Download Supporting Sustainable Livelihoods: Lessons from Five Case Studies

Message
The World Food Programme and the International Fund for Agricultural
Development are in a strategic alliance in India to develop replicable models
of sustainable household level food security. Both agencies work closely with
the national and state governments, civil society institutions and other partners
in pursuit of this goal. WFP and IFAD also collaborate to support three
integrated livelihood enhancement projects in Jharkhand-Chattisgarh, Orissa
and Gujarat. Among their other joint activities, documentation of knowledge
in the area of food security and addressing rural poverty is a major focus for
the two agencies.
As part of the latter initiative, WFP and IFAD teamed up with Indian Grameen
Services, a leading NGO, to prepare five case studies of successful
interventions in enhancing the livelihoods of the poor. The aim was to capture
the processes, support structures, institutional models and specific interventions
that led to sustainable livelihoods.
I feel that these case studies offer valuable insights on what works in
addressing livelihood issues and the lessons are relevant for a wide range of
stakeholders, including policy makers, administrators, donors and civil society
institutions.
We at WFP are committed to contribute in our own small way to India’s
goal of food security for all and a rapid elimination of poverty.
GianPietro Bordignon
Representative & Country Director,
UN World Food Programme
Foreword
The United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) has been actively
working in India for over four decades to support national initiatives in achieving
household level food security and improvement in nutritional standards of
vulnerable groups, especially women and children. In partnership with the
national and state governments, civil society organizations, expert bodies,
researchers and Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs), WFP has assisted major
national programmes like Operation Flood, ICDS and food-for-work. In
addition to its monetary and food resources, WFP has also contributed to the
efficacy of these programmes through knowledge management and advocacy
by supporting research and impact evaluation studies, training and
dissemination of technical knowledge.
Since 2001, WFP has partnered a sister UN agency, the International
Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), to support rural livelihood projects
funded by the latter in the country. WFP’s collaboration with IFAD spans
hosting a Field Presence Unit in the Country Office at Delhi, besides providing
food assistance to three on-going IFAD projects in Jharkhand-Chattisgarh,
Gujarat and Orissa. The current volume of five case studies of successful
livelihood promotion interventions is part of WFP’s effort towards
documentation and sharing of knowledge of local strategies and successes
at achieving food security through sustainable livelihoods. The report,
prepared by Indian Grameen Services, a leading national NGO, also
highlights the close partnership that WFP and IFAD enjoy with civil society
institutions in India
The lessons emerging from these case studies are relevant not just for
current and future project design of multilateral and bilateral agencies, but
as much for national, state and local authorities, policy makers, NGOs,
financial institutions, experts and research bodies. They form an addition to
the rich body of development literature already available in India and, in its
own small way, we hope this document will enhance the understanding of all
those working to respond to livelihood challenges a little further.
These case studies reiterate a familiar, but often ignored, message that
there is no one approach to successful livelihood promotion. Despite the
variety of conditions in which livelihoods are supported, there are a few core
elements that must be necessarily addressed to achieve sustainable outcomes.
The importance of building participatory and democratic institutions, investing
in capacity of the clients of a programme and creating strong links to financial
services, markets and technology, all emerge as common themes in the five
examples covered in this report. Even so, the most important learning from
this report is that satisfactorily addressing equity issues may be the one factor
which determines the long term sustainability of a livelihood intervention.
This set of case studies is also an attempt to trigger a wider debate on
institutional support structures for livelihoods, the role and impact of often
generously funded government and donor supported programmes and the
role of PRIs, among others. Therefore, comments and feedback on the issues
discussed in the report would be welcomed.
New Delhi
January 2006
Pravesh Sharma
IFAD Field Presence Coordinator in India &
Special Senior Adviser, WFP
Acknowledgements
This report is the outcome of a successful collaboration between WFP and Indian Grameen
Services, the not-for-profit arm of the BASIX group of institutions, in particular its visionary
founder, Mr. Vijay Mahajan. It is to him that goes the credit of guiding the initial idea of
documenting local examples of successful livelihood promotion to this point. Mr. Mahajan
has personally contributed richly to institutions that address livelihood challenges, most
notably by first setting up PRADAN and later BASIX, besides nurturing countless other bodies
working in this field. Despite his schedule, and a setback to his health during the preparation
of these case studies, he has put a personal stamp on their final shape. All the members of
BASIX and IGS at Hyderabad and Delhi gave unstinted support to this study.
The team of experts that visited the five locations and prepared the case studies,
comprising Ms. Aditi Mehta, Mr. Sourindra Bhattacharjee, Ms. Preeti Sahai and Mr. G.
Sathyanarayana, are also to be thanked for their painstaking efforts in putting this document
together.
The support and willing help of representatives of the institutions studied is also gratefully
acknowledged. In particular, Dr. H K Kharecha and other officials of DHRUVA (BAIF) at
the Head and Field Offices provided valuable insights. Thanks are also due to SHG
members who shared their views on the programme.
We express our gratitude to members of the Lijjat Family, especially Mrs. Jyotibehn
Naik and Mrs Irene Almeida for patiently helping the team during its visit. The Sanchalika
and members of the Bandra Lijjat Centre in Mumbai also provided the team with many
inputs during their peak working hours.
Mr. Rama Reddy, President, CDF, Hyderabad and Ms. Vijayalakshmi, Manager,
gave generous cooperation and help. Thanks are also due to officials of the Mulkanoor
Women’s Thrift Cooperative Society and Vishwa Bharathi Mahila Podupu Samithi, Damera
for spending their valuable time with the study team.
Mr. Vijay Kumar IAS, CEO of SERP, Hyderabad provided highly useful insights on the
evolution and development of SAPAP. Thanks are also due to Ms. Vajaya Bharati CEO,
SMELC, Urvakal, Kurnool as well as District Project Manager DPIP, Kurnool and
Mahabubnagar for sharing their experiences. We would also like to thank Mr. Ravi
Kumar CEO, Adarsha Welfare Society and Mr.Girivardhan Reddy, CEO, Addakal Mandal
Mahila Samakhya (AMMS) in Mahabubnagar for throwing light on the evolution of
AMMS. Thanks are also due to officials of AMMS and Hussainapauram Village
Organization for their time and insightful observations and comments.
Mr. Jack Croucher, Mr. Mukul Prakash, Arunesh, Dipak and Supervisors in AT India in
Ukhimath are thanked for their assistance to this study, in particular by explaining the
introduction of tasar in Uttaranchal.
Table of Contents
Overview.............................................................................................8
Steps in Livelihood Promotion................................................................9
DHRUVA - Investing in Natural Resource Management
for Livelihood Promotion in South Gujarat.............................................11
Lijjat - A Women’s Enterprise with a Difference.......................................21
Building Sustainable Financial Services for Women - The
Co-operative Development Foundation in Andhra Pradesh....................34
Building Institutions for Livelihood Promotion - South Asia
Poverty Alleviation Project in Andhra Pradesh (SAPAP).............................48
Success in the Himalayas - The Story of Chamoli Tasar..........................60
Overview
Comparison of the Cases Across
Various Parameters
8
Particulars BAIF-DHRUVA
Lijjat
CDF-MACS
UNDP-SAPAP
CTPL
Target
Poor Tribals in
Population Gujarat
Poor or middle
class women in
cities
Poor households,
especially women
in AP
Poor households
in AP
Poor households
in hilly regions of
Uttaranchal
Objective
Additional /
regular income
during idle time
Access to financial
services, hitherto
unavailable
Poverty alleviation
objective in the
district
Enhanced income to
poor through
additional employment
Economic well
being through
increased income
Choice of NRM- based
intervention with familiarity of
operations
Low skilled labour Building and
intensive
strengthening
production
people’s
institution
Weaving economic
and non-economic
benefits around
people’s inst.
New activity proposed
with investment in
capacity building of
local people
Strategy
Building confidence
among people
through economic
benefits
Building brand
image by
supplying quality
products
Social mobilization
and capacity
building for
accessing services
Multiple stakeholders
collaborating to
provide complementary
services
Capacity building
of the poor and
technology
stabilization
Sequence
of
activities
Production
stabilization phase
with small lag in
market development
Simultaneous
thrust on
production and
marketing
Awareness of target
population and
building institutions
with them
Approach of building
people’s inst and
using it for harnessing
other benefits.
Thrust on technology
development followed
by market
development
Institution Simultaneous
building building of people’s
process
inst for economic
and non-economic
benefits
Based on certain
core principles.
Evolved as the
organization
grew in size
The model was
conceived by the
implementing
agency and
people’s capacity
was developed to
manage them
Three tier federation
model was conceived
and built to facilitate
transactions
No thrust on
institution building,
except for creation
of intermediary
organization
Scaling up Model stabilization
Strategy and its replication
in other places
Demand lead
creation of centres
and diversifying
into related
products
Model stabilization
Building cooperatives through and its replication
in other districts
awareness and
capacity building
Sustaina- Still dependent on
bility
outside support for
new ventures
No support, pure Minimal outside
Support required
business model support over time to still for various
manage operations tasks
Thrust on adaptation
of technology and
simultaneous
capacity building
Support required for
forward and
backward linkages
Steps in Livelihood Promotion
Steps Phase
1
2
Feasibility
Study
Activity
Critical processes
Outcomes
Choice of area,
activity and
target
beneficiary
Area
Decision on number of
villages, blocks or districts
Development Model of grass
root institution,
phase
Production/
service activity,
markets
Spread of pilot
● Technical feasibility
● Manageability
Activity
● Familiar vs new
● Access to resources
● Demand in the market
Target Beneficiary
● Poor vs entire community
● Men, women or both
●
Grass Root Institution (if any)
● Social mobilization
● Structure of the inst.
● Processes for group meeting,
decision making, task
allocation or any other systems
● Costing and pricing of services
● Capacity building strategy
Production/Service Activity
● Choice of technology or
methods and its training
● Collaborating with agencies
providing financial and nonfinancial resources
● Process for provision of input
services
● Implementation
Markets
● Identification of market or
buyer
● Decision on the form and time
of sale
● Investment on processing
and its management–by
whom and where
● Pricing of products and services
Choice of initial activity and
diversification strategy
depending on the objective
Institutional form with clear
purpose, systems and
processes, roles and
responsibilities of members
Product/ services clear to
the ultimate beneficiaries
and initiation of operations
Some contractual form
(informal also) arrived for
sale of produce
Mechanism of market
operations clear to
producers and/or
marketers
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Supporting sustainable livelihoods - Lessons from five case studies
Steps Phase
10
Activity
Critical processes
Outcomes
3
Stabilization
Phase
Corrective
measures
incorporated
based on
feedback
Incorporate feedback for
improving efficiency of the inst;
Production or service delivery
model tested out and well
entrenched
Decision on the time, form and
place of marketing or produce
All the operations
understood and managed
by the beneficiaries with
minimum outside support
4
Scaling Up
Phase
Choice of area
and scale
Decision of the resources required
for scaling up and organizing
them. Identify the collaborators in
new area
The implementation
process replicated suited to
local context, if any
5
Knowledge Documentation Conduct impact and process
Dissemination and information studies. Participate in relevant
sharing
workshops. Exposure visits to
outsiders
Use of customized model
for replication in new areas.
6
Advocacy
and Policy
Work
(if any)
Favourable changes in
policy directives
Participation in
policy forums,
state and
national
workshops
Organise workshop
Documentation of policy issues
Educating various stakeholders
through meetings and
correspondence
DHRUVA - Investing in Natural Resource
Management for Livelihood
Promotion in South Gujarat
Introduction
D
HRUVA stands for Dharampur Utthan Bahini signifying it to be the
propeller of development and awakening in the area, similar to the
navigators use of the polestar (Dhruva) for direction and sailing.
DHRUVA has been involved in economic and social development of the
tribal community in Dharampur block in district Navasari in South Gujarat.
DHRUVA used a holistic view of development with natural resource base as
the core intervention for economic development of the community in the
initial stage, subsequent to which they moved into other areas such as literacy,
health, etc. The case looks into the process of integrated development in the
area over a period of time.
Case Methodology
In order to understand the process of the intervention and its impact, the
following methodology was used:
● Discussion with the key officials at the Headquarters of DHRUVA as
well as the field staff
● Field visits along with the staff to understand the implementation outcome
and the processes used therein
● Semi-structured interviews with the beneficiaries, including community
based organizations
● Sharing of preliminary findings with the officials to check the veracity of
the conclusions drawn
● Study of the secondary material on the organization and intervention
per se
Based on the above, the inferences would be drawn about major learnings
from the intervention and its replicability potential.
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Supporting sustainable livelihoods - Lessons from five case studies
Process of Intervention
The standardization of the WADI program evolved over a period of time
as an integrated package of livelihood program which includes income
generating activity through horticulture program, soil and water conservation,
improved farming and forestry, health and women’s development and microfinance. The initial approach is establishment of fruit orchard from where
several other programs were incorporated.
The term WADI is the local term for a fruit orchard. In the program at the
beneficiary level which is mostly the tribals, one acre of plot is selected to plant
fruit trees, namely mango and cashew. Recommended distances and variety is
planted, keeping in requirement of the demand for market and processing. Intercropping of vegetables is done in the plot, which gives an additional but frequent
income. On the boundary, forest plantation is normally done, which serves dual
purpose of both as a fencing as well as for investment purpose. Such an
arrangement helps in generating income flow periodically to the families.
But over the years, the families also have been diversifying into other
enterprises. One of the most common ones was mango nursery, which most
of the households are raising in their homestead land. The other major activity
promoted in the area is diary with the help of credit from the mobilized
savings of the Self-Help Groups.
Such an approach represents a conscious strategy of developing and
maintaining a diversified portfolio using the natural resource base effectively
and judiciously. Such a portfolio also had been developed over a period of
time accompanied by the development of skills of the people and higher
ability for investment and risk associated with such diversification.
In addition to promoting the Wadi program, DHRUVA also carried out
soil and water conservation like trench cum bunds and tree platforms and
micro-watershed development program. This twin approach has helped in
enhancing land productivity and greater access to drinking water and irrigation.
Moreover, the community health program and women development through
self-help groups were also taken up as other important support programs.
Scaling up Strategy
The initial program was started in Vansda Taluka in Valsad district in 1982.
Due to the paucity of the staff, difficult terrain, poor infrastructure as well as
gestation period required for standardization of the intervention, it was limited
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Supporting sustainable livelihoods - Lessons from five case studies
to Vansda taluka covering 38 villages. In 2000, the project was extended to
Dhrampur and Kaparada talukas in Valsad district as well as Ahwa Taluka in
Dang district.
Such a scaling up of the program was done consciously to develop and
offer a standardized product to the beneficiaries, provide the much required
forward and backward linkages to support the program and building of the
local institutions which can manage the local issues and problems with minimal
support from the promoting organization.
Impact of the Programme
DHRUVA in partnership with about 19,000 tribal families has been able to
covert about as many 17,000 odd acres of wasteland into productive orchards.
Since its inception, 4,63,005 mangoes, 5,05,630 cashew and 79,22,300
forest trees has been planted. The coverage in three districts is given below:
District
Taluka
Navsari
Vansda
Valsad
Dharampur
Kaparada
Dang
Ahwa
Total
Total
Villages
Total
Families
Total
Acreage
38
5,686
5,129
144
12,958
12,128
19
792
679
201
19,436
17,936
Source: Annual Report, 2003-04
More than 8,000 wadi farmers have already completed soil conservation
activities in their plots and another 3,000 farmers are undertaking conservation
activity presently. The watershed program is covering 28 villages through 13
micro-watershed program. The watershed progam envisages to cover about
6,872 hectares in which 3,905 hectares has already been treated.
Role of Institutions
The achievements of DHRUVA can be attributed to a large extent to the
quality and role of institutions involved in the project. Two categories of
institutions and their roles in promoting and sustaining the project interventions
are described below.
