Download Spinoza, Leibniz and Quantum Cosmology

Spinoza, Leibniz and Quantum Cosmology
Presented at
Quantum Mind 2007
Salzburg, Austria
by
Dr. Laura E. Weed
The College of St. Rose
432 Western Ave
Albany, NY 12211, USA
[email protected]
(01) (518) 458-5328
1
Spinoza, Leibniz and Quantum Cosmology
Introduction
During the Scientific Revolution, the mechanism of Isaac Newton and the René
Descartes triumphed over the more complex epistemological and metaphysical systems
of Baruch Spinoza and G.W. Leibniz because the Spinozistic and Leibnizian systems
seemed to speculate about unnecessary entities and forces, violating Ockham’s simplicity
rule for scientific theories. Clearly, much of what Spinoza and Leibniz wrote is simply
out of date and insufficiently prescient to be of any help with contemporary quantum
mechanics. However, I am proposing that at least three of their ideas, which I will
articulate in this paper, would be helpful in constructing a metaphysics and epistemology
for the quantum world. The three general ideas that I hope may appear less speculative
and extraneous to contemporary scientists than they did to their counterparts of previous
centuries are:
1. Metaphysically, the cosmos is organic: Parts of the universe and wholes, both
local and cosmological, interrelate, forming an organic cosmos, rather than
a congeries of compounded components.
2. Epistemologically, perspective limits access to knowledge: The totality of
what exists exceeds human faculties and methodologies for gaining
knowledge.
3. Perspective skews measurement and temporal scales, undermining
mechanism: The relationships among the varieties of measurement and
temporal scales in the universe precludes a meaningful conception of
universal mechanical causation.
First, this paper will explore ways in which Spinoza’s attributes and modes,
Leibniz’ monads, the electrons in the Bell experiment and Everett’s many-world
hypothesis, reflect a structured and self-organizing, holistic and inter-relational cosmos,
rather than a world that is a compositional result of adding parts. Second, the paper will
2
explore the methodological and perspectival limits that Spinoza and Leibniz proposed in
opposition to the Newtonian and Cartesian faith in the ultimate unity of science. These
methodological limits have re-emerged, I shall argue, in the role of the observer in
quantum mechanics. Third, I shall argue that the Newton-Descartes concept of global
mechanical causation presupposes a uniform, global space-time, across which these
causes might unfold. In contrast, the Spinozistic and Leibnizian alternatives consider
time to be multi-layered, exhibiting local, regional, macro, micro, and superposed
variations that might provide more useful paradigms for understanding the findings of
quantum mechanics, such as Feynman’s proton and electron graphs, and the multilayered character of nature.
1. Nature is organic, not a congeries of compounded components.
For Spinoza, famously, there exists only one substance. He seems to have been
motivated to embrace this position by awe at the interrelatedness of the parts of nature.
His definitional criteria for something being a substance require complete independence
of all other things for any substance-candidate. Yet, only the entire universe, which for
him is identical with God, can rate as a self-causing organic whole of this type. In the
axiom system he devises in his Ethics, Spinoza claims that he proves that substance is:
a) prior to its affections (prop. 1)1
b) unique in its attributes (prop. 5)2
c) not produced by any other substance (prop. 6)3
d) necessarily existent (prop 7) and necessarily infinite (prop. 8).4
e) indivisible (prop. 13)5
1
Baruch Spinoza, The Ethics, in The Chief Works of Benedict De Spinoza, trans. R.H.M. Elwes, Dover
Publications, New York, 1955, p. 46
2
ibid. p. 47
3
ibid.
