opposed to, say, a “What’s Happening Here” view. Well,
we like to be All Things to All People, here at GMT, and we are aware,
as noted above, that “history” often fails to cooperate with our desire
to produce balanced “games”. To ameliorate, if not entirely remedy,
this situation, we offer two suggestions for Competitive Play. These
methods will provide a more even balance; however, the “end result”
may often not reflect “historical” objectives or realities.
#1: The Rout Point Bid Method. This method works best for those
players who are familiar with both the game AND the battle. In essence,
each player bids Rout Points to play a specific side … usually the favored
one. The winning bid then subtracts the number of Rout Points he has
bid from the total required to rout his chosen side.
Example: Two gamers want to play Zama; they both want to play
Scipio. Player #1 bids 25 RP’s, but player #2 offers 35 as his bid. #2
gets to play Scipio, but his army now routs when it reaches 195 points
… not the 230 listed.
#2: The Game Rule Fix Method. In this method we simply suggest
certain rules to play— or ignore—that should balance the game.
SIZE AND TROOP QUALITY CHARTS
The Size and Troop Quality charts included in the Victory section of
each battle show the number of units involved, the army’s total Size,
the total Rout Points and the average per unit TQ. For the average TQ
calculation, the unit TQ (not Rout Points) is used for Skirmishers,
Elephants, and double-size units.
CREDITS
Original System Designed By: Mark Herman
Game System Designed By: Mark Herman/ Richard
Berg
Beneventum and Cynoscephalae Designed by: Mark
Herman
Bagradas, Cannae, and Zama Designed by: Richard H.
Berg
Game Developed By: Richard H. Berg
3rd Edition Development: Alan Ray
Box Cover and Counter Art: Rodger B. MacGowan
Map Art: Leland Myrick
Rules Layout: Neil Randall
Art Director: Rodger B. MacGowan
Rules Editing / Index: Gene Billingsley
Historical Commentary: Richard H. Berg and Mark
Herman
Latin Consultant: Caesar (Sid)
Playtesters: Mike Reed, Dick Vohlers, James Stormes,
Keith Schlesinger, Boyd Schorzman, David Fox, Joseph
Holt
© 2008
2008 GMT
GMT Games
Games LLC
LLC
©
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SPQR Scenario Book
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THE BATTLE OF BENEVENTUM
Pyrrhus of Epirus vs. Roman Consul M. Curius Dentatus—Southern Italy, 275 BC
Historical Background
After an unsuccessful four year campaign in Sicily, Pyrrhus returned,
again, to aid Tarentum. Pyrrhus’s reputation—which, even a hundred
years later, was quite impressive—brought thousands of Samnites,
Bruttians, Lucanians, Sabines, and other Italians back into his by-now
depleted mercenary force. Led by his somewhat short-handed corps
of war elephants, Pyrrhus, once again, marched on Rome. Consul M.
Curius Dentatus (the last name coming from a particularly noticeable
set of buck teeth) quickly gathered his consular army and moved south
to intercept him. He camped about 130 miles southeast of Rome near
the town of Beneventum (at that time named Maleventum; obviously
as things got “better” the name changed) and waited for Pyrrhus.
Pyrrhus approached Beneventum with an army consisting of 20,000
foot, 3,000 cavalry and some 15 elephants. The cavalry were mostly
his Thessalian units whereas, in addition to his Macedonian-style
phalanxes, most of the 20,000 foot were sword-armed, Italian-colonial
Greeks. The Roman army under the Consul Dentatus consisted of a
fairly typical Consular army (17,000 foot and 1,200 cavalry), who’s
contingent of alae sociorum was a bit reduced by sizeable defections
of Sabines and other Italians to the Tarentine/Pyrrhic cause.
Pyrrhus’s patrols detected the Roman defensive positions and he decided on a surprise night attack. His approach march took longer than
planned (Lex Murphus, no doubt), and the Romans, upon detecting
the Epirote army, sprang to arms and repulsed the initial assault with
Pyrrhus losing eight elephants.
Dentatus now decided to offer battle and fight Pyrrhus on the plain
adjoining his camp. The initial Roman attack failed, due in part to Pyrrhus’s skillful use of his remaining elephants plus some stiff Epirote/
mercenary resistance. However, a second Roman assault managed to
stampede the elephants into their own positions. The shaken Macedonian phalanx retreated from the field in disorder, and the Romans had
a victory—albeit just barely.
Dentatus’ victory convinced Pyrrhus to give up his dreams of western
conquest and he departed for Greece. Casualties are unknown, but Pyrrhus returned to Greece with approximately 8,000 foot and 500 cavalry.
He was killed in a minor engagement three years later, leaving the
Southern Greeks on the Italian peninsula without strong leadership. In
272 BC Rome conquered Tarentum, and two years later she completed
her subjugation of all Southern Italy with the capture of Rhegium.
Beneventum was the pivotal battle in the Roman Republic’s bid for
Italian peninsular hegemony. It is the first of three battles (Cynoscephalae and Pydna are the other two) where the Roman Manipular Legion
met—and defeated—a purely Alexander/Macedonian style army in
a stand-up fight. It is also an interesting study in the Roman use of a
fortified camp in support of its battle plan.
Pre-Game Notes
This is an unusual scenario, mainly because of the very palpable presence of the Roman Camp, as well as the fact that Beneventum was a
somewhat unusual Meeting Engagement. There is a host of special rules
© 2008 GMT Games LLC
SPQR Scenario Book
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and some interesting “artillery”. The scenario does have a relatively
small number of units, and, with no set deployment, players are free
to explore their own strategies and tactics.
It should also be noted that there is not that much “hard” information on
this battle, and the classical descriptions of it are often quite conflicting.
No one is even quite sure exactly where it took place! We have tried to
provide the best “game” given the available information.
Map
Alae Sociorum (III and V)
The Player may designate either ala as left or right wing. The alae
are grouped by standard cohorts/triarii, standard cavalry, and then the
extraordinaires of both the cohorts and V cavalry. IMPORTANT: The
alae are short on cavalry (only one non-extraordinaires cavalry unit
from each ala is used) and foot (do not use the alae Triarii and reduce
the number of cohorts by one—i.e., there should be 8 cohorts and one
cohort extraordinaires from each ala).
Alae Cohorts (Number in [#] is number of units that start in hex)
Use the Beneventum map.
Difficulty And Balance
The Set-Piece battle is a good scenario for those not overly familiar
with the system. The Meeting Engagement is more formidable and
requires that players know a lot about what their units can do—aside
from adding a bunch of extra rules.
The Romans are slightly favored, more so in the Set-Piece battle. Results
in the Meeting Engagement depend much on what the Epirote player
does at night. The Rout Point Bid method is the best one to use here, as
this is a difficult scenario for which to supply rules adjustments.
Playing time is about two hours for the Set-Piece battle; another hour
for the Meeting Engagement
INITIAL DEPLOYMENT
Left Wing Right Wing
Alae Cavalry (one from each ala)
AS/III CE, AS/V CE[c]
AS/V RC EX [c]
2907, 2908, 2910, 2911
(two per hex; all units face South vertex)
3707, 3708, 3710, 3711
(two per hex; all units face North vertex)
3105, 3505 (units face NW or
SW vertex)
3204, 3404 (units face NW or
SW vertex)
3304 (units face NW or SW vertex)
c = The Cohorts and Ala Extraordinaires
Camp Guard (Face units either toward a gate or toward outside of
camp if in a tower)
III VE (b, c), V VE (b, c)[d] 2806, 3303, 3312, 3806
The Roman Army under Curius Dentatus
AS/III VE (a, b),
AS/V VE (a, b),
III Scorpion (a, b), 2803, 2813, 3803, 3813 (one VE
and
V Scorpion (a, b) one Scorpion in each hex)
The Romans use the III and V Legions and Alae. Roman units are
deployed inside the Camp according to the following setup.
d = At the instant of Roman Alert, these gate guards are immediately
placed in a vacant Velites tent hex, facing any direction.
THE NIGHT ATTACK/MEETING
ENGAGEMENT
Leaders
Hex
M. Dentatus (OC) Three (3) Tribunes Two (2) Prfct Soc
One (1) Prfct Eqt
3305
3205
3405
3304
Units
Hex(es)
The Epirote/Italian Army under Pyrrhus of Epirus
At the beginning of the scenario there are no Epirote units on the map.
All Epirote units enter the map during the Approach March Phase.
III Legion (All units face SE vertex)
III VE (a)[a]
III HA (a–d)
III PR (a)[b]
III (b–d)
III TR (a–c)
III RC
3504, 3604 or 3704
3607, 3608, 3610, 3611
3507
3508, 3510, 3511
3407, 3408, 3410
3411
V Legion (All units face NE vertex)
V VE (a)[a]
V HA (a–d)
V PR (a) [b]
V PR (b–d)
V TR (a–c)
V RC
2904, 3004 or 3104
3007, 3008, 3010, 3011
3107
3108, 3110, 3111
3207, 3208, 3210
3211
a = One Velites unit from each Legion gets to sleep; the other two are
in the Camp Guard, below.
The Epirote Army
The Leaders are Pyrrhus, Alexander, Leonatus, and Milon. Not much is
known about the Epirote command structure below Pyrrhus. One of his
best generals, Megacles, bought the farm at Heraclea (ostensibly while
in disguise as Pyrrhus!). For that matter, most of his “staff” was killed
at either Heraclea or Asculum. Alexander was Pyrrhus’s second-oldest
son, and, at the age of 23, was certain to have been given some level
of command (his oldest son, Ptolemy, was regent in Epirus; consider
his youngest son, Helenus, to be “part of” Alexander). Leonatus was
the fellow who (supposedly) saved Pyrrhus’ life at Heraclea, in an
incident that smacks a bit too much of “Alexander and Cleitus at the
Granicus”, if you ask me. Milon is mentioned (often) in several minor
Epirote roles.
The Epirote Army is divided into five (5) sections:
Advanced Guard
Macedonian LC; Greek Mercenary LC (1–2); Epirote SK Slingers (1–3);
Cretan SK Archers (1–2); and the Thracian LI (1–4)
Main Body
Macedonian PH (1–6); Epirote HO/HI (1–3); Thessalian HC (1–5); The
Guard HC (a pretty good indication Pyrrhus is with this group); Indian
EL (1–3)
b = The Primus Principes of the legion
© 2008 GMT Games LLC
SPQR Scenario Book
Left Flank Guard
Samnite MI (1–2); Bruttium MI (1–2)
Right Flank Guard
Lucanian MI (1–2), Sabine MI (1–2)
Rear Guard
Italian MI (1–2)
Approach March Order
The Approach March Phase precedes the start of play, before using
the normal Sequence of Play. The Approach March Phase continues
until either the Romans are alerted or the Epirote player declares he
is done.
The order of entry of the above five (5) sections of the Epirote army,
Initial Approach March (IAM) Multiple, and Entry Hex is:
1. Advanced Guard (4x/3044); then the
2. Main Body (2x/3143, 3044 and/or 2943; units may be split amongst
these hexes, or they may all enter through the same hex); then the
3. Left Flank Guard (2x/2644); then the
4. Right Flank Guard (2x/3343), and finally the
5. Rear Guard (1x/3044).
In the Initial Approach March Phase, each separate section of the Epirote
army moves its full movement allowance times its IAM Multiple (cohesion costs are incurred for terrain but not for multiple moves in the same
turn). Thus, the Macedonian Light cavalry in the Advance Guard would
enter through hex 3044 and have a Movement Allowance of ‘32’ (8 x
4 = 32). If at any point during this movement the Romans are alerted
(see below) then the Approach March Phase is immediately concluded.
There is no further Epirote Approach movement; the Scenario now
starts according to the standard Sequence of Play.
Initial Approach March Procedure
During the Initial Approach March Segment the Epirote Army enters
the map with each unit from a named section (e.g., Advanced Guard)
expending its MA the number of multiples indicated. Complete the
movement of one multiple with all units in that section before beginning
the next multiple. Leaders may be placed with any section, but they use
the IAM Multiple of the section with which it enters the map. After all
units have conducted their Initial Approach March and if the Romans
are not yet alerted, then the Epirote player can choose to conduct an
Extended Approach March.
As each unit enters the map it pays the terrain cost of the entry hex plus
a number of movement points equal to the number of units from that
section that have entered by the same hex ahead of that unit. Therefore,
if a Cretan Archer is the third unit to enter the game during the IAM
via 3044, it uses 3 MPs: 1 for the hex and 2 for the two previous units.
The Epirote player must move all of his units onto the map during
the Approach March Phase; he may not hold any back. Exception: if
movement of an Epirote units during the Initial Approach March Phase
results in a Roman Alert, all Epirote Approach Movement ceases and
play resumes using the standard Sequence of Play.
Important: All Epirote units that do not enter the map by the conclusion of Game Turn 1, never get into play but DO count as eliminated
units for determining Army Withdrawal.
Extended Approach March
After completing the Initial Approach March Phase, the Epirote player,
if his units have not been spotted, now announces whether he will extend his Approach March or not. If he doesn’t, then the Scenario begins
immediately with Turn 1. If he elects to extend his Approach March,
5
he now moves his army section by section in the same order as during
the Initial Approach March. This time, all units may move up to two
Movement Allowance multiples (2x). Upon completing each section’s
movement—or at the instant of Roman Alert—he rolls a one die for
each entire section and consults the Night March Fatigue table to determine the number of cohesion for each unit due to Fatigue. Compare
the one die roll to each unit’s TQ in that section and apply the indicated
result. Elephants are not subject to fatigue and thus are not affected by
any die roll. Any cohesion point penalties called for are immediately
applied to all units that have moved from that section. After all units
have completed their Extended Approach March, or the Romans are
alerted, the Scenario begins.
Night March Fatigue Table
Die roll
Effect
Same as or lower than TQ
No Effect
1, 2 higher than TQ
1 Cohesion Hit
3+ higher than TQ
2 Cohesion Hits
Roman Alert
No Roman unit may move or fire until the Roman Army is alerted.
The Roman army is alerted the instant that any Roman unit has a LOS
(see below) to an Epirote unit . . . or, at the beginning of Game Turn 5,
whichever comes first. All un-alerted Roman commanders are considered “Finished” (and thus the Romans can do nothing) until alerted.
• If Alert occurs during the Approach March Phase, all Roman commanders are eligible to be activated at the start of the immediately
succeeding first turn
• If Alert occurs during a standard (post-Approach) turn, Roman commanders with Initiative ratings lower than those of “Finished” Epirote
leaders remain Finished for that turn. Only those Roman leaders
whose Initiative Ratings would make them eligible to be used (as
per 5.12) are alert and capable of command
Example: Leonatus and Milon have been activated and are finished
for the turn. During movement under an Order given by Alexander,
the Romans are alerted. Only Dentatus, with an Initiative Rating of
‘5’, is eligible to be activated. All the other tribunes and praefects are
Finished for that turn.
Upon alert all Roman units are eligible to receive orders. Line Commands are permitted inside the camp. Remember to place Velites gate
guards in their tent hexes.
Time of Day and Line of Sight
LOS—and Roman Alert—is dependent on the lighting conditions. There
are three lighting conditions in this scenario: night, dawn, and day.
• The entire Approach March Phase occurs at Night
• Game Turns 1 through 3 use Dawn Lighting Conditions
• Game Turns 4 to conclusion are Day Lighting Conditions
There are three Alert Lines on the map: the Night Alert Line, the
Dawn Alert Line and the Day Alert Line. At ANY time an Epirote unit
moves “inside”—closer to the camp—the Alert Line corresponding
to the Lighting Conditions—it is spotted and the Romans are alerted.
Exception: Woods will block Alert LOS. The Alert LOS extends into
a woods hex—but never through.
Example #1: It is Night. An Epirote unit moves from 3024 to 2923 to
2823 to 2723. It was spotted the instant it entered 2823—even though
it finished its movement outside the Night Alert Line.
© 2008 GMT Games LLC
SPQR Scenario Book
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Example #2: It is Dawn. An Epirote unit is in 1114. It moves into 1214
and then into 1313. Its movement has not alerted the Romans because,
even though it is inside the Dawn Alert Line, the trees block LOS.
An Example of Approach March: First the Epirote Advanced Guard
enters at hex 3044 and each unit moves 4 times its movement allowance
(32 hexes cavalry, 24 hexes skirmisher, 20 hexes Light Infantry) in a
Southwesterly direction with the lead cavalry unit near hex 1321. The
Main body enters next at hexes 2943, 3044, 3143 (2 x MA) and follows
the Advanced Guard with the lead unit near hex 2034. The Left Flank
Guard then enters at hex 2644 and moves to the left of the Main Body
followed by the Right Flank Guard entering at hex 3343 which conforms to the right of the Main Body. The Initial Approach March Phase
concludes with the Rearguard entering at hex 3044. Epirote units at no
time came within 10 hexes of a Roman unit (it being a Night Turn) and
therefore the Romans are not alerted. The Epirote commander decides
not to extend Extended Approach March, and the Scenario begins using
the normal Sequence of play.
