Download Leading Edge 2020: international development in Asia

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The Leading edge:
inTernaTionaL
deveLopmenT in
asia, 2020
This research briefing reviews the findings of The Leading
Edge: International Development in Asia, 2020,1 a ‘horizons’
scanning report investigating how International NGOs
(INGOs) are adapting to a rapidly changing region where the
traditional ‘rules of engagement’ between global North and
South have perhaps altered quicker than anywhere else.
Interviews were conducted with eighteen experts on
development in Asia, from civil society, government, the
private sector and intergovernmental bodies. It provides a
qualitative investigation of how four areas which emerged
strongly in earlier Trócaire research - Shifting Geopolitics,
Demographic Shifts, Climate Change and Pressure on
Natural Resources – will play out in Asia over the coming
decade.
1
In 2011, Trócaire published Leading Edge 2020, a ‘horizons scanning’ report
on the future of international development, the major trends which would
shape development in the coming decade, and the implications for INGOs.
The findings of this report formed the basis of the Asia 2020 research report.
Both reports are available through Trócaire’s website at www.trocaire.ie
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IntroductIon: the AsIAn century?
“The coming decade – and indeed century – belongs to Asia.”
International Organisation, Europe
There is little doubt that current commentary on Asia focuses on growth, growth and growth.
Estimates from the Asia Development Bank (ADB) show that by 2050 per capita income in Asia
could reach parity with Europe.2 The region will double its share of global GDP to 52%.3 Its urban
population will have doubled, with all the cultural change, agricultural shifts and demand for
employment that brings.4
That standard narrative includes, of course, significant omissions. The percentage of people living
on less than $1.25/day in South Asia rose from approximately one third to 45% between 1990 and
2005, and continues to rise.5 South Asia accounts for 44% of those living in conditions of multidimensional poverty globally, compared with 29% in Sub-Saharan Africa.6 Equally, it’s uncertain
whether newfound wealth will translate into greater political freedoms.
Neither is there evidence of a ‘trickle down effect’ between countries of unequal growth levels. The
ADB predicts that, under a ‘best case’ scenario for sustained prosperity in Asia, in 2050 91% of all
GDP growth in Asia will be accounted for by just seven countries.7 The standard vision of prosperity
in Asia continues to assume the dominance of a small number of nations. And in Asia, where
regional structures remain underdeveloped and politically problematic, the knock-on effect of
growth from one economy to another is doubly uncertain.
Nonetheless, the point remains that the simple fact of Asia’s newfound wealth is a game-changer for
how international development can be effective in that region – if only in bringing an end to
assumptions from donors that with aid dollars comes influence.
And indeed it is interesting that in this context, the interviewees in Leading Edge Asia challenge
INGOs to begin to more carefully distinguish between two separate problems: political will and
poverty. It is clear that in Asia, political will at both national and international level has become the
issue of the day.
2
2
Asia Development Bank (2010) Asia 2050: Realizing the Asian Century http://www.adb.org/publications/asia-2050-realizing-asian-century
p.3
3
ibid, p.3
4
ibid, p.6
5
Sumner, Andy (2010) Where do the poor live? p.5 http://www.ids.ac.uk/files/dmfile/GlobalPovertyDataPaper1.pdf
6
Sumner Where do the poor live? p.6
7
Asia 2050 p. 8
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Key trend #1: shIftIng geopolItIcs
Does economic growth equal political power?
“This is a zero sum game, and those that have power currently are going to be reluctant to pass
it over” – Economist, South Asia
In Asia perhaps more than any other region, our interviewees emphasised that any changes in
geopolitical power would come as a consequence of economic shifts and growth. And while there
was broad agreement amongst interviewees as to the speed of economic growth – India’s and China’s
economies will be second only to the US in terms of size within a decade – there was far less
consensus as to whether economic growth would translate into increased political influence at a
global level. In forums such as the World Bank and IMF, the same old players continue to dominate.
Leadership in Asia
The dominating ‘unknown’ mentioned by interviewees was what ‘balance of power’ will emerge within
Asia. Though China is often touted as the obvious ‘emerging power’, our interviewees’ attention
focused on the potential of regional blocs to serve as a credible counterbalance to China. Whether or
not regional integration solidifies in South and Southeast Asia was identified as a critical factor in
determining the extent to which China will pursue its interests in the region unilaterally.
