Download Chapter 1 Introduction - Wageningen UR E

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Summary
This study aims to develop, in a logic deductive way, an approach to forecast the probability of
future outcomes of political processes. In order to do this, two sub research questions are formed:
What determines probability of a policy and how to measure this probability in practice? These
questions are answered in chapter 2 and 3 of this report. The theoretical framework is based on the
assumption that future policy is determined by current opinion and knowledge on what is a
sensible solution to the policy problem. The more compatible a future policy is with the current
opinion and knowledge on what is sensible, the more probable it is. Reconstructing a policy theory
offers an approach to construct the assumptions on final, causal and normative relations on whom
a policy is build. In this way the current opinion and knowledge is made explicit, as the current
policy on the problem is based on this.
When the policy theory is formed, from this criteria are derived which state the important features
a future policy should have in order to be compatible with the current ideas and knowledge on it.
A future policy can be evaluated on compatibility with these criteria, and in this way its
probability can be determined. To make this evaluation complete and not lose sight of the whole, a
policy constitution is also formed out of the policy theory. Evaluation on this constitution is
included and results combined with the evaluation on the criteria.
This method is applied to a practical case; the Separate Sinks Target Regime (SSTR) as a post
2012 climate change policy regime. The SSTR is a proposal for a global climate regime which
provides for two targets; one for the LULUCF sector and one for the non-LULUCF sector. These
two targets can be inter-exchangeable between sectors and between countries, in this way four
different options occur. The theoretical framework is tested on practical use to answer the second
research question; which of the four options of the SSTR, is the most probable to become the post
2012 climate regime.
In order to find this most probable option, a policy theory is reconstructed from the UNFCCC
convention’s text (1992). From this policy theory criteria and constitution are formulated and the
options are evaluated on compatibility with this. The result is that the option that provides for the
exchange of credits between countries but not between sectors is the most compatible and
therefore the most probable. The option that provides for inter-exchangeability between sectors
and countries, scores the best on compatibility with the criteria but is incompatible with the
constitution since it is not environmental effective.
The role of LULUCF in a post 2012 climate policy regime has implications for the Natural
Resource Management sector since it affects the role and function of forests. Therefore the
outcome of this research is of importance for decision making.
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Acknowledgements
First I would like to thank my supervisor André Blum for his supervision, your enthusiasm was
motivating. Thank you for taking the time for our discussions and your good ideas. You provided
me with the right balance of guidance and challenge.
Secondly I would like to thank Eveline Trines from Treeness consult for her help and smart
suggestions. Through your knowledge, experience and time, for me the complex topic came alive.
It was inspiring to see your commitment to combating climate change.
Thanks also to Jan Verhagen for your good ideas and the introduction into the LULUCF and
climate change topic.
Gert-Jan Nabuurs, thank you for all the information and literature and brainstorming with me on a
research proposal.
I would also like to thank Esther Turnhout and Marielle van der Zouwen for assistance on the
policy evaluation part, which really helped me synthesizing all the gathered information into a
frame.
Thanks to my friend Pieter de Pous for the good discussions and brainstorms about politics and
climate change.
Last but not least I would like to thank Sven Koopmans for his moral support and his, surprisingly
being unfamiliar with the topic, very good remarks on the content. You on hard times pulled me
through.
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Table of Contents
Summary ........................................................................................................................ 3
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................ 4
Table of Contents ........................................................................................................... 5
Glossary ........................................................................................................................ 7
Chapter 1 Introduction ................................................................................................. 12
1.1Background ......................................................................................................... 12
1.2 Problem statement .............................................................................................. 13
1.3 Research Objective ............................................................................................ 16
Research Questions .............................................................................................. 16
Chapter 2 Theoretical and Conceptual Framework ..................................................... 17
2.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 17
2.2 Forecasting Political Processes .......................................................................... 17
2.2.1 Analyzing Political Processes ..................................................................... 17
2.2.2 Policy Evaluation ........................................................................................ 17
2.2.3 Policy Theory .............................................................................................. 19
2.2.4 Policy theory as a means to forecast future policy ..................................... 20
2.3 Climate Change policy: What will happen after 2012? ..................................... 21
2.3.1 The Kyoto Protocol: a short Overview ....................................................... 21
2.3.2 Future Developments .................................................................................. 24
2.3.3 Five options for commitment differentiation .............................................. 24
2.4 Post Kyoto climate policy and the Natural Resource Management Sector ....... 25
2.4.1 Separate Sinks Target Regime, an option with implications for Natural
Resource Management ......................................................................................... 25
2.4.2 Controversy surrounding sinks ................................................................... 27
2.5 What makes a regime probable to become the post Kyoto regime? .................. 29
Chapter 3 Methodology ............................................................................................... 31
3.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 31
3.2 Methodology ...................................................................................................... 31
3.3 Methods for analyzing future political Developments: the post Kyoto case ..... 31
3.4 Practical Step by Step ........................................................................................ 34
Chapter 4 Results ......................................................................................................... 36
4.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 36
4.2 Reconstruction of the Policy Theory of the UNFCCC on Post Kyoto regimes . 36
4.2.1 The aims and means .................................................................................... 36
4.2.2 Cause & effect relations .............................................................................. 38
4.2.3 Normative assumptions ............................................................................... 38
4.2.4 Constitution of the policy theory of the UNFCCC ..................................... 39
4.3 Criteria ............................................................................................................... 39
4.3.1 Criteria derived from the policy theory ...................................................... 39
4.3.2 Division of criteria into main values ........................................................... 40
4.3.3 Final set of criteria ...................................................................................... 40
4.4 The Qualitative Evaluation of the four options of the Separate Sinks Target
Regime ..................................................................................................................... 44
4.4.1 Introduction ................................................................................................. 44
4.4.2 Sinks and the post Kyoto Regime ............................................................... 44
4.4.3 Evaluation per option .................................................................................. 44
4.4.4 Compatibility per criterion .......................................................................... 48
4.4.5 Relation between compatibility and probability ......................................... 49
4.4.6 Evaluation to the Constitution .................................................................... 49
Chapter 5 Discussion ................................................................................................... 51
5.1 Sinks discussion ................................................................................................. 51
5.2 Discussion of the results in the light of the Objective and the theoretical
framework ................................................................................................................ 52
5.3 Discussion on Method........................................................................................ 52
Chapter 6 Conclusion ................................................................................................... 54
6.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 54
6.2 Conclusion on the first research question .......................................................... 54
6.3 Conclusion on the second research question ..................................................... 55
6.4 Consequences for management & Policy .......................................................... 56
Literature ...................................................................................................................... 57
Annexes ........................................................................................................................ 60
Annex I Defenitions used in the UNFCCC.............................................................. 60
Annex II Evaluation of the four options of the SSTR ................................................. 62
Criteria indifferent to Fungibilty .......................................................................... 62
Evaluation per option ........................................................................................... 63
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Glossary 1
Adaptation Actions taken to help communities and ecosystems cope with changing climate
conditions, such as the construction of flood walls to protect property from stronger storms and
heavier precipitation, or the planting of agricultural crops and trees more suited to warmer
temperatures and drier soil conditions.
Afforestation Planting of new forests on lands that historically have not contained forests.
Annex A Sectors/source categories The Annex A sector refers to the Annex A in the Kyoto
Protocol, where the sectors responsible for GHG emission taken into account in the Kyoto
Protocol are listed: Energy, Fuel combustion, Fugitive emissions from fuels, Industrial processes,
Solvent and other product use, Agriculture, Waste
Annex I Parties The industrialized countries listed in this annex to the Convention sought to
return their greenhouse-gas emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000 as per Article 4.2 (a) and
(b). They have also accepted emissions targets for the period 2008-12 as per Article 3 and Annex
B of the Kyoto Protocol. They include the 24 original OECD members, the European Union, and
14 countries with economies in transition. (Croatia, Liechtenstein, Monaco, and Slovenia joined
Annex 1 at COP-3, and the Czech Republic and Slovakia replaced Czechoslovakia.)
Annex II Parties The wealthy countries listed in this annex to the Convention have a special
obligation to help developing countries with financial and technological resources. They include
the 24 original OECD members plus the European Union.
Anthropogenic emissions Greenhouse-gas emissions resulting from human activities.
Biomass fuels Energy sources that are renewable as long as the vegetation producing them is
maintained or replanted, such as firewood, alcohol fermented from sugar, and combustible oils
extracted from soy beans. Their use in place of fossil fuels cuts greenhouse gas emissions because
the plants that are their sources recapture carbon dioxide from the atmosphere.
Bonn agreements Political deal reached at COP-6 in Bonn, Germany, in 2001, by which
governments signed off on the most politically controversial issues under the Buenos Aires Plan of
Action.
Brazilian proposal A proposal -- not accepted -- for distributing the burden of greenhouse-gas
emission reductions among UNFCCC Annex I parties based on the effect of cumulative historical
emissions from 1840 on the global average surface temperature. The proposal also contained a
proposed emission-reduction target for Annex I Parties of 30 per cent based on 1990 emissions
levels.
Carbon sequestration The process of removing additional carbon from the atmosphere and
depositing it in other "reservoirs," principally through changes in land use. In practical terms,
carbon sequestration occurs mostly through the expansion of forests.
CDM Clean Development Mechanism.
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Definitions from Glossary are derived from Glossary of climate change acronyms from the
UNFCCC website: http://unfccc.int/essential_background/glossary/items/2639.php , [cited 23november-2004]
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Certified emission reductions (CER) A unit equal to one metric tonne of carbon dioxide
equivalent which may be used by Annex I countries towards meeting their binding emission
reduction and limitation commitments under the Kyoto Protocol.
CFC Chlorofluorocarbon.
CH4 Methane.
Climate Regime The set of rules and commitments of as put down in a climate policy.
CO2 Carbon dioxide
Compliance Fulfillment by countries/businesses/individuals of emission and reporting
commitments under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol.
Conference of the Parties (COP) The supreme body of the Convention. It currently meets once a
year to review the Convention's progress. The word "conference" is not used here in the sense of
"meeting" but rather of "association," which explains the seemingly redundant expression "fourth
session of the Conference of the Parties."
Conference of the Parties/Meeting of the Parties (COP/MOP) The Kyoto Protocol's supreme
body will be the COP, which will serve as the Protocol's meeting of the Parties. The sessions of
the COP and the COP/MOP will be held during the same period to reduce costs and improve
coordination between the Convention and the Protocol.
Countries with economies in transition (EIT) Those Central and East European countries and
former republics of the Soviet Union in transition from state-controlled to market economies.
Deforestation The direct human-induced conversion of forested land to non-forested land.
Emission-reduction unit (ERU) A unit equal to one metric tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent,
applicable to binding emissions-reductions targets under the Kyoto Protocol, and generated
through joint implementation projects.
Emissions trading Mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol through which Parties with emissions
commitments may trade units of their emissions allowances with other Parties. The aim is to
improve the overall flexibility and economic efficiency of making emissions cuts.
entry into force The point at which an intergovernmental agreement becomes legally binding
occurring at a pre-stated interval after a pre-stated and required number of ratifications by
countries has been achieved. The Climate Change Convention required 50 ratifications to enter
into force. It now enters into force for each new Party 90 days after that Party ratifies the
Convention.
European Union (EU) As a regional economic integration organization, the EU is allowed to join
the Convention, and has done so. However, it does not have a separate vote from its members. The
EU also may be a Party to the Kyoto Protocol. Because it signed the Convention when it was
known as the EEC (European Economic Community), the EU retains this name for all formal
Convention-related purposes. Members are Austria, Belgium, Cyprus (Greek part), Denmark,
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and
the United Kingdom.
First commitment period, refers to the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, 20082012, in this period the targets set under the Kyoto Protocol by the Parties need to be achieved.
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Global warming potential (GWP) An index representing the combined effect of the differing
times greenhouse gases remain in the atmosphere and their relative effectiveness in absorbing
outgoing infrared radiation.
Greenhouse gases (GHGs) The atmospheric gases responsible for causing global warming and
climate change. The major GHGs are carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide
(N20). Less prevalent --but very powerful -- greenhouse gases are hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs),
perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6).
Group of 77 (G-77) and China A large negotiating alliance of developing countries that focuses
on numerous international topics, including climate change. The G-77 was founded in 1967 under
the auspices of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). It seeks to
harmonize the negotiating positions of its 132 member states.
HFC Hydrofluorocarbons.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Established in 1988 by the World
Meteorological Organization and the UN Environment Programme, the IPCC surveys world-wide
scientific and technical literature and publishes assessment reports that are widely recognized as
the most credible existing sources of information on climate change. The IPCC also works on
methodologies and responds to specific requests from the Convention's subsidiary bodies. The
IPCC is independent of the Convention.
JI Joint implementation
Kyoto Protocol An international agreement standing on its own, and requiring separate
ratification by governments, but linked to the UNFCCC. The Kyoto Protocol, among other things,
sets binding targets for the reduction of greenhouse-gas emissions by industrialized countries. The
Protocol has yet to enter into force.
Land use, land-use change, and forestry (LULUCF) Refers to the impact of land use by
humans -- and changes in such land use -- on greenhouse-gas emissions: expanding forests
reduces atmospheric carbon dioxide; deforestation releases additional carbon dioxide; various
agricultural activities may add to atmospheric levels of methane and nitrous oxide.
LDC Least developed country.
Leakage That portion of cuts in greenhouse-gas emissions by developed countries -- countries
trying to meet mandatory limits under the Kyoto Protocol -- that may reappear in other countries
not bound by such limits. For example, multinational corporations may shift factories from
developed countries to developing countries to escape restrictions on emissions.
Mechanisms Three procedures established under the Kyoto Protocol to increase the flexibility and
reduce the costs of making greenhouse-gas emissions cuts; they are the Clean Development
Mechanism, emissions trading, and joint implementation.
Mitigation Actions to cut net emissions of greenhouse gases and so reduce climate change.
Examples are using fossil fuels more efficiently for industrial processes or electricity generation,
switching to solar energy or wind power, improving the insulation of buildings, and expanding
forests and other "sinks" to remove greater amounts of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere.
N2O Nitrous oxide
Non-Annex I Refers to countries that have ratified or acceded to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change that are not included in Annex I of the Convention.
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) Many NGOs attend climate talks as observers to
interact with delegates and the press, and to provide information. To be accredited for such
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activities under the Convention, NGOs must be non-profit. They include environmental groups,
research institutions, business groups, and associations of urban and local governments
OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) An association of
industrialized nations consisting of Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, the Republic of
Korea, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
the Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United
States.
Party A state (or regional economic integration organization such as the European Union) that
agrees to be bound by a treaty and for which the treaty has entered into force.
Policies and measures A frequently used phrase -- sometimes abbreviated as PAMs -- referring to
the steps taken or to be taken by countries to achieve greenhouse-gas emissions targets under the
Kyoto Protocol. Some possible policies and measures are listed in the Protocol and could offer
opportunities for intergovernmental cooperation
Post Kyoto refers to the period after the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, that is to
be after 2012.
Post Kyoto Climate regime, the regime which sets the rules and commitments for after 2012.
Protocol An international agreement linked to an existing convention, but as a separate and
additional agreement which must be signed and ratified by the Parties to the convention
concerned. Protocols typically strengthen a convention by adding new, more detailed
commitments.
Quantified Emissions Limitation and Reduction Commitments (QELRCs) Legally binding
targets and timetables under the Kyoto Protocol for the limitation or reduction of greenhouse-gas
emissions by developed countries.
Ratification Formal approval, often by a Parliament or other national legislature, of a convention,
protocol, or treaty, enabling a country to become a Party. Ratification is a separate process that
occurs after a country has signed an agreement. The instrument of ratification must be deposited
with a "depositary" (in the case of the Climate Change Convention, the UN Secretary-General) to
start the countdown to becoming a Party (in the case of the Convention, the countdown is 90
days).
Reforestation Replanting of forests on land that was previously forested but subsequently
converted to other use.
Reservoirs A component or components of the climate system where a greenhouse gas or a
precursor of a greenhouse gas is stored. Trees are "reservoirs" for carbon dioxide
RMU Removal unit (generated in Annex I Parties by LULUCF activities that absorb carbon
dioxide).
Second Commitment period, period after 2012 when new commitments have to be reached.
Separate sinks Target Regime(SSTR) climate regime with two separate targets set; one for the
LULUCF sector, and one for the Annex A sectors.
SF6 Sulphur hexafluoride.
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signature The signing by a head of state or government, a foreign minister, or other designated
official indicating a country's agreement with an adopted international text, such as a Convention
or Protocol, and signaling the country's intention of becoming a Party to the agreement.
Sinks Any process which removes a greenhouse gas from the atmosphere. The major sinks are
forests and other vegetation which through photosynthesis remove carbon dioxide. Under the
Kyoto Protocol, developed countries, in their calculation of net greenhouse-gas emissions, may
deduct from their totals the removal of greenhouse gases through the expansion of sinks. That may
help them to meet their mandatory emissions targets. However, calculating the effects of sinks is
methodologically complex and the standards for doing so still need to be clarified.
Sustainable development Development that meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs
Umbrella group A loose coalition of non-European Union developed countries formed following
the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol. Although there is no formal membership list, the group
usually includes Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Russian
Federation, Ukraine, and the United States.
UN United Nations.
UNCCD United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification.
UNCED United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil,
1992).
UNDP United Nations Development Programme.
UNEP United Nations Environmental Programme.
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1Background
The emergence of life on earth has led to the conversion of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere and
carbon dissolved in the oceans into innumerable inorganic and organic compounds on land and in
the sea. The development of different ecosystems over millions of years has established patterns of
carbon flows through the global environmental system. Natural exchanges of carbon between the
atmosphere, the oceans, and terrestrial ecosystems are now being modified by human activities,
primarily as a result of fossil fuel burning and changing land use. This activity has led to a steady
addition of carbon dioxide to the atmosphere and enhancement of the atmospheric concentration
by more than 28 percent over the past 150 years2.
While the world’s climate has always varied naturally, the vast majority of scientists now believe
that rising concentrations of “greenhouse gases” in the earth’s atmosphere, resulting from
economic and demographic growth over the last two centuries since the industrial revolution, are
overriding this natural variability and leading to potentially irreversible climate change3. CO2 is
one of these so- called greenhouse gasses (GHG) and is accounted for 50 % of the overall global
warming effect arising from human activities4.
UNFCCC
The 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change provides the foundation for
intergovernmental efforts to address this problem. The Conference of Parties (COP), the supreme
body of the Convention, held its first session in early 1995. At its third session in December 1997
in Kyoto, the COP adopted the Kyoto Protocol (KP), under which developed countries commit to
reduce their collective emissions of GHG by at least 5% by the period 2008-20125.
The KP was opened for signature on March 16 1998. It will enter into force 90 days after it has
been ratified by at least 55 parties to the Convention, including developed countries accounting for
at 55% of the total 1990 carbon dioxide emissions from the industrialized countries. These
conditions are met since Russia has ratified the protocol 18 November 2004. The Kyoto Protocol
will enter into force 90 days after Russia's ratification, which is 16 February 20056. In the mean
time the Climate Change Convention’s Parties will continue to carry out their commitments under
the Convention and prepare for the future implementation of the Protocol7.
Although the KP is an important milestone in international climate policy making, it represents
only a minor first step in controlling global emissions of greenhouse gasses. Implementation of the
KP will only result in a slowdown of the global increase in greenhouse gas emissions. This reality
became even clearer after the United States withdrew from the KP in early 2001, later followed by
Australia.
A stabilization of the concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHG) in the atmosphere, the objective
of the UNFCCC8, will require substantial reductions of global GHG emissions in the order of over
60% of 1990 levels (IPCC, 2001c). According to the KP, the review of future commitments for
2
IPCC, 2000: 29
UNFCCC, 2002: 3
4
UNFCCC, 2003: 2
5
UNFCCC, 1999: 13
6
UNFCCC, 2004
7
UNFCCC, 1999: 13
3
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Annex I Parties is to be initiated by 2005 (UNFCCC, 1997a). In 2012 the first commitment period
of the Kyoto Protocol will end.
In order to combat climate change, a new climate change regime should be established for the
second commitment period. Already there are numerous proposals for commitment differentiation
put forward during climate negotiations concerning the second commitment period after 2012.
International agreement has to be reached on which regime will be used.
1.2 Problem statement
One of the proposals for commitment differentiation brought forth by the international
negotiations is the Separate Sinks Target Regime. It is based on the two possibilities given by the
KP for a country to mitigate climate change, either by decreasing the GHG emission or by
removing GHG from the atmosphere by so called “sinks”. Sinks in the KP are defined as Land
Use, Land Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF), as ways to sequester carbon into the biosphere,
as such remove them from the atmosphere. The SSTR provides for two separate targets; one for
the sinks sector, and one for the non-sinks sector.
In the following table and figure is shown what the share of sinks is in the global carbon cycle. An
overview of the average annual global carbon budget for 1989 to 1998 according to the IPCC
Special Report on LULUCF is given:
Emissions from fossil fuel combustion and cement production
6.3 + 0.6 Gt C/yr
Storage in the atmosphere
3.3 + 0.2 Gt C/yr
Ocean uptake
2.3 + 0.8 Gt C/yr
Net terrestrial uptake= (1)-((2)+(3))
0.7 + 1.0 Gt C/yr
Emissions from land-use change
1.6 + 0.8 Gt C/yr
Residual terrestrial uptake=(4)+(5)
2.3+ 1.3 Gt C/yr
4.0
Storage in the atmosphere
Ocean uptake
2.0
Net terrestrial uptake
0.0
Gt C/year -2.0
Emissions from LULUCF
-4.0
-6.0
Fossil fuel combustion and
cement production
-8.0
Source/uptake
Figure 1. Global carbon balance from 1989 to 1998 9(Giga tonnes carbon per year)
Source: IPCC Special report on LULUCF, 2000
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UNFCCC, 1992:6
IPCC, 2000: 32
13
These data show that the atmospheric burden of CO2 in the atmosphere (3.3 Gt C/yr), plus uptake
by the oceans (2.3 Gt C/yr), don’t account for 0.7 Gt C/yr of the emissions from fossil fuel burning
and cement production (6.3 Gt C/yr). This 0.7 Gt C/yr must therefore go into land (terrestrial)
ecosystems. However emissions into the atmosphere from land-use change, are about 1.6 ± 0.8 Gt
C annually. Other terrestrial ecosystems must therefore be taking up about 0.7 + 1.6 = 2.3 Gt C/yr,
with an estimated uncertainty of  1.3 Gt C/yr. This 2.3 Gt C/yr is called the residual terrestrial
uptake, in other words, the carbon sequestration into the biosphere; sinks. The 2.3 Gt C/yr is larger
than the emissions reduction commitments under the first commitment period of the Kyoto
Protocol and therefore the possibility of a significant fraction of the residual uptake entering the
accounting system of Parties was the cause of considerable difficulty in the negotiations for the
first commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol10.
Noted from these data can also be that when taking sinks into account in a climate regime, the
emissions from LULUCF could be accounted for 1.6±0.8 Gt C/ y ,mainly through decreasing
deforestation. This is a considerable amount of emissions. Forests contain about 45% of the global
stock of carbon11, displaying the importance of the conservation of forests in mitigating climate
change. This is why is claimed that sinks should be included in a climate regime, however there is
a controversy surrounding sinks; during international negotiations a discussion on the inclusion of
sinks is raised.
The main arguments against sinks are based on the fact that sinks have a temporary character,
because they are subject to unpredictable change that cannot always be prevented. Because of their
temporary character the use of credits generated by sinks justify an emission from the inactive
pool (carbon stored in fossil fuel) to enter into the active pool (biosphere and atmosphere), which
cannot be reversed. Also opponents claim, using sinks to mitigate climate change is not making a
contribution to the solution of the real problem; the emission of GHG.
The Separate Sinks Target Regime is created in a reaction to the arguments against the inclusion
of sinks in a climate regime. It addresses the arguments put forward in international debate about
the inclusion of sinks in a climate regime by creating two separate targets; one for the LULUCF
sector, and one for the non-LULUCF sectors. With the non-LULUCF sector is meant the Annex A
sector, as put down in the Kyoto Protocol12. Such target could then be either inter-exchangeable or
not on two levels: between sectors and between countries as is schematically presented in table 1.
This yields four variations, through the inter-exchangeability (fungibility) of the emissions and
removals under both targets between countries (or not) and between sectors (or not).
Sector to sector
Fungibility
Yes
No
Yes
A
B
No
C
D
Country to country
Table 1The Separate sinks target regimes and fungibility
(source: Trines, 200413)
10
Trines, 2004: 2
The Royal Society, 2001:7
12
For the content of the Annex A, see glossary.
13
Trines, 2004: 22
11
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With these four options, subsequently Option A, B, C and D, different possibilities occur, having
different implications. For example when credits can be traded between countries like in Option A
and B, a global trading system could be established, where competition could determine the
cheapest prize per credit. When credits can be traded between sectors, like in Option A and C,
sinks credits could be traded for industrial emissions, and in this way the non-sinks sector target
could be reached for example. These feature four different climate regimes with different sets of
characteristics, with each their own advantages and accordingly probability to become a post
Kyoto climate regime.
The four options have different roles for sinks and since forests can function as a sink, the four
options hold different roles for forests. This means that the role of sinks in a climate regime has
implications for the Natural Resource Management (NRM) sector, because forests could function
as a way of meeting the targets of a climate change regime. In this way the inclusion of sinks in a
climate regime could offer opportunities for forestry and nature management, since it can generate
new functions. With new functions new ways of financing could be generated to finance forest
and nature areas, as forests and their GHG sequestrating capabilities could become an export
product for example. The inclusion of sinks could hold a promise as a way to conserve nature and
protect bio diversity. This means that in time NRM and policy will have to respond to this. How to
respond depends on what the future climate regime will be and this is yet unclear. It is unknown
what the role of sinks will be in a post Kyoto climate regime.
Sinks and Natural Resource Management
The mitigation potential of land
management activities
Agricultural
Management
Slowing
Deforestation
Tropical
Regeneration
Tropical
Agroforestry
Tropical
Forestation
Temperate
Agroforestry
Temperate
Forestation
Figure 2. The potential of various land management
(Source: The Royal Society, 2001:3)
The potential of land management activities to mitigate global emissions of CO2 by increasing the
carbon sink potential of forestry and agriculture or reducing emissions from deforestation. From
figure 3 can be extracted what including sinks in a climate regime could potentially mean for the
Natural Resource Management sector. It indicates the potential of different land management
activities to sequester carbon, as can be seen the highest potential for carbon sequestration in
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forests lies in the tropics. Allowing trade between countries or not would have great consequences
for the parties involved. When international credit trading is not allowed, but sinks credits can be
used to reach set targets under a climate regime, countries in the tropical regions would be at
benefit compared to countries at the more temperate regions.
In general, measures to enhance or conserve forest sinks have a potential for additional positive
environmental effects, such as improved preservation of biodiversity and natural landscape
features, soil conservation and protection of hydrological balance. The opportunities are
significant; both for polluters to compensate for their emissions as well as for land owners and
authorities to market another forest product14.
The future role of sinks will be the outcome of a political process; the international negotiations on
the post Kyoto climate regime. Appropriate strategies in NRM can only be developed if future
developments are properly anticipated. This means a way should be found to forecast political
processes. When political processes can be forecasted the outcome can be indicated and
anticipated timely to.
1.3 Research Objective
This study aims to identify appropriate research approaches to cope with existing information on
political processes i.e. on post Kyoto regimes and the role of sinks to explore what will be a
probable outcome of the international negotiations. The aim of this study is to explore which of
the four options possible when taking into account inter-exchangeability of the SSTR, is the most
probable to become the Post Kyoto regime.
Research Questions
In order to fulfill the research objective the main research questions to be answered are stated here.
Main research Question:

Which theory provides a theoretical background to make forecasts on the outcome of
political processes possible?

Which of the four options possible, when taking into account inter-exchangeability, of the
Separate Sinks Target Regime is the most probable to become the post Kyoto climate
regime?
Sub questions:
To structure the research process the main research question can be subdivided into 2 sub
questions. The sub questions address the issue of the design of an appropriate research approach to
identify the probability of a regime. First has to be explored what it is that determines probability,
and subsequently how to apply this in practice;
14

What determines probability of a policy?

How to measure this probability in practice?
Pous, de, 2004:24
16
Chapter 2 Theoretical and Conceptual Framework
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter the theoretical background is given to this research. It provides a theoretical
framework to the problem stated in Chapter 1, how to forecast future policy processes, and the
practical question what the probability is of the four options of the SSTR as a post Kyoto regime.
With this framework a start to the solution of the problem can be made.
Firstly theory is provided on the forecasting of policy processes, paragraph 2.3 deals with climate
change policy and the potential future developments. And eventually in 2.4 the relation with the
SSTR and Natural Resource Management will be elaborated.
2.2 Forecasting Political Processes
2.2.1 Analyzing Political Processes
In order to forecast political processes and above all forecast their outcome, political behavior has
to be analyzed and forecasted. When in political negotiations decisions on future policy have to be
made, the assumption is that people make choices based on their current believes on future
circumstances, because one can only decide on the future in the present. It is exactly this
assumption that hands a tool for forecasting political processes; the current opinions on a topic
form the base for future policy.
Concerning policy making, assumed could be that when a choice needs to be made between
various options, people choose what is sensible. What is sensible is then in the light of their
current believes, opinions and expectations for the future, which implies that the most sensible
choice is the choice that is the most compatible with their current believes and knowledge on what
is good. Added to the most sensible choice can be that in political decision making several parties
are involved, and that people choose the most sensible thing from their own position. Which often
could mean the choice is on the most beneficiary option to their position. This is the option that
provides them and the interests they represent with the most benefits to the least costs.
2.2.2 Policy Evaluation
State policy can be defined as: an attempt by the state to solve or reduce certain societal
problems15. State policy is usually described in policy documents and afterwards policy is
implemented.
Van de Graaf and Hoppe define policy as a political confirmed plan16. They argue that policy is
more then just the formulation of a plan to solve problems, policy is the result of a policy process
in which various organizations and people are involved and accordingly policy can only be
justified as policy when it has been subject to political argumentation and debate17.
Both definitions suit this research, as the subject of this study is climate policy, which indeed is an
attempt by the state, and in this case several states, to solve a (future) problem, human induced
climate change. But it also is very much a result of a policy process of international negotiations
where climate policy has been subjected to political discussion.
15
Bressers & Hoogerwerf, 1995 in Roetemeijer, 2004: 21
Graaf, van de & Hoppe, 1989: 45
17
Majone, 1978: 211
16
17
So the definition of policy used here will be a synthesis of these two definitions:
Policy is a political confirmed plan, which is the result of an attempt by the state/and or states to
reduce or solve certain societal problems.
The definition of evaluation in general can be described as:
The judgment of the perception or observation of a specific phenomenon on the basis of specific
criteria18.
Important to notice from this definition is that the judgment is based on specific criteria, which
consequently should be formulated up front. When applied to a policy context this general
definition can also be specified to:
The judgment of the observed content, processes or effects of a policy by making use of definite
criteria19.
For example a policy could be evaluated on its success in solving the intended problems. In the
case of a climate policy the reduction of GHG in the atmosphere could be a criterion, or the
prevented emissions. As for this study, a policy is evaluated before it is even completely designed,
the intended outcome is known already, the prevention of dangerous human induced climate
change, only the specific measures and commitments have to be formulated. Which means the
evaluation will not be on the effects of the policy.
There are different sorts of Policy evaluation, the concept of policy evaluation can be subdivided
on the base of certain applications and features of policies, for example on the base of the moment
of evaluation, which for this research is an important and special facet of the subject of research.
Evaluation types through moment of evaluation
A distinction on different types of evaluations can be made on the stage in the policy cycle;
formulation, implementation and evaluation. On all of these three stages policy evaluations can be
conducted, they are called respectively; ex-ante evaluation, monitoring and ex-post evaluation.
Ex-ante evaluation is used before the policy is implemented. According to Bressers (1995) the
content, processes and effects are assessed. Other scholars interpret this type of evaluation as an
analysis related to the conceptualization and design of interventions. Ex-ante evaluation is often
part of the process of policy preparation.
Monitoring is used during the implementation process of the policy. The results of this evaluation
are used to judge if policy changes have to be made to steer the process in the desired direction.
Ex-post evaluation is carried out after the policy has been implemented. It is an assessment of
impact and efficiency of the policy20. On the basis of the ex-post evaluation one can learn if the
policy was effective and efficient and whether in future policy, things have to change in order to
reach the desired goals,.
Inherent to forecasting policy processes, is the future aspect of the policy, which means, ex ante
policy evaluation should be conducted.
Policy effects, content and processes
As the explanation of an ex-ante evaluation already stated, ex-ante policy evaluation can
according to Hoogerwerf and Herweijer (1998) be focused on the effects the processes and the
content of a policy. They state the following:
18
Bressers & Hoogerwerf, 1995: 22
Bressers & Hoogerwerf, 1995: 22
20
Bressers & Hoogerwerf, 1995: 22
19
18
The effects of a policy
To create feedback on policy making the effects a certain policy will have on the community can
be evaluated. This is not unambiguous; the problem that rises here is to what extent is the
observed change in society (or the lack of this) caused by the specified policy. Literature poses a
solution to this dilemma by making a division in three concepts; goal achievement, effectivity and
efficiency, these three concepts accounting for the difference between intended and unintended
outcomes and taking into account the cost/revenue ratio of a policy.
The policy process
The policy process can be described as the dynamic course of actions and interactions with respect
to the policy. Policy always is a result of all kinds of movements and forces within society.
Movement characterizes it, mutual influence of factors and actors and also by a successive course
of happenings with a recognizable structure. The policy process can on its turn be divided into sub
processes. These sub processes can form a way to help construct reality and place it in a certain
context.
The content of the policy
Policy content consists of three parts; goals, means and time planning. These different parts are of
course linked together in the policy by a certain structure. When analyzing the policy content, the
different parts and the structure have to be found and reconstructed in a transparent manner. In
this way an overview can be created of the policy content and it can be analyzed.
In this study is attempted to forecast political processes, and especially their outcome in terms of a
future policy. This clearly does not refer to the effects of a policy, as they cannot be measured yet.
Interest is on the outcome of a process, the policy evaluation is not on the policy process itself but
on the outcome of a future policy; the policy content.
2.2.3 Policy Theory
The design of a policy, according to Bressers and Hoogerwerf (1995) the construction of ideas and
formulation of a to be implemented policy is always implicitly or explicitly based on assumptions
on the effects that certain means will have in a policy field on reaching the set goals.
The whole of assumptions on which a policy is based can be called Policy Theory.
History and background
In literature first announcements of policy theory stem from the 1950’s in the Netherlands by the
sociologist Jacques van Doorn. Before that even in the thirties Karl Mannheim published about the
transparent pronunciation of assumptions at the base of social planning21. Since the 70’s the policy
theory became common ground and more literature was published on this topic22. Sometimes
referred to as policy theory but it is named many different things, Hoogerwerf in 1990 stated a list
of 17 authors who referred in this or other names but to the concept of Policy theory. As can be
learned from his article, there is a wide variety of names in literature referring to basically the
same thing. Although the definitions differ somewhat with the different authors, in large they
share the same characteristics. In the following section the main characteristics will be stated.
Main Characteristics
From all the different definitions a set of main characteristics of a “policy theory” can be
extracted. According to Hoogerwerf (1990) Policy Theory concerns assumptions on features and
21
22
Mannheim, 1935: 7
Hoogerwerf, 1990: 285
19
phenomena and also on relations between phenomena. He also states that the assumptions on
which a policy is based are to be distinguished in 3 different relations; the relation between:

aims and means (final relations),

cause and effect (causal relations)

values and the in policy used norms (normative relations).
To conduct a policy theory analysis the assumptions should be found and reconstructed after
which they have to be linked to form a policy theory.
2.2.4 Policy theory as a means to forecast future policy
When the current political opinion on a topic gives an indication on the future outcome of political
processes, the probability of a policy regime can be measured as a means of compatibility with the
current statements on the subject. Reconstructing a policy theory can reveal the assumptions on
which a policy is based. These assumptions represent the believes of the policy makers on the
policy topic. This means that by reconstructing the policy theory the current opinion on the policy
subject is given, and that compatibility with this gives an indication on future developments.
As defined in paragraph 2.2.2 policy evaluation is the judgement of the observed content of a
policy by making use of definite criteria. Two important concepts stem from this definition for this
research; content and criteria. As stated above, to evaluate policies on the content the
reconstruction of a policy theory can be used.
Compatibility can be defined as: goodness of fit23. The term goodness of fit does not necessarily
mean two elements have to be identical24.
Reconstructing the policy theory can do this, from the policy theory “criteria” can be derived
which pronounce the headlines of the policy. These criteria would represent the most important
norms, assumptions and aims of the policy.
Adding this all up, compatibility in this context means; the sum of the goodness of fit of the
criteria derived from the policy theory. This can be visualised in a formula:
Compatibility= sum (fit of criteria)
Measuring of fit of criteria:
How to measure compatibility? In literature certain degrees of compatibility are described. In the
research of Falkner (2003), amongst others the degree of correctness of implementation was
‘measured.’ In other words, the degree of success was investigated. The degree of correctness of
implementation is divided in four degrees: large, medium, small and none. Although this study
aims to measure something different then correctness of implementation, the idea of degrees of
compatibility could very well be applied to this study. Elzen et al. (2003) in the study on five
potential post Kyoto regimes makes use of five degrees of compatibility ; fully satisfied; generally
satisfied; partly satisfied; poorly satisfied; not satisfied at all.
23
24
Capraso et al., 2001 in Noordhuizen, 2003: 23
Capraso et al., 2001 in Noordhuizen, 2003: 23
20
2.3 Climate Change policy: What will happen after 2012?
2.3.1 The Kyoto Protocol: a short Overview
Increasing scientific evidence of human interference with the climate system, coupled with
growing public concern over global environmental issues, began to push climate change onto the
political agenda in the mid-1980s. Recognizing the needs of policymakers for authoritative and
up-to-date scientific information, the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the UN
Environment Program (UNEP) established the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC)25 in 1988.
In 1990, the IPCC issued its First Assessment Report, confirming that human-induced climate
change was indeed a threat and calling for a global treaty to address the problem. As a response
the UN General Assembly launched negotiations on a framework convention on climate change26
in 1990.
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
On 9 May 1992, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (the UNFCCC)
was founded. The Convention was opened for signature, on June 1992, and came into force in
March 1994. There are now 189 Parties (including the European Community) to the Convention,
which thus is approaching universal membership27.
Since the Convention’s entry into force, Parties have agreed to meet annually in the Conference of
the Parties (COP) to review the implementation of the convention and continue talks on how best
to tackle climate change. The objective of the Convention is stabilizing atmospheric
concentrations of greenhouse gases at levels that would prevent dangerous human interference
with the climate system. Such levels, which the Convention does not quantify, should be achieved
within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure
that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a
sustainable manner. To achieve this objective, all Parties to the Convention, committed themselves
to a set of general obligations to respond to climate change28.
The Convention divides countries into two groups; the industrialized countries, listed in the Annex
I of the convention; the Annex I countries, and those that are not listed in the Annex I ; the nonAnnex I countries. The Convention currently lists 41 Annex I Parties. These are the industrialized
countries who have historically contributed the most to climate change. They include both the
relatively wealthy industrialized countries that were members of the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1992, plus countries with economies in transition (the
EITs), including the Russian Federation, the Baltic States, and several Central and Eastern
European States.
The per capita emissions of Annex I Parties are higher than those of most developing countries
and their capacity to address climate change is higher. The Convention states that therefore the
Annex I parties should take the lead in combating climate change according to principles of equity
and common but differentiated responsibilities. To do so , Annex I Parties are committed to
adopting national policies and measures with the non-legally binding aim that they should have
returned their greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by the year 200029.
25
For explanation to IPCC see glossary
UNFCCC, 2002: 8
27
UNFCCC, 2002: 8
28
UNFCCC, 2002: 8
29
UNFCCC, 2002: 8
26
21
The Kyoto Protocol
At the third meeting of the Conference of parties (COP), the Kyoto Protocol was adopted in
Kyoto, Japan in 1997. The aim of the Kyoto Protocol is to set more stringent goals for
industrialized countries to tackle climate change.
The Kyoto Protocol shares the Convention’s objective, principles and institutions, but significantly
strengthens the Convention by committing Annex I Parties to individual, legally binding targets to
limit or reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. Only Parties to the Convention that have also
become Parties to the Protocol, will be bound by the Protocol’s commitments, when it has entered
into force30.
The aim of the Kyoto Protocol is a reduction in the emission of GHG31 by industrialized countries
(the Annex I countries) with 5,2 % compared to the year 1990 to be established in the first
commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol; 2008-2012. The Kyoto Protocol enters into force if it is
ratified by 55 or more countries, provided also that the Annex I countries that ratified together
account for at least 55 % of the total global emission of CO2 in 1990. This latter condition is
fulfilled since Russia ratified in November 2004, However the US (responsible for a quarter of
global emissions of GHG) has indicated its intention not to ratify the KP.
The countries that ratified the Protocol are allowed to reach their target set under the KP through a
reduction of the emission of GHG in the atmosphere but also trough reducing the amount of CO 2
in the atmosphere through carbon sequestration by land use systems and forestry, also referred to
as sinks. CO2 is accounted for 50 % of the overall global warming effect arising from human
activities32 and that is why it is an important focal point in the Protocol.
Sinks
Sinks are defined as: Any process, activity or mechanism that removes a greenhouse gas, an
aerosol or a precursor of a greenhouse gas from the atmosphere33. A lot of things can function as a
sink, for example the oceans and the continental biosphere; also forests can function as such,
because by growing a tree sequestrates CO2 from the atmosphere into the biosphere. Growing or
generating forests will continue to absorb uptake carbon for 20 to 50 years or more after
establishment, depending on species and side conditions, though quantative projections beyond a
few decades are uncertain34. Forests store the carbon into their biomass and also into the soil.
Pristine forests were long believed to be mostly in a state of equilibrium, such that over a period of
several years their carbon balance would be neutral. This view has been challenged in more recent
years by increasing evidence that undisturbed areas of forests also sequester carbon35.
Because of these mechanisms, forestry activities can provide a way of combating climate change,
either by increasing the removals by sinks of greenhouse gases from the atmosphere (e.g. by
planting trees or managing forests), or by reducing emissions (e.g. by curbing deforestation)36.
Using wood for timber products can increase the lifetime of carbon stored into wood. This has
proved to be hard to account for as it is hard to keep track of the lifetime of timber products.
Sinks under the Kyoto Protocol
30
UNFCCC, 2002: 9
The targets cover emissions of the six main greenhouse gasses (GHG): Carbon dioxide (CO2),
Methane (CH4), Nitrous oxide (N2O), Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), Perfluorocarbons (PFCs),
Sulphur hexafluoride (SF6)
32
UNFCCC, 2003: 1
33
UNFCCC, 1992: 7
34
IPCC, 2000: 37
35
Lugo & Brown, 1993; Philips et al., 1998; Shultze et al., 1999.
36
UNFCCC, 2003: 1
31
22
Above sinks as a physical object are discussed; sinks can also be politically defined in relation to
the Kyoto Protocol. Sinks in the Kyoto Protocol are also called, Land Use, Land Use Change and
Forestry (LULUCF). In this study focus will be on forests as sinks.
Parties decided in the Kyoto Protocol that greenhouse gas removals and emissions through certain
activities - namely, afforestation, reforestation since 1990 in their own country - are accounted for
in meeting the Protocol's emission targets. Conversely, activities that deplete forests, namely
deforestation, will be subtracted from the amount of emissions that an Annex I Party may emit
over its commitment period.
Emissions or removals from forest management are also accounted for in the KP on the basis of
Article 3.4, this is limited to a pre-defined cap for each Party. A Party may choose to account for
additional human-induced activities for the first commitment period, provided these activities have
taken place since 1990. Also the possibility exists for a Party to compensate deforestation debits
by forest management removals, up to a maximum of 9Mt C (33 Mt CO2eq)37.
Complementary to this, the Kyoto Protocol also provides for flexible mechanisms, which allow
countries to make use of the GHG sequestration in the LULUCF sector in other countries. There
are three flexible mechanisms; Joint Implementation, the Clean Development Mechanism and
Emission Trading. These are designed to help Annex I Parties cut the cost of meeting their
emissions targets by taking advantage of opportunities to reduce emissions, or increase greenhouse
gas removals, that are less costly in other countries than at home38.
Joint implementation
Joint Implementation (JI) (article 6, Kyoto Protocol) means that any Party included in Annex I
may in order of meeting its commitments under Article 3, transfer to, or acquire from, any other
Annex I Party, emission reduction units resulting from projects aimed at reducing anthropogenic
emissions by sources or enhancing anthropogenic removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in any
sector of the economy39. For example the Netherlands could meet their emission reduction target
under the KP by buying credits in Poland derived from an afforestation project, because these
credits are cheaper compared to credits attained in the Netherlands itself.
The Clean Development Mechanism
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) (article 12, Kyoto Protocol) is a mechanism for
project-based emission reduction activities in developing countries. Under the CDM, investors
from Annex I states receive Certified Emissions Reduction units (CERs) for the actual amount of
greenhouse gas emissions reduction achieved, subject to host country agreement. The CDM
allows CERs from projects initiated after 2000. Certificates will be generated through the CDM
from projects that lead to certifiable emissions reductions that would otherwise not occur, also
referred to as additionality. If we take the Netherlands as an example again, the Netherlands could
finance a renewable energy project in Brazil. The Certified Emission Reduction units that are
gained by this project, e.g. the amount of GHG emissions that are prevented by the renewable
energy compared to the situation before the project, the Netherlands can use to meet their targets
under the KP.
The Clean development mechanism aims at stimulating mainly developing countries to reduce
their emissions although they don’t have set targets under the KP, and promoting sustainable
development in developing countries as sinks could be enhanced and improved technology can
37
ECCP, 2004: 5
UNFCCC, 2002
39
UNFCCC, 1997
38
23
reduce their emissions. This all together should form a cost effective way to reach targets under
the KP.
Emission Trading
Under emissions trading, an Annex I Party may transfer some of the emissions under its assigned
amount, known as assigned amount units (AAUs), to another Annex I Party that finds it relatively
more difficult to meet its emissions target. It may also transfer CERs, ERUs or RMUs that it has
acquired through the CDM, joint implementation or sink activities in the same way40. In this way
credits derived from forestry projects can be traded among countries and used to reach emission
targets under the KP. For example, the Netherlands could buy Assigned Amount Units from
Russia that has a surplus of credits gained from reforestation projects to meet the Dutch target
under the KP.
2.3.2 Future Developments
In 2012 the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol will end. What will happen in politics
concerning climate change combating is yet unclear. In order to really prevent dangerous human
induced climate change, as is the objective of the UNFCCC, a follow up should be designed for
international climate combating policy after 2012. One of the issues that need to be considered in
post Kyoto climate policy is the possible role of land use and forestry systems. The KP includes
provisions for the review of its commitments, so these can be strengthened over time. Negotiations
on targets for the second commitment period are due to start in 2005. The whole Protocol will be
reviewed at the second session of the COP, after the Protocol has entered into force.
After this review, in order to combat climate change, a new climate change regime may be
established. Already there are numerous proposals for commitment differentiation put forward
during climate negotiations concerning the second commitment period after 2012. International
agreement has to be reached on which regime will be used. When the negotiations on the KP
started there was the idea that a top down target should be established which countries had to
reach. During the negotiations this idea was abandoned for the idea of commitment differentiation,
meaning that each party decides on its own target.
2.3.3 Five options for commitment differentiation
In the second half of 2004 The Netherlands hold the presidency of the European Union (EU). The
Dutch ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality intended to use this opportunity to initiate
the consideration of the role of land use and forestry in possible future climate regimes. To this
end the Ministry organized a workshop in October of 2004 for the EU Expert Group on Sinks.
As a preparation for the workshop an options paper41 was drafted. The main objective of this paper
is to provide an overview of the current state of thinking with respect to the possible roles of land
use and forestry in future climate regimes. In this paper five options for potential future climate
regimes are elaborated, several technical aspects and political dimensions of each of these options
are reviewed.
The five options of climate policy regimes on how to set targets that are discussed in the paper are:
40
41
UNFCCC, 2002
Trines, 2004.
24

The Traditional Approach: the way in which the Kyoto Protocol came into existence
based on the willingness of countries to make commitments followed by negotiations to
take specific ‘wishes’ into account42.

The Brazilian Proposal: individual country ceilings that together indicate the maximum
increase in the global mean surface temperature that will be tolerated. The ceilings are
calculated on the basis of a temperature reduction target for all participating countries
together. The calculation is based on the predicted temperature increase that results if the
emissions of this group of countries remain constant and equal to 1990 emission levels
throughout the period from 1990 to 202043.

A Regime of Contraction and Convergence: This regime consists of two steps:
Contraction: whereby a global emissions capacity is ultimately divided amongst countries
on the basis of equity, the same amount per capita. Step two; Convergence, the
distribution of emissions capacity moves from the current level of emissions per capita
towards a per capita volume of emissions that is equal for every person in the world 44.

The Multi Stage Regime (MSR): a quantitative regime whereby countries gradually
increase their level of participation in the regime by moving from one stage to a next
depending on their level of development. Gradual accession is translated into multiple
stages within regime thus enabling MSR to combine several apportionment principles and
multiple forms of commitment in several stages of a single system45.