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Supporting sustainable livelihoods - Lessons from five case studies
Role of BAIF - The livelihood promoter
The key role played by BAIF in piloting the core strategy of DHRUVA and
sustaining it for almost two decades through a cadre of dedicated workers is
evident from the impact on the ground. BAIF’s Gandhian approach to
community development, enshrined in the vision of its founder, the late
Manibhai Desai, has certainly acted as a guiding light to determine the
direction of the project. BAIF’s selection of the project area in a backward
taluka of South Gujarat and its analysis of the problem of poverty was
impeccable as it addressed both social and economic dimension of the
poverty simultaneously. It could only have been a strong moral imperative
that allowed Manibhai Desai to foresee the dangers of making an intervention
to enhance incomes without addressing the rampant problem of alcoholism.
Thus the early message was strongly pro-prohibition. At the same time the
choice of using the natural resource base to build livelihoods was an effective
strategy, given that the subsistence oriented exploitation of the available natural
resources could be intensified with tangible benefits in a short period of time.
As a strategy, BAIF also realized the importance of offering a model
indigenous to the society that was easily identified with and understood by
the community. The community responded to the concept of mango plantations
since most of the tribals to whom the package was offered had worked as
wage labourers on the farms of large farmers who owned mango plantations.
There was a ready association with plantations and prosperity in the minds of
the tribals, as well as familiarity with basic cultural practices, that BAIF
intelligently tapped into.
Given the above it must be concluded that BAIF showed immense skills of
communication with the community, analysis and adaptive responsiveness in
its early work in the area. It has gradually expanded its program to cover
more than 20,000 families after a small beginning. The dedication and
commitment of its field workers is impressive. With modest salaries and basic
facilities they have worked as facilitators of tremendous social and economic
change. Most of the staff interviewed during the field visit showed high levels
of awareness and understanding about their role and responsibilities, as well
as shortcomings and areas for improvement.
BAIF is an ideal example of a rural livelihood promoter with an integrated
view of livelihoods and the hand-holding role required of the facilitating
agency. It has gradually enabled the community institutions it has promoted
to assume greater responsibility for decision making and has sought to ensure
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Supporting sustainable livelihoods - Lessons from five case studies
sustainability by creating linkages to markets and credit. BAIF is aware of the
importance of its facilitating role and is proud of it. In fact, it does not subscribe
to the concept of an ‘exit strategy’. It foresees an evolving role for itself in the
area, with newer economic investments and services being offered to the
community to scale up from their present level of livelihoods. However,
the NGO believes that the scale-up could be based on a ‘user pays’
model. While details are as yet unavailable or to be developed, if
such an approach is ever presented it promises to uncover a new paradigm
in livelihood promotion.
Role of grassroots institutions
BAIF implemented a conscious strategy of nurturing people’s institutions
as a core component of its livelihood model. This involved the creation and
support to four separate kinds of institutions:
● At the village level it promoted women’s self help groups (SHGs) and
other user groups (such as orchard growers). Each of these grassroots
bodies had between 10-15 members.
● All the user groups and SHGs were federated into a Gram Vikas Mandal
(GVM) at the village level. The GVM on an average has 80-100
households as members.
● An Ayojan Samiti (AS-Management Committee) was formed with 1215 members chosen from among the various user groups.
● At each cluster of 25-30 villages a cooperative was registered, with
around 1800 primary members, each household commanding two
shares, one each for the man and wife.
This carefully layered structure helped to address separate but
complementary needs:
i) The user groups and SHGs at the village level functioned as common
interest groups, the former addressing the needs of farmers and fruit
growers and the latter exclusively focused on women and micro
savings.
ii) The GVM functioned in lieu of a gram sabha, which was not formally
formed at the time under the state panchayat law, and provided a
forum where all the participating households could meet on a common
platform and take collective decisions. The GVM also acted as a
village level financial intermediary, pooling savings from every
household on the day the “Holi” festival is celebrated and giving out
loans to various member households for a one year term at a fixed
25% per annum interest by common consent.
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Supporting sustainable livelihoods - Lessons from five case studies
iii) The AS was a functional body that took day to day management
decisions and reported back to the GVM.
iv) The cluster cooperative was meant to answer the needs of marketing
of farm produce and also leveraged the potential of value addition
through agro processing, bulk purchase of inputs and linking to larger
financial resources.
An important observation about the development of people’s organisations
in DHRUVA is that it accompanied, and not preceded, the livelihood
interventions. This is seen as counter intuitive to several livelihood development
projects which insist on a sequential arrangement involving promotion and
stabilization of grassroots organisations such as SHGs, cluster association
etc. before mounting the livelihood interventions. BAIF holds that the
community’s engagement with participatory institutions must be seen as part
of an overall plan that appears to give them immediate and tangible benefits.
The long term evolution of the various tiers of institutions in DHRUVA would
lend credence to this approach.
The widespread success and sustainability of the DHRUVA model in Valsad
rests to a considerable extent on these institutions. They provide the element
of ownership to the community and answer felt needs and aspirations. The
strength of these institutions varies, and BAIF is candid in admitting that it
places staffers in each of these bodies to provide advice, managerial support
and hand-holding. This is not seen as encouraging dependence but rather
as providing continuous resource support that is critical to the functioning and
survival of these grassroots bodies. It is debatable whether the goal of total
self-reliance of community institutions in remote rural hinterlands can be
realized in the sense of their total autonomy in functioning.
Specialised services such as preparing accounts, balance sheets, calculating
interest payments, drawing up village resource plans, watershed designs etc.
may need to be provided from outside in the long term. There are already
examples (such as the Community Resource Centre model promoted by
MYRADA in Karnataka) to suggest that there is a rethink in the development
sector about the definition of the concept of self reliance of community
institutions and DHRUVA offers a good case study of the importance of
sustaining such institutions. BAIF accepts its responsibility of providing
continuous inputs to these bodies, but its not clear how it hopes to meet the
long term costs of such support. Grant based support will not last forever and
a fee-based model is yet to be fully grounded.
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Supporting sustainable livelihoods - Lessons from five case studies
Targeting and Equity Issues
The fact that the majority of the beneficiaries were tribals, who used to eke
out their living as wage labours, is a good evidence that program chose the
economically and socially deprived sections of the village. The intervention
was carried in homestead land signifying that the families owned very little or
no land for agricultural purposes. However, there was no conscious strategy
for targeting women in the program. Some of the recent initiatives of bringing
women together through SHG have been taken up along with health issues
of women and children is a step forward towards the same in the program.
Financial Linkages
One of key factors to success in terms of outreach and scale is tapping
of financial resources from various quarters in a phased manner. This
included a process of internal generation of funds from the community,
including women.
In the beginning, DHURVA got the required grant from KFW for initiating
the program. After its initial success and stabilization of the program, DHRUVA
attracted funds from multiple sources from the State Government through
DRDA, DPIP as well as NABARD. The Government of Gujarat helped in
establishment of Wadis through the Tribal Sub Plan in Vansda, Dharampur
and Kaprada as well as in Dang district DHRUVA also tapped the financial
resources from the Department of Agriculture and Co-operation, Ministry of
Agriculture, Central Government for promotion of integrated horticulture,
especially homestead vegetable and floriculture. In the year 2003-04, the
cost of establishing 1,500 wadis has been sanctioned through the Rastriya
Gram Vikas Yojana.
The promotion of Self-Help Groups helped in mobilising savings as well
as extending of credit for various income generating activities. A total of 436
SHGs has been formed in 135 villages with their cumulative savings and
credit were around Rs.19.4 lakhs and Rs.18.5 lakhs respectively.
As mentioned earlier, DHRUVA has also promoted community based credit
program, known as Sahabhagi Vikas Yojana for several need based credit
for farm and non-farm activities, including working capital loan for
co-operatives. The cumulative credit disbursed through the program is
Rs. 332.65 lakhs and the cumulative recovery is around 269.29 lakhs.
It is evident that the strategy of tapping external sources for program level
17
Supporting sustainable livelihoods - Lessons from five case studies
intervention and use of internally generated fund to meet the impending
credit needs of individuals seemed a complementary approach. But a strategy
for direct linkage with the financial institutions seemed to be absent in the
approach which can be looked in the near future.
Marketing and Technology Linkages
One of the reasons for the success of the program is the well defined
strategy of forward and backward linkages in the project. This was facilitated
with the establishment of producer’s co-operatives, which helped in both
aggregation of produce as well as distribution of inputs, thereby creating
economies of scale in both the functions. The aggregation of produce also
helped in higher realization of prices.
The strategy of local value addition through people’s institution helped in
higher retention and thereby income among the producers. This was done
through the establishment of processing centres in a cluster of villages for
both mango and cashew. For marketing of the produce, the creation of
brand ‘Vrindivan’ was another significant step which helped in tapping the
local retail market for mango pickles and pulp.
The marketing support function is done through the 12 Co-operatives,
which also acts as an apex body for 12-15 Ayojan Samitis. These institutions
are engaged in mango and cashew processing, marketing of farm produce,
purchase of inputs in bulk and distributing the same in a decentralised manner.
The wadi farmers have contributed Rs. 14.2 lakhs as a share capital. The
Vasundhara Co-operative is the oldest co-operative, which is providing the
marketing support to all newly formed co-operatives. In the financial year
2003-04, about 192 tonnes of cashew and 560 tonnes of mango was
processed. The sales turnover of Vasundhara co-operative in 2000-01 was
Rs. 72.61 lakhs and it increased to Rs. 204.21 lakhs in 2003-04, registering
a growth of around 200 percent.
Sustainability Prospects
The period of the existence of the institutions and program is somewhat an
evidence of the sustainability of the program. The program judiciously
combined economic benefits and development of local institutions around
these benefits which will probably help in its management beyond the handholding period. The reasons for its sustainability are:
● Choice of program which uses the prior knowledge and is not alien to
the people
18
Supporting sustainable livelihoods - Lessons from five case studies
●
●
●
●
It revolves around natural resource base management with which the
beneficiaries were familiar
Building of skills of the people over a period of time in other activities
(nursery) and management of both own farm and institutions so that
the interest is sustained
Assurance of market to the producers is one of the key elements of
enhanced participation and its scaling up
The conscious strategy of building trust within the community and efficacy
of staying and working together through institutions
The project should now looks for institutional linkages for accessing financial
resources, which may be required for re-plantation of the orchard as
well as for any other requirement for access to better technology or
diversification plans.
Replicability Potential
The spread of the program in the number of villages in three districts itself
is an evidence of the scope of replicability of the program. The intervention
can be started in hilly terrain or even in the plains with suitable agro-climatic
conditions with moderate to high rainfall areas. One of the key elements of
success is to ensure a market of the produce, which may not be done through
the program, at least in the initial stages.
The same program can be replicated around other activities, which can
judiciously use the existing natural resource base but with a shift from traditional
agriculture. The possible avenues could be floriculture, olericulture or even
cultivation of medicinal plants but with an existence of an assured buyer.
Conclusion
The success of the project is apparent from the scale it has achieved in two
decades and the number of the beneficiaries it had supported. This has been
made possible through an array of phased interventions in the area. However,
the project deliberately initiated with interventions familiar to the community,
which was followed by diversification into other activities, which required some
skill development and use of low technology. Concomitant with the flow of
economic benefits, the project build people institution which provided the
much required support services around these activities. In the process, the
project developed the capacity of the people in management of institution
as well as the activities beneficiaries pursued. This helped in ensuring both
operational and financial sustainability of the program.
19
Supporting sustainable livelihoods - Lessons from five case studies
Major Learnings
The intervention was primarily based on the existing skills and knowledge
of the people in orchard cultivation. This skill was harnessed by providing the
beneficiaries necessary support for cultivation on their homestead land. This
helps the people to identify with the work and is sure of the outcome, which
makes it easier for adoption.
The other important learning was intensive use of the land, which ensures
greater flow of income to the poor families. The diversified portfolio approach,
as often seen in poor families, for sustenance was taken into account using
the same resources. This also sustained the interest of the people in the program.
The phased nature of expansion of both activities undertaken and area
gives the scope for standardization of the intervention to be carried out
and therefore is easier to implement. The critical aspect of management of
such program is the decision on the time when the scaling up of activities is to
be done.
Building people’s institution is as important as providing economic
benefits. The question to be answered is when and how the efforts of institution
building process is to be undertaken- preceding or simultaneously with the
economic intervention. The process of institution building around the economic
activity undertaken in the program is evident in the program, which had
helped in sustaining the interest of the beneficiaries.
The issue of thrust on ‘production’ or ‘marketing’ is similar to chicken and
egg problem. But it is important that a large scale intervention should have
well laid out strategy for marketing of the produce as seen in the case.
Decision on the type of market intervention to be taken up often is critical to
the success of intervention and helps in both employment creation as well as
enhanced income to producers.
20
Lijjat - A Women’s Enterprise with a
Difference
Introduction
T
his case study highlights the growth of the Shri Mahila Griha Udyog
Lijjat Papad (popularly known just as Lijjat) over a period of four
decades. Lijjat is an endeavour managed solely by women which has
attracted worldwide attention. The prime reason for its success can be attributed
to adherence to some core principles and practices by its members and by
following a simple process of manufacturing with great stress on maintaining
quality. The study traces the evolution of Lijjat from a tiny endeavour of a
group of women to its present scale of operations and attempts to develop
an understanding of the underlying factors that contributing to its phenomenal
success as well as the scope for replicating such models or processes in other
sectors for generating sustainable livelihoods.
Lijjat is an atypical model since the members believed and practiced
principles of co-operation and collective ownership from the very beginning
and in the process built an institution that could compete and survive in a
fiercely competitive market on its own strength. We are conditioned to expect
that cooperative economic ventures must have an in-built element of subsidy,
at least in the initial stages (e.g. NDDB and the milk revolution, or even sugar
production). However, Lijjat’s success is entirely without any official support
or subsidy. It is also noteworthy that the venture began without any external
agency or promoter. It was the up-scaling of a cottage industry by a group of
completely untrained and semi skilled women. These several factors make
Lijjat an unusual and a typical livelihood model. The fact that Lijjat not only
helped its members attain a steady income but also indirectly contributed to
their empowerment, which makes it unique among all the cases, studies in
this series.
21
Supporting sustainable livelihoods - Lessons from five case studies
Case Methodology
In order to understand the process and its impact, the following
methodology was used:
● Discussion with the key officials at the headquarters of Lijjat as well as in
the branches
● Semi-structured interviews with the members
● Sharing of preliminary findings with Lijjat functionaries to check the
veracity of the conclusions drawn
● Study of the secondary material on the organization
Based on the above, inferences were drawn about major learnings from
the intervention and the potential for replicating it in other areas.
Process of Intervention
Lijjat Papad is a highly decentralised enterprise where the production process
is broken up into several self-contained steps which engage a large number
of women with low skills using their homes as a work place. Seven women
initiated the venture in 1957 to earn additional income through the use of
their idle time. Even though these women made initial losses, they persisted in
their operations using ingredients from their houses. Their low overheads and
attractive prices rapidly created a demand for their product. As demand
increased, more and more women entered the production process and the
number rose to 25 within three months. With the profits of the first six months,
each of the members of the group bought 5 grams of gold.
Thus was born, again unconsciously, the practice of equal profit sharing
among the group, irrespective of their individual contribution. Additional rooms
and space were rented as and when required for rolling and drying papads,
but by the third year the physical space required for rolling out the volume of
papads in demand was simply not available. This paucity of space forced
the Lijjat sisters into their single most innovative production decision. This was
a significant decision to decentralise the production of papads from a
centralised location to the homes of the members of the group. Thus, at one
stroke, the physical capacity to produce papads dramatically multiplied. This
enabled the group to respond to the growing demand without having to
invest upfront in workspace, machinery or overheads.
The new model of decentralised production was simplicity itself. Papads
were prepared at home premises using a simple technology through
rolling and drying. The prepared papads were then delivered to the
22
Supporting sustainable livelihoods - Lessons from five case studies
branch office the next morning while another batch of pre-mixed dough
is collected for the next day production. The quality check of the papads
was done by experienced members in the branch on the spot at the time
of delivery through visual inspection and the rejection percentage was
intimated and recorded. Payment for the production was made the
following day to each member. This is the standard operating practice
of Lijjat Papad even today. Thus a systematic production process evolved,
with a keen eye on every detail leading to high quality standards
and timeliness.