Southeast Asian regionalisation emerged in interviews as the most realistic counterbalance to China’s
influence. Increased intra-regional trade and investment was regarded as inevitable. Less certain was
the likelihood of increased labour mobility. Interviewees pointed to the organisation’s recent expansion
beyond economic affairs. ASEAN’s recent engagement with human rights issues in Myanmar was one
such example cited.
Cooperation in the area of Disaster Risk Reduction was identified as a non-politicised area demanding
cross-border coordination, which might serve as a forerunner to increased political regionalisation.
“The South Asian community will just learn to find some common ground because they have to,
they don’t have any choice” – Donor, Southeast Asia
In South Asia, regional integration was considered limited by tension between India and Pakistan. That
relationship was consistently mentioned as the biggest potential conflict trigger in South or Southeast
Asia, complicated further by Afghanistan. Our interviewees’ analysis, however, was that were IndianPakistan relations to improve, a strengthened South Asian bloc would provide the most formidable
regional counter-balance to China.
There was little agreement amongst interviewees in predicting what sort of relationship will emerge
between China and India. Some predicted that competition between the two would exacerbate
conflicts involving Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran.
Others argued that India would not pose a challenge to China as a regional leader. Economically,
interviewees pointed to India’s fragility, its deficit, and its boom-driven economy. Politically, growing
civil society mobilisation was cited as evidence that India, a democracy, could not depend on
domestic opinion to implement dramatic policy shifts. In a context where good governance, rather
than reach on the global stage, will determine the fortunes of the marginalised in emerging
‘superpowers’, India’s continued internal flux might indeed be read as a positive sign for attempts to
ensure growth translates into reductions in poverty.
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WhAt WIll the role of chInA In the regIon be over
the next decAde?
“China is just the latest ‘evil empire’ like Japan 40 years ago or Russia more recently. I
think we’ll see the Chinese, eventually, are not so irrational or brutal or evil, as they
become real global players” – INGO, South Asia
While the world waits to see what China’s next move will be, our interviewees were less
convinced that China has any grand plan to increase its space at the global table. One
commentator argued that China itself has been taken aback by how quick its economic
growth has been and are unsure how to use their newfound influence. Major challenges of
internal stability remain before, interviewees argued, China steps up to the global stage.
A number of interviewees emphasised the potential for a win-win situation in the region vis-avis China: investment and support for economic activity, including demand for resources, is
not necessarily a bad thing. The Chinese private sector could increase inter-dependence and
as such regional stability.
“China depends on securing a future for a country that cannot survive
by itself” – Regional NGO, Southeast Asia
The alliances which China develops globally were identified as being critical to how it exerts
influence. A number of interviewees pointed out that careful alliances and a multilateral
attitude were a necessity, because the Chinese economy is structured in such a way that it
can’t survive by itself. China needs food and resources and the global economic system to
grow and survive. This will limit its willingness to challenge the global economic status quo in
ways which might undermine traditionally strong economies. Conversely, interviewees
speculated, alliances within Asia might allow China to pursue a strategy of enabling growth
within the region, to develop markets in such a way that China becomes less reliant on the
EU and the US. The route China takes in this regard will determine a huge amount of the role
it plays in the region.
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Will geopolitical shifts help the poorest?
“The North has not been good for development - that is certain. So the changes can only be
good.” – Economist, India
Our interviewees formed two bodies of opinion on whether the increased global significance of
many Asian economies would be positive for the poor. Some worried that any shift in power away
from the global North would risk lowering the human rights status quo.
Others though questioned whether we are really moving away from a positive model at all. One
interviewee pointed to the fact that the dominant development model of the past century has been so
destructive that emerging powers physically cannot pursue the same resource-demanding growth
strategies that Northern counterparts have. China, for example, was seen as too easily placed as the
‘evil’ cousin; rather, its expansionist, resource-hungry policies are simply replicating the standard
development model, but with potential for dividends regionally.
Shifting Geopolitics: Reflections from the Humanitarian Sector
Interviewees listed deteriorating relations between Israel and Iran or India and Pakistan, and any
destabilisation of North Korea, as the potential ‘sparks’ for conflict in the region.
