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THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN:
THE AMERICAN CONTRIBUTION AND THE BOMBARDMENT OF DURAZZO
Evan Michael Vaughan, B.A.
Thesis Prepared for the Degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS
May 2012
APPROVED:
Geoffrey Wawro, Major Professor
Robert Citino, Committee Member
Donald Mitchener, Committee Member
Richard McCaslin, Chair of the Department
of History
James D. Meernik, Acting Dean of the
Toulouse Graduate School
Vaughan, Evan Michael. The Development of Anti-Submarine Warfare in the
Mediterranean: The American Contribution and the Bombardment of Durazzo. Master of Arts
(History), May 2012, 91 pp., 75 titles.
The Entente powers began World War I without any formal anti-submarine
countermeasures. However, the Entente developed countermeasures through trial and error over
time. Success was moderate until America joined the war. With America came the arrival of
subchasers to the Mediterranean Theater of Operations. This highly specialized vessel helped
turn the tide against U-boats. A true counter to the U-boat threat in the Mediterranean did not
come until October 2, 1918 with the bombardment of Durazzo.
This thesis discusses the development of Entente anti-submarine capabilities and
illustrate how America's contribution led to success. A detailed analysis of the rarely discussed
bombardment of Durazzo is included using archival documents.
Copyright 2012
by
Evan Michael Vaughan
ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would not have been able to make this thesis possible if it were not for the following
individuals:
My father, Michael Vaughan, M.D., who ultimately made it possible for me to get my
master's.
My major professor, Dr. Geoffrey Wawro, who has dedicated his time in helping me gain
my master's.
Professors Robert Citino and Donald Mitchener for being a part of my committee and
guiding me through several classes.
A special thanks to the individuals who helped me at the Washington Navy Yard and
National Archives.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ............................................................................................................. iii
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS ...........................................................................................................v
NOTE TO THE READER ............................................................................................................. vi
THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN:
THE AMERICAN CONTRIBUTION AND THE BOMBARDMENT OF DURAZZO ...............1
Appendices
A.
U.S. FORCES AT THE BOMBARDMENT OF DURAZZO ..............................80
B.
CHRONOLOGY OF THE BOMBARDMENT OF DURAZZO ..........................82
BIBLIOGRAPHY ..........................................................................................................................87
iv
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Page
1.
The Otranto Barrage ..........................................................................................................18
2.
Subchasers 227 and 324 .....................................................................................................31
3.
Hydrophone........................................................................................................................33
4.
Subchasers and USS Leonidas AD-7 .................................................................................36
5.
American Subchasers anchored at Corfu, Greece, 1918....................................................38
6.
Durazzo, Albania ...............................................................................................................43
7.
Allied intelligence map of Durazzo pinpointing coastal batteries .....................................44
8.
Two phase Italian and British bombardment of Durazzo ..................................................49
9.
Captain Nelson in white shaking hands .............................................................................55
10.
S.C. 129’s attack on a U-boat during the bombardment of Durazzo .................................60
11.
S.C. 215 and S.C. 128’s attack on a U-boat during the bombardment of Durazzo ...........63
12.
Lt. Cmdr. Bastedo (Commander in this photograph) ........................................................71
v
NOTE TO THE READER
For the purpose of clarity, the following German terms appear in their English equivalents.
Kapitänleutnant ......................Lieutenant-Commander
Linienschiffsleutnant..............Lieutenant
Oberleutnant ...........................Lieutenant Junior Grade
Mittelmeerdivision .................German Mediterranean Division
vi
THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN:
THE AMERICAN CONTRIBUTION AND THE BOMBARDMENT OF DURAZZO
Scholarship on the First World War as a naval war has tended to focus on large surface
actions, such as Jutland and the struggle for the Atlantic shipping lanes. Considerably less
attention is given to the Mediterranean Theater and even less to the submarine war in this theater.
The literature on naval warfare, whether scholarly - Richard Hough's The Great War at Sea, Paul
Halpern's A Naval History of World War I and The Naval War in the Mediterranean 1914-1918,
and Arthur Marder's From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, or popular, Robert Massie's
Dreadnought - has focused on large surface engagements or the submarine war in the Atlantic.
Little attention has been paid to the strategic and tactical problems posed by submarines in the
Mediterranean, which was a strategically vital front and theater in the war. Even more obscure is
the Entente and American anti-submarine effort in the Mediterranean that developed throughout
the war. However, as illustrated in Lawrence Sondhaus' The Naval Policy of Austria-Hungary,
1867-1918, a very important part of the war for the Entente and Central Powers was played out
in the Mediterranean Theater between U-boats and anti-submarine vessels.
Most works that cover anti-submarine warfare during World War I, such as Dwight
Messimer's Find and Destroy: Anti-Submarine Warfare in World War I devote a very small
portion to the Mediterranean Theater. Furthermore, very little is written on the Otranto Barrage
and the American subchasers that were part of this theater. In fact, Robert M. Grant's U-boat
Hunters only mentions the Otranto Barrage as a note in his list of German submarines sunk
during the war. The discussion of the American subchasers is so limited that the sources that do
mention these vessels often quote the same sources. The memoirs of Ray Millholland, The
Splinter Fleet of the Otranto Barrage, and Hillary Ranald Chambers Jr., United States
1
Submarine Chasers, are the two most referenced sources that cover these American vessels. In
addition, archival material is hardly ever presented when discussing the subchasers. By far the
least discussed among historians is the Allied bombardment of Durazzo on 2 October 1918.
Lawrence Sondhaus only devotes half a paragraph in Navies of Europe to this raid. Furthermore,
Arthur Marder does not mention the bombardment of Durazzo once in his five volume opus,
From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow. Through the extensive use of archival material and
primary and secondary sources, this analysis focuses on Entente and later Allied, anti-submarine
warfare against Central Powers U-boats in the Mediterranean and Adriatic Seas, with an
emphasis on the American effort and the bombardment of the Austrian Port at Durazzo.
Both the Entente and Central Powers were dependent on this area for troop movements,
operations, and most important, supply convoys. Using the Mediterranean Sea to move supplies
and personnel was much more feasible than land means because alliances among both sides
meant that certain land routes were no longer usable. The Entente used the Mediterranean to
move troops and supplies from North Africa, France, Egypt, Greece, and Italy to support
operations in the Balkans, Dardanelles, and the Western Front. In addition, Great Britain relied
on the Suez Canal for passage to India, Australia, and New Zealand. During the opening months
of the war, the Entente enjoyed relatively risk-free use of the Mediterranean and Adriatic Seas.
The arrival of German submarines in 1915 limited this freedom.
During the early months of the war, before Entente naval surface operations increased in
the Mediterranean, the Central Powers used the Mediterranean to move supplies and troops to
the Ottoman Empire, Austria-Hungary, and the Dardanelles. However, as the war unfolded, the
2
Central Powers relied more on land routes to move troops and supplies around this theater of
operations. 1
The full potential of the U-boat and the importance of anti-submarine warfare were not
understood at the start of hostilities in 1914. German and Austrian U-boats would become the
Central Powers' main naval presence in the Mediterranean. The addition of the German U-boats
to the Austrian vessels already in the Adriatic caused the Entente Powers to become much more
cautious and concerned about their sea lines of communication. This led to the Entente's antisubmarine warfare effort against marauding German and Austrian U-boats. While the Entente
would develop various countermeasures to the U-boat threat, the high loss of shipping would
continue to increase until 1918. 2
Action within the Mediterranean and Adriatic Sea began soon after World War I started
on 28 June 1914 with the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria. Italy, although a
member of the Triple Alliance, declared its neutrality on 3 August and did not join the Central
Powers. 3 As a result, Italy's position was constantly questioned and many wondered what side
Italy would join if it decided to enter the war. Due to this uncertainty and the presence of
German warships in the region, Britain had six battleships sent to the Mediterranean. 4 As
hostilities began, Germany had the cruisers Goeben and Breslau stationed at Pola, in the
Adriatic. Rear Admiral Wilhelm Souchon, commander of the German Mediterranean Division,
planned to use the two cruisers to attack the French convoy lines in the Mediterranean that were
1
Paolo. E. Coletta, Sea Power in the Atlantic and Mediterranean in World War I (Lanham: University Press of
America, 1989), 93-95, 98.
2
Lisle A. Rose, Power at Sea: The Age of Navalism, 1890-1918 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2007),
253, 257.
3
Antonio Salandra, Italy and The Great War: From Neutrality to Intervention (London: Edward Arnold & Co.,
1932), 71.
4
B. B. Schofield, British Sea Power: Naval Policy in the Twentieth Century (London: B. T. Batsford Ltd, 1967), 30.
3
bringing troops to France from North Africa. On 3 August, Admiral Souchon learned of the
German declaration of war against France. 5 The next day, both cruisers arrived off French
Algeria, North Africa. The Goeben bombarded Philippeville and Breslau shelled Bône, also
known as Annaba. The two cruisers stopped firing on shore installations after French batteries
returned fire. Neither ship took any damage, while considerable damage had been inflicted on
French installations. These were the first shots fired in the Mediterranean. 6
Following these bombardments, Souchon and his two cruisers were ordered to sail to
Constantinople. As Souchon headed towards Constantinople he passed several British ships, but
nothing happened. Only after this passing did the British declare war on Germany on 4 August. 7
This declaration of war caused Souchon to become concerned about the French and British fleets
catching up to destroy him before he reached the Dardanelles. Because of the recent start of the
war and the formation of alliances, Souchon feared the British and French, while the British and
French feared the Austro-Hungarian Navy. What ensued was a high speed chase across the
Mediterranean, with the French and British ships pursuing the Goeben and Breslau.
Interestingly, the British cruisers in pursuit were unable to steam at their maximum speed
because of faulty boiler systems, while the two German cruisers were able to steam two knots
over their maximum speed. 8 The Turkish government allowed Souchon to pass through the
Dardanelles. Souchon successfully evaded the British and French and handed over the two
5
Paul G. Halpern, A Naval History of World War I (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1994), 51-52.
6
Rose, Power at Sea: The Age of Nationalism, 1890-1918, 191.
7
Robert K. Massie, Dreadnought: Britain, Germany, and the Coming of the Great War (New York: Random House,
1991), 908.
8
Theodore Ropp, The Development of a Modern Navy: French Naval Policy 1871-1904 (Annapolis: Naval Institute
Press, 1987), 228-229.
4
cruisers to the Turkish Navy. 9 The Goeben was renamed the Yavuz Sultan Selim and the Breslau
became the Midilli. The Central Powers viewed this as a major victory over the Entente and
declared it to be their first naval triumph of the new conflict.
The Entente, on the other hand, viewed this event as an opportunity to strengthen their
war effort against the Central Powers. 10 Shortly before the transfer of the Goeben and Breslau,
Great Britain ceased construction of three Dreadnought battleships: Resadiye, Sultan Osman-i
Evvel, and Faith Sultan Mehmed, which were being built in British shipyards for the Turkish
Navy. The first two joined the Royal Navy renamed Erin and Agincourt, while the third was
scrapped. 11 Other factors, such as the Berlin-Baghdad railroad and Otto Liman von Sanders'
mission to reorganize the Ottoman Army earlier in 1913 led to the Ottoman entry into the war. 12
In fact, Germany already effectively controlled the Ottoman Army because of von Sanders'
mission to supervise the training of an Ottoman Army. In addition, Germany wished to gain
naval bases around the Dardanelles and the Sea of Marmara in order to have a presence in the
Eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea. This greatly upset the Russians who believed that the
development of a strong Ottoman Army and a German naval presence would someday be used
against them. 13 However, the gift of the Goeben and Breslau was the final event that eventually
caused the Ottoman Empire to join the war allied with the Central Powers.
9
Charles W. Koburger, Jr., The Central Powers in the Adriatic, 1914-1918 (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2001),
26-29.
10
Lawrence Sondhaus, Navies of Europe: 1815-2002 (London: Pearson, 2002), 153.
11
Lawrence Sondhaus, Naval Warfare 1815-1914 (New York: Routledge, 2001), 220.
12
Mustafa Aksakal, The Ottoman Road to War in 1914: The Ottoman Empire and the First World War (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2008), 3, 57.
13
Frank G. Weber, Eagles on the Crescent: Germany, Austria, and the Diplomacy of the Turkish Alliance (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1970), 22, 34-35, 63.
5
With the Goeben and Breslau contained within the Dardanelles, the French, British, and
Russians were free to use the Mediterranean without fear, for the time being. The Mediterranean
Sea was a vital sea communication line for these three Entente Powers. The French used the
Mediterranean to ship troops from North Africa to France for the Western Front. The British
transported men and supplies to Egypt and relied on the Suez Canal to get to India. The British
got troops from India and oil from Iran and Iraq. 14 Russia used the Dardanelles to enter the
Mediterranean Sea for shipping and transportation purposes. The Dardanelles and the Sea of
Marmara was the point where all Russian shipping had to pass through the Black Sea into the
Mediterranean and vice versa. 15 As the war unfolded, Egypt became the focal point of British
operations in the Mediterranean. Equipment and men were amassed at Egyptian ports in
preparation for operations in the Dardanelles and Salonika. 16 Both France and Great Britain
relied on their colonies to get the necessary numbers of men for their armies. As the war
unfolded, the Entente and Central Powers relied on the Mediterranean more and more for
operations and transportation.
During this time, tensions in the Dardanelles and Turkey began to increased. Upset by the
transfer of the Goeben and Breslau, the British Admiralty ordered British surface ships around
the Dardanelles to sink these two warships if they entered the Mediterranean. This order was
later expanded to include all Turkish ships leaving the Dardanelles. 17 Tensions increased further
when the Goeben and Breslau bombarded the Russian ports at Odessa and Theodosia in the
14
Paul G. Halpern, The Naval War in the Mediterranean: 1914-1918 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1987), 2627.
15
Dwight R. Messimer, Find and Destroy: Antisubmarine Warfare in World War I (Annapolis: Naval Institute
Press, 2001), 191.
16
David R. Woodward, Hell in the Holy Land (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2006), 15, 19.
17
Coletta, Sea Power in the Atlantic and Mediterranean in World War I, 9, 16.
6
Black Sea on 29 October 1914. 18 On the same day, the Ottoman Empire joined the war allied
with the Central Powers. 19 Admiral Souchon, the man who started hostilities within the
Mediterranean, was also the first to begin the fighting in the Black Sea. In retaliation, Russia
declared war on Turkey on November 2; while the British and French sent a small squadron of
naval vessels to bombard Turkish forts at the mouth of the Dardanelles. With Russia and Turkey
now belligerents in the growing war, Russia's shipping route to the Mediterranean Sea was cut
off. Britain finally declared war against Turkey on 5 November 1914, two days after the British
and French bombardment of the forts. 20
Throughout 1914, the British knew of the possible threats from German and Austrian
U-boats, but believed they would not be used against convoys and shipping. For the first six
months of the war, Germany shared the same view as the British and only used its U-boats for
reconnaissance and to attack capital warships. 21 In fact, Germany truly did not know how to get
the most use out of its submarines for the first year of the war. 22 Because of the 1909 Declaration
of London, which was an effort to defend the maritime rights of neutral nations in times of war,
Germany did not use its U-boats against Entente shipping at first. 23 On the rare occasion that a
U-boat attacked a supply vessel, the submarine would surface and give warning to the vessel's
crew before attacking. The first British anti-submarine warfare measure was ordered in
18
Henry W. Nevinson, The Dardanelles Campaign (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1919), 11.
19
Weber, Eagles on the Crescent, 5.
20
Peter Hart, Gallipoli (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 11-14.
21
Vice Admiral Wolfgang Wegener, The Naval Strategy of the World War (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1929),
61-63.
22
Gary E. Weir, Building the Kaiser's Navy: The Imperial Navy Office and German Industry in the von Tirpitz Era
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1992), 132-133.
23
Arthur J. Marder, The Road to War: 1904-1914. Vol. 1 of From The Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal
Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961), 358-361.
7
September 1914, when the Admiralty ordered its warships to make periodic course changes. So
confident were the British that they had no program to cope with submarine warfare until the
very end of 1914. In the opening months of the war, politics became the most effective antisubmarine measure. 24
With the British, French, and Russians at war with the Ottoman Empire, the Suez Canal
came under threat from Ottoman forces. At this time, the British relied on Indian soldiers to
guard the vital Suez Canal. The area around the Suez Canal was subjected to small periodic
attacks made by Turkish soldiers. As a result, Britain began to build up defenses in Egypt. 25 The
British, along with the French, thought the best form of defense was to use their naval ships to
cut off Turkish supply lines at İskenderun, which is located on the Southern Mediterranean coast
of modern day Turkey. This action would protect the Suez Canal and Entente shipping in the
eastern Mediterranean. The British, French, and Russian naval bombardments against Turkish
lines of communication proved just how defenseless these supply lines were to naval gunfire.
After this Entente show of force, the Turks gave up their idea of attacking the Suez Canal and
Egypt. In addition, Turkey repositioned large numbers of their troops to defend against the
Entente operations in the Dardanelles in February 1915, thus sparing the Suez Canal and
Egypt. 26
The Entente began operations in the Dardanelles and Salonika in an effort to break the
stalemate on the Western Front and to put pressure on the Ottoman Empire. In addition, Winston
Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, believed that an offensive against Gallipoli would be the
24
Messimer, Find and Destroy, 3-10.
25
Woodward, Hell in the Holy Land, 15.
26
Halpern, Naval History, 106-108.
8
best way to defend Egypt. 27 Starting in April of 1915, British forces, along with Commonwealth
soldiers from New Zealand, Australia and India, concentrated on Gallipoli. 28 Interestingly, Otto
Liman von Sanders, the German officer who trained the Ottoman Army, was placed in charge of
the defenses at Gallipoli. 29 The British believed that a massive campaign at Gallipoli would force
the Ottoman Empire to an armistice and would reopen Russia's route to the Mediterranean Sea.