4
ibid. p. 48
5
ibid. p. 54
3
f) contains its explanation, and its causation, within itself (p. 8)6
from all of which he concludes:
God is the only substance, there cannot be any other one (prop. 14)7 and
All that exists is God. (prop. 15)8
Whatever one makes of this strange argument, Spinoza is clearly defending a
form of metaphysical monism against Descartes’ division of the world into a distinct
mental and spiritual layer which is separate from the mechanical and material layer of
reality. Spinoza will acknowledge that intellectually distinct laws govern the material
and the mental attributes of substance, but since all are metaphysically identical with
THE substance,9 they are ultimately, interdependent and interrelated, not autonomous
processes. Each of God’s attributes is conceived through itself, but each ultimately
expresses the reality or existence of substance. (prop. 10)10 Two of God’s attributes,
according to Spinoza, are being a thinking thing and being an extended thing. As merely
attributes of substance, the mental and the physical must both be contained in substance
and conceived through it.11
Spinoza’s monism rules out Cartesian dualism as well as the materialist’s
proposal that the mental might be reducible to, or eliminable in favor of the material
aspects of reality, or conversely, the idealist’s proposal that the material could be
eliminated in favor of the mental. Spinoza’s metaphysical position is sometimes
characterized as a form of atheistic reductivist materialism, as Jonathan Bennett
6
ibid. p. 50
ibid. p. 54
8
ibid. p. 55
9
Diane Steinberg, On Spinoza, Wadsworth Philosopher’s series, Wadsworth Press, Belmont, CA, 2000, p.
16
10
Spinoza, Elwes Trans. p. 50-51
11
ibid.
7
4
conceives of it,12 but more commonly it is thought of as a form of dual-aspect theory,
pantheism or panpsychism.13 We might agree with Steinberg that the repeated references
to infinity should be understood to mean, merely, ‘unlimited.’14 Then we could
understand Spinoza’s stress on the priority of substance as endorsement of a form of ‘topdown,’ organic homeostasis as a form of non-mechanical causation. Spinoza says that
for something to exist is for it to exhibit a form of power,15 not all of which can be
merely transferred from one object to another in a mechanical way.
Substance must be the ultimate source of power, although its nature differs as it
manifests in one attribute or another. If we can imagine an impossible form of prescience
for Spinoza, we might claim that Substance must be the unifying principle that accounts
for why E=mc2, but that, minimally, also makes the equation self-causing and self-aware.
He explicitly argues against Descartes that merely local and mechanical causation could
never add up to the power of substance, nor provide the unity needed to account for the
uniformity of nature.16
For Spinoza, thus, a universe could not be compiled from mechanical parts
computationally added together. It is rather the case that the parts have the qualities they
have because they are parts of the whole, and it is the qualities and powers of the whole
that cause the parts and explain the qualities that the parts exhibit. Mentality and
Physicality are two of monistic Substance’s infinite attributes, according to Spinoza.
Substance is not limited to these two attributes, but contains all attributes that are possible
and conceivable by God, of which there are an infinite number.
Jonathan Bennett, A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics, Hackett Press, Indianapolis, IN, 1984
David Skrbina, Panspsychism in the West, Bradford Books, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, p.88.
14
Steinberg, p. 16 (“Infinite” means “not bounded” or “not limited.”)
15
Spinoza, Elwes trans, p. 52
16
Spinoza/Elwes, p. 67-68
12
13
5
In quantum mechanics I see resonances of Spinoza’s infinite attributes in the
Everett many-worlds hypothesis. Hugh Everett developed this hypothesis as an account
of how superposed alternative states of reality can co exist prior to a wave collapse,
which results from an observation, and ‘chooses’ one of the superposed states. John
Gribben describes the Everett hypothesis as follows:
Everett’s interpretation is that the overlapping wave functions of the whole
universe, the alternative realities that interact to produce measurable
interference at the quantum level, do not collapse. All of them are equally
real, and exist in their own parts of superspace (and supertime).17
Like Spinoza, Everett also, seemed to conceptualize his worlds as representations of all
possible states of reality as simultaneously superposed on one another. For both Everett
and Spinoza, perspective, not causation, joins the inherently unrelated layers of reality
into a monistic thing. Observers create local realities out of universal possibilities.
