Download If Simmel Were A Fieldworker: On Formal

If Simmel Were A Fieldworker: On Formal Sociological Theory And Analytical Field Research*
Author(s): Eviatar Zerubavel
Source: Symbolic Interaction, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Fall 1980), pp. 25-34
Published by: Wiley on behalf of the Society for the Study of Symbolic Interaction
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Field Research 25
If Simmel Were A Fieldworker:
On Formal Sociological Theory And
Analytical Field Research*
Eviatar Zerubavel, Columbia University, New York, N. Y 10027
In this paper, an attempt is made to apply the methodological principles of Simmel’s formal
sociology to fieldwork and, thus, to lay out systematically the methodological foundations of
“analytical field research.” The paper centers around three major methodological principles: (a)
shifting the emphasis from actual facts to the particular analytical perspectives from which they are
viewed; (b) establishing concern with formal patterns which are abstracted from reality rather than
with its concrete contents; (c) studying only selected aspects of concrete phenomena and makinga
commitment to particular analytical concerns and foci. Based on these methodological principles,
certain guidelines for analytical field researchers are then recommended.
ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT branches of sociology is a school generally
referred to as “formal sociology.” Unfortunately, this school has not produced yet a
substantial body of empirical research. Ever since the days of its founder, Georg
Simmel, it has usually been associated with the armchair and the library, generally
divorced of any direct contact with social reality. The theoretical work which it has
generated has, therefore, generally not been empirically grounded. A number of
sociologists have already called for developing empirically grounded formal
sociological theories (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Denzin, 1970; Schwartz and Jacobs,
1979).
A most effective way of grounding a theory would be doing fieldwork. Field
research is undoubtedly among the most useful avenues for gathering information
about social life and acquiring first-hand familiarity with social reality. The present
paper aims at laying out the methodological foundations of the kind of field research
which would be based on the principles of formal sociology.
It may sound ironical, not to mention risky, that one would try to apply the
principles of a theorist whose work is usually regarded as the prototype of “armchair
theorizing” in sociology to a research tradition as empirically oriented as field
research. And yet, the successful combination of the analytical thrust of formal
sociology with the empirical vigor of fieldwork ought to ,produce “analytical field
research” which would most likely contribute to eliminate the artificial split between
“theory” and “research” in sociology.
Most of the literature on formal sociology has so far been restricted to
discussions of some of Simmel’s classic examples of “forms of sociation” (sociability,
domination and subordination, marginality, and so on), as well as to long debates over
the ontological status of those “forms.” The present paper aims at shedding some
light on one particular aspect of Simmel’s formal sociology which has so far been
almost totally neglected; the fact that it actually constitutes a methodology. I shall,
*An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the Eastern SociologicalSociety,
New York, March 1977.1 am most grateful to Herbert Blumer, Renee Fox, Samuel Heilman, Charles Lidz,
Loren Roth, and Yael Zerubavel for some very useful suggestions.
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26 SYMBOLIC INTERACTION
therefore, begin by laying out the methodological principles that are embodied in
formal sociology and then try to apply them to actual field research by offering some
systematic guidelines for generating sociological theory from it.
Let us first examine the methodological foundations of the formal philosophy of
science in general and of the formal approach to the sociological enterprise in
particular. Though Simmel is by no means the only sociologist to have generated
formal theory, he has nevertheless done more than any other sociologist to lay out
explicitly the methodological principles which underlie the formal approach. He
presented these principles in 1908 in his classic essay “The Problem of Sociology”
(Simmel, 1959), and reformulated them nine years later in “The Field of Sociology,”
the opening chapter of his Grundfragen der Soziologie (Simmel, 1950:3-25).In these
two works one can find the entire methodological spirit of formal sociology.
Analy t ical Perspec t ives
In its philosophy of science, the formal school is deeply concerned with the
epistemological concerns of scientists and much less so with the nature of the reality
which they study. Science is characterized not by the actual subject matters that are
studied, but, rather, by the particular analytical perspectiveor standpoint from which
it views them. Accordingly, the various sciences are distinguished from one another
on the basis of the different perspectives from which they view reality.