MEETING ENGAGEMENT; Free Set-Up Scenario
If it’s a stand up/set piece fight you want, first deploy the entire Roman
army in any hex from xx18 and west inclusive. Units may be placed
inside the camp. Then, set up the Epirote army in any hex from xx31
and east inclusive. Ignore all Approach March rules. It is daylight. Play
continues using all other rules.
Design Note: Although the standard, face-off battle did occur at Beneventum, there is little information as to who stood where. We therefore
leave it to your skill and imagination to fill in the blanks.
(if sufficiently deranged). The Epirotes did not have any siege equipment (or, at least none that we are aware of); their ability to attack the
camp was extremely minimal. And a berm, in case you’re wondering,
is a low “wall” formed by the dirt that is dug out of the ditch. From the
bottom of the ditch to the top of the berm was about eight feet. Roman
camps usually did not have “permanent” walls. In addition, the gates
did not actually have “doors”; entrance was blocked by a barrier, as is
represented on the map. The entire camp is Level-2 elevation, same
as the hill it is on.
Historical Note: The Roman Camp is a “hex” version of the typical
Roman Consular Army camp as detailed and drawn by Polybius. It is
quite accurate as to placement of the units (with some minor adjustments for play); it is also “to scale”.
Exiting the Camp
During the first 5 Game Turns after being Alerted the Roman units inside
the Camp are restricted as to which gate through which they may exit
the camp. After that 5th turn the restriction is removed. In addition,
all Roman commanders inside the camp are capable of issuing a Line
Command without resorting to a Strategy die roll.
Unit Organization
Exit Gate
Legions III and V
Ala Left Wing Cohorts
Ala Right Wing Cohorts
All other units except Camp Guard
Camp Guard
Porta Decumana
Porta Principis Sinistra
Porta Principis Dextra
Porta Praetoria
Any Gate
Line Command Eligibility
Historical Note: It often took some time, perhaps a couple of hours,
for an army of this size to deploy from inside a camp.
Roman
Epirote
1. *Velites (VE)
1. *Elephants (EL)
Scorpiones
2. *Hastati (HA) and Ala
Cohorts (CO/CE)
2. *Skirmishers (SK) and Thracian Light Infantry (LI)
3. *Principes (PR) and Ala
Cohorts (CO/CE)
3. Hoplites (HI), Medium (MI),
and Light (LI) Infantry
4. Triarii (TR)
4. Phalanxes (PH) and Hoplites
(HI)
5. All Cavalry
5 All Cavalry
6. **Velites (VE), Cavalry,
AS/CE
* = Do not have to be adjacent; see 4.24.
** = This special line may be used for exiting the Camp. Once all
Roman leaders are outside the camp, it may not be used as a Line.
Scorpions have no TQ, Type, Size, or Movement Allowance; their only
rating is their Range. A scorpion may fire:
• twice per Game Turn when the Roman player is active, and;
• twice per enemy Orders Phase at any activated enemy unit that is
range and Line of Sight
However, the scorpion’s hex must be occupied by a friendly infantry
unit in order to fire.
Scorpions may fire at any time during the phase/turn. The first time an
artillery unit fires, place an appropriate (Turn/Phase) “Fired” marker on
it. The second time it fires, flip the marker over to its “Finished Fire”
side. There is no need for an Order or Line Command; the Roman
player simply states he is firing his scorpion. A scorpion may be fired
in any direction, up to a range of seven hexes. If an Epirote unit enters
a Tower hex, the scorpion is automatically destroyed. Scorpions never
run out of Missiles.
Towers
SPECIAL RULES
The Roman Camp
No more than one infantry unit and one Scorpion unit may occupy a
tower hex at any one time.
The Roman penchant—rigorously applied—for pitching a fortified
camp at the end of each day’s march (usually in the early afternoon) is
well-known. As noted, above, Dentatus had encamped to await Pyrrhus’
next move. There are special Terrain effects for the Camp—and a special
chart for them: the Roman Camp Terrain Effects Chart. We have no
desire to write a whole series of rules on siege warfare. We have tried,
however, to give some idea of what the Epirote player could try to do
A Roman infantry unit capable of missile fire in a Tower Hex gains the
following fire benefits:
• Subtract one (-1) from its Missile Fire die roll at its normal ranges
• It may fire at a Range of one greater than its usual maximum range.
If it does so, it requires a ‘0’ die roll to achieve a hit (and there is no
die roll adjustment for being in the tower, as above)
© 2008 GMT Games LLC
SPQR Scenario Book
The Scorpion’s Fiery Sting, or What a Flaming Arrow
You Are (Optional Rule)
There is a great deal of disagreement as to whether the Romans used
“flame arrows” against Pyrrhus’s elephants. The bolts fired by scorpions were certainly capable of being wrapped in rags, covered with oil
or pitch, lit, and thus launched. The controversy centers on just how
the Romans could have used them in the field, the oil needed for the
flammable coating not being easily available. The story goes that when
the elephants forced the Romans back they came within range of the
scorpions, from which one or more flame “arrows” were fired, scaring
the ivory out of the tuskers—a not unwarranted reaction. Anyway, it’s
too nifty a piece of chrome to pass up.
Each scorpion can be converted to launching flame missiles, simply by
the Roman Player saying so.
The Benefits
A hit on an elephant unit with a flame arrow is an automatic rout (and
subsequent rampage). No other type of unit is affected by a flame arrow
other than the regular effect of a missile hit (if one of these shafts hits
you, the fact that you are now on fire is not going to either improve or
worsen your already dead condition).
The Drawbacks
• The range is reduced by one (to a maximum of six hexes), and, except
for one and two hex ranges, add one to any die roll when determining hits. This accounts for the increased air resistance firing bolts
wrapped in rags and soaked in oil would have
• Once started, the tower may not stop using flame arrows (the fire
was hard to extinguish)
• If an Infantry unit occupying a Tower which is using flame arrows
routs, some screaming legionary kicks over the bucket of Greek Fire
and, essentially, torches both the unit and the entire tower. The unit is
eliminated. Treat the hex thereafter as a hex which no one can enter
(it’s burning) for the remainder of the scenario. Involuntary entry
into a burning tower hex eliminates the unit.
Roman Flaming Pigs, or Bringin’ Home the Bacon
(Optional Rule)
Several sources—such as the usually unreliable Dionysius and the
usually reliable H.H. Scullard—talk about the use of “flaming pigs” to
distract and scare the elephants (war gamers already introduced to such
items as Russian Tank Dogs and the Union Exploding Mules at Valverde
will probably not bat an eye here). As everyone knows, elephants under
strain have an unusual fear of small animals who make screeching
noises. Someone appears to have experimented with the idea of letting
a few porkers loose amongst the behemoths, as little else seemed to be
working. When this had some effect, the military-industrial complex
up-graded the system by tarring Old Porky with some pitch, setting
him ablaze, letting him loose, and, then, abada, abada, abada, that’s all
folks!! It seems the combination of burning ham hocks and squealing
porkers was supposed to unnerve the elephants even more (perhaps this
would have worked even better were the elephants kosher). Knowing
that someone is sure to write in asking why we have not included this
bit of arcana (which Scullard maintains is reasonably possible—even
probable), we give you the opportunity to recreate this Great Moment
in Military History.
7
At any two (2) times during the game the Roman Player, instead of issuing an Individual Order, may roll on the FLAMING PIG Table. This
counts as an Individual Order . . . an Order of Pork Chops!!
The Flaming Pig Table
Die Roll
0
1–7
Pig from Hell
Elephant designated by die roll attacks the nearest combat unit—be it Roman or Epirote—directly to its front.
If more than one target, roll die. If further away than 4
hexes, treat as No Effect.
No Effect, but breakfast is served
8
Add one Cohesion Hit to any one Elephant
9
For any one Elephant roll die. Add number of Cohesion
Hits equal to die roll minus TQ, with the total being at
least one
Triarii Doctrine
This rule is in effect for this scenario.
Retreat Edges
The Epirotes use the east map edge, the Romans the west map edge.
VICTORY
Play continues until:
• The Epirotes have at least five combat units inside the Roman Camp
and there are no Roman combat units inside the camp, at which point
the Epirotes automatically win; OR
• Starting with Game Turn 10, all non-routed, Roman units are inside
their camp. If the Roman player retreats all of his units into the camp
he loses; OR
• One Army Withdraws
The Roman Army withdraws when units with Rout Points totaling 120
have been eliminated. The Epirote Army routs when units with Rout
Points totaling at least 100 have been eliminated.
Pyrrhus is worth 25 Rout points if wounded; if he’s killed, the Roman
Player wins. Scorpions are worth 0 Rout Points.
Size and Troop Quality
213[a]
Rout
Points
252
Rout
Ratio
40%
169
337
35%
Army
Units
Size
Epirote
40
Roman
55
a = Elephant Sizes (15 points) were excluded
© 2008 GMT Games LLC
Avg TQ
5.7
6.1
SPQR Scenario Book
8
THE BATTLE OF THE BAGRADAS PLAINS
Xanthippus vs. Roman Consul M. Atilius Regulus—North Africa, Winter, 255 BC
Historical Background
In the beginning, the First Punic War went pretty much in favor of the
Romans. The Carthaginians were a naval power, and her land armies—
ill-trained and with a poor appreciation of operations and tactics—fared
poorly against the disciplined Roman legions. Surprisingly, however,
Rome, even though her navy was built virtually from scratch, managed
to land an apparent knock-out blow against the Carthaginian fleet off
Ecnomus (Sicily) in 256 B.C. Following that victory, the Romans decided to bring the war to Africa and landed Marcus Atilius Regulus and
his consular army near Carthage. Unfortunately for Regulus, most of his
cavalry had been sent elsewhere. Even so, he had great initial success
against the few forces the Carthaginians sent against him, and he was
all set to deliver what he felt sure would be the coup de grace.
The Carthaginians, however, finally had a bit of luck. They managed
to secure the services of a Spartan “general”, Xanthippus, who, while
no genius, was one of the few people in the area who had any working
knowledge of land army operations and tactics. He restructured the
Carthaginian army, drilled it to an acceptable level of training, and
explained to them how they could use the flat expanses of Northern
Africa to their advantage. He then set out to lure Regulus into a fight,
and the consul, despite the alarming indications that the Carthaginians
were up to something new, took the bait. In mid-winter, 255 B.C., on the
plains near the Bagradas River, Regulus and Xanthippus finally faced
off. To counter the Carthaginian front wall of almost 100 elephants,
Regulus deployed his maniples in a formation that shortened his flanks
but extended his depth to withstand (at least to his way of thinking)
the charge of the elephants. Unfortunately, his flank was protected by
a woefully inadequate cavalry contingent, and the Carthaginian 8–1
(!!) superiority in horse would prove telling . . . .as it usually did. The
Carthaginian war elephants kept the Roman infantry lines busy, her
cavalry routed that of the Romans, the African phalanxes charged home
and, together with the cavalry, they totally shattered Regulus’ legions.
There would be no quick end to the war.
Pre-Game Notes
It is recommended that players not familiar with the system play this
scenario first; it is the best battle with which to learn the game, see
how the combat units work, and experiment with the various tactics
available.
Historical Note: This is the 1st Punic War Bagradas battle, not the one
which Scipio fought at the end of the 2nd Punic War.
Map
Use either the Zama or the Cannae map. If you wish, you can ignore
any and all terrain on the map—although, even with the site of this
battle being unidentified, it took place in pretty much the same area as
Zama (whose exact site is questionable, too), so the terrain is likely to
be quite similar.
Difficulty And Balance
This is the “easiest” historical battle in the game. Playing time is between 1 1/2–2/12 hours; although it could be over in a matter of minutes
if the Roman Player isn’t careful.
Balance heavily favors Carthaginians, whose superiority in mounted
troops (both cavalry and elephants) is an object lesson in combined
arms. Aside from the obvious Rout Point Bid method, as a Rules Fix,
provide the Romans with all of their Alae cavalry, as suggested.
© 2008 GMT Games LLC
SPQR Scenario Book
INITIAL DEPLOYMENT
The Carthaginian Army under Xanthippus
All units face southeast. Do not use 4.5; Carthaginian Subordinate
commanders are reliant on Xanthippus for LC ability. The Carthaginian
may NOT use Replacement leaders.
Leaders
Xanthippus (OC)
Hasdrubal Hamilcar
Bostar
Hex
1923
2031
2011
w/ any unit
Units
Elephant Line
African EL (1–19)
Hex(es)
Left Wing
Carthaginian HC (1–5)
N. African LI (1–3)
Right Wing
Carthaginian HC (6–10)
Iberian LI (1–3)
2131–2135
2032, 2034, 2036
All units face northwest. The Romans have a full Consular Army, minus
the cavalry of the alae (a telling absence). The two standard-skill legions/
alae (III and V) are used. Regulus deployed with his maniples in double
depth, rather than extended line, so they do not start stacked.
Leaders
Hex
Regulus (OC)
Anywhere
Two (2) Tribunes, Two (2) Prfct Soc One with each separate HA/PR
line, with/adjacent to any
infantry unit
Two (2) Prfct Eqt
2808, 2833
Left Wing Cavalry
V RC
Hex(es)
2808
2833
Velites Line
AS/III VE (a, b)
III VE (a–c)
V VE (a–c)
AS/V VE (a, b)
2712, 2714
2716, 2718, 2720
2722, 2724, 2726
2728, 2730
Hastati Line
AS/III CO (a–c)
III HA (a, b)
V HA (a, b)
AS/V CO (a–c)
AS/III CO (d, e)
III HA (c, d)
V HA (c, d)
AS/V CO (d, e)
2812, 2814, 2816
2818, 2820
2822, 2824
2826, 2828, 2830
2914, 2916
2918, 2920
2922, 2924
2926, 2928
Principes Line
AS/III CE
AS/III CO (f, g)
3012
3014, 3016
3316, 3317
3318, 3319, 3320
3321, 3322, 3323
3324, 3325
Line Command Eligibility
The Roman Army under M. Atilius Regulus
Units
Right Wing Cavalry
III RC
3018, 3020
3022, 3024
3026, 3028
3030
3114, 3116
3118, 3120
3122, 3124
3126, 3128
AS/III TR (a, b)
III TR (a–c)
V TR (a–c)
AS/V TR (a, b)
2106–2110
2006, 2008, 2010
1909–1922
1924–1932
III PR (a, b)
V PR (a, b)
AS/V CO (f, g)
AS/V CE
AS/III CO (h, i)
III PR (c, d)
V PR (c, d)
AS/V CO (h, i)
Triarii Line
2212–2230
Main Line
African PH (1–7)
Celtic MI (1–9)
9
Roman
Carthaginian
1. *Velites (VE)
1. *Elephants (EL)
2. *Hastati (HA) and Ala
Cohorts (CO/CE)
2. Celtic Medium (MI), Iberian
Light (LI) Infantry
3. *Principes (PR) and Ala
Cohorts (CO/CE)
3. Phalanxes (PH), Celtic Medium (MI) Infantry
4. Triarii (TR)
4. Carthaginian Heavy (HC)
Cavalry
5. Legion Cavalry (RC)
5 *N. African Light (LI) Infantry
6. *Iberian Light (LI) Infantry
* = Do not have to be adjacent; see 4.24.
SPECIAL RULES
Triarii Doctrine
This rule is in effect for this scenario.
Alae Cavalry (Optional)
If you want to balance the game a bit, give Regulus his alae cavalry,
placing the Romans on one wing and the alae on the other. You could
also change the Roman deployment, if you wish. Whatever you do, it
couldn’t be worse than what Regulus did.
Retreat Edge
Retreat Edges are those that are directly behind the respective
armies.
VICTORY
Carthaginian Army withdraws when units with Rout Points totaling
at least 110 have been eliminated. The Roman Army withdraws when
units with Rout Points totaling 125 have been eliminated. When using
the Alae cavalry variant, the Roman army withdraws when units with
Rout Points totaling 135 have been eliminated.
Size and Troop Quality
Army
187[a]
Rout
Points
279
Rout
Ratio
40%
Avg
TQ
5.6
58
174
354
35%
6.1
64
192
391
35%
6.1
Units
Size
Carthaginian
51
Roman
Roman/w
Alae Cavalry
a = Elephant Sizes (95 points) were excluded
© 2008 GMT Games LLC
SPQR Scenario Book
10
THE BATTLE OF CANNAE
Hannibal Barca vs. Consul G. Terentius Varro—Southern Italy, August 2, 216 BC
Historical Background
In 219 B.C., Hannibal Barca, commanding-general of the Carthaginians
in Spain—and avowed enemy of Rome—led an army of some 35,000
men and 34 elephants across the Alps into Italy to challenge the growing
mercantile power of the Republic of Rome. In 218 B.C., he defeated
Sempronius’ legions when they rashly splashed across the icy Trebbia
River to attack the Carthaginians. The Romans lost 20,000 men; in the
ensuing winter, Hannibal lost all his elephants (save one) plus one of
his eyes. He did, however, gain the allegiance of the vaunted, swordswinging Celts. Advancing into central Italy the following spring, he
ambushed Flaminius’ legions on the shores of Lake Trasimene, driving
the entire army into the lake. A second Roman force had been lost. In
both battles, the Romans, regardless of the situation, had used the same
tactics they always used, relying on the weight of their infantry to break
the center of the enemy (Carthaginian) line.