Beyond conflict, the geopolitical trend cited as most significant for humanitarian relief in Asia was
the likely emergence of increasingly confident ‘new humanitarian actors’, in the form of increasingly
assertive governments in Asia. Increasingly, governments see providing emergency response within
their own borders as a core element of asserting their own sovereignty. Interviewees welcomed
such independence, while noting challenges – the most obvious being a threat to the humanitarian
principle of impartiality.
Interviewees argued that the increased political and economic power of emerging economies would
likely lead to changes in the logistics of emergency response. It was anticipated that any relief
mechanism within ASEAN would employ a far stricter definition of ‘sovereignty,’ and require far
more explicit consent from recipient governments, than is the case with the UN.
Finally, increased regional cooperation was welcomed by interviewees, seen as critical to ensuring
effective response to natural disasters which are inherently cross-border.
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shIftIng geopolItIcs In AsIA: WhAt role for
InternAtIonAl ngos?
“The influence of donors from the West is dropping fast. Their budgets relative to
national economies are dropping, and Asian governments have good reason not to
listen to donors anymore.” – International NGO, South Asia
The consensus amongst interviewees was that INGOs have largely ignored the drastic shifts
in power across Asia. Amongst recommendations for how INGOs can adapt to the shifting
context were;
1. INGOs must consider how best to influence governments, as their leverage as donors
decreases
2. INGOs must build the capacity of local civil society to advocate that new power on the
global stage be translated into new welfare for the poor
3. INGOs should build understanding of the meaning of humanitarianism amongst
emerging powers who are initiating humanitarian programmes, both overseas and
within their own borders
4. INGOs must consider the political implications of how they fund their work, as global
power shifts
Key trend #2: demogrAphIc chAnge
“Demographic shifts are the single most significant trend in Asia: almost everything else
follows from there” – Economist, International Organisation
Urbanisation
“Rural sectors are very static. In urban settings, tomorrow doesn’t look anything like today:
you can work in a slum today, and when you return tomorrow, it’s gone”
– Academic, South Asia
A large majority of interviewees identified urbanisation as the key demographic shift impacting on
development across Asia. Interviewees were divided as to whether the most important response to
unplanned urbanisation was simply better planning, or active prevention of migration to urban areas.
A number of policy options were identified which would actively keep people in rural areas. One
commentator advocated shifting rural policy towards the provision of non-farm employment,
arguing that agriculture cannot provide the level of employment and income required to keep people
in rural areas. Others emphasised that government policy regulating land concessions and land
grab is often actively pushing people out of their land when they do want to stay.
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A second group of commentators pointed to the significance of how governments handle
urbanisation when it does take place. The qualitative difference in the skills and knowledge required
to effectively respond to urban needs was seen as a major challenge to doing this.
Migration to urban areas was recognised as presenting distinct challenges for women in particular.
Interviewees noted that women migrants tend to be overrepresented in informal sectors, such as
domestic work and the sex industry, and as such are often excluded from progressive regulation of
the formal employment sector.
“Urbanisation could easily lead to the extermination of an entire class of people – foragers,
pastoralists and so on – simply by virtue of their occupation”
– Regional NGO, South Asia
Urbanisation’s cultural impact was also highlighted. Some interviewees pointed to the threat, for
example, to the identity of the ‘peasant’ in many countries. Others noted that the increased
independence of women urban migrants would alter family structures, and lead to falling fertility
rates and a shrinking labour pool over time.
Asia’s shifting age profile
Countries in South and Southeast Asia are split between those experiencing rapid aging, and those
with rapidly increasing working-age populations. Again, the importance of government policy
responses to these new challenges was emphasised by interviewees; aging demands a social net,
and youth demands employment generation, neither of which are currently in place.
In Southeast Asia, our interviewees argued that the implications of increasing numbers of older
citizens have been largely ignored. The ‘dependency ratio’ will change, putting pressure on younger
people financially and in terms of how they use their time. Meanwhile governments can’t necessarily
rely anymore on traditional family structures to support elderly relatives.
Sex-selective feticide was recognised as being particularly worrying in Asia. Beyond the clear
ethical issues it raises, it will exacerbate gender imbalance over time. Interviewees linked this trend
to inadequate security for older populations and the resulting preference for a son capable of
providing for parents.
