Download ORAL DEFENCE ANNOUNCEMENT Matching Market Design: From

ORAL DEFENCE ANNOUNCEMENT
Li Mengling
Matching Market Design: From Theory to Practice
This thesis examines efficiency and fairness in matching markets. We first study a generalized many-tomany matching problem with ties. A natural solution concept is Pareto stability, which ensures both stability
and Pareto efficiency. We show that a Pareto stable matching always exists by developing an efficient
algorithm to compute one. Next, for a practical problem where one side of the market has homogeneous
preferences, we propose two new competing Pareto stable matching mechanisms. In the application of
course allocation problem, we run simulations with unique course matching data which show that the Pareto
stable matching mechanisms can significantly improve the overall efficiency and welfare of the students.
Finally, we consider the generalized roommates problem with N students to be assigned to M rooms.
Students may have weak preferences and rooms can have different capacities. We show that a Pareto
efficient assignment always exits by introducing efficient algorithms to compute such assignments.
Date:
Time:
Venue:
Supervisor:
SCHOOL OF PHYSICAL AND MATHEMATICAL SCIENCES
DIVISION OF MATHEMATICAL SCIENCES
SPMS-MAS-03-01, 21 NANYANG LINK, SINGAPORE 637371
17 August 2015 (Monday)
12.00pm
NTU SPMS MAS-03-06,
Executive Classroom 1
Assoc Professor Chen Ning