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International Negotiation 14 (2009) 311–328
brill.nl/iner
Hydrosolidarity and International Water Governance
Andrea K. Gerlak*
Director of Academic Development, International Studies Association, University of Arizona
Department of Political Science, 324 Social Sciences, Tucson, AZ 85721, USA
(E-mail: [email protected])
Robert G. Varady**
Udall Center for Studies in Public Policy, University of Arizona
Address: 803 E. First St., Tucson, AZ 85719, USA
(E-mail: [email protected])
Arin C. Haverland***
Department of Arid Lands Resource Sciences, University of Arizona
803 E. First Street, PO Box 210483, Tucson, AZ 85719, USA
(E-mail: [email protected])
Received 14 April 2008; accepted 31 July 2008
Abstract
In the first decade of the 21st century, ‘hydrosolidarity,’ the notion that water management should include
considerations of ethics and equity, has influenced international approaches to conducting environmental
research and formulating water policy. Since its inception in the 1990s, the term appears frequently across
a spectrum of water-related research. It has accordingly permeated discourses and publications on water
management. Such rapid proliferation of the concept has helped usher in a wave of transition from conflict management to cooperative efforts between upstream and downstream basin users, as well as a
complex paradigm that links both human and environmental welfare. In this paper, we trace the intellectual origins and changing conceptions of hydrosolidarity. We outline some of its applications as well as
various reactions to the concept. We close by discussing how the concept can help frame negotiations
between riparian states and influence treaty-making and institution-building in river basin settings.
Keywords
hydrosolidarity, international conflict, cooperation, transboundary, water management, water governance,
stakeholder participation
*) Andrea K. Gerlak serves as the Director of Academic Development for the International Studies
Association, as a visiting Professor in the Department of Political Science and Senior Policy Associate with
the Udall Center for Studies in Public Policy at the University of Arizona. Please direct all correspondence
to this author.
**) Robert G. Varady serves as the Deputy Director and Research Professor of Environmental Policy at
the Udall Center for Studies in Public Policy at the University of Arizona. Dr. Varady is also currently
serving as president of the International Water History Association (IWHA).
***) Arin C. Haverland is a doctoral student in the Department of Arid Lands Resource Sciences at the
University of Arizona.
© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2009
DOI: 10.1163/157180609X432842
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A.K. Gerlak et al. / International Negotiation 14 (2009) 311–328
Introduction
In the past two decades, there has been increased attention to governance and
sustainable management of water resources by policymakers, managers, academics, international institutions, and non-governmental organizations (NGO),
among others (Hattingh 2007). Today’s water governance has been characterized
as a “bottom-up process of norm diffusion and normative convergence over time
across separate regimes at the basin level” (Conca 2005: 95). Governance, according to this view, is diffuse and decentralized. There exists no global rivers regime,
nor is there a movement toward one (Falkenmark 1990; Conca et al. 2006).
Rather, there are a myriad of ‘global water initiatives’ including mega-conferences
on water, new organizations, and awareness-raising campaigns, which have arisen
since the early-1990s (Varady et al. 2008). Some have referred to the absence of
appropriate governance mechanisms, such as the lack of broad stakeholder participation and applicable international law on transboundary aquifers, as ‘hydroschizophrenia’ (Llamas and Martinez-Santos 2005; Jarvis et al. 2005). Insofar as
it is generally accepted that the world is experiencing a water crisis, many of the
leading voices in the global development community believe that this is more a
crisis of governance than of actual physical resources (Global Water Partnership
2000). We agree that better governance of water resources will help confront the
perceived crisis (UNESCO 2005). Accordingly we ask, how can the concept of
‘hydrosolidarity,’ as defined over the past decade, contribute to resolving these
global problems, particularly management of transboundary waters?
What is “Hydrosolidarity”?
In its broadest sense, hydrosolidarity originated as a deliberate attempt to inject
mutual understanding, common good, and ethics in relation to shared waters. It
arose, perhaps unconsciously, as a rejection of and counteraction to the implicit
and self-centered notion of ‘hydroegoism,’1 the view that satisfying geopolitical
self-interests (national, regional, sectoral, political, or other) should be the chief
principle guiding water management in general and allocation in particular. Of
course, the roots and principles of hydrosolidarity date back to the focus of the
1970s on holistic, equitable, appropriate-technology, small-is-beautiful (Schumacher 1999; orig. 1973), and socially responsible views of development and
resource management.