A Separate Sinks Sector for Particular Countries: Sometimes also referred to this as ‘a
sinks protocol’. Under this a regime four sub-categories can be envisaged: a system with
emission reductions that are inter exchangeable with those generated in other sectors (e.g.
energy or industry) and/or with other countries through the Kyoto mechanisms, and
without these options of inter exchangeability46.
These five regimes are but a selection of the numerous proposals put forward during international
negotiations. As can be said for now they all have equal chances of being chosen as the post Kyoto
regime used for climate change mitigation after 2012, if a choice is made out of these five at all.
2.4 Post Kyoto climate policy and the Natural Resource
Management Sector
2.4.1 Separate Sinks Target Regime, an option with implications for
Natural Resource Management
The Separate Sinks Target Regime (SSTR) provides for separate targets: one for the Annex A
sector and one for LULUCF. Emissions and removals under both targets could either be interexchangeable (fungible) between countries (or not) and between sectors (or not) 47. See table1.
Option A is a regime where the targets in the first place are set separately for the LULUCF sector
and for the Annex A48 like all four options of this regime. Within Option A it is possible for the
participating countries to exchange and or trade the credits they establish from sector to sector and
42
Trines, 2004.
Trines, 2004.
44
Elzen, den, et al. 2003: 7
45
Elzen, den, et al. 2003: 7
46
Trines, 2004. :22
47
Trines, 2004. :22
48
UNFCCC, 1997
43
25
from country to country. This means that in order to reach the set target a country is free to act
liberally and do as it wants, flexible mechanisms can be used and targets can be inter-exchanged
between the two separate goals initially set. This would actually mean keeping the status quo as
rules are set under the Kyoto Protocol. Although the KP does not provide for two separate targets,
credits gained in all sectors can be inter exchanged, also between countries. One could argue that
when the credits from the two separate targets can be inter exchanged between sectors and
countries there are no two separate targets anymore. Therefore Option A resembles the structure of
the KP.
Option B has the separate targets for the LULUCF and Annex A sectors, and allows exchange of
both credit types between countries, but not between sectors. So the Kyoto mechanisms would
apply, but credits built up in the sinks sector cannot be exchanged for credits in the Annex A and
vice versa, neither nationally nor internationally. Which puts a restriction on the flexible
mechanisms as they are known under the KP, because they are used more liberally and credits
from the two sectors can be inter exchanged.
Option C has like the others two separate targets, and allows credits to be exchanged between
sectors, so between the Annex A and the LULUCF sectors, but prohibits the exchange of credits
between countries. So in this option a country is free to exchange credits between sectors within
its own country but not among other countries.
Option D has the two separate targets set and credits created by a given country either in Annex A
or the LULUCF sector cannot be inter exchanged between different sectors, nor between
countries.
Implications of the SSTR for Natural Resource Management
The SSTR has a great focus on sinks and their role in combating climate change. The four
different options hold four different roles for sinks within a climate regime. The role of sinks in a
future climate regime has implications for Natural Resource Management (NRM), because with
the different role of sinks, the role and function of forests also varies. Including sinks in a climate
regime would mean a potential new role of forests in policy and management of a country as they
could function as a way of meeting the targets of a climate change regime. The NRM sector in
time would have to deal with this and adapt the management and policy of forests to the rules set
for sinks and the management of sinks in the climate regime.
Table 2. Implications and decision making problems for the NRM sector
Natural Resource
Management Actors
State Forest Service
Supervising/ Certifying
agencies
Landowning non-profit
organisations
Forest investment companies
Private forest owner
Implications and Decision making problems
Adapt forest policy plan
Redefine certification guidelines and criteria
Reconsider certifications
Adapt policy plan
Add income opportunity for new forest function as sink
Adapt policy plan
New investment options
Adapt policy plan
Add income opportunity for new forest function as sink
As can be seen from table 2, for the actual Natural Resource Management Actors, the role of
forests as described in a future climate policy will have various similar and specific implications.
What they all have in common is, all have to make decisions for the future, and in order to do this
correctly, all have to forecast what will happen with the role of forests in a post Kyoto Climate
26
Regime. Concluded from this can be that knowledge on post Kyoto climate policy is needed for
decision making in the NRM sector.
If the SSTR is chosen as the post Kyoto regime, the choice for one of the four options of varying
fungibility will make a difference for the Natural Resources sector, because with the varying
options, the role of sinks will differ. With a different role for sinks comes a different role for
forests and nature areas per country. Not only is it important to know which regime is the most
probable for NRM, getting more insight into the probability and features of a future climate
regime will also contribute to the international discussion and negotiation process on climate
change policy and the role sinks play. From this stems that knowledge is needed on the probability
of potential future climate regimes. The regime, which will fulfil the role of post Kyoto regime,
has yet to be chosen in international negotiations.
2.4.2 Controversy surrounding sinks
However there is a controversy about what the role of sinks actually should be in climate regimes.
The discussion, in international negotiations and beyond can be divided into a discussion from a
biological point of view and a political one. In the following section an overview is given of the
international discussion by stating the main arguments opposed to and in favor of the inclusion of
sinks in a climate regime, and the most important experienced difficulties with the determination
of the role of sinks in a climate regime.
Sinks is one word for a very diverse subject in terms of: functionality (arable land, forest), climatic
region (tropical, boreal), structure (plantations, natural forests), speed of growth; 8 year
eucalyptus, 180 year rotation beech), carbon content (grassland, tropical rainforest) economic
importance, co-benefits (biodiversity, coastal protection) etc. Therefore, the importance of sinks
varies, not only from Party to Party, but also from region to region. Sinks are a very diverse
subject matter with many different stakeholders. This has proven hard to reconcile in an
international treaty49.
The difference in importance and meaning of forests and sinks per country, per climate,
economical features (such as importance of forestry sector in national economy and employment)
and per environmental criteria, causes certain countries to have more sinks potential due to their
environmental and landscape characteristics.
During international negotiations on the KP it became clear that opinions on the inclusion of sinks
differed widely: the “umbrella” group (Canada, United States of America, Japan, Australia,
Russia, New Zealand, Norway, Iceland and the Ukraine) on the one hand were supportive to the
idea of inclusion of sinks in the Kyoto Protocol, and, on the other hand, the European Union who
was more cautious towards the inclusion of sinks and wanted this to be only a small part of
meeting targets50.
The amount of carbon available in the active pool (the atmosphere and biosphere) increases;
unlike carbon in fossil fuels, carbon stored in the biosphere can be released into the atmosphere
again51, because they are subject to unpredictable change: insect attacks, fire, illegal logging, landuse policy, political upheaval, etc. Therefore non-permanence will always remain an issue and the
reversal of sequestration a liability when tied to (legally binding) quantified commitments52.
49
Trines, 2004: 16
Locatelli & Loisel, 2002: 165
51
FERN, 2004.
52
Trines, 2004: 16
50
27
Opponents of the inclusion of sinks in a climate regime state that sinks do not solve the real cause
of the problem; the emission of GHG: The measures that can be taken to combat climate change
can be roughly divided into two categories, either reducing the emission of GHG or the removal
from GHG from the atmosphere by sinks. The opponents of the latter option claim that money and
effort put into sequestrating GHG in sinks is loss of money and activity put into making a solution
to the source of the problem namely the emission of GHG53. This touches on another important
feature of sinks in climate regimes; the conservation and/or enhancement of existing sinks.
Conserving or enhancing existing carbon can prevent stocks emissions from deforestation. Forests
contain about 45% of the global stock of carbon54and worldwide the LULUCF sector is
responsible for an important amount of GHG removals. Therefore, advocates of sinks claim, it
cannot be left out from any climate treaty that wants to be environmentally effective; and therefore
they should be included in a future climate regime55.
Moreover a loophole could be established by including sinks, in establishing a carbon sink a
carbon emission that would otherwise not have occurred because it would have put the user of
fossil fuel over its emission allowance could be justified in this way56. Taking the non-permanence
into account, the possible risk of a loophole and the end of pipe character, sinks can function as a
means of buying time until a better technological solution is in stock. This advocates of inclusion
of sinks in climate regimes claim is the role sinks can play in mitigating climate change because
there is no difference in climatological effect between CO2 taken up by the land and CO2
reduction due to other causes57. Therefore sinks can be deployed relatively rapidly at moderate
cost, which is why they could play a useful bridging role while new energy technologies are
developed.
The scientific functioning of sinks is still not clear-cut. There is considerable uncertainty
associated with the estimates derived using the techniques that will be required to monitor,
quantify and verify land carbon sinks established under the Kyoto Protocol. There is an urgent
need to increase the accuracy of these techniques before land carbon sinks are utilized to any
significant extent58. Exact quantification of carbon stocks and fluxes can be done but is extremely
labor intensive and costly. The capacity to quantify may prove to be an issue for Parties where
sinks play a minor role or that are at a lower level of economic development in comparison to
Annex II Parties59.
Old growth forests could actually be put at risk as they are cut down to make way for fast growing
single species plantations which absorb more CO2 and therefore provide more CO2 credits60. In
this way biodiversity would be at threat, single species plantations would mean a loss of
biodiversity compared with the old growth forest. Also this would imply emissions from the
sequestrated carbon in the biosphere of the original forest instead of the aimed reductions by the
new plantation61.
Carbon sink activities may well develop into future carbon bombs once climate change reduces
the ability of trees to survive in their current locations62.
53
Locatelli & Loisel, 2002: 165
The Royal Society, 2001: 7
55
Trines, 2004: 16
56
FERN, 2004.
57
Noble & Scholes, 2001.
58
Royal society, 2001: 7
59
Trines, 2004.
60
Greenpeace, 2001
61
FERN, 2004
62
FERN, 2004
54
28
There is a risk of leakage, this occurs when activities to increase carbon storage in some places
inadvertently promote activities elsewhere which either decrease carbon storage (negative
leakage) or increase carbon storage (positive leakage). Thus, tree planting or regeneration for
carbon storage may provide timber which undermines incentives for forestry elsewhere (negative),
or lessens the need to destroy or log native forests (positive), or provides an example which others
follow (positive)63.
Trade of sinks credits between countries
Within the sinks discussion there is a special discussion on the role of sinks in a flexible
mechanism, where credits gained by removals of GHG from the atmosphere can be traded
internationally, therefore this is discussed separately here.
The creation of vast carbon sinks could freeze land-use to the detriment of local populations, in
this way decreasing their development opportunities. But promoters of sinks included in climate
regimes claim exactly the opposite namely that the consequences for development and
environment will be positive: Projects to reconstitute the wooded cover would, in their view, have
positive effects on soils and hydrological systems. Reforestation activities and reconstituted
ecosystems would create employment, revenue and natural resources for local populations64.
The use of sinks and the trade of the credits gained by GHG removals hold an economic efficient
solution to sequestrate carbon. Economic efficient because the credits can be retrieved there where
they are the most efficient in terms of land price, growth speed, labor cost, etc.
It also appears a potentially powerful instrument to bring about increased developing countries
participation by among others cooperation on the enhancement of sinks65.
2.5 What makes a regime probable to become the post Kyoto
regime?
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is one of a series of
recent agreements through which countries around the world are banding together to meet the
challenge of combating human induced climate change. Through the UNFCCC the Kyoto Protocol
is established. The Conference of Parties (COP) the supreme body of the UNFCCC decided on the
content of the Kyoto Protocol, and in time has to decide on the content of a post Kyoto Protocol. It
seems logic that the ideas and assumptions that are put down in the UNFCCC form the base of any
future climate regime. The UNFCCC reflects the assumptions on the problem of human induced
climate change and the solution to it; it represents the outcome of negotiations with all involved
parties. Consequently, as long as there are no very important changes in the political environment
or important new scientifical insight provided, the assumption is that a regime is chosen that
corresponds with beliefs and assumptions on what a post Kyoto regime should look like.
As in the conventions text the current beliefs on climate change and its solutions are put down.
From this can be concluded that a climate regime in order to be found suitable as a post Kyoto
regime should be consistent with the UNFCCC. Therefore the assumption is that the regime will
be chosen which is the most compatible with the ideas and assumptions on what a post Kyoto
regime should look like. In the case of this research the four options of the SSTR should be
evaluated on their compatibility with the UNFCCC.
63
Royal Society, 2001:7
Locatelli & Loisel, 2002: 165
65
European Consultative Forum on the Environment and Sustainable Development, 1999:4
64
29
The compatibility of the regime with the UNFCCC can be determined through the reconstruction
of the policy theory of the Conventions text. From this policy theory criteria can be derived.
Through a policy evaluation based on these criteria the probability of a post Kyoto regime can be
determined as a function of the compatibility with these criteria. Since compatibility is defined as
the sum of goodness of fit to the criteria.
30
Chapter 3 Methodology
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter the methodology and the method used to conduct this study will be explained. As
we have seen in the previous chapter the outcome of political processes is assumed to be
determined by current knowledge and opinions on solutions to problems. Reconstructing a policy
theory can make the assumptions on a current policy implicit, which would state the current
opinion and knowledge on the policy topic. As a consequence, by reconstructing the policy theory
a forecast can be made of the probability of a future policy. This is set out in the the theorethical
framework constructed in chapter 2. From this chapter this theory will be tested on its value in
reality.
First the methodology used for this research will be stated, which is the result of a synthesis of the
theory provided in chapter 2. Paragraph 3.3 states the method and paragraph 3.4 applies this on the
practical case of the probability of the SSTR as a post Kyoto regime.
3.2 Methodology
The methodology used for this research has been to this point logic deductive; theories are
combined through logical reasoning into a framework that can be applied to forecast future
political processes.
As the aim of this study is to evaluate future policy developments, policy content evaluation
would be a suitable methodology. From Chapter 2 can be learned that criteria are needed to
conduct a policy evaluation. Probability of future policy developments is related to the
compatibility with the current opinion on the policy topic. Since the outcome of policy processes
is determined by negotiation with politically involved people. People base decisions on the future
on their current beliefs of what is sensible and favorable to them. These beliefs can be found in
current policy on the specific subject. Reconstructing the policy theory exposes the beliefs and
assumptions on the policy topic on which the policy is based, which reflect the current opinion on
the topic. A policy theory exposes assumptions on goals, means, cause and effects and the norms
and values on which a policy is based. From these assumptions criteria can be extracted that state
the main values of the policy. With these criteria a quantitative policy evaluation could be
conducted. Compatibility with these criteria determines the probability of policy that in time
would be the outcome of a future policy process.
To test this research strategy, it will be applied to a practical example; the probability of a post
Kyoto Climate regime.
3.3 Methods for analyzing future political Developments: the
post Kyoto case
Up till now the methodology has been logic deductive, a theoretical framework has been created
to forecast future political processes. From here the theory will be applied to a case study, the
methods applied will refer to an empirical analytical frame and therefore consist of approaches to
generate and process data derived from the analysis of real world cases. To this aim post Kyoto
climate policy will serve as a case for further analysis.
The reconstruction of a policy theory will be used to forecast the outcome of a policy process, and
to define the criteria to conduct policy evaluation to. In this paragraph will be set out which
method will be used to reconstruct the policy theory, and how the policy evaluation will be
conducted.
As is displayed in paragraph 2.2.3 there are many different names referring to policy theory. For
all the different names that refer to the set of assumptions underlying a policy there are just as
many methods to reconstruct these assumptions and relations between assumptions into a policy
theory. To reconstruct a policy theory a method should be used to explore the assumptions on
which the policy is based and to connect the different assumptions together to form a theory.
Because the method described by Hoogerwerf (1998) is a synthesis of the various methods
described by different authors, and has all sets of assumptions covered, which makes it the most
complete method, this will be the method used to reconstruct the policy theory.
Step one in reconstructing the policy theory is the selection of documents and the parts of these
documents that will function as a base to reconstruct the policy theory. Meeting the commentary
by Faludi and Waterhout (2002) on the reconstruction of a policy theory on the final document by
making use of more documents then just the final policy document. The argument they state in
