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Global Caring: Rethinking the relationship between Self and Other
Introduction
Global trade, media, communication, business and travel have on the one hand
resulted in a feeling of increased proximity to others in the world while on the other
hand, because these very same global processes have intensified economic and social
disparities, the realities of people’s lives across the globe have grown ‘miles apart’.
‘Distant others’ are in fact not so distant anymore, both because of the ‘time-space
compression’ globalisation is famously associated with (see e.g. Harvey 1990) –
distances can be easily bridged through fast transport and communication- and
because our lives are increasingly interconnected with consumption patterns on the
one side of the globe having real impacts on lives on the other side. The latter
combined with the fact that the nation-state has seized to be the only significant
political actor and the sole meaningful form of community, makes it imperative to
consider the moral relationship between individuals in the Global North and the
Global South.
Global development work and global solidarity alliances of women are among the
responses to the realisation that our lives are globally intertwined and that addressing
the gross inequalities that persist in this world require a concerted effort. This paper
will investigate how these responses, which will here be treated as instances of global
citizenship and global civil society, negotiate the relationships and responsibilities
between the privileged of this globe and their distant yet not so distant others. I will
examine different articulations of the moral self-other relationship and the
contradictions and tensions that arise from this relation that is mutually
interdependent yet unequal in power. I will argue that direct or mediated encounters
with others challenge the position of the Self and that relinquishing one’s fixed
notions of Self and otherness can lead to feelings of anxiety. Furthermore, recognition
of one’s complicity in the situation and status of the Other can result in a paralysing
feeling of culpability. Hence, rather than focussing on the first obstacle or hurdle on
the road to global responsibility, namely those who claim not to care about others in
radically unequal positions, I am interested in interrogating how those who show a
commitment to global justice negotiate being intertwined in unjust and unequal power
structures. The framework of global citizenship and global civil society helps
identifying which issues are at stake and which issues need to be problematised in
justice seeking practices. As Van Rooy and Robinson indeed point out ‘the language
about civil society is, therefore, language about, and language that shapes, power
relations’ (1998:32). I will trace the recurrent themes of inclusion and exclusion,
sameness and difference/otherness and the uneasy reconciliation of these
contradicting forces in the discourse on global citizenship and global civil society.
Rather than attempting to solve the tensions in the terms, or render the terms useless
(e.g. Hutchings 2005) I would argue that these contradictions are actually productive
as these conceptual paradoxes point to paradoxes and complexities in real world
practices. The paper will conclude by exploring different approaches to otherness and
evaluating the possibility of a ‘constructive complicity’ (Spivak1990:4) that could
provide some minimal foundation for a moral imperative of responsibility for others.
Global Citizenship and Global Civil Society
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Arguably we can treat global development work, global feminism as instances of
global civil society discourse and global citizenship discourse. I will draw on both
global civil society and global citizenship discourse as these two terms are intertwined
and sometimes even overlap, in part because of a common historical development.
Sometimes ‘global civil society’ and ‘global citizenship’ are presented as the same:
‘groups that campaign for a better environment can be seen as quintessential
expressions of global civil society and world citizenship’ (Carter 2001:93). Other
times, global civil society is said to play a key part in the formation of global
citizenship (Desforges 2004). Armstrong makes this confusion very explicit by
stating: ‘There is an odd slippage in the literature, however, on the question whether
global civil society expresses the emergence of global citizenship, or in fact engineers
that emergence. Here prominent accounts of global civil society become somewhat
circular, for many defenders of GCS do see it as playing a role in creating global
citizens’ (2006:352). Carter sees ‘Amnesty as an organisation (…) as a collective
global citizen’ while at the same time he holds that Amnesty enables individuals to
act as global citizens by encouraging them to write protest letters, attend
demonstrations and gatherings (2001:83). This also means that the contradictions that
we are here interested in are both present in the term ‘global citizenship’ and also
occur in the notion of ‘global civil society’.
Some political theorists would argue that a global citizenship (e.g. Bowden 2003)
cannot exist in the absence of a global state as citizenship is intrinsically tied to being
positioned within a state. I would however follow a similar line as Beck who says
about a ‘world society’ that ‘the question of how far it exists may therefore (in
accordance with the Thomas theorem that what people believe to be real becomes real
in its consequences) be empirically turned into a question of how, and to what extent,
people and cultures around the world related to another in their differences, and to
what extent this self-perception of world society is relevant to how they behave’
(1999:10). Following Corry (2006), I interpret the word ‘global’ of global citizen in a
social or psychological rather than a physical sense, so being global in scope rather
than in actual physical contact with people from all over the globe or literally
transgressing national borders (for this physical sense, the word ‘international’ might
be more apt (see Scholte in: Corry 2006)). In this way ‘a civil society organisation
may be ‘global’ simply by the way it conceives of its constituency [and] the interests
it chooses to advance’ (Corry 2006:319 emphasis added). This also corresponds to
Franklin et al. who ‘consider the global to be an aspiration rather than an
achievement’ and who are interested in ‘the constitutive power of the global – as a
fantasy, as a set of practices, and as a context’ (2000:5). We will later see how this
global fantasy and or global practices take shape in the context of global feminism
and global development work with a gender dimension.