The Romans now adopted the strategy, propounded by consul, Q. Fabius Cunctator (the Delayer), of avoiding battle with Hannibal, hoping
he’d get tired of stomping around the peninsula and simply go home.
It didn’t work; at least not initially. Hannibal took the opportunity to
lay waste to the countryside, forcing the Roman people to send another
army against him. Therefore, in the summer of 216 B.C., the two newlyappointed consuls, Caius Terentius Varro and Lucius Aemilius Paullus,
led their newly-raised consular armies to join with a similar force under
previous consuls Servilius and Atilius. This huge army of (supposedly)
eight double legions—some 75,000+ men, the largest, by far, yet seen
in Roman history (however, see further notes on this, below)—found
Hannibal seizing the grain depot at Cannae, just south of the Aufidus
(today, the Ofanto) river. Paullus, the more experienced general,
cautioned against facing the Carthaginians too soon. Unfortunately,
it was Varro’s day to command (they alternated command each day, a
remarkable system virtually guaranteed to produce disastrous results)
and he was intent on avenging the two previous losses.
The battlefield at Cannae would, at first glance, seem ideal for the Romans’ purposes: the river and the hills would anchor their flanks and
prevent the fabled Numidian cavalry from running amok. Unfortunately,
the short frontage, between the river and the hills, forced the Romans to
squeeze their far-too-many maniples into an unwieldy formation (and
the Numidians ran amok anyway). The result was the greatest defeat
ever suffered by a Roman army, and a battle so masterfully fought by
Hannibal, a military genius in the same rank as Alexander or Caesar,
that it is, even today, the subject of intense scrutiny and study. (See the
note, below, on Victory.)
Pre-Game Notes
Every working historian worth his salt has an opinion on this battle—
and most of them differ. As such, the game provides the player/historian
with many opportunities to examine one of the most famous and studied
battles of all time. Just how did Hannibal do it?!?
Because of its unusual nature—and its fame—this has been a difficult
battle to “design”. We shy away from “You Must Do This” rules which
force a historical outcome. We have made several scenario changes … to
go along with Basic Rules changes that address some factors especially
© 2008 GMT Games LLC
SPQR Scenario Book
11
A Long, but Important, Design/Historical Note: There is a major difference of opinion about the size and make-up of the Roman army at
Cannae: how many legions were actually present? Polybius, our most reliable ancient source, states there were eight double legions, almost
80,000 men. Delbruck and Connolly agree. However, there is evidence which would seem to contradict that number. As we have noted, above,
a consular army invariably consisted of two double legions. That would have given the two new consuls an army of four double legions.
Several sources then state that this force may have been “augmented” by an additional levy of allied troops up to a strength of around
45,000+, a very large army for the time, and probably larger (although not by much) than Hannibal’s. Despite the loss of two battles to
Hannibal—both with two-legion armies—the Romans still felt secure in their ability to overcome the Carthaginian invader, as well as the
point that all other legions previously raised and in the field were busy elsewhere. (Livy proffers a total of 13 legions in existence at the time
of Cannae; other historians give this number as 18, so that leads us nowhere.) Quite simply, where did the other four legions come from?
And exactly how did the Carthaginians manage to envelop an army twice their size?
There is also the question of the size of the Roman cavalry contingent, driven from the field so quickly. With four legions, it would have been
about 4800, definitely outnumbered by Hannibal’s 10,000 or so horse as virtually all sources indicate. With 8 legions, there would have
been almost 10,000 Roman mounted troops; even with their inferior skills, this number would have been virtually impossible to drive from
the field with the speed and ease obviously exhibited by the Carthaginians at that time. (It took about 20 minutes for the Iberian and Gallic
cavalry to simply blow away the Roman right wing.) Finally, there is the Roman proclivity (not limited, to be sure, to them alone) to magnify
their defeats so as to highlight later victories.
On the other hand, there are a large number of scholars—both ancient and modern—who do accept the eight-legion theory. Peter Connolly,
in refuting many of the above arguments, points out the following:
1.
2.
3.
4.
The Romans had previously fielded a four-legion consular army against the Celts in 225 B.C.;
The Cannae “army” was led by two consuls and two proconsuls, indicating greater size and more legions;
The “missing” 4000 cavalry had been destroyed at Lake Trasimene;
The non-presence of the triarii, the usual rear defensive line, enabled Hannibal to complete his encirclement (Delbruck, however, says,
definitively, that the triarii were present—they simply were not tactically trained to turn and face the rear while the rest of the army was
going forward); and
5. The Senate perceived Hannibal as the greatest threat to the existence of the state and reacted accordingly.
Therefore, an 8-legion army would not be unrealistic. The fact that the Romans considered Cannae such a monumental disaster—one far in
excess of similar losses at Trebbia and Trasimene—gives further credence to the eight-legion theory. For the record, we go with the eightlegion thesis.
There is a second problem. Although the course of the Aufidus/Ofanto has changed over the years, it is agreed that the distance between the
river and the hills was around 3km. Given the manner in which the Roman army was drawn up, the cavalry had a frontage of about 1200–1500
meters, leaving around 1500+ meters for the legions. (Delbruck sets out the Roman infantry frontage at only 700+ meters!!) That’s some
57,000 men packed into a frontage of a mile. That’s quite a job of “packing”. Granted, the ground was chosen by Hannibal, and Varro, who
insisted on fighting there (Paullus recommended moving on) had the military insight of an armadillo. But such a battlefield would totally
negate the manpower advantage that Varro would have had. His ability to (possibly) stretch out his frontage to outflank his opponent was
completely negated by the terrain restrictions. Surely, he would have been advised of the dangers in fighting at such a place; then again,
hubris played no small part in the military mind of many such, inferior Roman consul/commanders. Polybius states that the maniples of the
legions assumed a frontage of only 5 soldiers per maniple, which (if you get out your trusty calculator) would make the “game” frontage (of
about 1500 meters for both infantry and cavalry, each) about right. If you believe this set of facts, this forced the Romans to greatly extend
the depth of their army—as we have done with the “historical” deployment.
Another bone of contention that designers must wrestle with is the supposed 10,000 troops the Romans left in their camp. What, exactly,
were they? Firstly, if you do accept that this happened, then the Romans must have had eight double legions; otherwise, they would not
have reduced their army by 25% to fight a foe that had already defeated them twice. Perhaps these were the hastily-raised allied troops used
to augment the four double legions. Many sources state that the 10,000 were mostly triarii. Delbruck, who goes into much detail over this
point, insists that only 25% were triariii; the rest were velites. We have opted for his figures, as the remaining velites are sufficient to cover
the Roman frontage and there would have been no need for a second line of velites.
As if all of this were not enough, there is the problem with Hannibal’s half-moon, “circular” infantry formation. Polybius is quite definite
about this, but what exactly did he mean? Several military historians insist that such a formation would have been tactically injudicious,
as it would have been impossible to move. Then again, perhaps Hannibal, aware of the Roman tactical doctrine of always throwing their
weight against the enemy center, never intended to move. The staggered, step-like formation we have chosen is what we feel is a more likely
interpretation of Polybius’ hyperbole.
Despite the many variations-on-a-theme possible with all of the above information, we have chosen, as our base/historical scenario, the
Polybius-Delbruck-Connolly, eight double-legion version. (When set up, the Roman army is indeed an imposing sight.) We have also provided some deployment information for playing a four-legion battle, as per the “revisionist” hypotheses of Livy and DeSanctis. Players are
always free to change their actual deployments, whether they use four or eight double-legions. Simply keep the respective armies on and
behind their front set-up lines.
A Note to Players: We heartily suggest that, if interested in this “problem”, you read—at least—Delbruck’s chapter on the battle.
© 2008 GMT Games LLC
SPQR Scenario Book
12
applicable to Cannae but certainly endemic to the era. Ultimately, it is
our feeling that Cannae was Cannae because:
• A great general was having his Best Day
• The Roman army was led by mediocrities who followed Roman tactical doctrine to the letter
• Hannibal was most aware of what the Romans would do, especially
with Varro in command, and
• Varro, a nonentity at best, was having the worst possible day.
Celtic MI (3), Iberian LI (7–9)
Celtic MI (4), Iberian LI (10–12)
Celtic MI (5), Iberian LI (13–15)
Celtic MI (6–9)
Celtic MI (10–13)
Celtic MI (14–17)
Celtic MI (18–21)
2121–2124
2011–2014
2025–2028
1907–1910
1928–1931
1804–1807
1832–1835
Right Wing
Understanding this, be aware that repeating the Carthaginian success
will take a superior Carthaginian player playing at his top form. Some
good die rolls won’t hurt, either.
Numidian LC (1–10) African Phalanxes (4–6) [b]
Map
a = Maharbal, a great cavalry commander, is capable of issuing Line
Commands without resorting to Hannibal’s Strategy rating. In essence,
this makes the Carthaginian command totally independent and remarkably effective.
Use the Cannae map.
Difficulty And Balance
This is a very large battle with a lot of counters. As such it presents
both sides with many tactical problems and decisions. We suggest you
NOT tackle Cannae until you have a solid, working knowledge of both
the game system and the different armies. We estimate the playing time
around 6–8 hours.
Balance for the basic, eight-legion game, slightly favors of the Carthaginians. The sheer weight of the Roman numbers may be just enough to
overcome their terrible command structure (which can be very frustrating for the Roman player). Balance for the four-legion scenario, heavily
favors of the Carthaginians.
This is a difficult battle to play competitively, because of the large number of variants available. For competition, we suggest the following:
• When playing the 8-legion version, use the Volturnus Rule; the
Romans may not use the Paullus variant or the Proconsul rule. Then
use the Rout Point Bid method.
• For the 4-legion version, use the Paullus and Proconsul variants, do
not use Volturnus. Then use Rout Point Bid method.
INITIAL DEPLOYMENT
The Carthaginian Army under Hannibal Barca
Hex
Hannibal Barca (OC) + Surus Mago Barca
Hasdrubal Gisgo
Hanno
Maharbal [a]
1914
1924
2106
2329
2237
Units
Hex(es)
2202–2206; 2101–2105
2002–2006
2402/2403, 2404/2405,
2406/2407
Skirmish Line
Balearic SK Slingers (1–11)
2409–2429, odd# hexes only
Center
Celtic MI (1), Iberian LI (1–3)
Celtic MI (2), Iberian LI (4–6)
2218–2221
2114–2117
The African Phalanxes were out front before the battle began, most
likely to disguise Hannibal’s deployment, especially as the wind was
blowing in the Roman’s eyes. Unless you really like to fiddle with
this sort of pre-battle maneuver, we heartily suggest that, as the Roman Player can see everything on the map anyway, you start with the
Phalanxes withdrawn, as noted.
Carthaginian Line Composition: The Carthaginian center—all that
Medium and Light Infantry—is not deployed in what the basic rules
would consider a line. However, the Carthaginian Player may treat
these units as being in a line as long as each unit is in an adjacent hex
… and there are no spaces between units.
Left Wing
Celtic LN (1–10) [c] Iberian LN (1–5) [c]
African Phalanxes (1–3) [b]
b = Players who wish to start from the point where Hannibal withdrew
his African phalanxes in preparation of his double envelopment plan
(see Historical Victory note, below) should place the African phalanxes
in the following hexes, facing as noted: 1702/1703 and 1735/1736 (facing Northeast), and 1604/1504, 1405/1305, 1534/1635 and 1333/1434
(facing Southeast). They should also move up Maharbal’s Numidian
cavalry to the 2400 line so that his frontage is extended and covered.
The African phalanxes were supposedly composed of “half-caste”
Africans and Carthaginians, who were Phoenician, not African . . .
although exactly what that entailed is a source of major (and somewhat
acrimonious) disagreement these days. It all depends on how “politically
correct” you wish to be. There is also some indication that these units
were not phalanxes in the Macedonian sense, but, rather, an extended
line of spearmen. Perhaps. However, Hannibal tended to use them as
if they were Macedonian-style phalanxes, so we have opted for that
“class” of unit.
c = Polybius, as well as several modern sources, refer to these as “heavy”
cavalry. However, other, modern information, based on archaeological evidence, indicates that the Spanish and Celtic horse were more
lancers than what we consider, in game terms, heavy cavalry. They
had shields, helmets, long spears and carried swords; but they had no
body armor. They also often dismounted and fought on foot, although,
it appears, not here.
All units are faced northeast
Leaders
2235–2239; 2135–2139
2431/2432, 2433/2434,
2435/2436
The Roman Army under Consul G. Terentius Varro
All units are faced southwest.
The Romans use all 8 legions and all 8 alae. However:
1. Only the legion cavalry and the alae cavalry from the VII, XIV, XV
and XIX Alae are used. Do NOT use the cavalry from the I, III, V
and X Alae.
2. The following units are not used in this battle:
a. All Alae Triarii
b. All Alae Velites
c. Remove one Velites unit from each of the I, III, V and X legion
© 2008 GMT Games LLC
SPQR Scenario Book
All of the above (a–c) represent the c. 10,000 men left in the
camp.
3. Skill-Level Adjustment: The Roman army at Cannae was not an
“elite” bunch; half of them were rather hastily raised, the other
half approaching manic depression. To include an elite and a
veteran legion will provide them with far too much staying power.
Therefore, the following units are Depleted:
• All LG, HI, and LI from I, III, V, and X Legion
• All LG, HI, and LI from I, III, V, and X Alae
• All Cavalry from the I and X Legion
Leader
Hex
Varro (OC) Paullus[a]
Servilius[a]
Atilius[a] Three (3) Tribunes,
two (2) Prfct Soc 3106
3129
3229
3627
Two (2) Prfct Eqt
3103, 3136
[a]
with/adjacent to any
infantry unit
Hex(es)
Principes Lines
All Principes (PR) from any 2 legions PLUS 12 alae cohorts (CO/CE)—
principes in center, alae on each side—in each of the following lines:
3410–3428 (even hexes only; two units per hex)
3510–3528 (even hexes only; two units per hex)
All Principes (PR) from any 2 legions PLUS 8 alae cohorts (CO)—
principes in center, alae on each side—in the following line:
3612–3626 (even hexes only; two units per hex)
All Principes (PR) from any 2 legions in the following line:
3716–3722 (even hexes only; two units per hex)
Triarii Line
3807–3830 (one unit per hex)
3001–3008
Alae RC (See Note #1) 3030–3041
Varro (OC) Paullus Servilius Atilius Two (2) Tribunes 3005
3028
3110
3228
with/adjacent to any
infantry units
Prfct Eqt
3036
Note on Leaders: Because of the presence of two consuls and two
proconsuls, we have reduced the number of tribunes to 2, the praefects
equitum to one, and eliminated the praefects sociorum. The consuls and
proconsuls can command any troops.
All Velites (VE)
Hex(es)
2908–2927
Hastati Lines
All Hastati (HA) from any 2 legions PLUS 12 alae cohorts (CO)—
hastati in center, alae on each side—in each of the following lines:
3009–3027 (odd hexes only; two units per hex)
All Hastati (HA) from any 2 legions PLUS 8 alae cohorts (CO)—hastati
in center, alae on each side—in each of the following lines:
3111–3125 (odd hexes only; two units per hex)
Principes Lines
All Principes (PR) from any 2 legions PLUS 12 alae cohorts (CO/
CE)—principes in center, alae on each side—in each of the following
lines:
3209–3227 (odd hexes only; two units per hex)
All Principes (PR) from any 2 legions PLUS 8 alae cohorts (CO)—
principes in center, alae on each side—in the following line:
3311–3325 (odd hexes only; two units per hex)
Triarii Line
All Triarii (TR)
Right Wing Cavalry
Hex
Velites Line
All Hastati (HA) from any 2 legions PLUS 12 alae cohorts (CO)—
hastati in center, alae on each side—in each of the following: lines:
3010–3028 (even hexes only; two units per hex)
3110–3128 (even hexes only; two units per hex)
3210–3228 (even hexes only; two units per hex)
3310–3328 (even hexes only; two units per hex)
All Legion RC
Leader
Units
2909–2928
Hastati Lines
All Legion Triarii (TR)
The Roman Army under G. Terentius Varro
Use all units in (only) the Recruit skill Legions (and alae): VII, XIV,
XV and XIX. This scenario assumes that the units left in camp were
the recently levied “additions”. In case of activation ties (5.12), Roman
leaders go first.
Velites Line
All Legion Velites (VE)
(See Note #2)
THE REVISIONIST, “DeSanctis/Livy”/4 Legion,
DEPLOYMENT
For those of you who want to see what happens if the Romans do have
only four double legions, try this version. Your main problem, as the
Roman, is that while your army is now halved—your opponent’s isn’t!