their article on policy theory is that the final policy document provides an insufficient basis for
forming an understanding of the policy theory behind it. Reconstructing a policy theory one needs
to explore the ‘world behind the plan’ where various actors represent various interests. Therefore
the final policy document would not provide the insight to reconstruct the true assumptions on
which this policy is based and more background literature on this policy should be used.
The second step is the selection of the text parts that will be used to reconstruct the policy theory.
Klein Haarhuis en Leeuw (2004) state that the reconstruction of a policy theory is a time
consuming practice, in this case because also background literature is used it becomes even more
so. That is also why certain parts of the policy documents and literature will be selected.
Following Hoogerwerf (1998), the next step consists of detecting and reconstructing the three
assumptive relations; causal, final and normative. As the analysis of literature on policy theory
shows, these three relations cover the different sorts of assumptions made when forming policy.
This is done by reading and scanning the selected parts of the conventions text for sentences or
sub sections that refer to either the objective that should be reached by the policy, the means that
are assumed to be effective to reach the goal, the assumed cause and effect of the problem that is
the motivation for the policy. The causal relations of a policy theory hold a perception of the
causes and effect of a problem situation. Thirdly normative statements and relations are detected,
which means statements that describe the norms and values to which the means should answer.
The normative part of a policy refers to the judgment of a problem situation, the problem
perception. With the problem perception certain solutions are allowed and others aren’t, this is of
great effect on the choice for means66. The judgment and origin of the policy targets; a target can
be seen as a specified value, the wanted situation67. The judgment and acceptability of the means
of a policy and their effects; the norms and values used for a policy also give a direction for the
means to chose, it provides a framework for desired and undesired means68.
From these assumptions the whole policy theory can be constructed, the set of assumptions are put
together as a coherent base of the policy. From the assumptions together a constitution to the
policy can be formed. This constitution reflects the most important overarching principles of the
policy.
66
Hoogerwerf & Herweijer, 1998: 251
Hoogerwerf & Herweijer, 1998: 251
68
Hoogerwerf & Herweijer, 1998: 251
67
32
When the policy theory is reconstructed, it can be described by criteria that state the various
principles on which the policy is based.
These criteria then are compared and completed by criteria and important features from literature
on the topic. Because there is a considerable risk when constructing a policy theory as an outsider
especially if this is done by just one person that it is not a just reflection of the assumptions on
which the real policy is based69, the criteria used in other literature to evaluate post Kyoto regimes
will be used as a supplement and a means of control to the criteria here defined. Afterwards the
various criteria will be divided into main values that state the most important values of the policy.
With this set of criteria a table can be made which can be used as a tool to evaluate potential future
policies to.
Table 3 policy evaluation tool
Policy option 1
Policy option 2
Policy option 3
Specific criterion 1
Compatibility Score
option 1 on criterion
1
Compatibility Score
option 2 on criterion
1
Etc.
Specific criterion 2
Compatibility Score
option 1 on criterion
2
Etc.
Specific criterion3
Etc.
Policy option 4
Main value 1
Main value 2
Specific criterion 1
Specific criterion 2
Etc.
Total score
Sum
compatibility
Option 1
total
score
Sum
compatibility
Option 2
total
score
Sum
compatibility
Option 3
total
score
Sum
compatibility
Option 4
total
score
When this is done the second part of the research is conducted; the policy evaluation. This policy
evaluation serves as a test to the above-described method. This test consists of the evaluation of
four different options of a potential future policy regime on its probability. Each option is
qualitatively evaluated through reasoning on compatibility with the various criteria that were
previously defined. Accordingly each option is awarded with a degree of compatibility for each
criterion. There are five degrees of compatibility defined; good; satisfactory; neutral; harmful;
destructive. The scores on the separate criteria are the summarized, and the 4 options are
compared on their compatibility with these criteria. Next to the evaluation on the criteria, another
evaluation is conducted; an evaluation to the constitution of the policy theory. With this evaluation
the general compatibility with the policy theory can be measured. Afterwards will be concluded
which option has the highest degree of compatibility with the criteria and therefore is the most
probable.
69
Hoogerwerf & Herweijer, 1998: 249-264
33
Reconstructing Policy Theory
Policy Evaluation
Selection of documents
Selection parts of documents
Aims & Means
Cause & Effects
Complement with criteria
From literature
Normative Values
Formulation of criteria
Policy Evaluation
Goodness of fit= Probability
figure 3: flow chart method
3.4 Practical Step by Step
The second aim of this study is to explore which of the four options possible when taking into
account inter-exchangeability of the SSTR, is the most probable to become the Post Kyoto regime.
Therefore the theoretical framework to forecast future policy developments as put out in the
former paragraphs should be applied to climate change policy. As is concluded in paragraph 2.5
probability of a post Kyoto regime can be measured by compatibility with the UNFCCC. To
discover the underlying assumptions and criteria of the UNFCCC a policy theory of the UNFCCC
will be reconstructed. From this policy theory the criteria will be derived and the four options of
the SSTR will be evaluated according to these criteria. The outcome of this evaluation will be the
probability of each of the options to become the post Kyoto regime.
How this will be done is described here step by step.
Reconstruction of the Policy Theory
The Policy Theory on the post Kyoto regime from the UNFCCC will be based on text in the
UNFCCC convention’s document. The parts from this text that are selected should be broad and
not to detailed concerning technical constitutions, or parts concerning practical or juridical
agreements with regard to the framework convention itself.
The selected pages are 1-16 from the conventions text; these pages refer to the articles 1 to 6. The
choice is based on the content of these articles as they refer to, general statements, definitions
used, objective, principles, commitments and research and systematic observation. Articles 6 to 26
refer to the organization of the UNFCCC, financial and juridical rules and a more detailed
34
subscription of instruments to be used. This is information refers to the organization of the
framework convention itself or the information is too detailed compared to the level of detail in
which post Kyoto regimes are described at this point in the negotiations, which makes this
information redundant for this study.
Aims and means
The assumptions referring to the aims and means of the UNFCCC listed on page 1-16 of the
conventions text will be extracted by scanning the text for sentences concerning objective and
ways to reach this objective.
Cause and effect
The cause and effect relationships of the UNFCCC 1992 document are detected by scanning the
text for sentences or sub sections referring to the causes of human induced climate change and the
effects this will have.
Norms and values
The different normative assumptions that together form the ideological base of the UNFCCC are
derived from the conventions text by scanning it references to norms and values.
When the assumptions on which the UNFCCC conventions text is based are found, criteria that
state the important characteristics will be defined. These criteria will be derived from the policy
theory of the UNFCCC and complemented with criteria from literature on the current discussion
about post Kyoto regimes.
Afterwards the criteria will be structured in a division of main values or overarching principles so
to say. These main values state the principle to which the separate criteria contribute. The
constitution stating the most important overarching principles from the UNFCCC about climate
change regimes will also be formed.
Policy Evaluation
When this is done the policy evaluation starts; each of the four options of the SSTR will be
evaluated according to each criterion. For each criterion a score is given, which will be summed
up so the total of compatibility with the UNFCCC can be measured.
At last the evaluation will be finalized with a evaluation of each of the options to the compatibility
of the policy constitution.
35
Chapter 4 Results
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter the research results will be displayed. In paragraph 4.2 the reconstructed policy
theory of the UNFCCC concerning assumptions that could be applied to a post Kyoto regime is
put down. In the third paragraph criteria that state the main values of the UNFCCC and
additionally important values for a post Kyoto regime to be effective are defined. The actual
evaluation of the four options of the SSTR on the set of criteria is shown in paragraph 4.4.
4.2 Reconstruction of the Policy Theory of the UNFCCC on Post
Kyoto regimes
4.2.1 The aims and means
The main objective of the UNFCCC is stated on page 6 as follows:
Objective
The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related
legal instruments that the Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in accordance with
the relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate
system.
Such a level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt
naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable
economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.
Mean
In the following sub sections is referred to the means to reach the objective, or conditions to which
means should be restricted, which form a part of the final relations of the policy theory.
Emission control, reduction or prevention
In article 4, Commitments, are stated and these refer to means in article 4.1,b and c:
Programmes to mitigate climate change should take into account anthropogenic emissions by
sources, and removals by sinks.
The mitigation focused on the emission by sources is divided in three means to do so; control,
reduction or prevention of anthropogenic GHG emission into the atmosphere.
Concluded from this taking into account the objective of the UNFCCC can be that the two main
means to mitigate climate change are to reduce, control or prevent GHG emission and to remove
GHG from the atmosphere by sinks.
GHG’s that should be taken into account are the ones not controlled by the Montreal Protocol.
The reduction, control or prevention of anthropogenic emissions is more specified in article 4.1.d
where specially is referred to the enhancement and conservation of sinks.
Conservation of sinks
36
In sub-section 4.1.d the important role of sinks and reservoirs in a climate system are put forward,
implying that sinks should be considered in climate change policy, and the importance of sinks is
also underlined on page 2.
Global action
On page 2 is referred to the global scale on which the mitigating strategies and actions should be
taken. The atmosphere concerns the whole world, no one can be excluded from using the
atmosphere, which also holds true for effects of the emissions into the atmosphere. That is why
action should be taken globally.
Article 4.5.1 goes a step further in stating that parties should cooperate in an international open
economic system to establish sustainable economic growth, which in turn would lead to a higher
ability of parties to mitigate climate change.
Article 4.1.h, highlights also the international cooperation on the exchange of information, which
would lead to better understanding and mitigation of the problem.
Up to date science
On page 4 the importance of science in the process of understanding and effectiveness of
mitigating is stated.
Means are assumed to be most effective when based on up to date science, as can be read from
article 4.2.c. where is stated that calculations of emissions by sources and removals by sinks of
greenhouse gases should take into account the best available scientific knowledge.
In this article also the importance of the use of up to date science for the measurements on which
the policy is based is set out.
From this can be extracted that up to date science and the constant re-evaluation of policies and
strategies to mitigate climate change on the base of new scientific knowledge is assumed to be a
means for reaching he objective.
Developed should take the lead
The UNFCCC is clear in stating that the developed countries should take the lead.
From different parts of text, page 4, article 4.3, 4.5, 4.9 refer to one general value to which the
means should answer: Developing countries should take the lead and make the first step in
combating climate change. In doing so they should support developing countries financially,
support them in development and enhancement of their capabilities and share information needed
for mitigation with the developing countries.
Developing countries should be given full consideration in international climate strategies.
Strategies at global, national regional level
In a synthesis from sub sections on page 4 and article 4.1.b and the earlier stated condition of
means to be most effective when applied at a global scale, derived can be that strategies should be
implemented at an international, national and when possible, regional level. When implemented at
these levels means are assumed to be the most effective.
National policies should fit specific country context
From the sub sections on page 4 and article 3.4 can be read that national policy to combat climate
change should fit to the specific circumstances of each country.
The sub-section on page 4 adds a condition to the principle above on international, national and
regional level of policy implementation. Here clarifying that national policies should reflect the
37
specific circumstances of the country, in order to be environmentally, socially and economically
the most effective, and that standards applied to one country could be inappropriate for other
countries.
Article 3.4 states among other important focal points that national policies should be appropriate
for the specific country conditions, with the addition that climate policy should be integrated with
national development policy programs. Climate policy strategies once again are related to
sustainable economic development, proving this is an important value in the UNFCCC.
Cost effectiveness
The general value derived from article 3.3 is cost effectiveness; means should be cost effective to
ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost.
4.2.2 Cause & effect relations
The causal relation forming the base of the UNFCCC is stated in the following two sub sections
from page 2:
The Parties to this convention concerned that human activities have been substantially increasing
the atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases, that these increases enhance the natural
greenhouse effect, and that this will result on average in an additional warming of the Earth's
surface and atmosphere and may adversely affect natural ecosystems and humankind. Noting that
the largest share of historical and current global emissions of greenhouse gases has originated in
developed countries.
4.2.3 Normative assumptions
Global Concern
From subsections on page 2 and article 3.1 can be learned that the human induced change in the
global climate is seen as a global problem concerning everyone. This is linked strongly to the
value that the climate system should be protected, for the benefit of future and present generations.
Taking this together with the causal relation who forms the base of the UNFCCC the main reason
for the foundation of the UNFCCC is found: Human activities cause the earth’s climate to change;
this is seen as a global threat to humanity and future generations and therefore should be
combated.
Minimizing effects on the economy, public health and the environment.
In article 4.1.f can be read that when preventing dangerous anthropogenic interference with the
climate system methods to reach this should take into consideration economy, public health and
the quality of the environment. These three concepts are seen as of great value and therefore
should be protected. A normative value that defines the content of policy means is that effects on
economy, public health and the quality of the environment should be minimized. Minimizing the
effects on economy is linked to the conditions that means to mitigate climate change should be
cost effective.
Action based on relative responsibility/contribution
Sections on page 2 and 4 refer to the normative value of the UNFCCC that action taken to combat
climate change should be according to the relative contribution or responsibility to the cause of the
problem.
These statements concern the normative value referring to the fact that developed countries since
the industrial revolution are responsible for the main share of emission of GHG. The industrial
38
revolution contributed considerably to their level of development. This statement together with the
first statement refers to the normative assumption that the burden sharing should be according to
current and historical responsibility. Because developed countries contributed more to the increase
in GHG in the atmosphere, and by doing so developed themselves, gaining more resources, which
makes developed countries more capable of addressing climate change.
Action should be according to not only relative responsibility but also to capability and on the
base of equity. Which means developed countries should contribute more because of their higher
capability and responsibility, as is put down in article 3.1.
In article 3.2 special consideration is given to developing countries and for the countries more
vulnerable to the effects of climate change in particular.
Sovereignty
From two subparagraphs on page 2 can be read that sovereignty of states is a value that should be
taken into account in climate policy. From the value of sovereignty stem both rights and
responsibilities namely; the sovereign right to exploit own resources pursuant to own
environmental and developmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within
own jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. This should be taken care of in climate policy, national
and international.
Sustainable development
In article 3.4 and on page six is referred to sustainable development, in social, economical and
environmental sense, on the one hand as a means of combating climate change, on the other hand
as an intrinsic value. Important for a climate regime is consequently that climate change mitigating
strategies should contribute to sustainable development or at least should not be in conflict with it.
4.2.4 Constitution of the policy theory of the UNFCCC
When the whole of assumptions on which the UNFCCC is based is taken into account, an abstract
can be made, an abstract that states the so to say “constitution” of the document. This constitution
reflects the most important issues to which a climate regime in general has to answer to despite the
separate scores on the criteria. This constitution can be formulated as follows:
A climate regime according to the UNFCCC should be environmental effective in achieving the
objective of the UNFCCC; stabilizing GHG in the atmosphere at a level that prevents dangerous
human induced climate change. This should be done on the base of equity and with as little harm
to economic development as possible taking into account sustainable development.
4.3 Criteria
4.3.1 Criteria derived from the policy theory
In order to be compatible with the UNFCCC, the post Kyoto climate regime should be compatible
with the following criteria:

Control, reduction or prevention of human induced GHG emission

The removal of GHG from the atmosphere by sinks

Global action taken to mitigate climate change
39

Developed countries should take the lead in combating Climate change

Implementation level of climate change policies should be international, national and
when possible regional.

National policies should fit specific country circumstances.

Cost effectiveness: Means should be cost effective

Minimizing effect on economy, public health and the environment: The effect on
economy, public health and the environment of means should be minimal.

Responsibility: Relative contribution according to responsibility to climate change.

Capability: Relative contribution according to capability to mitigate climate change

Sovereignty of states

Sustainable development, social and economic.

Consider developing countries and/or countries more vulnerable to the impacts of climate
change
4.3.2 Division of criteria into main values
As can be read from literature on the evaluation of post Kyoto climate regimes, often a
standardized division in criteria is used. Although the criteria differ somewhat with the different
authors the division generally stays the same. The division of criteria into environmental,
economic, political and technical criteria offers a schematic overview of the main values, which
are of importance for a post Kyoto regime. These values provide the relative contribution of
separate criteria to these main values. This not only provides overview it is also a useful tool to
evaluate regimes, because regimes can be evaluated on their compatibility with the main values,
and the contribution of the single criteria to the main values.
Therefore the criteria derived from the Policy theory of the UNFCCC will be divided in the main
values: Environmental criteria, Economic criteria, Political criteria and Technical criteria. This is
the division in criteria as has been used by Hohne et al. (2003) this division is taken because it
divides criteria into the main values stated in the UNFCCC. The study by den Elzen et al. (2003)
complements the set with General policy criteria, these are criteria that are of importance to the
probability of a post Kyoto regime, but cannot be derived from the conventions text. These criteria
stipulate special criteria of importance for the efficiency of post Kyoto regimes, and therefore will
also be used in the division.
4.3.3 Final set of criteria
As stated in Chapter 3, the reconstruction of a Policy theory by one person and based on the final
policy document does not hold enough guarantees that it is complete or that it reflects the whole
set of assumptions which form the base of the policy. That is why the set of criteria derived from
the policy theory is compared and where necessary complemented with criteria from other
literature70.
In literature on potential post Kyoto regimes, various criteria have been used to qualitatively
evaluate the regimes. Some of the criteria are based on the objectives and statements of the
UNFCCC, some on political and policy scientific theories on international negotiation processes
and some are learned from practice during the international negotiations by the COP.
40
Distinction can be made between criteria that are UNFCCC based, and criteria that are other
based. Compatibility with the UNFCCC is considered not the only important factor regarding
probability of a post 2012 climate regime. This can be learned from the studies here discussed on
the evaluation of commitment differentiation, parts of the criteria used can be traced back to the
UNFCCC, other criteria are more specifically based on what is necessary for a post 2012 regime
to be efficient. A post Kyoto regime requires more specific features, because it has more specific
goals then the UNFCCC, which was just the first step on global action against climate change.
Therefore the criteria from the studies on commitment differentiation are used to compose a
complete set of criteria to evaluate the four options of the SSTR. This will be done by taking the
four sets of criteria, including the one derived from the policy theory together, considering overlap
in similar criteria with slightly different definitions and form a final set of criteria.
Environmental Criteria
Environmental criteria refer to the direct reaching of the objective; mitigating climate change.
Environmental effectiveness:
The effectiveness of a climate change regime depends on a number of factors, such as
a) reduction, control or prevention of emission of anthropogenic GHG of all sources
b) removal of GHG from the atmosphere by sinks
c) stringent global emission targets to safeguard the fulfillment of the ultimate objective of the
Convention71.
d) stimulate participation of significant emitters72
Inducing technological change: Technological change will probably make the largest contribution
to a drastic reduction in GHG emissions in the long term73.
Encouragement of early action: The encouragement of countries that do not yet have binding
commitments to keep emissions as low as possible74.
Promoting sustainable development: In any case, the regime should not hinder sustainable
development by providing the wrong incentives.
Non UNFCCC based environmental criteria
Incentives for developing countries to take action to control their emissions: With the growing
share of developing countries in global GHG emissions, the environmental effectiveness of any
post-Kyoto climate regime will, to a large extent, become depend on the action taken, in
particular, by the larger developing countries75.
Political Criteria
Generally relate to factors directly affecting the political acceptability of a climate change regime.
Equity: The normative values that stem from the UNFCCC that provide conditions which
influence the fairness of climate policy are put together referring to the concept equity. The equity
of a climate change regime depends on a number of factors, such as
70
Hohne et al., 2003, Elzen, den, et al., 2003 and Sherrard et al., 2004
Hohne et al., 2003: 66
72
Elzen, den et al., 2003: 86
73
Elzen, den et al., 2003: 86
74
Hohne et al., 2003: 66
75
Elzen, den et al., 2003: 87
71
41
a) Developed countries should take the lead
b) Contribution according to responsibility
c) Contribution according to capability
d) Sovereignty of states
e) no-harm to (right to) development76
Non UNFCCC based political criteria
Supportive to trust building: This trust can be enhanced by making the decision fairly and
transparently, by agreement on regime rules binding all Parties (avoiding arbitrariness in future
decision-making) and by respecting previously agreed stipulations in the UNFCCC77.
Room for negotiation: Finally, a regime proposal should, ideally, provide sufficient structure by
shaping a clear framework for negotiation on the one hand, while, on the other, be sufficiently
flexible so as to reach a compromise78.
Economic criteria
Economic criteria generally relate to the economic acceptability of a climate regime.
Cost effectiveness: measures to deal with climate change should be cost-effective so as to ensure
global benefits at the lowest possible cost.
National policies to mitigate climate change should fit specific country circumstances: National
differences resulting from factors such as geographical situation, (energy) resource endowment,
and economic structure and international specialization should be accounted for79.
Minimizing adverse economical effects: Commitments should be distributed so that the global
costs are minimized and that it gives countries sufficient flexibility to reach their commitments80.
Avoidance of disproportional or abnormal burdens for some (groups of) countries: Like energy
exporters, taking developing countries and countries more vulnerable to the effects of climate
change into consideration81.
Promoting sustainable economic development: Sustainable development as a means to strengthen
the ability to mitigate climate change, and as an intrinsic value.
Non UNFCCC based economic criterion
Certainty about cost: Certainty about the level of costs and related economic impacts is important
to avoid the risk of high cost, and to increase the willingness of countries to participate82.
General policy criteria
These are criteria that are less directly environmental, political, economic or technical/institutional
in nature, but important from a strategic policy development perspective.
76
Elzen, den et al., 2003: 87
Elzen, den et al., 2003: 87
78
Elzen, den et al., 2003: 87
79
Elzen, den et al., 2003: 87
80
Hohne et al., 2003: 66
81
Elzen, den et al., 2003: 87
82
Elzen, den et al., 2003: 87
77
42
International, National and if possible regional level of implementation: Climate change
mitigation asks for global action, in order to be effective international policy should be
implemented at national and if possible regional level.
Non UNFCCC related criteria
Regime stability or robustness: The design of the regime should be such that it is robust to
changing economic and political circumstances83.
Internal consistency or compatibility: When a climate regime is based on different types of
commitments these may be (partially) incompatible. Such inconsistencies may hamper the
effectiveness of a regime84.
Technical and institutional criteria
These criteria concern technical and institutional requirements of regime approaches related to
both the negotiation process and the implementation and monitoring of commitments. These
requirements may be technical, legal or organizational in nature. These criteria cannot be derived
from the framework convention text but are important for a good post Kyoto regime.
Compatibility with the structure of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol: For the continuity of the
process and from a legal point of view, a post Kyoto climate regime is more effective it is
consistent with the current structure of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto protocol, so it doesn’t require
major revisions85.
Moderate political and technical requirements of the negotiation process: The approach should be
simple and require a low number of separate decisions by international bodies, and all necessary
data and tools should be available and verifiable86.
Simplicity of the negotiation proces: Regime approaches that are complex in nature, either due to
their concept, need for complex calculations, information requirements or their large number of
policy variables, complicate international negotiations87.
Table 4 The final set of criteria
Set of Criteria
Environmental Criteria
Specific Criteria
Environmental effectiveness
Inducing Technological change
Encouragement of early action
Promoting Sustainable development
Incentives for developing countries to take action
Political Criteria
Equity
Supportive to trust building
Room for negotiation
Economic Criteria
Cost Effectiveness
C.C. mitigating policies should fit country circumstances
Minimizing adverse economical effects
Avoiding disproportional burdens for parties
Promoting sustainable economic development
Certainty about cost
General Policy criteria
International, National and regional level of implementation
83
Elzen, den et al., 2003: 87
Elzen, den et al., 2003: 87
85
Elzen, den et al., 2003: 87, Hohne et al., 2003: 66
86
Hohne et al., 2003: 66
87
Elzen, den et al., 2003: 87
84
43
Regime stability or robustness
Internal Consistency or compatibility
Technical and Institutional
criteria
Compatibility with the structure of the UNFCCC and the KP
Moderate political and technical requirements of the negotiation process
Simplicity of the negotiation process
4.4 The Qualitative Evaluation of the four options of the Separate
Sinks Target Regime
4.4.1 Introduction
The evaluation of the four options of the SSTR will be per option, per criterion. Because the SSTR
is focused on the role of sinks in a post 2012 regime, this will be an important focal point in the
evaluation. The criteria defined are not specially focused on sinks, therefore this evaluation will
require an interpretation of the general criteria to the role sinks have in each option.
Because sinks are a controversial topic in the negotiations, first an overview of the stated pro’s and
con’s of the inclusion of sinks in a climate regime will be given. The list of benefits and
disadvantages is a result of arguments put forward in discussions during international negotiations
for the Kyoto Protocol. From this information the final set of criteria can be interpreted for the role
of sinks.
In paragraph 4.4.3 the SSTR an the four Options will be summarized, the paragraph following that
will start the evaluation by listing the criteria that all four options comply with in the same manner
followed by paragraph 4.4.5 which evaluates all the options for the set of criteria that remain.
Paragraph 4.4.6 gives a schematic overview of the outcomes of the evaluation.
4.4.2 Sinks and the post Kyoto Regime
As can be read from paragraph 2.4.4, it is not clear-cut whether the inclusion of sinks in a climate
regime form either a threat or an opportunity.
Therefore the discussion on sinks as set out in paragraph 2.4.4 serves as a background to the
evaluation and should be borne in mind when reading the analysis of the four options of the SSTR.
From this discussion can be read that although the UNFCCC states clearly that the removal of
sinks should be taken into account in climate change policy, during negotiations under the KP
opinions on the inclusion of sinks differed widely. In this study, the inclusion of sinks will be
regarded in the light of the policy theory of the UNFCCC, and as such as positive to the
environmental effectiveness of a regime. From negotiations under the KP it is known that the
inclusion of sinks in meeting reduction targets in the KP was merely an outcome of a compromise
than that of total agreement by all parties. From the sinks discussion can be learned that the
environmental effectiveness is disputable in some aspects.
In all four options of the SSTR sinks are included; therefore this will not be of influence on the
outcome of the evaluation. Some arguments stated in the sinks discussion of paragraph 2.4.4 are
of importance for the comparison of the different options though, because they differ with the
different role of sinks in the options. These arguments will be used in the comparison of the
options.
4.4.3 Evaluation per option
Option A provides for the participating countries to exchange and or trade the credits they
establish from sector to sector and from country to country.
44
Option A scores well on the environmental criteria, since it is inducing technological change,
encourages early action, promotes sustainable development and offers incentives for developing
countries. The only low score is on the environmental effectiveness because with Option A the
argument in the sinks discussion that removals by sinks justify additional emission of GHG, while
the removal may well be temporarily is at stake, because credits can be inter-exchanged between
different sectors. This means that a credit from a removal in the LULUCF sector can be traded and
used as an extra emission in for example the transport sector. Had it not been possible to trade it
between sectors this would have meant that either the emission in the transport sector had not been
possible or that it had to be compensated by another emission reduction in the Annex A sector.
The option of trade of credits between countries does make the realization of set targets more cost
efficient and this could have the consequence of higher targets because they are cheaper to
achieve.
Option A also scores well on the political criteria, like all four options it scores well on equity.
Because Option A is actually the current structure of the KP it is supportive to trust building
concerning its compatibility to the KP and the UNFCCC and the agreements made under these.
The high flexibility of trading between sectors and countries leaves enough room for negotiation.
Option A is the best Option concerning the economic criteria; it is the most cost effective option
because it offers the cheapest way to generate credits, in all sectors and in its own country or
abroad, can be chosen and used to meet targets under the regime. This offers global benefit at the
lowest possible price.
Also this Option takes into account the specific country circumstances since it allows for credits to
be moved around freely between sectors and countries; this means countries can choose in which
way they want to meet their targets. Each country could choose the best fitting combination of
strategies.
Commitment differentiation can be applied to this option; consequently each country can set its
own targets
Because of the liberal character of this option, market forces are allowed to work with as little
restrictions as possible when compared to the other options under the SSTR. This to certain extent
limits adverse economical effects.
Contrary to options C and D, countries with small sinks potential are less disadvantaged under
option A, because option A offers the opportunity to benefit from sinks potential in other
countries. This avoids disproportional burdens for certain countries.
The promotion of sustainable development is not clear-cut concerning the LULUCF projects in
developing countries financed by developed countries, but the inducing of technological change
makes this score positive.
Like all options of the SSTR in General, the general policy criteria score well.
And as said before Option A actually has the form the KP has which makes it the most compatible
with the UNFCCC and the KP which means agreements on the base of CDM and JI established
under the KP can be continued under this option as it accounts for the exchange of credits between
countries.
Option B allows exchange of both credit types between countries, but not between sectors.
Option B scores the highest of all four options on the environmental effectiveness because the
environmental effectiveness is the highest. Because all emission from the Annex A and the
LULUCF sector are taken into account, but emissions in the Annex A sector can not be exchanged
45
for removals in the LULUCF sector that might well be temporarily. In this way one of the main
arguments against the use of sinks in a climate regime is taken care of.
For the other environmental criteria Option B scores the same as Option A because of the allowed
trade of credits between countries.
The score on the Political Criteria is also good except for the compatibility with the UNFCCC and
the KP which is lower as in Option A because trade cannot be between sectors, which influences
the trust building.
Option B’s score on the Economic criteria is good, the restriction on the trade between sectors
makes it less cost effective, and causes lower scores lower on the country circumstances
Option B is cost effective in the sense that credits can be traded between countries but not between
sectors. The most cost effective way to reach targets is restricted to the same sector. This does put
restrictions on cost effectivity also on the compatibility with specific country circumstances and
the minimization of adverse economic effects.
Option B is not completely compatible with the agreements made under the KP, as credits gained
under CDM and or JI by removals of sinks cannot be used to meet emission targets from Annex A.
They can be used to meet targets under the LULUCF sector, so projects started under the KP can
be continued. Under option B two different targets need to be established, this would mean a
change in the structure of the KP.
Option C allows credits to be exchanged between sectors, but prohibits the exchange of credits
between countries.
Option C scores generally low on all main values. It scores low on all environmental criteria,
because like in Option A emissions and removals from different sectors can be exchanged. This is
potentially not environmental effective.
But the possibility of trade of credits between countries does make the realization of set targets
more cost efficient and this could have the consequence of higher targets because they are cheaper
to achieve.
Because it is impossible in this Option to exchange credits between countries it does not stimulate
the targets to be higher because they are cheaper, it does not stimulate participation of significant
emitters and it does not induce technological change, encourage early action or provide
developing countries with incentives to keep their emissions as low as possible.
It also scores low on the political criteria, except on equity, but this is the same for all the options.
Because of its incompatibility with the flexible mechanisms of the KP, it is not supportive to trust
building, and since international trade of credits is impossible, it does not offer a lot of room for
negotiation. International trade of credits is also very important for the economic value that is why
this option scores low on all the economic criteria. The flexible mechanisms CDM, JI and
emission trading under the KP would not be allowed under option C, which makes it incompatible
with the KP, so it does score low on the technical and institutional criteria.
Option D credits either from Annex A or the LULUCF sector cannot be inter exchanged between
different sectors, nor between countries.
This Option has all the environmental, economic and political disadvantages from Option C, but
since change between sectors is not allowed it is more environmental effective, because loopholes
don’t occur.
Because also the trade between sectors is limited this option scores even lower then Option C on
cost effectiveness, due to this also the taking into account of specific national circumstances is
46
lower. Because sinks cannot be used nationally to reach targets set for the Annex A sector like
now is possible under the KP, it is incompatible with the KP and the UNFCCC.
47
4.4.4 Compatibility per criterion
table 5 Compatibility of criteria
Option A
Option B
Option C
Option D
Environmental effectiveness
-1
2
-1
0
Inducing technological change
1
1
-1
-1
Encouragement of early action
1
1
-1
-1
Promoting Sustainable development
1
1
-1
-1
Incentives for developing countries
1
1
-1
-1
Equity
1
1
1
1
Supportive to trust building
1
0
-1
-1
Room for negotiation
1
1
-1
-1
Cost effectiveness
2
1
-1
-2
Taking into account country circumstances
2
1
-1
-2
Minimizing adverse economic effects
2
1
-1
-1
Avoidance of disproportional or abnormal burdens
1
1
-1
-1
Promoting sustainable economic development
1
1
-1
-1
Certainty about costs
0
0
0
0
International, national and regional level of implementation
2
2
2
2
Regime robustness or stability
0
0
0
0
Internal consistency or compatibility
1
1
1
1
Environmental criteria
Political criteria
Economic criteria
General Policy criteria
Technical and institutional criteria
Compatibility with the UNFCCC and KP
Moderate political and technical requirements of the negotiation
process
1
-1
-1
-2
-1
-1
-1
-1
Simplicity of the negotiation process
-1
-1
-1
-1
Average compatibility score
Standard Deviation
0.8
0.65
-0.55
-0.65
0.95
0.88
0.89
1.04
2=good; 1= satisfactory; 0=neutral; -1=harmful; -2= destructive. –2 is marked
Figure 4: Goodness of fit of criteria
Compatibility
Option D
Option C
Option B
Option A
destructive
harmful
neutral
satisfactory
good
Compatibility
48
4.4.5 Relation between compatibility and probability
Figure 4 graphically displays the outcome of table 5. This is the average compatibility of the
options with the criteria derived from the policy theory of the UNFCCC. As explained in chapter 2
there’s an assumed coherence between the compatibility of a post Kyoto regime and the