To adapt such thinking to the increasingly important question of water, noted
Swedish hydrologist Malin Falkenmark, an early proponent of integrated water
1)
Hydroegoism is a term believed to have been first used during the 1998 Stockholm International Water
Institute Young Water Professionals Report to describe self interests by stakeholders in the water sector.
More specifically, hydroegoism refers to the control of water based on power, river-basin position
(upstream vs. downstream), and potential to exploit water (Zeitoun 2005).
A.K. Gerlak et al. / International Negotiation 14 (2009) 311–328
313
resources management, devised a new conceptual framework.2 Hydrosolidarity
added social justice and human rights to the already long list of technical variables
that influence the provision and management of water. Falkenmark initially presented her ideas on this subject in 1996 at the World Conservation Congress.
After further reflection and refinement, she first used the term publicly in her
Volvo Prize Lecture in Brussels, Belgium, in 1998. In her published article of
the lecture, Falkenmark described the process of escaping what she termed ‘water
blindness’ by addressing the need for ‘water solidarity’ (Falkenmark 1998: 356).3
This approach, she argued should be paired with the concepts ‘green water,’ or
solid water originating from rainfall (Hoff 2007), and ‘virtual water.’ Virtual
water, or water involved in the production of food, is transferred from one region
that is better endowed in terms of water needed for food production to a waterdeficient region with large food needs (Falkenmark 2002). This concept of virtual
water is especially significant for equity in water-short areas because it seeks to
trace hidden or unintended movement of water.
The concept of water solidarity would then, according to Falkenmark, open
the eyes of the water world to forms of management that would mandate three
key components, namely that: (1) human water obligations deserve the same
respect as other human rights to safe household water; (2) recognition of “upstream/
downstream issues related to sharing water” must take precedence; and (3) the
significance of support from ethical, religious, and philosophical circles as a means
of incorporating water ethics (Falkenmark 1998).
‘Water solidarity,’ as originally conceived by Falkenmark in her 1998 lecture,
subsequently underwent a metamorphosis as scholars and practitioners adopted
and tweaked the concept, molding it into what became known as ‘hydrosolidarity.’ According to Victor Duchovny, Falkenmark’s hydrosolidarity has come to
entail five key conditions: (1) motivating stakeholders and decision-makers to use
broad information, (2) designing organizational structures for finding compromise solutions, (3) making public participation socially acceptable, (4) addressing
social implications of resource use, and (5) redressing the use of resources that
damages the interest of other uses (Duchovny 2002: 121). He advocates including four additional conditions, including state governance on the principle of
national hydrosolidarity, public involvement in the promotion of moral awareness, creation of a regulating system of laws and provisions, and forecasting
2)
Falkenmark was awarded the 2005 Rachel Carson Prize, the 1998 Volvo Environmental Prize, and
other awards recognizing her innovative approaches to the sustainable use of water resources.
3)
Several years later Falkenmark would further elaborate on ‘water blindness’. She writes: “[w]ater tends
in the general debate to be thought of with a strong technical bias. Thus the debate continues to be hampered by a sort of water blindness favoring a basically technical conceptualization of water. In line with
such a view, water resources management is taken as various ways of controlling and governing direct
water use and related waste flows, not as managing water’s various functions in the landscape.” (Falkenmark 2003b: 2037).
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(Duchovny 2002: 121). These conditions can apply directly to negotiations involving shared river basins and the management of such basins.
Ultimately, Falkenmark maintains that it is critical to institutionalize interdependencies in river basins in order to foster hydrosolidarity (Falkenmark and
Lundqvist 1999; Falkenmark and Folke 2002). She writes: “The basis should be
general solidarity with focus on beneficial sharing of the joint water resource –
that is, the rainfall caught within the water divide. Solidarity means the willingness to restrain one’s freedom. Adaptation to the hydroclimatic constraints of a
catchment will demand that all the interested parties are prepared to compromise. Principles and rules for sharing will have to be found for the unavoidable
compromises between incompatible water interests in a certain catchment”
(Falkenmark and Rockström 2004: 214). Hydrosolidarity can be applied to many
different scales, including the global and regional level, the national scale, and the
catchment and cross-national scale (SIWI Waterfront 2002: 18).