This was of vital importance to the Entente because this route was critical to keep Russia
supplied. Entente forces carried out operations at Salonika in an effort to prevent the Central
Powers from building a railroad between Germany and Constantinople. If this railroad were to be
established, it would strengthen the Central Powers' defense in the Dardanelles and jeopardize
the Gallipoli campaign. 30 This railroad was necessary to the Ottoman war effort because the
empire could not execute the war on its own. The vast majority of the supplies the Ottoman
Army depended on came from Germany. 31 In addition to the land campaigns, the Entente
believed that overwhelming naval superiority in the region would cut off Turkey from maritime
shipping.
Many Entente leaders believed the French and British naval forces alone would be
enough to get Constantinople to surrender. British and French naval ships in this area could sever
the supply lines for the Turkish army in the Dardanelles region, which mostly came from the
Mediterranean sea. 32 The gathering of Entente ships sparked German concern that the Turks
27
Robin Prior, Gallipoli: The End of the Myth (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 7, 11.
28
Thomas G. Frothingham, The Naval History of the World War: The Stress of Sea Power 1915-1916 (Freeport:
Books for Libraries Press, 1971), 52-55.
29
Prior, Gallipoli: The End of the Myth, 77.
30
Richard Hough, The Great War at Sea: 1914-1918 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 150-151.
31
Weber, Eagles on the Crescent, 106.
32
Hart, Gallipoli, 32-33.
9
would not be able to fend off the attackers and that lines of communication between Germany
and the Ottoman Empire would be severed. 33 This concern motivated the Germans to send Uboats to the Mediterranean Sea. The Turks pleaded for these U-boats to be used to attack British
and French ships, while Germany also tried to get Austrian submarines to assist. Austria refused
to use their submarines, but Germany sent four UB and four UC type U-boats by rail to Austrian
ports on the Adriatic Sea. 34 By 20 May 1915, the German U-21 left Cattaro for Constantinople
under the command of Lieutenant-Commander Otto Hersing. 35 On 25 May U-21 torpedoed and
sank the Royal Navy battleship HMS Triumph off Gallipoli. Two days after this attack, U-21
returned to the area and sank another British battleship, HMS Majestic. In the days after these
two attacks, another German submarine sank the large Italian cruiser Amalfi. 36 Suddenly, the sea
lines of communication which the British, and more importantly the Entente, relied on were at
risk of being severed. The Entente quickly realized that U-boats in the region could cut off the
maritime supply lines that supported land operations. 37 The loss of these two battleships, as well
as supply vessels spurred an increase in Entente anti-submarine operations at the western
entrance of the Dardanelles. Months later on 13 September 1915, the British announced that they
had made the Dardanelles impassable to U-boats by using nets and mines. Germany started an
organized anti-shipping campaign in the Mediterranean Sea because of the successes of U-21
and the buildup of British and French forces at Salonika.
33
Edward J. Erickson, Ordered to Die: A History of the Ottoman Army in the First World War (Westport:
Greenwood Press, 2001), 77-79.
34
Messimer, Find and Destroy, 192-194.
35
Victor Rudenno, Gallipoli: Attack from the Sea (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 136-144.
36
Henry J. James, German Subs in Yankee Waters: First World War (New York: Gotham House, 1940), 4.
37
A. T. Mahan, Naval Strategy (Westport: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1911), 166-167, 207.
10
Germany separated the Mediterranean into two areas, an eastern and a western half, with
Sicily being the dividing point. German U-boats had greater success in the west because Entente
anti-submarine measures in that area were weak compared to the eastern half. However, U-boats
did operate in the Aegean Sea in the areas around Salonika and the Dardanelles. Entente supply
vessels and convoys were the main target for these submarines. Between September and
December of 1915, German U-boats sank ninety-nine Entente ships. With the loss of needed
capital and supply ships thanks to the implementation of an organized German anti-shipping
campaign, the Entente suddenly found themselves faced with the threat of U-boats in the
Mediterranean and no way to counter it. 38
In retaliation against the German and Austrian U-boat campaign, the British and French
began submarine operations against Turkey, but lost eight boats when trying to pass through the
Dardanelles. 39 In the end, operations at the Dardanelles and Salonika proved to be unsuccessful
for the Entente powers. Large numbers of British, French, and Italian troops were required to
hold the Salonika Front, which failed to prevent the fall of Serbia to the Central Powers. The
Entente's defeat at Gallipoli by late 1915 ultimately led to the Entente's failure in the
Dardanelles. 40 Because of this defeat, the British and French were unable to open a shipping lane
to the Black Sea to supply Russia. As a result, the Entente was forced to use the Arctic Ocean to
ship supplies to the Russian ports at Murmansk and Archangel. 41 During these two operations,
U-boats inflicted considerable damage to Entente supply lines in the Mediterranean. These
38
Messimer, Find and Destroy, 192-194, 202.
39
Halpern, Naval History, 115-119.
40
Coletta, Sea Power in the Atlantic and Mediterranean in World War I, 22.
41
Sondhaus, Navies of Europe: 1815-2002, 167.
11
events contributed to an increasing interest by the British to begin anti-submarine operations in
the Mediterranean to protect shipping.
As events unfolded around the Dardanelles, the British and the French realized that
control of the Mediterranean Sea would keep the Austrian Navy bottled up in the Adriatic Sea.
Once France declared war on Austria-Hungary, French naval ships in the Mediterranean made a
daring attempt to surprise the Austrian Navy. On 16 August 1914, French ships surrounded the
Austrian Cruiser Zenta hoping to lure the rest of the Austrian Navy out of their ports to rescue
the ship. Unfortunately for the French, the Austrian ships remained in their ports. Even after this
encounter, both the French and Austrian Navies maintained operations in the Adriatic. French
ships entered the Adriatic to protect Entente convoys shipping supplies to Montenegro. On the
other hand, Austrian ships continued to operate off the Montenegrin Coast, until the AustroHungarians took over Montenegro in 1916. Like the Mediterranean, the Adriatic Sea was a vital
sea line of communication for the Entente. The French considered a raid on the Austrian naval
port at Cattaro, but this never materialized and the port would later harbor Austrian and German
U-boats. 42 Towards the end of 1914, both the Central and Entente Powers began to use
submarines in the Adriatic Sea.
At this time, Austria had seven submarines in service, but only five were capable of
carrying out operations. 43 Germany was not much better off, having only thirty-six
U-boats in operation at the start of the war. 44 Nevertheless, French naval ships protecting
convoys to Montenegro became vulnerable to Austrian U-boats. With complete surprise on 21
December 1914, the Austrian U-12 torpedoed the French battleship Jean Bart, starting
42
Koburger, Jr., Central Powers, 33-35.
43
Halpern, Naval History, 61.
44
Sondhaus, Naval Warfare 1815-1914, 205.
12
submarine operations in the Adriatic Sea. Following this encounter, the French decided that it
was no longer worth risking their naval ships to protect the convoys to Montenegro. Afterwards,
the French Navy only carried out operations at the mouth of the Adriatic at the Strait of Otranto.
By April 1915, Italy started negotiations with the Entente Powers, which caused great
concern for the Austrian Navy. The Austrian Navy would be threatened if Italy were to join the
war allied with the Entente Powers. Anticipating Italy's move, French ships began to resume
operations in the Adriatic Sea. On 27 April, the French cruiser Leon Gambetta was torpedoed
and sunk by the Austrian U-5 under the command of Lieutenant Georg Ritter von Trapp. 45 This
led to the beginning of a stalemate in the Adriatic because the Austrians did not want to risk their
surface ships, while the France lacked a naval base in the area, which kept their surface ships and
submarines from operating effectively. 46 The French Naval bases in the Mediterranean were
located at Algiers, Rachgoun, and Oran in Algeria, Bizerte in Tunisia, and Toulon, France. The
French strategically put bases at these locations at the start of the 20th century because of their
close proximity to the Strait of Gibraltar. However, these bases were too far away to support
French naval operations in the Adriatic. 47 Both the Entente and Central Powers wondered if
Italy's entrance into the war would give one side the needed advantage to break the stalemate. On
23 May 1915, Italy joined the Entente and declared war on Austria-Hungary. At this time, Italy
still had not declared war against Germany. 48 Italy's move to the Entente allowed the British and
French to have free rein over the Adriatic and Mediterranean Seas until German submarines
arrived in late 1915.
45
This commander would later gain fame in the movie The Sound of Music.
46
Halpern, Naval History, 61-62, 64.
47
Ropp, The Development of a Modern Navy: French Naval Policy 1871-1904, 336-338.
48
Salandra, Italy and The Great War, 361
13
Italy's entry into the war was a great advantage for the Entente Powers, but Italy did have
its weaknesses. Compared to other Entente nations, the Italian Navy was not capable of carrying
out anti-submarine missions. Italy did not possess large numbers of trawlers and drifters that
could be used to patrol for Austrian and German submarines. Trawlers dragged anti-shipping
nets while drifters were vessels that stayed in place and had nets drifting from the stern. To
address this weakness, Italy stopped building four battleships in order to construct cruisers and
other anti-submarine vessels. Italy also armed trains with heavy coastal defense guns and used
them to protect naval bases from Austrian destroyers and submarines. 49 By 1917 and 1918,
Italian planes were regularly used to fly reconnaissance missions to locate U-boats in the
Adriatic. 50 Due to Italy's move to the Entente, German submariners were told to consider Italian
ships as hostile, but under no circumstances were the German submarines to reveal their identity.
In the event that a German submarine had to surface or was spotted, they were instructed to fly
the flag of Austria. This precaution was necessary because Italy had declared war on AustriaHungary, but not on Germany. In addition to their anti-submarine warfare mission, the Italians
placed great importance on protecting their convoys. 51
Italian shipping was especially vulnerable to submarines because of the close proximity
to Austrian submarine bases on the other side of the Adriatic Sea. Despite this, by the end of the
war, the Italian Navy had shipped 1,499,595 Entente men by convoys to different areas around
the Mediterranean. In 1915 these convoys transported and supplied the Italian force in Albania.
In April and May of 1916, the Serbian Army along with an Italian garrison was evacuated from
49
Paolo E. Coletta, Allied and American Naval Operations in the European Theater, World War I (Lampeter: The
Edwin Mellen Press, Ltd, 1996), 319-320.
50
Geoffrey L. Rossano, Stalking the U-boat: U.S. Naval Aviation in Europe during World War I (Gainesville:
University of Florida Press, 2010), 294-297.
51
Sondhaus, Navies of Europe: 1815-2002, 165.
14
Durazzo by Italian convoys after the Austro-Hungarian offensive into Albania. By August of
1916, these Italian vessels were shipping provisions to the port of Salonika, Greece, in order to
supply the Italian troops in Macedonia. 52 The Italian Navy may not have been well equipped for
anti-submarine warfare, but it did make great contributions to the Entente war effort by shipping
troops and vital equipment around the Mediterranean.
This series of events in the Mediterranean and Adriatic Seas along with the formation of
alliances led to the Central Powers' use of submarines and the Entente Powers' anti-submarine
warfare operations in the area. Germany sent more submarines to the Austrian ports of Pola and
Cattaro in an effort to attack Entente convoys. 53 By the end of 1915, Admiral Pini, Italian Chief
of the Navy, stated that the protection of convoys operating in the southern Adriatic was of great
importance. 54 This order was given primarily in recognition of the loss of 640 Entente vessels to
U-boats, totaling 1,189,031 tons worldwide. 55 By the middle of 1916, Germany had sent twelve
U-boats to Cattaro and three to Constantinople. This number would increase to twenty by the end
of the year. German submariners favored the western half of the Mediterranean because this area
was the entry point for Entente shipping. The increase of submarine activity prompted the
British, French, and Italians to take defensive measures against the submarine threat. 56
In December of 1915, British, French, and Italian representatives met in Paris to divide
the Mediterranean Sea into anti-submarine patrol areas. The idea was that these three powers
52
Office of the Chief of Staff of the Royal Italian Navy (Historical Section), The Italian Navy in the World War
1915-1918 (Rome: Historical Section, 1927), 31, 33.
53
Paul G. Halpern, The Battle of the Otranto Straits: Controlling the Gateway to the Adriatic in World War I
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 11-13.
54
Henry Newbolt, History of the Great War: Naval Operations Vol. IV (New York: Longmans, Green and Co.,
1928), 101.
55
Rose, Power at Sea: The Age of Nationalism, 1890-1918, 259-260.
56
Messimer, Find and Destroy, 194-195, 203-204.
15
would be responsible for escorting Entente convoys in their area of the Mediterranean. Great
Britain was assigned areas in the east, the Adriatic and Ionian Seas were assigned to Italy, and
France covered the western half of the Mediterranean. 57 This meeting created eighteen patrol
areas, but this number was condensed to eleven in early 1916. This patrol zone concept was not
successful because the Entente lacked effective anti-submarine capabilities in 1915 and 1916. 58
In addition, the three Entente powers did not effectively work together to coordinate patrols. In
some cases, patrols came late or never showed up, leaving vessels easy prey for U-boats. Entente
shipping losses continued to grow and U-boat attacks increased with each passing month.
The escalating loss of Entente shipping to U-boats illustrated to the Entente powers that
the anti-submarine measures being used were ineffective. From May 1915 to December 1916,
Germany lost five U-boats and Austria four. Five of these nine U-boats were lost in combat
situations, but only four of these were sunk as a result of Entente surface anti-submarine patrols.
On the other hand, U-boats wreaked havoc among Entente shipping in the Mediterranean and
Adriatic. While commanding U-35, Lieutenant-Commander Lothar von Arnauld de la Periere
sank more than forty Entente vessels in June and July of 1916. The same commander sank fiftyfour cargo vessels in August around Spain and Sicily. In three weeks, von Arnauld de la Periere
sank ninety-one thousand tons of Entente shipping. In addition, two other U-boat commanders
sank a combined seventy-five vessels between July and August of 1916 in the western half of the
Mediterranean. 59 Due to these staggering losses, the Entente quickly focused more attention on
developing and carrying out effective anti-submarine countermeasures. Before 1916, the convoy
57
Arthur J. Marder, The War Years: To the Eve of Jutland. Vol. 2 of From The Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The
Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), 335
58
Coletta, Allied and American Naval Operations, 316-318.
59
Messimer, Find and Destroy, 194-195, 203-204.
16
was not a widely accepted countermeasure to U-boats. Many believed that such a large
concentration of slow moving ships would pose an easy target for submarines. Critics also
believed the large amount of smoke created by the convoy would only attract U-boats. 60
However, the loss of shipping to U-boats began to decrease by 1917 as the Entente started to use
the convoy system in the Mediterranean as a defensive measure against U-boats.
Convoys were comprised of naval escorts, usually destroyers, which would accompany
transport ships to their destination. The convoy system was an improvement in the effort to
protect shipping and lowered the losses among supply ships. In addition to defending supply
ships, convoys lured U-boats into a lethal anti-submarine defense of destroyers and other ships.
Even with the successes gained from using the convoy system, U-boats still remained a constant
threat to Entente shipping. 61 Unlike the Atlantic Ocean in which there were vast areas U-boats
could not venture, the entire Mediterranean Sea was a giant naval battlefield. 62 By the end of
1915, thirty-two German and several Austrian U-boats were operating in the Mediterranean,
which accounted for 30 percent of Entente commerce losses by 1918. 63 The submarines that
attacked Entente shipping in the Mediterranean operated from ports within the Adriatic Sea.
Preventing German and Austrian submarines from entering the Mediterranean and attacking
shipping was of great importance to the Entente Powers. 64 When reevaluating anti-submarine
countermeasures, the Entente shifted their focus to an earlier measure that had mixed results.
60
Marder, The Road to War: 1904-1914. Vol. 1 of From The Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the
Fisher Era, 1904-1919, 360-361.
61
Rear-Admiral William Sowden Sims, The Victory at Sea (Garden City: Doubleday, Page, & Company, 1921),
198-199, 211.
62
Messimer, Find and Destroy, 205.
63
William N. Still Jr., Crisis at Sea: The United States Navy in European Waters in World War I (Gainesville:
University of Florida Press, 2006), 492
64
Ray Milholland, The Splinter Fleet of the Otranto Barrage (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1936), 109110
17
The new focus for the campaign against the U-boats was to stop and destroy the U-boats
and protect shipping. Entente leaders quickly realized that all German and Austrian submarines
had to pass through the forty-mile wide Strait of Otranto to enter the Mediterranean Sea when
leaving their ports in the Adriatic Sea. 65 The depth of 3,600 feet at the strait was too great for
Figure 1. The Otranto Barrage 66
anti-submarine nets to be used. 67 Thus the Entente started their first major coordinated antisubmarine countermeasure by creating a barrier of ships that would patrol the narrow strait. This
65
Hilary Ranald Chambers Jr., United States Submarine Chasers in the Mediterranean, Adriatic, and the Attack on
Durazzo 1920 (New York: Kessinger Legacy Reprints, 1920), 41.
66
Drawing by author.
67
Sims, Victory at Sea, 229.
18
led to the start of the Otranto Barrage, which was a British, French, and Italian effort to keep the
U-boats bottled up in the Adriatic and keep them from entering the Mediterranean Sea. This
barrier of Entente ships stretched across the Adriatic Sea, beginning at the northern tip of Corfu,
Greece, continuing to Otranto, Italy. 68 The overall command of the barrage was under Italian
Admiral Alfredo Acton, while British Commodore Howard Kelly was in charge of operations. 69
The barrage started off as a modest line of defense and grew over time to a formidable and well
organized barrier of ships.
British drifters started to form this line of defense in September of 1915. 70 Early attempts
at creating a barrage for anti-submarine warfare consisted of 120 trawlers and 30 motor launches.