For Leibniz, reality consists of monads and God. Monads are individual
entelechies each of which expresses its own unique nature or hacceicity (essence).18 So,
for Leibniz there is a sense in which each atom of reality is individual, unique, selfdetermining and (possibly)conscious. Each monad develops according to its own inner
nature and contains within itself, from its beginning, its entire past and future.19 Leibniz
claims that monads are ‘windowless,’ by which he means that they have no direct ability
to interact with or perceive any other monads.20 Nevertheless, the entire universe of
John Gribben, In Search of Schrodinger’s Ca, quantum physics and reality, Bantam Books, Bantam
Doubleday, NY, NEW York, 1984, p.237
18
Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz, Monadology and Other Essays, trans. P. Schrecker and A.M. Schrecker,
Bobbs-Merrill Library of the Liberal Arts, Indianapolis, IN, 1965, p.150, p. 159
19
ibid. p. 158
20
ibid. p. 148
17
6
radically independent monads is woven into a harmonious web of interrelationships by
God’s divine providence.21
Leibniz rejects the mechanical atoms that compose the material world in
Cartesian dualism in favor of this panpsychist22 view of animated simples, because he
believes that there are insuperable problems in the merely mechanical and geometrical
view of matter presented by Descartes, Galileo or Newton. In particular, he thinks that a)
concepts such as ‘inertia’ and ‘force’ cannot be adequately handled by mechanical and
geometrical notions, because they lack principles involving dynamism,23 b) that the
principle of sufficient reason, representing a demand for a complete explanation of an
object or event, cannot be satisfied by the mechanical analysis,24 c) that the principle of
the identity of indiscernibles could not distinguish one location in space from another
without identifiable individual essences occupying the spaces,25 and, d) that reality must
be continuous; that is, there can be no radical departures, or gaps, in nature.26
On the issue of dynamism, Margaret Dauler Wilson points out that Leibniz had
reasoned that mechanical and geometrical determination can account only for changes in
place. As a result, an existentialist account is needed to explain any other aspect of an
entity, or any other change that it might undergo. For Leibniz, the existentialist account
21
ibid. p. 156
Skrbina, p.95-99.
23
Leibniz, “What is Nature?” in Monadology and Other Essays, pgs. 102-106.
24
Daniel Garber, “Leibniz: Physics and Philosophy,” in The Cambridge Companion to Leibniz, ed.
Nicholas Jolley, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, p.305.
25
Leibniz, “Critical Remarks Concerning Descartes’ Principles” in Monadology and Other Essays, pgs 4546, and “What is Nature?”p. 109.
26
Schrecker and Schrecker, “Translator’s Introduction” to Monadology and Other Essays, p.xvii.
22
7
required reintroducing the entire scholastic metaphysics including forms, entelechies,
final causes, and ultimately the assertion of the entity’s value and moral purpose. 27
Related to the location-specific nature of mechanical and geometrical principles is
Leibniz’ objection that mechanical principles violate the principle of sufficient reason.
Modern science, from Galileo to the present has stressed answers to ‘how’ questions and
rejected questions that asked ‘why’ something happened. Judea Pearl summarizes
Galileo’s Discorsi as consisting of two rules:
One, description first, explanation second—that is the “how” precedes the
“why”; and
Two, description is carried out in the language of mathematics; namely,
equations.28
Leibniz objected that too much was lost in this honing-down of principles. An
explanation, for him, had to give a complete account not only of how a thing was formed
and moved, but also of why it existed as it did, rather than not existing, or existing in
some alternate possible form. He claimed,
…[W]e can find no true or existent fact, without there being a sufficient
reason why it is thus and not otherwise.29
The principle of sufficient reason required a complete account of all of the causes and
effects of a monad, not merely the local antecedent motion that brought it into place.
Thus, for any individual independent monad, the sufficient cause had to encompass not
just the monad, but God and the whole world, past through future.
I will discuss Leibniz’ identity and continuity issues in the third section of the paper.