At the same time the language of the ‘global’ should not be used lightly without
acknowledgement of the political implications that Shiva points to: “The ‘global’ in
the dominant discourse is the political space in which a particular dominant local
seeks global control and frees itself of local, national and international restraints. The
global does not represent the universal human interest, it represents a particular local
and parochial interest which has been globalised through the scope of its reach”
(2003:231). Similarly Bauman states: “Some of us become fully and truly ‘global’;
some are fixed in their ‘locality’ – a predicament neither pleasurable or endurable in
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the world in which the ‘globals’ set the tone and compose the rules of the life game”
(1998:2).
The relationship between global citizenship and the Other involves paradoxes and
ambiguities at a number of junctures. The first ambiguity lies in the fact on the one
hand global citizenship is seen as an extension of national citizenship (see e.g. Falk
1994) and hence carries the traditional connotation associated with national
citizenship, namely that it can only exist in opposition to an Other. National
citizenship implies to be a member of an in-group that is part of a clearly delineated
area which differentiates itself from the outsiders that are excluded by these borders.
Bowden even goes as far as suggesting that since ‘something to compare and contrast
the self or one’s nation with is a basic necessity of self-awareness or self-recognition,
and therefore, consciousness’, global citizenship is impossible (2003:358). On the
other hand, the notion of ‘global’ is said to indicate that it equally applies to all
citizens of the world without excluding anyone, as Dower for example holds that ‘all
human beings are global citizens in virtue or rights and duties which we all have as
human beings’ (2002:40). Hence the notion of global citizenship is on the one hand
inscribed with the idea of exclusion (as ‘citizenship’ is dependent on others being
non-citizens of your territory) and on the other hand (as ‘global’ potentially includes
all) with a notion of inclusion. Hutchings indeed argues that ‘part of which has been
forgotten in the debate about global citizenship is the fact that citizenship has always
been a privilege, even where it is also a right, and has always been underpinned by
coercive powers (legitimate or otherwise) which exclude and limit as well as protect
and enable’ (2005:86).
This slippery path between national identity, exclusion and inclusion can be illustrated
by the statement from the ‘411 Initiative For Change’, a Canadian organisation that
seeks to promote civic participation of young people on social issues: ‘Canadian
culture inherently includes being a global citizen. Canada embraces multiculturalism,
immigration, and cross-cultural understanding’ (2007). Another illustrative example
would be the case of Britain where in 1999, the Department for International
Development (DFID) called in their White Paper ‘Building Support for Development’
for incorporating a ‘global dimension’ in the national school curriculum which would
allow children from 5-18 years to ‘understand the key global considerations that shape
their lives’ (1999:1). The language of this strategy paper reflects some of the issues of
inclusion and exclusion, and an uneasy alliance between the global and national
identified above (see Biccum 2005 for more on Britain’s development education). The
commitment to global justice is often articulated through national(ist) language both
by praising the achievements of Britain (e.g. ‘the response to the recent refugee crisis
in the Balkans is only the latest example of the depths of concern and generosity in
our country’ (1999: no page nr). Furthermore, calls for concern and responsibility are
justified by a reference to selfish motives; “Understanding of our global
interdependence, and in particular that failure to reduce global poverty levels will
have serious consequences for us all” (1999:3).
A second and further complication occurs over the idea of responsibility as
interestingly, global citizenship appears not to be a mere geographical extension of a
national citizenship, but is rather imbued with highly normative and aspirational
notions of global justice (see e.g. Falk 1994 and Oxfam 1997). Falk for example
maintains that despite the fact that the global business elite might regard themselves
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as global citizens as they are citizens of the globe rather than tied to one specific
country, they do not deserve that label as they lack a ‘global civic sense of
responsibility’ (1994:135). Yet this responsibility seems to be based on an implicit
assumption that there is an ‘elite’ of global citizens, e.g. NGO workers, development
workers, activists who care for a weaker other ‘non-global citizen’ rather than that all
are global citizens with a reciprocal responsibility. Hutchings for example puts it very
starkly: ‘the capacity to identify oneself, be recognised and act as a global citizen is
parasitic on the dramatically undemocratic and inegalitarian nature of the global order
in general, both institutionally and normatively’ (2005:97). So the responsibility of
the global citizen is articulated simultaneously through otherness and sameness; the
global citizen is responsible for others both in virtue of his or her sameness of sharing
the same globe and in virtue of his or her otherness of being in a comparatively
privileged position to be or to be able to act as a global citizen.
