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Dual-use Governance in Synthetic Biology Promises, Hype and Security Brett Edwards, University of Bath Back ground • PhD thesis – Why do some aspects of Synthetic Biology attract dual-use concern and not others? • Case studies: US and UK • Qualitative historical/ constructivist approach. » Security Studies, Risk, STS – National level focus Overview 1) Studying ‘what isn’t there’ 2) Synthetic Biology A Case in Point 3) Findings Studying what isn’t there(1) Which approach to adopt for the purposes of the research? - Ethical ‘Gold Standard’? - Existing risk assessment frameworks? - Contrast stated objectives with actual achievements in key institutions? - Contrast experiences ‘on the ground’ with policy/academic literature. Studying what isn’t there(2) • Key aim is to examine political processes which have underpinned the emergence of policy outcomes. – Agency – Institutions/ structures – Ideas • Want to examine changes in ‘the feasible ’ with regard policy as well as implementation. Focus of analysis Subject and Scope National Approach Politics and Practice Studying what isn’t there(3) Key Concepts • Four Domains of Governance Studying what isn’t there(3) Key Concepts (2) Primary and Secondary Securitization - New channels/ forums - Implementation politics Fair Explanation? Underlying causal mechanisms Unearthing norms: S&T and risk Provision of a theoretical lens Synthetic Biology A Case in Point What is Synthetic Biology (1)? • Defined initially by funding councils – Fed into ethical framings in Both the US and UK • EU Ethics reports and SynBerc. • • • • Promissory Interdisciplinary Controllable Biology/ Controllable Risks Applications of Engineering Principles? What is Synthetic Biology (2)? • Six subfields (Lam et al 2009) – DNA circuits • standard biological parts – Synthetic metabolic pathways • biological synthesis of chemicals – Proto-cell creation • model of a cell – Unnatural components • New proteins, with functions – Synthetic Microbial Consortia • Cells, working together Dual-use concerns about synthetic Biology (1) • Spread of concern – DNA Synthesis Academic Field Amateur Community • Key areas of concern. – Scenarios/ and pre-existing concerns with oversight. Dual-use concerns about synthetic Biology (1) Key findings • Roles and successes and failings of specific institutions – NSABB/ ELSI dead zone • Rhetoric belies little governmental interest • Simularity of US and UK – ELSI is king • Role of concerns about ‘Top- down’ Securitization • Externalisation of dual-use concerns about biodefense • Patch-work of responses. Further questions • Risk and dual-use • Generalizability – Other fields/ other countries • Future relevance of ELSI in Synbio? • Militarization Thank you!