Download Final Assignment, Philosophy of Science Nov. 18, 2014 Kenzo

Final Assignment, Philosophy of Science
Nov. 18, 2014
Kenzo Fujisue
(Approximately 1800 words).
Q. Does theory change in the history of science undermine scientific realism?
Does theory change in the history of science undermine scientific realism? The answer might be: Theory
change in the history of science may and may not undermines scientific realism. Rather I should say that
the history of science is neutral with the respect to the issue of scientific realism.
The Stanford Encyclopedia said “Scientific realism is a positive epistemic attitude towards the content
of our best theories and models, recommending belief in both observable and unobservable aspects of the
world described by the sciences” and “most define scientific realism in terms of the truth or approximate
truth of scientific theories or certain aspects of theories. Some define it in terms of the successful reference
of theoretical terms to things in the world, both observable and unobservable.”
Therefore, in terms of argument about scientific realism, I set two viewpoints of “Truth or approximate
truth of scientific theories exists?” and “The world is described by the sciences in both observable and
unobservable aspects?” I would like to argue the question from these two viewpoints as follows.
1.
Argument about Scientific Realism
I made the blow matrix with two axis of “Truth or approximate truth of scientific theories exists?” and
“The world is described by the sciences in both observable and unobservable aspects?” In this matrix,
scientific realism is located in the Yes and Yes segment.
In the textbook, scientific realism is argued mainly from a statics viewpoint. I would argue scientific
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realism from historical viewpoints of Kuhn and Laudan. Kuhn’s scientific revolution and Laudan’s
pessimistic induction are located in the segment of No and No.
2.
Implication from History of Science
I would argue scientific realism from historical viewpoints of Kuhn and Laudan
1)
(i)
Thomas Kuhn’s Scientific Revolution
Existence of truth or approximate truth of scientific theories
Ladyman wrote in his textbook “Kuhn was one of those who emphasised what has become known as the
theory-laden nature of observation (p110).” The Theme of “theory-ladenness” is currently a broadly
accepted notion in philosophy of science as well as other areas of philosophy, and it is almost impossible
to deny it. However, in the similar way of thinking, interpretations of some histories can be defined as
viewpoint-laden. This means that histories can be interpreted not by data and observation but by viewpoint
of individual. This means that history is open to multiple interpretations and that the same piece of
evidence can support conflicting claims (quoted from the Stanford History Education’s site,
http://sheg.stanford.edu/rlh). The science history is similar, especially in terms of unresolved theories such
as Copenhagen interpretation and Pilot wave theory.
In his book of “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions”, Kuhn wrote “theories do not evolve piecemeal
to fit facts that were there all the time. (p140)”, “Rather they emerge together with that the facts they fit
from a revolutionary reformation of the preceding scientific tradition, a tradition within which the
knowledge-mediated relationship between the scientist and nature was not quite the same. (p140)” and
“it is just the incompleteness and imperfection of the existing data-theory fit that, at any time, define many
of the puzzles that characterize normal science. (p146)”.
In other words, if there are no fits between theories and facts, there are no objects those existence can be
proven by theories.
However, in the completely unobservable case of Higgs Bosom, the first elementary scalar particle
discovered in nature, scientists’ community “decided” that the parcels made in the CERN’s super collider
are “Higgs Bosom” and a part of the novel paradigm is not proved but decided by scientists as Kuhn
pointed out. The important point is that scientists can have provisional existence of Higgs Bosom and
create new theories of multiple Higgs Bosons/Higgs mechanism based on provisional existence of Higgs
Bosom. In this case, it seems that existence of unobservable occurs paradigm shift rather than anomalies.
An additional question is how we can know the paradigm shifts. To define the shift of paradigms, we
should have at least a vantage point to observe both of the paradigms. In my opinion, experiments of
physics become bigger and bigger, and observations and theories become more complicated and detailed.
Under such circumstances, scientists cannot have same paradigms easily. Then not only exist paradigm
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but also provisional existences might be able to make a new paradigm. It is because provisional existences
can have higher flexibility and more simplicity than paradigm including special terms and experiment
procedure. For example, Neutrino Oscillation is an anomaly of Standard Theory but can be predicted by
provisional existences of unobservable Neutral Particle oscillation. In Kuhn’s paradigm theory, Neutral
Particle oscillation may be normal science but I guess that there are more cases that provisional existences
can change paradigm rather than anomalies and moderate change of sciences has more impact on
scientific progress than scientific revolution. In other words, there are provisional existences with some
truth of theory can shift a paradigm.
(ii)
Description of the world by the sciences
Ladyman’s textbook said “Kuhn’s analysis of the relationship between theory and observation suggests
that theories infect data to such an extent that no way of gathering of observations can ever be theoryneutral and objective (p98)”.