These small boats were armed with depth charges as well as one small caliber deck gun, which
was smaller than the gun mounted on U-boats. The vessels would only patrol the strait during the
day and would return to port at night. This left the strait unmonitored at the night, which led to
increased losses to Entente shipping in the Mediterranean. German and Austrian submarines
simply waited for the patrolling vessels to leave and then moved through the unprotected strait
under the cover of darkness. Along with this limitation, the vessels patrolling the strait were not
equipped with submarine detection equipment. Vigilant crewmembers could only rely on their
vision and hearing to pinpoint the location of a marauding submarine. This greatly reduced the
effectiveness of the patrolling ships. Several hindrances and problems plagued the barrage in its
first two years of operation. 71
68
Milholland, Splinter Fleet, 109-110.
69
A.B. Feuer, The U.S. Navy in World War I: Combat at Sea and in the Air (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1999),
107.
70
Halpern, Naval History, 159.
71
Feuer, The U.S. Navy, 107-108.
19
The width of the strait was simply too large for the Entente to patrol effectively. Most
importantly, the British and Italians lacked the number of trawlers and drifters to make effective
patrols in 1915 and 1916. In addition, the Italians did not provide the destroyers and trawlers and
drifters they promised they would send to conduct patrol duties at the strait. 72 On many
occasions, the Italian vessels would wait in port to be radioed by the drifters, but the U-boat
would be long gone by the time the destroyers reached the submarine's reported area.
The Entente was so desperate to stop U-boat activity that unorthodox countermeasures
were used on more than one occasion. By the end of 1915, the Royal Navy sent four converted
colliers, Penhallow, Saros, Werribee, and Remembrance to Malta to act as decoys. When viewed
from a submarine's periscope, these vessels appeared to be defenseless supply vessels, but in
reality they were armed with concealed deck guns. As lethal as these ships were, none ever sank
any U-boats during the war. In addition, Entente surface vessels rammed U-boats around the
Strait of Otranto on two occasions. On 12 August 1915, the Italian Citta de Palermo followed the
wake of a torpedo at full speed. At the end of its run, the ship hit U-3's conning tower causing
moderate damage to the submerged vessel. U-3 survived the encounter and attempted to return to
Cattaro, but was destroyed in its attempt by the French destroyer Bisson. In a strange twist of
fate, the second ramming occurred on 4 December 1915 when U-65 torpedoed the SS Caledonia.
As the Caledonia was slowly sinking, the captain of the stricken vessel ordered full speed ahead
while following the torpedo's wake. U-65 was rammed and severely damaged by the sinking
vessel, but only the Caledonia sank. Lieutenant Fischel called off his patrol and returned his
damaged U-boat to Cattaro. While the Entente surface vessels faced their own problems, the
Entente faced a further setback from the anti-submarine nets they laid in the strait.
72
Marder, The War Years: To the Eve of Jutland. Vol. 2 of From The Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy
in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919, 329-332.
20
Nets laid early in the operation were set at too shallow a depth and did not descend deep
enough to stop German and Austrian U-boats. On many occasions, U-boats would pass under
nets or go above them under the cover of darkness. On only one occasion was a U-boat destroyed
as a result of the nets. On 3 May 1916, the British drifter Evening Star II disabled U-6 with her
12-pound gun after the U-boat had gotten caught in the nets. Even though the nets were generally
ineffective, the Entente laid more nets in April of 1916. Some of these new nets had antisubmarine mines attached to them to increase their effectiveness. 73 It was not until 3 August
1918 that UB-53 commanded by Lieutenant zur See Sprenger, struck one of these mines. 74 As a
result of the damage caused by this mine, Lieutenant zur See Sprenger ordered to scuttle the
submarine. 75 Even with the large number of resources that went into the Otranto Barrage,
Austrian and German submariners claimed that the Otranto Barrage was ineffective in its first
two years of operation.
Austria claimed by mid-1916 that the Otranto Barrage was not a great threat to their
submarines. Once the U-boats passed the barrage and entered the Mediterranean, there was very
little that could stop the submarines because Entente anti-submarine capabilities were largely
ineffective in the open sea. 76 Austrian submarine commander Forstmann explained that all he
had to do to pass through the Otranto Barrage was remain submerged while passing through the
barrage vessels. If he was located, he remained submerged and waited till dark to pass through
73
Messimer, Find and Destroy, 197-199, 207-208.
74
Arthur J. Marder, Victory and Aftermath: January 1918-June 1919. Vol. 5 of From The Dreadnought to Scapa
Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), 35.
75
Robert M. Grant, U-boat Hunters: Code Breakers, Divers, and the Defeat of the U-boats, 1914-1918 (Annapolis:
Naval Institute Press, 2003), 144.
76
Arthur J. Marder, 1917: Year of Crisis. Vol. 4 of From The Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the
Fisher Era, 1904-1919 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), 95.
21
the strait on the surface. This commander said the barrier of ships would have been much more
effective if the Italians and British expanded the barrage.
By the start of 1916, the Austrians pushed the Serbian Army out of Montenegro, which
gave them port facilities that were even closer to the Strait of Otranto. 77 During the Serbian
evacuation, 134,000 men and nearly 36,350 horses were transported to Corfu. The majority of
the convoys that evacuated the Serbian Army were comprised of Italian ships. 78 Italy alone
committed 81 transport ships, which made 560 crossings during the evacuation. 79 Austrian
surface ships were not used against the convoys that were part of the evacuation, but submarines
did carry out a few attacks. By the end of the evacuation, the Entente had lost eleven light
warships and eight steamers. 80 The Italians believed the Austrian Navy would move vessels from
Cattaro to Durazzo, which was further south and closer to the Mediterranean Sea. The close
proximity to the Strait of Otranto meant Austrian surface ships could even be used against the
barrage vessels. On more than one occasion, there were small surface engagements between
Austrian and Italian surface warships at the mouth of the strait. The loss of Montenegro was
another setback for the Entente Powers' anti-submarine warfare campaign in the Mediterranean
and Adriatic Seas. 81 Military setbacks and the largely ineffective Otranto Barrage caused Entente
leaders to search for a much more effective anti-submarine defense to protect shipping in the
Mediterranean.
77
Charles W. Koburger Jr., The Central Powers in the Adriatic, 1914-1918 (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2001),
58-59, 61.
78
Newbolt, History of the Great War, 120-121.
79
Royal Italian Navy (Historical Section), The Italian Navy, 33.
80
Newbolt, History of the Great War, 121.
81
Koburger, Central Powers, 58-60.
22
Before the United States joined the war, Entente Powers regularly asked the neutral
nation if it could help counter the U-boat threat. Although Woodrow Wilson and the U.S. were
angered by German's unrestricted U-boat campaign, the nation remained neutral. 82 In fact, many
Americans still had strong feelings of isolationism that endured throughout the late 19th and early
20th centuries. Most Americans simply did not want the nation to get entangled in foreign
adventures. 83 However, the rising losses to civilian shipping from the U-boats, especially the loss
of the Lusitania on 7 May 1915, pushed the U.S. closer to the Entente powers. 84 Wilson was so
disgusted by the loss of 1,198 passengers in the Lusitania sinking that he lashed out so strongly
that Germany stopped U-boat attacks on the west coast of Britain on 5 October 1915. 85 However,
Germany began to focus more attention on the U-boat after the sinking of this Cunard Liner and
it was at this point that Germany realized that U-boats were the most effective vessels in their
navy. 86 Nonetheless, the U.S. did start to increase ship building, in the event the nation joined the
war. President Wilson even claimed in a 1916 speech that the America was constructing
"incomparably the greatest navy in the world." 87 In addition, Congress and the Department of the
Navy authorized several naval ships to be built. Training of naval personnel and technological
developments became a focus of American pre-war preparations. Assistant Secretary of the Navy
Franklin D. Roosevelt believed the U.S. Navy would need to have a force of 200,000 men if the
82
Karl E. Birnbaum, Peace Moves and U-boat Warfare: A Study of Imperial Germany's Policy towards the United
States, April 18, 1916-January 9, 1917 (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1958), 328-329.
83
Geoffrey Wawro, Warfare and Society in Europe, 1792-1914 (New York: Routledge, 2000), 165-166.
84
Hough, The Great War at Sea, 174-175.
85
Geoffrey Bennett, Naval Battles of the First World War (London: B.T. Batsford Ltd, 1968), 276, 279.
86
Weir, Building the Kaiser's Navy: The Imperial Navy Office and German Industry in the von Tirpitz Era, 143.
87
Michael D. Besch, A Navy Second to None: The History of U.S. Naval Training in World War I (Westport:
Greenwood Press, 2002), 4.
23
country were to go to war. 88 During the second half of 1917, American engineers and researchers
worked on the development of anti-submarine equipment, particularly the hydrophones that were
later installed on American subchasers. The British had previously tried to use hydrophones
against submarines, but had no success. 89 By 1917, the U.S. was preparing for a war that became
increasingly inevitable.
All of this changed once the U.S. declared war on Germany on 6 April 1917. Although
the U.S. was allied with the Entente Powers, they never formally joined the Entente and were an
associate power. Thus, the Entente Powers, the United States, and other associate powers were
referred to as the Allies. 90 Admiral William Sims, later commander of American Naval Forces in
European waters, demanded that the destroyers and anti-submarine vessels should be sent
overseas as fast as possible. Winston Churchill even claimed that if the U.S. could not contribute
to the anti-submarine effort, that it would be "impossible to go on with the war." 91 The heavy
losses due to U-boats had nearly forced the island power to surrender by the time America joined
the war. 92 At this time, U-boats were sinking around 900,000 tons of Entente shipping a month
worldwide, while only 177,000 tons a month were being built. 93 A message sent by the U.S.
Navy claimed that "the Adriatic was practically an Austrian lake" because of the high number of
Austrian U-boats operating in this sea. 94 Admiral Sims later pointed out that Austrian submarines
88
Ibid, 5, 7.
89
Sims, Victory at Sea, 202-203.
90
Walter Millis. Road to War: America 1914-1917. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1935), 456-457.
91
Feuer, The U.S. Navy, 3.
92
William M. McBride, Technological Change and the United States Navy, 1865-1945 (Baltimore: The John
Hopkins University Press, 2000), 125-126.
93
Feuer, The U.S. Navy, 2-3.
94
Lawrence Sondhaus, The Naval Policy of Austria-Hungary, 1867-1918 (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press,
1994), 329.
24
originating from Cattaro were inflicting so much damage to Entente shipping that all steps
should be taken to bring this threat to an end. 95 The Entente Powers realized that without a
solution, it was only a matter of time before the U-boats would cut off their maritime supply
lines throughout the world.
Great Britain and Italy viewed America's entry into the war as an opportunity to refocus
their attention on the U-boat threat in the Mediterranean Sea. Shortly after the U.S. joined the
war, both Entente Powers requested that American ships be sent to the Mediterranean. 96 At this
time, British and Italian shipping losses in the Mediterranean due to U-boats had risen to as high
as 150,000 tons in the month of May 1917. However, the U.S. was still not at war with AustriaHungary and did not see any interest in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations. While America
initially refused to get involved in the Mediterranean, Japan sent fourteen destroyers to conduct
anti-submarine sweeps in this area. 97
Japan joined the Entente on 23 August 1914 with the intent to gain control of the German
Shantung territories in China. In the final decades of imperialism, Japan saw the war as an
opportunity to spread its Empire. Japan's main contribution to the war against the Central Powers
was the destroyers sent to the Mediterranean. 98 On several occasions, Japanese destroyers were
spending more time out in the open sea looking for submarines than British, French, and Italian
destroyers. Several British Naval Officers mentioned that the Japanese sailors manning these
destroyers were extremely dedicated to their duty. There devotion was so strong that a few
95
Coletta, Allied and American Naval Operations, 346.
96
Admiral of the Fleet Viscount Jellicoe, The Crisis of the Naval War (Freeport: Books for Libraries Press, 1920),
147, 153.
97
Still Jr., Crisis at Sea, 486-487.
98
Thomas G. Frothingham, The Naval History of the World War: Offensive Operations 1914-1915 (Freeport: Books
for Libraries Press, 1971), 126-127.
25
Japanese officers committed hara-kiri after a vessel under their protection was torpedoed and
lost. 99 These destroyers primarily acted as convoy escorts and had mixed results in this role.
In February of 1917, the Japanese destroyers began anti-submarine operations in the
Mediterranean Sea. Rear Admiral Kozo Sato was in charge of the Japanese destroyers operating
in the Mediterranean and was under orders to assist the British Royal Navy in protecting
shipping. One destroyer, IJN Sakaki, was torpedoed by the Austrian U-27 on 11 May 1917. The
destroyer did not sink, but the ship's captain and sixty-four crewmen were killed. Following the
attack, the other Japanese destroyers with the Sakaki attacked U-27 with depth charges for sixhours straight. The Japanese were unsuccessful in sinking the submarine; but its commander,
Lieutenant Robert Teufl von Fernland was so startled that he returned to the Austrian port at
Cattaro. Defenses against U-boats gradually increased as more powers slowly joined the Entente
war effort. 100
By the summer of 1917, American cruisers and U.S. Coast Guard Cutters were tasked
with protecting Entente convoys around Great Britain. These cutters were transferred over to the
U.S. Navy, were usually 190 feet in length, and armed with three small caliber deck guns. In
addition, the Department of the Navy planned to send fifteen armed yachts to protect convoys
around Gibraltar. However, most of these went to France and only two, the Yankton and Nahma,
were sent to Gibraltar in September. By December of 1917, three more yachts, a small number of
Coast Guard Cutters, and five Bainbridge-class U.S. destroyers had arrived at Gibraltar to protect
shipping. Even with this increase of force, these vessels had little success against U-boats due to
the ships' slow speed and faulty depth charges. The officer in charge of the U.S. gunboat
99
Marder, Victory and Aftermath: January 1918-June 1919. Vol. 5 of From The Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The
Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919, 36-37.
100
Messimer, Find and Destroy, 206.
26
Marietta mentioned that "one American escort was so slow that, when she dropped astern of her
convoy to "kick up a straggler," she required nineteen hours to regain her position." 101 In fact,
many of the U.S. yachts and gunboats deployed to Gibraltar were constructed for use in China.
The gunboat Nashville (PG-7) fired the first American shot of the Spanish-American War. Even
with severe limitations, these vessels were pressed into service to combat the growing threat
from Central Power U-boats. At this time, Entente focus on anti-submarine warfare was near its
peak and the convoy system started to gain more and more attention.
By September 1917, Entente convoys escorted by U.S. warships to and from North
Africa increased. A standard convoy route between Gibraltar and Algeria was established in
September under escort of American ships. Convoys on this route had great success because
Austro-Hungarian submariners were under orders not to torpedo American ships, which resulted
in them steering clear of convoys under American escort. In October, a convoy left Great Britain
for Egypt also under escort by U.S. warships. This convoy route remained in use until January
1918 when Tunisia became the new destination. American warships provided the much needed
defense for Entente convoys in the Mediterranean resulting in decreased losses. American
participation in anti-submarine duties in the Mediterranean increased drastically when the nation
declared war on Austria-Hungary on 7 December 1917. 102 Because of the convoy system, for the
first time since the start of 1917, more British cargo vessels were produced in May of 1918 than
were sunk by U-boats. 103 In addition, increased Allied anti-submarine countermeasures in the
101
Still Jr., Crisis at Sea, 488.
102
Ibid., 488-489.
103
Bennett, Naval Battles of the First World War, 285.
27
Mediterranean during 1917 resulted in 43 U-boats being sunk in the final five months of the
year. 104
By the start of 1918, British, Italian, and French military leaders discussed changes that
could be made to the Otranto Barrage to increase its effectiveness. Italian and French officials
wanted to put in place an anti-submarine net long enough to cross the Strait of Otranto. The
British on the other hand, wanted to continue using surface warships to patrol the area. To
strengthen this anti-submarine defense, British officials proposed sending light cruisers to join
the patrol operations at the strait. Until this point, destroyers were the largest Entente warships
searching for submarines at the strait. At this time, the main focus of the Otranto Barrage was
preventing Austrian and German submarines from entering the Mediterranean Sea.
Despite these desputes, Austrian and German submarines continued to enter the
Mediterranean Sea to sink British, French, and Italian supply ships. In January of 1918 alone,
Austrian submarines based at Cattaro sank 26,020 tons of shipping in the Mediterranean. In
addition to commerce losses, U-27 sank the British destroyer HMS Phoenix in May 1918. 105
While submarines continued to launch attacks against shipping, the Austrian surface fleet
remained in port and no longer carried out raids. 106 Even though the British, Italians, and French
believed improvements were made to the barrage, the U-boat threat remained present in the
Mediterranean. 107
American interest in the safety of convoys in the Mediterranean increased when
American transports began unloading troops at Marseilles, France. The arrival of American
104
Sondhaus, Navies of Europe: 1815-2002, 178.
105
Koburger, Central Powers, 99, 101.
106
Thomas G. Frothingham, The Naval History of the World War: The United States in the War 1917-1918
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1926), 257.
107
Koburger, Central Powers, 101.
28
troops in Europe caused French ports in the Atlantic to become crowded with activity, which led
to the use of the port of Marseilles, France. 108 Admiral Sims highlighted U-boat successes in the
Mediterranean and called for an increased presence of American ships in the area to protect
convoys bringing American troops to the Western Front. 109 In May 1918, Sims asked the
Department of the Navy to send three destroyers and several subchasers to the Mediterranean to
participate in the anti-submarine effort. These ships were tasked with locating and destroying
submarines, not with performing escort duties. 110 In addition, Sims headed the growing push for
action to destroy the Austrian and German U-boat bases in the Adriatic.
Between 15 and 21 May 1918, Entente and American representatives met in Rome to
discuss plans for offensive action against the U-boat ports. However, Lloyd George, Georges
Clemenceau, and Vittorio Orlando could not agree on planning for an offensive. As a result,
Sims' plans were quickly dismissed by the lack of agreement. This represented one of the lowest
points in the Mediterranean war in relations among the Allies. 111 Fortunately, a substitute for the
largely ineffective Otranto Barrage was not far off.