“South Asia has already created 800,000 jobs per month over the last decade, but a 50%
increase on this would be required to satisfy demand.” – International Organisation, Europe
Meanwhile, a younger population in South Asia will place major pressure on the jobs market. Over 1
million entrants to the jobs market are predicted every month for the next 20 years globally. 30-40%
of the increase in the global labour force will come from South Asia. Interviewees questioned
whether governments have adequately considered the implications of the demand for jobs.
Investment will be key, interviewees argued, to encouraging young people to pursue their potential
at home.
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Demographic Changes: Reflections from the Humanitarian Sector
“With a disaster in an urban area, you drive into a city and you can’t really tell who is affiliated
to whom. They might not even know each other. But they might spend an awful lot of time
with someone a few streets or districts away. It’s not intuitive, as it is in rural areas.”
– INGO, Southeast Asia, humanitarian
Rapid urbanisation coupled with low building codes means that increasingly large, increasingly
condensed populations are exposed to devastating natural disasters. The megacities of Kathmandu
and Manila, for example, are overdue an earthquake, and they are the most devastating places such
events could happen.
Interviewees from the humanitarian sector emphasised the weakness of humanitarian response in
urban settings. Two issues in particular were identified. Most significantly, traditional humanitarian
responses rely on established social networks in rural areas, to gain access and negotiate with
communities. This doesn’t exist so easily in urban areas; networks are much more fluid and
complex. A second difficulty particular to urban areas is land rights. Land rights are more complex in
urban areas, which makes building shelters, schools etc. doubly complex.
demogrAphIc chAnge In AsIA: WhAt role for
InternAtIonAl ngos?
“In a rural area you can turn up in a village and you can probably assume that people
know each other, and that there’s some kind of hierarchy. In a city, it’s much more
complicated than that. This has huge implications for how INGOs carry out their work.”
– INGO, Southeast Asia
1. INGOs need to increase their capacity to respond to need in urban areas
There was consensus across interviewees that the absence of INGOs operating in urban
areas was due less to strategic decisions than to lack of capacity. In relation to
humanitarian response in particular, two specific gaps were identified: capacity to
advise on disaster-proofing urban planning, and ability to rapidly engage communities in
relief efforts in highly complex urban environments.
2. INGOs must consider how to work with the growing numbers of educated, unemployed
young people: there is a real potential for conflict emerging from this group
3. INGOs should engage the new supporter base which is emerging in the shape of
growing middle classes in Middle Income Countries, for both fundraising and
awareness raising/campaigning
4. INGOs must disaggregate information regarding demographic changes to ensure that
inequalities relating to, for example, employment distribution are not masked by overall
statistics
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Key trend #3: clImAte chAnge And
nAturAl dIsAsters
A vulnerable region
In discussing the specific impacts of climate change in Asia, natural disasters were named as a
particularly Asian threat. The region’s tropical and sub-tropical location, combined with growing
urban mega-cities, form a deadly combination.
Specific also to Asia, several interviewees pointed to the as yet unknown impact which the melting
of glaciers in the Himalayas will have over the coming decade on water and food security and
resource production. Massive areas of South Asia, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Nepal
and Bhutan, are reliant for their current way of living on the Himalayan glaciers, and these are now
changing in highly unpredictable ways.
The “absence of justice” in the climate discourse
“Climate Change is not a natural phenomenon ... but a relation between people, between
powers, and in terms of resource management” – Regional NGO, Southeast Asia
A number of interviewees mentioned that the pertinent problem to be addressed over the next
decade is not climate change as such, but an absence of broader justice. The rights of women in
society, for example, will determine how powerfully they feel the effects of climate change. In
Indonesia women have strong entitlements to land ownership, ensuring far greater legal recourse
following displacement. Interviewees pointed out that ‘adaptation to climate change’ policies were
equally open to disparate impacts on rich and poor.
“The only reason countries in the region are paying attention to climate change and the
environment is because its being pushed down their throat by international organisations” –
Private Sector, Southeast Asia
A similar problem was identified in donor policies. One interviewee argued that governments in the
region are frustrated with the labelling by donors of a range of vulnerabilities – food insecurity, for
example - as ‘climate change.’ The ‘climate change’ label, often necessary to attract funding, was
seen as obscuring more fundamental global inequalities, such as how to use resources or produce
energy in a more equitable manner, for example.