Margaret Dauler Wilson, “Leibniz, Dynamics and Contingency in Nature,” in Ideas and Mechanism,
Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, pgs. 434-437
28
Judea Pearl, Causality, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2000 p. 334
29
Gottfried Leibniz, Monadology, in Classics, p. 592
27
8
One of the consequences of the Cartesian/Newtonian/Galilean world view that
Spinoza and Leibniz are rejecting is that all action is local, and specially or temporally
separated events can not affect one another. Contemporary quantum mechanics is,
however, encountering problems with the Newtonian and Galilean presumptions that
reality consists of compounds and functions of point-particles, and that compositionality
and motion within a Cartesian grid constitute explanation. Tim Maudlin explains the
problem, beginning with Einstein’s attempts at maintaining the modern scientific thesis.
Einstein’s world view held that each region of space-time has its own
intrinsic physical state, and that the entire and complete state of the
physical universe is specified once one has determined the intrinsic state
of each small region.30
Bell’s and Aspect’s experiments, however, have cast doubt on the simple spatial relations
and compositional constructability of physical states presumed by Einstein and his
scientific predecessors. The photons in these experiments are in physically separated
states, and yet seem to be communicating with one another at a rate faster than the speed
of light. Using Fleming’s theory of hyperplanes to discuss the photon-pair interaction,
Maudlin points out that,
…[T]he polarization state of a photon in this theory is not an intrinsic
property simply of the space-time region the photon occupies. The photon
has a polarization state only as a component of a larger whole, a complete
hyperplane. … The singlet state which the photons start out in is nonseparable in the technical sense of not being a product of polarization
states of the individual particles. That is the polarization of the pair is
something over and above the sum of the states of the parts. 31
Maudlin indicates that a more organic conception of reality is needed to
understand the relationship between the photon pairs.
30
Tim Maudlin, Quantum Non-locality and Relativity, 2nd ed., Blackwell Publishers, Malden, MA, 2002,
p.211
31
ibid.
9
To conclude this section I will reiterate that both Spinoza and Leibniz imposed
more substantive demands on the conception of explanation than Descartes, Newton or
Galileo did. A complete explanation, for Spinoza, required that a cause be selfcontained, and that a substance be self-generating, and so, nothing less than the whole
universe could count. For Leibniz, likewise, a monad must contain its whole explanation
within itself. These requirements may yet be too demanding for the everyday practice of
science, for surely many smaller local explanations and strictly mechanical ones are
possible for a wide range of events. It seems however, that to understand nature in depth
requires a global perspective in which the organic nature of the whole is understood to be
reflected, in some sense, in the modes or entelechies of the parts. A metaphysically
thicker conception of the parts is needed to do this. Minimally, self-organizing
principles, and organic connections between parts and wholes must be included.
2. Perspective limits access to knowledge
The Cartesian version of rationalism defended a view of all of reality, from the
geometrical location of any point in space through the introspective contents of a mind,
as epistemologically completely transparent. All one had to do was look or think to know
the complete nature of extention or mind. Although both Spinoza and Leibniz are
rationalists, both had reservations about the transparency of nature. In particular, both
Spinoza and Leibniz thought that one’s perspective on an issue and human limitations
limited the types of facts to which one had access, and ultimately, only God could
compile a complete, unified science.
Modes are Spinoza’s individual things, such as mid-sized objects, tables, chairs
and people, that exist dependently on the attributes of physical extension and mental
10
extension. Ultimately, these mid-sized objects are not real things, but temporary
expressions of the infinite attributes, which are, in turn, expressions of the physicality and
mentality of substance, or God.32
As human modes, we can only know the two
attributes in which we participate, the physical and the mental, and we cannot even know
the manner of the unity that connects these two attributes within ourselves.33 God or
Substance consists of (  - 2) more attributes. Our ability to conceive or perceive is
restricted to our status as modes, pieces of a piece of substance, and is necessarily warped
and confused by our partial view.34 As a rationalist, Spinoza thinks that we can improve
our occluded view by using mathematical and scientific reasoning,35 and that emotions
and attachments further occlude our perspective.36 But no human can see the whole of
which we are a minute part.