probability of a regime. Therefore figure 5 gives the probability of the various options. The
options can score negatively on compatibility, but not on probability. The difference lies herein
that a negative score on compatibility means that the value of the criteria is harmed by the specific
option. As with probability, this cannot become negative it only becomes less probable. For
example the criterion environmental effectiveness, Option A and C score a minus 2 on
compatibility with this criterion, meaning they harm the environmental effectiveness of a post
Kyoto climate regime, both for the same reason, the possibility of a loophole in the production of
carbon credits. This does not harm the probability of the regime in the sense that it becomes
negatively probable, since this is impossible. It only becomes less probable, as the assumption is
that the regime is chosen which is the most sensible; the regime which reaches the objective in the
most effective way.
Figure 5: Probability
Probability
Option D
Option C
Option B
Option A
Very improbable
Very probable
Probability
4.4.6 Evaluation to the Constitution
In this paragraph the results are displayed of the evaluation of the four options on the constitution
of the UNFCCC: A climate regime according to the UNFCCC should be environmental effective
in achieving the objective of the UNFCCC; stabilizing GHG in the atmosphere at a level that
prevents dangerous human induced climate change. This should be done on the base of equity and
with as little harm to economic development as possible taking into account sustainable
development.
Option A is incompatible with the constitution of the UNFCCC because it is not environmentally
effective. The inter exchangeability between sectors creates the possibility of a loophole which
makes it not as effective as it could be in reaching the objective of the UNFCCC; stabilizing the
concentration of GHG in the atmosphere at a level that prevents dangerous human induced climate
change. Although Option A is just in terms of equity and takes into account economic
development, it is not compatible with the constitution of the UNFCCC.
Option B is compatible with the UNFCCC as it is environmentally effective, can be considered
just in terms of equity and does take into account sustainable (economic) development.
49
Option C is incompatible with the UNFCCC as it scores low on all the constitutional values.
Option D is the most incompatible with the UNFCCC from all the options of the SSTR, it scores
the lowest on all the constitutional values of the UNFCCC.
50
Chapter 5 Discussion
5.1 Sinks discussion
This study contributes to the discussion on the inclusion of sinks in a climate regime, by
evaluating potential options for a post Kyoto regime and the role sinks play herein.
The SSTR provides an alternative for the Kyoto Protocol structure and is a reaction on two main
arguments on the use of sinks in a climate regime. One of the main arguments against the use of
sinks as they are used in the Kyoto Protocol is that the use of sinks and the credits generated from
removals of GHG from the atmosphere by sinks is that sinks have a non permanent character,
whereas an emission from fossil fuel is permanent. But although sinks have a non-permanent
character they are responsible for removals and existing sinks do contain a considerable amount of
carbon. Therefore opponents of the inclusion of sinks claim they should be taken into account in a
climate regime in order to be effective. The SSTR as designed in Option B would provide a
solution to this, as it would take into account removals by sinks and wouldn’t allow permanent
emissions to be justified by non-permanent sink credits.
The subjective character of the evaluation is intrinsic to this type of research: From the criteria it is
difficult to state the order of importance of the values represented in the policy theory. Because
some criteria are more important then others.Which concept is the most important cannot easily be
determined, as it is subjective to the viewpoint of the actor. When trying to determine the relative
importance of the criteria one could argue that environmental criteria are the criteria that directly
contribute to the objective of the climate regime88 and therefore are of main importance. Then
again, political acceptability is important for the effectiveness and accordingly for the probability
of a regime as well89. As the UNFCCC clearly states, mitigating climate change requires global
action90. A regime has to be acceptable to countries in order to encourage as many states as
possible to join. Economic criteria also play an important role in political acceptability, measures
to mitigate climate change shouldn’t be perceived expensive, as therefore they will not work91.
This is due to the fact that a climate regime has to be agreed upon in international negotiations
between states. States have more interests then only mitigating climate change. States have to base
their choice for a climate regime on a cost- benefit analysis. Hohne in his article on commitment
differentiation classifies identifies four main values; Environmental criteria, Political Criteria,
Economic Criteria and Technical criteria as 3;3;2;1 as a possible weighting of the importance of
the sets of criteria, for each set of criteria is determined by two criteria92. This shows a rating
where environmental and political criteria are rated equally important for the effectiveness of a
post Kyoto regime. This problem is intercepted in this study by the creation of a policy
“constitution”, in which the constitution of the policy is put down, in any case a future policy
should be compatible with this. As environmental effectiveness in the multi criteria analysis is
equally ranked to for example the criterion certainty about costs, in the constitution
environmentally effectiveness is stated again, to make sure this is include in the most probable
option.
A global climate regime is always the result of a compromise, because of its global character and
the various interests of the different parties involved. This doesn’t always result in the most
environmentally effective regime, but merely in the most politically acceptable regime. On
88
Trines, 2004: 20
Trines, 2004: 20
90
UNFCCC, 1997
91
Hasselknippe, Dorland, & Gupta, 2001: 6
92
Hohne et al., 2003: 7
89
51
political acceptability more factors next to environmental effectiveness are of influence. This can
be learned from practice with the KP. In order to persuade Japan and Canada to ratify they are
allowed a higher percentage of their targets to be reached through removals by sinks93. Not
because this is more environmentally effective but because it is more environmentally effective
compared to a situation where these countries wouldn’t join. For Canada and Japan, the larger
sinks they were allowed, means a considerable reduction of costs to mitigate climate change, and
also a considerable decrease in their need to reduce emissions94. This might not be the ideal
situation to combat climate change but it is political reality and therefore should be taken into
account. This is also hard to take into account in a scientifical study, becauseno-one can look into
the future.
A remark on Option B might be that it could turn out to be unacceptable for countries with a high
percentage of deforestation through illegal logging that is beyond the control of the state. For the
state would be charged for the deforestation beyond their control.
The problem arises with Option B on the trade of sinks credits among countries, for who would
be the buyers? Question would be is there a market for these credits? Countries with low sinks
potential on their own land could just not take on a LULUCF target. Effectivity of a separate
LULUCF target is to certain extent dependent on the willingness of countries with high emissions
from deforestation to compensate these by buying LULUCF credits in countries with afforestation
or reforestation95.
The use of biological sinks is seen by many of the interviewed experts to be beneficial if it is
integrated with forest conservation, reforestation and biodiversity measures.
5.2 Discussion of the results in the light of the Objective and the
theoretical framework
A point of discussion concerning the theoretical framework of this research is the assumption that
a regime is probable when it is compatible with the UNFCCC. One could argue that there are
other forces of influence on the probability of a regime rather then compatibility with the
UNFCCC. The effectivity of a post Kyoto regime is maybe better guaranteed when based on an
evaluation of the weaknesses of the KP. And when effectivity is higher, it becomes more probable.
Compatibility with the UNFCCC is probably not the sole predictor for the future; other forces are
of influence too. In this research through criteria from other literature on the topic this is tried to
be completed.
5.3 Discussion on Method
Influence of the method on the results; a qualitative analysis like this always holds a certain risk of
subjectivity as the compatibility with the criteria cannot be measured but only be reasoned.
The writing of the Policy theory by one person, based on one final document does not hold enough
guarantees that the policy theory is complete. Therefore in this research the criteria derived from
the policy theory of the UNFCCC are complemented with criteria from other scientifical
evaluations on post Kyoto regimes. When the policy theory here reconstructed would be cross
checked in other research the Policy theory could differ.
93
Pohjohla, 2003: 446
Pohjohla, 2003: 446
95
Trines, 2004
94
52
The difficulty with pointing out the most probable option in this research is caused by the final set
of criteria being somewhat dominated by social economic criteria. The amount of criteria is not an
exact reproduction of their relative importance.
The focus of this regime and this study is to great extent on sinks. Sinks are not the most important
concept of a climate regime, nor are they the most important solution.
The used theoretical framework and method put into practice on the case of the probability of the
four options of the SSTR, provides useful experience for the practical value of the frame. Time
will tell of course whether the outcome was a realistic one. As for this case, the policy theory of
the UNFCCC probably is not the sole predictor for the future. As for the negotiations on the Kyoto
Protocol and the UNFCCC, there was less knowledge available on climate change then there will
be for the negotiations on the post Kyoto regime. This means that new arguments, which cannot
be derived from old policy documents, will be taken into account. It seems obvious that a post
2012 regime at least shouldn’t be incompatible with the UNFCCC, as in here a lot of normative
values, which are more resistant to time are put down. Therefore the UNFCCC provides a good
base for forecasting on the broad features of a regime. Since the proposals for post 2012 regimes
are only described in very broad terms because they are still in a design faze, this suits the research
strategy.
53
Chapter 6 Conclusion
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter the final conclusions of this study will be set out. As set out in Chapter one, the aim
of this study is to develop an appropriate research approach to cope with existing information on
political processes i.e. on post Kyoto regimes and the role of sinks to explore what will be a
probable outcome of the international negotiations on the topic.
By answering the sub questions: What determines the probability of a future policy and how to
measure this in practice, a method to forecast the outcome of political processes and their
probability can be attained. When applied to the second research question: Which of the four
options possible, of the Separate Sinks Target Regime is the most probable to become the post
Kyoto climate regime? This method could contribute to the evaluation and designing of an
effective and political acceptable post Kyoto regime. Because the SSTR has a great focus on sinks
and their role in a post Kyoto regime, this study provides more insight in the contribution of sinks
and the different roles possible for sinks, on the score of a regime on the various criteria and the
probability in general. This in turn would assist to the global quest to combat climate change, also
providing a preview of what to expect for the people who in time will have to deal with the
consequences of made policy, so timely anticipation is possible in this example: the Natural
Resource Management sector.
This will be done by answering the Research Question and the sub questions, in paragraph 6.2 and
6.3, followed by hints for further research in paragraph 6.4, concluding with the consequences of
the results of this research for the practice of the policy field in paragraph 6.5
6.2 Conclusion on the first research question
The question: Which theory provides a theoretical background to make forecasts on the outcome
of political processes possible? Is answered in chapter one to three, where theory and a method are
provided. The question is answered by the means of answering the two sub questions; what
determines probability and how to measure this in practice?
The first sub question is answered by the theoretical framework, based on the assumption that
future policy is based on current knowledge and opinions on the policy topic and the solution to
the problem. When during negotiations decisions have to be made on future policy, people tend to
choose the option that is compatible with the current knowledge and their opinion on it.
This provides the answer to the first question; what determines probability of a future policy;
namely the compatibility with current knowledge and opinion on the policy topic.
This can be determined in practice by conducting a special kind of ex-ante policy evaluation; the
reconstruction of the policy theory. A policy theory extracts the assumptions that form the base of
the policy. In the Policy Theory the assumptions on final, causal and normative relations are
stated. These relations reflect the current knowledge on the topic, the opinions on the cause and
effect and the solution to it. Consequently can be concluded that probability of future policy
outcomes can in practice be determined by the compatibility with the policy theory of the current
policy on the topic. This is measured by compatibility with the criteria derived from the policy
theory and compatibility with the constitution of the policy. These two concepts are derived from
the policy theory and state the most important values of the policy theory.
54
6.3 Conclusion on the second research question
Which of the four Options of the SSTR possible when taking fungibility into account is the most
probable to become the post Kyoto climate regime?
This question can be regarded as a test case for the theoretical framework. Here the theory is put
into practice; the probability of a post Kyoto regime is measured.
Probability of a post Kyoto climate regime is determined by its compatibility with the UNFCCC.
Compatibility with the UNFCCC is explored by reconstructing the Policy Theory of the
Conventions text document according to Hoogerwerf (1998). In the Policy Theory the
assumptions on final, causal and normative relations on post Kyoto climate policy according to the
UNFCCC are stated. From this Policy Theory, the constitution of the UNFCCC as well as criteria
that state the main important features a climate regime has to have, are derived. The set of criteria
that reflect the values of the UNFCCC are subsequently complemented by criteria from literature
on post Kyoto climate regimes. These complementary criteria state important characteristics that
are not stated in the UNFCCC’s convention text, but that are of great influence on the effectivity
and political acceptability of a post Kyoto Regime. The result is a set of criteria to which climate
regimes can be evaluated on their probability as a post Kyoto regime. The criteria are divided in
five main values that state the important features of a post Kyoto regime; Environmental criteria,
Political Criteria, Economic criteria, General policy criteria and Technical and Institutional
criteria. See table 6.
When applying this method table 5 can be constructed, a table that shows the compatibility of the
options with the separate criteria. The average compatibility score for the different options on the
criteria and the Standard deviation is calculated.
Table 6. Average and SD score
Option A Option B Option C Option D
Average compatibility score
0.8
0.65
-0.55
-0.65
Standard Deviation
0.95
0.88
0.89
1.04
Probability
0.9
0.825
0.225
0.175
The average gives the score of the separate options on their compatibility with the criteria, the
standard deviation displays the dispersion around the average. From the Average can be learned
that Option A is the most compatible with the criteria, followed by Option B. From the standard
deviation however can be learned that although the average score of Option A is the highest, its
deviation around the average is higher compared to Option B. Meaning that Option A scores
higher, but also lower then Option B on various criteria, which is not favourable in a climate
policy regime.
Option C and D score considerably low on average, concluded can be that these Options don’t
offer a lot of advantages and therefore are not probable to become a post Kyoto climate regime.
Option A resembles the structure of the Kyoto Protocol, as can be argued that when two separate
targets are set, one for Annex A and one for the LULUCF sector and they can be inter-exchanged
between countries as well as between sectors, practically there are no two separate sectors. Option
B really represents a Separate Sinks Target Regime.
Compatibility of criteria isn’t exactly coherent with the probability of the regime, as probability
cannot be negative contrary to the compatibility. Compatibility can be harmed, as for the
probability of a regime just becomes less. Therefore to calculate the probability the sum of one
and the value of the compatibility divided by two, in this way creating the positive number of
55
probability. Which gives also the conclusion that on probability measured by criteria Option A
scores the best followed by Option B.
From the evaluation on criteria is learned that Cost effectiveness, taking into account country
circumstances and minimizing adverse economic effects are fully satisfied in Option A, whereas
in Option B these criteria are generally satisfied. This is the price Option B has to pay for the
Environmental effectiveness that is fully satisfied by this regime and poorly satisfied in Option A.
The last criterion on which that score of the two options differ is of course on compatibility with
the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, whereas Option A scores generally satisfied and B poorly
satisfied.
The other policy evaluation is the evaluation on the compatibility with the constitution of the
UNFCCC: A climate regime according to the UNFCCC should be environmental effective in
achieving the objective of the UNFCCC; stabilizing GHG in the atmosphere at a level that
prevents dangerous human induced climate change. This should be done on the base of equity and
with as little harm to economic development as possible taking into account sustainable
development.
The Option that is compatible with this constitution is Option B. Option A is not compatible
because it is not environmentally effective, and the Options C and D are incompatible on all the
values stated in the constitution.
What then is the answer to the research question, which Option is the most probable post Kyoto
regime? Summarizing the conclusion from this research is that Option C and D are improbable to
become a post Kyoto regime. Option A scores the best on average compatibility with the criteria
but is incompatible with the constitution of the UNFCCC. Therefore Option B which scores good
on average, has a small standard deviation to the average, and is compatible with the constitution
is the most probable option of the SSTR to become the post Kyoto Regime should the SSTR be
chosen as the post Kyoto Regime.
Concluded from this research can be that international trade of credits, between sectors or not, is
of decisive value for a post Kyoto climate regime and should be included in order to be effective.
6.4 Consequences for management & Policy
Two influential lessons learned from this research are that international credit trade make a post
Kyoto climate regime more probable, which is why it is likely to be a part of the post Kyoto
regime. Secondly, when two separate targets are created, one for LULUCF and the other for nonLULUCF, trade between these sectors is negative for the environmental effectiveness and positive
for the cost effectiveness. Since the objective of a climate regime in the first place should be to
reach the objective of mitigating climate change, environmental effectiveness can be considered a
more important value compared with cost effectiveness.
For natural resource management it means that sequestration credits could offer a new function for
forests, but it is on a competitive base. If credits are produced somewhere else more cheap, they
are more attractive to be used for this purpose. Which means for example that tropical forests,
which have a higher growth rate, are more attractive since they offer more sequestrated carbon in
the same time on the same area compared to forests in more temperate zones.
56
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59
Annexes
Annex I Defenitions used in the UNFCCC
For the purposes of this Convention:
1. "Adverse effects of climate change" means changes in the physical environment or biota
resulting from climate
change which have significant deleterious effects on the
composition, resilience or productivity of natural and
managed ecosystems or on the operation of socio-economic
systems or on human health and welfare.
2. "Climate change" means a change of climate which is
attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that
alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which
is in addition to natural climate variability observed
over comparable time periods.
3. "Climate system" means the totality of the atmosphere,
hydrosphere, biosphere and geosphere and their
interactions.
4. "Emissions" means the release of greenhouse gases and/or their precursors into the atmosphere
over a specified area and period of time.
5. "Greenhouse gases" means those gaseous constituents of
the atmosphere, both natural and anthropogenic, that
absorb and re-emit infrared radiation.
6. "Regional economic integration organization" means an
organization constituted by sovereign States of a given
region which has competence in respect of matters
governed by this Convention or its protocols and has been
duly authorized, in accordance with its internal
procedures, to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to
the instruments concerned.
7. "Reservoir" means a component or components of the
climate system where a greenhouse gas or a precursor of a
greenhouse gas is stored.
8. "Sink" means any process, activity or mechanism which
60
removes a greenhouse gas, an aerosol or a precursor of a
greenhouse gas from the atmosphere.
9. "Source" means any process or activity which releases a greenhouse gas, an aerosol or a
precursor of a greenhouse gas into the atmosphere.
61
Annex II Evaluation of the four options of the SSTR
Criteria indifferent to Fungibilty
First the criteria that do not differ per option of the SSTR will be discussed here because they are
of influence on the favourability or probability of the SSTR as a whole, but not to the different