There was some divergence of opinions, however, on whether it would be helpful to politicise the
debate on the impacts of climate change. China remains engaged with the issue at a global level
precisely because it remains seen as relatively politically neutral.
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Tensions between climate change and growth
“Climate change demands a whole new way of thinking and living: not just doing what we’re
doing now but naming it green” – Regional NGO, Southeast Asia
Of greatest significance for our interviewees, and subject to much disagreement, was the
incompatibility between policies to mitigate the effects of climate change, and the continued pursuit
of economic growth in Asian economies. Our commentators were divided between those who
called for the need to ‘decouple’ growth from development, and those who argued that now is not
the time to question a model which, for all its faults, continues to increase the standard of living of
many in the region.
The former group argued that current attempts by Asian governments to address climate change
amounted to little more than window dressing. Solutions continue to be based on an ‘old paradigm’
of resource-driven growth which, ultimately, will prove unsustainable. This group advocated the
work of activists attempting to shift the debate in a direction which questions the
growth/development nexus more broadly.
“We cannot lose sight, in climate change debates, of the fact that we have very large
populations that are denied even the basics of what would be seen as a minimally decent
life.” – Academic, South Asia
The larger group amongst our interviewees, however, emphasised the continued importance of a
growth-based model in the Asian context, where the needs of 40% of the region’s population still
have not been met. Citizens and government are generally in agreement that pollution is a
necessary component of the growth which their economy requires at this point.
Interviewees emphasised that the northern discourse on climate change is not sufficiently cognisant
of this fact, and that talk of ‘decoupling’ growth from development remains a broadly Western
agenda.
Reduced emissions are a necessity: but it is not reasonable or likely to expect poorer countries to
choose a low-carbon path for the sake of the planet.
“I don’t think there’s much prospect for, at the moment, many developing countries singlehandedly deciding to follow a low-carbon development path, because no one has really
demonstrated what that looks like.” – INGO, Europe
Perhaps what this dilemma most strongly demonstrates is the need for leadership from those
countries not faced with the massive development needs of Asian economies. A definite, tested
model from international organisations, Northern countries and INGOs must be developed to show
poorer countries how a lower carbon development model can get them the same results.
As long as investment by Northern governments in environmentally destructive infrastructural
projects continues, it is absurd for donors to fund ‘climate change’ projects under the guise of
environmental sustainability, interviewees argued. Civil society in the South won’t tolerate this.
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“The most commonly felt impact of climate change:” Responding to
Natural Disasters in Asia
“We are seeing a very Asian story of climate change: too much water in the wrong place at
the wrong time in a way that we’re not able to cope with.” – International NGO, Southeast Asia
There was a clear trend across interviews of discussing the impacts of natural disasters in Asia as a
core part of discussions on climate change.
Interviewees pointed out the real potential, on a continent lauded for its dramatic development
gains, for natural disasters to reverse such moves forward overnight. They emphasised again and
again the inconsistency between government concern with economic growth, and failure to
acknowledge the massive economic losses which a disaster can bring. Urbanisation compounds
the likely economic impact of a natural disaster.
Investment in long-term disaster risk reduction strategies is far less costly than financing the impact
of a future disaster. Political will was once again identified as preventing progress in the area: all the
more so in the case of an investment on which the ‘return’ may never be seen.
Interviewees highlighted the increasing unwillingness of countries to ask for external disaster relief.
This was viewed as a justified response to the chaotic, invasive international responses to a number
of prominent crises in recent years. Meanwhile, there was recognition of the growing internal
capacity for response. Bangladesh was cited for its high quality early warning system. Interviewees
emphasised the imperative for INGOs to utilise such local ‘comparative technical advantage’
wherever possible.
Mega-disasters in overpopulated areas are predicted to increase. They will likely be accompanied
by the sort of massive technological failure which has never previously been faced. As mentioned
earlier, Kathmandu and Manila are long ‘overdue’ such a disaster. Water scarcity, identified by one
interviewee as the most likely source of conflict in the region over the next twenty years, further
increases the complexity of the crisis.
Interviewees emphasised the importance of cross-border cooperation in determining how well Asia
can respond to natural disasters. Increased vulnerability to disaster will also demand new social
protection provisions. How will governments insure people living on increasingly marginal lands?