Recommended mostly for “what if” play and people with a virulently
anti-Roman strain in their psyche.
All units are faced west.
a = May command any units. Historically, Varro started the battle in
charge of the legionary cavalry. Paullus, Servilius and Atilius may NOT
be replaced if killed.
Units
13
3409–3427 (even hexes only;
two units per hex)
Right Wing Cavalry
Left Wing Cavalry
All Legion RC
3001, 3003, 3005, 3007
3030–3041
Left Wing Cavalry
Legion units are always placed in the center; cohorts alae on the
wings.
All Alae RC
© 2008 GMT Games LLC
SPQR Scenario Book
14
Legion units are always placed in the center; cohorts alae on the
wings.
Line Command Eligibility
Roman
Carthaginian
1. *Velites (VE)
1. *Balearic SK Slingers
2. *Hastati (HA) and Ala
Cohorts (CO/CE)
2. Celtic Medium (MI), Iberian
Light (LI) Infantry
3. *Principes (PR) and Ala
Cohorts (CO/CE)
3. African Phalanxes (PH)
4. Triarii (TR)
4. Celtic and Iberian Lancer
(LN) Cavalry
5. Legion Cavalry (RC)
5 All Cavalry
6. Alae Cavalry (RC)
* = Do not have to be adjacent; see 4.24.
SPECIAL RULES
Overall Commanders
Hannibal is the Carthaginian Overall Commander. Historically, Varro
was in command of the Romans at Cannae (but, see below). For OC
purposes, Paullus will replace Varro (and vice versa), if the latter is
killed.
The Paullus Variant
Because command was switched daily (between consuls), players
may designate Paullus as OC if they wish to alter play balance. He is
somewhat a better commander than Varro (who, all things considered,
was a major jerk). It might be interesting to see what the result would
have been had Paullus, not Varro, been in charge. If trying this, Varro
may NOT automatically use a Line Command (as does Paullus when
Varro is in charge.)
The Proconsul Variant
Players who find the Carthaginians too successful (which we don’t
feel will happen in the eight-legion deployment) may address the Roman’s main problem—command—with the following variant. The
two proconsuls—Servilius and Atilius—may issue one Line Command each turn without being within Varro’s range by rolling the die
when it is their Phase (either initial or Momentum). If the dieroll is a
0–4, they may issue the LC; if it is a 5–9 they are Finished. Add one
(+1) to the die roll if this is a Momentum Phase; +2 if it is the second
Momentum Phase.
Important: This rule should be used ONLY as a play balancing element
for competitive play.
Triarii Doctrine
Swords of the Celts
No, it’s not a forgotten Christopher Lambert Classic Movie (which, in
itself, is an oxymoron) . . . . it’s a rule that simulates the fear—and the
casualties—created by the Celtic long sword and the way it was used.
The Celts swung it in huge, whooshing circles, slashing at anything
in range. Unfortunately, the Celts were somewhat undisciplined and
liable to disintegrate after the impetus of their initial attack was spent,
which is the reason for their (relatively) low TQ. They were almost
purely offensive.
In the Charge section of Shock Attack (8.33), units defending against
any attack that includes Celtic infantry add one (+1) to the Pre-Shock
TQ Check die roll.
Play Note: This rule is NOT applicable to any other battle. Why?
Mostly, because the term “Celts” is somewhat generic, and the Celts
at Cannae were different from those at Zama and elsewhere (the latter
were more Gauls than Celts, but we already had far too many counters
anyway . . . .)
Historical Note: The Celts, who in the previous century had fought
pretty much in the altogether, by this period had donned pants that
looked as if they came from a close-out sale in double-knits. As for
their unusual hair-do’s, if you’ve ever had the misfortune to see the
infamous boxing promoter, Don King, you get a pretty good (actually
a great) idea what the Celts’ hair looked like.
The Volturnus (Optional)
It was a hot August day when the battle took place. (Actually, several
sources state it took place in June; regardless, it was hot.) Even worse,
a debilitating wind (known then as a volturnus, and which we, today,
would call a sirocco) had whipped up from the south and was blowing
a steady stream of dust to the NE—right into the face of the Roman
army. The midday sun, over the shoulders of the Carthaginians, shone
directly into the Roman eyes, not helping the situation either. (Leads
you to believe Varro had laid off about 20,000 talents on the Carthaginians, eh?) This rule, considered optional for those not wishing to bother
with an extra dieroll and some low-level math, simulates the effect of
the Volturnus.
At the start of each turn, prior to any Leader Activation, is the Volturnus
Phase, as below. The Roman Player rolls the die. If he rolls a 0–6, the
wind is blowing. A 7–9, the wind has stopped, temporarily, and there
is no effect that turn.
Volturnus Phase. The Roman player checks to see whether the wind is
still blowing the dust into his face.
If the Volturnus is blowing, any unit that begins movement facing into
a West or Southwest vertex (as below) reduces its MA (for all purposes,
including withdrawal) by one (all Roman units start the game with this
problem). Any Roman missile units facing in those directions reduce
their range by one (to a minimum of 1 hex) and lower their Missile Hit
number by one (to a minimum of 0) in each range.
The Volturnus always blows from the same direction; it does NOT
change.
Note: We highly recommend that you use this rule if you are playing
for an historical result.
This rule is in effect for this scenario.
Terrain Note
The Aufidus River is uncrossable. It may not be entered and is considered impassable terrain for that purpose. Although they are not visible,
both flanks are, essentially, “anchored”—by the river on the Roman
right and the plateau on the left—both represented by the edge of the
map. (It worked out really nicely . . . .)
Retreat Edge
The Romans retreat toward the northeast edge of the map while the
Carthaginians retreat toward the southwest edge.
© 2008 GMT Games LLC
SPQR Scenario Book
VICTORY
More Historical Digression: Cannae was the greatest Roman defeat
in its entire history; all or parts of eight (or four) legions were either
totally destroyed or so obliterated that they were useless. (The actual
survivors—who included the future Scipio Africanus, a tribune at the
battle—were, for the most part, exiled to hard times in Sicily, and the
legions were not used for active duty until Scipio took them to Africa,
where they redeemed themselves at Zama, 14 years later.) Estimates of
the Roman dead go to upwards of 50,000—including Consul Paullus,
the two former consuls serving as proconsuls, Servilius and Atilius, as
well as 80 senators—three times the number of dead for both sides at
Antietam and more than several WWI battles! As for Varro, despite his
having been bonked on the noggin by a Balearic slinger’s stone—the
one wound least likely to have any effect on his abilities—he fled back
to Rome where he was actually congratulated by “the people” for “not
giving up”. (Boy, I bet several politicians would love to have his “spin”
flack!) However, despite the Senate’s remarkable leniency, Varro does
not appear to have been given any office higher than Rat Catcher for
the rest of his career.
To feel that the players can—or even should—recreate this result is
folly. Anyway, who would want to play the Romans? The object of the
game is not to see what happened—which we already know—but to see,
perhaps, why it happened and how it might have turned out differently.
We have provided rules that create the problems and advantages of
both sides; whether or not they lead to such a predestined end is the
measure of your abilities as gamers.
The Army Withdrawal Levels (and percentages), below, reflect the
designers’ estimations of the overall Cohesive Strength and Discipline
of the opposing armies. While Hannibal’s force was pretty much a
mercenary one, the soldiers showed remarkable allegiance to Hannibal,
with whom they stayed for over a decade with hardly a murmur. On
the other hand, at least four of the Roman legions at Cannae were raw
recruits. Players will note the rather large Average TQ that the Roman
army had, even with those recruits. This was a reflection of the innate
discipline and training that even the newest legions had. Rome’s problems lay not in this area but, usually, with her commanders and their
stolid—and virtually non-existent—ideas concerning tactics.
A Historical Note on Victory: O.K. You’ve got the eight-legion version set up and you want to know how Hannibal did it. Well, we’re
sure it wasn’t quite as easy as it looks—but, with our trusty pair of
hindsight glasses firmly in place, it sure looks easy. In essence, at
Cannae, Hannibal raised the Macedonian system to its finest hour,
combining each of the separate weapons system in his command—
and especially his cavalry—to neutralize everything the Romans
could throw at him.
Using the historical set-up, Hannibal’s initial move was to withdraw
his African phalanxes so that they were now deployed as per the note
in the Carthaginian set-up. With Varro still trying to walk and think
at the same time, Hannibal now had both his cavalry wings charge
their undermanned Roman counterparts at the same time, quickly
driving them from the field. (Actually, Hannibal’s left wing cavalry
had the more immediate success, after which it circled behind the
Roman triarii to assist Maharbal.) With their flanks unguarded—
and threatened by cavalry—the Romans had nowhere to go but into
their usual (and tired) strategy of trying to break the opponent’s
center by moving forward, en masse, against the unusually deployed
Carthaginian foot. Hannibal, however, had seen two previous Roman
armies in action and he had devised a tactical deployment that would
“bend, but not break”. As the Roman lines approached, Hannibal’s
Celtic and Spanish infantry gradually withdrew the center of their
line (taking some heavy losses as they did so from the inexorable
legions) so that the original convex formation became concave, with
the Romans in the center. At this point, the African phalanxes closed
in on each side of the Romans, and Hannibal’s cavalry returned from
their pursuit of the Romans to close up the rear. The entire Roman
army was now encircled, and the rest of the day was given over to
methodical slaughter of the legions.
At Cannae, it was shown that, given an exceptional commander—
and Hannibal was truly an exceptional commander—who could
anticipate the enemy and control the various forces in his command, the Macedonian system could prevail . . . as long as it had
superiority in cavalry.
The Carthaginian Army withdraws when units with Rout Points totaling
195 have been eliminated. For the 8-Legion version, the Roman Army
withdraws when units with Rout Points totaling 240 have been eliminated. When using the 4-Legion version, the Roman army withdraws
when units with Rout Points totaling 165 have been eliminated.
Hannibal is worth 25 Rout Points if wounded; if he is killed the Romans
win automatically.
Size and Troop Quality
Army
351
Rout
Points
486
Rout
Ratio
40%
Avg
TQ
5.8
128
384
665
25%[a]
5.2
208
636
1,202
20%
5.8
Units
Size
Carthaginian
78
Roman [4 Legions]
Roman [8 Legions]
[a]
15
No adjustment has been made for Depleted units
a = the low Roman Rout Ratios reflect the fact that this army was
newly raised, and few men had seen any previous action.
© 2008 GMT Games LLC
SPQR Scenario Book
16
THE BATTLE OF ZAMA
Hannibal Barca vs. Proconsul P. Cornelius Scipio—North Africa, 202 BC
Historical Background
Many historians consider Zama one of the most important battles in
Western civilization. Perhaps that is reading too much into its obvious
political conclusion: Rome’s Mediterranean expansion. With wonderful
hindsight, however, it is fairly easy to see that Carthage was doomed as
a political entity; her inefficient, city-state form of government was no
match for the Roman concept of people and state. Rome’s ascendancy
was simply a matter of time, and Zama helped to hasten that date.
From a military point of view, however, Zama is an immensely important
battle. On one level it shows what a genius Hannibal truly was; his army
at Zama was inferior to Scipio’s; yet, Hannibal came rather close to winning. On a loftier plane, Zama is the proving ground of the flexibility of
the Roman legionary system—as implemented by the insightful mind of
Scipio Africanus—and its superiority to the powerful, yet linearly rigid,
Macedonian system. The latter would live on for another 50 or so years,
suffering further repeated blows at Cynoscephalae (see below), Magnesia
(Antiochus and the end of the Seleucids) and Pydna (Perseus and the
end of Macedonia). The Roman legions would continue to hold sway
for the next several centuries. Delbruck further adds to its importance
by arguing that it was the first use of echelon tactics; i.e., the different
lines of troops were not there to simply provide depth but to be used for
differing tactical purposes—as well as acting as a reserve.
In 210 B.C., with Hannibal’s army still on the loose in southern Italy,
the young Publius Cornelius Scipio was chosen to command the Roman
forces in Spain. Scipio was something of a surprising choice, given
his youth and lack of experience in public office—although not overly
shocking given Scipio’s ideas on how to conduct the war against Carthage
and the people’s demand for some sort of action. (Fabius Cunctator was
still implementing the theory that Rome could bore Hannibal to death;
exhausted by ennui, he would then go home. It pretty much worked.)
In a few short years, the son of a consul from the First Punic War had
proven himself to be an exceptional field commander, with a victory over
Hasdrubal at Baecula and a masterful, tactical showpiece win at Ilipa. In
205 B.C. he was elected consul where, in the Senate, he went face-to-face
with the delaying strategy of Fabius. Scipio advocated taking the war
directly to Carthage; the only way to get Hannibal out of Italy was to force
him to return to Africa to defend his city-state. To this end—albeit with
some senatorial reluctance—he was handed the command of Sicily and
its two legions, mostly remnants and veterans of the Cannae fiasco. After
raising some additional forces to flesh out his consular army, he set off
for North Africa where, in a series of stunning maneuvers, he won several
land and naval battles, forcing the Carthaginians to sue for peace.
In the meantime, with Mago’s army having been destroyed in Liguria,
the Carthaginians demanded Hannibal return to Carthage, as Mago’s
defeat had nullified whatever “Italian strategy” Hannibal had. Hannibal’s
arrival seemed to strengthen the backbone of the Carthaginians, and they
repudiated the peace treaty through a variety of actions that the Romans,
as was their wont, assigned to the usual Punic Treachery. Hannibal’s army
was in bad straits, however, especially in the all-important area of cavalry.
Even worse, after a series of political and military maneuvers involving claims to the Numidian throne, Scipio had acquired the services of
Masinissa, the new Numidian king, along with the cream of his capable
light cavalry. Although Hannibal was aware of these developments, he
assumed that he could bring Scipio to battle before Masinissa arrived.
And to strengthen his outnumbered cavalry wing (which included about
2000 Numidians led by one of Masinissa’s leftover rivals), he quickly
trained a corps of 80 or so war elephants. (However, see the note on
Hannibal’s elephants, below.) Both generals were now set for battle; all
they needed was a place.
The site of the Zama battlefield has never been firmly pinpointed. If you
read Polybius/Livy closely, it seems to have taken place closer to the
village of Naraggara. We have used the map from H.H. Scullard’s book,
Scipio Africanus, Politician & Soldier, (it also appears in Liddel Hart’s
book, with an added cross-battlefield trail) which is based on that con-
© 2008 GMT Games LLC
SPQR Scenario Book
tained in the Kromayer-Veith Atlas (a German work extremely difficult
to obtain through the normal, local-library channels—or through any
channels, for that matter). If interested, we suggest you consult Scullard
for a discussion on all possible sites, of which Veith’s selection—and
our choice—appears the most reasonable.
Zama is pretty much a set-piece battle. We have provided only one scenario, although the players may feel free to change deployments within
the parameters of the original dispositions. There are some problems in
terms of unit types and numbers, and where/how they deployed. We do
know that Scipio had an augmented, two-legion consular army; see the
notes on the Roman army under their deployment. Hannibal’s somewhat
hastily assembled army is somewhat easier to pin down, although numbers and weapons system types are evasive.
It appears that Hannibal, aware of his inferiority in mounted troops, placed
the onus of victory on his infantry. To that end, he hoped that one of two
things would happen: either his elephants would drive off the Roman
cavalry, or the Roman cavalry would recklessly pursue the undermanned
Carthaginian horsemen off the battlefield, allowing Hannibal’s infantry
to go head-to-head with the legions.
Well, the elephants proved a bust (Scipio pretty much saw to that), but
Hannibal was on the money about the Roman cavalry chasing the Africans
hither and yon. That left it up to the infantry, and, despite the eagerness
of some of Hannibal’s newest recruits to be elsewhere, his veterans were
pretty much holding their own against Scipio’s relentless legionnaires
when Laelius returned with the cavalry, hit Hannibal’s lines from the
rear, and sealed Carthage’s doom. Hannibal, himself, escaped, but the
2nd Punic War was over—and so was Carthage’s prominence.
Hannibal, still a fairly young man, sought employment in the Near East.
He was on the field at Magnesia when the Romans decided to put a quick
end to the machinations of the Seleucid ruler, Antiochus the Great, in
190 B.C. (So was Scipio, although the latter was ill and had little input).
It is something of a measure of Antiochus’ lack of genius that, having
one of history’s greatest tacticians at his side, he failed to put him to any
significant use. Rome eventually decided that Hannibal was a major pain
regardless of where he was, so they declared him an outlaw and finally
tracked him down in Bythnia (northern Turkey), where he had been helping King Prusias in his contre-temps with Pergamum. With his house
surrounded, Hannibal, bitter and tired, committed suicide.
Map
Use the Zama map.
Difficulty And Balance
While not as massive as Cannae, Zama presents both players with
problems that are best tackled by experienced players. The playing time
about six hours and with two equal players the Romans are slightly
favored. For competitive play, use the following Rules Fixes for a
better balanced game:
• Hannibal gets the Elite Phase in the first turn (this is historically
what occurred anyway)
• Do not use the Blow, Scipio, Blow Rule.