This philosophy of science underlies the formal approach to the sociological
enterprise. What distinguishes sociology from the other sciences of man is clearly not
a different subject matter, but, rather, the fact that it is guided bya unique “purposeof
cognition” (Simmel, 1950:8),1a unique analytical perspective which highlights only
particular aspects of man. The actual subject matter with which sociology deals is by
no means different from that which is dealt by history, psychology, political science,
economics, or even human anatomy, for that matter. The only rationale for
distinguishing among those disciplines is the fact that each of them views man from
yet a different analytical angle, thus highlighting different aspects of him.
In his efforts to justify the claim for a distinct science of sociology, Simmel was
clearly far more interested in the novel ways it offers for approaching reality than in its
possible contribution to our factual knowledge about man. In fact, he actually claimed
that sociology is a standpoint or perspective (Simmel, 1950:7-8),that it is a method for
viewing man (Simmel, 1950:13-16).
In its relation to the existing sciences, sociology is therefore a new method, an
instrument ofinvestigation, a new way of getting a t the subject matters ofall those
sciences. . .it contains no subject matter not already treated in one of the existing
sciences. I t only proposes a new way for all of them (Simmel, 1959:312).
He went to great lengths emphasizing that it cannot be a distinct subject matter that
distinguishes sociology from the other sciences of man, since,
. . .sociology contains no subject matter that is not already treated in one of the
extant sciences.. .[It] is not a science with its own content (Simmel, 1950:14.
Emphasis mine).
‘That is Kurt Wolff‘s translation of the German word Erkenntnisabsicht. Rudolf Heberle’s translation is
“cognitive intention” (Heberle, 1948:252).
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Field Research 27
He insisted that it is not new facts about man that would justify a distinct disciplineof
sociology, but, rather, the development of new ways of viewing him.
[Sociology’s] special character derives from the circumstance that it brings a whole
realm ofobjects under a specificviewpoint. Not its subject matter but its approachthe specific abstraction which it makes-differentiates
it from the other
sociohistorical sciences (Simmel, 1959:318).
. . .sociology, as a special science, might find its specific subject matter merely by
drawing a new line through facts which are quite well known (Simmel, 1959:313).
Simmel’s own way of illuminating in the most unusual fashion the most well-known
facts about man is an excellent example of the application of the first methodological
principle of formal sociology-shifting the emphasis from gathering new facts to
developing new analytical perspectives from which to view reality.
Abstracted Formal Patterns
The way to transcend the concreteness of the reality which one studies is to abstract
from it, and it is only through a process of abstracting from concrete reality that
scientific topics can evolve. Simmel himself even went as far as to claim that,
Abstractions alone produce science out of the complexity or the unity of reality
(Simmel, 1959:316).
Accordingly, it may very well be argued that each science differs from the other
sciences by the fact that it has a uniquely distinct way of abstracting from concrete
reality.
That is true, of course, of sociology as well, a point which was made quite
explicitly by Simmel:
The topics of [sociology’s] researchers certainly arise in a process of abstraction
. . .Sociology is thus founded upon an abstraction from concrete reality (Simmel,
1950:11).
Formal sociology thus regards the abstraction of the basic “forms”of social life as the
main concern of the sociologist. According to Simmel,
. . .there remains for a sociology in the strictest sense. . .nothing but the treatment of
the forms abstracted (Simmel, 1959:319).
Sociologists, therefore, ought to transcend the unique peculiarity and idiosyncrasy of
actual historical manifestations. Rather than deal with the concrete contents of
reality, they must be concerned primarily with abstracting formal patterns from it. As
Coser has argued, Simmel insisted that,
. . .analysis of the limited number of forms which could be extracted from the
bewildering multiplicity of social contents might contribute insights into social life
denied to those who would be content with descriptions of the concrete (Coser,
1965:8).
Hence the primacy of “forms” and “patterns” in the formal sociologist’s concern.