In addition to streamlining the production process as described above,
Lijjat also carved out a market niche for itself through systematic brand building
over the years. The strategy of identifying commission agents and cash only
sales resulted in ready availability of funds in the business rapid and continuous
growth. Marketing was ensured through seven sales offices across the country.
Lijjat has also geared up towards changing times and explored new markets,
including the exports.
Another innovative and strong aspect is the system of accounting. A daily
record of sales and payments is maintained and a statement of accounts is
prepared every evening by the accountant and vetted by the Sanchalika1 . At
the end of each month a profit and loss account as well as balance sheet has
to be completed. Even today, if the accounts are incomplete, the branch
does not open for work the next day till the accounts are finalised. This has
given a tremendous sense of discipline to both workers and managers alike
and has evolved to the level of an ethic. Despite the effort required to achieve
this level of updation through a largely manual system the exercise is treated
as a routine and not exceptional.
Over time the intervention kept expanding horizontally. As the scale of
operations grew, more and more in-house divisions were formed – processing
of flour, grinding masala, printing and polypropylene packing were formed
one by one. Lijjat also expanded into producing and marketing other products,
such as powder detergent which have become fairly successful.
Scaling up Strategy
From an initial membership of 7 women in Mumbai, the organisation
today boasts of a membership of around 42,000 women across the country.
1
The woman heading the branch is called the Sanchalika.
23
Supporting sustainable livelihoods - Lessons from five case studies
Again, from a one stop organisation which completed all processes under
one roof, the organization today has 63 branches and 40 divisions spread
out in 17 states of India.
Gaura Bai- A Lijjat Sister’s Story
Dharavi supplies papad to 5 Lijjat centres in Mumbai. Gaura Bai
Wadkar is 32 years old and lives in a jopadpatti in the Dharavi slums.
Her appearance testifies a life full of activity and work combined with
an air of quiet competence and efficiency. She has also become a
Lijjat packer for the past nine years. In addition, she rolls papad daily,
the quantum of which depends on her engagement in packing at the
Centre. On such packing duty days, she takes home 3 kgs of dough for
rolling the papads. This is because she is busy in the Centre till 11 AM
in the morning. Packing fees are generally worth 5-6 kgs of dough
which is around Rs.70 approximately. The days that she is not allotted
packing duty, Gaura Bai takes home 5 kgs of prepared dough which
takes her 4 hours to prepare, she gets around Rs.70/-. The average
monthly income is around Rs. 3,000. Gaura Bai’s husband is a daily
labourer who earns less than Gaura Bai, due to irregular employment.
Her day begins at 4 a.m. when she cooks for the day. Thereafter she
goes to the Bandra centre, which is about 15 minute ride on the bus run
by Lijjat enterprise. On days of packing duty (which is about 4 times a
week) she is engaged in packing until 10 or 11 a.m. On other days,
she picks up dough and gets back home by 6-6.30 a.m. She has to
devote around four-to five hours daily to roll the papads. Gaura’s papad
rolling has brought a stable income into her home, allowing her to
send both sons and daughter to school. She would love to be in a
managerial position in Lijjat, but feels she is not educated enough to
be in a decision making position and is not in a position to give time to
educate herself. She feels that her association with Lijjat has helped her
in own self development.
Lijjat scaled up its operations through a strategy of replicating the standard
operating structure and procedures of the Mumbai model in other parts of
the country. The need for expansion was caused by a “demand pull”, whereas
word of mouth publicity combined with good quality and attractive pricing
created an ever increasing demand for the product. The decentralised
production model enabled Lijjat to rapidly respond to market demand, while
24
Supporting sustainable livelihoods - Lessons from five case studies
its low cost model kept competitors from eating into its market share. The mode
of replication is also highly systematic. A few experienced members physically
relocate to the city or site of the new branch. The team goes through a checklist
that includes finding adequate premises, selecting and training core staff, training
new members and establishing the physical and financial systems. This can last
for a period of several months. If one or more of the team members deputed
from the head office need to return to Mumbai before the systems are fully
functional, new volunteers replace them to complete the job. This handholding
period generally last up to 6 months but can continue till such time the new unit
is able to run its own affairs efficiently. This in essence is the basic manner of
branch expansion. When the new branch stabilizes, it nurtures additional
branches in a similar manner. Members are deputed to fan out and are given
the responsibility of ensuring proper functioning of the unit. Thus, the in-house
method of expansion through replication ensures both training and handholding support to new units. This is the key to the high level of standardisation
that Lijjat has been able to achieve.
Due to their consistent high quality, reasonable pricing, regularity and
reliability of its supply chain, Lijjat’s papad slowly began to occupy a market
niche. Largely by virtue of word of mouth publicity of the home fresh nature
of the product and the authentic cottage nature of the enterprise, the demand
for Lijjat products far outstripped its supply. This led to the opening of more
branches, first in Mumbai city, where operations were concentrated and then
later in other parts of Maharashtra, Gujarat and other states.
Today Lijjat has 62 branches, 17 being in Mumbai and its suburbs, 11
in the rest of Maharashtra and 12 in Gujarat. The remaining 23 branches
are spread across the states of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Delhi, Haryana,
Jharkhand, Jammu &Kashmir, Kerala, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh,
Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal.
The strong concentration in Mumbai, Maharashtra and Gujarat reflects
the origins and growth of the organisation as a natural progression of
sorts, where affinity and perhaps more responsive for growth and
diversification than a conscious scaling up strategy. It also reflects on
consumer dietary preferences in the region which Lijjat was able to identify
and exploit successfully.
In the first 7 years of its existence (1959 to 1966) Lijjat functioned as an
unregistered organisation. In 1966-67 it was registered as a public trust and
recognised by the Khadi & Village Industries Commission (KVIC) for tax breaks
25
Supporting sustainable livelihoods - Lessons from five case studies
and interest subsidies. Yet the professional manner in which it was managed
by women without any formal training in running an enterprise reflects on
their motivation and self-learning abilities. It also supports the notion that
entrepreneurship is an acquired asset and need not always be attained
through formal learning processes.
Lijjat is an excellent case of in-built expansion and diversification of a
successful livelihood strategy. Besides its branches in several parts of the country
it has also established its own support divisions catering to most input supply
and output packaging needs, thereby ensuring that quality inputs are used in
its production processes, which contributes to sustaining quality. The allied
divisions include dal and flour mills. Some go-downs were also constructed
to support logistics.
The brand recognition of Lijjat was also used periodically into both related
and unrelated product. The Khakra division set up in 1974, flour mills in
1975, masala division in 1976 are some of the related examples of
diversification of the Lijjat enterprise. The attempt was to use the positive
brand image of Lijjat papads to push other food products. However, these
products did not succeed in the same manner as the papad venture, largely
because Lijjat was not able to independently promote them through a focused
marketing effort. It relied on the goodwill for the Lijjat brand to carry these
products forward but did not factor in the much bigger competition and cutthroat marketing and advertising efforts that other competing products in
these categories could muster. Recently, Lijjat has ventured into the supply of
chapattis in Mumbai. In other unrelated diversification choices, there were
failures such as leather and production of matches. Both had to be closed
down as these turned out to be unviable. However, the most successful
diversification was the production of detergent. The Lijjat detergent brand,
SASA, has met with tremendous success. SASA has 6 production units, a
research and quality control division and a sales and purchase office.
Occupying a niche in a highly price sensitive market without the advertising
blitz associated with larger brands, SASA is another example of innovation
and responding to market needs.
Marketing of Lijjat products is supported by advertising division, seven
sales offices and the export division. This reflects another strong element
of learning involved in the enterprise and can be compared with many
larger organizations that devote considerably greater resources to
these aspects.
26
Supporting sustainable livelihoods - Lessons from five case studies
Impact of the Programme
The impact of the enterprise can best be understood by the outreach that
Lijjat has been able to attain over these years. Lijjat has a membership of
around 42,000 women in 17 states of the country. Lijjat has been a vehicle
of social empowerment for these women as also benefiting them financially
by providing them sustained returns for their work2 . According to the Annual
Report of 2003-04, the accumulated profits of the Lijjat enterprise stand at
Rs. 48.32 crores while the annual profit for the year are Rs. 6.54 crores. This
was achieved on an annual turnover in 2003-04 of Rs. 310 crores. The
average monthly income to each worker is Rs.3000/The decentralised production methodology has ensured that the women
do not have to leave their homes for work and allows them flexible working
schedule enabling them to discharge other household responsibilities. This
account for the easy acceptance of the work among such a large number of
women since they feel their economic activity will not disrupt the family by
their absence. Men are also less hostile to women working at home for extra
income than travelling to a workplace.
Lijjat has engendered democratic principles through member participation
as part of its administrative culture. The women not only take day-to-day
decisions, but also elect members to the management committee from among
themselves. In this respect Lijjat was much beyond just an entrepreneurial venture,
it was a symbol of women’s strength. These women were actually helping each
other to grow beyond the confines of their homes, to take on greater responsibility
and develop a sense of self-worth and self-esteem. Many women who had
little formal education were handling money and banking transactions and
managing a business of around Rs. 300 crores annually.
Role of Institutions
The most remarkable aspect of Lijjat is the absence of an outside agency in
kick starting the enterprise. It is truly a homegrown model based on the intuitive
intelligence and self-learning skills of a small group of poor women. It reiterates
the now widely held belief that the poor are highly entrepreneurial and only
seeking an enabling environment to realise their potential. It is equally remarkable
that while the venture began on a very small scale, and went on to organically
grow in size, it retained its essential character in spirit and in practice all through.
Lijjat is a voluntary organisation with collective ownership and trusteeship being
2
Technically this income is in the form of profit sharing for all women of a centre/branch.
27
Supporting sustainable livelihoods - Lessons from five case studies
practiced. In the process, Lijjat evolved into an institution based on some core
principles strictly adhered by the members and simultaneous development of
simple systems and processes, understood and practiced diligently by all
members. The other unique feature in Lijjat is that it has remained a member
owned and managed body resisting the rise of a small managerial elite that
normally takes control in all such institutions as they grow in size. This helped
Lijjat become a highly effective livelihood intervention which also promoted
economic and social growth and mobility of its women members.
Some initial guidance, which in effect laid the founding principles of Lijjat
Papad, was provided by Chaganlal Karamshi Parekh or Chaganbapa, a
community elder and social worker. He advised these women on how to
translate core Sarvodaya values into working principles.
One institution involved in promoting the growth of Lijjat was the Khadi
and Village Industries Corporation (KVIC), which recognised the value of
Lijjat’s work and registered it under the ‘Processing of Cereals and Pulses
Industry Group’, under the KVIC Act which helped them to access cheaper
funds from banks and enjoy tax benefits.
Targeting and Equity Issues
By the nature of its work and philosophy, Lijjat is a self-targeting enterprise.
Its pro-poor bias is part of its institutional genetic code. It is an articulated
working philosophy that the organisation is “neither for the poor sisters, nor
for the rich ones” (Basic Philosophy and Practices of our Organisation, Symbol
of Women’s Strength- Lijjat Press 2004)3 . Since only women from the lower
income groups are actually willing to do the work of rolling papads, in itself
a highly laborious and time consuming undertaking, the nature of the activity
makes for a self-selection among the economically active poor. There is also
self-selection in terms of women with a somewhat entrepreneurial aptitude
since the earnings are both in the form of both in the form of wages and
shared profits. What is even more important is their sense of ownership of the
enterprise and the role that many of them play in management. This makes
Lijjat one of the most equitably owned and managed enterprises operating
at this level. It also accounts for its rapid expansion and growth, which is a
reflection of a collective decision. Without proclaiming themselves as icons
of gender equity, the Lijjat members have demonstrated that it is possible to
run a profitable commercial enterprise entirely for and by women.
3
28
Jaswantiben Popat, quoted in EPW, Malathi Ramanathan, Women & Empowerment, Shri Mahila Griha Udyog
Lijjat Papad, April 24, 2004.
Supporting sustainable livelihoods - Lessons from five case studies
Jyoti Naik-An Epitome of Women Empowerment
Jyoti Naik is the eldest of the family of four brothers and sisters. She is
associated with Lijjat from 1971 when she started rolling pappads at the age
of twelve. She got additional work in Lijjat through her deputation into the
packaging section. Thereafter, she has been taking higher responsibilities in
the organization and rose to rank of President. She started managing inventory
at the Bandra branch in 1973, when she was in charge of stores, looking
after stocks, preparing and packaging papad dough. Despite tragedy of
untimely demise of her mother in 1976, she was rolling papads and managing
Lijjat packaging section and in the process continued to earn well.
Simultaneously, she managed four siblings at home. She had to discontinue
her education after class X as the demands on her time were too high.
From then onwards, Jyoti was transferred to the Vadala branch in 1981
as Sanchalika, also become the Editor of the Lijjat Patrika. Later she
became member of the Central Committee, which in turn made her Vice
President in 1989 and thereafter rose to rank of President. As is the practice
of paying on basis of papad rolled, Jyoti’s income is equivalent to the
value of 30 kg of rolled papads a day, attesting to the value the
organisation puts on her increased responsibilities.
Her long years with Lijjat have given her a huge wealth of intuitive institutional
knowledge. Even today Jyoti goes to a branch at 4 am 2 or 3 times a week,
comes to the head office at 10 am and often stays till 7-8 pm in the evening
for all seven days. Jyoti is in touch with Sanchalikas over phone daily across
the country ironing out administrative details, responding to queries and
monitoring supply and production figures. There is a collegiate atmosphere
in her chamber as she confers with the VP and local Sanchalika discussing
issues that in other organisations of such size would be the preserve of male,
upper class, English speaking professionals. The next day, Jyoti ben, the VP,
Smt. Kamal Bhandore and the Sanchalika Mulund were going to Pune as the
Pune Sanchalika had lost her husband and they wanted to condole his demise.
Thus, Lijjat fosters a strange sense of dignity and equality among the women
as all have risen from the ranks. There is no organisational elite at Lijjat - only
seniority within a sisterhood - bound together by hard work and almost similar
class background. “Sab papad belne wale hai” (all the women are those that
would roll papad), with strong shared ideals of collectivity, equality and mutual
respect. In fact the women refer to their co-sharers as “sisters”, or “sister workers.”
29
Supporting sustainable livelihoods - Lessons from five case studies
The perspective of equity was also strongly present in Lijjat’s organisation
and functioning. Only women could be members and thus owners of the
organisation. The member sisters had started sharing the profits or losses
among themselves from the start.
The other important learning in this regard is the fact that women have an
innate ability to adapt to new roles. Women who began by rolling papads
went on to establish new branches, serve in management positions, direct
marketing efforts and undertake planning and strategic decision-making
functions. This adaptability has enabled Lijjat to achieve a virtually frictionless
transition from a cottage to a large-scale enterprise.
All members, irrespective of their position in the organisation, receive the
same per unit rolling charges. In cases where a branch makes losses due to a
fall in quality standards, all the members share the losses equally by reducing
their rolling charges. The office bearers in the organisation, such as the president
and secretary, have to be not only from the same social milieu, but must also
have to be erstwhile members who rolled papads. The members who show
leadership skills are gradually given greater and greater responsibility, such as
becoming the sanchalika or the branch head and other administrative duties.
This model of power sharing is unique and puts Lijjat virtually in a class of its
own in respect of equity. As is stated in the oath that each member takes on
enrolling Lijjat fosters a sense of dignity and equality.
It is also noteworthy that there is no organisational elite at Lijjat – only
seniority within a sisterhood - bound together by hard work and a common
social background. “Sab papad belne wale hai” (all of us roll papads), is a
slogan truly lived in practice. Strong shared ideals of collectivism, equality
and mutual respect are manifested in the organisation.