Leibniz’ take on the epistemological limitations of perspective is that each
autonomous monad, or monistic mind/agent in reality has its own perspective from its
own point of view.37 Each monad reflects the status of all of the rest of reality, but in a
confused way, warped by its own entelechy. Like Spinoza, Leibniz will consider God
capable of an all-knowing point of view and an all-coordinating role that ensures the
coherence of the whole universe.38 But we human monads are disabled by our
‘windowlessness’ from accurately judging the perspectives of any of our fellow monads,
much less apprehending the perspective of God. 39
32
Spinoza, Ethics, in Elwes, p. 88-91.
Ibid. p. 92
34
ibid. p. 97-109
35
ibid. p 118-119
36
ibid. p. 185
37
Monadology, p. 157
38
ibid. p. 161
39
ibid. p. 158
33
11
Quantum mechanics proposes a universe in which epistemological access to
information is skewed by the perspective of an observer. Each particle experiences the
space-time of its own light cone, but particles moving in other light cones may not be
accessible at all,40 or may be so only through black holes or worm holes, that radically
alter whatever passes into them.41 Schroedinger’s cat may be dead from one temporal
perspective, alive from another, and simultaneously both dead and alive from yet another
temporal perspective. More properly speaking, in a relativistic world, there is no standard
that could be used to evaluate simultaneity. Certainly no human scientific community
has a perspective that might be specified as the determinant of spontaneity.42 Indeed, on
Feynman’s diagrams, photons and electrons turn into each other, sometimes tracking
backward in time, a feat that no human could conceivably perform.43 Even specific
location for identifiable specific particles becomes problematic in the Bell and Aspect
experiments.44
Yet despite these strange perspectival quirks, there are larger cross- zone
resonances among the particles of quantum mechanism. As good rationalists, scientists
typically make the Leibnizian presupposition that something must coordinate the
polarization information in the Bell and Aspect experiments. However, scientific
methodology, as developed from the Cartesian paradigm, relies on analyzing a field of
activities into objects and movements, and should be, as Leibniz criticized it for being,
incapable of viewing its point-particles as existential loci of power, or as effective
40
Maudlin, p. 51
Maudlin, pgs. 236-237
42
Maudlin, p. 51
43
Gribben, p. 195-202
44
Gribben, p. 168-169
41
12
agents.45 Hence, the merely geometrical structure that results should not self-organize or
engage in effective relations. Anton Zeilinger points out the ontological ramifications of
the epistemological limits of the scientific method in this passage.
It appears that, certainly at least for quantum systems, it is wrong to
assume that the features of the world which we observe, the measurement
results, exist prior to and independently of our observation…Therefore,
the notion that a reality exists independently of information is a senseless
concept. 46
So, our methodology for obtaining knowledge is hardly incidental to the knowledge we
obtain. Perspective need not be exclusively anthropomorphic, as both Leibniz and
Spinoza pointed out. We can do an analysis from the perspective of a distant planet or a
time-reversing photon. But there is no information that could give a universal,
unqualified view from nowhere.
3. Temporal and Measurement scales and mechanism
One of the most pernicious effects of the diversity of perspectives revealed by the
last section of the paper, for rationalists, is the apparent incommensurability of one
perspective with another that seems to result. The unitary Cartesian or Newtonian spacetime grid is barely recognizable in the convergence spaces47 and neighborhood
networks48 of contemporary calculus, and discontinuities between space-time light
cones,49 between stochastic and deterministic layers of scientific analysis,50 or between
Leibniz “A New System of Nature” in Philosophical Essays, trans, Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber,
Hackett Publishing Co., Indianapolis IN, 1989, p. 142
46
Anton Zeilinger, “Essential Quantum Entanglement” in The New Physics for the twenty-first century, ed.