A solution to the problems hindering the effectiveness of the Otranto Barrage came in
June 1918, when a group of American subchasers arrived at Govino Bay in Corfu, Greece. 112 At
this time, the Royal Navy alone was losing on average thirty-four ships a month in the
Mediterranean to U-boats. 113 From 12-16 June, these subchasers conducted their first patrol on
108
Still Jr., Crisis at Sea, 491.
109
George W. Baer One Hundred Years of Sea Power: the U.S. Navy, 1890-1990 (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1994), 67-70.
110
Still Jr., Crisis at Sea, 491.
111
Coletta, Allied and American Naval Operations, 348.
112
Feuer, The U.S. Navy, 107-108.
113
Anne Cipriano Venzon, ed, The United States in the First World War: An Encyclopedia (New York: Garland
Publishing, Inc., 1995), 750.
29
the Otranto Barrage. The vessels would patrol for six days and then would be relieved by another
group of chasers. 114 Their arrival increased the number of Allied ships operating on the barrage
to 280 vessels. 115 By this time, the barrier of patrolling ships consisted of three individual lines
of defense, which worked together to increase the barrage’s effectiveness. British and Australian
destroyers composed the first, northern-most, line, which was tasked with protecting the other
two from any raiding Austrian cruisers or destroyers as well as searching for U-boats attempting
to leave the Adriatic. 116 The second line consisted of small trawlers and launches. 117 American
subchasers comprised the third line, which was the last line of defense. These subchasers had the
mission to destroy all German and Austrian submarines that managed to get past the first two
lines before they were free to enter the Mediterranean. In addition, they were tasked with
locating and destroying all submarines that tried to re-enter the Adriatic. 118 This system had its
handicaps but was the best the Allies could do to keep German and Austrian submarines
contained within the Adriatic.
114
Messimer, Find and Destroy, 201.
115
Henry Newbolt, History of the Great War: Naval Operations: Volume V (London: Longmans, Green, and Co.,
1931), 286.
116
Milholland, Splinter Fleet, 50, 109-111 and 119-120.
117
Sims, Victory at Sea, 230.
118
Milholland, Splinter Fleet, 110.
30
Figure 2. Subchasers 227 and 324 119
Historians have often described the subchaser as America’s greatest contribution to the
war against U-boats during the First World War. 120 Even with this honor, the subchaser had both
an interesting and bumpy history. The idea for a small patrol ship began in 1915 when Assistant
Secretary of the Navy, Franklin D. Roosevelt, stressed the importance of a National Navy
Reserve equipped with patrol vessels. 121 In March 1917, the General Board approved a
design for a 110-foot subchaser by designer Albert Loring Swasey. To speed up construction and
to circumvent the shortage of materials used in the construction of larger naval ships, subchasers
119
Naval Historical and Heritage Command Photo Library, S.C. 227 and S.C. 324, NH000391.
120
Theodore R. Treadwell. Splinter Fleet: The Wooden Subchasers of World War II (Annapolis: Naval institute
Press, 2000), 12.
121
Norman Friedman, U.S. Small Combatants: including PT-Boats, Subchasers, and the Brown Water Fleet
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1987), 19-21.
31
were made of wood. 122 This later became a benefit for the subchaser because their wooden hull
did not detonate German anti-shipping mines. 123 These small anti-submarine vessels began being
commissioned around December 1917. 124 By the end of World War I, a total of 448 subchasers
had been built. 125
The hydrophone was the most valuable piece of equipment aboard this small vessel that
did so much to turn the tide against the U-boat. British Professor William Bragg had previously
experimented with the hydrophone concept but had little success. 126 This device was used to
detect the sounds of a submerged submarine’s propellers, while being operated from the inside of
the subchaser when at a complete stop. The three types of hydrophones were the S.C. tubes, K
tubes, and M-B tubes; with the S.C. tubes being the most durable and easiest to use.
The S.C. tubes had two rubber pieces on the end of a reversed T pipe, which could be
placed into the water underneath the subchaser. The two small rubber pieces were hollow and
shaped like a ball that allowed a copper wire to be inserted inside. Connected to the copper tubes
were the earpieces to a regular physician’s stethoscope, which allowed the listener to hear any
noise. The listener could turn the submerged T-shaped device until the sound became steady in
the listener’s ears, which determined the direction of the sound. When the listener had a set
position on the submerged submarine, he would report the position to the subchaser’s
commander who then drew a line on the map. Since subchasers hunted in threes, he would radio
the other two chasers to exchange information, which resulted in three intersecting lines that
122
Robert Gardiner, Conway’s: All the World’s Fighting Ships 1906-1921(London: Conway Maritime Press Ltd,
1985), 132-133.
123
Robert W. Love, Jr., History of the U.S. Navy: 1775-1941 (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1992), 496.
124
Chambers Jr., United States Submarine Chasers, 6.
125
Gardiner, Conway’s, 132-133.
126
Bennett, Naval Battles of the First World War, 276.
32
would indicate the submarine’s position. At the time, this triangulation technique for locating a
submerged submarine was more effective than any other technique the British, French, or
Italians possessed. 127 The hydrophones were used to locate U-boats, but it was the chaser's
offensive weapons that dealt the fatal blow to the submarines.
Figure 3. Hydrophone 128
For its small size, the 110' subchasers were well armed for the anti-submarine role. The
main deck armament for the SC-1 class was a 3-inch/ 23-caliber gun mounted close to the
127
Millholland, Splinter Fleet, 119-122
128
Drawing by author.
33
vessel's bow. Two .30-caliber machine guns could be mounted on each side of the bridge. The
main anti-submarine weapon carried was the depth charge. Twenty-four of these charges were
usually carried by each chaser. These depth charges were set to explode at a preset depth and
were fired from a Y-gun which launched one charge to either side of the vessel. 129
Unfortunately, the small size of the vessel made the crew's life challenging on many
occasions. Compared to the exciting life aboard the spacious and grand battleships, life on board
a cramped subchaser was dull and anything but enjoyable. The entire navy looked down upon the
little vessels and never missed an opportunity to harass both the crews and the undersized
chasers, calling them splinter boats, mosquitoes, or Cinderellas. 130 At first sight, even the crews
of the subchasers laughed at the small size of the ships that were to carry them into battle.
However, it wasn’t too long until the crews realized that their anti-submarine mission was vital
to the survival of convoys as well as to the defense of the main fleet. Because the subchaser's
mission required the crew to work together, tight camaraderie grew among these men.
Subchaser crews formed strong bonds, which would prove vital once in battle. Every
crew member knew what he had to do and did it with the utmost co-operation with the rest of the
crew. As a result of the dependency on each other for survival and the success of their mission,
there was less formality between officers and the enlisted men among the subchaser crews.
Saluting was not enforced nor were there ever any dress inspections on board. The tight bonds
formed among the crewmembers later paid off, and, as a result, they saved countless Allied
merchantmen’s lives from U-boats and anti-shipping mines. Unfortunately, this friendship did
not make the living conditions on board the small vessel any better.
129
T. Garth Connelly, US 110' Subchasers in Action (Carrollton: Squadron/ Signal Publications, 2009), 4.
130
A. A. Hoehling, The Great War at Sea: A History of Naval Action 1914-18 (Westport: Greenwood Press
Publishers, 1965), 260.
34
Life on board a subchaser was exhausting and took every crew member time to master.
Poor ventilation was always a problem below decks, causing the crews to be drenched with
sweat. 131 In the Adriatic, living conditions were especially harsh, with both days and nights
being hot and often reaching well over 100 degrees during the afternoon. Because of the high
temperatures, crewmen often slept on the open deck at night and were routinely kept on general
quarters throughout the night. Eating on board a subchaser was a chore in itself. As one crew
member described, “Eating became a fine art, of the impressionistic school, to be sure plastered
all over one’s person, as it were.” 132 Among the most popular activities on the small ships were
playing poker and reading, with swimming being a rare luxury because of the threat of sharks in
the Adriatic. Subchaser officers did not permit shore liberty in Corfu, Greece, which meant the
crews could not leave their tight and cramped boats at dock. Due to the importance of the
subchaser's mission and the unsanitary conditions ashore, the crews were kept on constant alert.
There were numerous complaints among the crew because to these restrictions. 133 On many
occasions, the maintenance required to keep the subchasers running kept crewmen occupied all
day.
All maintenance performed on the subchasers was the crews' responsibility, and they
often received little help from the U.S. Navy. Much of the crews' free time was spent repairing
the wooden vessels and their power plants which broke down regularly. One officer even
mentioned, “The boats are slowly going to pieces.” 134 The subchaser tender, USS Leonidas
131
Milholland, Splinter Fleet, 15, 27, and 85.
132
Still Jr., Crisis at Sea, 500.
133
Chambers Jr., United States Submarine Chasers, 47, 51.
134
Still Jr., Crisis at Sea, 500.
35
AD-7, provided spare parts and tools, but it was up to the crews of the subchasers to make the
repairs. 135 With such a low priority on maintenance, the U.S. Navy had nearly no supplies set
aside for the small vessels.
Figure 4. Subchasers and USS Leonidas AD-7 136
As with every other unique quality of these vessels, the subchaser officers were in a
league of their own. The officers in command of the individual subchasers were generally young
men who interrupted their college education to fight the war. Captain Charles P. Nelson, USN
was in overall command of the American subchasers operating in the Mediterranean and Adriatic
Seas. 137 Nelson graduated from the United States Naval Academy in 1898 and was a career
135
Chambers Jr., United States Submarine Chasers, 27.
136
Naval Historical and Heritage Command Photo Library, USS Leonidas and Subchasers in Corfu, NH73480.
137
Sims, Victory at Sea, 207, 228.
36
Naval Officer. 138 Affectionately called "Juggy Nelson," he nonetheless demanded top
performance from his men and wanted to take the fight to the source of the U-boat threat. 139
These commanders had a rare connection with their crews, as the absence of strict regulations
among subchaser crews made it possible for them to form strong bonds with the men under their
command. 140 In addition to their youth, these commanders were all officers in the Navy Reserve
with no prior experience commanding naval vessels. 141 However, these men managed to turn the
subchaser into the most formidable anti-submarine weapon the Allies possessed during the Great
War.
The subchaser crews worked together and kept their spirits high when faced with
unbearable conditions and tense situations. The tight bonds formed among these men are a fitting
testimony to what men can do under war’s harsh realities. The small wooden vessels might not
have provided a comfortable ship experience, but they did provide an invaluable service to the
entire U.S. Navy and Entente.
By the end of World War I, 235 subchasers had crossed the Atlantic to join the Allied
war effort. 142 Interestingly, the small subchasers left the United States for Europe under their
own power, which caused one U.S. naval captain to say, "Well, may God help them." 143
Subchasers crossed the Atlantic in a protective convoy of destroyers, transports, and battleships.
On several occasions, larger capital ships depended on the subchaser for defense. One British
sailor on board a transport vessel mentioned "how happy everyone was at the sight of the little
138
Hoehling, The Great War at Sea: A History of Naval Action 1914-18, 262.
139
Sims, Victory at Sea, 207, 228.
140
Milholland, Splinter Fleet, 21 and 85.
141
Chambers Jr., United States Submarine Chasers, 9.
142
Friedman, U.S. Small Combatants, 30-32.
143
Chambers Jr., United States Submarine Chasers, 9.
37
ships." 144 The majority of the small vessels left from New London, Connecticut, to Bermuda,
resupplied at the Azores, and arrived in Europe at Gibraltar. Several crewmen commented that
Bermuda was beautiful and "the water was clean and transparent, as the British forbid even bilge
pumping in this Queen's basin." 145 The thirty chasers that were assigned to the Mediterranean
then traveled to Malta and finally Corfu, Greece. For these particular subchasers, the transit
voyage lasted two months. Although these vessels were hastily designed and built, the subchaser
quickly established a reputation as being a versatile and vital weapon. Through the baptism of
fire, the subchasers not only gained the respect of the U.S. Navy, but also the Entente Powers. 146
Figure 5. American subchasers anchored at Corfu, Greece, 1918 147
144
Stephen Howarth, To Shining Sea: A History of the United States Navy: 1775-1991 (New York: Random House,
1991), 311.
145
Chambers Jr., United States Submarine Chasers, 18.
146
Venzon, ed., The United States in the First World War, 574-575.
147
Naval Historical and Heritage Command Photo Library, Subchasers Based at Corfu, Greece, NH42570.
38
Allied shipping losses in the Mediterranean decreased with the arrival of the American
subchasers. The U.S. subchasers increased the effectiveness of the Otranto Barrage once they
began operations in 1918. They were the first vessels exclusively designed and outfitted for antisubmarine warfare. 148 By July of 1918, U-boat commanders found it very difficult to attack
Allied shipping. 149 Not only were the subchasers fully capable of destroying submarines, but
they were also successful at spreading fear and lowering the morale among Austrian and German
submariners, who knew it was always difficult to sneak past the waiting vessels. After the war, a
U-boat captain claimed that a subchaser located his submarine with listening equipment, saying
“We submerged to deep soundings, but when we put up to periscope depth again at 7:30 p.m. our
pursuers were still there and within three cables’ length of us.” 150
Even though the chasers were well suited for the anti-submarine role, constant training
was necessary to make the vessels effective. On a few occasions when the American vessels
were not patrolling the Strait of Otranto, they would head to Gallipoli to practice their submarine
hunting skills with the Italian submarine Nautilus. In addition, the enlisted crewmen were
granted their first shore liberty at Gallipoli. This training and constant dedication to duty are
what turned the subchasers into such an effective anti-submarine weapon. 151
The subchasers were so effective that German and Austrian submarine commanders
preferred to pass through the strait only when foul weather could camouflage their movement.
However, the subchasers were still able to locate submarines in rough seas. In fact, S.C. 129
crewman Carey Johnston claimed they were so skilled with the listening tubes that "the
148
Milholland, Splinter Fleet, 50, 109-111 and 119-120.
149
Werner Fürbringer, FIPS: Legendary U-boat Commander 1915-1918 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1999),
117.
150
Still Jr., Crisis at Sea, 500.
151
Chambers Jr., United States Submarine Chasers, 60.
39
difference between the sound of an oil engine, and that of an electric motor" was easily
recognizable. 152 The effectiveness of the subchasers had devastating effects on the Austrian and
German submariners towards the end of the war when many submarine officers had to get their
crews to board at gunpoint. 153 Captured Austrians claimed that this led to a mutiny among
Austrian submariners. 154
All together the Barrage commander credited British and American ships with over 150
submarine contacts and 63 sightings. As effective as this line of defense was, it failed to put an
end to the submarine threat. German and Austrian submarines still managed to sneak pass the
subchasers and drifters to continue their lethal operations against Allied shipping. 155 It was not
long before Allied leaders in the Adriatic and Mediterranean Theater realized that they would
have to take the fight to the source of the problem in order to put an end to the submarine threat.
The method the Allies used to keep German and Austrian submarines contained in the
Adriatic was likened to “stomping on individual ants.” 156 After four years of running the Otranto
Barrage, almost everyone associated with this defense realized they needed to destroy the ports
being used for submarine operations in order to end the U-boat threat. Planning among the Allies
began as to which Austrian port they should attack in order to maximize the damage. Strategists
considered the ports at Pola, Fiume, Spalato, and Durazzo; since submarines carried out missions
and received maintenance at these locations. 157 However, Durazzo had importance for the Allies'
war effort.
152
Feuer, The U.S. Navy, 107-108.
153
Halpern, The Naval War 1914-1918, 507.
154
Sims, Victory at Sea, 231
155
Still Jr., Crisis at Sea, 500.
156
Milholland, Splinter Fleet, 223.
157
Ibid, 223.
40
Durazzo had become the lifeline for the Balkans, as all supplies entering the area
originated from this location. In 1917 alone, the Austro-Hungarian Navy had shipped 960,000
tons of supplies to the port of Durazzo. 158 Removing Durazzo as an effective staging area would
successfully cut off the Balkans, forcing the Central Powers in the region to sue for peace. In
September 1918, General Franchet d’ Esperey, the Entente Commander in the Balkans,
requested naval action to destroy the port. 159 Problems immediately developed since Durazzo
was in the Italian zone and French forces would need permission from Italy to conduct
operations against the harbor.
French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau took the request to attack the port seriously
and asked the Italians to act or to let France lead the attack. With only a handful of destroyers
and support vessels, Italy was unable to carry out an affective raid against Durazzo alone. If the
Italians were to take action, they would have to ask the French for assistance, which would affect
the French convoy system and require British support from the Otranto Barrage. The Italians had
previously considered an attack on Durazzo, but did not think the risks would be worth the gains.
Seizing the moment, British Commodore Howard Kelly, commander of the British Adriatic
Naval Force, offered to support the operation by offering all forces, including the American
subchasers, under his command. This was the foundation for the Allied coalition operation
against the Austrian naval base. 160
Durazzo was the Austrian naval instillation closest to the Otranto Barrage and posed the
biggest threat to Allied shipping. In addition to putting an end to the submarine threat, the
elimination of Durazzo would open a pathway for the Entente powers to spearhead an
158
Sondhaus, The Naval Policy of Austria-Hungary, 1867-1918, 329.
159
Coletta, Allied and American Naval Operations, 350.
160
Halpern, The Naval War 1914-1918, 556-557.
41
offensive across Albania to isolate the Austrian and Bulgarian armies operating in the Santi
Quaranta and Salonika Fronts. Santi Quaranta, known as Saranda in Albanian, is located in
Southern Albania and was the name of the front where Italian and French forces fought
Bulgarian and Austro-Hungarian troops. The Salonika Front was located in Northern Greece
along the Aegean Sea. In addition, Entente forces would be able to confront Austria by going
through the Morava River Valley and then through Serbia. A course to certain victory could be
drawn out for the Entente powers, starting at this base, far from the bloody Western Front. For
these reasons, Austria made sure the port was impregnable to any attack. 161
Planning for the attack on Durazzo called for the gathering of additional intelligence on
the port. Much of this intelligence came from reconnaissance planes as well as from a deserter.