options.
Environmental Criteria
Environmental effectiveness c) stringent global emission targets to safeguard the fulfillment of the
ultimate objective of the Convention.
The four options do not differ in the stringency of the targets set, because there are no targets set
yet, the ability of the SSTR to reach stringent targets is not clear yet, how this eventually works
out depends on the completion and final version of the regime.
Promoting sustainable development
From an environmental point of view the inclusion of sinks in a climate regime poses positive
effect on sustainable development. This is the same for all four options, while all four options take
sinks into account. This contributes to halting deforestation and degradation, it contributes to
conservation and prevention of desertification96
Political Criteria
Equity a) Developed countries should take the lead
In all four options no clear rules are set out in this stage to secure developed countries from taking
the first step, this will depend on the final version of the regime and therefore will not make a
difference in the comparison of the four options.
b) Contribution according to responsibility
The SSTR in this stage of development does not offer rules to encourage contribution of a party to
mitigation according to the responsibility to climate change. The SSTR in its current form does
not discourage the contribution according to responsibility either. Specific rules to establish this
can be implemented into this framework in a later faze. This means that this criterion does not
affect the compatibility of the options in the evaluation now.
c) Contribution according to capability
The same arguments for the former criterion hold true for this criterion, it’s to early in the
development of the SSTR to give remarks on this criterion yet.
Equity d) Sovereignty of states
Sovereignty of states is not threatened under the SSTR. Countries can decide independently what
measures to take and what targets to set. Also for the credit trading from country to country, a host
country to a LULUCF project is free to choose to whether or not take this on.
Economic criteria
Certainty about costs
Also for certainty about costs can be said that the SSTR is not elaborated enough to be evaluated
on this criterion.
96
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62
General policy criteria
International, National and if possible regional level of implementation
The SSTR can be implemented on these three level independent of fungibility between countries
or sectors.
Regime stability or robustness
The separate targets nor the fungibility influences the robustness of the regime as far as can be
seen in this stage of elaboration of the regime.
Technical and institutional criteria
Simplicity of the negotiation process
Because of the two separate targets set, the negotiation process might be influenced and become
more complex, because of the insecurities, calculations and the difficulties with what to include
and what not. But since sinks are included in all four options this does not influence the outcome
of the evaluation.
Moderate political and technical requirements of the negotiation process:
The inclusion of sinks in all options requires exact quantification of carbon stocks and
fluctuations; this is labor intensive and costly. Also the accuracy level of these techniques need
still to be increased, this will require more scientific research.
The inclusion of sinks will also need more political requirements as it has proven complex
material in negotiations to reach agreement on the base year and coverage etc.
Internal consistency or compatibility
In this development stage of the SSTR, the regime has no inconsistency with its own structure.
Evaluation per option
Each Option will be evaluated on the satisfaction per criterion.
Option A provides for the participating countries to exchange and or trade the credits they
establish from sector to sector and from country to country.
Environmental Criteria
Environmental effectiveness:
a) Reduction, control or prevention of emission of anthropogenic GHG of all sources
With option A the argument in the sinks discussion that removals by sinks justify additional
emission of GHG, while the removal may well be temporarily, is at stake, because credits can be
inter-exchanged between different sectors. This means that a credit from a removal in the
LULUCF sector can be traded and used as an extra emission in for example the transport sector.
Had it not been possible to trade it between sectors this would have meant that either the emission
in the transport sector had not been possible or that it had to be compensated by another emission
reduction in the Annex A sector. The option of trade of credits between countries, does make the
realization of set targets more cost efficient and this could have the consequence of higher targets
because they are cheaper to achieve.
b) Removal of GHG from the atmosphere by sinks
LULUCF is accounted for in all four options of the SSTR, since this sector is globally responsible
for significant quantity of emissions and removals, accordingly it seems to contribute to the
63
environmental effectiveness to include removals from sinks in a CC regime. Also it is stated in the
UNFCCC that removals by sinks should be taken into account.
The ability to trade credits between sectors would have an inherent incentive for a greater
coverage in comparison to options where this trade between sectors is not allowed. When trade
between countries is allowed targets that are accepted are likely to be higher as they are easier and
less costly to achieve97.
d) Stimulate participation of significant emitters
As for the EU, during the negotiations for the KP the EU preferred not to include sinks in a
climate regime because of the uncertainty of measurements and all the difficulties stemming from
that. The Umbrella group sought additional flexibility from sinks in relation to their reduction
commitments98 future treatment of LULUCF). This means that option A would meet the request to
the wish of the umbrella group because the credits gained from the LULUCF sector can be used
flexible to meet reduction commitments.
Credits gained from probable temporarily sinks can be used in this option to meet emission
reduction targets; this will meet resilience with parties, as it seems not environmental effective.
Inducing technological change
Because this option has the possibility to exchange credits between countries, technological
change in developing countries can be induced by developed countries for the benefit of meeting
their own emission targets. In this way developed countries could invest in GHG efficient
technologies that can be established more easily and cheaper in developing countries compared to
their own national situation. This could serve as an incentive to inducing technological change.
Encouragement of early action
The possibility to trade credits between countries might function as an incentive for countries that
do not yet have binding targets under a climate regime to keep their emissions as low as possible
so they can sell the credits gained in international projects.
Incentives for developing countries to take action to control their emissions
Land use change emissions are larger in relation to other emissions in many developing countries
and a possible basis for engagement by some developing countries would be to include accounting
of deforestation emissions on a net-net basis, which would give credit for reductions in emissions
relative to the base year99(LULUCF and future Action on Climate Change).
This means that it holds a potential incentive for some developing countries to join. It might also
work the other way around for countries that have a high emission rate from deforestation which
cannot be controlled by the state as it is due to illegal logging. For these countries it posses a
potential problem as their emissions from deforestations are being counted as debits.
Also the fear of reducing development options in land use in developing countries due to the large
time scale might prevent developing countries from joining a climate change regime.
Political Criteria
Equity
e) No-harm to (right to) development
97
Trines, E.P 2004
Trines, E.P. 2004
99
Trines, E.P. 2004
98
64
For this criterion the part of the discussion about whether credits derived from the LULUCF sector
in developing countries should be traded to developed countries applies. Opinions differ on this
subject, some say it offers opportunities to development, some claim it freezes land-use and
therefore development opportunities, the outcome probably varies per situation.
No real judgment on this criterion for option A can be given.
Supportive to trust building
This is influenced by the transparency and fairness of the decisions and by agreement on rules
binding all parties and by respecting agreed stipulations under the UNFCCC. The transparency is
not influenced by the different fungibility under the four options. Option A does seem fair in the
sense that national circumstances can be taken into account, and trade can be between countries
most liberal.
Option A is compatible with the agreements that are made in the flexible mechanisms under the
KP.
Room for negotiation
Room for negotiation comes from a balance between a clear set of rules to form a framework for
negotiation on the one hand and flexibility and space to negotiate on the other hand. The SSTR is
not elaborated to that extent that can be spoken of a clear framework, but option A does provide
the most flexibility of the four options for negotiations and the possibility to reach compromises.
Economic criteria
Cost effectiveness
Option A is the most cost effective option under the SSTR, because the cheapest way to generate
credits, in all sectors and in its own country or abroad, can be chosen and used to meet targets
under the regime.
National policies to mitigate climate change should fit specific country circumstances
Under this option, credits can be moved around freely between sectors and countries; this means
countries can choose in which way they want to meet their targets. Each country could choose the
best fitting combination of strategies.
Commitment differentiation can be applied to this option; consequently each country can set its
own targets.
Minimizing adverse economical effects
Because of the liberal character of this option, market forces are allowed to work with as little
restrictions as possible when compared to the other options under the SSTR. This to certain extent
limits adverse economical effects.
Avoidance of disproportional or abnormal burdens for some (groups of) countries
Contrary to options C and D, countries with small sinks potential are less disadvantaged under
option A, because option A offers the opportunity to benefit from sinks potential in other
countries.
Promoting sustainable economic development
The ability to trade credits gained in the LULUCF sector between different countries and the
contribution of this to sustainable development is as set out in the sinks discussion twofold. It is
claimed to contribute to the sustainable development in developing countries by stimulating
involvement in community projects and as a source of income. On the other hand because of the
65
time scale of LULUCF projects land use would be frozen for the local population not taking into
account alternative land use options. Which argument holds true depends on country specific
circumstances. To countries with large areas under agriculture and forestry which do not depend
heavily on these sectors for their development, the inclusion of LULUCF may open opportunities
to enter new markets100.
Under Option A technological change is stimulated, which in turn would stimulate sustainable
economic development, as it would make sectors more energy efficient.
Technical and institutional criteria
Compatibility with the structure of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol
Agreements on the base of CDM and JI established under the KP can be continued under this
option as it accounts for the exchange of credits between countries. This makes Option A
compatible with the structure of the UNFCCC and the KP.
Option B allows exchange of both credit types between countries, but not between sectors.
Environmental Criteria
Environmental effectiveness:
a) Reduction, control or prevention of emission of anthropogenic GHG of all sources
With option B the environmental effectiveness of the regime could potentially be high, because all
emission from the Annex A and the LULUCF sector are taken into account, but emissions in the
Annex A sector can not be exchanged for removals in the LULUCF sector that might well be
temporarily. In this way one of the main arguments against the use of sinks in a climate regime is
taken care of.
b) Removal of GHG from the atmosphere by sinks
See Option A
d) Stimulate participation of significant emitters
This option does offer the option of using sinks to reach targets set, although it does not offer the
flexibility to move targets around freely between sectors. And this option does deal with the
argument of a potential loop hole as might occur in Option A, which probably makes the political
acceptability higher and accordingly stimulates participation by large emitters. This is probably an
option that does give in to the umbrella group because it is possible to use sinks to reach targets.
Inducing technological change
See Option A
Encouragement of early action
The possibility to trade credits between countries might function as a incentive for countries that
do not yet have binding targets under a climate regime to keep their emissions as low as possible
so they can sell the credits gained in international projects.
Incentives for developing countries to take action to control their emissions
The same arguments as for Option A
Political Criteria
Equity
100
Trines, E.P. 2004
66
e)no-harm to( right) to development
See Option A.
Supportive to trust building
The transparency is not influenced by the different fungibility under the four options. Option B
does take into account national circumstances for fungibility between countries. Option B is not
completely compatible with the agreements that are made in the flexible mechanisms under the
KP, because of the restriction of fungibility between sectors.
Room for negotiation
Separating LULUCF from the other sectors offers opportunities to negotiate a deal that is
politically acceptable101. Option B has flexibility of negotiation because credits can be traded
between countries, although not between sectors.
Economic criteria
Cost effectiveness
Option B is cost effective in the sense that credits can be traded between countries but not between
sectors. The most cost effective way to reach targets is restricted to the same sector. This does put
restrictions on cost effectivity.
National policies to mitigate climate change should fit specific country circumstances
The same arguments as for Option A apply except that for this Option the trade between sectors is
not allowed which limits the ability of countries to fit measures to their specific national
circumstances.
Minimizing adverse economical effects
Option B is cost effective because of the fungibility between countries, but less cost effective as
option A because credits cannot be traded between sectors.
Avoidance of disproportional or abnormal burdens for some (groups of) countries,
See Option A.
Promoting sustainable economic development
See Option A.
Technical and institutional criteria
Compatibility with the structure of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol
Option B is not completely compatible with the agreements made under the KP, as credits gained
under CDM and or JI by removals of sinks cannot be used to meet emission targets from Annex A.
They can be used to meet targets under the LULUCF sector, so projects started under the KP can
be continued. Under option B two different targets need to be established, this would mean a
change in the structure of the KP.
Option C allows credits to be exchanged between sectors, but prohibits the exchange of credits
between countries.
Environmental Criteria
Environmental effectiveness:
101
Trines, E.P. 2004
67
a) Reduction, control or prevention of emission of anthropogenic GHG of all sources:
With Option C the same argument as for Option A holds true, because emissions and removals
from different sectors can be exchanged. This is potentially not environmental effective.
The option of trade of credits between countries does make the realization of set targets more cost
efficient and this could have the consequence of higher targets because they are cheaper to
achieve.
b) Removal of GHG from the atmosphere by sinks
Like option A the opportunity to trade credits between sectors could be an incentive for greater
coverage of sinks in comparison to options where trade between sectors is impossible. This option
does not have the advantage of trade between countries like Option A, which will make the
described influence smaller.
d) Stimulate participation of significant emitters
This option seems not compatible with the positions of the major countries who are the larger
emitters, because on the one hand it has the possibility to exchange between sectors which has the
problem of permanent emissions traded against probable temporarily removals by sinks. Plus it
does not offer the cost effectiveness of the trade between countries which could make it more
economic efficient and would take country circumstances into account.
Inducing technological change
Under Option C it would not be allowed to exchange credits between countries, accordingly
technological change in developing countries by developed countries is not induced, as it is under
the former two options.
Encouragement of early action
Option C does not provide extra incentives to countries that do not have binding commitments to
keep their emissions as low as possible by trading credits internationally.
Incentives for developing countries to take action to control their emissions
Sinks are taken into account, but cannot be traded internationally; this doesn’t offer the incentives
for developing countries as Option A and B do.
Political Criteria
Equity
e) no-harm to( right) to development
As this option does not offer the opportunity to trade credits between countries, the discussion
applied to Option A is not applicable to this situation. Option B therefore does not harm the right
to development in that way.
Supportive to trust building
Transparency is not influenced like in all the options, the fact that this option does not take into
account the country specific potential to reduce emissions or remove GHG from the atmosphere
because trade can not be international influences the fairness of this regime in a negative way,
which is not supportive to trust building.
The agreements made under the KP cannot be continued this also is not supportive to trust
building either.
Room for negotiation
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Option C does offer clear rules for a framework, it does provide limited flexibility as credits can
be traded between sectors but not between countries.
Economic criteria
Cost effectiveness
This option offers the opportunity to have the most cost effective measures at a national level,
because trade can be between sectors, but not internationally. The UNFCCC states clearly that
measures should be cost effective as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost. Option C
does not offer this.
National policies to mitigate climate change should fit specific country circumstances
Option C does not offer the benefit of trading between countries that countries can choose
international means that would fit them best. It does offer the opportunity to reach targets
according to national capability.
Minimizing adverse economical effects
Because of the limited cost effectiveness, adverse economic effects are not minimized to their full
extent.
Avoidance of disproportional or abnormal burdens for some (groups of) countries
Countries with limited potential to reduce emissions or sinks potential would be at a disadvantage
compared to countries with more potential to do so.
Promoting sustainable economic development
This option does not have the advantages and disadvantages option A and B have on this criterion,
but sustainable development is not promoted in another way by this Option C either.
Technical and institutional criteria
Compatibility with the structure of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol:
The flexible mechanisms CDM, JI and emission trading under the KP would not be allowed under
option C.
Option D credits either from Annex A or the LULUCF sector cannot be inter exchanged between
different sectors, nor between countries.
Environmental Criteria
Environmental effectiveness:
a) Reduction, control or prevention of emission of anthropogenic GHG of all sources
Within this option emissions in the Annex A sector cannot be traded for (temporary) removals in
the LULUCF sector, this is environmental effective
But international trade of credits is not allowed in this option, which means it doesn’t have the
benefit Option A and B have that due to higher cost effectiveness targets are bound to be higher.
b) Removal of GHG from the atmosphere by sinks
Sinks are taken into account under option D, but because trade between countries is not allowed
this option does not offer the benefit that targets in the LULUCF sector are likely to be higher
because of the cost effectiveness.
d) Stimulate participation of significant emitters
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The umbrella group wanted flexibility to reach set targets; option D does not offer flexibility in
trade between countries nor between sectors.
This option des not offer the disadvantage of option A and C on the environmental effectiveness,
but it doesn’t offer the advantages of the other options either, therefore this option is not likely to
stimulate the participation of major parties.
Inducing technological change
Because under this option international trade of credits is not allowed, option D does not offer the
benefits of Option A and B.
Encouragement of early action
See Option C
Incentives for developing countries to take action to control their emissions
See Option C
Political Criteria
Equity
e) No-harm to (right) to development
See Option C
Supportive to trust building
See Option C
Room for negotiation
See Option B
Economic criteria
Cost effectiveness
Because of the little flexibility allowed in meeting targets, this is the least cost effective option of
the four.
National policies to mitigate climate change should fit specific country circumstances
Countries can set the two targets accordingly their specific national circumstances like in all the
options, but it does not hold the advantages of international and intersectoral trade offers.
Minimizing adverse economical effects:
Market forces are not working unrestricted on this Option between sectors nor between countries,
which potentially could cause adverse economic effects to increase.
Avoidance of disproportional or abnormal burdens for some (groups of) countries,
See Option C
Promoting sustainable economic development
See Option C
Technical and institutional criteria
Compatibility with the structure of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol:
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International emission trading is not allowed in Option D, also trade between the two sectors
nationally isn’t allowed either. This makes this the most incompatible Option of the four.
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