• Use the full complement of 80 elephants, all of which are “veteran” elephants. They do not start Depleted, and they get Elephant screens.
INITIAL DEPLOYMENTS
The Carthaginian Army under Hannibal Barca
All units are faced northwest.
Leaders
Hex
Hannibal Barca (OC)+Surus Hasdrubal Gisgo
Hanno
Tychaeus
Anywhere
Anywhere
Anywhere
3236
17
Units
Hex(es)
Skirmish Line
Balearic SK Slingers (1–7) [a]
2811, 2814, 2817, 2820,
2823, 2826, 2829
Elephant Line
African Elephants (1–16)*
2906–2936, even number
hexes only
Left Wing Cavalry
Numidian LC (1–5)
3133–3137
Right Wing Cavalry
Carthaginian HC (1–5) [g]
3104–3108
Mercenary Line
Celtic MI (1–10)[c] Ligurian MI (1–6)[c]
Balearic Med MI (1–2)[b, c]
Mauritanian MI (1–4)[b, c]
Levies
N. African LI (1–6)[d]
Carthaginian MI Levies (1–16)[d]
Reserve Line
African Phalanx (1–5) [e, f] 3110–3131
3310–3331
3716–3717, 3718–3719
3720–3721, 3722–3723
3724–3725
Bruttium HI (1–12) [f]
3710–3715, 3726–3731
* = All elephant units start Depleted. Additionally, they do not have
elephant screens, so the “a” missile capability is ignored. Important:
See the Special Rule, below, on Hannibal’s elephants.
a = Although none of the “ancient” sources mention the slingers, several
modern (reliable) sources state they were most surely present—as Hannibal was never without them in Italy and he must have brought some
of those back with his Old Army when he returned to Carthage.
b = Polybius specifically mentions “heavily-armed” infantry from the
Balearic Isles and Mauretania (Morocco). Historically, troops from
these areas were invariably light-armed infantry and/or skirmishers. It
is, however, highly likely that Hannibal re-armed them with heavier
weapons (if not armor), as they were in the same line with the Ligurians
and Celts. If they were light infantry/skirmishers, they would not have
been so deployed.
c = Remnants of Mago’s Army, composed of mercenaries from a variety
of areas from Spain to Northeast Italy. These units may deploy in their
line as the player wishes, as there is no indication as to how they were
intermixed within that line.
d = Termed, variably, as Libyans, Africans, whatever. These—and their
compatriot Carthaginian levies—were extremely unreliable, hastily
trained troops. Although they constitute a second “line”, it appears
Hannibal intended to use them to extend his first line as the battle developed. They may be intermixed as the player sees fit. See the Special
Rule on these units, below.
e = Although the presence of “4000 infantry from Macedonia” (phalangites??) is mentioned in several sources, many modern historians
consider these more legend than fact. Actually, they tend to use the
word “annalistic”, which should not be confused with “analistic”,
which is what some of these authors appear to be as you slog through
their works. We agree with those modern interpretations and have left
the Macedonians out. If you wish, use two Macedonian phalanx units
instead of two African phalanx units.
f = Hannibal’s veterans, the “Old Army of Italy”
g = Although the Carthaginian Sacred Band cavalry is not mentioned as
being at Zama, there is no reason to assume it should not have been.
© 2008 GMT Games LLC
SPQR Scenario Book
18
The Roman Army under P. Cornelius Scipio
All units are faced southeast.
Scipio has a full consular army augmented by the addition of about
7000 “volunteers” (plus Masinissa’s 10,000 Numidians). The presence
of these volunteers (Polybius’ term) creates somewhat of a problem,
as it is not clearly stated how or where they were used. Liddell Hart
says these were “Scipio’s men”, used to augment the legions to an
expanded strength of 6500 infantry. As Scipio had some time to train
these volunteers while in Sicily, and he did engage in several minor
battles before Zama, we have adopted Liddell Hart’s position (although
reducing his numerical estimate)—at least for game purposes—that
they were deployed with the hastati and principes lines, being similar in
weaponry to the cohorts of the alae. Serendipitously, this allowed us to
extend Scipio’s lines so that they were equal in length to the opposing
infantry lines, as is indicated in the sources. To do so, we also lengthened
the third, Triarii, line with the cohorts extraordinaires plus some of the
volunteer cohorts. The velites front was extended by the Numidian
light infantry, as has been suggested by some of the sources. Granted,
much of this is surmise; however, we do feel that our guesses have been
“educated” ones. You can always redeploy; we won’t tell a soul.
The Roman should use the I and X legion and alae, plus 22 additional
cohort units (but NO extraordinaires) from any of the recruit-level
alae (AS/VII, AS/XIV, AS/XV, or AS/XIX). The color borders of these
auxiliary, recruit-cohorts still apply for stacking rules. If players wish
to alter balance, they can substitute legions/alae of lesser skill levels.
The Historical deployment uses Scipio’s non-staggered, manipular
formation, with the so-called elephant lanes (See the note on Hannibal’s elephants). Several sources say the “historical” legions present
were the V and VI.
Leaders
Hex
Scipio (OC) Masinissa[a] Laelius[b]
Two Tribunes (2), two Prfct Soc[c]
Anywhere
With/adjacent to any
Numidian cavalry unit
With/adjacent to any
Legion or Alae Cavalry
With/adjacent to any
infantry units
a = Masinissa has a Charisma rating of “2C’. This means it may be
used only when stacked with a Numidian cavalry unit. Masinissa may
automatically issue a LC in his Initial Phase, regardless of where he is
on the battlefield. Momentum-generated LCs follow 4.25 (Masinissa
was quite a capable commander in his own right). If killed, Masinissa
may NOT be replaced.
b = Scipio’s old buddy, and Polybius’ confidant, Gaius Laelius, was
the Praefectus Equitum in charge of all Roman cavalry. If killed, he is
replaced by a Praefect Equitum.
c = Roman Tribunes and Praefects Sociorum may command any and
all types of legion/alae infantry.
Units
Hex(es)
Velites Line
I VE (a–c), X VE (a–c)
AS/I VE (a, b), AS/X VE (a, b)
2313–2323 (Odd
numbered hexes only)
2309, 2311, 2325, 2327
Hastati Line
I HA (a–d), X HA (a–d)
AS/I CO (a–e), AS/X CO (a–e)
Recruit CO (6)
Principes Line
I PR (a–d), X PR (a–d)
AS/I CO (f–i), AS/X CO (f–i) AS/I CE, AS/X CE
Recruit CO (8)
2017, 2019, 2021, 2023
(two per hex)
2011, 2013, 2027, 2029
(two per hex)
2015, 2025
2007, 2009, 2031, 2033
(two per hex)
Triarii Line
I TR (a–c), X TR (a–c)
AS/I TR (a, b), AS/X TR (a, b)
Recruit CO (8)
1819–1824
1817–1818, 1825–1826
1813–1816, 1827–1830
Left Wing
I RC, X RC, AS/I RC (a, b, EX),
AS/X RC (a, b, EX)
2205–2208, 2104–2107
Right Wing
Numidian LI (1–4) *
Numidian MI (1–6) *
Numidian LC (1–10) *
2329, 2331, 2333, 2335
2133–2135, 2233–2235
2236–2240, 2136–2140
* = Use the Numidian counters that are part of the Roman counter-mix;
not the ones that are part of the Carthaginian mix.
Play Note: Yes, there’s an odd ala cohort in each line, which means it
has to start stacked with a cohort from a different ala. Nothing tragic,
and you’re always free to change the deployment, if you wish. The
present situation arose from (a) the fact that ‘9’ is an odd number, and
(b) Scipio’s army was a bit of a mix-and-match affair, in which he has
upped the strength of his legions, so such intermingling was possible.
Line Command Eligibility
Roman
Carthaginian
1. *Velites (VE), Numidian
Light (LI) Infantry
1. *Elephants
2. *Hastati (HA) and Ala
Cohorts (CO)
2. Celtic, Ligurian, Balearic,
Mauretanian MI
3. *Principes (PR) and Ala
Cohorts (CO/CE)
3. African Phalanxes (PH), Bruttium HI
4. Triarii (TR) and Alae Cohorts (CO)
4. Carthaginian Heavy (HC)
Cavalry
5. Legion and Alae Cavalry
(RC)
5 Numidian Light (LC) Cavalry
6. Numidian Light (LC)
Cavalry
6. N. African Light (LI), Levy
(MI) Infantry
7. Numidian Medium (MI)
Infantry
7. **Balearic Slingers (SK)
* = Do not have to be adjacent; see 4.24.
** = Can be within three hexes of another (and no intervening
units, etc.)
SPECIAL RULES
Blow Scipio, Blow
2217, 2219, 2221 2223
(two per hex)
2211, 2213, 2215, 2225,
2227 (two per hex)
2209, 2229, 2231
(two per hex)
Hannibal, with a severe shortage of cavalry (which was to prove decisive), decided to augment his horse with a corps of war elephants.
His plan, according to most historians (see, though, note on Hannibal’s
elephants) was to neutralize Scipio and Masanissa’s horse by placing
his pachyderms up front and have them charge the Romans at the
outset to drive off their cavalry and disrupt their front line (Shades of
© 2008 GMT Games LLC
SPQR Scenario Book
Porus at the Hydaspes!!). Unfortunately, he had little time to train his
elephants (the reason for their low TQ), and Scipio was ready for them.
Not only did he supposedly modify the standard legionary checkerboard
deployment to create lanes for the charging elephants (for which bit of
silliness we refer you, yet again, to the elephant note), but, at the start
of the battle, he set up quite a din of trumpets and shouts, all of which
served to frighten the untrained tuskers, many of which ran wild before
they could even get going.
Therefore, at any time during the game—but only once—instead of
a Line Command from Scipio (and only The Scipster), the Roman
Player may turn on his Punic Ghetto Blaster. He rolls one die for each
elephant on the map. If the die roll is higher than the TQ, that elephant
immediately suffers a number of cohesion hits equal to the difference
(all standard rout rules applying); if it is the same as or lower, there
is no effect.
Levy Retreat and Old Guard Rally
The Carthaginian second line of infantry—the North African and
Carthaginian levies—was a hastily raised group. In order to “stiffen
their collective spines”, Hannibal placed them in front of his veterans
with the idea that the latter would stop the levies from running away.
To recreate this, we give the Carthaginian Player two possibilities with
any routing North African Light Infantry or Carthaginian Levies:
• If one of these units routs, instead of retreating it directly back, the
Carthaginian may “rout” it sideways and around the third line (of
African Phalanxes and Bruttium infantry). Once they pass the Old
Guard, they head directly for the map edge; OR
• They head directly backward, as in the standard rule. The instant they
move adjacent to an (un-routed) African Phalanx/Bruttium unit, the
Carthaginian player rolls the die. If the die roll is the same as or lower
than the TQ of the Old Guard unit, the routing levy/light infantry
is automatically rallied. If it is higher, the routing unit is eliminated
AND the Old Guard unit suffers one cohesion hit. Only Old Guard
units may so rally routing levies.
Either option may be applied to individual units. The rule applies only
to routing North Africans and levies—as these were the only units that
Hannibal instructed the Old Guard to worry about.
Hannibal’s Elephants
One of the more interesting questions surrounding Zama concerns
Hannibal’s elephants. The first arises as to numbers. Polybius states
there were about 80; Delbruck and Veith argue for a much lower figure:
perhaps 15–20. That question is not as much fun, however, as how they
were to be used.
By this time it was quite apparent to everyone that elephants had little
effect against trained infantry, especially when covered by disciplined
skirmishers. Their best use was against enemy cavalry, who, no matter how well-trained the horses were, still had major troubles with the
pachyderms. What, then, were Hannibal’s elephants doing arrayed in a
line directly opposite Scipio’s infantry—especially as Hannibal was so
deficient in cavalry?
Delbruck’s rather common sense answer is quite interesting. They were
simply buying time, creating enough of a disturbance so that Scipio’s
cavalry would be gone, having chased Hannibal’s cavalry off the field.
With all cavalry gone, and the elephants having delayed Scipio’s deployment of his foot, Hannibal could now fight this battle on a pure infantry/
power basis, where he was probably superior in numbers. This is such
an obvious, possible (and Hannibal-like) solution that it comes as somewhat of a surprise that few post-Delbruckian scholars have adopted it.
We think it sounds as reasonable as all get-out. Which brings us back to
the question of numbers. If Hannibal had that many elephants (80), why
didn’t he split their usage, assigning half to counter-balance the cavalry
and the other half against the infantry? If you agree with Delbruck’s
19
hypothesis concerning Hannibal’s tactics you have to also agree to a
lower elephant figure. Of course, you will notice, that, when using all
80 elephants, Hannibal does pretty much get to cover both the Roman
infantry and cavalry. “Is a puzzlement.”
A tangential question arises over Scipio’s infantry deploying without the
usual manipular intervals. Polybius states he was creating lanes for the
elephants to pass through. Think about that for a second. Never mind
the fact that elephants were mostly used against cavalry, so that Scipio
would have had to have been amazingly prescient to discern Hannibal’s
rather unique use for his elephants. The really amazing thing is that
Scipio would have been dumb enough to expect the elephants to simply
charge right down those open lanes—rather than into the troops. How
thoughtful of them. I don’t think so.
In any case, players are free to adjust the numbers of elephant units available to Hannibal according to whom they believe. We have provided an
initial deployment of 16 units (80 pachyderms). The lowest the Carthaginian should go is 4 units. Try this: roll the die twice, adding them together.
The number rolled is the number of elephant units the Carthaginian player
gets to use. If greater than 16, he gets 16. If less than 4, he gets 4. They
still deploy in the same line. Their location is up to the Carthaginian
player; however, the two-space line restriction still applies.
Triarii Doctrine
This rule is NOT used in this scenario.
Retreat Edges
The Romans retreat toward the northwest edge. The Carthaginians
retreat toward the southeast edge.
VICTORY
The Roman Army Withdraws when units worth 230 Rout Points have
been eliminated. The Carthaginian Army Withdraws when units worth
170 Rout Points have been eliminated. This number remains the same
regardless of how many elephants the Carthaginian player gets.
Hannibal is worth 25 Rout Points if wounded; if he is killed the Romans win automatically. Scipio is treated normally; his death is NOT
an automatic Carthaginian victory.
Size and Troop Quality
Army
336[a]
Rout
Points
483
Rout
Ratio
35%
Avg.
TQ
5.4
340
657
35%
6.2
Units
Size
Carthaginian
94
Roman
106
a = Elephant Size points (80) were excluded
A Note about Victory: At Zama, Scipio was able to neutralize the
advantages that Hannibal could produce with the Macedonian
system by gaining superiority in cavalry—and using it, something
which previous Roman commanders rarely understood. With his
mobility and maneuver thus severely restricted, Hannibal was
forced to rely almost entirely on the power of his infantry reserve
to break the Roman line. There is also a possibility that he specifically relied on the fact that the superior Roman cavalry would chase
the Carthaginian horse, thus rendering them unavailable! That he
almost succeeded in doing this—and it was only the late return of
Laelius and Masinissa with the cavalry that spelled a quick end to
the battle—is further testament to Hannibal’s genius.
© 2008 GMT Games LLC
SPQR Scenario Book
20
THE BATTLE OF CYNOSCEPHALAE
King Phillip V of Macedon vs. Consul T. Quinctius Flamininus—Greece, 197 BC
Historical Background
By the end of the 3rd century, B.C., Macedon, and her king, Phillip V
was still the dominant force in the eastern Mediterranean. Her army,
a direct descendent of Alexander’s, was still much feared, as was the
Macedonian style of warfare, which still emphasized combined arms
but placed far more reliance on the power of the phalanx than Alexander
ever did—or would have. While Rome was going the way of increased
flexibility and maneuver, the Macedonian phalanx was becoming, if
possible, more rigid than ever.
During the 2nd Punic War, Phillip sided with Carthage. Although this
arrangement produced no pitched battles between Rome and Macedon,
it became known, historically, as the First Macedonian War. After some
indecisive skirmishing, an uneasy peace was negotiated that enabled
Rome to concentrate its energies on defeating Carthage. Legend has it
that Phillip supplied Hannibal with several thousand men at Zama, but
there appears to be no support for this story.
In 200 BC, with Rome now the dominant power in Italy and the Western
Mediterranean, Rhodes and Pergamum petitioned her for aid against
continuing Macedonian aggression in the Dardanelles and Egypt. This
petition focused Roman attention on the Aegean and its unresolved
business with Phillip. Rome demanded complete Macedonian withdrawal from Greece. Phillip agreed in part but wanted to maintain
control over Demetrius in Thessaly, Chalcis in Euboea, and Corinth
in Achaea, which the king had called the “fetters of Greece”. A Greek
delegation sent to Rome gave the Senate a lesson in Greek geography
and the negotiations ended in an impasse. However, as a result, the
Senate voted Consul Lucius Quinctius Flamininus two Roman Legions
plus 6,000 allied foot and 300 allied cavalry to prosecute the Second
Macedonian War to conclusion.