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28 SYMBOLIC INTERACTION
Given this second methodological principle of formal sociology, the emphasis on
abstracting formal patterns from concrete reality, it should come as little surprise that
the work of this school has been depicted as “the geometry of social forms” (Levine,
1971:xxv). In abstracting from the variations in content so as to focus only on the
constant forms and arrive at “observations the significance of which would extend
beyond the range of the particular fact” (Bougle, 1965:58), formal sociology follows
the steps of geometry. In reducing an infinite number of actual facts to a minimum of
formal patterns, the formal sociologist resembles the geometrician, who deliberately
ignores the material contents of actual bodies so as to isolate their spatial forms alone.
Sociology, the discipline that deals with the purely social aspects of man. . .is related
to the other special sciences of man as geometry is related to the physico-chemical
sciences. . . Both geometry and sociology leave to other sciences the investigationof
the contents realized in the forms, that is, the total phenomena whose forms they
explore (Simmel, 1959:320).
Geometrical abstraction investigates only the spatialforms of bodies. . . Similarly, if
society is conceived as interaction among individuals, the description of theforms of
this interaction is the task of the science of society in its strictest and most essential
sense {Simmel, 1950:21-22).
In this respect, of course, the formal sociologist also resembles the logician (Simmel,
1959:317), as well as the grammarian, who isolates the pure forms of language from
the concrete contents of actual speech (Simmel, 1950:22).
Selectivity and Focus
In order to be able to abstract from concrete reality, formal sociologists develop and
cultivate their analytical selectivity by studying only particular aspects or dimensions
of concrete phenomena rather than their totality. In other words, they commit
themselves to certain analytical foci. This the fundamental distinction between formal
sociology and “general sociology” (Simmel, 1950:16-21, 26-39), or between formal
theory and “substantive theory” (Glaser and Strauss, 1967).
How do formal sociologists abstract from concrete reality? How do they
accomplish the fairly difficult cognitive task of viewing reality only from one particular
perspective and of focusing only on particular aspectsof it? The answer lies in the fact
that the particular “cognitive purpose” which guides their thinking is formed around
particular concepts. As Simmel pointed out,
Every science rests upon an abstraction inasmuch as it considers the totality ofsome
given thing in one of its aspects and from the viewpoint of a particular conception
(Simmel, 1959:313).
Under the guidance of its particular conception, any science extracts only onegroup
or aspect out of the totality or experienced immediacy of phenomena (Simmel,
195O:l I).
This point has since been made even more explicitly by Herbert Blumer:
The abstraction of a relation from this worldofparticulars. . .ispossible only through
conceptualization and necessitates, ultimately, a concept. That is to say, the very act
of abstraction is an act of conception {Blumer, 1931520).
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Field Research 29
This is certainly true of the formal sociological enterprise.
. . .sociological phenomena. . .are factored o u t of this living reality by means of an
added concept (Simmel, 1950:21).
Hence the centrality and indispensability of conceptualization to formal sociology.
Let us proceed now to the application of the methodological principles of formal
sociology to actual field research and consider the fundamentalguidelines that would
help to produce “analytical field research.” The necessary product of the formal
sociological approach, such research clearly differs substantially from conventional
ethnographicresearch, since the two are based on quite incompatible methodologies,
and it would be most useful to consider the former in contrast to the latter.
“Intellectual Novelties”
The sociocultural, as well as academic, climate within which the ethnographic
tradition has developed has advocated a kind of research which is very different from
that advocated by formal sociology. To begin with, ethnographers have traditionally
studied cultures which have been in the process of dying, and that has made them
particularly committed to record, and, thus, preserve for posterity, everything
possible from these cultures, before they would disappear forever. In addition to that,
having encountered cultures so vastly different from their own, they have tended to
become reluctant to say or write anything about them before having grasped the
entire cultural context within which any exotic pattern would “make sense.” Finally,
they have also been heavily influenced by functionalism, which involves a holistic
approach of encompassing social systems as integrated wholes, as well as by cultural
relativism, which rejects universals and advocates cautiousness in transcending the
cultural context of one’s object of inquiry and in making any generalizations.