Kuhn pointed out that the sense of many scientific terms such as atom, electron, species and mass has
changed considerably. He denied description of the world by science during the course of scientific
revolutions (Ladyman, p235).
Kuhn denied the description of the world in both observable and unobservable aspects. However, I think
that “the Ultimate Paradigm” can exist. It is because the world (universe) is limited by the maximum size
of 13.7 billion light year radius and the minimum size of Plank Length. If the world, the object of truth,
is limited, there is possibility of limit of truth, and there can be possibility of the ultimate paradigm
explaining the most comprehensive truth of the limited world. Under such ultimate paradigm, there is no
change/shift of paradigms and science can describe the world in the unchangeable paradigm. It is because
the course of scientific revolutions is stopped. Stephen Mooneyi said “The Ultimate Paradigm of Science
(the Paradigm), represents the finite construction possibilities of the Universe that are present in a moment
of time.”
For examples, the Higgs mechanism can integrate the general relativity theory and the quantum gravity
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theory and the superstring theory might be able to integrate the four forces of physics. If we can have the
ultimate paradigm and no more paradigm shifts/scientific revolutions occur, we can have truth or
approximate truth of theory. In other words, the world is described by the sciences.
2)
Larry Laudan’s Pessimistic Induction
(i)
Truth or approximate truth of scientific theories
“Laudan produced a list of now abandoned theories that once enjoyed predictive and explanatory success.
Many of these theories featured theoretical terms, such as phlogiston, ether and caloric, which were
supposed to refer to various kinds of unobservables (Ladyman, p231).” Laudan had several pessimistic
induction examples of the crystalline spheres of ancient and medieval astronomy, the effluvial theory of
static electricity, the catastrophist geology, the vibratory theory of heat, the theory of circular inertia and
theories of spontaneous generation. Laudan pointed out that there is continuity of scientific theories at the
level of observable phenomena but no continuity at the level of unobservable phenomena. In other words,
the truth of scientific theories cannot exist at the level of unobservable phenomena.
However, in terms of Atom Theory, this theory was once denied by Descartes and Mach. The atomism
theory once had predictive and explanatory failures, but now is accepted as a scientific theory and atoms
are observed as real. This case is an Optimistic (Induction). Now some scientists believes in the existence
of the electromagnetic ether and the optical ether and are trying to prove the existence of the ether. There
is “possibility” of re-acceptance of the ether theory. The history can be interpreted as both pessimistic and
optimistic generally.
(ii)
Description of the world by the sciences
Laudan pointed out that unobservable cannot be regarded as true or even approximately true. However,
if he is accepted, we cannot descript the scientific theory of quantum physics at all, because quantum
cannot be observed. We should follow "Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen"?
3.
Conclusion
Therefore, we can say that theory change in the history of science MAY NOT undermine scientific realism
as well as that theory change in the history of science MAY undermine scientific realism, which means
that the theory change in the history of science is neutral with scientific realism and anti-realism, and that
it is case-by-case. According to Kuhn, when we follow the history of science, sciences are not necessarily
going to progress by theory verification or disproved data, it is caused just by paradigm shift. Different
paradigms cannot have same truth or approximate truth of scientific theories. Kuhn pointed out that
paradigm include procedure of experiment and methods of observation and we can observe unobservals
under some theories. Therefore, when paradigm shifts/changes, unobservals also change at the same time.
In other words, when paradigm shift occurs, there is no truth or approximate truth of scientific theories.
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However, I pointed out the possibility of no more paradigm shifts and existence of the ultimate paradigm.
Under the ultimate paradigm, there is no change of paradigm and we can describe the world by science.
Kuhn also did not deny the truth of theories. In his book of “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions”, he
mentioned Copernicus and wrote “when sixty years after his (Copernicus's) death the telescope suddenly
displayed mountains on the moon, the phases of Venus, and an immense number of previously
unsuspected stars…those observations brought the new theory a great many converts (p153,154)” In
this paragraph, Kuhn proved scientific realism. It is not possible to conclude the theory change in the
history of science is neutral with scientific realism in terms of Kuhn’s paradigm theory.
According to Laudan’s pessimistic induction, the history of science furnishes vast evidence of empirically
successful theories that were later rejected. True/approximately true scientific theory can be denied when
we follow the history of science. However, I pointed out the case of Atomism Theory, this theory was
once denied but again accepted as a scientific theory. There are both cases of pessimistic and optimistic.
In terms of Laudan’s viewpoint, the theory change in the history of science is neutral with scientific
realism.
In my opinion, the scope of theory change in the scientific history can cover both realism/antirealism and
even non-realism/non-antirealism as the below figure. Finally, the scientific history can be interpreted by
individual’s viewpoint and must be very comprehensive.
Stephen Mooney, “The Ultimate Paradigm of Science (The Universe beyond the Abstractionist Paradigm
of Physics)”, http://philpapers.org/archive/MOOTUP-6.pdf.
i
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