What security net will be available for those displaced due to the effects of climate change?
Interviewees agreed that the major determinant of how climate change plays out will be ‘ability to
cope’ with these new shocks, more than the science of climate change itself.
Climate Change: Reflections from the Humanitarian Sector
“Do humanitarian organisations have a mandate to work on emerging, likely long-term,
mega-disasters? Are they to be dealt with as humanitarian problems, or is it a question for
development?” – International Organisation, Europe
The most significant analysis coming from our interviews with the humanitarian sector was that,
while of huge importance, the real impact of climate change was that its effects would be felt in
conjunction with a large number of other vulnerabilities: increasing water scarcity, increased
populations and marginalised urban populations. Given the likely scale of such vulnerabilities,
interviewees also pointed to the high potential for conflict predicted to emerge as the effects of
climate change worsen.
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“Disasters are the most commonly felt impact of climate change: communities might not
understand emissions, but they feel it when there’s drought, when there are floods.”
– Regional NGO, Asia
One of the few certainties noted was that the impacts of climate change, and in particular the high
vulnerability in Asia to natural disasters, would inevitably demand massively increased humanitarian
response levels. The nature of these disasters, however, would shift significantly. Interviewees noted
than humanitarian assistance has always been provided on a short-term basis, with an exit strategy. If,
however, a rapidly changing natural environment means that disasters are simply the ‘new normal,’ this
has serious implications for how we view humanitarian work in the context of broader development.
clImAte chAnge And nAturAl dIsAsters: WhAt role
for InternAtIonAl ngos?
“My question to donors is, while we in India are fighting our government for a
responsible climate change policy, you guys are giving aid to countries because you
want your countries to be able to go and mine coal. So why should we side with you?”
– Regional NGO, South Asia
1. INGOs need to put pressure on their own governments, and populations, to change their
own behaviours. INGOs must also raise awareness about the principle of historical
responsibility for climate change
2. There is a need for greater coherence between donor/INGO policies to prevent the provision
of discrete funding for climate-related activities, while continuing to pursue resourcedependent economic growth strategies directly contradictory to this work.
3. INGOs need to resist co-optation into the policy solutions of the North – in particular the
‘commoditisation of the atmosphere’ through carbon trading
4. INGOs must articulate a model of development which mitigates climate change and delivers
on the basic needs of the worlds’ poorest. They must engage with the basic dilemma that
the current growth model, for its flaws, is the only one proven to be capable of bringing large
populations out of poverty.
5. Aid directed towards natural disasters must become more locally sensitive, and more
carefully routed to remain within local economies. The most advanced, relevant expertise is
often available regionally, rather than in the global North.
6. The rapidly increasing frequency of natural disasters, the likelihood of ‘megadisasters’
particularly in urban areas, and the impacts of climate change necessitate that INGOs build
disaster risk reduction into all long-term development work.
7. INGOs must begin to reconsider the distinction between humanitarian crises and what often
are in fact longer-term vulnerabilities which result directly from our development model.
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Key trend #4: pressure on nAturAl resources
Resources and economic growth in Asia: public good versus individual right?
“What do you do when countries are growing and populations are growing? We (the INGO
community) are supporting development, and development requires resources.”
– International NGO, Europe
That the resources fuelling development and growth in Asia are coming under increased pressure
was the strong consensus from our interviewees. Water was the resource cited most frequently by
interviewees, and highlights well the extent to which the region’s economic fortunes are tied to
resource availability. One interviewee pointed to the extent to which Bhutan’s economy is
intertwined with the Himalayan floodwaters, increasingly unpredictable as glaciers melt.
In different ways, our interviewees emphasised the ‘high stakes game’ that is the scramble for
resources in the region. There is a very real link between resource demand and improvements in
people’s wellbeing. The question becomes what to do with people and countries that are simply
growing. We have not yet articulated a model of how to accommodate growth without high resource
usage, and such practical considerations should not be dismissed lightly by those with a
‘conservation’ agenda.
But interviewees differed as to how governments ought to manage the inevitable clash between
collective needs for increasingly scarce resources, and individual rights. Who should prevail, for
example, when claims to traditional ownership of forests come into tension with the public good of
using such fertile land for food production? Some argued that, if well managed, development would
require that governments have leeway to appropriate certain resources in the interest of the broader
population. Others argued that state appropriation of resource rich land has lead, in effect, to
military occupation of large swathes of India, China and Indonesia.