Financial Linkages
One of key factors to Lijjat’s success in terms of outreach and rapid scaling
up is the policy of internal generation of resources and rotating working
capital on a weekly/biweekly cycle. Marketing is on a strictly cash-and-carry
basis, allowing for funds to be continuously recycled in the business profit
margins were such that they enabled a rapid scaling up of operations through
continuous expansion. The Sisters Savings Fund is also available to the each
of the Lijjat branches, to tide over short-term cash deficits, in case of necessity.
In addition to self-generated resources, borrowings from KVIC were resorted
to as and when required.
30
Supporting sustainable livelihoods - Lessons from five case studies
During 1971-76, KVIC had extended loans of Rs. 8.94 lakhs under the
‘Processing Cereals and Pulses Industry Scheme’, which was used for expansion
of existing branches, establishment of new ones and for purchase of
equipment for the masala unit in Mumbai. The organisation scrupulously
rejects charity and grants. Lijjat believes in running its business with acumen
and professionalism on its own resources.
Marketing and Technology Linkages
In a pragmatic departure from the accepted practice of cooperative
endeavours to rely on official marketing outlets or on other semi official
organisations (such as KVIC or state government retail outlets), Lijjat adopted
strictly commercial techniques from the very beginning. It appointed agents
on a commission basis for marketing its products.
Marketing is a centralised function in Lijjat. The branch office is responsible
for setting a target for monthly production and the marketing. Each Lijjat
centre has a clearly delineated marketing territory to avoid competition
amongst centres. Commission agents are attached to almost all Lijjat Centres
and they account for a major part of the Lijjat sales. Another significant
aspect of marketing in Lijjat has been the decision to export its products.
Lijjat’s export revenue in the year 2003-04 was 9 crores.
Lijjat has grown and prospered with its strategy of forward and backward
linkages. The setting up of various divisions for its input supply and output
packaging needs has contributed to creating economies of scale in
procurement as well as production. Head Office sources informed that they
prefer dal from Myanmar, followed by Jalgaon and Latur, as the Indian
varieties do not give them adequate yields, large quantities being wasted as
husk. Purchases in bulk are made through agents. The dals are processed
centrally in Lijjat’s own mills at Vashi and Nasik. Heeng (asafoetida) is imported
from Iran whereas black pepper is purchased from Cochin.
Lijjat has a separate marketing, sales, and advertising divisions. The
commission/discounts paid were over half of the total selling expenses incurred
by Lijjat in the financial year 2003-04. The advertisement expenses at around
3.71 crores were around 15% of the selling expenses.
The use of technology in production at Lijjat Papad would go against the
basic principles of low skill production technique and decentralised production.
As a natural corollary to its lack of upgradation of production technology, its
31
Supporting sustainable livelihoods - Lessons from five case studies
outreach in terms of the number of women it engages is very high. Thus a
successful balance has been achieved between scale, quality and employment.
Sustainability
The scale of operations and phenomenal success of Lijjat Papad without
any external institutional support right from its inception is proof of the basic
soundness and sustainability of Shri Mahila Griha Udyog Lijjat Papad as an
institution. The tenacity with which Lijjat has held on to its principles over a
period of over forty years and yet continue to grow with all its members is a
great tribute to the strength and versatility of the organisation. The responsibilities
of every office bearer and member have been laid down in the constitution
and have been modified with changing times and growth of the organization.
The social and economic milieu it engages in the decentralised papad
production, model the high sense of discipline in timing are among many
other such factors that fuel hope of its sustainability into the future.
In addition, Lijjat has kept pace with the changing marketplace and has
emerged not just as another profitable institution, but a world leader in papad
manufacturing. The uncompromising quality standards of Lijjat, its diversification
into newer divisions to address its own growing needs better, the scale it has
managed to achieve has helped it achieve financial sustainability.
Replicability Potential
The model is replicable into other sectors which require labour intensive
but simple production processes with minimum use of technology. The caution
is how the model is to be adapted to create and maintain the quality standards
as well as ensure concomitant sales of the produce. This is where the greatest
challenge during replication would come.
One of the key factors is the ‘development of market power’ which Lijjat
has been able to enjoy through its brand. Any replication model should have
the aim in building the same, in case, it has to succeed in the medium term of
about ten years. The important factor underlying the success of Lijjat is
management by member-owners rather than by professionals, an effort needs
to be geared on similar lines from initiation.
Conclusion
Lijjat is a movement as much as an enterprise considering the number of
women it has productively engaged, the social impact it has had, and the
augmented incomes it gave to its members. The success of Lijjat does not
32
Supporting sustainable livelihoods - Lessons from five case studies
need speaking for. The tremendous growth it has achieved in around four
decades while combining social and economic imperatives for its target
segment is unparalleled.
While Lijjat Papad is an outstanding institution, it might be in place to
attend to the primary factors that make it so. The institution was created on
the planks of collective ownership and management. The core factors behind
its success and sustainability also remain its collective ownership, management
and its adaptability to changing market conditions.
Major Learnings
The most critical learning is that even uneducated women can take up
higher responsibility, when one gives the right autonomy and environment to
them. The existence of Lijjat empire is a great proof, in which belief in business
and leadership acumen of the women was given a priority to formal training.
The sense of ownership among the Lijjat sister was an important factor
in its success. This helped in achieving efficiency in operations and reaching
a scale with uncompromising quality. It is altogether different from recipient
approach to development which often makes the intervention unsustainable.
The labour intensive and familiar nature of the activity chosen lead
to the success of the initiative. The diversification into new products was a well
thought out decision in Lijjat wherein the skill set of the people was taken into
consideration. The thrusting of new activity to people through training and
capacity building can have chances of failure as was seen in Lijjat also.
The critical aspect of catering to the market demand and tapping the
same is evident in the Lijjat case. It is necessary that markets for products
should be identified first in case of such intervention so that a continuous
cycle of production and sale is maintained. This helps in building confidence
in the beneficiaries to engage themselves in a sustained manner.
Brand building strategy has to be in place, provided the intervention is
to be taken to a scale as Lijjat. This helps in not only having their own niche
market but also helps in diversification into new areas, often seen in large
corporates. Such a large scale operation also requires establishment of
backward and forward linkages for easy and smooth operations as was
evident in Lijjat.
33
Building Sustainable Financial Services for
Women - The Co-operative Development
Foundation in Andhra Pradesh
Introduction
T
he use of co-operative mode to support beneficiaries has been used by
government and quasi-government agencies as well as communities in our
country as well as elsewhere. The co-operative development route has seen
many successes and failures worldwide, a phenomenon observed in all forms of cooperatives, be it a financial, production or marketing co-operative institution. Some
of the successes in the co-operative sector have been unique and is worth examining.
One such institution is Co-operative Development Foundation (CDF) which has been
primarily working in three districts in Telangana region of Andhra Pradesh but has
made significant contribution to the co-operative movement in the country.
The case describes the evolution of CDF from an institution primarily engaged
in promotion of co-operatives to an organization which has spearheaded a
revolution in the co-operative sector. The dual role played by CDF of building
community institutions in the form of co-operatives as well as carrying out policy
advocacy to strengthen the sector is unparalleled in Indian Co-operative history. The
case outlines the process and steps through which the work has been carried out over
three decades and tries to enumerate the critical aspects of the intervention by CDF.
Case Methodology
In order to understand the process of the intervention and its impact, the
following methodology was used:
● Discussion with the key officials at the Headquarters of CDF at Warangal
as well as the field staff
● Field visits to Thrift Cooperatives (TCs) and Association of Women Thrift
cooperatives (AWTC) along with the staff to understand the functioning
of thrift cooperatives and outcome and the processes gone into
formation and consolidation of TCs and AWTCs
● Formal and informal interactions with the members, office bearers and
34
Supporting sustainable livelihoods - Lessons from five case studies
●
●
staff of thrift cooperatives and association of women thrift cooperatives,
Women dairy cooperative
Sharing of preliminary findings with the Programme coordinator, CDF
and President of CDF to check the veracity of the conclusions drawn
Study of the secondary material, impact studies on CDF and publications
on CDF and intervention per se
Based on the above, the inferences would be drawn about major learnings
from the intervention and its replicability potential.
Process of Intervention
CDF started its initiatives in Mulakanoor and its surrounding areas to tap initial
advantage of presence of efficient functioning Mulkanoor Agricultural Cooperative
Society (Now Mulkanoor Cooperative Rural Bank and Marketing Society Ltd1.). In
1975, a group of young volunteers started their work in Rajendranagar Panchayathi
Samithi and institutionalised their efforts into Multipurpose Cooperatives Association
(MCA) in the year 1977. The foundation for the MCA lied in the critical
understandings developed by these group of volunteers and willing cooperators
of the Panchayathi Samithi from an efficiently functioning primary agriculture
cooperative society (PACS) in Mulkanoor of Karimnagar district. The basic attributes
of success of Mulkanoor PACS that the MCA committed to were:
● Optimum size in terms of sustaining healthy internal democracy and
providing financial viability
● Provide input, processing and marketing services to its members
● Access capital from both commercial banks out side the three tier
cooperative system
● In addition to above learning from Mulakanoor success, the volunteers
were committed to inclusion of all sections of village in the PACS.
MCA resolved formally to promote CDF as a society in the year 1981 with the
mandate of co-operative advocacy work, manage and develop the revolving fund
for the use of PACS, and help other types of co-operatives to form into associations.
Thus CDF was registered in the year 1982. The mission of CDF as visualized is
The aim of Cooperative Development Foundation is to promote an
environment in which cooperatives flourish as decentralised,
democratic, self-help and mutual-aid organisations effectively
harnessing and fostering local resources in consonance with the
universally accepted principles of cooperation.
1
Registered under AP Cooperative societies Act 1964 and Converted to AP Mutually Aided Cooperative
Societies Act 1995 in the year 1995
35
Supporting sustainable livelihoods - Lessons from five case studies
The work at grass root level gave CDF the required experience and expertise on
formation of the co-operatives and its management. In its endeavour to promote
Thrift Co-operatives (TC), CDF staffers used to hold an open meeting in the village,
where wide publicity was given to ensure the attendance of the largest possible number
of women. The importance of savings and collective action was explained over several
sessions to the assembly of women. Self selection of groups was then encouraged
and around these informal groupings the thrift cooperatives take shape. Repeated
meetings and trainings ensure that the initial interest does not wane and women see
the TC as an institution that will answer their priority needs.
Thus in the initial period, staff of CDF moved around villages and conducted series
of meetings with women to promote Women Thrift Co-operatives (WTCs). Over the
years, the process of promotion of new thrift cooperatives were done by members of
those WTCs already promoted and facilitated by CDF staff members. Till 1991, CDF
staff was more involved in facilitating promotion of TCs through meetings and extension
work. Thereafter, members of TCs formed were imparted (transfer of skills through
working together) required skills to facilitate and promote Women Thrift Cooperatives
(WTC). Later, CDF staff was involved in this activity only on invitation by willing villagers
as a facilitator of forming the TC. The success of WTCs has lead to men coming
forward to form TCS and the same iterative process was followed for formation of
Men Thrift Cooperatives (MTCs).
The TCs promoted by CDF are unique in terms of their capital base for loans. The thrift
of members is only form of capital in these societies, which is used for giving loans to
members. The thrift of members can be withdrawn only in the event of member withdrawing
his/her membership. The membership of the TCs ranges from 300 to 900 members. The
attributes of these societies that stand out are member awareness, strong ownership feeling
and member driven governance. The process followed by CDF contributed to establishing
of self serviced and patronised entities rather than one with a service-provider relationship.
The member-directors attend the TC office every day all through the working hours indicating
the importance given to promotion of a self-governed institution.
In the initial period, most of the tasks in the TC were handled by CDF staff, including
accounting, returns etc. Thereafter, a Board of Directors was formed in each TC from
among the members. Women would elect to accept posts through a show of hands. The
leaders (BOD) and CDF staff worked together at the various responsibilities. Transactions
were often done at night, when women members returned from labour work on fields or
work sites. The pass book was a simple postcard sized card. Paperwork was kept simple
and at a minimal level. At the end of two years the early associations (Mulukanoor,
Kothapath, Makdumpuram) were formed and more staff was recruited. The associations
36
Supporting sustainable livelihoods - Lessons from five case studies
recruited accountants who would physically move from village to village to write the book
of accounts for the TCs as per a preset time table. The monitoring and supervision work
was shared between CDF and the office bearers of the associations. Regular audit was
undertaken by CDF. This system basically continued with slight changes till 1999. Thereafter,
each WTC gradually recruited its own staff for housekeeping functions. Thus in the overall
process of intervention, CDF gradually transferred the role of promoting cooperatives to
TCs and confined itself to providing services such as Cooperative Audit service, Cooperative
revolving fund assistance for infrastructure development, member education and
management training and promotion of member centred cooperatives under MACS act.
CDF attempts at being wholly inclusive and non discriminatory in terms of outreach.
There is no caste or class bias, its members belong to all castes and social and
economic classes. The fact that monthly contributions are small (Rs.20/-) makes for
self selection from amongst the economically vulnerable sections of society. By stipulating
a sum of Rs. 20 per month as the compulsory savings contribution, CDF sent out an
important signal that its TCs were looking at those with limited savings capacity. Bigger
savers were offered different instruments such as RD (recurring deposit scheme), FD
(fixed deposit) and an ordinary savings bank account.
CDF’s efforts were unquestionably highly innovative in their approach but it must
also be noted that Andhra Pradesh in the 1980s was home to a vigorous and successful
grassroots mobilization effort led by development NGOs. Many successful banking
and micro credit initiatives emerged as a result of these efforts all across the state.
CDF’s efforts were part of this larger trend and will be counted among the more
successful ones. Their vigorous advocacy work to create a conducive legal climate for
autonomous thrift cooperatives to thrive must also be acknowledged. Their belief in
the cooperative cause at a time when the mainstream trend was towards the formation
of self help groups (SHG) is also creditable, since it was promoting an institutional
model that was widely considered a failure and the MACS legislation was not perceived
at that time as a major turning point in the life of primary cooperatives. It was only
subsequently, and largely based on the Andhra experience, that the MACS legislation
was seen as an answer to many of the problems that plague the cooperative system.
Scaling up Strategy
CDF grew to its present stature in three distinct phases. The first phase (1975-85 as
Multipurpose Cooperatives Association) endeavoured to replicate Mulkanoor
cooperative in other parts of the state. During this phase CDF realised that the Andhra
Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act of 1964 was not conducive to replication of
Mulakanoor cooperative, as the law contains several provisions which were not
favourable for promotion of cooperation.
37
Supporting sustainable livelihoods - Lessons from five case studies
Co-operative Structure Promoted by CDF
Structure: Three layered structure with members at the base, Thrift
co-operatives (TCs) in the middle and their federation known as Association of
Thrift Co-operatives (ATCs). The ATCs are formed federating the TCs in a
radius not more than 20 Kms.
Memberships: Men and women are members of MTCs and WTCs
respectively and membership varies from 300 to 900 in each TCs.
General Body (GB): All members of TC are automatic members of GB
whereas in ATCs all the Board Members of the participating TCs constitute the
general body. General body meeting is convened by BoD once in a year, or
on request by members or by Registrar of Co-operative Societies. In ATCs,
General body meeting is convened by BoD once in a year, or on request by
members or by Registrar of Co-operative Societies.
Governance: Twelve members elected by GB constitute the Board of
Directors (BoD) for a three year term in TCs in which four members retire every
year. The President is elected by Board members from among themselves for
a one year term. Monthly meetings, review meetings and special meetings on
requisition by a member is called by the President.
In ATCs, all the Presidents of TCs make up the BoD and the President is
elected for one year term. Monthly meetings, review meetings and special
meetings on requisition by a member is called by the President.
Operations: In TCs, loan, savings and insurance services are offered.
Compulsory, recurring and fixed savings are offered. Loans are available to
members based on the different form of savings. Three times the compulsory
thrift can be taken as loan by a member and the subsequent amount is based
on the loan utilization and repaying capacity. Loans upto 85% of the other
deposits is also available to members. Both life and accident insurance products
are offered to the members.