The Influence and Use of Hydrosolidarity
In the first decade of the 21st century, the notion of hydrosolidarity has palpably
influenced international approaches to conducting environmental research and
formulating water policy. Since its inception, the term has appeared frequently in
nearly every genre of water-related research and has accordingly permeated discourses and publications on water management. The concept of hydrosolidarity
has served as a kind of centerpiece for several World Water Forums (WWF),
including the most recent forums in 2003 and 2006. The 2006 World Water
Forum in Mexico included an agenda for risk-reduction policies, strategies for
alleviating social conflicts and armed threats, and ways to adapt to climate change
and variability. Perhaps most significantly, the 2006 forum called for “the establishment of a local water culture and hydrosolidarity” (World Water Forum 2006).
A WWF document asserts: “Developing and respecting water ethics becomes a
key element of successful implementation of integrated and sustainable water
resources management. Diversities of ethical values that take different forms in
different cultural groups need to be respected” (World Water Forum Thematic
Area 5 2006).
The term hydrosolidarity has been used in watershed management and transboundary water conflict publications to describe the interests and needs of upper
and lower river basin stakeholders (Castelain 2002), in strategic plans for fisheries
and hatcheries (International Water Association 2003), in aquaculture, dam building and hydropower (Ndung’u 2003), as best management practices recommended for catchment areas (Falkenmark et al. 2004), and even in urban planning
meetings (USGS New Jersey 2005) and graduate thesis documents (Davidsen
2006). In addition, many international and regional organizations have adopted
it for use in their workshops and conferences, including the United Nations Edu-
A.K. Gerlak et al. / International Negotiation 14 (2009) 311–328
315
cational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the United Nations Environment
Programme, the Global Environment Facility, and the Organization of American
States. The Stockholm International Water Institute (SIWI) has sponsored several
seminars as well as web-based discussions to promote the concept of hydrosolidarity with academics and practitioners from around the globe.
Reactions to Hydrosolidarity
Despite enthusiasm surrounding the concept, there remain concerns with the
applicability of hydrosolidarity. Effective use of the framework requires realistic
benchmarks for achieving and maintaining hydrosolidarity; few if any such metrics have been developed. Some observers and potential users have argued that
hydrosolidarity needs definite boundaries and guidelines, including techniques to
measure the impact of applying the hydrosolidarity paradigm at the global,
regional, constitutional, national, and catchment levels. One critic is skeptical
that the obstacles to hydrosolidarity can be overcome in a globalizing world,
increasingly dominated by the corporate and social behavior of the World Bank
and its partners and institutions (Afunaduula 2006).
In addition, policy and economic scholars have suggested that while striving
towards hydrosolidarity may be beneficial, the approach still requires fundamental water laws to be successfully funded, implemented, maintained, and monitored (Wouters 1999; Piagram 2001; Jagerskog 2002). A lack of incentives has
also been cited as a bar to hydrosolidarity as upstream users are not likely to give
up their interests for the benefit of downstream users without compensation.
Appropriate incentives may include reduced taxes or other benefits such as financing of investments or provision of non-related goods and services (Bayarsaihan
and McKinney 2002). The actions surrounding hydrosolidarity may be considered a “natural mass expression of charity” that is unlikely to occur if they are not
encouraged by palpable financial measures such as tax reductions or other rewards,
particularly in developing countries (Castelain 2002).
Finally, others have argued that hydrosolidarity is in practice difficult to achieve.
Llamas and Pérez-Picazo (2001) maintain that a lack of knowledge, arrogance,
vested interests, neglect, institutional inertia, and corruption are just some of
the obstacles to hydrosolidarity. Llamas, a professor of Hydrology, and PérezPicazo, an economist, also wonder whether “the notable and beautiful concept of
hydrosolidarity might be used for corruption and serve as [an] unethical way
for lobbies to withdraw public money,” citing the Segura Catchments under the
2001 National Water Plan in Spain as an example of such abuse (Llamas and
Pérez-Picazo 2001: 93).
Despite such concerns, hydrosolidarity contributes to the management and
negotiations around transboundary waters through its emphasis on dialogue
and ethics. In addition, hydrosolidarity can support some technical or functional
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directives related to transboundary water governance. We discuss these contributions next.