Initial information confirmed Allied commanders' worst fear: Durazzo was a very heavily
defended port as well as a key spot for distributing military supplies to the Central Powers' war
effort in the Balkans. In addition, the port was more heavily defended than previously thought.
161
Millholland, Splinter Fleet, 224-225.
42
Figure 6. Durazzo, Albania 162
Durazzo was bristling with both anti-aircraft guns and coastal defense artillery. Aerial
photographs revealed that there were six heavy artillery batteries surrounding Durazzo. In the
center of Durazzo there was one anti-aircraft battery (A) as well as one near the coast (B), both
batteries having four artillery pieces. In between these two batteries was one gun (D) thought to
be of medium caliber. Slightly to the south of these gun emplacements was a three piece antiaircraft battery (C). South of this battery and against the coast was a recently constructed
entrenched position (G) with either three or four artillery pieces. Allied analysts thought that this
162
Drawing by author.
43
position was a heavily armed shore battery. Adjacent to this battery was another (F) with four
anti-aircraft pieces. To the north of the first two mentioned batteries was the believed position of
a two piece artillery battery (E). The letters accompany Figure 7. These artillery pieces were
180mm and posed a serious threat to both attacking aircraft and ships. After assessing the coastal
defenses, the Austrian and German operations originating from the port were covered in detail.
Figure 7. Allied intelligence map of Durazzo pinpointing coastal batteries 163
163
September 2, 1918, Office of Naval Intelligence: Notes on Albanian Coast, including Durazzo: DurazzoDefenses and Outside Communications, National Archives-RG38, Entry #98, K-6-b #10777, Entry #98, Box #1011,
U.S. Naval Attaché Reports 1887-1939.
44
Equally important was a summary of the material and modes of transportation used to
keep the Austrian, German, and Balkan war effort afoot in the Balkans. The Central Powers used
a large railway system to bring supplies into Durazzo, which would also distribute supplies to the
Macedonian front. Supplies were shipped to the south of Durazzo to Segas for their troops in the
region. In addition to these rail movements, several supply warehouses were moved closer to
Segas to support operations. A repair shop that previously was at Ragosini was relocated to
Vorra, just northeast of Durazzo. Aerial reconnaissance showed that the main Central Powers
troop traffic in Albania was shifting towards San Giovanni di Medua, north of Durazzo. Reports
indicated that two torpedo boats or destroyers, along with two submarines, screened the convoys
moving these troops. The intelligence on the movement of supplies and troops from Durazzo
illustrated to the Allies the importance of this port to the Central Power naval effort.
Aerial reconnaissance made note of the presence of ships that were at anchor in Durazzo.
These reports emphasized the presence of steamers and small support ships, most likely used for
the transportation of supplies and troops. Also highlighted was that submarines, torpedo boats, or
destroyers screened the convoys leaving Durazzo. This informed the Allied commanders that
numerous warships were most likely anchored at Durazzo at any given time. However, the threat
from submarines would be the greatest to any Allied force that went to bombard the port. 164
Details of the activity originating from the port were gained from a deserter. Allied
intelligence reports indicated that two torpedo boats or destroyers, along with two submarines,
screened the convoys moving Central Power troops to the Serbian Front. Supplies were also
shipped south from the port to Segas for their troops who were in the Lower Semeni. The modes
of transportation and material used to keep the Austrian, German, and Balkan war effort alive
164
September 2, 1918, Office of Naval Intelligence: Notes on Albanian Coast, including Durazzo: Durazzo-Defenses
and Outside Communications, National Archives-RG38, Entry #98, K-6-b #10777, Entry #98, Box #1011, U.S.
Naval Attaché Reports 1887-1939.
45
were highlighted in these reports. 165 Intelligence reports clearly indicated that Durazzo was vital
to the Central Power war effort and to their submarine campaign in the Mediterranean Sea. These
intelligence reports quickly led to the planning of an operation against Durazzo.
The Allies planned for a naval and air coalition force to bombard Durazzo, which would
provide enough fire power to make sure all Central Power activity originating from this port, was
brought to a halt. Italian, British, American, and French ships would participate in the naval
operation, while Italian and British airplanes would attack the port from the air. The main
objective was to disrupt the supply line used to deliver military supplies to Bulgaria and to put an
end to U-boat operations originating from the port. In addition, military installations, such as
warehouses and anchored ships were major targets for this operation. 166 The combination of
naval and air forces in this operation was distinctive for the time.
This Allied attack plan was unique when compared to other World War I operations
because of the coordinated naval and air attack. In fact, the bombardment of Durazzo is the only
instance during the war in which warships and airplanes were used together to attack the same
target. No other operation during the war combined naval and air forces from four powers. To
insure maximum damage, the Allied ships would bombard in two separate phases on Wednesday
2 October 1918.
The Italian 3rd Division led the first phase of the attack, commanded by Italian Rear
Admiral Palladini. 167 Three Italian armored cruisers comprised the division: San Giorgio, Pisa,
165
September 2, 1918, Office of Naval Intelligence: Notes on Albanian Coast, including Durazzo: Durazzo-Defenses
and Outside Communications, National Archives-RG38, Entry #98, K-6-b #10777, Entry #98, Box #1011, U.S.
Naval Attaché Reports 1887-1939.
166
Commander in Chief of Fleet and Lower Adriatic to Commodore Commanding British Adriatic Force, 30
September 1918, Bombardment of Durazzo, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918,
Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, INC F1-4.
46
and San Marco. 168 Escorting the Italian ships were eight British destroyers, four of which were
given the task of sweeping during the duration of the bombardment, and two divisions of Italian
P.N. class torpedo boats. 169 Since these torpedo boats were constructed at the Pattison Yards in
Naples, Italy, the P.N. stands for Pattison, Naples. 170 The Italian cruisers were to bombard
Durazzo steaming from the Northwest to the Southeast. 171 All three ships were to fire high
explosive shells from a distance of 12,000 meters offshore, while steaming at 6-knots. For escort
and protection, Rear Admiral Palladini had at his disposal two Italian torpedo boat destroyers,
four coastal torpedo boats, and an assortment of subchasers. Once the ships of 3rd Division
completed their bombardment, they were to steer back towards the Italian port of Brindisi. 172
Immediately after the Italian bombardment, British cruisers would enter the port and continue the
onslaught.
A division of three British light cruisers, commanded by British Commodore Howard
Kelly, followed the Italian cruisers and composed the second phase of the bombardment. These
cruisers would shell the port after the Italian cruisers ships had finished and left the
bombardment area. The three 6-inch gun cruisers Lowestoft, Dartmouth, and Weymouth formed
167
Commodore W.A.H. Kelly to Commanding Officers of all Light Cruisers and American Subchasers, 1 October
1918, Bombardment of the Port of Durazzo, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918,
Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, INC G1.
168
Commander in Chief of Fleet and Lower Adriatic to Commodore Commanding British Adriatic Force, 30
September 1918, Bombardment of Durazzo, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918,
Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, INC F1.
169
Commodore W.A.H. Kelly to Commanding Officers of all Light Cruisers and American Subchasers, 1 October
1918, Bombardment of the Port of Durazzo, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918,
Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, INC G1.
170
Robert Gardiner, Conway’s: All the World’s Fighting Ships 1906-1921 (London: Conway Maritime Press Ltd,
1985), 273.
171
Commodore W.A.H. Kelly to Commanding Officers of all Light Cruisers and American Subchasers, 1 October
1918, Bombardment of the Port of Durazzo, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918,
Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, INC G1.
172
Commander in Chief of Fleet and Lower Adriatic to Commodore Commanding British Adriatic Force, 30
September 1918, Bombardment of Durazzo, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918,
Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, INC F1-2.
47
the main part of this division, along with the torpedo boat destroyers Tribune (No.29), Badger
(No. 49), Shark (No. 08), and Fury (No. 68) acting as screening escorts. The cruisers would fire
at a range of 10,000 meters off the shore of Durazzo. As with the Italian 3rd Division, the British
Division was instructed to bombard, while steering from the Northwest to the Southeast at 10knots. 173 Once the British cruisers had completed their task, they too were instructed to return to
Brindisi, following the route of approach.
Steaming to the north of Durazzo was the Italian 4th Division under the command of
Rear Admiral Mola, which was comprised of three scout divisions. This division was instructed
to cruise near Cattaro in order to oppose any opposing forces that might attack the Allied
bombardment force. 174 Along with the Italian ships were three cruisers and four destroyers from
the British Royal Navy, under the command of the captain of the HMS Glasgow. 175 All of these
ships were to follow the usual route to Brindisi at the conclusion of the bombardment. Several
warships and submarines were tasked with support missions to protect the bombardment force.
173
Captain Nelson to Subchasers, 1 October 1918, Memorandum for Subchasers: General Plan of Action, NARG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, INC
K4-5.
174
Commander in Chief of Fleet and Lower Adriatic to Commodore Commanding British Adriatic Force, 30
September 1918, Bombardment of Durazzo, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918,
Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, INC F2.
175
Commodore W.A.H. Kelly to Commanding Officers of all Light Cruisers and American Subchasers, 1 October
1918, Bombardment of the Port of Durazzo, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918,
Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, INC G2.
48
Figure 8. Two phase Italian and British bombardment of Durazzo 176
.
176
Commander in Chief of Fleet and Lower Adriatic, to Commodore Commanding British Adriatic Force, 30
September 1918, Bombardment of Durazzo, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918,
Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, MAP.
49
In the event that an Allied ship from the bombarding force was damaged, an assigned
rescue ship, the HMS Titan, along with a torpedo boat was on station fifteen miles from
Durazzo. These two ships were to cruise in the general area and were scheduled to return to
Brindisi at 1:30 p.m. once the bombardment had ended. On the day of the operation, all tugs and
torpedo boats in Brindisi that were seaworthy were to remain on alert starting at 8:00 a.m.
onwards. For added protection, four French, two British, and two Italian submarines would be on
patrol in the Adriatic north of Durazzo, looking for any ships that might threaten the
bombardment force. These submarines were to return to their ports early on October 3 and
continue their usual assignments. While warships prepared for the bombardment, Italian torpedo
boats from Valona would attack Durazzo the night before the attack. While naval forces
bombarded from the sea on, aircraft would bomb and strafe the Austrian port.
Italian airplanes would bomb the port early in the morning on October 2, before the naval
bombardment. Starting at 9:00 a.m. shortly after the Italian planes had commenced their aerial
attack, British aircraft would continue the aerial attack. From 12:00-12:30 p.m., airplanes flying
out of Brindisi would bomb the batteries around the Cape of Durazzo. Finally, from 12:30-1:30
p.m., additional British planes would continue the aerial assault against the same coastal
batteries. 177 Just as the Entente had depended on the American subchasers before for protection
against submarines, these reliable vessels were again requested for the attack on Durazzo.
At the request of Commodore Kelly, twelve subchasers commanded by Captain Charles
P. Nelson would participate in the raid. 178 Nelson was a strong advocate of a coalition strike
177
Commander in Chief of Fleet and Lower Adriatic to Commodore Commanding British Adriatic Force, 30
September 1918, Bombardment of Durazzo, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918,
Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, INC F2 and F3.
178
Commodore W.A.H. Kelly to Captain Nelson, 1 October 1918, Orders for American Subchasers, NA-RG45,
Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, INC H.
50
against the German and Austrian submarine ports in the Adriatic. When news of the planned
attack on Durazzo reached Nelson, he received the news with delight and told the subchaser
officers, “It’s going to be a real party, boys.” 179 Admiral Sims said “the American Navy
possessed few officers more energetic, more efficient, more lovable, or more personally
engaging than Captain Nelson.” 180 Plans called for the small boats to be used as screening
vessels for the bombardment force. 181 In the event that an Allied ship was damaged, the
subchasers would assist the stricken ship back to Brindisi, Italy. 182 Allied officers highlighted the
importance of the American role in the bombardment and stressed that the safety of the cruisers
depended on their actions. 183
As with past operations, training became the most important method of preparation. If the
raid was to have any chance of success, intense training in anti-submarine warfare and ship
screening had to take place. Training became especially important for the American subchasers
because the ships of the large bombardment force depended on them for protection against
mines, submarines, and any hostile ships that attempted to pick up steam during the shelling.
Close cooperation among the Allied forces was essential to success because the operation against
Durazzo would be a joint operation of America, Italian, French, and British forces.
Allied commanders wanted the twelve best subchasers from Govino Bay, Corfu, to attend
an anti-submarine school at an Italian submarine base at Brindisi, Italy. For ten days, the
179
Edward M. Coffman, The War to End All Wars: The American Military Experience in World War I (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1968), 117.
180
Coffman, The War to End All Wars, 116-117.
181
Commodore W.A.H. Kelly to Captain Nelson, 1 October 1918, Orders for American Subchasers, NA-RG45,
Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, INC H.
182
Commodore W.A.H. Kelly to Captain Nelson, 1 October 1918, Orders for American Subchasers, NA-RG45,
Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, INC H.
183
Captain Nelson to Subchasers, 1 October 1918, Memorandum for Subchasers: General Plan of Action, NARG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, INC
K4.
51
Americans trained and got up-to-date information on the newest submarine tactics as well as
anti-submarine operations. 184 The small ships practiced their anti-submarine tactics and skills
against an Italian submarine, which played the role of the submerged enemy submarine. This
also served as an opportunity for the young sailors to learn how to identify the specific sound of
a submarine's engine. The training proved invaluable for the subchaser crews as well as for the
success of the operation against Durazzo. 185
The twelve American subchasers that were to participate in the Allied attack on Durazzo
were divided into four units, with three chasers in each unit. These vessels were part of
Detachment 2, from the American subchaser base at Govino Bay, Corfu, Greece. The three
vessels of each unit would stay and work together, during the engagement. 186
The American subchasers were scheduled to leave Brindisi at 3:45 a.m. on the morning
of 2 October. At a point fifteen miles offshore from Cape Durazzo, the vessels would meet the
Italian ships from 3rd Division and escort them to the bombarding site at 15 knots. Before
shelling began, the subchasers would reduce speed and proceed to their individual screening
stations. While carrying out screening duties, they were to steer a zigzag course and maintain a
speed of 12 knots. If the subchasers came under attack from shore batteries, they were to steer
out of gun range. Once the Italian armored cruisers completed their attack, the subchasers would
rendezvous with the approaching British light cruisers and continue screening operations in an
identical manner. One unit of subchasers was ordered to advance north and patrol near Cape Pali,
while another unit would proceed to the south near Cape Laghi. Once the British cruisers
184
Milholland, Splinter Fleet, 199 and 212.
185
Feuer, The U.S. Navy, 111.
186
Milholland, Splinter Fleet, 303.
52
concluded their bombardment, the subchasers would join together and return to Brindisi. 187
Because planners were concerned with the safety of the cruisers and the secrecy of the
mission, some normal protocols were forbidden during the operation. Wireless transmission
among the Allied ships was strictly prohibited until the bombardment began. Only in cases of
extreme importance was the transmission of wireless messages allowed. However, wireless
communication was allowed by the flagships of the Italian and British bombardment divisions.
Under no conditions were the Allied ships to use signals in standard language throughout the
mission. 188 In addition, every man was to do his specific duty and to refrain from any
unnecessary risks.
Due to the mission's importance, Allied leaders ordered that the ships involved were not
allowed to take any needless risks because the loss of a single ship could be seen as a victory for
the Central Powers. In the event of an emergency, the commanding officer of each ship was
responsible for the destruction of all secret documents. The defense and escorting to safety of
any damaged ship was of high importance throughout the attack. 189 Well before the operation,
every ship involved in the operation was to gather at the port of Brindisi, Italy and the officers
were to begin final preparations.
At 10:00 a.m. on 30 September, the American subchasers arrived at Brindisi. Upon their
arrival, the subchaser officers received instruction on the upcoming attack of Durazzo from
187
Commodore W.A.H. Kelly to Captain Nelson, 1 October 1918, Orders for American Subchasers, NA-RG45,
Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, INC H.
188
Commander in Chief of Fleet and Lower Adriatic to Commodore Commanding British Adriatic Force, 30
September 1918, Bombardment of Durazzo, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918,
Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, INC F5.
189
Commodore W.A.H. Kelly to Commanding Officers of all Light Cruisers and American Subchasers, 1 October
1918, Bombardment of the Port of Durazzo, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918,
Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, INC G2.
53
Allied commanders. 190 Later, Captain Nelson called for all of these officers to assemble on his
flagship, S.C. 95. The twelve men remained huddled inside the boat for several hours after dark.
Nelson briefed the men on their assignments in the approaching operation and told them, “I can't
tell you where we’re going. Because we are not expected to come out. We’re a suicide fleet-slam
right through the enemy’s mine fields and smash their subs in their own harbor.” 191 Preparing for
the worst, the subchaser crews “…padded in her crew’s mattresses, which had been rigged
around the bridge and charthouse as splinter mats. The men also sanded the decks to prevent the
gun crews' bare feet from slipping in their own blood…” 192 All of the Allied ships that were to
participate in the bombardment of Durazzo arrived at the Italian port of Brindisi, Italy, by the
night of 1 October. Early on the morning of 2 October, at 1:30 a.m., the four units of subchasers
got underway. All of the chasers exited the harbor, except for S.C. 244 from Unit D, which
damaged its propeller and remained in port. 193 The eleven remaining vessels began making their
way towards the Albanian coast at 12 knots, heading for Durazzo. The subchasers spearheaded
the Allied attack by leaving several hours ahead of the main bombardment force. 194
190
Commander Subchaser Detachment Two, to Force Commander, 2 October 1918, U.S. Naval Forces Operating
in European Waters: Subchaser Detachment Two: Base Twenty Five, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, MMediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, PG-2.
191
Milholland, Splinter Fleet, 226-227.