The second phase (1985-95) was a sustained campaign to advocate for a liberal
cooperative law which was in consonance with universally accepted principles of
cooperation. In this endeavour, CDF had the support of several alliance and networks.
This phase successfully concluded with the enactment of Andhra Pradesh Mutually Aided
Cooperatives act of 1995 (MACS act), a parallel and liberal law.
38
Supporting sustainable livelihoods - Lessons from five case studies
The third phase of CDF’s work though began in a small way in 19901991, took full shape in the year 1995, after the enactment of MACS act.
This phase has execution four clearly defined tasks:
1. Assist men and women in areas around Warangal in forming and
developing new generation cooperatives under the MACS act
2. Disseminate the contents and implications of the MACS Act, through out
Andhra Pradesh to motivate large number of men and women to organise
themselves into cooperatives for their economic and social development
3. Advocate for enactment of liberal cooperative law in other states
4. Disseminate the contents and implications of parallel and liberal
cooperative law in the states where such a law is enacted
As part of strengthening cooperative infrastructure, CDF has established a
Cooperative Infrastructure Fund (CRF). CRF primarily finances working and fixed capital
(Storage infrastructure, agri processing units etc.) requirements of paddy and other agri
cooperatives for processing and marketing. CDF has assisted Women thrift groups
and CTCS to acquire equipment. The fund as of date is about 1.50 crores.
As part of scaling up its advocacy efforts, CDF has published booklets,
pamphlets, posters, press articles, discussion papers for policy-makers, reports
and produced Audio-Visuals extensively.
Impact of the Program
CDF works on the basis that vibrant local economies can bring long term
sustainable development to local communities and to individuals. In this
background CDF encouraged men and women to design, manage and
control the cooperatives and capture a significant share of the local market.
The impact of the approach is depicted in the table 1.
CDF began its journey towards cooperatives promotion in the year 1990
and by 1992; it could promote 8 WTCs and 2 MTCs. As of December 2003
the number of TCs reached a figure of 463 with a combined membership
over one lakh. The number of borrowers increased to 70,000 from a mere
1,000 with corresponding increase in average loan size from Rs.93 to Rs.2,619
in respect of women and from Rs.450 to Rs.4,212 in respect of men.
The other significant impact is in the area of dairy. On this front, 67 Women dairy
cooperatives have been formed with a membership of 8,426. The value of milk
procured (daily average procurement10682 Lts) would be around Rs.2.5 crores. The
dairy women cooperative is exclusively run and managed by women.
39
Sl. No. Description
Unit
As on 31 Dec 1990
As on 31 Dec 1995
As on 31 Dec 2002
As on 31Dec 2003
As on 30 Sep 2004
MTC
WTC
MTC
WTC
MTC
WTC
MTC
WTC
MTC
WTC
1
Members
No
213
1422
3319
13830
35713
51878
39281
63969
40989
68664
2
Thrift Cooperatives
No
2
8
22
63
175
200
187
259
185
253
3
Association of Thrift
Cooperatives
No
1
1
1
6
18
23
15
22
15
21
4
Regular thrift
Rs
15900
90019
1680596 7401827 61889176 47828061 77116000
5828000
98533000 67120000
5
Bonus
Rs
23286689 23952290 22842000
23604000 26982000 27779000
6
Members with
recurring deposits
No
228
1662
262
2107
313
2270
7
Recurring deposit
Rs
405675
1911605
541000
2482000
626000
2908000
8
Members with
savings accounts
No
308
413
351
437
432
458
9
Savings
Rs
351959
99651
629000
140000
855000
161000
Supporting sustainable livelihoods - Lessons from five case studies
40
CDF - Scaling UP and Out reach
Sl. No. Description
Unit
As on 31 Dec 1990
MTC
WTC
As on 31 Dec 1995
MTC
WTC
As on 31 Dec 2002
As on 31Dec 2003
As on 30 Sep 2004
MTC
WTC
MTC
WTC
MTC
WTC
Members with fixed
deposits
No
101
183
100
215
106
212
11
Fixed deposits
Rs
1227352
807932
1250000
943000
1443000
1039000
12
Members in
Abhayanidhi
No
18678
21741
20559
24722
13
Abhayanidhi deposits Rs
14
Total owned funds
Rs
16101
99343
2632360 9692959 1.09E+08 101946918 135830000 122827000 157552000 139275000
15
Borrowers
No
17
980
1767
9764
24200
33602
27729
42128
28989
47956
16
Average membership No
in cooperative
106
177
151
219
205
231
210
247
222
271
17
Average thrift per
member
Rs
975
63
506
535
1729
922
1963
910
3161
977
18
Average loan standing Rs
450
93
1188
885
3706
2619
4212
2619
7389
2571
1292
9374
16549
19991
617750
367339
8686930
10882980 9955000
12200000 11101000 13412000
41
Supporting sustainable livelihoods - Lessons from five case studies
10
Supporting sustainable livelihoods - Lessons from five case studies
Other impact areas include Paddy farmers’ cooperatives brought in to a
Paddy Farmers’ Federation (PFF). PFF provides paddy storage facility of
2,000 tonnes and processing and marketing services to around 1,000
members.
CDF has established a Cooperative Thrift and Credit System (CTCS) in
the states of AP, Karnataka, Tamilnadu, Goa and Pondichery. CTCS has a
membership base of about 200,000 which is organised into 14 regional
associations and one apex federation.
After gradual withdrawal from the task of promotion and formation of
TCs (transferred the skills to TCs), CDF has taken up training and consultancy
services to dairy, agriculture and other cooperatives and their networks as
also to various cooperative development and financing institutions.
Impact at TC Member Level
The women members, in majority cases put loans for productive purposes.
These were to expand existing business and also start new ventures. These
economic activities were provision store, cloth shops, tailoring, bangles shops,
tea shops, spices business/grinding units etc. Further women have acquired
the status to spend more on themselves and their children on education,
health care, buying gold, house hold articles such as sofa/TV etc. Members
expressed that availability of loans for both productive and consumption/
personal purpose loans and timely availability of loans have contributed to
better utility of loans and its usefulness in improving their lives and living
standard.
Other benefits included culture of saving in banks, increased level of self
confidence, assuming power and commanding decision maker status in the
family and social status within the community. The most important impact as
put by members is WTC has been a spring board in fostering solidarity
among women and a platform to interact with the external world.
Role of Institutions
The role of the various institutions in building the CDF network is given
below:
CDF’s role in establishing of TCs network
The success of CDF is lies in its belief of capability of local resource and
building the TC network on the principle of self management. CDF role in
42
Supporting sustainable livelihoods - Lessons from five case studies
motivating, organising and transferring skills, motivation and social
mobilisation have been the foundation and pillar of TC network.
Initially CDF role was primarily promotional in nature in which concept of
thrift societies was explained to villagers, along with motivating them to form
such societies and thereafter imparted some training on co-operative principle
and its functioning. There is a complete reversal of role of CDF as of now
wherein CDF is more into capacity building of the thrift co-operatives and
there is less thrust on promotional activity. Over a period of time CDF has
successfully devolved the task of mobilization of primary TCs to intermediate
institutions. Associations of TCs are now seeking to promote and nurture new
primary cooperatives. Hence, CDF has shifted its focus to training of staff in
new TCs and associations. Even internal audit functions have been taken
over by associations, CDF restricting itself to conducting audits of the latter.
This is in addition to audit by a regular chartered accountant.
CDF staff however continues to support the network by attending the
general body meetings of selected cooperatives, especially when certain
ideas need to be propagated and promoted. CDF staff also attends the
monthly association meetings regularly. CDF has been continuously involved
in developing the capacity of the members and staff. Several types of training
are being conducted for building the capacity. It conducts regular annual
training of accounts staff deployed in the TCs, based upon both indents
from the fields as well as perceived weakness at any level. In addition, the
supervisors (chosen from amongst the 12 directors in every WTC) are also
given regular training in accounts so as to be able to discharge their role
fully. CDF undertake regular training of members of the Board of the WTC
in order to fully explain to them their responsibilities and duties. Skill
improvement training of both staff and office bearers is regularly undertaken
in different areas such as communications, writing skills, analysis of situations
as well as accounts.
Clearly CDF has successfully transited from the role of a promoter and
implementer to one of a facilitator. This is a remarkable achievement since
many similar organisations find it difficult to withdraw to a less hands-on
role. This is often on account of the insecurity and false notion of the promoting
organization that the withdrawal of support will lead to the collapse of the
initiative. It speaks of CDF’s confidence in its investment in people’s capacity
that they could painlessly withdraw after a period of support and the institutions
promoted could more or less chart their own course subsequently. What is
43
Supporting sustainable livelihoods - Lessons from five case studies
significant is the fact that capacity was created in local institutions to perform
the tasks initially shouldered by CDF. In a sense this is the ideal approach to
institution building as expansion and growth of the model is not dependent
on the original promoter but is taken up as part of as a self-propelled initiative.
It also helps to generate tremendous confidence in the institutions that take
over these roles.
The success of the CDF strategy is once again a reiteration of the importance
of institution building in a successful livelihood intervention. The role of
motivating the community, providing initial training and awareness building
inputs and later sustaining the growth of a large number of grassroots institution
(i.e. the Thrift Cooperatives) speaks of the motivation and efforts of CDF to
achieve the objective of creating a member-based savings network. While
receiving some donor support for its promotional work (especially Canadian
grants), CDF consciously refrained from using donor funds for on-lending.
They also discouraged the TCs that were promoted from accessing grant or
low cost or subsidized funds, believing these to be antagonistic to financial
discipline and prudent borrowing behaviour. In retrospect, it was a wise move
and to a great extent explains the health and viability of the TCs in AP.
Role of grassroots institutions
The grassroot institution has played the dual role of financial intermediation
as well as that of a promoter. CDF consciously built the capacity of the TCs
and ATCs to perform both the functions adeptly.
TCs and ATCs provided the much required financial services to its members
from its internal resources from the network, a key element in the success of
such an endeavour. In addition to handling financial operations directly, the
institutions collaborated among themselves for transfer of funds within the
network of ATCs.
One of the great roles performed by the grass root institutions was
propagating the concept of co-operative in the region and its consequent
benefits. This promotional activity by the grassroot institutions themselves
provided credibility and therefore helped in building confidence of newly
formed institution. The scale CDF has reached and the poor households it
could bring under its co-operative fold was a result of conscious strategy of
using the grass root institutions.
The other important role played by the grass root institutions was capacity
44
Supporting sustainable livelihoods - Lessons from five case studies
building of sister organizations, especially newly formed ones and thereby
helping in their establishment. The process of formation of WTC itself lies on
transfer of skills model. The higher order skills are always available to TCs
from AWTCs. Beyond this for continuous learning CDF has full fledged training
wing and conducts trainings to all WTC/AWTC staff and office bearers and
also rolls out ToTs (Training of Trainers) for member training on a regular
basis.
Targeting and Equity Issues
CDF made a conscious effort to target poor women in its institution building
strategy. This came out of its initial learning when it mobilized thrift cooperatives
of urban employees in the 80s and found that women were unable to join
these bodies in a meaningful way. Its rural cooperatives formed earlier were
in any case focused on the agricultural sector and largely comprised of male
farmers. Thus, CDF decided to promote all women TCs alongside the male
cooperatives. What began with 81 villages in Warangal district in AP grew to
a total of over 300 villages and a little over 100,000 members, 65 percent
of which are women. CDF, thus made the journey from an untargeted institution
building strategy to a highly focused one, in the process successfully reaching
poor rural women who were otherwise not able to access the basket of financial
services that the thrift cooperatives were able to offer.
The truly democratic nature of the thrift cooperatives further leads to the
conclusion that CDF has built genuinely participatory organizations. The
management of the cooperative emerges from within these bodies and even
the association draws its office bearers from the basic units. The only external
input is provided by accountants and auditors. For an institution focused on
financial intermediation, the level of participatory management in the TC is
remarkable and may perhaps be a unique model of its kind. CDF may have
unwittingly embedded the genetic code for self-targeting of the poor in the
TC by the provision of small savings which accumulates and is locked in for
the entire period of the membership. This resulted in the membership of the
thrift cooperatives becoming attractive only to a certain class of poor women
who otherwise had no recourse to institutional financial services for the small
amounts that they could occasionally set aside. Thus the product itself ensured
targeting of the poorer sections of village society.
Financial Linkages
CDF has drawn in funds from international agencies for its work of
promotion and nuturing of co-operatives. Notable among them are Oxfam,
45
Supporting sustainable livelihoods - Lessons from five case studies
Ford Foundation, Canadian Cooperative Association, Friedrich Naumann
Foundation, Action Aid and HIVOS. It also raised its own resources through
consultancy fees and interest on co-operative revolving fund.
However, a conscious strategy was adopted of not accessing any funds
from external source for financial operations of thrift cooperatives promoted
by CDF, which rely exclusively on members’ savings for all their financial
transactions. Due to the provision of locking in savings for the duration of
membership, the cooperatives have adequate capital for meeting their credit
requirements. Interest rates are realistically fixed and meet the cost of operations.
Conclusion
The belief in the co-operative movement and its innate strength of bringing
economic and social benefits to poor propelled CDF’s work in the cooperative sector. The most important aspect of work is CDF’s venturing into
new roles with the passage of time leading to wide spread and profound
impact on the sector. The initial approach of learning from the ground, taking
lessons to wider forum and persistent efforts of advocacy are some of key
lessons to be drawn from the work. CDF through its work has therefore not
only provided direct benefits to the poor in its area of operation but also has
had an indirect impact leading to promotion and creation of viable financial
co-operatives in the country, which makes it an unique intervention. Such
effort is often not seen and is a great eye opener for the development sector.
Major Learnings
The first major lesson from the CDF experience is that a successful
programme to provide financial services to the poor need not follow only
the dominant SHG model. Given the overwhelming official, donor and
civil society support to the SHG model for expanding out reach of financial
services to the poor, the CDF thrift cooperatives stand out as a stark exception.
While it may be argued that these institutions could grow and flourish in the
special circumstances prevailing in AP at a point of time when autonomous
grassroots institutions were being encouraged, the replication of the model in
other states with similar enabling legislation should not be impossible. The
key factors that made for success in this case seem to have been the sustained
mobilization and capacity building efforts of the promoting organizations
and the complete devolution of management functions to members who
took decision on loans, interest rates, management practices etc. Thus, while
CDF may not have set out to achieve this goal, its efforts in fact greatly
empowered the women members of the cooperatives they promoted.
46
Supporting sustainable livelihoods - Lessons from five case studies
The second major lesson from this case study is the fact that successful
financial intermediation can be undertaken as a stand alone activity and
need not be associated with livelihood promotion efforts. CDF allowed full
autonomy to the thrift cooperatives to extend loans to their members for all
economic and consumption activities, provided that the management of the
thrift cooperative was satisfied of the borrower’s ability to repay. This allowed
members the flexibility and independence to invest in and deepen on-going
livelihood activities. It also allowed CDF to focus exclusively on product
innovation within the closed network of the cooperative structure and respond
to needs such as insurance, recurring deposits etc. over a period of time.
A unique feature of the CDF model is the totally self-sufficient nature of
financial transactions. This has proved that a programme for small borrowers
can be successfully managed entirely from the savings of its members. This
makes the model exceptional among all micro-finance models. The selfsufficient funding is also partly responsible for the high level of confidence
among the members and their belief in their own competence to manage the
organization. By cutting out any external agency, such as banks, government
bodies, donors etc., the thrift cooperatives are able to adopt a flexible and
need-based approach towards meeting their requirements. There is also a
tremendous sense of pride in being able to leverage collective resources to
meet the needs of their members.
It must be noted that one of the hidden reasons for the success of this
initiative is the high level of initial motivation and intensive training and
capacity building inputs provided by the CDF. CDF’s inputs in this venture
are more than a just institution building efforts and include a long term
handholding partnership in terms of capacity building of the leaders in key
areas such as accounts, micro-credit, leadership, advocacy functions, etc.