A problem of scarcity or a question of distribution?
Interviewees questioned whether scarcity of resources was in fact the problem at all. Many pointed
to distribution of resources as being at the core of the issue. Interviewees emphasised the
importance of a state role in resource distribution in particular for women, who don’t traditionally
have a strong role in local decision-making processes in many places. Some pointed to a simple
lack of capacity by government to distribute and manage resources effectively. One example given
was that India has in fact enough water for its economy and agriculture if managed properly.
Adequate management of water will also require cross-border cooperation of rivers and water beds,
which to date has been absent.
“Before, when you talked about development work, you thought of things like building
potable water for communities: now you can’t even do that, because water is owned by
companies. It’s hard to know what is left to do.” – Regional NGO, Southeast Asia
Other interviewees highlighted that proper management of resources is absent because the very
principle behind government management of resources is under threat. Under such an analysis, it is
the model of development being pursued which is at the core of the resource problem in Asia. The
problem of scarcity, under such an analysis, cannot be easily solved by discrete policy innovations,
without challenging the economic model itself. Whether or not resources actually are scarce is
irrelevant if people can’t access them.
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“The state has to be the allocator between rich and poor, urban and rural, between ethnic
groups, class groups and gender groups. Tensions are unavoidable, and the state has to be the
one to deal with them.” – Academic, South Asia
A number of interviewees argued that the increased concentration of food, water and land in smaller
numbers of hands has centralised production, distribution and trade of goods in the hands of small
numbers of corporations, with full discretion as to their future use. In this manner as resources
concentrate, scarcity increases, and that scarcity leads to reactionary policies promoting further
concentration. Chief amongst the detrimental impacts of such concentration of power over resources is
the threat to the very concept of common access to resources.
What should a government response look like?
“Changes in policy will fix this problem. What is needed is an understanding of the politics of
why clearly beneficial reforms haven’t taken place.” – International Organisation, United States
Whether following the logic that resource pressure is a question of mismanagement or of economic
ideology, interviewees agreed that pressure on resources is a political rather than natural problem, and
as such there are political solutions. In Thailand, repeated drought was addressed through diversified
crop selection, which has proofed agriculture against the effects of drought, showing that pro-active
government policy can manage resources effectively and equitably.
How then, should governments respond? In Asia, where the public good often trumps the individual
good, a number of interviewees pointed to the likelihood that government responses would involve the
resettlement of communities in the interests of better planning and resource distribution. This may well
be in the public interest, but regardless of how well planned will inevitably disrupt individuals’
livelihoods. This could result in huge cultural shifts for people used to, for instance, subsistence living.
“We must remember human beings’ capacity to adapt” – International Organisation, Europe
Finally, a number of interviewees pointed to the potential of technological innovation to mitigate the
crisis of resources. There was a sense that the negativity around resource depletion often obscures the
very likely technological advances which will be made. Interviewees cited evidence of East Asian
countries compensating for resource deficits by investing heavily in human resources, demonstrating
the capacity to innovate in terms of how we respond to the problem, to simply do less with more.
Pressure on Natural Resources: Reflections from the Humanitarian Sector
“There is a danger that continuing to respond to resource crises in the traditional manner will
create a condition where relief encourages people to stay in a place which simply isn’t viable
anymore ... humanitarian actors will be accused of simply keeping people alive with no bigger
plan.” – International NGO, Southeast Asia
In some places, scarcity is rendering places entirely unlivable, to the point where humanitarian
responses to hunger and thirst might appear to have no ‘end point’. Somalia and Kenya are the most
prominent situations of such a protracted crisis, and interviewees predicted similar scenarios in areas
affected by the Himalaya river basin. Interviewees questioned whether it was either sustainable or
manageable to continue to provide relief for people in areas where it is increasingly unlikely populations
will ever sustain themselves. A real response requires that we consider these scenarios as the new,
long-term norm, rather than a particular, short-term crisis.
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pressure on nAturAl resources: WhAt role for
InternAtIonAl ngos?