Gordon Fraser, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2006, p. 266
47
Ralph Kopperman, Prakash Panangaden, Michael B. Smyth, Dieter Spreen, and Julian Webster, “04351
Summary-Spatial Representation: Discrete vs. Continuous Computational Models. Dagstuhl Seminar
proceedings, at http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2005/171/pdf/04351_summary.pdf
48
Howard A. Blair, “Discrete Atoms or Continuous fields, What’s the Difference?” at
http//www.cis.syr.edu/`blair
49
Maudlin, p. 51
45
13
micro and macro levels of matter.51 All of the above considerations indicate a reality that
exists on multiple temporal and measurement scales, that appear to leave no clear
location for the global occurrence of classical causes.52
Both Spinoza and Leibniz ultimately resolve the incommensurability dilemma by
fiat; by declaring God the grand coordinator that renders the cosmos a uni-verse rather
than a multi-verse. Leibniz, however, had some interesting arguments for this position,
that were not a matter of mere fiat. I will explore the concepts of continuity and identity
that Leibniz used to argue for system within the multi-verse in this section of the paper,
as well as showing what some contemporary scientists are saying about the
incommensurability of perspectives within a multi-layered reality.
Leibniz’ arguments for an existential understanding of the nature of monads
resulted from at least three considerations that he thought were very important. a) Zeno’s
paradoxes ruled out regression to infinite smallness,53 b) there is no such thing as a
structureless point,54 and c) if there were any such thing as a structureless point, it could
exhibit no energy.55 All three of the above considerations are tied to considerations
concerning identity and continuity; the principle of the identity of indiscernables would
render two structureless points indiscernible if the only distinction between them were
50
Sunny Auyang, Foundations of Complex Systems Theories, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
UK, 1998, especially chap 34-36, pg.259 ff.
51
Antoni Politi, “Complex Systems”, in The New Physics for the twenty-first century, , ed. Gordon Fraser,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2006 p. 340-347
52
Henry Stapp, . “Why Classical Mechanics Cannot Naturally Accommodate Consciousness, but Quantum
Mechanics Can.” Psyche 2: 5. 1-17 http://psyche.csse.monash.edu.au/v2/psyche2-05stapp.html 1995
53
Leibniz, “On Body and Force, Against the Cartesians” in Philosophical Essays, p. 250 ff.
54
ibid. “On the Nature of Body and the Laws of Motion, p.245
55
Leibniz, Monadology and other Essays p. 43-43.
14
location in identically mirrored spaces,56 and no continuum could result from even an
infinite line of featureless and powerless points.57
Mathematics can clearly conduct regressions to infinite smallness, as Cantor58
followed Zeno in pointing out. But as Zeno also argued, no world, finite or infinite, nor
any combination thereof, can exhibit this feature.59 Leibniz argued that all features of the
natural world must result from qualities contained in its monads. For example, the roar
of an ocean wave must exist as a tiny sound or sound potential, perhaps itself inaudible,
in smaller bits of water, that compounds as many drops come together. The structure of
the minute parts had to, in some way, enable this feature. 60 So, nature, unlike vanishing
mathematical points, had to have structure all the way down and all the way up. Further,
the structure had to be effective structure; structure that could give a sufficient reason for
the identity of the parts and the effective agency of the parts.61
The upshot of these considerations, for Leibniz, is that nature must be a
continuum of systematically interrelated and effective structures exhibiting no gaps. A
calculus vector, representing an action by a physical particle, therefore, could not
represent bare movement of a vanishingly small mathematical point.
As physics progressed, atoms turned out to be far from unstructured, uncuttable
mathematical vanishing points,62 and quarks may be composed of strings, which in turn
may be vibrating energy. Michael B. Green points out that, in fact, string theory rejects
point-like particles.
56
Leibniz, Monadology and other Essays, p.45.
Leibniz, Á New System of Nature” in Philosophical Essays, p. 139
58
Carl A. Boyer, A History of Mathematics, 2nd ed. John Wiley and Sons, Inc. 1991, pps. 566-567
59
ibid. p. 74-76
60
Leibniz, “Letters to de Volder” in Philosophical Essays, p. 182
61
Leibniz, “On Body and Force, Against the Cartesians” in Philosophical Essays, p. 256
62
Chris Quigg, “Particles and the Standard Model” in The New Physics for the Twenty-First Century, ed.
Gordon Fraser, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2006, p. 90 ff.