Another significant learning of the CDF’s work is policy advocacy, which
was taken up consciously on a sustained basis. As policy and legal constraints
faced by the co-operatives were identified during grass root support, CDF
intensified efforts on policy changes to create a more enabling environment
for functioning of the co-operatives. Such continuous efforts resulted in
enactment of new co-operative law in the state of Andhra Pradesh, which in
turn was adopted by several states. Such policy work is often not taken up
grass root institutions which require persistent efforts at various levels over a
long period of time.
47
Building Institutions for Livelihood
Promotion - South Asia Poverty
Alleviation Project in Andhra Pradesh (SAPAP)
Introduction
T
he South Asia Poverty Alleviation Project (SAPAP) was conceived and
implemented in three districts of Andhra Pradesh as an upshot of
SAARC’s commitment to poverty eradication. The UNDP assisted SAPAP
pilot was started in 1996 primarily using a community based approach to
combat rural poverty. The conceptual strength and efficacy of approach of
SAPAP is evident in the emulation of the design by GoAP in to its major World
Bank aided poverty reduction project, Andhra Pradesh District Poverty Initiatives
Project (DPIP), which was started in the year 2000. The case delves into the
methods and processes used to mobilise the community and helping them to
access both financial and non-financial resources for enhancing their
livelihood.
SAPAP was implemented in three districts namely Mahboobnagar, Kurnool
and Ananthapur. The coverage by SAPAP was 695 habitations in 20 mandals
(administrative sub-units of a district) in these drought-prone districts of Andhra
Pradesh. Although conceived to be implemented in the entire district; the
coverage was reduced to 20 mandals in 1997 as the learning from project
implementation suggested that the area was too large for effective social
mobilization. The project facilitated organization of the poor into1 2,395
Self-Help Groups (SHGs) with 42,842 members in 695 habitations in 20
mandals in three districts in association with 18 partner voluntary organizations.
Case Methodology
In order to understand the process of the intervention and its impact, the
following methodology was used:
● As part of methodology, interactive, informal meetings were held at
1
48
May, 1997. SAPAP project concluded in the year 1999 as reported during field interactions.
Supporting sustainable livelihoods - Lessons from five case studies
different villages2 and with different levels of people’s institutions3 that
were built as part of SAPAP.
● Discussion with the key officials at the Headquarters of Society For Elimination
of Rural Poverty (SERP), appropriate officials in the DPIP office (Kurnool
and Mahboobnagar districts) as well as the field staff
● Field visits along with the staff to understand the implementation outcome
and the processes used therein
● Semi-structured interviews with the beneficiaries, including community
based organizations
● Sharing of preliminary findings with the officials to check the veracity of
the conclusions drawn
● Impact Assessment studies
● Study of the secondary material on the SAPAP as also Velugu (a world
bank assisted rural poverty elimination project being implemented by
Society for Elimination of Rural Poverty ) and intervention per se
Based on the above, the inferences would be drawn about major learning
from the intervention and its replicability potential.
Process of Intervention
SAPAP was a pilot project implemented with financial assistance from UNDP.
The process of intervention has been by and large in the form of activities in
line with the SAPAP objective4 .
Two approaches were followed in implementing the SAPAP. One was an
issue-based approach and the other was an area-based approach. In the
former, issues such as child labour, bonded labour and disability - that do not
emerge in discussions with communities but have a very direct bearing on
poverty were addressed. Special efforts of identifying and organising these
disadvantaged people into groups and thereafter follow a route of capacity
building and economic empowerment. In the latter, specific geographical areas
were identified where a process of social mobilization was initiated. Social
mobilisation process included formation of people’s organisations considering
all important dimensions such as gender, caste and class. Training and capacity2
3
4
Nannor, Lodipalli, Hussainapuram, Urvakal, Kalva and Addakal
SHGs, Village Organisations (Federation of SHGs) and Mandal Samakhyas (Federation of Village
Organisations)
The overall objective of the GOI-UNDP Community-based Pro-poor Initiatives (CBPPI) Programme is to
support national efforts toward empowerment of communities for poverty alleviation through a process of
social mobilization and people-centred development. There are five interlinked Programme Support
Objectives: (i) to support social mobilization efforts for building and strengthening people’s organizations;
(ii) to assist in training and capacity-building of organizations of the poor; (iii) to facilitate the creation of
family and community assets and support demand-driven social services; (iv) to build alliances and
partnerships amongst various interest-groups in order to mainstream the lessons of pilot initiatives into
macro-policy and programmes; and, (v) to support pro-poor policies for creating an enabling environment.
49
Supporting sustainable livelihoods - Lessons from five case studies
building exercise followed the social mobilization process. Promotion of
sustainable livelihoods and asset creation at community level was integral to
the whole process of social mobilization and capacity building. Thus, the process
aimed at participation of poor people, especially women amongst them through
strong grass root organisation for their own development. Such process, hitherto
non existent, has been cornerstone of SAPAP implementation process.
SAPAP - Implementation Strategy
SAPAP seeks to alleviate poverty by centrally involving the
village community in the organization and management of
developmental affairs. The objective is empowerment of the
disadvantaged sections, especially women and the landless, through
the triad of social organization, skill development
and capital formation. Thrift and credit was the entry point.
The process also laid stress on building effective partnerships between
NGOs (non-governmental organizations), people’s organizations and the
Government. The NGOs were engaged in the social mobilization process of
the poor in their area of operation, provide support to building people’s
institution and helping these institutions to undertake livelihood program. The
people’s institution fostered participation of poor in articulating their needs,
devising solutions and implementing them. With the support of the NGOs,
SAPAP has been instrumental in institutionalisation of three tier people’s
organisations namely SHGs, Village Organisation and Mandal Samakhya
in the mandals it has been operating. A network and federation of these
local institutions gave them the required size and strength to bargain for
effective partnerships with government and private entities.
The District Rural Development Agencies in the three districts of Mahboobnagar,
Kurnool and Anantapur (SAPAP districts) have been the implementing agencies.
The South Asia Poverty Alleviation Project team played the advisory role.
For effective implementation of the program, capacity building was done at
various levels on the themes of participatory process, building people’s institution,
social mobilization as a developmental strategy and also for effective
governance of the project. The capacity building exercise was done not only
for newly created institutions but also of the implementing agencies of the state
administration such as the Panchayat Raj Institutions (PRIs) and District Rural
Development Agencies (DRDAs). This helped in co-ordination among various
stakeholders and activities as well as efficient management of the project.
50
Supporting sustainable livelihoods - Lessons from five case studies
Scaling up Strategy
In the first phase emphasis was largely on social mobilization with relatively
smaller number of poor people in a chosen area getting trained and being
offered credit for income generation activities. Such efforts were scaled up later
to cover the entire operational area. Building on the first phase, the process
geared to raise the capacity of the village organizations as well as that of
panchayat members, DRDAs and line department officials in the areas of
social mobilization and sustainable livelihoods. Efforts were made this phase
to assist in the formation of more SHGs in the same area, intensify the training
of these groups, assist the groups to federate and form their own rural support
organization. In addition, cadres of Para professionals were developed so that
technical knowledge and skills are shared and benefited the community.
A second phase of the process consisted support to community groups to
undertake income-generation schemes that they conceived and manage.
Productive credit provided on a larger scale through a revolving fund mechanism
to build family and community assets (desilting of irrigation tanks, providing
child care facilities, low-cost sanitation, etc.). Organizations of the poor were
also linked to the banks and government anti-poverty programmes.
As a support mechanism efforts were made to identify legal and regulatory
frameworks that protected the interests of the poor and assisted them in their
search for a livelihood.
Impact of the Programme
The most significant impact of SAPAP is evident in adoption of SAPAP
model and social mobilisation process by GoAP for its major poverty reduction
project (VELUGU-being implemented by autonomous body namely Society
for Elimination of Rural Poverty). This could be stated as classic example of
influencing the policy makers as also policy per se.
Overall SAPAP impacted major aspects such as micro credit, social capital,
poverty and women’s empowerment5 , mainly done through SHGs and their
Federation stated earlier. These benefits are summarised below.
Socio-Economic Impact
●
5
Reaching out to the poor especially SCs, Muslims and Women headed
households (WHH).
Not the objective of SAPAP. Derived benefit from the project.
51
Supporting sustainable livelihoods - Lessons from five case studies
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
Improved well being6
Reported sending children to schools (Urvakal, Kalva, Lodipalli, Nannor
and Hussainapuram – all levels SHG-VO-Mandal Samakhya)
Women came out of timid behaviour
Family members involved women in financial matters and decisions
Women groups got recognition as social intermediaries and all line
departments disseminated their programmes through SHGs
Induced interest and ambition in election politics
Reported construction of own houses as well as renovation of houses
Reported considerable decrease in migration due to drought and lack
of earning opportunities
Families helped to move across the poverty line through linkages with
other poverty alleviation programs
Emergence of strong village level social institutions and pressure groups7
Improved Access
●
●
●
Improved access to credit and repeat loans (respondents from
Husainapuram village, Kalva village and Lodipalli village)
SAPAP gave lift to women groups in economic up-liftment/ self
employment loans as a result of which, women groups have come to
stay as dependable and reliable channels for institutional finance delivery
Sustainable livelihood opportunities and systems established through
productive credit support and community asset creation
Institution Building
●
●
●
●
6
7
52
Formation of social capital in the form of trained book keepers, effective
leadership, Health educators, Education volounteers, Asset management
(watershed), village and mandal level resource persons etc.
SHGs of women developed and strengthened
Village Organisations (VOs) formed and federated into mandal
networks
Specific interest groups such as agricultural labourers’ associations, small
and marginal farmers’ associations, water users’ associations, watershed
committees, mining workers’/quarry workers’ associations, handloom
Members met in Lodipalli (bonded labours (once) group_Gulabi group), Nannoor (Women headed
households and destitutes) and members interacted at Urvakal mandal samakhya themselves expressed
improved levels of their standard and comfort of living
Village Organization (VO) a federation of SHGs is a social forum. Illustrative functions are: Organizing left
out poor, Resolving conflicts at SHG level, Monitoring and evaluation of SHGs, forum to share ideas,
building bridge between people and government functionaries, financial intermediation and offers surety to
SHGs, Participates in village development, Auditing of SHGs and provide functional space for trainings and
trains SHG members. VO is a legal entity.
Supporting sustainable livelihoods - Lessons from five case studies
weavers’ associations and rural artisans associations developed and
supported.
Capacity Building
●
●
●
Capacities of the Self-Help Groups of women strengthened
Capacities of local/village activists built in the fields of agriculture,
livestock, forestry, sericulture, watershed management, civil works, health,
education, etc.
Capacities of PRIs and DRDAs strengthened to promote people’s
participation and empowerment for effective local governance and
poverty alleviation
Increased Bargaining Power
The limited sample of primary stake holders and SHGs/VOs/Mandal
Mahila Samakhyas interacted revealed a few instances of collective
bargaining by the grass root institutions, the examples of which are evident in
labour, commodity and financial markets.
The instances in labour market pertain to collective bargaining for equal
wages with men and better working condition for women. SHGs also have
come together to free the bonded labour.
On the commodity market front SHGs attempted at establishing storage
space so that farmers need not suffer price loss due to distress sales or lack of
space for storing harvested produce till prices stabilize. There were also
indications of SHGs forming into marketing societies for bulk marketing as
well as purchase of inputs like seed and sale of milk, etc. One specific example
in commodity marketing that could be quoted here pertains to Pangal Mandal
Mahila Samakhya. This MMS procured Castor at Rs.1330/-Quintal and
sold at Rs.1450/- a Quintal. The profit sharing was MMS (30%), VO (70%).
A similar attempt by MMS at Kosgi (Mahboobnagar district) was reported.
In the financial market, VOs bargained for loans to their members and
also negotiated with money lenders for lower interests. The efforts of Mandal
Mahila Samakhyas (MMS) as financial intermediaries may be stated as
encouraging. MMS borrowed funds from DRDA/SC corporations/NGOs
for on lending to SHGs through VOs.
Not withstanding the reported collective operations, SHGs reported difficulty
and limitations to negotiate or intervene with the market channels. In the
53
Supporting sustainable livelihoods - Lessons from five case studies
overall analysis, the sustainability or continuance of marketing efforts on a
consistent basis appear to be feasible and practical but if supported by a
systematic and conscious approach with structured capacity building inputs
and handholding services.
Role of Institutions
Implementing agencies and facilitating agencies
The achievements of SAPAP could be attributed to combined efforts of DRDA,
the implementing agencies UNDP (UNDP team played an advisory role) and
UNICEF which has supported specific issue based programs such as back to
school and bridge courses for child labour. Equal contribution for the success of
SAPAP came from partner agencies which were engaged in social mobilisation,
capacity building of primary stake holders and bank linkages of SHGs.
The key role played by DRDAs in building the cadre of resource persons
for social mobilization and facilitating SHGs formation which contributed in
a large way to the sustenance of people’s institutions. NGO’s support role
has been instrumental in effective functioning and management of network
of people’s institutions. As an example, activity base of Mandal Samakhya
at Addakal village stands as proof of the contributions from Adarsha Welfare
Society (AWS), a partner NGO. The Mandal Samakhya promoted by AWS
has an integrated commercial complex housing Mahila Bank, Training centre,
Super bazaar, Dairy Unit and a High way restaurant.
Role of grassroots institutions
SAPAP model is rested on the approach of nurturing people’s institutions as a
core component. This involved the creation and support to three separate but
interlinked institutions. These institutions has been performing specific roles towards
achievement of their own goals as well as contributing to the overarching vision of
the program. The specific roles of the grass root organizations are outlined below:
1. The SHGs and other user groups (such as quarry workers/ irrigation
water users etc. performed the following functions through its meeting
once a week
● Discussion on the basic needs of women and users
● Discussion on the issues requiring support of VO
● Decision on the quantum of thrift and internal lending
● SHGs contribute to corpus of VO and Share capital to Mandal
Samakhyas
2. All the SHGs were federated into a Village Organisations (VO) at the
54
Supporting sustainable livelihoods - Lessons from five case studies
village level. The VO on an average has 60 to 100 households as
members. The VOs carried out the following functions
● Organising all the poor households into groups
● Resolving conflicts arising at SHG level
● Acting as a bridge between people and government functionaries
● Financial intermediation role for accessing credit and grants
● Stand as a surety for the loans provided to SHGs
● Functions as social forum to discuss issues such as child labour/child
marriages etc., which are beyond the capacities and realm of SHGs
● Undertakes member trainings
● Auditing of SHGs participating in village development
3. VOs were federated in to Mandal Samakhya which performed:
● Mobilisation of funds from various external agencies
● Providing funds to VOs for onlending to SHGs
● Building of the rapport between people and Government functionaries
through local community volounteers
● Arrangement of regular meetings with Government officials at
village level
● Undertaking training programs for Executive committee members/
Group Leaders/SHG Book keepers
Financial Linkages/Resource Mobilisation
Multiple sources were tapped during the implementation of the project.
UNDP provided approximately US$ 900,000 on a co-financing basis to
cover the administrative and personnel costs of a sub-regional team to advise
the DRDAs on sub-programme strategies.
The other important source of funds was the State Government where
linkages were established with all the line departments both at the state and
district level. The District Magistrates have provided poverty alleviation resources
under the government anti-poverty programmes to groups mobilized by the
sub-regional team. The UNICEF-supported child labour elimination and backto-school programme was also implemented by the sub-regional team, but
in some select mandals.
The internal resources generated through the three-tier grass root
organization also needs a mention. This helped in both mobilising savings
as well as extending of credit for various income generating activities. In fact,
some of the Mandal Samakhyas have also promoted Mahila Banks for
several need based credit for farm and non-farm activities.
55
Supporting sustainable livelihoods - Lessons from five case studies
Thus a strategy of tapping external sources for program level intervention
and use of internally generated fund to meet the impending credit needs of
individuals seemed a complementary approach. These efforts are
supplemented by a strategy for direct linkage with the financial institutions.
