Download Podcast No 19 – The Problems caused by

Podcast No 19 – The Problems caused by Unification II
Today’s podcast is the final one in our series about Italian unification. As we
saw in the last podcast the first 10 years of a united Italy after 1860 saw the
new state go through severe birth pains. In the last podcast we looked at:
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Continuing differences between North and South;
The problems caused by “Piedmontisation”; and
The Brigand’s war;
In today’s podcast we’ll focus on:
 The disillusionment of the radicals and democrats after 1860;
 The attitude of the Catholic Church to the new state; and
 The effect of the death of Cavour.
As we saw in the last podcast, in the South, in Sicily, but also all over the rest
of Italy the imposition of Piedmont’s Statuto, Piedmontese taxes, provincial
governors, Piedmontese conscription and ‘foreign’ troops from elsewhere in the
peninsula, fuelled a backlash against rule from Milan. These things also gave
ammunition to those democrats, radicals and Mazzinians who claimed that
Italy had not been united, instead it had been taken over by Piedmont, which
had used 1859 and 1860 as a way of expanding and aggrandising the rule of
the House of Savoy. As further evidence they pointed to Victor Emmanuel’s
insistence on being known as the ‘IInd’, referring to his position as the second
Victor Emmanuel of Piedmont, rather than taking on the name of the ‘Ist’
Victor Emmanuel of Italy.
These democrats couldn’t even point to the parliament as a victory for
democracy. Piedmont’s electoral rules meant that, according to the estimation
of Christopher Duggan only 1 in 10 men over the age of 25 owned enough
property to be able to vote. The Senate remained full of Piedmontese senators,
appointed by the King. For many critics the Italian parliament was too fond of
talking, of speeches full of rhetorical flourishes and faction-fighting instead of
forging national feeling through bravery and heroic actions.
The unhappiness of these left-wingers could not be ignored. In 1862, and
1867 they tried again to raise a volunteer army, under the leadership of
Garibaldi to take Rome. Rome was still occupied by French troops, and the the
possibility of attacks on the Pope raised the risk that France or Austria, both
Catholic powers, would invade Italy to protect the Papacy. Each of these
radical adventures was planned with the connaivance and possibly the
encouragement of the King and at least some of his ministers. Each time their
enthusiasm was betrayed, when fear of intervention from France or Austria in
defence of the Pope caused the King to disown the attempts. In 1862 this led
to the Italian Army being used against Garibaldi’s volunteer army. At
Aspromonte in Calabria, during a march North towards Rome, Garibaldi was
shot in the ankle and given a wound that would trouble him for the rest of his
life. In 1867 he was arrested by Papal Troops at Mentana near Rome, when
the planned invasion of Italian Forces to support him never materialised. Both
of these humiliations added to the nationalist and democratic radical’s
disappointment in this new Italy, which seemed un-willing to take risks or to
create an Italy in which ordinary Italians had a say in their future.
This sense of resentment and disappointment was fuelled by the poor
performance of Italy’s armed forces. Rather than Italy’s completion being
achieved in a series of victorious and nation-building wars, it insteat took place
as a result of the military power of other countries.
In 1866 there was a brief war between Prussia and Austria. Italy took part in
that war as Prussia’s ally and had hoped to defeat Austria’s forces and take
control of the territory of Venetia and the city of Venice. Italy’s army and navy
proved to be no match for the better supplied and better trained Austrian
forces. Italy was defeated on land and sea, though Garibaldi’s troops did win
several victories. As part o the peace negotiations at the end of the AustroPrussian war, Austria did cede control of Venetia. However, in a final insult to
Italy, and in order to reflect the fact that Austria had not been defeated by
Italian forces, Austria gave Venetia to France, who then gave it to Italy.
In 1870 war was declared between Prussia and France and, in preparation for
the war, French troops were withdrawn from Rome. In September 1870,
Napoleon and thousands of his troops were captured at the Battle of Sedan.
Once Napoleon was captured the way to Rome was clear and Italy acted.
Victor Emmanuel II gave Pius IX the option of an amicable solution to Rome’s
future, guaranteeing him certain rights, powers and securities if he allowed
Rome to become part of the new Italy. Pius refused the offer. On 20th
September 1870, after only token resistance, Italian troops broke through the
walls of Rome at Porta Pia. It was not until 1929 that the Church finally gave
up its claim on Rome, settling only for the recognition of the Vatican City as
separate state.
So, it was not only the democrats and radicals that objected to Italy. The new
state also saw continuing opposition from the Catholic Church. The Church
had been able to use its control of education across Italy as a way of
maintaining her influence on young Italians, and resented her loss of power
through the reform of education that the new Piedmontese system brought in.
However, the Church’s objections to the new state went much further than
this. In 1864 Pius IX published the ‘Syllabus of Errors’, a long list of things that
the Church did not like about the way the modern world was developing
generally and about the new united Italy in particular. Importantly it also reasserted the Pope’s temporal power and although the Church could not impose
these ideas, the Syllabus did contribute to the way that support for a united
Italy drained away in the South in the 1860s and polarised opinion across
Italy.
Finally, the weakness of the political system became apparent after the death
of Cavour in 1861 Piedmont’s prime ministers could not match his leadership
and management of the different factions in Parliament.
The politicians who succeeded Cavour seemed less able to act as a brake on
Victor Emmanuel’s plans for further aggrandizement. In 1862 and 1867 the
king veered between plans to attempt to take Rome, to invade Greece or to
use terrorists to start a civil war in the Austrian Empire. Furthermore, a
tradition of ‘trasformismo’ emerged. Trasformismo refers to the practice of
governments changing coalitions, ministers and policies to reflect the level of
support for left and right deputies in elections. Politicians such as Agostino
Depretis and Francesco Crispi would maintain their positions by giving
ministerial positions to Deputies from the left and the right, depending on
which group had the largest support in the Chamber of Deputies. This led to
short-term policies, which did not solve some of Italy’s long term problems. It
also led to a reputation that politicians lacked conviction. In the years after
1861 a divided parliament produced coalition governments that maintained the
status quo and defended the interests of the rich and powerful rather than
being a place of conflict between politicians of the left and right and making
changes to benefit all Italians.
Well, that’s it etc.