Upon arrival in Greece, Consul Flamininus conducted a series of negotiations that allied most of Greece with Rome for its coming showdown
with Phillip. This gave the Roman army, reinforced by almost 10,000
men from the Aetolian League, a grand total of 23,000 foot and 1,100
cavalry to face Phillip’s 23,500 foot and 2,000 cavalry. From somewhere—probably a gift from Masinissa—Flamininus also managed to
attract the services of 20 elephants, which were to play a surprisingly
decisive role in the coming battle. Aficionados of Alexander the Great
will notice the diminution of the Macedonian cavalry wing, despite
its numerical superiority to that of the Romans, both in numbers and
effectiveness. This was due, in part, to the hilly and rocky Greek terrain, most of which negated the capabilities of cavalry; Cynoscephalae
would be a major example. It also reflected a reduced appreciation of
Alexandrian tactics. And, given the equality of strength in both armies,
the approaching battle would be won by the respective tactical systems
and not weight of numbers.
Both armies lurched forward in an attempt to seek each other out.
Phillip and Flamininus knew they could not keep their respective coalitions in the field indefinitely, so each wanted to fight quickly. Near
Pharae, in Thessaly, reconnaissance forces from both sides came into
contact, although no battle occurred because the respective commanders felt the terrain was too constricted by walls and enclosed farms.
The Macedonians then headed for a supply region to replenish their
stocks of food. The Romans moved parallel to the Macedonians to cut
them off from the needed grain, with the two forces being separated
by a long ridge called Cynoscephalae (so named for its resemblance
to a “dog’s head”). On the third day of marching a torrential storm
© 2008 GMT Games LLC
SPQR Scenario Book
arose drenching the forces and causing a heavy fog. The Macedonians
tried to march on but could not make any headway in the storm. They
withdrew to camp, leaving a strong outpost on the ridge. The Roman
army stayed in camp but sent out a reconnaissance party to locate the
Macedonians. With a heavy fog obscuring visibility, the two patrols
bumped into each other on the rain-soaked ridge. With the Macedonians
holding the heights, both sides sent back for reinforcements. The battle
of Cynoscephalae was on.
Flamininus reluctantly sent reinforcements, forcing the Macedonians
off the ridge. Phillip felt compelled to reinforce his exposed unit and
prevent its destruction. These fresh Macedonian forces reclaimed
the ridge from the Romans as the fog began to lift. Perceiving an opportunity to destroy part of the Roman army, Phillip now reluctantly
committed his entire army. Flamininus followed suit, and a full-scale,
pitched battle began.
Phillip took personal command of his right wing, and as soon as it
formed on the ridge he doubled the depth of the phalanx and attacked the
Roman left. This maneuver was, momentarily, successful; however, it
separated the Macedonian army into two sections, with the Macedonian
left wing under Nicanor still deploying from march column. Flamininus,
seizing the moment, sent his right wing, lead by his elephants, slamming
into the Macedonian left. An unknown Roman tribune, most likely from
the Triarii, noticing that the Macedonian army was now split in two,
exposing the flanks of the phalanxes, seized the initiative—and the day
(carpe diem, for those of you who collect Latin idioms)—by leading
20 Roman maniples (the entire principes and triarii lines from one Roman legion) into the rear of the Macedonian right wing. This Roman
maneuver—a text-book example of flexibility versus rigidity—shattered
the Macedonian army and Phillip’s hopes of Greek hegemony, leading
to a swiftly negotiated conclusion to the Second Macedonian War.
Even more important, Cynoscephalae was the first major confrontation
between the Roman legions and a full-blown Alexandrian/Macedonian
army led by phalanxes. (Both Hannibal and Pyrrhus adapted the Macedonian system rather than used it.) While Phillip’s phalanxes could not
be budged in a head-to-head confrontation (the legions that attacked
them frontally suffered heavy losses; see the notes on the Phalanx in
the terminology section), they could, if outflanked, be easily defeated.
Both the difficulty of the terrain at Cynoscephalae and the ability of
the legion to maneuver freely, and in sections, enabled this to happen.
The day of the phalanx was rapidly drawing to a conclusion, a curtain
that would finally be drawn some 30 years later, at Pydna.
PRE-GAME NOTES:
Play Note: This battle is great fun, especially if you play the Fog and
Hidden Movement rules. That it is a pure meeting engagement, allows
players to experiment with their units—and their tactics. It can also be
used as a “play-first” scenario using the Set-Piece deployment.
Map
Use the Cynoscephalae map.
Difficulty And Balance
The set-piece battle is a fairly easy one, but the aspects of hidden movement that the fog creates in the Meeting Engagement make that a more
complex affair. Do not underestimate how difficult it is to move fairly
rigid formations in this type of terrain. Playing time for the set-piece
battle is around two hours; add at least another hour for the Meeting
Engagement.
This battle is fairly even, with a slight edge to the Romans. A lot depends
on how the players handle the difficulties of the terrain. For competitive play use the Rout Point Bid Method. A Rules Fix would be to use
the optional Augmented Roman Cavalry rule, but do not increase the
Rout Point Withdrawal Level! This addition will, of course, help the
Romans..
21
INITIAL DEPLOYMENT
THE MEETING ENGAGEMENT
This scenario lists the historical “turns” of arrival. When using the
optional “Fog” rule, these will probably change.
Roman Army under T. Quinctius Flamininus
Most Roman units start off map (in camp). A small reconnaissance
party is on a ridge.
Within 3 hexes of Hex 2020: Aetolian Lt (LC) Cavalry; Aetolian Lt
(LI) Infantry (1, 2); Prfct Eqt*
* = May give Individual Orders (not LC) to infantry until Tribune or
Praefect Sociorum enters game and is within range.
Roman Reinforcements
All Roman reinforcements enter the map through the Hexes in the SE
corner of the map marked with an R (1037, 1038, 1039, 1040, 1041,
1042, 1043, and 1044). The maximum number of combat units that
may enter play in any one turn is 16. There is no limit on the number
of leaders that can enter per game turn. Once Roman units have entered
play they may not voluntarily leave the map. The III and V Alae Sociorum are much reduced in strength, reflecting what Flamininus was
granted by the Senate. Note that the Praefects and Tribunes may give
orders to the Greek allies.
Game Turn 3 [Group #1]
AS/V EX RC V; Apollonian Lt (LI) Infantry; Aetolian Lt (LI) Infantry (3,4);
Cretan Lt (LI) Infantry; Cretan (SK) Archer (1–5–6); Prfct Soc (1)
Game Turn 8 [Group #4] (Roman player picks the order of unit
entry)
III Legion; V Legion; AS/III Alae* ; AS/V Alae** ; The Aetolian
League [Aetolian (HI) Hoplites (1–8), Athamanian Med (MI) Infantry
(1–3)]; African Elephants (1–4); Consul Q. Flamininus; Tribunes (2);
Prfct Soc (2); Prfct Eqt (1)
* = (without velites, cavalry and cohorts ‘a’ and ‘b’)
** = (without velites, cavalry ‘a’ and ‘b’, and cohorts ‘a’ and ‘b’)
Macedonian Army under Phillip V
Only a small reconnaissance party is on the map at the start.
Within 2 hexes of Hex 2718: Thessalian HC (1, 2); Macedonian LI
(1–4); Philocles*
* = Philocles was actually the King’s prefect and garrison commander
of Corinth, but we needed another leader.
Macedonian Reinforcements
The Macedonian reinforcements enter the map through the Hexes
marked with an M (4216, 4217, 4218, 4219, 4220, and 4221). The
maximum number of combat units that can enter play in any one turn
is five (5). There is no limit on the number of leaders that can enter per
game turn. Once Macedonian units have entered play they may not
voluntarily leave the map.
Game Turn 5 [Group #2]
Macedonian HC (1–3); Illyrian LI (1–4); Mercenary HI (1–3); Epirote
(SK) Slingers (1–3); Cretan (SK) Archers (1–4–6) (1–2); Athenagoras
Game Turn 7 [Group #3]
Macedonian Phalanxes (PH) (1–12); Thracian LI (1–4); Phillip V;
Nicanor
Fog (Optional)
As noted above, the battle started while a heavy fog covered the field,
which led to both sides blundering into each other. To simulate this
we have provided a quasi-double-blind (limited) hidden movement
rule. As this does require a bit of “bookkeeping”, we make it optional.
© 2008 GMT Games LLC
SPQR Scenario Book
22
Given the few counters affected—and the fun and historicity it adds to
the game—we heartily recommend it. If you play without it, use the
reinforcement arrival turns listed, above. If using the Fog rule, these
arrivals are dependent upon who sights whom—and when.
There are three visibility conditions: Heavy Fog, Light Fog, and Clear.
Visibility affects the distance over which a Line of Sight can be attained.
The Fog Effect Table, below, lists the maximum LOS distance for the
given visibility conditions—no unit can see any other unit that is outside
the allowed maximum—plus any effect on movement allowances. All
normal LOS rules still apply.
Visibility at the start of the game is Heavy Fog. Starting with the 3rd
Game Turn, a “Fog Lifting” die roll is made at the start of the turn,
before any other phase. If the die roll falls within the given range, the
Fog lifts one level from Heavy to Light, or from Light to Clear. Once
visibility is Clear no further Fog lifting die rolls are necessary.
Fog Lifting Die Roll Table
Game Turn
Die Roll to lift Fog one level
3, 4
0–1
5
0–3
6
0–6
7 till Clear
0–8
Group #1: One Turn after LOS is attained
Group #2: Three turns after LOS is attained
Group #3: Five Turns after LOS is attained
Group #4: Six turns after LOS is attained
Example: If initial LOS is attained at the start of Game Turn 3, Group
#1 may enter in turn 4; Group #2 in turn 6; Group #3 in turn 8; and
Group #4 in turn 9.
Hidden Movement (Advanced Optional Rule)
Players wishing even more “realism” can use Advanced Hidden Movement. Nothing arcane here, simply determine—based on fog and LOS
(of which there is not much between the two armies at the beginning—
which units can see which. Ones that could/cannot be seen, including
arriving reinforcements, do all their movement hidden, until sighted.
This will require a bit more paper work, plus some agree-to-before
house rules, but it does create some mass confusion. This confusion is
not helped by the fact that both sides have the same-colored counters;
however, we already told you that.
THE SET-PIECE BATTLE
If it’s a stand up/set-piece fight you want, without all of the early stumbling around in the fog, then this scenario is for you. This deployment
approximates the decisive moment of the battle, when the main armies
had partially deployed on the field and Phillip unleashed the Double
Depth Phalanx charge that almost carried the day. As the Romans lost
the initial battle on the heights, some Roman units are not deployed
as they are considered to have been routed from the field during the
early fighting.
Visibility Effect Chart
Visibility
Max LOS Distance
Effect on Movement
Heavy Fog
5 hexes
MA halved, rounded up
Light Fog
10 hexes
Reduce MA by one (–1)
Clear
25 hexes*
None
* There is a limit because there was still a fine mist that hindered
distance visibility.
The Fog/Hidden Movement Rule
In addition to the above, neither side places any of his units on the map
for the first turn. He simply writes down to where they have moved; all
movement and cohesion rules apply. However, the following deployment restrictions apply:
• The Roman Praefect Equitum is placed in 2020. Combat units must
be placed either in 2020 or south of 2020 and within range.
• The Macedonian leader, Philocles, is placed in 2718. Combat units
must be placed either in 2178 or north of 2178 and within range.
All units in the Reconnaissance parties MUST stay within their
leader’s range at all times.
At the start of turn 2, the players place the Leader Counter, ONLY,
on the map. Starting with turn 3, this comes after the Visibility die
roll. Each player then notes where his other units are (by looking at the piece of paper on which he has written their most recent
location). If any of his units can attain a LOS to the enemy Leader
counter, he states so—and, at this point, BOTH sides now place all
their units (that are in play) on the map (if Distrust is imminent, refer
to the written movements).
Play continues using Hidden Movement until a sighting is made.
Fog Reinforcement Schedule
Reinforcements, as you may have noted, are listed by group. When
playing the Fog rule they do not, necessarily, arrive in the listed turn.
The groups are eligible to enter, as follows:
Important: The game starts with the Macedonian Player using an Elite
Initiative Order (5.5), with Phillip as the selected leader, even though
Phillip is not an elite OC. He may use this only in the first game turn.
Roman Army under T. Quinctius Flamininus
All Roman units are facing north. Place the Roman leaders available—Flamininus, 2 Tribunes, 3 Praefects Sociorum and 2 Praefects
Equitum—in any hex occupied by a friendly unit (the Romans are not
deployed in their usual checkerboard fashion).
Units
Hex(es)
Right Wing
V RC
AS/V RC (ex) AS/V (c–i), AS/V CE
AS/V TR (a, b) 2210
2211
2315, 2316, 2317, 2318,
2115, 2116, 2117, 2118
1916, 1917
Center
V VE (a–c) V HA (a–d) V PR (a)
V PR (b–d) V TR (a–c)
III VE (a–c) III HA (a–d) III PR (a) III PR (b–d) III TR (a–c)
2312, 2313, 2314
2319, 2320, 2321, 2322
2119
2120, 2121, 2122
1919, 1920, 1921
1824, 1825, 1826
1827, 1828, 1829, 1830
1627
1628, 1629, 1630
1428, 1429, 1430
Left Wing
III RC
Aetolian AS/III CO (c–i), AS/III CE
AS/III TR (a, b)
© 2008 GMT Games LLC
1842
1840
1832, 1833, 1834, 1835, 1632,
1633, 1634, 1635
1433, 1434
SPQR Scenario Book
Aetolian League
Aetolian HI (1–8) Athamanian MI (1–3)
1836, 1837, 1838, 1839,
1636, 1637, 1638, 1639
1436, 1437, 1438
Elephants
African Elephants (1–4)
1926, 1929, 1932, 1935
Note: The Hoplites and the Athamanians of the Aetolian League ARE
supposed to be red. We realize that keeping track of even these few units
that are the same color as the Macedonians is a bit of a pain. We feel,
however, that keeping the nationality colors consistent is important as
this series grows and provides increasing opportunity for design-yourown construction sets.
Macedonian Army under Phillip V
All Macedonian units are facing south, unless indicated to be In Column.
Leader
Phillip V
Philocles Athenagoras
Nicanor
Hex
2819
Any hex occupied by a
Macedonian unit
Any hex occupied by a
Macedonian unit
Any hex occupied by a
Macedonian unit
Units
Hex(es)
Macedonian HC (1–3),
Thessalian HC (1–2)
Thracian LI (1–4)
Mercenary HI (1–3)
Macedonian Phalanxes (1–6)*
Macedonian LI (1–4)
Illyrian LI (1–4)
Macedonian Phalanxes (7–12) **
2606, 2607, 2608, 2609, 2610
2611, 2612, 2613, 2614
2713, 2714, 2715
2716–2717, 2718–2719,
2720–2721
2722, 2723, 2724, 2725
2735, 2736, 2737, 2738
2730–2731, 2729–2829,
2928–3028, 3127–3227,
3326–3426, 3525–3625
* = In Double Depth, two units per hex
** = In Column
23
SPECIAL RULES
Macedonian Double-depth Phalanxes
Phillip V, in an effort to increase the crushing pressure of the phalanxes,
implemented a formation which doubled their depth. The Macedonian
player may recreate this, using the rules in 9.5.
The Macedonian Phalanxes which begin on the right flank start the
game in double-depth formation. All other Macedonian Phalanxes
begin deployed as single units (in column). They may be formed into
double-depth during the battle, as per 9.51.
Augmented Roman Cavalry (Optional)
Most sources state that the Roman cavalry contingent at Cynoscephalae was significantly smaller than that of a normal Consular army.
This is probably due to the difficulty of transporting horses overseas.
If you want to play with a full contingent of Roman cavalry add the
missing 5 Roman Alae cavalry units to Group #4. For the Set-Piece
battle place the AS/V RC in hexes 2008, 2009 and the AS/III RC in
hexes 1843–1845.
Triarii Doctrine
This rule is NOT used in this scenario.
Retreat Edges
The Romans retreat toward the south map edge. The Macedonians
retreat toward the north edge.
VICTORY
In the Meeting Engagement, the Roman army withdraws when units
worth 140 Rout Points have been eliminated, while in the Set-Piece
battle the Roman withdrawal level is 135 Rout Points. In both versions,
Macedonian army withdraws when units worth 115 Rout Points have
been eliminated.
Phillip is worth 25 TQ points if wounded, if he is killed the Romans
win automatically.
Size and Troop Quality
Meeting Engagement
Army
Units
Size
Rout
Points
Rout
Ratio
Avg TQ
Line Command Eligibility
Macedonian
37
220
291
40%
6.1
Roman
Macedonian
Roman
76
230[a]
408
35%
5.4
1. *Velites (VE), Greek Skirmishers (SK)
1. Phalanxes
Set Piece
2. *Hastati (HA) and Ala
Cohorts (CO/CE), any 4
Greek Infantry
2. Skirmishers (SK), Light (LI)
Infantry
Units
Size
Rout
Points
Rout
Ratio
Avg.