Sustainability Prospects
The sustainability of such a large scale program carried out with DonorGovernment-Non-Governmental partnership can be judged through the
performance of the grass root organizations created during the program. It is
quite natural that all the grass root institutions created will not achieve the
scale desired and have a significant impact. The following case of a successful
grass root organization originating from the program will provide the insights
of the prospects and issues regarding long run sustainability.
Profitability
Village Organizations: Till last before year dividends were paid and
got accumulated at SHGs level. These pay outs were book entries and physical
cash was not paid. Last year some VOs paid dividend in cash to SHGs. This
year onwards all V.Os have plans to pay dividend in cash.
Resource centre: In the initial years and up till year 2001, MMS earned
about Rs.30000/- per month, presently the figure is around Rs.10000. The
reason was SHG movement was nascent in SAPAP districts and the training
needs were huge. In the later years, the demand for SHGs training has been
on decline and thus the revenues also dwindled Presently two staff members
are manning the resource centre.
Mahila Bank: Started with a capital of Rs.12 lakhs in the year 1999 and
presently the outstanding is under Rs.25 Lakhs. Reportedly it is making marginal
profits. The size of banking operations was kept low deliberately. The reason reported
is that VOs have been able to meet the demand for credit by SHGs adequately
and the objective of Mahila Bank is only to cater to the gaps in access to credit.
Super Bazar: Still running into losses as the agency model and village
depot model has not yet worked out. Still continuing with the concept of
servicing the needs of the women but is not cost effective.
Highway Restaurant: Employs about 40-50 women, chosen from the
SHGs. It is yet to make profits.
56
Supporting sustainable livelihoods - Lessons from five case studies
The specific concerns as forwarded by the AWS, partner NGO are enlisted
here under:
1. Building business management skills of member women in a democratic
set up and in a community owned and managed business systems
2. How to professionalize the operational systems in a decentralised environment
3. How to introduce efficient decision making process in business operations
congenial to functioning of people’s institutions
4. How to match business priorities with accountability, responsibility,
transparency and democratic functioning in a people’s institution set up
5. Should people’s institutions confine to bridging service gaps/core needs/
pivotal service that will have multiplier impact in the lives of target communities
Therefore, the issue of sustainability in such large scale program is
dependent the ability of the community based organization to develop into a
self-managed entity during the project period. It entails not only building
these institutions but achieve operational and financial sustainability through
provision of services required by the community.
Mandal Mahila Samakhya, Addakal
Mandal Mahila Samakhya, Addakal is one of the successful initiatives
launched under SAPAP and presently is a part of the Velugu project. SAPAP
identified Adarsha Welfare Society (AWS) as partner of SAPAP initiatives in
Addakal Mandal in Mahboobnagar district. AWS began its supportive role to
SAPAP in June 1995 and was assigned promotional role for social mobilisation,
management of initiatives and seed capital (funds were also parked with AWS)
in Addakal mandal. Beginning from June 1995 till early 1998 the inputs by
AWS were Groups’ Management, Local Capacities Building and Provision of
seed capital fund to SHGs for taking up income generation activities (IGA).
Networking of SHGs became a part of SAPAP approach in the early
1997 and mandal level federation started taking shape in the early 1998.
As a result of this approach, Village Organisations (VO - SHGs federated at
village level) came into existence. AWS also followed the same model and
VOs were made the custodians of seed capital and other resources (revolving
fund from District Rural Development Agency etc.). The centralisation of funds
at VO reported to have helped in planning credit (beneficiaries as well as
size of loan) and recovery efficiently. AWS was instrumental in putting in
place the revenue model for VOs, which earned about 25% of interest income
earned by SHGs and in turn provided the book keeping services to SHGs.
57
Supporting sustainable livelihoods - Lessons from five case studies
During the year 1998, main agenda of AWS was establishing SHGs and
bank linkage. In the process, gap in terms of inhabitants belonging to chronic
defaulting villages were not having access to banks was found. Hence the
formation of Mandal Mahila Samakhya (MMS) as a financial intermediary
under the Mutually Aided Cooperative Thrift Societies (MACTS) act was done.
The objective was to service the villages constrained by service area approach
of Banks and beneficiaries facing the trouble as they were residing in chronic
defaulting villages. Thus Mahila Bank started with a capital of about Rs.12
Lakhs (Rs.300/- share capital per SHG and Rs.2700/-Fixed deposit per SHG).
The MMS diversified into other activities over a period of time. Resource
centre was built which provided space and trainers to train VOs and SHGs in
various aspects ranging from leadership training to group management, book
keeping and training of trainers. However, to sustain MMS in long run and
limited scope of enhancing the resource centre as training institute, MMS felt it
necessary to add new revenue earning activities. This had resulted in the addition
of super bazaar and a highway restaurant by the year 2001 in the activity
profile of MMS. Super Bazar was started with an investment of Rs.5 Lakhs
mobilised as share capital from SHGs at the rate of Rs.300/- per group.
Replicability Potential
The overall strategy of SAPAP in Andhra Pradesh had major focus on building
institutions of women. Women formed a pre-dominant part of the total participants
from close to 70,0008 households that were addressed for social mobilization
under the SAPAP initiative. Over 5,200 SHGs of poor women has been promoted
at grassroots level, which have been federated into 380 Village organizations.
The scale it has reached in its mobilization process speaks of the intrinsic strength
of the approach supported by congenial policy environment in the state.
SAPAP approach has been replicated in Andhra Pradesh. The World Bank
has assisted the State Government with a nearly $ 500 million loan for taking
the program forward from an initial catchment of 750 villages to nearly
30,000 villages9 of the State.
Society for Elimination of Rural Poverty (SERP), established by Government
of Andhra Pradesh took the responsibility for up-scaling the SAPAP model to
cover the entire State since year 2000. The most important lesson coming out
of SAPAP is on the policy end - principles of social mobilisation and institutional
8
9
58
Source:UNDP India news
Source: UNDP India News
Supporting sustainable livelihoods - Lessons from five case studies
building as part of the strategy to lift the poorest of the poor, including those
at the very bottom of the social hierarchy from the clutches of extreme poverty
with the support of parallel structure.10 This structure would play a pivotal role
of providing advisory support, harnessing resources from various entities and
networking with both public and private institutions for effective implementation.
Conclusion
UNDP-SAPAP initiative is an exemplary model of donor-public- private
partnership in the field of livelihood promotion. This could be a possible answer
to rather unified approach taken up public and private institutions till date. It is
necessary that various stakeholders use their complementary skills to reach and
promote large scale rural livelihoods as demonstrated through the SAPAP initiative.
Major Learnings
Some of the major learnings emerging from SAPAP initiatives are outlined below:
■ One of most important learning is social mobilization of the poor is a
necessity for reaching out more beneficiary but it should accompanied
by engaging them in activities for providing economic benefits which
will sustain interest. The latter could be identifying the most pressing
needs of the target population and working on the same.
■ Partnership model is key to success of such large scale initiatives with
each of the collaborating providing complementary services for efficient
management of the project. However, the model in the long run should
build the partnership of the grass root institutions and agencies providing
the various input, output and capacity building services.
■ A favourable policy environment can help in building people’s institution
which can pave the way for easier operations for newly created
institutions. The MACTS Act not only helped in creating people’s institution
but also helped these institutions to undertake multifarious activities under
the purview of the Act.
■ Up-scaling of a program is possible when the pilot model modified
based on the ground realities and feed back from various stakeholders.
The pilot should be used to delineate the process with well defined
roles and responsibilities of the various stakeholders.
■ Livelihood promotion can be done through a judicious mix of financial
services, business development services as well as capacity building
services and each of these are important. The support agency has to
take the decision on the sequence and intensity of services to be provided
with an objective of making the institutions self-sustainable.
10
Source: UNDP India news
59
Success in the Himalayas
- The Story of Chamoli Tasar
Introduction
C
hamoli Tasar Private Limited (CTPL) is an exemplary enterprise, wherein
focussed development work has helped to create a business enterprise
in the hills of Uttaranchal. It began as a developmental intervention by
an NGO, Appropriate Technologies India (AT India) and has taken the shape of
an independent enterprise covering over 800 community members in a difficult
hilly terrain. The uniqueness of the intervention lies in the fact that there was no
tasar cultivation in these regions of Uttaranchal. AT India took the initiative of
introducing Oak Tasar in these areas, develop the capacity of the local community
in Tasar cultivation and production of value added products. This paved
way for new livelihoods for the local people involved in various stages of the
value chain.
CTPL is an enterprise engaged in the production of Temperate Oak Tasar.
It engages in all activities in the value chain, right from seed cocoon production,
to rearing of cocoons, to converting fibre into yarn, to designing and weaving
fabric. This enterprise was initiated as a Temperate Oak Tasar Development
Project in 1997 with 15-20 people from the community. The enterprise presently
is spread across five districts, ten blocks and around 110 villages in Uttaranchal
with its headquarters at Ukhimath.
Case Methodology
In order to understand the process of the intervention and its impact, the
following methodology was used:
■ Discussion with the key officials at the Headquarters of Chamoli Tasar
as well as in the branch
■ Semi-structured interviews with the members
■ Sharing of preliminary findings with the officials to check the veracity of
the conclusions drawn
■ Study of the secondary material on the organisation and intervention per se
60
Supporting sustainable livelihoods - Lessons from five case studies
Based on the above, the inferences were drawn about major learnings
from the intervention and its replicability potential.
Process of the Intervention
AT India is a development organisation, which engages in a variety of
activities with its target community. AT India is working in eight sub-sectors,
namely tasar, honey, dairy, micro-finance, conservation and plantation, ringal,
lichens and eco-tourism. From the beginning a natural resource management
regime has been in place in interventions undertaken by AT India to ensure
that regeneration remains faster than the rate of exploitation. In the case of
chamoli tasar also, it has been constantly monitored jointly by representatives
of CTPL, AT India, the respective Van Panchayats and the Forest Department.
Given that there was no trace of Tasar in the area, AT India did a phenomenal
job of identifying the opportunity, preparing and training the community for
cultivation and value addition of tasar, organizing the entire production process
from end to end and developing the institutional set up. The initial introduction
of Tasar in the area called for recruiting experts who necessarily had to come
from outside the region. Even in light of attractive salaries, it was impossible to
recruit outsiders to live and work in these relatively remote and difficult Himalayan
regions. Thus with the valuable assistance of one highly qualified expert on
deputation from the Central Silk Board, local persons were recruited and trained.
In retrospect, this turned out to be a very good choice.
While the Temperate Oak trees grow only at altitudes of above 7000 feet,
the habitation of the villagers involved in rearing were at lower altitudes.
Moreover, the grainages had to be maintained at lower altitudes, while seed
preservation was being done at higher altitudes. The logistics of managing
such intricate operations and weaving them with the economic lives of the
poor community was a complex task. Rearing involved temporary shifting of
men to higher altitudes, reeling and spinning centres were established at
central locations in proximity with habitation areas.
The production process of tasar fabric is long and involves several stages.
These stages are divided into the pre and the post cocoon activities. In the
pre-cocoon activities, there are four stages, Grainage, Rearing, Sorting and
Grading and Seed Preservation. The post-cocoon activities involved Washing,
Sorting for colour, Reeling/Spinning, Dyeing and Deguming, Weaving,
Quality checks and Finishing in that order. As tasar was a new activity, trainings
were imparted to these rearers on rearing tasar cocoons on Oak trees, to
61
Supporting sustainable livelihoods - Lessons from five case studies
spinners and reelers for spinning and reeling respectively. In addition,
supervisors were trained to manage the pre and post cocoon activities.
AT India initially did a careful selection of the division of activities between
themselves and the community. The core activities of cocoon rearing, reeling/
spinning and to some extent weaving required a large number of people and
hence the local community was involved in these activities. The others such as
grainage and seed preservation required very high levels of technical specialisation
with high monitoring needs for which the educated locals were groomed. The
marketing function was handled completely by AT India. As the capacities of workers
and their technical specialisations increased, more managerial and supervisory
roles with clear cut responsibilities were assigned. In addition, they were put on the
rolls of Chamoli Tasar Private Limited (CTPL), an enterprise legally incorporated in
1998, which managed the production aspect of the intervention.
In the initial period, most of the energies of AT India were directed towards
production end. As a result the production process was streamlined much earlier,
but AT India still struggled with the marketing of Chamoli Tasar’s products around
2002. Once the wool by silk blend was introduced, the markets accepted the
product and marketing was much smoother. This eventually turned out to be the
unique selling proposition of Chamoli Tasar. Thereafter, designers were hired to
improve marketability of the woven fabric. Through such efforts, AT India provided
the much required management and marketing support to CTPL.
AT India’s effort was to make Chamoli Tasar a community owned enterprise,
however due to restrictions on ownership of a private limited company and
lack of any other types of appropriate legal forms, it has evolved into an
organisation whose equity is held by AT India, through its representatives.
Chamoli Tasar is governed by a board comprising the community and AT
India persons in a 3:1 ratio. The production and operations of Chamoli
Tasar are handled by its own staff and management, while marketing support
is being provided by AT India. Chamoli Tasar currently engages over 800
persons, mostly by providing production material and training for specific
activities across the tasar value chain. In this manner Chamoli Tasar has
effectively managed to promote over 800 direct livelihoods, without yet tying
them down to any membership or ownership form.
Scaling up Strategy
In the first phase, AT India mostly focussed on standardizing the production
process with simultaneous capacity building of the community. This effort
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Supporting sustainable livelihoods - Lessons from five case studies
took most of the organisational energies and hence market linkages remained
weak during this period. With the stabilization of production process by 200203, rigorous marketing efforts were made. This resulted in market orders and
helped Chamoli Tasar up scaling its activities. The sales went up from around
INR 2.5 lakhs to INR 15 lakhs between 2002-03 and 2003-04.
The basic model of Chamoli Tasar was to involve persons from the local
community in the production activities as the production process was labour
intensive. Any increase in production volumes required engagement of larger
number of human resources at all levels of the value chain. Hence AT India
invested in developing local people and provided them with the material for
production. Some of these were:
● In order to increase the number of rearers, from amongst the community,
some experienced rearers were chosen as ‘lead producers’, who in turn
identify and train other rearers. The lead producers get paid for each
rearer trained by them.
● As part of the scaling up strategy, Chamoli Tasar has been thinking
around a lateral expansion as well, in terms of more members of the
same family being engaged in different activities in the value chain. For
example, a rearer’s wife/daughters/sons could also do the next stage
work such as reeling, spinning, and weaving. This would provide
additional advantage of enhancing family incomes, by taking them up
the value chain. This would also help mainstream Tasar as one of the
core economic activities of the family, and thereby strengthen the
commitment of each member to the enterprise.
Although the mountainous terrain necessitates decentralised production of
cocoons, efforts have been made in setting up of centres for spinning, reeling
and weaving which can cater to spinners, reelers and weavers. Such centres
are being set up at a central location, once there were enough number of
them from an area. There are as of 2004, 19 spinning/reeling centres and 6
weaving centres across their area of operations.
Another critical aspect for scaling up is the availability of biomass. AT
India has been conscious of the ecological degradation that such an activity
causes, and has therefore adopted ‘conservation and plantation’ as one of
its primary programs. A planned strategy of plantation of different varieties
of seeds (in kilograms) per hectare is followed by AT India.
At the output end, most of the increase in production now is backed by
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Supporting sustainable livelihoods - Lessons from five case studies
orders. Diversification is a part of the scaling up strategy, because their current
product caters to a niche market only. Innovative designs and fabrics are
therefore being tried out alongside. Similarly other silks such as eri, muga
which have higher productivities and lower cost involvement are being brought
in, but a trial period of three years is being budgeted for.
The intervention is at a stage where further upscaling by expanding to further
locations and building similar bases can be done. This will require, however, a
well thought out strategy for initiating similar operations in other areas.