57
15
…[A]s long ago as 1905 there were good reasons to contemplate theories
of fundamental particles of non-zero size. However, with few exceptions,
subsequent developments were based on the notion of point-like
particles… It is interesting that the neglected attempts to describe
extended particles by Born and Infeld in 1934 and by Dirac in 1962 play a
central role within modern developments in string theory.63
So, point particles are at present being replaced with more Leibnizian structures in
conceptions of very small entities.
Leibniz also argued that continuity could not be constructed from vanishing point
particles. Howard Blair and his associates at Syracuse University are expanding on work
done at the Dagstuhl Seminar 64on the interrelationship between discrete and continuous
structures in non-linear chaotic systems. This research on convergence spaces is tracing
the ways in which order may arise then disperse, in phases.65 The researchers’
observations are in line with Leibniz’ objections to understanding atoms as
mathematically vanishing point particles.
For these researchers, a continuum is not
constructed of structureless points, but structure can be defined, and self generates more
structure where there is an identifiable space in a definable topological neighborhood. For
Blair, as for Leibniz, atoms may be fields or discrete structures, as long as they are
capable of exhibiting activity.
Antonio Politi discusses the many layers of complexity and measurement,
especially in conditions of chaos and far from equilibrium systems. He argues that one of
the key problems that is yet to be solved in physics concerns accounting for entropy
Michael B. Green, “Superstring Theory” in The New Physics for the Twenty-First Century, p. 126
Ralph Kopperman, Prakesh Panangaden, Michael B. Smyth, Deiter Spreen, and Julian Webster, “04351
Summary – Spatial Representation: Discrete vs. Continuous Computational Models.” At
http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2005/171
65
Howard A. Blair, David W. Jakel, Robert J. Irwin, and Angel Rivera, “Elementary Differential Calculus
on Discrete and Hybrid Structures,” at http://www.cis.syr.edu/~blair The authors argue that discrete and
continuous patterns replace one another in phases in chaotic conditions, featuring non-linear transitions.
63
64
16
within these systems. The problem is, as Maudlin points out, that in the absence of an
objective conception of simultaneity,
A single photon is part of many wholes, as many as there are hyperplanes
through it. … Photons in Fleming’s theory can be both polarized and not
polarized. Measurement events can be both deterministic and stochastic.
It all depends on the particular hyperplane to which one assigns the
proton. And Nature assigns the protons even-handedly to all of the
hyperplanes at once. 66
Despite acknowledging the problems raised by Maudlin with explaining an issue such as
entropy in such a system, Politi still thinks that a universal Turing machine might
adequately model entropy. Politi remarks,
…[T]he availability of fast computing devices is inducing the change in
the meaning of “explanation.” This term is increasingly used to indicate
that a simple simulation or model captures the essence of a
phenomenon...67
I conclude that many scientists still fail to recognize how Cartesian and Newtonian their
understandings of their enterprise are. Politi, among others, should embrace his inner
Leibniz, or Spinoza.
66
67
Maudlin, p. 212
Politi, p. 368
17
Bibliography
Albert, David Z.1992 Quantum Mechanics and Experience, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
Anthony, Louise. 1995. “Law and Order in Psychology.” Philosophical Perspectives 9: 429-446.
Auyang, Sunny. 2000 Mind in Everyday Life and Cognitive Science, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
------------1998. Foundations of Complex-system Theories in Economics, Evolutionary Biology
and Statistical Physics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
Bennett, Jonathan, 1984, A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics, Hackett Press, Indianapolis, IN.
Blair, Howard A., Jakel, David W., Irwin, Robert J., and Rivera, Angel, “Elementary Differential Calculus
on Discrete and Hybrid Structures,” at http://www.cis.syr.edu/~blair
Boyd, Richard, Gasper, Philip, and Trout, J.D. 1993. The Philosophy of Science. MIT Press, Cambridge,
MA.
Boyer, Carl A., 1991: A History of Mathematics, 2nd ed. John Wiley and Sons, Inc.