192
Ibid., 228.
193
Commander Subchaser Detachment Two, to Force Commander, 2 October 1918, U.S. Naval Forces Operating in
European Waters: Subchaser Detachment Two: Base Twenty Five, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, MMediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, pg 2.
194
Commodore W.A.H. Kelly, to Captain Nelson, 1 October 1918, Orders for American Subchasers, NA-RG45,
Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, INC H.
54
Figure 9. Captain Nelson in white shaking hands 195
Meanwhile, at 7:30 a.m., ships forming the 3rd Division, consisting of the Italian armored
cruisers San Giorgio, Pisa, and San Marco departed Brindisi, under the command of Italian Rear
Admiral Palladini. 196 Eight British destroyers escorted the Italian cruisers. 197 These ships moved
cautiously towards Durazzo at 18 knots and planned to arrive off the coast of the port around
noon that day. 198 While the Allied ships were steaming towards their objective, Italian airplanes
began the aerial attack at sunrise, followed by British aircraft that continued the aerial offensive
195
Naval Historical and Heritage Command Photo Library, Captain Nelson, NH52757
196
Commander in Chief of Fleet and Lower Adriatic, to Commodore Commanding British Adriatic Force, 30
September 1918, Bombardment of Durazzo, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918,
Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, Inclosure F1 (sec).
197
Commodore W.A.H. Kelly, to Commanding Officers of all Light Cruisers and American Subchasers, 1 October
1918, Bombardment of the Port of Durazzo, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918,
Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, Inclosure G1.
198
Commander in Chief of Fleet and Lower Adriatic, to Commodore Commanding British Adriatic Force, 30
September 1918, Bombardment of Durazzo, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918,
Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, Inclosure F1.
55
at 9 a.m. 199 At 8:40 a.m., the subchasers arrived and held their position six miles out from
Durazzo. At this point, the small vessels waited for the arrival of the bombardment force.
Spotting the advancing Italian cruisers shortly after 9:07 a.m., the subchasers steered
towards their assigned patrol areas. At this time, the Italian force was approximately seven miles
away. Unit B headed towards and patrolled to the northeast of the Italian cruisers near Cape Pali,
while Unit D screened an area to the south of the advancing ships. Unit G screened the left,
shoreline side, while on the right; ocean side of the Italian division was Unit H. 200 The vessels
from Unit G and H screened the sides of the Italians at a distance of 1,000 yards.
Prior to starting the bombardment, the Italian armored cruisers and British screening
cruisers slowed from 18 knots down to 8. 201 At 10:00 a.m., the Italian's began shelling Durazzo,
thus beginning the naval attack on the port. 202 The Italian cruisers fired at the port at a range of
12,000 meters offshore. 203 As one subchaser crewman mentioned, “Undoubtedly we caught the
Austrians completely by surprise.” 204 Throughout the ensuing onslaught, Italian and British
aircraft bombed Durazzo. 205 At 10:08 a.m., the batteries around Durazzo began firing on
199
Commander in Chief of Fleet and Lower Adriatic, to Commodore Commanding British Adriatic Force, 30
September 1918, Bombardment of Durazzo, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918,
Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2,INC F3.
200
Commander Subchaser Detachment Two, to Force Commander, 2 October 1918, U.S. Naval Forces Operating in
European Waters: Subchaser Detachment Two: Base Twenty Five, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, MMediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, PG2-4.
201
Commodore W.A.H. Kelly, to Captain Nelson, 1 October 1918, Orders for American Subchasers, NA-RG45,
Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, INC H.
202
Captain Nelson, to Subchasers, 1 October 1918, Memorandum for Subchasers: General Plan of Action, NARG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, INC
K2.
203
Commander in Chief of Fleet and Lower Adriatic, to Commodore Commanding British Adriatic Force, 30
September 1918, Bombardment of Durazzo, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918,
Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2,INC F1.
204
Milholland, Splinter Fleet, 228.
205
Commander in Chief of Fleet and Lower Adriatic, to Commodore Commanding British Adriatic Force, 30
September 1918, Bombardment of Durazzo, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918,
Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2,INC F3-4.
56
subchasers from Unit G, Their shells fell substantially short of the patrolling subchasers. 206
Meanwhile Carey Johnston, radio operator from S.C. 129, stated, "Although their projectiles
were high and off the mark, the missiles flew overhead with a wicked shriek and a menacing
ricochet when they hit the water. I was so frightened that I had a hard time remembering the
radio code.” 207 As a result of the incoming shells, Unit G started zigzagging at 10:12 a.m. at a
speed of 12 knots, while continuing on their assigned patrol line. 208 To the north, Unit B could
already see the approaching British light cruisers. Not long after the shelling begun, all three
subchasers from Unit B spotted moving wake and two periscopes breaking the surface of the
water, the telltale signs of lurking submarines.
During the attack of Durazzo, S.C. 129 distinguished itself among the American
subchasers as the first to spot a Central Power submarine underway. 209 S.C. 129, along with the
rest of Unit B, was steering a course to the northeast in their designated patrol area, when at
10:25 a.m., S.C. 129 spotted a periscope from a submerged submarine 1,600 yards off the port
side. 210 At 10:28 a.m., S.C. 129, at the back of Unit B, quickly turned to port, falling out of
formation. 211 On board, Carey Johnston stated, “Sure enough, I could see an enemy submarine
206
Commander Subchaser Detachment Two, to Force Commander, 2 October 1918, U.S. Naval Forces Operating in
European Waters: Subchaser Detachment Two: Base Twenty Five, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, MMediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, PG3.
207
Feuer, The U.S. Navy, 113.
208
Commander Subchaser Detachment Two, to Force Commander, 2 October 1918, U.S. Naval Forces Operating in
European Waters: Subchaser Detachment Two: Base Twenty Five, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, MMediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, PG3.
209
1 October 1918 to 31 October 1918, War Diary: U.S. Naval Base Vol. 5, 2 October 1918, NA-RG45, Entry #254,
World War I War Diary: U.S. Subchasers October 1-October 31, 1918, item #711/777, PG2-3.
210
1 October 1918 to 31 October 1918, War Diary: U.S. Naval Base Vol. 5, Attack of Subchaser No. 129 on Enemy
Submarine, 2 October 1918, NA-RG45, Entry #254, World War I War Diary: U.S. Subchasers October 1-October
31, 1918, item #711/777, PG4.
211
1 October, 1918 to 31 October 1918, War Diary: Second Squadron, U.S. Submarine Chaser Detachment Two,
Attack of U.S Submarine chaser No. 215 and U.S. Submarine Chaser No. 128 on Enemy Submarine during
Operations off Durazzo, 2 October 1918, NA-RG45, Entry #254, World War I War Diary: U.S. Subchasers April
1917- March 1927, item #674/777, INC L1.
57
porpoising-alternately surfacing and diving. It was headed for the cruisers.” 212 The other two
subchasers in Unit B observed S.C. 129’s turn to port and determined that it had sighted a
submarine and was preparing to attack. 213 The crew of S.C. 129 positioned their subchaser so
that it could attack at right angles and rapidly determined that the speed of the submerged
submarine was 6 knots. The submarine was heading towards the south, getting into position to
attack the Allied force. 214 As S.C. 129 began to make its attack on the submerged submarine,
S.C. 125 and S.C. 128 from Unit B spotted another periscope, which they pursued. 215
At 10:34 a.m. when a crewmember of S.C. 129 accidentally blew a whistle, the signal to
release a depth charge, the crew released a stern dropped charge. The submarine fully submerged
after the explosion and returned to periscope depth a minute later. Not wanting to lose the
submarine again, S.C. 129 began laying a pattern of depth charges in front of the submarine at
10:36 a.m. These charges were set to detonate at a depth of fifty feet, except for the eighth
charge, which had a setting for one hundred and fifty feet. Following the release of the second
depth charge, the submarine periscope was still visible, but quickly faded. The third charge was
dropped just ahead of the submarine’s wake, while S.C. 129’s course would have delivered the
fourth directly on top of the submerged submarine. Following the release of fifth depth charge,
the subchaser had to reduce speed to five knots because of engine trouble. After the detonation of
212
Feuer, The U.S. Navy, 113-114.
213
1 October, 1918 to 31 October 1918, War Diary: Second Squadron, U.S. Submarine Chaser Detachment Two,
Attack of U.S Submarine chaser No. 215 and U.S. Submarine Chaser No. 128 on Enemy Submarine during
Operations off Durazzo, 2 October 1918, NA-RG45, Entry #254, World War I War Diary: U.S. Subchasers April
1917- March 1927, item #674/777, INC L1.
214
2 October 1918, Attack of U.S. Submarine Chaser No. 129 on Enemy Submarine during Operations off Durazzo,
2 October 1918, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M1918-October 2, INC M-1.
215
2 October 1918, Attack of U.S. Submarine Chaser No. 215 and U.S. Submarine Chaser No. 128 on Enemy
Submarine during Operations off Durazzo, 2 October 1918, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean
October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, INC M-1.
58
the seventh charge, the crew reported that objects similar to pieces of metal appeared. 216 Carey
Johnston recalled, “Over the noise of the exploding cans, I heard an excited yell from Ensign
Jacoby, ‘We got him!” 217 The crew also noted an explosion separate from those made by the
depth charges, which immediately grabbed the crew's attention.
Subsequently, S.C. 129 returned to the area it had just bombed and noticed oil and
bubbles. 218 One crewmember said, “In the midst of the floating oil, I saw a torso and head of a
U-boat sailor, encased in a life jacket.” 219 At this point, the subchaser had come to a complete
stop to note the destruction. At 10:40 a.m., a patch of white water unexpectedly rose to the ocean
surface around twenty-five yards away from the subchaser. This white water continued to rise for
twenty seconds before subsiding, while bubbles continued to rise. 220 After the attack, Johnston
stated, “We had sunk the U-boat, but also sustained damage to our chaser. The blasts from the
depth charges had severely shaken the ship and the gasoline feed to one engine was ruptured.” 221
While S.C. 129 was attacking a U-boat, the other two subchasers from Unit B also started their
own separate attack on another submarine.
216
2 October 1918, Attack of U.S. Submarine Chaser No. 129 on Enemy Submarine during Operations off Durazzo,
2 October 1918, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M1918-October 2, INC M-1.
217
Feuer, The U.S. Navy, 114.
218
2 October 1918, Attack of U.S. Submarine Chaser No. 129 on Enemy Submarine during Operations off Durazzo,
2 October 1918, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M1918-October 2, INC M-1.
219
Milholland, Splinter Fleet, 236-237.
220
2 October 1918, Attack of U.S. Submarine Chaser No. 129 on Enemy Submarine during Operations off Durazzo,
2 October 1918, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M1918-October 2, INC M-1.
221
Feuer, The U.S. Navy, 114.
59
Figure 10. S.C. 129’s attack on a U-boat during the bombardment of Durazzo 222
S.C. 215 and 128 of Unit B were heading on a course to the northeast when S.C. 129
turned out of formation. Realizing that S.C. 129 had located a submarine, S.C. 215 turned to port
to assist in the pursuit. At the same time, S.C. 215 spotted another moving periscope 750 yards
222
2 October 1918, Attack of U.S. Submarine Chaser No. 129 on Enemy Submarine during Operations off Durazzo,
2 October 1918, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M1918-October 2, INC M-2.
60
away, heading northeast. At 10:30 a.m., S.C. 215 raised the signal flag to attack and opened fire
on the submarine with the port machine gun and the 3-inch gun. The Commanding and
Executive Officer's aboard observed that the second 3-inch shot dropped two feet short of the
exposed periscope. This shell shattered the periscope and created a six foot high splash of water.
S.C. 215 fired six 3-inch shells at the submarine. As soon as S.C. 215 began the attack, S.C. 128
came alongside to join in the hunt.
S.C. 215 continued the attack by steering to port, while S.C. 128 followed and took a
position 100 yards off her starboard side. The crews of the two subchasers observed that the
submarine was turning south towards the British light cruisers. At this time, the cruisers were
two miles ahead of the submerged submarine, getting ready to turn into the bombarding area.
Both S.C. 215 and S.C. 128 approached the lurking submarine and began laying depth charges,
in forty fathoms of water. S.C. 215 released six charges from the stern, while S.C. 128 dropped
four. Both vessels also fired several charges from their Y-gun. All of the depth charges were set
to detonate at a depth of fifty feet.
The first four depth charges released from S.C. 215 left no signs of destruction.
However, when a charge launched from the starboard Y-gun exploded, the Executive Officer on
board observed an object resembling a plate come to the surface. Other debris rose to the surface
and later sank, but this was enough evidence for the Executive Officer to yell out, “That got
him!” 223 Other crewmen on S.C. 215’s deck also reported that they saw the same debris.
Following the explosion from the fourth depth charge released by S.C. 128, two machinist’s
223
1 October, 1918 to 31 October 1918, War Diary: Second Squadron, U.S. Submarine Chaser Detachment Two,
Attack of U.S Submarine chaser No. 215 and U.S. Submarine Chaser No. 128 on Enemy Submarine during
Operations off Durazzo, 2 October 1918, NA-RG45, Entry #254, World War I War Diary: U.S. Subchasers April
1917- March 1927, item #674/777, INC L1.
61
mates on board the subchaser said that a piece of wreckage rose to the surface and then quickly
sank. Shortly after, oil began rising to the surface in large quantities.
The officers of S.C. 215 and 128 determined that it was more important to search for
more submarines than to search the spot just depth charged. Following the attack on the
submarine, the two subchasers steered towards S.C. 129, which was now facing trouble from
disabled engines. 224 While heading towards the crippled subchaser, S.C. 128 sighted a third
submarine. Both S.C. 215 and S.C. 128 turned west to hunt for the recently spotted submarine,
but found no traces. S.C. 215 and 128 then headed towards S.C. 129 to offer assistant. After S.C.
129’s crew finished engine repairs, the three subchasers resumed their original screening
operations. 225 Allied officials concluded in the post-battle report that the depth charges dropped
by S.C. 215 and the fourth stern dropped charge from S.C. 128 destroyed the ominous
submarine. 226 Unit B subchasers, spotted three submarines, with two most likely being sunk. 227
224
1 October, 1918 to 31 October 1918, War Diary: Second Squadron, U.S. Submarine Chaser Detachment Two,
Attack of U.S Submarine chaser No. 215 and U.S. Submarine Chaser No. 128 on Enemy Submarine during
Operations off Durazzo, 2 October 1918, NA-RG45, Entry #254, World War I War Diary: U.S. Subchasers April
1917- March 1927, item #674/777, INC L1-2.
225
Commander Subchaser Detachment Two, to Force Commander, 2 October 1918, U.S. Naval Forces Operating in
European Waters: Subchaser Detachment Two: Base Twenty Five, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, MMediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, PG5.
226
1 October, 1918 to 31 October 1918, War Diary: Second Squadron, U.S. Submarine Chaser Detachment Two,
Attack of U.S Submarine chaser No. 215 and U.S. Submarine Chaser No. 128 on Enemy Submarine during
Operations off Durazzo, 2 October 1918, NA-RG45, Entry #254, World War I War Diary: U.S. Subchasers April
1917- March 1927, item #674/777, INC L1.
227
Report from Captain Nelson, 2 October 1918, First Report Covering the Action of the Chasers at Durazzo, NARG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #2, Area M-1918-October 2,
PG1.
62
Figure 11. S.C. 215 and 128’s attack on a U-boat during the bombardment of Durazzo 228
228
1 October, 1918 to 31 October 1918, War Diary: Second Squadron, U.S. Submarine Chaser Detachment Two,
Attack of U.S. Submarine chaser No. 215 and U.S. Submarine Chaser No. 128 on Enemy Submarine during
Operations off Durazzo, 2 October 1918, NA-RG45, Entry #254, World War I War Diary: U.S. Subchasers April
1917- March 1927, item #674/777, INC L1.
63
As the Italian ships fired at Durazzo and the British cruisers began to enter the
bombardment area, Italian torpedo boats raced into the port and attacked two destroyers and one
torpedo boat that were anchored in the harbor. These torpedo boats attacked two destroyers and a
torpedo boat. Once within range, the torpedo boats launched their torpedoes, which struck one
destroyer. 229 A subchaser crewmen recalled, “The torpedo boat nearest the Austrian destroyer
suddenly pitched to a stop and swung her bow dead amidships on the Austrian…I watched the
streaks of her eighteen-inch torpedoes dart straight for the Austrian. There was a terrific
explosion; boilers flew skyward, spinning like pinwheels, with jets of steam still spurting from
them.” 230 The damaged destroyer lost control and was quickly beached. 231
Following closely behind the Italian 3rd Division were the advancing British light cruisers
Lowestoft, Dartmouth, and Weymouth coming from the north, which soon turned into the
shelling area. British Commodore Howard Kelly commanded the British force aboard the HMS
Lowestoft.232 The British cruisers were to begin firing without delay, once the Italians were at the
final stretch of the bombarding area. At 10:51 a.m., the Italian cruisers stopped firing and exited
the harbor. 233 The screening subchasers from Unit G and H left the Italian ships to begin
229
Office of the Military Attaché, Rome-Intelligence Section, 9 October 1918, The Destruction of the Naval Base of
Durazzo by Italian and Allied Naval Forces on October 2, 1918, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, MMediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, pg 2-3.
230
Milholland, Splinter Fleet, 233. The torpedo boats were referred to as Motoscafo Armato Silurante in Italian.
231
Office of the Military Attaché, Rome-Intelligence Section, 9 October 1918, The Destruction of the Naval Base of
Durazzo by Italian and Allied Naval Forces on October 2, 1918, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, MMediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, pg 3.
232
Captain Nelson, to Subchasers, 1 October 1918, Memorandum for Subchasers: General Plan of Action, NARG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, INC
K4.
233
Commander Subchaser Detachment Two, to Force Commander, 2 October 1918, U.S. Naval Forces Operating in
European Waters: Subchaser Detachment Two: Base Twenty Five, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, MMediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, PG4.