The Value of Hydrosolidarity as a Broad Framework
Hydrosolidarity, which was meant to broaden perspectives, is a paradigm that can
help shape how we negotiate and manage shared waters. Specifically, it promotes
a broad framework of conflict resolution and emphasizes an ethical and equitable
dimension to negotiations of shared waters. Considerable research warns of the
potential conflict between upstream and downstream states over shared water
resources. Gleditsch et al. (2006) find that upstream-downstream situations in
river basins can induce conflicts related to resource scarcity. Homer-Dixon (1999)
argues that conflict or war is most likely when a downstream state is highly dependent on the shared water for its national well-being and the upstream country
threatens to substantially restrict the river’s flow. Others have argued that the
upstream-downstream relationship can impede treaty formation (Song and Whittington 2004). Indeed, for some time, scholars have cited the upstream-downstream issue as arguably the most intractable problem along transboundary rivers
(Le Marquand 1977).
Hydrosolidarity has the potential to ameliorate the upstream-downstream divide
through its emphasis on dialogue. While negotiations around shared waters have
historically focused on the technical and political issues of water distribution,
hydrosolidarity can help reframe negotiations by promoting resolution of conflict
with a climate of dialogue. The United Nations Educational and Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) seeks to encourage dialogue between peoples
from diverse countries through instructional programs that allow participants to
“learn how to develop genuine solidarity for the sharing of water resources through
mutual understanding and support” (UNESCO 2005).
In addition to its emphasis on conflict resolution, hydrosolidarity advances an
ethical and equitable dimension to negotiations of shared waters. According to
Falkenmark, the social perspective of hydrosolidarity “involves the need to meet
fundamental human needs in terms of safe household water, water-dependent
food production, and – in view of present technique deficiencies – water-polluting
income generation activities” (Falkenmark 2003a: 35). Similar attention to ethical concerns in recent years is contained in the Millennium Goals of 2000. Goal
7 of this suite of objectives aims to ensure environmental sustainability, including
sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation (Heeb et al. 2006).
For Falkenmark, attention to ethics can help us overcome many institutional,
technical, and scientific weaknesses that characterize how we manage ecosystems,
including our flawed organization of science and fragmentation of government
systems (Falkenmark and Folke 2002). The ‘new ethics’ espoused by hydrosoli-
A.K. Gerlak et al. / International Negotiation 14 (2009) 311–328
317
darity, according to Falkenmark, “have to incorporate principles that, on a catchment basis, allow for proper attention to the hungry and poor, upstream and
downstream, to descendants, and to sites and habitats that need to be protected”
(Falkenmark and Folke 2002: 1).
Outlining a Functional Value of Hydrosolidarity
Beyond the use of hydrosolidarity as a broad paradigm that can help shape negotiations and management of shared waters, hydrosolidarity can be employed to
support four salient features of transboundary water governance at the crossnational scale: (1) creation of a cooperative institutional structure; (2) promotion of
stakeholder participation; (3) development of shared knowledge; and (4) enhanced
integration and linkages.
Creation of a Cooperative Institutional Structure
Hydrosolidarity can help influence the development of institutional structures
that support cooperation around shared waters. This may include the development of national plans, donor coordinating committees, river parliaments, strategic
action plans, and river basin organizations. South African water-governance
scholar Anthony Turton sees shared water-management regimes as a “durable
manifestation of hydrosolidarity” and a necessary step to help ‘desecuritize’ the
water discourse (Turton 2001: 4).
According to Ken Conca et al. (2006), there is a noticeable convergence of
thinking on joint management and the protection of transboundary rivers. Increasingly, donor organizations are emphasizing new governance mechanisms, as evidenced by the Global Environment Facility’s (GEF) regional waters program,
which seeks to improve cooperation around shared waters through the creation
of regional basin institutions (GEF 2008; Gerlak 2004a; Uitto and Duda 2002).
Durth (1996) points to the degree of institutionalism as an important catalyst
for promoting cooperation and governing river basins. According to a UNEP
report, “The historical record indicates an increased likelihood of conflict in
basins lacking institutions that can accommodate changing political, hydrologic,
or other basin conditions” (UNEP 2002: 4). Cooperation over water resources
is also thought to produce ecological benefits to the river system (Sadoff and Grey
2002).