Brendel, David H. 2000, “Philosophy of Mind in the Clinic: The Relation between Causal and Meaningful
Explanation in Psychiatry.” Harvard Review of Psychiatry, 8:4: 184-191.
Cartwright, Nancy,1989 Nature’s Capacities and their Measurement. Clarendon Press, Oxford, UK
Corbí, Josep E. and Prades, Josep L.2000. Minds, Causes and Mechanisms. Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, UK.
Dowe, Phil. 2000. Physical Causation Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK
Dretske, Fred.1994.“If you Can’t Make One you Don’t Know How it Works,”Midwest Studies in Philosophy XIX,
Philosophical Naturalism, 1994, eds. French, Uehling and Wettstein, U of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame IN
French, Peter A., Uehling, Theodore E., Jr., and Wettstein, Howard K, eds. 1993. Midwest Studies in
Philosophy Vol. XVIII, Philosophy of Science, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame IN.
Greene, Brian, 2000The Elegant Universe, Vintage Books, Random House, NY,
Gribben, John ,1984,In Search of Schrodinger’s Ca, quantum physics and reality, Bantam Books, Bantam
Doubleday, NY, New York.
Jolley, Nicholas,1995. The Cambridge Companion to Leibniz, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK
Kopperman, Ralph, Panangaden, Prakesh, Smyth ,Michael B., Spreen, Deiter, and Webster, Julian, 2005:
“04351 Summary – Spatial Representation: Discrete vs. Continuous Computational Models.” At
http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2005/171
Leibniz, G.W. 1982. New Essays on Human Understanding, abridged ed., trans and ed., Peter Remnant and
Jonathan Bennett, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK
-------1989. Philosophical Essays, trans. Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber, Hackett Publishing Co.
Indianapolis, IN
-------1965. Monadology and Other Philosophical Essays, trans. Paul and Anne Schrecker, Bobbs-Merrill Co.
Indianapolis, IN
Mackie, John L. 1980 The Cement of the Universe, Oxford Press, Clarendon, UK
Machamer, Peter. 2004. “Activities and Causation: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Mechanisms.”
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 18:1: 27-39.
Maudlin, Tim. 1996. “On the Unification of Physics.”The Journal of Philosophy 93:3:129-144.
-------2002-Quantum Non-Locality and Relativity, Blackwell Publishing, Malden MA,
Paul, LA. 2000, “Aspect Causation.” The Journal of Philosophy, 97:4. 235-256.
Pearl, Judea, 2000 Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
Politi, Antoni 2006 “Complex Systems”, in The New Physics for the Twenty-First Century, ed. Gordon Fraser,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
Quigg, Chris 2006.“Particles and the Standard Model” in The New Physics for the Twenty-First Century, ed. Gordon
Fraser, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK,
Skrbina, David, 2005. Panpsychism in the West, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
Sosa, Ernest, 1993. “Epistemology, Realism and Truth: The First Philosophical Perspectives Lecture.”
Philosophical Perspectives, 7: 1-16.
Spinoza, Baruch, 1955 Works of Spinoza, unabridged Elwes translation, trans. R.H.M. Elwes, Dover
Publications, NY
----------1998. Principles of Cartesian Philosophy with Metaphysical Thoughts, trans. Samuel Shirley,
Hackett Publishing Co., Indianapolis, IN
Stapp, Henry P. 1995. “Why Classical Mechanics Cannot Naturally Accommodate Consciousness, but Quantum
Mechanics Can.” Psyche 2: 5. 1-17 http://psyche.csse.monash.edu.au/v2/psyche2-05stapp.html
2003. Mind, Matter and Quantum Mechanics, 2nd ed. Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Germany
Steinberg, Diane,2000.On Spinoza Wadsworth/Thompson Learning, Belmont, CA
Thompson, Garrett, 2001. On Leibniz, Wadsworth/Thompson Learning, Belmont, CA,
Wilson, Margaret Dauler, 1999. Ideas and Mechanism, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ
Zeilinger, Anton 2006.“Essential Quantum Entanglement” in The New Physics for the twenty-first century, ed.
Gordon Fraser, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
18