1. INGOs should act as a ‘watchdog,’ monitoring the activities of private companies in
acquiring natural resources, resisting the corporatization of natural resources
2. INGOs should work more closely with governments to plan sustainable, rightsoriented policies for resource acquisition, in particular around resettlement
3. INGOs should ensure that scarcity and resource rights are mainstreamed across all
programming, in terms of the approaches and models which they advocate
4. INGOs should increase local community ability to influence the political processes
which decide resource distribution
5. INGOs must examine and articulate a response to the tension between resource
conservation and the growth which development demands
conclusIons: WhAt next for development In
A groWIng AsIA?
“Money is no longer a big deal. You can’t just come bearing money and expect to achieve
something, anymore. You need to make a smarter contribution than that.”
– Economist, South Asia
“In many middle income countries, governments aren’t spending money on the poor, because
there isn’t the politics that forces them to spend. The development sector has played some
role in inadvertently allowing that to continue.” – Economist, South Asia
It is worth noting the significant ambiguity from interviewees, when asked, as to whether INGOs
could add value in middle income countries at all. Interviewees flagged the very real danger that
competition might emerge between local and international NGOs for funding, but also for political
space to negotiate with governments and to campaign. Similarly, some interviewees questioned
whether INGOs would be willing to begin taking ‘the lead’ from local civil society in terms of policy
direction.
One interviewee flagged the growing number of billionaires in India, something which INGOs, whilst
mindful that such wealth has little immediate impact on the poor, cannot turn a blind eye to. In this
context, the most significant role identified by interviewees for INGOs was strengthening critical
social movements which could ensure pressure to bring such redistribution about. By funding
service provision while leaving more critical elements of civil society unfunded, INGOs have at times
altered the shape of civil society in a way which limits its ability to hold government to account.
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Even where INGOs are not needed financially, interviewees pointed to the usefulness of the
transnational face of INGOs, and their potential to mobilise citizens and opinions across borders.
They are uniquely situated to address the inherently transnational challenges facing the region. This
might take the shape of facilitating south-south exchange amongst civil society actors,
strengthening social movements across borders, or building platforms for exchange of knowledge
on specific themes.
A number of interviewees brought the ‘international mediator’ role of INGOs to a further level again,
advocating the furthering of a type of ‘globalised South’ inclusive of the poor in the UK, in Asia, and
globally, building solidarity between, for example, those who see their welfare eroded in the UK, and
those being prevented from protesting on the streets of Cambodia. These interviewees pointed to
the responsibility of international NGOs to get directly involved in the causes of the oppressed in the
global North: the more conservative the policies of governments in the North, the more challenging
life in the global South.
A number of specific areas for intervention in middle income countries were noted. The first is the
issue of sustainability: while countries are inevitably growing, whether this happens in an
environmentally sustainable manner is not inevitable, and as such this was noted as an area where
there is increasing need for intervention. The second is gender equality. Here, our interviewees
argued that even equitable economic growth is insufficient to deliver the rights of women. More
broadly, they emphasised the need for INGOs to consider what progress won’t automatically come
through economic growth, such as respect for human rights, and focus their work entirely in these
areas. Finally, one interviewee emphasised the tendency for new ‘exclusions’ to occur within middle
income countries, even when growth is well-distributed; for example the increase in groups such as
domestic workers and migrants within wealthy economies.
If current rates of growth continue, 3 billion additional people on the Asian continent will be classed
as ‘affluent’ by 2050. The new wealth at the disposal of governments across Asia challenges INGOs
to ‘do’ development in contexts where political will, not poverty, is the problem. Placing Asia 2020
beside the findings of Trócaire’s global Leading Edge, this emphasis on political will and decisionmaking is the clearest distinctive feature coming from Asia. The challenges which emerged in our
interviews were met by potential policy solutions every time, if political will were present.
It is notable, though, that interviewees reflected on the very real danger that the presence INGOs in
countries where there is wealth may in fact serve to weaken the political will needed for Asia’s
growth to benefit the poorest. Given the significance of political will in addressing Asia’s challenges
over the coming decade, the greatest challenge for International NGOs in Asia, now, is surely to plan
their work as ‘Asia’s century’ begins with this to the forefront of their minds.
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Asia 2050: Realizing the Asian Century 2011: Asia Development Bank, p.3
http://asianbondsonline.adb.org/publications/adb/2011/Asia_2050-Realizing_the_Asian_Century-Executive_Summary.pdf