64
escorting the British cruisers. With the Italian ships out of the area, the British cruisers began
bombarding at a distance of 10,000 meters and continued the onslaught. 234
Just as the British cruisers began entering the port, Ensign Henry R. Dann, commanding
officer on board S.C. 130, spotted an anti-shipping mine floating in the direct path of the
advancing British screening destroyers. 235 The crew of S.C. 130 noticed that the mine had
characteristics of the German Mark IV anti-shipping mine. The alerted subchaser quickly left
formation to steer towards the mine, leaving S.C. 324 and 337 to guard the right side of the
British ships. S.C. 130 fired at the mine once with the 3-inch deck gun, which struck the mine
causing it to sink. Shortly after destroying the mine, the crew spotted another floating mine 500
yards away. Without wasting time, S.C. 130 headed towards the mine and idled alongside it in
order to caution the British destroyers of the danger in the area. 236 Noticing the subchaser’s
warning, all four British destroyers changed their course, avoiding possible disaster. 237
The three British cruisers continued their shelling with great accuracy, while the
screening destroyers were also relentless in their attack of the port. The American subchasers
continued screening the British vessels as they made their way through the bombardment area. In
the midst of the shelling, a submerged submarine torpedoed HMS Weymouth. At 11:08 a.m., the
British ships stopped firing and began to head back to Brindisi, Italy. While the cruisers left, the
234
Captain Nelson, to Subchasers, 1 October 1918, Memorandum for Subchasers: General Plan of Action, NARG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, INC
K4.
235
Report from Captain Nelson, 2 October 1918, First Report Covering the Action of the Chasers at Durazzo, NARG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #2, Area M-1918-October 2,
PG1.
236
Commander Subchaser Detachment Two, to Force Commander, 2 October 1918, U.S. Naval Forces Operating in
European Waters: Subchaser Detachment Two: Base Twenty Five, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, MMediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, PG4.
237
Historical Section, 3 March 1922, United States Forces which operated; assisting and supporting Italian and
British war ships in the Bombardment of Durazzo, Albania, October 2, 1918, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, MMediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, PG3.
65
British destroyers and the subchaser from Unit G advanced closer into Durazzo and began
shelling at point blank range. 238 In addition, Italian torpedo boats raced into the harbor to inflict
further damage. 239 This continued until 11:25 a.m., when the destroyers stopped firing. 240
Reports suggest that the third enemy submarine sighted by S.C. 128 was the submarine
responsible for torpedoing the Weymouth. 241 Austria claimed that, “Lieutenant Hermann Rigele
in U-31 managed to torpedo the Weymouth, blowing off the cruiser’s stern and killing four
men.” 242 The submerged submarine launched two torpedoes at the Weymouth, with the first
missing and the second striking the cruiser. 243 The torpedo struck Weymouth in the stern, but the
ship continued bombarding and later returned to Brindisi, Italy, under its own propulsion. 244 A
number of the participating American subchasers received orders to escort Weymouth, as the
British ships began to leave the Austrian port.
Around 12:45 p.m., subchasers from Unit D, G, and H headed towards the damaged
Weymouth and began to escort the ship. Although not badly damaged, protecting the Weymouth
from marauding submarines and warships on the way back to Brindisi was vital. The escorting
238
Commander Subchaser Detachment Two, to Force Commander, 2 October 1918, U.S. Naval Forces Operating in
European Waters: Subchaser Detachment Two: Base Twenty Five, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, MMediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, PG4.
239
Force Commander, to Commander Subchaser Detachment Two, 9 October 1918, Engagement of Subchasers in
Detachment Two, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area
M-1918-October 2, PG1.
240
Commander Subchaser Detachment Two, to Force Commander, 2 October 1918, U.S. Naval Forces Operating in
European Waters: Subchaser Detachment Two: Base Twenty Five, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, MMediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, PG4.
241
Report from Captain Nelson, 2 October 1918, First Report Covering the Action of the Chasers at Durazzo, NARG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #2, Area M-1918-October 2,
PG1.
242
Halpern, The Naval War, 558.
243
Office of the Military Attaché, Rome-Intelligence Section, 9 October 1918, The Destruction of the Naval Base of
Durazzo by Italian and Allied Naval Forces on October 2, 1918, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, MMediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, PG2-3.
244
Milholland, Splinter Fleet, 238-239.
66
subchasers, along with the Weymouth, returned to Brindisi at 8:30 p.m. 245 While these three units
guided the Weymouth back to Italy, chasers from Unit B spotted an Austrian vessel moving
inside Durazzo.
Shortly after the British cruisers had finished bombarding, subchasers from Unit B
spotted the Austro-Hungarian hospital ship, Baron Call, picking up steam. 246 The Baron Call
was trying to flee Durazzo to the north. Upon spotting the hospital ship, the British destroyers
HMS Nereide and Ruby began steering to the rear of the ship. While approaching the fleeing
ship, the Unit B subchasers raised the international flag, signaling “Stop Immediately.” The
Neredie placed a party of armed sailors on board the hospital ship. Once the Baron Call was
outside the port of Durazzo, Unit B subchasers began escorting the hospital ship back to Brindisi,
Italy. Once reaching Brindisi at 12:30 a.m. on 3 October, port officials instructed the subchasers
to release the Baron Call and to tie up in port. 247
All of the eleven participating subchasers made it back to Brindisi, although they did not
return to port together. There were no casualties among the eleven small boats. 248 Every one of
the ships that took part in the attack returned to the Italian port. Six men were killed and only a
few wounded among the British and Italian bombardment force. These were the men killed on
245
Commander Subchaser Detachment Two, to Force Commander, 2 October 1918, U.S. Naval Forces Operating
in European Waters: Subchaser Detachment Two: Base Twenty Five, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, MMediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, PG3-6.
246
Report from Captain Nelson, 2 October 1918, First Report Covering the Action of the Chasers at Durazzo, NARG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #2, Area M-1918-October 2,
PG1.
247
Commander Subchaser Detachment Two, to Force Commander, 2 October 1918, U.S. Naval Forces Operating in
European Waters: Subchaser Detachment Two: Base Twenty Five, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, MMediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, PG5.
248
1 October 1918 to 31 October 1918, War Diary: U.S. Naval Base Vol. 5, Attack of Subchaser No. 129 on Enemy
Submarine, 2 October 1918, NA-RG45, Entry #254, World War I War Diary: U.S. Subchasers October 1-October
31, 1918, item #711/777, PG1-4.
67
the Weymouth, which was torpedoed by an Austrian submarine during the bombardment. 249 The
extremely low casualty figures were just one of many reasons why the Allies claimed the
operation was a major victory.
The Allies considered the bombardment of Durazzo a strategic victory. 250 Some officials
viewed the engagement as a sledge hammer being used against a fly. 251 Heavy damage inflicted
on ammo dumps, docks, shore defenses, and the town near Durazzo were reasons enough for
Allied commanders to write Durazzo off as a functional military facility. The attack had left all
of the ships at anchor in the port of Durazzo either sunk or badly damaged. Torpedoes used
against the harbor dock facilities were especially effective in inflicting serious damage to port
installations. 252 Four hours after the bombardment, British planes flew over the port and reported
that the destruction was extremely high. 253 According to Allied reports, the loss of life on shore
was also extremely high. Many viewed the victory as devastating to the Central Power’s war
effort in the region. 254 Among those celebrating were the crews of the subchasers that took part
in the engagement.
Several subchaser crewmen mentioned that the Allied naval force seemed to be more
skilled than did the defending Austrian force. The Austrian shore batteries did not achieve a
lethal hit on any of the attacking ships. So confident were the men that many mentioned that
249
Milholland, Splinter Fleet, 238-239.
250
1 October 1918 to 31 October 1918, War Diary: U.S. Naval Base Vol. 5, Attack of Subchaser No. 129 on Enemy
Submarine, 2 October 1918, NA-RG45, Entry #254, World War I War Diary: U.S. Subchasers October 1-October
31, 1918, item #711/777, PG4.
251
Halpern, The Naval War 1914-1918, 557-558.
252
1 October 1918 to 31 October 1918, War Diary: U.S. Naval Base Vol. 5, Attack of Subchaser No. 129 on Enemy
Submarine, 2 October 1918, NA-RG45, Entry #254, World War I War Diary: U.S. Subchasers October 1-October
31, 1918, item #711/777, PG4.
253
Office of the Military Attaché, Rome-Intelligence Section, 9 October 1918, The Destruction of the Naval Base of
Durazzo by Italian and Allied Naval Forces on October 2, 1918, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, MMediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, pg 3.
254
Milholland, Splinter Fleet, 238-239.
68
there seemed to be a lack of fear among the subchaser crewmen. 255 The Allies credited the
subchasers from Unit B with sinking two U-boats during the attack. 256
The actions these men displayed under fire gained the attention and respect of several
Allied leaders. In reference to the subchasers that took part in the bombardment, Commodore
Kelly, Commander of the British Adriatic Force, mentioned, “I am most gratified for the
valuable service rendered by the eleven American Chasers.” 257 Furthermore, the subchasers
distinguished themselves by successfully neutralizing Austrian anti-shipping mines around
Durazzo before the cruisers and destroyers entered the port. When the Weymouth was torpedoed,
the subchasers successfully escorted the damaged ship back to port. Most importantly, the
subchasers were successful in locating and attacking Austrian submarines within the port. If it
were not for the actions of the subchasers, the casualties among the Allied bombardment force
would have been higher and more ships would have either been damaged or sunk. The raid on
Durazzo was such a success because of the presence and actions of the eleven American
subchasers.
Allied nations commended several subchaser crewmen who were present at the attack
for their exceptional leaderships and acts of heroism. Lieutenant-Commander Bastedo received a
commendation for his leadership over Unit B, during the unit’s engagement of two submarines.
Many praised Machinist’s Mate 1st Class John Fabris from S.C. 179, for his action during the
battle, which allowed his ship to continue fighting. Fabris used his hand to hold a vital engine
piece in place throughout the battle, which result in third degree burns on his hands and arms.
255
Chambers, Jr., United States Submarine Chasers, 76.
256
Love, Jr., History of the U.S. Navy: 1775-1941, 506.
257
Historical Section, 3 March 1922, United States Forces which operated; assisting and supporting Italian and
British war ships in the Bombardment of Durazzo, Albania, October 2, 1918, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, MMediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, PG3.
69
Finally, Ensign Henry R. Dann, commander of S.C. 130, was recognized for extraordinary
heroism in guiding his subchaser next to a floating anti-shipping mine, which served as a
warning for the advancing British destroyers. All of the subchaser crewmen who participated in
the action against Durazzo received special recognition from the British and Italians. 258
Following the successful raid, Allied nations bestowed numerous decorations on Nelson.
He died in November 1935. One of his crewman remarked that devotion to him was so great that
peers actually believed that he would enter the Pantheon of “John Paul Jones, Perry, Farragut,
Dewey, in the Book of Glorious Tradition of the American Navy.” 259 All of the American
subchaser officers present at the shelling of Durazzo performed remarkably in their duties, but
Lt. Cmdr. Paul Henry Bastedo is deserving of special recognition.
Lt. Cmdr. Bastedo was second in command of the American subchasers for the
operation. 260 Bastedo was a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, class of 1908, and a career
Naval Officer. 261 During the bombardment, Lt. Cmdr. Bastedo was on board S.C. 215, part of
Unit B. 262 As a result of his courageous leadership and S.C. 215’s assist in sinking a U-boat
during the attack, the Navy awarded Lt. Cmdr. Bastedo the Distinguished Service Medal. His
later commands included the ill-fated USS Indianapolis (CA-35) from 1932-1934 and USS
Quincy (CA-39) from 1937-1939. Both of these vessels were later sunk during the Second World
258
Report from Captain Nelson, 2 October 1918, First Report Covering the Action of the Chasers at Durazzo, NARG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #2, Area M-1918-October 2,
PG1.
259
Milholland, Splinter Fleet, 240.
260
1 October 1918 to 31 October 1918, War Diary: U.S. Naval Base Vol. 5, 2 October 1918, NA-RG45, Entry
#254, World War I War Diary: U.S. Subchasers October 1-October 31, 1918, item #711/777, PG-1.
261
Rear Admiral Paul H. Bastedo, Twentieth Century Biographical Collection, Navy Dept. Library, pg 1.
262
1 October, 1918 to 31 October 1918, War Diary: Second Squadron, U.S. Submarine Chaser Detachment Two:
List of Officers on Vessels of Unit G, 2 October 1918, NA-RG45, Entry #254, World War I War Diary: U.S.
Subchasers April 1917- March 1927, item #674/777, INC N.
70
War. Bastedo retired from the Navy on 1 June 1946 as a Rear Admiral (Upper Half) and died in
1951. He was buried in Arlington National Cemetery with full military honors. 263
Figure 12. Lt. Cmdr. Bastedo (Commander in this photograph)264
As the Allies celebrated what they considered to be a highly successful mission, Austria
merely labeled the attack as a failure. Austrian reports of the bombardment tell a much different
story than that of the Allied accounts. They claimed that an Allied naval force, far greater than in
actuality, shelled Durazzo. A telegram from Vienna stated that four battleships, four cruisers, and
263
Rear Admiral Paul H. Bastedo, Twentieth Century Biographical Collection, Navy Dept. Library, 1-3.
264
Naval Historical and Heritage Command Photo Library, Lt. Cmdr. Bastedo, NH54945.
71
around 20 destroyers and torpedo boats attacked the port. Although the Austrians exaggerated
the size of the bombardment force, they greatly reduced the size of the Italian and British air
attack, stating that only 15 planes took part. Their reports also indicated that the Austrian
submarine U-31 torpedoed the British cruiser Weymouth and claimed the ship later sank because
there were only three cruisers spotted later on, instead of the assumed four. In addition, the
Austrians believed that U-31 successfully fled the area without receiving any damage from
Allied ships. 265 There was even an Austrian claim of a direct hit on a British destroyer by one of
the shore batteries around Durazzo. Austria denied Allied claims that the port was inoperable,
instead they said the damage to the port and loss of life was very light. 266 The Allied report that
American subchasers had sunk two submarines was seen as incorrect by Austrian accounts,
which asserted the subchasers did not sink any submarines during the engagement. 267 Conflicting
with the American accounts of the Austrian shore fire, Austria claimed to have fired back with
great accuracy.
Austria stated that their shore batteries fired effectively and accurately, thus causing the
Allied naval force to pull back. Austria claimed to have sunk one torpedo boat during the British
phase of the attack when in fact none were damaged or sunk. 268 In the wake of such devastation,
Austria acknowledged only minor damage to Durazzo.
Austrian accounts portrayed the Allied attack as being less effective than what the Allies
claimed. The damage listed was limited to one crippled steam ship and a small number of
265
Feuer, The U.S. Navy, 114.
266
Kolnische Zeitung, 7 October 1918, A Naval Attack on Durazzo, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, MMediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #2, Area M-1918-October 2, PG1.
267
Kolnische Zeitung, 7 October 1918, A Naval Attack on Durazzo, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, MMediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #2, Area M-1918-October 2, PG2.
268
Feuer, The U.S. Navy, 114.
72
destroyed warehouses. 269 The claim was even made that the bombardment of Durazzo was not a
crushing defeat to the Austrian Navy because the only ships anchored at Durazzo were the
destroyers Dinara and Scharfschutze, torpedo boat Tb87, steamers Graz, Herzegovina, and
Stambul, and the hospital ship Baron Call.270 These reports indicated that far less damage was
done to the port than what the Allied declared. More than likely, the Austrians exaggerated the
attack on and damage to the Weymouth in an effort to portray the Allied attack as being less
successful. Despite the different interpretations, operations in the Mediterranean and Adriatic, as
well as on the Western Front were quickly coming to an end.
The combined naval and air operation against Durazzo was the final large-scale
engagement in the Adriatic, during World War I. 271 In addition, the defense of Durazzo during
the Allied attack was the very last action for the Austro-Hungarian Navy. On 31 October 1918,
Austria-Hungary ceased to exist when Hungary severed ties with Austria. 272 A few days
following the attack, the remnants of the Serbian Army set foot ashore at Durazzo. 273 Entente
forces took control of the Austrian port on 14 October 1918. 274 The landing of the Serbian Army
at Durazzo placed a strong Entente presence at the back of the Austrian and Bulgarian troops that
were fighting on the Santi Quaranta and Salonika fronts. This action was quickly followed by the
Austro-Hungarian Armistice on 3 November 1918. 275 Although there was an Armistice with
Austria-Hungary, the German submarines trapped in the Adriatic Sea were not bound to this
269
Ibid, 114.
270
Halpern, The Naval War, 557-558.
271
Halpern, The Naval War 1914-1918, 556-558.
272
Sondhaus, The Naval Policy of Austria-Hungary, 1867-1918, 340, 349-354.
273
Milholland, Splinter Fleet, 239.
274
Frothingham, The Naval History of the World War 1917-1918, 257.
275
Milholland, Splinter Fleet, 239-241.
73
agreement. 276 On one occasion, several German U-boats left Cattaro for Germany, slipping right
past the Otranto Barrage. These U-boats managed to pass Gibraltar and later sank the British
battleship Britannia.277 However, American subchasers at Gibraltar located and sank two of the
fleeing submarines. 278 All subchasers in the Mediterranean and Adriatic continued operations
until the German Armistice.
Shortly after the Austro-Hungarian Armistice, Germany signed an armistice with the
Allied forces on 11 November 1918. Warships of several Allied powers gathered in Corfu to
celebrate the end of the war. Returning an act of camaraderie by the subchaser crewmen, French
bands played the Star-Spangled Banner, the first time the Americans had heard the tune since
leaving the United States. After this, the subchasers traveled across the Adriatic and
Mediterranean as a sign of American presence, since they were the only ships in the region
representing the United States. Some crewmen even visited with Pope Benedict XV while in
Rome. 279 By the end of hostilities in the Adriatic Sea, there were thirty-six subchasers based at
Corfu, Greece. With all the celebration and cheering over the armistice, the American crews did
not have time to think of the major importance of the attack of Durazzo for the United States.