Green Cross International, an NGO founded by Mikhail Gorbachev whose
mission is to “help ensure a just, sustainable and secure future for all,” recommends the creation of river basin authorities to help coordinate basin interests
and reduce conflict in river basins (Green Cross International 2000). Some argue
that river basin commissions or authorities need to be linked to national level
authorities to ensure continued support within riparian country bureaucracies
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(Marty 2001). Others caution that states should not need to be limited by the
basin level but rather they can more openly negotiate less rigid institutional scales
that promote cooperation (Fischhendler and Feitelson 2003: 559). Based on
UNESCO’s experience promoting cooperation around shared waters, that organization has found that: “Once international institutions are in place, they are
tremendously resilient over time, even between otherwise hostile riparian nations,
and even when conflict is waged over other issues” (UNESCO 2003: 318).
River basin cooperation in Europe is put forth as a model for cooperation
around transboundary waters. Cooperative institutional arrangements along
the Danube and Rhine Rivers in Europe, dating back to the early 1900s, provide
evocative examples of the power of cooperation over common pool resources
like transboundary rivers (Duda and LaRoche 1997; UNEP 2002: 12; Gerlak
2004b; Bernauer 1995; Verweij 2000). But regional cooperative institutional
arrangements are also on the rise in Africa, perhaps as a result of increased donor
emphasis there on regional cooperative arrangements (Lautze and Giordano
2007). Given that transboundary river basins are the norm rather than the
exception (Varady and Morehouse 2003), recent research on institutions in
such watersheds has found in some a large number of cooperative institutional
arrangements. In all, 180 cooperative institutional arrangements were found
across 124 international river basins, with varying degrees of the depth of cooperation; approximately 40 percent of all transboundary rivers in all regions of the
world are managed through cooperative institutional arrangements of some form
(Gerlak 2007).
Promotion of Stakeholder Participation
Falkenmark (2003b: 36) maintains that long-term resilience of the overall water
system has to be secured for the benefit of coming generations and suggests that
securing societal acceptance of necessary tradeoffs through stakeholder participation in planning and decision making is essential. The importance of stakeholder
participation is similarly echoed in a variety of sectors. Fisheries for example must
be managed within the framework of river basins and based on the concept of
hydrosolidarity between all stakeholders, including respect for downstream interests. Jonch-Clausen et al. (2005: 155) assert “the value and the potential of
local fisheries are often underestimated. Their true value must be evaluated and
information spread to managers and decision makers. Both capture fisheries
and aquaculture must respect local interests and facilitate local stakeholder participation.” Without stakeholder participation the “initiative to create and apply
sustainable development indicators would also be ineffective and short-lived”
(Annaev 2002: 166).
Public participation is also an important component of hydrosolidarity. It can
help eliminate or minimize both corruption and infringement on rights (World
A.K. Gerlak et al. / International Negotiation 14 (2009) 311–328
319
Water Forum Asia-Pacific Regional Document 2006). Professional and administrative control or hydroegoism exists when there is a lack of public participation
(Global Water Partnership 2005). The 4th World Water Forum in 2006 echoed
calls for citizens to more ethically interact with water, particularly in times of
crises. This agenda also included a thematic baseline which incorporated the concept of integrated water resources management and which now considers the river
basin as the fundamental planning unit (for non-urban water issues) “that seeks
higher ethical involvement of citizens in their interaction with water, particularly
during crisis” (World Water Forum Section 5 2006).
In order to overcome hydroegoism all sectors must be represented, including
hydropower, irrigation, water supply, and recreation, in order to develop mutually acceptable rules and water management. Within the European Union, the
hydrosolidarity concept “provides commonly accepted thinking in relation to
basic needs of different stakeholders within a basin,” (IUGG 2003) thereby promoting stakeholder consultation and broad involvement of water users (Salomons 2004). India’s river parliaments, where upstream-downstream civil society
institutions coordinate to bring together diverse users, are a good model for this
(Agarwal 1999). Ultimately, however, states will need to adopt relevant laws and
regulations and then implement and monitor them (Dukhovny and Sokolov
2005; Wouters 2001).