TQ
Macedonian
32
215
281
40%
6.2
3. *Principes (PR) and Ala
Cohorts (CO/CE)
3. Hoplites (HI), Light (LI)
Infantry
Roman
71
209
386
35%
5.6
4. Triarii (TR)
4. African Phalanxes (PH), Bruttium HI
5. All Cavalry
5 All Cavalry
Army
[a]
a = Elephant Size points (20) were excluded
6. Greek Allied Infantry
7. Elephants
* = Do not have to be adjacent; see 4.24.
© 2008 GMT Games LLC
SPQR Scenario Book
24
A LEARNING SCENARIO
The following, abstract “battle” is provided for gamers
not familiar with the system who want to see how things
work before starting to get down to the serious, historical blood-letting. One player commands the Romans, the
other, the Carthaginians. This is a truly “hypothetical”
battle; more of a heavy skirmish, to be sure. The Romans
have more “counters” and better TQ (more or less); the
Carthaginians have more “men” (about 6000–5000) and
a decided advantage in mounted troops. They also have
Hannibal.
Map
Use the Cannae Map
Romans
Use the III Alae Legion, with Flamininus, one Tribune, and two
Praefects Equitum (in case you wish to split your cavalry to both
wings).
Carthaginians
Two African Phalanxes, four Iberian light infantry, 2 Balearic slingers, 2 Numidian Light Cavalry, 2 Celtic Lancers, 2 Elephants (African); Hannibal (but no Leader Elephant), Mago, and Tychaeus.
Deployment
Romans set up first; Carthaginians second. Make sure there are at
least five hex rows between armies and that both sides are fairly
equidistant from the edge of the map.
Players may use any “optional” rules they wish, although, as you are
learning the system here, we recommend keeping it to a minimum.
We suggest limiting Hannibal to one LC per turn.
Victory
The Romans Rout when they have “lost” 34 Rout Points; the
Carthaginians rout when they have lost 25 Rout Points. Elephant
losses do NOT count towards this total (the rates are fairly low to
make this relatively quick).
SPQR DESIGNERS’ NOTES
By Mark Herman & Richard Berg
The Roman Art of War: The Legion Under the Republic
The Roman military originally used a Hoplite style of warfare throughout the period of its tutelage under, and liberation from, the Etruscans.
Sometime during the early 4th century BC, after the Gauls had occupied Rome (around 390 BC?) and withdrawn, a legendary military
leader named Camillus reorganized and rearmed the Roman Legion.
The Century (100) was originally an administrative unit based on the
voting rolls of the old Servian army. Camillus linked two centuries
together into a tactical unit called a maniple. The two centuries of a
maniple could either be in line (side by side) or in column (one behind
the other). He then organized the maniples into three lines based on a
new doctrinal specialization. The first and second lines were the Hastati
and Principes respectively. These lines were armed in the new style
with the sword as their main armament. The third line, the Triarii, were
the older more experienced soldiers and were armed and arrayed in a
Hoplite-like phalanx.
The Hastati and the Principes were the one-two punch of the legion. The
manipular organization of the Legion, with its clearly defined chain of
command, allowed the Romans to use its superior tactical organization
to execute line changes during battle. A typical Roman battle would see
the Velites harass the enemy battle line while screening their own forces.
Upon a signal the Velites would withdraw through the gaps between
the Hastati maniples, deployed in column formation. Then the Hastati
line would advance toward the enemy battle line and deploy into line
formation. The Hastati battle line would then break into a run just as
they were about to come in contact with the enemy and throw their
pila (Roman javelin). The pila volley would disrupt the front ranks of
the enemy just as the Hastati closed for hand to hand combat. If the
Hastati began to tire or become disrupted, the Principes would move
into intervals to relieve them. This was probably done using a well
rehearsed battle drill whereby the Hastati pulled one Century out of the
line and then disengaged the second, which moved back through gaps
in the Principes maniples, also deployed in column formation. As the
Principes columns moved forward, the Hastati maniples cleared out of
the gaps allowing the Principe to deploy their rear Centuries forward
into line. The Principes closed with the enemy, who were now faced
with a fresh missile volley and charge.
This use of tactical reserves for the main battle line gave Rome a huge
advantage over a Phalanx-style formation. Whereas the Macedonian
model was to attack the flanks of the enemy and roll up his battle line,
the Roman system was designed to frontally shatter it. A Phalanx, with
its tight formation had little tactical flexibility and could not move reserves to relieve the front ranks. The Legion’s ability to keep constant
and fresh pressure on an enemy battle line nearing exhaustion helped
defeat their Latin and Southern Greek neighbors who used a more rigid
doctrine. The Legion, however, was not invincible. The Samnites, using
a similar system, gave the Romans a significant challenge such as their
victory in 321 BC at Caudine Forks. It was for this last eventuality that
the Triarii, a defensive formation, were in the third line.
The Triarii were the most experienced campaigners in the Legion and
were near the end of their military service. They were armed with spears
in a modified Hoplite Phalanx formation. The saying went, “The last
resource is in the Triarii.” If the Hastati and Principes were unable to
prevail against the enemy then the Roman commander would probably withdraw. The Principes would withdraw through the Triarii, as
the Hastati had done earlier, while the Triarii moved forward. The rear
centuries of the Triarii would then move from column to line formation and present the enemy with a solid front of spears as the Legion
withdrew in good order from the field to their nearby camp.
One of the key weapons of the post-Camillan Legion was a Spanish
sword variant, the gladius. The gladius produced fearful wounds, making it superior to the spear, and a reduced reach which required superior
mobility to employ it against spear-armed opponents. To gain the required mobility the body armor of the Legionary soldier was lightened
significantly and compensated for by a superior shield, the scutum. The
scutum, probably borrowed from the Samnites, covered most of a man’s
body and substituted for the necessity of heavier armor.
It had become apparent to ancient generals that once opposing Hoplite
battle lines came into contact it became a pushing match, due to the
difficulty of bringing a spear to bear at a range less than the length of
© 2008 GMT Games LLC
SPQR Scenario Book
its shaft. When the Legionary soldier was in contact with the enemy he
would thrust out from behind his body shield, then withdraw behind it.
In this manner he was able to defeat a spear-armed opponent by coming
into direct contact where his shorter and more maneuverable sword
gave him the edge. It is interesting to note that the other solution to
this problem, which Phillip II of Macedon chose, was to lengthen the
shaft and attack from a standoff range.
Livy credits Hannibal as saying that one of the key innovations that
placed Pyrrhus in the highest ranks of military commanders was his
use of the defensive camp. If this is true then the Romans took their
most important doctrinal innovation from another culture. The Romans
weren’t originators, but they knew how to reverse engineer with the
best of them. If this supposition is true then they adopted this technique
around 277 BC when Pyrhus was in Sicily. It has been said that the
Legionary soldier was actually an engineer trained as an infantryman.
This may be true based on the great skill that Roman armies exhibited
in siege craft. A Roman camp was designed to hold an entire Consular
army. At the conclusion of each day’s march the Consular army built
its defensive camp to protect the army from surprise attack and to have
a nearby refuge if a battle went against them.
Pyrrhus vs. Rome
With some notable exceptions, Rome produced a series of political
generals whose only saving grace was their ability to implement the
solid Roman doctrine in a fairly rigid and competent manner. As long
as the opponent was not a military genius (Alexander, Pyrrhus, or
Hannibal), the solid Legionary soldier would usually prevail. When a
first-class general was the opponent, he was usually able to exploit the
organizational deficiencies inherent in the Roman tactical system.
The Consular army used infantry instead of cavalry as its shock arm.
This limited the mobility and speed with which force could be brought
to bear on the enemy. In addition all of its missile armed troops were on
foot and there was a notable absence of bow-armed units. The cavalry
was meant to protect the flanks of the Legion, not break the enemy army.
The lackluster quality and doctrine of Roman and Allied cavalry made
a Consular army vulnerable to superior shock cavalry penetrating its
flanks and disrupting the legionary infantry. The lack of mobility and
range of the Roman missile forces also created opportunities for horse
archer armed forces such as occurred at Carrhae. A combined arms
Macedonian style army was well equipped to defeat the Roman Legions
in battle as witnessed by the early, but costly, victories of Pyrrhus in his
initial encounters with Rome. Pyrrhus had all of the pieces, except he
was short in the quantity and quality of his cavalry arm.
Pyrrhus had been campaigning in the west since 280 BC. In the five
years he spent there, he did not receive substantial reinforcements
and his ability to transport horses by sea was limited. Due to the large
defections in Rome’s Southern Greek allies, she was under-equipped
with cavalry against Pyrrhus and lost the first two battles (Heraclea and
Asculum). Additionally, the Romans seem to have had problems with
the Epirote Elephant corps. In the end Pyrrhus didn’t have a sufficient
superiority in cavalry to prevail, nor the manpower to pull it off. He
was one Pyrrhic victory too far.
Hannibal vs. Rome
Rome was vulnerable to a combined arms army, especially one well
equipped and well led. Hannibal brought both of these factors to bear
on the Romans and the result was Cannae. The Carthaginian army that
fought in Italy succeeded tactically, but failed operationally and strategically. Hannibal was able to win an unbroken string of battlefield victories
until Zama but failed to defeat Rome. He failed because operationally
the Roman navy denied Carthage command of the sea, hampering
his ability to maintain the size and quality of his army. He also failed
operationally because be was unable to conduct a successful siege of
Rome and win the war. He failed strategically because he was unable
25
to create the kinds of defections amongst Rome’s Southern Greek allies
which his strategy was predicated upon. In the end, his inability to solve
these problems and the destruction of his overland reinforcements at
the Battle of the Metaurus, led to his withdrawal from Italy.
At Zama, Rome resolved the tactical problems that had plagued their
forces in Italy. They were led by their first great general, Scipio Africanus, who had removed their deficiency in cavalry by enlisting the
defecting Numidian cavalry on their side. The resulting Roman victory
at Zama metamorphosed the city state into a world-class power.
Phillip V vs. Rome
Like the Romans, the Macedonian tactical system had changed and the
Phalanx had become the primary shock arm instead of its cavalry. The
Battle of Cynoscephalae pitted two armies of similar philosophy against
each other. The primary difference was the armament of the opposing
infantry battle lines. The extra-length sarissa used by Phillip’s army,
around 21 feet long, was a replacement for the 14 to 18 foot sarissa
from earlier times. This extra reach presented problems for the Roman
sword-armed infantry, as witnessed by the Roman left flank yielding
to this tactical system at Cynoscephalae. Phillip’s battle line, however,
was very unwieldy, especially over rough ground. In the final analysis,
Phillip V, although a competent general, was no Alexander. In the end
it was the new Phalanx’s extreme flank vulnerability in rough terrain
that won the 2nd Macedonian War for Rome.
Could Alexander the Great Have Conquered Rome?
In 323 BC Alexander was at the height of his fame and experience.
Assuming he had the time, and we know he had the inclination, he
probably would have conquered Rome. Why do I come to this conclusion? In 321 BC the Samnites defeated the Romans at Caudine Forks.
It wasn’t until 295 BC that Rome won the decisive battle of Sentinum
and it took until 290 BC before the Samnites were totally subjugated.
A confrontation between Alexander and Rome would have occurred
around 318 to 313 BC when Rome was not a world class power. When
Rome came up against Hannibal, another General who used Combined
arms warfare, it faired poorly. It was Hannibal’s inability to raise the
Southern Greeks in revolt against Rome that led to his strategic defeat.
Alexander the Great would not have had this problem because Rome
had not yet conquered the Southern Greeks nor consolidated her position in Central Italy. Unfortunately, death was life’s way of telling
Alexander to slow down. Anyway, if you own Alexander and SPQR,
try it out and see what happens.
Game As History
SPQR has been designed to allow you to investigate the Roman tactical system in battle. We’ve attempted to supply information sufficient
for you to understand the doctrine and try and employ it under game
conditions. It is in this manner that the game can become living history.
The way you can accomplish this in the game is to have your Hastati in
two stacks of two counters separated by one hex. Two hex rows behind
the Hastati are the four Principes counters in the same formation. One
hex row behind them are the three Triarii counters each separated by
one hex. In front of this formation are the Velites counters. First the
Velites move forward and throw a missile volley or two at the enemy.
After they are pila depleted (dePILAtated?!), withdraw them through
the three lines of the Legion to replenish their missile supply. Using a
line command, the Hastati move forward and un-stack creating a solid
front. When adjacent to the enemy battle line, they throw their pila then
commence shock combat. If the Hastati do not rout the enemy, give
another line command and pull them back through the gaps between the
Principes stacks, which then are given another line command to move
them into contact with the enemy. If all else fails, pull your Principes
back through your Triarii, close ranks, and hope for the best. Rome
rarely rewarded failure and neither does SPQR, so if the Triarii are
employed you probably are going to lose the battle.
© 2008 GMT Games LLC
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SPQR Scenario Book
The Evolution of the Alexander Design
seemed to possess. During the period depicted by SPQR and even later,
Cavalry after an initial success would pursue their enemy for varying
lengths of time effectively removing them from the battle. The Duke
of Wellington as late as Waterloo bemoaned this deficiency in his own
cavalry units. We have captured this phenomenon with the Cavalry
Pursuit rules which can remove successful cavalry from the battle for
varying amounts of time. At Zama it is the return of the Numidian
cavalry that helps carry the day for Rome.
The stacking rules are far more advanced and complex than in Alexander, although they allow you to conduct the wide range of line and
formation changes which were the sine que non of the Roman legion. We
have hopefully reduced the burden these critical rules require through
the color coding system we have employed.
Conclusion
Roman doctrine was predicated on the smooth line changes which
allowed a simple set of signals to move large bodies of men into
complicated tactical maneuvers. It was recipe warfare that allowed
lackluster political appointees to win tactical victories. The game portrays the Roman leadership as superior in executing line commands,
but individually they are mediocre commanders in situations requiring
more creative solutions.
During Alexander’s invasion of Persia his highly disciplined cavalry
would remain under control even after routing the enemy. It appears
that this was a unique characteristic which only the Companion cavalry
During the period of the Republic, Rome destroyed or conquered all
organized competitors around the Mediterranean rim. These victories
prevented any successor states from arising to challenge Rome’s
control and security. The Legions had done their work well. After the
Civil Wars and during the Empire period the Legions met a host of
unorganized and disjointed cultures who were never a serious strategic
threat to Rome.
SPQR SOURCES
A Brief Note: There are few “ancient” sources—e.g., Livy, Dionysius,
Plutarch, and that bunch—cited, below. This game is not intended as
the definitive treatise on Roman tactics, and most ancient sources are
pretty much summed up and covered in the more modern works. Polybius, of course, being the main (and, in our opinion, the most reliable)
work on the era, is required reading. We wish we could have gotten
hold of Walbank’s book of commentaries on Polybius, but it was, to our
surprise, nowhere to be found.
Adcock, F.E., The Roman Art of War Under the Republic (Barnes &
Noble, Inc., NY, 1970) Actually, a series of lectures given at Oberlin
College in 1939, this short book is mostly valuable for its psychological
insights into the Romans at war. Makes a good point that it mattered
little how mediocre Roman generals were—and most were often less
than mediocre; it was Roman discipline, steadiness and courage that
won the battles.
Bowder, Dana (Ed.), Who Was Who in the Roman World (Cornell U.
Press, Ithaca, NY, 1980) Handy, dandy reference book with a write-up
on virtually everybody. Has good bibliographical source info for all
listings, plus lots of “pictures” (mostly coins and busts, to be sure.)
Bradford, Ernle, Hannibal (McGraw Hill, New York, 1981). Rather
good, generic history of the general, with some fairly incisive comments
on the various battles. Bradford opts for 8 legions at Cannae, giving
that size as the reason for the ensuing Roman confusion and disaster
and stating the Carthaginians were so superior in command and unit
morale that numbers mattered little, if at all.
Connolly, Peter, Hannibal and the Enemies of Rome (Silver Burdett Co.,
Morristown NJ, 1985). Originally part of a larger work (“Greece and
Rome at War”), this book has a lot of information and schematic graphics on Cannae, including good analysis of latter-day terrain, as well as
excellent information on the Celtic and Spanish troops.It also contains
a great, birds-eye view painting of the start of the battle. A Polybius
supporter, Connolly puts forth cogent arguments for an eight-legion
Roman army at Cannae. Good deployment plan for Bagradas Plains.
Connolly, Peter, The Roman Army, (Silver Burdett Co., Morristown NJ,
1985). Also originally part of “Greece and Rome at War”, this work has
excellent visual information on what the army of the Republic looked
like. Unbelievably, these two valuable books are usually found in the
Children’s section of the library!! I guess if a book has pictures and
large print . . . . can you see an 8-year old checking out the difference
between hastati and principes?? Don’t let the pictures fool you; Connolly is a major historian of decided impact.