Impact of the Intervention
The intervention has impacted the lives and livelihoods of people in the
area and as also on the local economy. With the introduction of a new crop
and economic activity around it, the awareness levels of the local population
has increased. They realised the potential of the natural resources in their
area, and the responsibility with which they should exploit their natural resources
for commercial use. The contact of the local community with the outside
market has increased, even though indirectly.
Over 800 persons are gainfully engaged in, and derive their primary livelihood
from Chamoli Tasar. An idea of the economic impact is given here:
Average Income (INR)
Period of Engagement
Rearer
4000 – 5000
4 months
Spinner
1500 – 2000 per annum*
Year Long*
Reeler
2000 – 2500 per annum*
Year Long*
Weaver Cat ‘A’
3000 – 4000/month
Year Long
Weaver Cat ‘B’
2000 – 2500/month
Year Long
Weaver Cat ‘C’ 1000 – 1500/month
Year Long
* This figure is low because there are always many new reelers and spinners
being trained at any given point of time. The experienced reelers and spinners
earn between INR 1000 to 2000 per month.
**Attendance goes down during sowing and harvest seasons.
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Supporting sustainable livelihoods - Lessons from five case studies
The number of personnel that have been trained by Chamoli Tasar are:
Activity
Rearing
Number of persons trained
902
Preservation and Grainage
40
Reeling
60
Spinning
281
Weaving
37
Dyeing/Finishing
Total
6
1326
Chamoli Tasar has had a positive impact on the quality of life and livelihood for
the persons involved in the project. There are spinning/reeling and weaving centres,
which provide an opportunity to the youth in the area to come out of their homes,
socialise, and improves their quality of lives to that extent. Women who have families
and prefer to work out of homes are given their own machines to carry home, after
training them adequately. They remain self employed and work from home.
Another impact of Chamoli Tasar is the establishment of local but privately
owned commercial enterprises in their area of operations. The cropping up
of new enterprises is a proof of the replicability and commercial soundness
of the intervention.
Role of Institutions
The achievements of Chamoli Tasar can be attributed to the contribution
by the institutions involved in the project. The two institutions and their roles in
promoting and sustaining the project interventions are described below.
AT India is the promoting NGO behind Chamoli Tasar. The intervention
was initiated in the Garhwal region of Uttaranchal. The groundwork initiated
by them was in form of introducing the concept of Tasar to the natives of
Ukhimath, training them in rearing, reeling, spinning, providing the related
infrastructure, etc. AT India thus engaged with the community and
simultaneously developed a cadre of technical and supervisory staff for the
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Supporting sustainable livelihoods - Lessons from five case studies
organisation. AT India also engaged with outside individuals and agencies
such as scientists, buyers for the fabric produced, etc. at the same time.
At the level of the community itself, AT India engaged at not one but several
levels. It identified and trained rearers, spinners/reelers, dyers, degummers, weavers,
quality checkers. In fact, one of the outstanding aspects of the role played by AT
India was its ability to handle multiple activities at the same time. Alongside AT India
engaged with scientists and botanists on aspects of worm feed quality, availability,
worm quality etc., which were intrinsic to enhancing productivity of the worm, and
at the same time, maintaining a healthy level of exploitation of natural resources.
The developmental component of the entire initiative was significant considering
the amount of mobilisation and training required, but AT India conceived and
run the initiative on the lines of business enterprises. Their focus on creation of an
exclusive cadre of local persons who supervised and directed the pre and post
cocoon production related activities, and other marketing and sales related
activities, shows the basic orientation of the initiative towards being on its own.
The approach was to build a mechanism and process right from production
and preservation of seed cocoons, to rearing of cocoons, to reeling and
spinning the fibre and weaving of fabric from the yarn. AT India tried to
involve and empower as many individuals as possible. The initial years were
spent more on smoothening the production process and the technical aspects
such as temperature for seed preservation, location identification, feed for
worms, equipment and accessories as needed.
The program expansion and coverage was gradual, and well thought out
by AT India. The number of persons involved was increased only once the
production process was systematised and streamlined. In the initial stages,
the developmental costs were subsidised through grants.
Besides AT India, the intervention was conceived as a project under the Central
Silk Board with funding from UNDP. The directorate of Sericulture has been very
supportive of the project and the CSB provided one of the most important specialist
resources initially, for introducing tasar in the area and training the people involved.
Targeting and Equity Issues
Like in any new venture, the persons adopting the new concept first are
early starters. In Chamoli Tasar similarly, the rearers who took in early, have
along with the team of AT India, been instrumental in mobilising more people.
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Supporting sustainable livelihoods - Lessons from five case studies
The profile of rearers who work with Chamoli Tasar is poor. The mount-hilly
terrain makes lives and livelihoods that much more difficult, and the drudgery
for women in doing household chores is high.
The quality of life for women had scope for significant improvement, and AT
India worked consciously at engaging and training women to work as reelers and
spinners. As a result, almost all the reelers/spinners engaged by Chamoli Tasar are
women. There are also some supervisors and quality controllers who are women.
Most farmers who have come in as rearers have small landholdings, and
subsistence income levels. They depended totally on traditional crops, such as
mustard and wheat and the cash income component out of the total was low. Till
now the rearing activities were done solely by men because rearing was done by
shifting to at higher altitudes for two to three months, under difficult climatic
conditions. As part of its revised strategy, Chamoli Tasar is doing plantations to
ensure rearing activities at lower altitudes and close to the habitation. This will
further ensure inclusion of women in the rearing process.
Financial Linkages
Chamoli Tasar began with a corpus grant from the Central Silk Board to
the tune of Rs.79 Lakhs. The equity base of Chamoli Tasar increased from
INR 2,000 to INR 200,000, between 2002 and 2004. This additional capital
was infused by AT India.
The huge corpus fund has enabled the enterprise to incur all the initial
developmental expenses. By the year 2002-03 Chamoli Tasar had incurred
losses to the tune of INR 54.5 lakhs. In 2003-04, losses to the extent of INR
50 lakhs were wiped out by reducing the capital reserve.
The nature of the developmental activities involved is such that the cost of
production is high. The cost of production is overwhelmingly tilted towards
the rearing activity. A large proportion of the costs can be attributed to the
rearing costs, which include developmental costs of mobilising rearers,
increasing their awareness, capacity building, trainings, etc. Post cocoon
developmental expenses include trainings that are imparted to reelers, spinners
and weavers, which also add significantly to the costs.
The enterprise has received other grants to subsidise manufacturing and
administrative expenses. From 2003-04 onwards, however, no grants were
received by Chamoli Tasar towards any expenses.
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Supporting sustainable livelihoods - Lessons from five case studies
Within the enterprise, financial linkages between the workers from the community
and Chamoli Tasar exist at several levels. Payments to reelers/spinners, weavers
are made after the completion of work, but the machinery used is provided by
Chamoli Tasar. Rearers are given credit in advance, to harvest cocoons. This credit
is in the form of seed cocoons given to rearers. The cocoon harvest is bought by
Chamoli Tasar, and the cost of seed cocoons is recovered at this stage.
Borrowing from financial institutions has not been undertaken as yet by
Chamoli Tasar. Now that most of the operating processes are streamlined,
this option can be explored for further growth.
Marketing and Technology Linkages
Marketing
Chamoli Tasar is one of very few Temperate Oak Tasar producers in the
country. With practically all the tasar produced in India being tropical tasar,
the economics of temperate tasar are not fully established yet. The downside
is that temperate tasar faces competition from its cheaper tropical varieties
such as eri, muga, mulberry etc., not only from within the country but also
from the much cheaper silks that flow in from China.
The vision that AT India had while promoting Chamoli Tasar was to create
a production house, and that the final product would be bought and marketed
by a centralised agency. This marketing agency task is handled by AT India
almost exclusively, with Chamoli Tasar only having a few sales staff at junior
levels, on its rolls.
Markets and Branding: Chamoli Tasar’s products are catering to a niche
market, the high end urban retail market which focuses on designer upmarket
items for fashion conscious customers. The brand has recently been renamed
from ‘Chamoli Tasar’ to ‘Devbhumi Temperate Oak Forest Tasar’. This reflects
a conscious strategy is to project the tasar or the product as, made in the hills
by people of the hills. It is being positioned strategically as being the product
of Uttaranchal State, and therefore probably can help in brand recall from
the identity of the state as well.
The marketing strategy for CTPL has really taken shape significantly,
2003 onwards. The marketing strategy involves
● Developing a network of upmarket retail shops which brand the product
as theirs and sell.
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Supporting sustainable livelihoods - Lessons from five case studies
●
Participating in exhibitions and fairs on textiles/silks and taking orders
from buyers in all parts of the country.
One aspect intrinsic to marketing of these products is designing of the
fabric and apparel. AT India has engaged designers for Chamoli Tasar, who
work on the product weaves, colours, blends of different yarn, design apparel
and also help link products to various markets.
In terms of the marketing arrangements, a significant network of retail outlets
selling Chamoli Tasar products has been developed over the years. Through these
high end retail outlets, Chamoli Tasar is catering to markets in Uttaranchal, Delhi,
Chandigarh and Chennai. Samples of colours and designs are discussed with
outlets, and a production order is taken for the season, which in turn reduces risks.
Exhibitions serve as a platform both for procuring orders and for increasing
the brand awareness, and reach out to a greater number of market players.
Chamoli Tasar tests the uptake of its new designs and apparel at these
exhibitions before launching full fledged production. The attempt is to introduce
primarily simple designs, which can be stitched by the community members
or at most by skilled tailors in the same area.
Technology Linkages
On the technology side, the primary issues at hand are the worm quality
and the natural resource management. The productivity of the current worm
species is very low compared to other tasar silk worms, particularly in the
Chinese and Korean markets. At present the entire rearing of worms is done
by stall feeding. This is not a sustainable measure in the long run, and Chamoli
Tasar had recognised this and has been working at host plant identification
and management, and extensive plantations of other varieties of trees which
can both grow at lower altitudes and support the silk worms. Chamoli Tasar
has engaged one of the leading botanists in the country, and has tied up with
the Kumaon University for related research.
Sustainability Prospects
Though not sustainable as yet, Chamoli Tasar is slowly edging towards it.
The vision of creating a community owned, sustainable enterprise is reflected
in many steps that have been taken since the start, and the current status of
the enterprise lends further credence to the fact that it can run on a sustainable
basis by itself. Chamoli Tasar is at the verge of operating break even, as of its
accounts for 2003-04.
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Supporting sustainable livelihoods - Lessons from five case studies
It will be worthwhile to examine the aspects of the enterprise which are in
place, and those which are not conducive for sustainability of the enterprise.
Aspects which lend credence to the sustainability prospects of Chamoli
Tasar are:
● The organisation structure is well developed with clear cut roles and
responsibilities
● High levels of technical and supervisory competence on issues other
than worm species
● High levels of involvement of the local community, and high level of
feeling of ownership towards the enterprise
● Efforts are underway to further broad base the ownership of Chamoli
Tasar by converting the enterprise from a Private Limited Company to a
Mutually Aided Cooperative Society
● Production processes streamlined, and are at a stage where they can
be handed over to service providers gradually
● Conscious efforts on part of Chamoli Tasar to take people up the value
chain and increase their involvement in the enterprise
● The marketing function, which is the higher end function is being provided
by an outside agency, which has access to greater resources for this
specialised function.
Some of the key challenges to sustainability of the enterprise are, and
Chamoli Tasar’s/AT India’s approach to tackle these areLow seed productivity: The cost of production of cocoons is almost
twice that of Chinese cocoons and at the same time the size of the cocoons
produced is almost half compared to others. Low productivity is a serious
potential threat, and the solutions being sought is from are at the marketing
and branding end and not at the production end. It includes
1. Coping with competition from cheaper silks – CTPL is not trying to
compete with silks from other states, by effectively offering a differentiated
product. The strategy is to work only on blended fabrics, which have a
different identity and serve a different market. Not just the oak tasar, but
also the cheaper eri, muga etc, will be blended with other yarns to
differentiate the product.
2. Rearing of cocoons, involves higher cost than if the cocoons are bought,
however there are some inherent advantages it comes with. It is because
of engaging in rearing activities rather than buying cocoons that Chamoli
Tasar has
● Created identity for the activity, without which it will be will be lost
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Supporting sustainable livelihoods - Lessons from five case studies
●
●
Achieved standardized output, which might become a concern without
self rearing
Retained ecological basis for the activity
Management cadre availability for CTPL: The management and
governance roles for Chamoli Tasar are being played by AT India. The first
major shift towards sustainability will entail detaching itself from AT India for
the management of the enterprise. Chamoli Tasar and AT India have an
informal albeit well working “producer - buyer relationship”, wherein the
latter buys all the produce of final fabric and yarn, and works on the marketing
of the fabric. This could be continued for a medium term period during
which capacity of CTPL be built for marketing its product independently.
Replicability Potential
Most developmental interventions have an initial gestation period wherein
progress is slow and even small successes are very difficult to come by. In the
case of Chamoli Tasar, the road has not been smooth either. Given the fact
that an initial developmental approach has paved the way for an enterprise
in such difficult environment, with very little institutional and policy support
beyond just funding, there is a high potential for replication.
The advantage of this journey by Chamoli Tasar and AT India is that now
there is precedence and a similar model can be adopted by other institutions.
It might be well in place to recognise the complexity of the market for textiles,
more so for the niche markets, and build on an initiative with a good sense of
the market. The operational, systems, processes, and even technology are
well laid out and streamlined by Chamoli Tasar, and can be used. The type
of human resources, the training needs, dealing positively with the ecology
have all been worked at by Chamoli Tasar and are well amenable to
replication. This has been observed with the setting up privately owned
commercial enterprises for tasar cultivation and its processing in the area.
Conclusion
Chamoli Tasar has effectively promoted livelihoods of the rural mountain
folk, by introducing a whole set of activities around Tasar production. AT
India began with tasar because of the resource availability in the area, the
suitability of the activity to the existing skill base of the local community, with
a vision of creating an industrial base for sericulture in Uttaranchal. This
intervention has led to several social and economic benefits for individuals.
Even at the level of the local economy, one can see better and fruitful
71
utilisation of both human and natural resources. This is a significant step in
ensuring a more vibrant economy, driven by a more aware and motivated
lot of persons.
It is important to recognise two aspects that make this enterprise distinct
from many other development interventions. Firstly, Chamoli Tasar is not
membership based, and the people involved have been coming in for
economic benefits, voluntarily, and not by tying themselves down to the
enterprise in any form. This is a particularly encouraging aspect and suggests
that a shift for Chamoli Tasar, to being community owned will only strengthen
the commitment of the people involved. Secondly, the producer and seller
relationship that Chamoli Tasar and AT India have established will go a long
way in enabling replication within Uttaranchal with as many production bases,
and possibly one centralised agency performing the marketing and
selling functions.
Major Learnings
A longer gestation period is required for introduction and stabilization
of any new activity. This would require more financial, technical and
organizational resources for standardizing the activity, which should be taken
into account in project development.
The issue of production or marketing first is often faced in a new
intervention. It is important to establish market linkages so that beneficiaries
get returns on their investment in labour, capital or both. This is necessary for
sustaining the interests of the poor families.
CTPL is a classic case of building an intermediary organisation which
does the liaisoning function between the community and markets. The risk
therefore was not passed on to the producers, as is often done through
building people’s institution. The specialised functions of procurement of raw
material, engaging people in job work and establishing market linkages has
taken up by this intermediary organization.
Competition has to be tackled through building a niche market, product
differentiation and innovative advertising. This is more true for competitive
sectors such as handloom and handicraft. The continuous investment in
research and development is therefore necessary in such interventions, which
will help in achieving long run sustainability.
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Design and Production:Silverline Communications
[email protected]
United Nations World Food Programme and International Fund for
Agricultural Development, a specialized agency of UN have an on-going
strategic programme partnership in India. To know more about WFP in
India or WFP-IFAD partnership please visit www.wfp.org.in.
The publication may also be downloaded from www.wfp.org.in/ifadindia