Development of Shared Knowledge
Data exchange provides a communication channel for countries that share water
resources (Chenoweth et al. 2001). Integrating information sharing into decision-making processes is seen as essential to transboundary water management
today (Grossman 2006: 179). The UN Convention (1997), Article 9 highlights
the need for regular exchange of data. The ability of states to generate scientifically-sound basin-level data lies at the heart of hydrosolidarity (Turton 2001: 6).
There are several powerful arguments for improved information sharing regarding transboundary waters. First, discussions of science can promote trust between
states and stakeholders (Miles et al. 2002; Uitto and Duda 2002). Second, reliable scientific knowledge about negative transboundary consequences of a problem is essential for creating international policy agreements to address the problem
(Dimitrov 2006: 18; Varady and Morehouse 2003). States are better able to solve
their problems if they have common understandings of them (LeMarquand 1977).
Third, the joint investigation into scientific aspects of a problem and possible
solutions is a way to mitigate fairness concerns (Marty 2001; Wolf 1997). Finally,
data itself can be used as a form of negotiating capital, and data-sharing can lead
to breakthroughs in negotiations that may spur further progress (Lautze and Giordano 2007). Conversely, the alternative – asymmetry in information – is thought
to hinder cooperation and lead to sub-optimal outcomes, because the less informed
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party tends to expect the worst scenario (Akerlof and Maun 1970; van der Zaag
2007; Elhance 2000).
Research on the role of information sharing in Africa found that formal information-sharing agreements were preceded by projects designed to improve the
information basis (Grossmann 2006: 219). They found that river basin organizations play a variety of roles with regard to information gathering and sharing
and that multiple instruments were employed along transboundary rivers and
lakes in Africa to generate and share information. These include joint basin studies, hydrological measuring networks, hydrological databases, water-management
models, and documentation centers. In his study of South African nations, Turton (2001: 5) found that the existence of durable regimes has a direct correlation
with the ability of states to generate legitimate basin-level data. Other cases suggest that riparian states may spend years simply sharing information in advance
of founding an effective, legally instituted international or regional body. This
was the case of the Commission for the Protection of the Rhine (ICPR) from
1950–1963 (Myint 2007).
Enhanced Integration and Linkages
In the water resources arena, integrated water resources management (IWRM)
has emerged as a guiding principle. Introduced in 1992 at the UN Conference on
Environment and Development, it is a comprehensive approach for achieving
sustainable freshwater resource use in catchments that can be traced back to the
1977 UN Conference on Water (Bonell 2004). As a response to more traditional
approaches that rely on narrow engineering and sectoral water concerns, IWRM
emphasizes the integration of different sectors, including industry, agriculture,
energy, transport, and environmental protection while advocating management
within the hydrological confines of the river basin. It calls for more integrated
approaches, including management of water quality and quantity, surface and
groundwater, water and land resources – and upstream and downstream uses
(Dombrowsky 2007: 8). The Global Water Partnership, a global water initiative
based in Sweden, has helped to operationalize IWRM with their “IWRM Toolkit,” a repository of actual experiences (Bonell 2004: 284).
Hydrosolidarity can further the goals of IWRM. It can do so by promoting hydrological boundaries rather than administrative or territorial interests (Dukhovny
and Sokolov 2005). At its core, hydrosolidarity adopts a river-basin perspective
and an integrated approach to managing the basin. This reframes the spatial focus
away from the artificial state or political border to the physical, hydrologic realty.
For Falkenmark (2001), hydrosolidarity can build linkages across concerns over
food security, water security, and environmental security.
Additionally, the GEF sees hydrosolidarity as helping to advance linkages
among freshwater, oceans, and coasts (GEF 2006). For the GEF, linked manage-
A.K. Gerlak et al. / International Negotiation 14 (2009) 311–328
321
ment can better ensure that upstream activities are “planned and implemented
with full knowledge of the potential impacts on the ecosystems and economic
activities and livelihoods of the ecosystems and the water cycle, and to promote
the sustainable development of both the higher and lower watershed areas” (GEF
et al. 2006: 6). The Organization of American States (OAS) sees hydrosolidarity
as supporting the development of national water plans within countries that are
based on the wider basin. According to OAS, these water plans can help better
conceptualize shared problems and foster notions of hydrosolidarity as a political
concept and basis for multi-jurisdictional cooperation (OAS 2006). Within the
United Nations system, UNEP acknowledges that hydrosolidarity can help cast
the management of fisheries in the framework of river basins and with a better
recognition of downstream interests (UNEP 2005). An experiment with IWRM
in the Upper Tiete Basin in the metropolitan region of São Paulo, Brazil demonstrates that public participation combined with modern decision support systems
technology can ameliorate urban water conflict on the watershed scale (Braga
1999).