The bombardment of Durazzo was the only naval engagement of World War I in which
American warships were present. 280 Although their contribution was small, these subchasers
undoubtedly contributed to the successful result of the bombardment. If it were not for the
presence of the subchasers, the Allied bombardment force would likely have suffered far greater
casualties. In addition, more Austrian submarines might have gotten underway if it were not for
276
Sims, Victory at Sea, 239.
277
Milholland, Splinter Fleet, 243.
278
Feuer, The U.S. Navy, 114.
279
Chambers Jr., United States Submarine Chasers, 78-89.
280
Milholland, Splinter Fleet, 239, 245, 247, 250.
74
the screening action of these vessels. Even though this engagement is easily overshadowed by
other larger naval actions, such as Jutland, the United States Navy made a key contribution to the
vital action against Durazzo. When the Allied anti-submarine campaign in the Mediterranean
climaxed on 2 October 1918, the American subchasers were there making the greatest impact.
Through the course of the First World War, the Entente Powers modified their antisubmarine efforts in the Mediterranean and Adriatic Seas to guard vital shipping from U-boats.
Each new step was an improvement over the former and trial and error became the best way of
learning how to combat the U-boats. The use of the convoy system to protect transports greatly
decreased shipping losses. However, losses still remained high throughout the war. The creation
of the Otranto Barrage was the Entente's greatest anti-submarine effort in the Mediterranean
Theater during the war. Although this line of defense hindered U-boat operations, it failed to put
an end to the submarine threat. The barrage was most effective in 1918 when the American
subchasers arrived, but even then, this defense only destroyed three U-Boats during the entire
war. 281 Central Powers' accounts claimed that seven German and Austrian U-boats were lost in
the Adriatic or Mediterranean to Allied anti-submarine defenses, however a true number has not
been determined. Out of all the kills reported by subchasers, only two have ever been
confirmed. 282 An Austrian report "showed, the Austrian high officers said, that the Germans had
lost six submarines on the Otranto Barrage in the last three months of the war." 283 Throughout
the war, Allied anti-submarine countermeasures in the Mediterranean were hindered by the lack
281
Coletta, Allied and American Naval Operations, 315.
282
Still Jr., Crisis at Sea, 493.
283
Sims, Victory at Sea, 231.
75
of a unified command. 284 Despite the Barrage, German and Austrian submarines still managed to
sneak pass the subchasers and continue their lethal menace of Allied shipping. 285
With all the efforts and improvements made in the campaign against the U-boats in the
Mediterranean, none were as effective as the Allied raid on Durazzo. This raid attacked the core
of the U-boat threat and destroyed the main port that supported most U-boat operations. After
this operation, the port quickly fell to Entente forces and U-boats were forced to use Adriatic
ports that were further north of the Mediterranean such as, Cattaro and Pola. Not only did this
raid result in a decrease in the number of U-boat operations, it also started a chain of events that
led to the Austro-Hungarian and German Armistices and ultimately to the end of the war.
The lessons learned in anti-submarine and U-boat warfare by the Entente, Americans, and
Central Powers was later applied during World War II. Unlike World War I where the Entente
lacked an effective countermeasure to U-boats for most of the war, the Allies in World War II
started to fight the submarine threat shortly after the outbreak of hostilities. Lessons learned
during the First World War were applied and in some cases, had to be relearned. As with the
First World War, heavily defended convoys were the best method for protecting shipping. The
convoy system was used much more during World War II and was accepted as the best form of
defense by the Allies. By 1945, the convoy system had evolved into a highly successful deterrent
against U-boats and even led to the creation of escort aircraft carriers, also known as Jeep
Carriers. In addition, land-based aircraft and blimps augmented the convoy system.
Countermeasures such as nets and anti-submarine mines which had little success in the First
World War were used in certain places, but were not the first line of defense. Even though
284
Arthur J. Marder, Jutland and After: May 1916-December 1916. Vol. 3 of From The Dreadnought to Scapa
Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), 277.
285
Still Jr., Crisis at Sea, 500.
76
shipping losses to U-boats were at times higher in the Second World War, anti-submarine
counter measures were much more organized and effective than they were from 1914 to 1918. 286
Although more effective anti-submarine weapons such as destroyers, aircraft, and even sonar
became the main concerns for submariners, American subchasers continued to play an important
role in World War II.
America's answer to the U-boat threat early in the Second World War was nearly the
same as the previous war and again involved heavy use of subchasers. Interestingly, a small
number of the original 110' chasers were still in active service. However, the beginning of a new
conflict started the construction of larger anti-submarine vessels designated the SC-497 class.
These vessels eventually became known as patrol craft or PC, once their missions expanded
beyond the anti-submarine role. These improved vessels were larger, fitted with the latest
equipment, and had more firepower than their predecessors. During World War II, U.S. Navy
and Coast Guard subchasers patrolled waters in every theater of the war, including the
Mediterranean. Again their contribution to the war effort was similar to that of the First World
War. The world's only surviving subchaser in its original configuration is KNM Hitra,
previously SC-718. This chaser is a veteran of World War II and is now displayed in Norway.
The legacy and successes of the 110' subchasers during World War I was carried on by the more
advanced subchasers during World War II. 287
Although the Allies applied lessons learned in World War I in combating submarines,
there is also evidence that suggests World War I and the bombardment of Durazzo left a lasting
impression on Germany. Germany's indecisiveness in the First World War on the use of U-boats
286
T. L. Francis. Submarines: Leviathans of the Deep (New York: Friedman/ Fairfax Publishers, 1997), 67-71, 7476.
287
Theodore R. Treadwell, The Wooden Subchasers of World War II, 13-20, 23, 89, 238.
77
against shipping was not repeated in World War II. Germany learned from World War I that Uboats could cut off the sea lines of communication Great Britain relied on for supplies. 288 Two
days after the start of hostilities in Poland, Germany started a full unrestricted U-boat warfare
campaign against shipping which lasted until the end of the war. As with the previous World
War, U-boats were again sent to the Mediterranean Sea. 289 U-boats had many of their early
successes in the Atlantic and at time nearly managed to isolate Great Britain from outside
communications. Unfortunately, guerre de course cannot win a war alone. In addition, the
construction of heavily protected U-boat pens, mostly along the French coast, could have
possibly been as a result of the devastation the Allied bombardment force caused to the
submarine base at Durazzo. These shelters protected U-boats from aerial bombardment on
numerous occasions and many are still intact to this day. 290
A detailed outlook on the diverse Entente and later Allied, anti-submarine effort in the
Mediterranean illustrates how countermeasures were developed through experimentation and
time. This analysis shows how the Mediterranean anti-submarine operations protected the
shipping vital to the conduct of local theater operations and to the greater war effort on the
Western Front. Most importantly, the American subchaser was the most important weapon used
against Central Power U-boats in the Mediterranean during World War I. Archival material gives
an in-depth narrative of the bombardment of Durazzo, which enhances the minimal work that has
been done on this engagement. Too small to be used in the Atlantic; the subchasers proved to be
effective and deadly in the calmer waters of the Mediterranean and Adriatic. 291 Not only did
288
Edwin P. Hoyt. The U-boat Wars (New York: Arbor House Publishing Company, 1984), 1-3.
289
Lawrence Paterson. U-boats in the Mediterranean 1941-1944 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2007), 17-19.
290
Randolph Bradham. Hitler's U-boat Fortresses (Westport: Praeger, 2003), 9-10, 19.
291
Love, Jr., History of the U.S. Navy: 1775-1941, 496.
78
these small vessels augment defenses already in place, but they helped reduce losses to the vital
shipping that kept the Allied war effort alive. 292 Although confirmed submarine kills were low in
number, the subchasers were an effective deterrent to submarines as confirmed by statements of
submarine commanders. Even though destroyers had the weapons needed for the destruction of
U-boats, they lacked the necessary hydrophones the subchasers had to locate submarines. These
small boats were the only Allied vessels of the war that were specifically developed for the antisubmarine role. Many Allied leaders were thankful for the contributions made by the subchaser
crews. In many cases the crews relished the excitement that accompanied the hunt for U-boats.
Although the subchasers were developed late in the war and had only one major engagement,
they were the forerunner of technology and tactics that would be expanded and undergo
widespread application during World War II. 293
292
Marder, Jutland and After: May 1916-December 1916. Vol. 3 of From The Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The
Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919, 276.
293
Milholland, Splinter Fleet, 307.
79
APPENDIX A
U.S. FORCES AT THE BOMBARDMENT OF DURAZZO
80
12 Submarine Chasers divided into 4 units
Unit B
Unit D
S.C. 215
S.C. 225
S.C. 128
S.C. 327
S.C. 129
S.C. 244
Unit G
S.C. 95
S.C. 179
S.C. 338
Unit H
S.C. 337
S.C. 130
S.C. 324
*S.C. 244 did not participate because of a damaged propeller blade 294
294
Ray Millholland. Splinter Fleet of the Otranto Barrage. app303).
81
APPENDIX B
CHRONOLOGY OF THE BOMBARDMENT OF DURAZZO
82
September 14, 1918
Entente Commander in the Balkans, General Franchet d’Esperey, started his assault against the
Bulgarians.
September 29, 1918
The Bulgarians are forced to an armistice as a result of General Franchet d’Esperey’s
offensive. 295
September 28, 1918
British Commodore Howard Kelly ordered Captain Charles P. Nelson, commander of subchaser
Unit-B, to have twelve subchasers ready to escort an Entente cruiser force, for the bombardment
of Durazzo. 296
September 29, 1918
7:00 pm
American Subchaser Units B, D, G, and H under the commander of Capt. Nelson, departed
Corfu, Greece and headed for Brindisi, Italy to rendezvous with the rest of the bombardment
force.
September 30, 1918
10:00 am
The four subchaser units moored up at Brindisi, Italy. 297
October 2, 1918
1:30 a.m.
Subchaser Units B, D, G, and H departed Brindisi. SC 244 from Unit D damaged her propeller
and was not able to leave Brindisi. 298
Dawn
Italian airplanes began the aerial bombardment of Durazzo. 299
295
Paul G. Halpern, The Naval War in the Mediterranean 1914-1918. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1987), 556.
296
A.B. Feuer, The U.S. Navy in World War I: Combat at Sea and in the Air. (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1999),
113.
297
Commander Subchaser Detachment Two, to Force Commander, 2 October 1918, U.S. Naval Forces Operating in
European Waters: Subchaser Detachment Two: Base Twenty Five, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, MMediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, PG2.
298
1 October 1918 to 31 October 1918, War Diary: U.S. Naval Base Vol. 5, Attack of Subchaser No. 129 on Enemy
Submarine, 2 October 1918, NA-RG45, Entry #254, World War I War Diary: U.S. Subchasers October 1-October
31, 1918, item #711/777, PG1.
299
Commander in Chief of Fleet and Lower Adriatic, to Commodore Commanding British Adriatic Force, 30
September 1918, Bombardment of Durazzo, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918,
Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, Inclosure F3.
83
7:30 a.m.
Ships from 3rd Division, which consisted of the Italian San Giorgio, Pisa, and San Marco as
well as eight British destroyers, depart Brindisi. 300
8:40 a.m.
The subchasers arrived off Durazzo and waited at a distance of six miles offshore, waiting for the
bombardment force. 301
9:00 a.m.
British airplanes arrive over Durazzo and maintain the aerial bombardment. 302
9:07 a.m.
The Italian bombardment force, with screening vessels, approached within seven miles of the
subchasers. At this time the American subchasers were ordered to head to their designated
stations. 303
9:10 a.m.
Unit B headed to the northeast to their designated bombardment are that ran to the southwest.
This course permitted Unit B to head to the north of the Italian Bombardment force, which was
beginning to enter the bombardment area.
9:55 a.m.
Unit G arrived at their designated station in the bombardment area and waited for the cruisers to
advance. 304
10:00 a.m.
The planned time for the Italian bombardment force to begin bombarding Durazzo. 305
300
Commodore W.A.H. Kelly, to Commanding Officers of all Light Cruisers and American Subchasers, 1 October
1918, Bombardment of the Port of Durazzo, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918,
Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, INC G1.
301
1 October 1918 to 31 October 1918, War Diary: U.S. Naval Base Vol. 5, Attack of Subchaser No. 129 on Enemy
Submarine, 2 October 1918, NA-RG45, Entry #254, World War I War Diary: U.S. Subchasers October 1-October
31, 1918, item #711/777, PG1.
302
Commander in Chief of Fleet and Lower Adriatic, to Commodore Commanding British Adriatic Force, 30
September 1918, Bombardment of Durazzo, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918,
Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, Inclosure F3.
303
1 October 1918 to 31 October 1918, War Diary: U.S. Naval Base Vol. 5, Attack of Subchaser No. 129 on Enemy
Submarine, 2 October 1918, NA-RG45, Entry #254, World War I War Diary: U.S. Subchasers October 1-October
31, 1918, item #711/777, PG1.
304
1 October 1918 to 31 October 1918, War Diary: U.S. Naval Base Vol. 5, Attack of Subchaser No. 129 on Enemy
Submarine, 2 October 1918, NA-RG45, Entry #254, World War I War Diary: U.S. Subchasers October 1-October
31, 1918, item #711/777, PG3-4.
305
Captain Nelson, to Subchasers, 1 October 1918, Memorandum for Subchasers: General Plan of Action, NARG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, INC
K2.
84
10:08 a.m.
Shore batteries of Durazzo started firing on Unit G. The shots fired fell significantly short of the
subchasers. 306
10:25 a.m.
S.C. 129, at the back of Unit B, spotted a submarine periscope 1600 yards off to the port, while
heading a northeastern course to their position on the patrol line. The submarine was on a direct
course to get into position to attack the Italian cruisers. 307
10:30 a.m.
The crew of S.C. 125 started firing the port machine gun and the 3-inch gun on a submerged
submarine they had spotted. 308
10:34 a.m.
The crew of S.C. 129 released a stern dropped depth charge, when a crewmember accidentally
blew a whistle (the signal to release a depth charge).
10:36 a.m.
S.C. 129 began dropping depth charges in front of the spotted submerged submarine.
10:40 a.m.
S.C. 129 spots a substantial amount of oil and bubbles around the area where the submarine had
been depth charged. 309
10:51 a.m.
The Italian cruisers stopped firing and exited the shelling area. Unit G moved to starboard and
approached the advancing British cruisers, which were approaching the area from the north.
Shortly after, the British cruisers began bombarding immediately.
11:08 a.m.
Shelling from the British cruisers stopped and the ships departed the area. Unit G along with the
British destroyers advanced towards Durazzo, while the destroyers kept firing at Durazzo.
306
Commander Subchaser Detachment Two, to Force Commander, 2 October 1918, U.S. Naval Forces Operating in
European Waters: Subchaser Detachment Two: Base Twenty Five, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, MMediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, PG3.
307
2 October 1918, Attack of U.S. Submarine Chaser No. 129 on Enemy Submarine during Operations off Durazzo,
2 October 1918, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M1918-October 2, INC M-1.
308
1 October, 1918 to 31 October 1918, War Diary: Second Squadron, U.S. Submarine Chaser Detachment Two,
Attack of U.S Submarine chaser No. 215 and U.S. Submarine Chaser No. 128 on Enemy Submarine during
Operations off Durazzo, 2 October 1918, NA-RG45, Entry #254, World War I War Diary: U.S. Subchasers April
1917- March 1927, item #674/777, INC L1.
309
2 October 1918, Attack of U.S. Submarine Chaser No. 129 on Enemy Submarine during Operations off Durazzo,
2 October 1918, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M1918-October 2, INC M-1.
85
11:17 a.m.
Unit G and the British destroyers began heading back to Brindisi. The destroyers continued
firing, with no shots coming from the shore batteries.
11:25 a.m.
British destroyers stopped firing on Durazzo. 310
1200-12:30 a.m.
Italian airplanes from Brindisi bombard the shore batteries near Cape Durazzo. 311
12:00 a.m.
Subchasers from Unit D took screening stations around the damaged HMS Weymouth.
1230-1:30 a.m.
British aircraft continue bombing shore batteries around Durazzo.
12:30 a.m.
Unit G and the destroyers altered course to 315 degrees to go assist the stricken HMS Weymouth.
12:45 a.m.
Unit G approached the starboard beam of the HMS Weymouth and was part of the force that
screened the damaged ship back to Brindisi. S.C. 95 was five hundred yards out on the starboard
side of the Weymouth. S.C. 179 and S.C. 338 following behind at 150 yard intervals. This
arrangement was maintained at 11 knots.
8:30 p.m.
Unit G arrives at Brindisi and tied up in the harbor.
October 3, 1918
12:30 a.m.
Subchaser from Unit B returned to Brindisi and moored in the harbor. 312
October 14, 1918
Durazzo is captured by Allied forces. 313
310
Commander Subchaser Detachment Two, to Force Commander, 2 October 1918, U.S. Naval Forces Operating in
European Waters: Subchaser Detachment Two: Base Twenty Five, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, MMediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, PG3.
311
Commander in Chief of Fleet and Lower Adriatic, to Commodore Commanding British Adriatic Force, 30
September 1918, Bombardment of Durazzo, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, M-Mediterranean October 2, 1918,
Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, Inclosure F4.
312
Commander Subchaser Detachment Two, to Force Commander, 2 October 1918, U.S. Naval Forces Operating in
European Waters: Subchaser Detachment Two: Base Twenty Five, NA-RG45, Area File 1911-1937, MMediterranean October 2, 1918, Box #177, Folder #3, Area M-1918-October 2, PG3-5.
313
Frothingham, The Naval History of the World War 1917-1918, 257.
86
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