As a result of all this, ethnographers have traditionally been taught that they
should try to encompass the social phenomena which they study in their totality, as
unsegmentable wholes, and never to confine their attention to only one particular
aspect of them. They have also been trained to provide their readers with a fully
detailed contextual background when presenting any of those phenomena.
Thus, many ethnographers have come to view their task as covering in
encyclopaedic detail every fact which might possibly relate to their object of inquiry,
and have developed a professional need to gather factual data, along with an
extremely descriptive style of presentation. This has often led to their having
developed interests and expertise in particular geographic, rather than analytic,
areas. Many ethnographers have become experts in particular societies or
communities, and their expertise has often been achieved at the expense of trying to
address particular themes which relate to social life in general.
The methodological foundations of formal sociology would lead analytical field
research to develop in an altogether different direction and fashion. Whereas the
ethnographer has been traditionally motivated by the desire to know more about the
social world, the analyticalfield researcher would most likely be motivated by the wish
to know about it in different ways. Whereas the former has been concerned primarily
with the contents of social life, the latter would most likely be concerned mainly with
the formal patterns that underlie it.
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30 SYMBOLIC INTERACTION
Analytical field researchers ought to abandon, therefore, the traditional
ethnographic search for exotic “factual novelties” to gather. Instead, they should
direct their creative efforts toward the development of new analytical perspectives
from which to view social life, that is, toward the discovery of “intellectualnovelties.”
As far as innovation is concerned, they ought to be challenged by the prospect of
illuminating even the most familiar and mundane concrete reality from yet novel
analytical viewpoints (consider, for example, the work of Erving Goffman, the
prototype of analytical field research).
One obvious implication of this is that analytical field researchers must abandon
area expertise and concentrate on developing particular analytical perspectives and
foci rather than on identifying particular concrete “fields.” As Schwartz and Jacobs
have put it, they,
. . .are in the business of studying sociological topics, not people. . . Their job is to
make a set of integrated observations on a given topic and place them in an analytic
framework (Schwartz and Jacobs, 1979:289).
If they are to innovate in any significant way, it would not be in their selection of the
actual concrete phenomena to be observed, but, rather, in their choice of the
particular analytical perspectives from which to observe them. Though their studies
have to be carried out in some concrete social settings, communities, or societies,
they must not be studies ofthose settings, communities, or societies, since their main
focus is, after all, analytical.
Focused Observations and Analytical Concerns
If analytical field researchers are to be something other than fact gatherers, and if they
are to commit themselves to some particular analytical perspectives and foci, they
must view reality in a deliberately selective manner. This entails abandoning the
canons of holism and giving up the traditional ethnographic efforts to study
everything about concrete phenomena so as to encompass them in their totality.
Therefore, they should accept the partiality of their studies, which is an inevitable
consequence of having committed themselves to particular analytical standpoints
and, thus, of having focused only on a few selected aspects of observed phenomena.
Rather than regret the fact that they ignore other aspects of the latter as a necessary
evil which is an inevitable result of the practical impossibility to observe “everything,”
they should regard their deliberate effort to view phenomena in a rather one-sided
manner by restricting their concern to-and focusing their observations on-only
some aspects of them as a methodological virtue. In short, they ought to commit
themselves to making focused observations.
This implies a rule of never beginning a study and entering the field before having
established some particular analytical concerns. As Blumer has put it,
The possession and use of a prior picture o r scheme of the empirical world
under study. . .is a n unavoidable prerequisite for any study of the empirical world.
One can see the empirical world only through some scheme or image of it. The entire
act of scientific study is oriented and shaped by the underlying picture of the
empirical world that is used (Blumer, 1969:24-25).
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Field Research 31
It is essential that analytical field researchers impose the particular analyticalfocus of
their study on their observations prior to the beginning of the research (and not only
in retrospect, for purely “cosmetic” purposes of presentation, as is quite often the
case with the act of formulating hypotheses. . .). The act of establishing the particular
analytical concerns and focus of the study must precede the act of entering the field,
because it is the focus of one’s concerns that determines, to a large extent, the
boundaries of one’s perception (Pike, 1967:98-119).Researchers’ particular analytical
concerns and foci provide their observations with the particular cognitive orientation
that is necessary in order to decide what to regard as “relevant” for their purposes
(and, therefore, notable), and what to ignore as “irrelevant.” These concerns and foci
must be established prior to the beginning of the study, since they essentially function
as sensitizerswhich help researchers “see” patterns which might have never emerged
in mere perception. In other words, researchers would have probably missed and
ignored many patterns had they not been particularly concerned with particular
analytical foci (see, for example, Zerubavel, 1979:xvii-xviii).