Applying Hydrosolidarity Principles to River Basins
Many efforts are underway to apply concepts of hydrosolidarity, including several
of the features of transboundary water governance, to specific river basins and
watersheds. The concept has been applied piecemeal to explain current activities
in certain basins, but also to advocate for new practices. We find evidence – mostly
implicit, though sometimes explicit – of the application of hydrosolidarity in
most regions of the world. To illustrate this development, we briefly note a few
select examples of where and how we see hydrosolidarity being applied to river
basin governance. These have been chosen because to varying degrees they provide real-world examples of how elements of the concept of hydrosolidarity have
either found their way into actual management paradigms or they outline governance. We discuss the basins in descending order of their incorporation of those
elements.
Australia’s Murray-Darling River basin, which is commonly cited as a paragon
of good water management in a water-scarce region, has adopted aspects of hydrosolidarity to help coordinate the development and management of the basin’s
river systems (Pigram 1999). Several of the features of transboundary governance
outlined above can be observed in this basin. These include the development and
evolution of institutional arrangements and agreements between stakeholders,
integration of water quality and quantity concerns, sharing of data and knowledge, and the existence of a well-developed participation process exemplified by
the natural-resources management strategy. In Central Asia, in the Aral Sea region,
the donor community has been an effective agent for fostering hydrosolidarity by
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using its financial leverage. There, as elsewhere, donor organizations increasingly
and demonstrably view hydrosolidarity as a way to achieve equitable water allocation (Le Moigne 2003). Accordingly, funders can promote information sharing
and encourage governments to ensure water management that is equitable and
attuned to human and environmental needs (Dukhovny 2002).
Going further, donors and development organizations have recognized the
value of strengthening civil society, which can serve as an agent for progressive
change. Along China’s Yellow River, some progress has been made in establishing
water users associations and other NGOs. As in Australia and Central Asia,
appropriate application of principles of hydrosolidarity can shed light on the
impacts of regional development on water resources (Ongley 1999). In the Yellow
River Valley, efforts have been underway to achieve hydrosolidarity in some development projects and thereby provide water to water-scarce parts of the basin,
improving linkages between resources. A conservancy commission is the institutional arrangement at the heart of integrated basin management there (Ongley
1999: 115).
On the other side of the globe, in the Brazilian region around the mega-city
of São Paulo, principles of hydrosolidarity combined with sophisticated technology are tackling water management concerns rising from population growth and
increased urbanization (Braga 1999). An experiment joining integrated water
resources planning with modern decision-support systems technology and enhanced
public participation mechanisms is helping develop a master plan for the basin.
In a regional adaptation of hydrosolidarity in India, planners and managers
have harnessed centuries-old traditions of local panchayati raj (decentralized
governance by councils of village elders). Water authorities have promoted basin
management and conflict resolution through the creation of river parliaments
(Agarwal 1999). Such river parliaments consist of upstream-downstream society
institutions that seek to improve dialogue and knowledge sharing between diverse
stakeholders as well as apply joint pressure on the state to improve river basin
management within a participatory framework (Agarwal 1999: 126).
In South Africa, hydrosolidarity has helped actors understand and overcome
critical institutional issues over shared waters. Applications of the equity features
embedded in the framing of hydrosolidarity have helped recreate a balance between
asymmetrical interests in river basins (van der Zaag 2007). Here the emphasis is
on water-allocation principles and practices, data-sharing and capacity building,
and harmonization of national water policies and laws. In the Nile River Basin,
another region characterized by upstream-downstream conflict, hydrosolidarity
has been embraced to promote stakeholder participation (Sendama and Granit
2002). Under the auspices of the Nile Basin Initiative and the Shared Vision
Program, a series of development projects are underway in the basin that embrace
components of hydrosolidarity, namely upstream-downstream cooperation in the
context of integrated water resource management.
