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Captive States, Divided Societies: Political Institutions of Southeastern Europe in
Historical Comparative Perspective
Alina Mungiu-Pippidi: Director, Romanian Academic Society, Bucharest
Alina Mungiu Pippidi holds a Ph.D. in Social Psychology from the University of Iasi, Romania. She is a
Professor of Political Communication at the Romanian National School of Government and
Administration, a consultant for the World Bank and UNDP in Romania and Director of the Romanian
Academic Society. She is a former Shorenstein Fellow of Harvard University and Fellow of the World
Academy of Art and Science. She has authored many books and articles on the Romanian transition, postCommunist political culture and nationalism.
Some relevant publications:
• Lessons learned: nation- and state building after communism. In: Alina Mungiu-Pippidi and Ivan
Krastev: Nationalism after communism. Lessons learned. Budapest 2004.
• Villages roumaines. Entre destruction communiste et violence libérale. Paris 2004.
• Europe’s “Desert of Tartars”. The borders of the enlarged European Union. Badia Fiesolana, San
Domenico 2001.
Political Modernization in the Balkans. Institutionalism versus political culture
This chapter will look at the post-Ottoman political histories of the Balkan countries (Romania,
Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Greece and Albania), focusing on the incentives and constraints that
shaped the national political systems, and the strategies of the main actors (monarchs, political
parties) to accede and keep political power. More specifically, the chapter will look at the
process of institutionalization of the political system (legislatures, elections, political parties)
explaining why these institutions did not succeed in shaping democratic systems.
As the hypothesis usually primed in connection with the Balkans politics is political culture the
chapter will discuss advantages and disadvantages of these two approaches (political culture
versus neo-institutionalism) and compare the explanatory power of both. A conciliatory model
will be proposed in the end.
Three distinct meanings of ‘political culture’ are currently used. The first considers ‘political
culture’ to be a configuration arising out of salient patterns of public opinion in regard to politics,
following the traditional approach of Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba. By aggregating
individual psychological data this view creates the ‘national’ on the basis of individual
representations of politics which are shared by the majority of the population. Three distinct
problems arise here: one, that majorities of public opinion shift constantly on a considerable
number of issues; second, that many crucial political issues fall short of meeting the approval of
clear and salient majorities. Third, that it is historically rather difficult to establish not only what
ordinary people though, but also whose opinion mattered. Elite-centered approaches and societycentered approaches can be made to meet in the middle, but this was not frequently done.
Secondly, there is a more ‘metaphysical’ vision of political culture, shared from cultural theory to
area studies and comparative politics, which sees history as an expression of national ‘character’
or culture. Insidiously, but persistently, it is this particular vision of political culture, which, more
often than not, colors the media stories on a specific country.
The Balkans, were almost as a general rule addressed under the latter meaning of political
culture, with grand cultural explanations provided to explain poor performance. However, if
political culture is treated as an independent variable, the evidence from political economy shows
that it matters little or not at all. External factors (decisions by the great powers, European
context) and structural constraints (multi-ethnicity, rural society), have such an overwhelming
importance in explaining the trajectories of countries that little room is left for other explanations.
Finally, a less frequently used meaning of political culture refers to what the French call
‘mentalités’. Mentalities are more than attitudes towards politics: they are actual behavior rooted
in widespread norms on politics. Mentalities are close to ‘informal institutions’, such as described
by Douglas North, widespread societal norms and procedures. It is in this approach that political
culture comes closest to neo-institutionalism. This chapter will explain the failure of democratic
institutions to take root in the Balkans by looking at the relationship between formal institutions,
informal institutions and external factors.