We have already established that formal sociologists can isolate sociological
patterns from their concrete contexts only by abstraction, since that isolation is
purely analytical. We have also established that abstraction presupposes
conceptualization, since only under the guidance of concepts can the researcher
factor out sociological patterns from the actuality of their concrete contexts. Most of
the concerns and foci of the analytical field researcher are, therefore, formed around
conceptual constructs. Since conception has a most significant role in guiding and
fashioning perception, it is hardly surprising that one of the major functions of
concepts in analytical field research is to sensitize the researcher’s perception. As
Blumer has pointed out,
[ A sensitizing concept] gives the user a general sense of reference and guidance in
approaching empirical instances. . sensitizing concepts merely suggest directions
along which to look (Blumer, 1954:7).
Sensitizing concepts are, therefore, indispensable to analytical field research
(Blumer, 1954; Denzin, 1970:14-15; Schwartz and Jacobs, 1979:28).
In adhering to the methodological principles of formal sociology, analytical field
research differs considerably not only from conventional ethnographic research, but,
also, from any research which is based on the positivist logic of scientific inquiry.
While they must establish certain analytical concerns and foci prior to their entrance
to the field, analytical. field researchers need not necessarily formulate any
hypotheses. Moreover, they do not even have to operationalize their concepts at that
stage. Finally, they should be open not only to new findings, but, also, to dimensionsof
their objects of inquiry which they might not have considered before. Thus, they need
not necessarily dimensionalize their object of inquiry before they enter the field, and
their perception of where its boundaries lie may be quite vague.
Recapitulation
In this paper, an attempt has been made to apply the methodological principles of
formal sociology to fieldwork and, thus, to lay out systematically the methodological
foundations of “analytical field research.”
Three major methodological principles of formal sociology have been discussed:
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32 SYMBOLIC INTERACTION
a) The shift of emphasis from actual facts to the particular analytical perspective
from which they are viewed.
b) The primary concern with the formal patterns whichare abstracted from reality,
rather than with its concrete contents.
c) The researchers’ analytical selectivity, which is manifested in the fact that they
study only selected aspects of concrete phenomena and commit themselves to
particular analytical concerns and foci.
Based on these methodological principles, the followingguidelines for analytical
field researchers have been recommended:
Rather than be motivated by the desire to know “more,” they should cultivate a
wish to know “in different ways.” They must abandon the traditional
ethnographic search for “factual novelties” to gather, and direct their efforts
toward the development of new analytical perspectives from which to view and
illuminate even the most familiar and mundane concrete reality, that is, toward
the discovery of “intellectual novelties.”
They must give up the traditional ethnographic efforts to study everything about
concrete phenomena, and commit themselves to focused observations, since
being committed to a particular analytical perspective involves viewing reality in
a selective manner and focusing only on a few aspects of observed phenomena.
They should enter the field only after having established some particular
analytical concerns and having imposed a particular analytical focus on their
observations. Since the isolation of sociological patterns from their concrete
contexts is possible only through a process of abstraction from reality, which is,
in turn, possible only under the guidance of concepts, these concerns and foci
ought to be formed around conceptual constructs. They function as sensitizers,
enabling researchers to “see” patterns which they would have probably missed
without them. They provide their observations with the particular cognitive
orientation that is necessary in order to decide what to regard as “relevant” and
what to ignore as “irrelevant.”
It is suggested here that an analyticallyoriented field research which would follow
these fundamental methodological guidelines would most likely generate theoretical
insights and contribute to the development of grounded formal theory, as well as to
the elimination of the artificial split between “theory” and “research,” in sociology.
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Field Research 33
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