A.K. Gerlak et al. / International Negotiation 14 (2009) 311–328
323
The above examples demonstrate how hydrosolidarity is being promoted to
improve how countries enhance their internal water-management processes and
how, in some cases, they negotiate with one another over water resources. Varying
levels of cooperation are embraced, highlighted by the mix of transboundary
water-governance features adopted in these cases.
Ultimately, there exists no perfect case study to illustrate hydrosolidarity in
practice. While bits and pieces of the concept have been adapted and employed,
no basin or region has officially adopted hydrosolidarity in its entirety. This is to
be expected since except for natural and human-induced cataclysms, water governance tends to occur incrementally and evolve over time. As the illustrations
above indicate, various features of hydrosolidarity have been embraced in ad hoc,
rather unofficial ways across the globe. We see hydrosolidarity in practice at various governance levels, including small-scale actions like river parliaments in India
to greater, regional levels, like efforts in the Nile River basin. There are numerous
examples of small steps taken to further develop the concept, from actual management practices to seminars, workshops, and conferences.
Perhaps the greatest contribution of the notion of hydrosolidarity to water governance is its strong ethical dimension. Dozens of donor agencies, international
organizations, and non-governmental organizations have been working for some
time now to promote cooperation along shared waters, with many of the aims we
outline above in our discussion of the functional value of hydrosolidarity. Falkenmark’s framing of hydrosolidarity helps shape our dialogue within an ethical frame.
Hydrosolidarity can then be viewed as a larger umbrella to more holistically capture both old and new water-management practices, from virtual water to stakeholder engagement. In this way, it can be seen as more of a manifesto on how
to frame water management today. It is not surprising, then, that it has been
influential in shaping dialogue about water, as demonstrated by the World Water
Forums. Indeed hydrosolidarity has become so embedded in our discourse about
water that even if you are unfamiliar with the term ‘hydrosolidarity,’ it is possible
to recognize its principles in action or to be familiar with examples of its practice.
Conclusion
The notion of hydrosolidarity – and all that it embraces – parallels and overlaps a
host of contemporary developments in water governance. Over the past decades,
the more traditional top-down, closed, and national-interest-based water-management
frameworks have been yielding to new, more diffuse models. These newer paradigms encourage public participation and transparency, seek to achieve greater
equity, and introduce integrated approaches to management that enhance efficiency and environmental sustainability. In a period of rising concerns over global
change and water scarcity, these and other holistic and humanistic principles are
324
A.K. Gerlak et al. / International Negotiation 14 (2009) 311–328
being promoted in numerous writings and adopted by various organizations and
basin states.
In this article, we have attempted to demonstrate how hydrosolidarity, which
packages a number of the above features, might be harnessed to reduce tension
between upstream and downstream riparians. There is a functional value to hydrosolidarity that can shape negotiations around water and the management of
shared waters. The concept can be employed to support four salient features of
transboundary water governance: (1) creation of cooperative institutional structures; (2) promotion of stakeholder participation; (3) development of shared
knowledge; and (4) enhanced integration and linkages.
Ultimately, for hydrosolidarity to make a meaningful contribution to negotiations about shared waters and the management of such waters, it will need to seen
as something separate and greater than integrated water resource management. It
will need to become valued for its ethical component that makes it more of a
grand manifesto and less of a cookbook or toolkit of practical water management
guidelines characterized by integrated water resources management. In view of
the strong institutional inertia and obstacles that remain pervasive in most settings, hydrosolidarity may not be the be-all, end-all magic cure for basin conflicts.
But employed in whole or in part, selectively and in concert with other strategies
and incentives, and as part of a holistic approach that is well adapted to the geopolitical and cultural conditions of a particular basin, hydrosolidarity offers the
potential for alleviating conflict over shared water resources.
Acknowledgments
The authors wish to thank Christopher Scott and Emily McGovern of the Udall
Center for Studies in Public Policy at the University of Arizona for their helpful
suggestions along with the valuable comments of the two reviewers. In addition,
the article is indebted to Maurits Ertsen of Delft Technical University for suggesting that the evolution and significance of hydrosolidarity be examined by scholars. The essay follows from Andrea K. Gerlak’s work on regional water authorities
and Robert Varady’s study of global water initiatives.
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