Cook, S.A., Adcock, F.A., and Charlesworth, M.P. (Editors), The Cambridge Ancient History (Cambridge University Press, London, 1978).
This massive, multi-volume work, is actually a series of articles on
virtually every aspect of ancient history. Vol VIII covers the Punic Wars,
with author B.L. Hallward pushing the augmented, 4-legion theory at
Cannae. Vol IX contains good basic information about the wars with
Pyrrhus (Beneventum) and the Macedonians (Cynoscephalae). Good
news: an extensive bibliography. Bad News: virtually all books listed
are in German or Italian. Bunch of pedants, if you ask me . . . .
de Beer, Sir Gavin, Hannibal (The Viking Press, NY, 1969) Pretty
much standard Hannibal bio, although well-written and informative.
Big advantage is that it has lots of pictures, showing battlefield terrain,
locations, etc. For those visual aids alone, highly recommended.
Delbruck, Hans, Warfare in Antiquity (Transl. by Walter Renfroe; University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln and London, 1990). A new edition
of the first volume of Delbruck’s “History of the Art of War”, 1920
edition. Delbruck was, probably, the first, great modern military historian, and his insights are still fresh. Extensive discussions of Cannae
(Hans is an 8 double-legion man, although he discusses the possibility
of a smaller force) and Zama, as well as dozens of other battles, plus
Delbruck’s ability to combine common sense with historical insight,
make this an invaluable book. He is, however, wrong on the Indian vs
African elephant debate.
Dorey, T.A., and Dudley, D.R., Rome Against Carthage (Doubleday &
Co., Garden City, N.Y., 1972) A workable, general history of all three
Punic Wars with very little hard information on the individual battles.
A point of (very) minor interest is that the authors have consular (221)
blowhard, Marcus Minucius—not Atilius—as co-commander of the
Roman center at Cannae. Where they got that particular bit of arcana
would be interesting to speculate on (for at least 30 seconds).
Gabba, E., Republican Rome: The Army and the Allies (transltd from
Italian) (Oxford Co., London, 1976) Boy, when I saw this title I
thought we had hit paydirt. All goes to prove you can’t tell a book by
its cover—or its title. Essentially a collection of essays by the author—
a historian of some repute, I’m given to understand—none of which
cover the title. Actually, I wasn’t ever quite sure what they covered.
Heavy stuff, much use of Greek (untranslated, of course . . . take that,
you peasants), and about as readable as a Victorian legal contract. Also
somewhat less interesting.
Garoufalias, Petros, Pyrrhus, King of Epirus (Stacey International,
London, 1979) Fairly definitive study of the Epirote mercenary. Mostly
© 2008 GMT Games LLC
SPQR Scenario Book
concerned with strategic and political factors. Very little on Beneventum, although he does talk much about the terrain. The prose style is
rather overblown and fawning, somewhat reminiscent of Boys’ Wonder
Book of Pyrrhus. However, the notes (which are longer than the narrative) are very good and contain excellent numerical information. Book
should have carried the subtitle, “The Eagle Has Landed”.
Hackett, Gen. Sir John (Editor), Warfare in the Ancient World (Facts on
File, New York, 1989) This is as good a basic book on ancient warfare
as you are likely to find. Good chapter on the early Roman legions a la
Polybius, plus a great painting (yet again by Connolly) of Cynoscephalae. Contains Connolly’s argument concerning the number of pila
in actual use. The authors of the various chapters are pretty much the
experts in their respective fields.
Jones, Archer, The Art of War in the Western World (U. of Illinois
Press, Chicago, 1987). A valuable survey of the whys and wherefores
of military developments, the book has an excellent section comparing
the Roman and Macedonian systems. If you are at all serious about
military history, this book is sine qua non.
Keppie, Lawrence, The Making of the Roman Army (Barnes & Noble
Books, Totawa, NJ, 1984) Good survey book covering development of
Roman Army. Anyone who alludes to Gilbert & Sullivan and uses the
movie, Spartacus, as a visual reference for Roman deployment methods can’t be all bad. The book’s appendices are especially invaluable,
although mostly for the legions of the early empire. Learned that the
Latin word, “as”, denoted a small-denomination coin. Do you suppose
imperial soldiers were paid with a piece of As?
Liddell Hart, B.H., A Greater Than Napoleon, Scipio Africanus (Biblo
and Tannen, NY, 1976) One of the earliest modern-day Scipio bios, it’s
a rather “harumphy” attempt to elevate Scipio to super-star status.The
intro is a hoot, claiming Lincoln would have fallen into obscurity had
he not been shot, Ludendorff was all set for iminent stardom, and who
can remember the name of a marathon winner. Well, he got the last one
right. Bluntly states Polybius is the only reliable source, although he
does give specific numbers for Scipio’s “expanded” legions at Zama.
Reading this, I couldn’t help but picture C.Aubrey Smith in “The Four
Feathers”. Very readable, with good maps, again thanks to KromayerVeith. Someone want to explain the title to me?
Polybius, The Rise of the Roman Empire (translated by Ian Scott-Kilvert)
(Penguin Books, NY, 1979) The “basic” book for this era, Polybius,
a Greek taken as hostage after the Romans defeated the Macedonians
27
at Pydna in 168 B.C., is our most reliable, antiquarian source. He was
also a friend of Gaius Laelius (see Zama OoB), which may have given
him access to inside information on Scipio. Aside from his coverage
of the Punic Wars, he provides an in-depth view of the Roman military
system of the time. Since only a few of Polybius’ forty books survived,
there are significant gaps in the narrative—sort of like reading “Moby
Dick” without all that stuff on the whaling industry—but it has excellent footnotes. Required reading.
Pratt, Fletcher, The Battles That Changed History (Hanover House, NY,
1956). One of the few books to contain more than a passing mention
of Pyrrhus. The chapter on Beneventum was, if not incisive, at least
available. Pratt’s breezy style tends to diminish any depth or credence
he might otherwise have, so it’s difficult to know exactly how much
you can trust him. He does mention some terrain details (gleaned from
Dodge, to be sure), and, for those literary and PBS mavens out there,
the maps in the book were drawn by Edward Gorey!
Scullard, H.H., The Elephant in the Greek and Roman World, (Cornell
University Press, Ithaca NY, 1974) A really good book covering just
about anything you would want to know about elephants at war. Scullard
discusses all the sources, and all the possibilities, as well as giving some
good battle information and elephant numbers. He also discusses—quite
seriously—the possibility of the use of “flaming pigs”, which he feels
were probably used. As a bonus, it’s quite readable.
Scullard, H.H., Scipio Africanus, Soldier and Politician (Cornell U.
Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1970) A valuable book, with not only excellent
insight into the mind of Scipio, but good analyses of his battles. Our
source for the Zama map, Scullard taking his from Kromayer-Veith.
(K-V is a German work on ancient battlefields.) Best of all, he writes
well (although his physical resemblance to Donald Pleasance is a bit
disconcerting).
Stewart, John, “The Elephant in War,” in MHQ, The Quarterly Journal
of Military History; Vol 3 No. 3 (MHQ, Inc., NY, 1991) Good survey
article of use of elephants in warfare. Contains some good information
on Pyrrhus, the Flaming Pigs, and the African-Indian argument.
Webster, Graham, The Roman Imperial Army, 3rd Ed. (Barnes & Noble
Books, Totowa, New Jersey, 1985). A classic work on the Roman army,
its tactics, etc. The introduction contains a good description and analysis
of the armies of the Republic. Basic Library material. It also contains a
nice section on the varieties of Roman “artillery” in use.
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8.52 Shock Superiority Chart
Attacker Weapons/Armor System vs. Defender
Defender Type
PH+
HI+
LG+
MI+
BI+
[PH] Phalanx
–
–
–
–
DS
[HI] Heavy Inf
–
–
AS
–
[LG] Legion Inf
–
–
–
[MI] Medium Inf
AS
–
[BI] Barbarian Inf
AS
[LI] Light Inf
LI
HC+
RC+
LN+
DS
DS
DS
DS
–
–
DS
DS
–
–
DS
DS•#
AS
–
–
–
–
AS
–
–
AS
AS
AS
–
[SK] Skirmisher
AS
AS
AS
[HC] Heavy Cav
–
–
[RC] Roman Cav
–
[LN] Lancer Cav
LC
EL+
CH+
DS
DS
–
DS
DS
–
–
DS•
–
DS•
–
–
–
DS
–
DS•
–
–
DS
–
–
–
DS
–
–
AS
–
–
–
–
DS•
–
–
AS
AS
AS
AS
AS
AS
AS
AS
AS
–
–
–
–
–
DS
–
–
AS
AS
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
AS
AS
–
–
–
–
–
–
AS
–
–
–
AS
AS
[LC] Light Cav
–
–
–
–
–
–
AS
AS
AS
–
AS
AS
[EL] Elephant
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
**
–
[CH] Chariot
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
Note: Always read down the Attacker Column. Use Available Weapons System most advantageous to each player.
Note: Any Shock attack against units In Column is automatically Attack Superior.
8.54 Shock Combat Results Chart
CRT Columns
DR
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
0
6(1)
5(2)
4(2)
4(2)
3(2)
3(2)
3(2)
3(2)
3(2)
3(2)
3(2)
2(2)
2(2)
1
6(1)
4(2)
4(2)
3(2)
3(2)
3(2)
3(2)
3(2)
3(2)
2(2)
2(2)
2(3)
2(3)
2
5(1)
4(2)
4(2)
3(2)
3(2)
3(2)
2(2)
2(2)
2(2)
2(2)
2(3)
2(3)
2(3)
3
5(1)
4(2)
4(2)
3(2)
3(2)
2(2)
2(2)
2(2)
2(2)
2(2)
2(3)
2(3)
2(4)
4
5(2)
4(2)
3(2)
3(2)
3(2)
2(2)
2(2)
2(2)
2(3)
2(3)
2(3)
2(4)
1(3)
5
4(2)
4(2)
3(2)
3(2)
2(2)
2(2)
2(2)
2(3)
2(3)
2(3)
2(3)
2(4)
1(3)
6
4(2)
4(2)
3(2)
2(2)
2(2)
2(2)
2(2)
2(3)
2(3)
2(3)
2(4)
2(4)
1(4)
7
4(2)
4(2)
3(2)
2(2)
2(2)
2(2)
2(3)
2(3)
2(3)
2(3)
2(4)
1(4)
1(4)
8
4(2)
3(2)
2(2)
2(2)
2(2)
2(3)
2(3)
2(3)
2(3)
2(4)
2(4)
1(4)
1(4)
9
3(2)
3(2)
2(2)
2(2)
2(3)
2(4)
2(4)
2(4)
2(4)
2(4)
1(4)
1(4)
1(6)
#(#) = Attacker Cohesion hits (Defender Cohesion Hits)
Notes
If Attacker Superior, Double (2X) defender Cohesion hits
If Defender Superior, Triple (3X) attacker Cohesion hits
Pass-Thru (9.11)
• Halve (round down) hits to infantry unit(s) performing
Pass-Thru
• Reduce hits to Elephant(s) by 1
Halve hits incurred in attacks against only Skirmishers with
a maximum of 1 hit (9.21)
Column Adjustments
Size Ratio Difference (SRD)—Shift
a number of columns right/left based
on the ratio of the sizes [8.36 Step
Two]
Depletion
1L Any attacking unit is Depleted
1R Any defending unit is Depleted
© 2008 GMT Games LLC
AS = Attacker Superior: Double
the Defender’s Cohesion Hit
result on the Shock Combat
CRT
DS = Defender Superior: Triple
the Attacker’s Cohesion Hit
result on the Shock Combat
CRT
DS• = If defender has missile
capability and is Missile No,
treat as No Superiority
DS•# =Same as DS•; In addition, if attacker is Cataphracted
Heavy Cavalry, treat as No Superiority
+ = Units Must Attack, if they
moved
– = No Superiority: Cohesion
Hits normal for both sides
** = If Indian Elephants are
attacking African Elephants,
Indian Elephants are AS; otherwise treat as No Superiority
Note: Regardless of weapons/
armor type, any unit that attacks
an enemy through its flank or
rear is automatically Attack
Superior with the exception
that Cavalry and Elephants are
never Attack Superior against
Elephants due to position.
Terrain Adjustments (Use best position available to defender).
1L All Defenders are in Woods or Marsh
*1L Any Defender on a higher terrain level than
the Attacker(s)
*2L All Defenders on higher terrain than
Attacker(s)
1R All Defenders on lower terrain than Attacker
For effects of the Roman Camp, see the Roman
Camp Terrain Chart
Phalanx Defense
1L Per supporting Phalanx when a Phalanx is
attacked frontally by moving Heavy Infantry
2L Per supporting Phalanx when a Phalanx is
attacked frontally by moving non-Heavy Infantry
other than a Phalanx
All adjustments are cumulative, except for “*”
items, which are either/or.
Die Roll Modifiers
• If a Leader is stacked with an attacking unit,
add his Charisma rating to the die roll
• If a Leader is stacked with a defending unit,
subtract his Charisma rating from the die
roll
• If an attacking Leader has been killed, subtract
his Charisma rating+2 from the die roll
• If a defending Leader has been killed, add his
Charisma rating +2 to the die roll
SPQR Scenario Book
32
6.27 Movement Cost Chart
Cohesion Penalties [a] to Enter/Cross
Terrain Type
Clear
MP Cost to
Enter/Cross
1
PH, HI
0
Woods [COL]
2
1
1
Broken [COL]
1
1[e]
Marsh [COL]
2
1
Stream
+0
Village
Impassable
River
Impassable
Dirt Road
1
LG, MI,
LI, SK Cavalry
0
0
[e]
Elephant
0
Chariot
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
P
P
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
No Effect
Roman Road
½ [b]
Up 1 Level
0
+1
1
Up more than 1 Level
[COL] [g]
Down 1 Level
+1 per level
Change Facing (per
vertex) PLUS
Change Facing in
Woods/Broken/Marsh
(per vertex)
[e]
1 per
1
1
0
0
0
level
1[e]
0
0
0
0
1(2) [c], [d], [f]
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
COL = The Cohesion costs listed also
apply to units In Column (See 6.7). Units
In Column do NOT pay Cohesion costs
for those terrain effects without the COL
designation.
Special Costs
•Reverse Face Maneuver.......... 3 MP
•Stack to form Double Depth... +1 MP
•Manipular Line Extension. ..... –2 to Movement
Allowance
Die Roll of Doom
10.29 Rally Table
Printed TQ
Die
Roll
3, 4, 5
6, 7, 8, 9
0, 1
1
1
2, 3
2
2
4, 5
2
2
6, 7
2
3
8, 9
3
4
Die
Roll
0, 1
2–8
Result
Re-Activation is possible. Play
immediately transfers to the opposing player, who may activate
any one of his leaders, regardless
of whether the leader is Finished
or not! Such a Re-Activated leader
may not use Momentum himself.
Leader attempting Momentum is
Finished. Go Back to Phase “A”.
P = Prohibited; unit cannot enter the hex.
a = Leaders never incur cohesion hits; treat
as cavalry.
b = To use the road movement rate, the unit
must begin and end its movement out of range
of enemy missile fire and at no time move into
enemy missile range. At no time may the unit
move within two hexes of an enemy combat
unit. The instant the unit violates these restrictions it must stop.
c = All non-legion/ala infantry, except for
Skirmishers (SK), and all cavalry pay a cost
of 1 MP per vertex shifted. Roman legion/ala
infantry pay a cost of 1 MP to change facing
in any direction regardless of the number of
vertices shifted. Skirmishers do not pay MP
to change facing.
d = It costs 3 MP for a Phalanx to Reverse
Face (6.44). It costs Elephants and Chariots
2 MP per vertex shifted.
e = The cohesion cost does not apply to
Phalanxes In Column (6.46). However, as
pertains to moving up levels, this exception
only applies to the first level moved up in the
Orders Phase. The unit incurs the hit for any
additional upward movement in that phase.
f = A unit using the Roman Road does not
pat any facing change cost when doing so to
conform to the road.
g = This line applies to units moving up more
than one level in any given Orders Phase.
Elephant Rampage Table
Die
Roll
0
Move Rampaging Elephant in the
direction indicated on the Compass
on the map.
7–9
• First Rampage die roll – Rampaging elephant moves directly
away from the unit that caused
the rampage
• Subsequent die roll – Rampaging
Elephant is eliminated. A leader
elephant is instead immediately
Rallied with Cohesion Hits equal
to TQ minus 2.
Rallied units are automatically Depleted.
Rallied foot units are automatically Missile No.
P.O. Box 1308, Hanford, CA 93232–1308
www.GMTGames.com
© 2008 GMT Games LLC
Move Rampaging Elephant in the
direction of the nearest friendly
unit. A leader elephant is eliminated
instead.
1–6
Die Roll Modifiers
+2 If the unit was previously Depleted.
GMT Games, LLC
Result