The discourse on global civil society, similarly, struggles to keep the different parts of
the term, ‘global’ and ‘civil society’, together. Anheier identifies the problematic
history of the word ‘civil’ as it is associated with ‘civilised’ versus ‘savage’ people’
(2001:2), something which could potentially divide the ‘global’ nature of global civil
society. Similarly, Armstrong interrogates the notion of ‘civility’ inherent in global
civil society, which can be used to exclude groups from the arena of global civil
society, whereas he believes that for global civil society to have any significant
transformative power they might need to be a bit less civil (Armstrong 2006).
Anderson and Rieff rightly warn for the danger of moral hegemony since the notion
of global civil society implies a position of representativeness and suggest that the
work of International Non-governmental Organisations (INGOs) should rather be
understood as modern missionary work, an attempt to spread a very particular set of
values, notably the universal declaration of human rights (2004). While some might
dismiss the term missionary as inappropriate as it is extremely value laden, strikingly
religious metaphors resurface time and again in literature on global citizenship and
global civil society both to denote positive and negative features. Hopgood’s analysis
of Amnesty International characterises the organisation as a church or religion (2006)
and Falk argues that the global citizen should be a ‘citizen pilgrim’ (2002:28). This
might reveal how the morality associated with global citizenship and global civil
society is still implicitly and explicitly tied to a (crusade of) Christian religious
morality. Moreover, Hopgood shows with reference to Amnesty International how the
power and the authority and hence the success and effectiveness of the organisation
depended to a significant degree on its reputation of being ‘objective’, neutral and
almost a-political while this same appearance of neutrality masked paternal, colonial
and patriarchal tendencies and suppressed dissenting voices (2006).
With the role of global civil society being conventionally perceived as playing a role
in representation of marginalised groups (see e.g. Kaldor in Baker and Chandler
2005), we need to ask the question who and which are being represented and who is
in the representative role. Chandhoke, aware of the fact that access to global civil
society is often restricted to privileged groups, asks the critical question ‘are citizens
of countries of the South and their needs represented in global civil society, or are
citizens as well as their needs constructed by practices of representation?’ (2005:362).
This brings us back to the question of exclusion and the realisation that whereas with
the exclusion inherent in national citizenship, ‘others’ might still be national citizens
in other states with the associated rights and duties, the exclusion of global
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citizenship, puts non-global citizens in the position of stateless beings without rights
and duties, ‘institutionally excluded form the high table of the global feast’ (Brah
2002:37) and at the mercy of those who come to their support. Yet at the same time
global citizenship and global civil society might need these dependent others as the
responsibility inscribed in these concepts relies on a divided world of helping and
helpless people.
Global Development Work, Global Feminism, Women NGOs
One reason to have a closer look in the discussion on the negotiation of the self and
other in relations of responsibility on justice seeking practices that have a
feminist/gender dimension is that, as Youngs mentioned, otherness is often articulated
through gender or more specifically through notions of e.g. the veiled woman (2007).
On a more abstract level, Said points to the fact that the Occident is portrayed as
‘masculine’ in contrast to the Orient, the Other of the Occident, that is constructed as
feminine (2003). So concentrating on global citizens who deal with women’s position
in the world brings out the contrast between the global citizen versus the Other more
starkly. At the same time, it emphasises a very particular kind of sameness in addition
to sharing the same globe, namely a notion of global sisterhood or at least sharing the
same gender. The second reason is that feminism has faced and is still facing a similar
critique as is expressed in relation to the work of NGOs and development
organisations, namely that they are based on predominantly Western values and
constructs. So that means that potentially imperial practices in the area of women’s
rights can on the one hand be more visible because of the combined influence of
white, western feminism and NGO/ development work, or on the other hand less
articulated as feminist theory and consequently relations with women across the globe
have been reformed and rethought.
Frankenberg indeed observes that ‘one experience of marginality [did not lead] white
women automatically towards empathy with other oppressed communities, nor [did]
participation in one kind of liberatory movement –feminism, the ‘Left’- le[a]d
automatically to anti-racism (1993:20). She emphasises how feminists had difficulties
coming to terms with their own and the movement’s racism as they thought of
themselves as ‘well-meaning individuals’ and consequently did now know how to
modify their behaviour feeling always at the risk of erring again (1993:3). Carby, in a
more cynical account, identifies a reluctance on the side of white women to
acknowledge their oppressiveness as they feel this would distract from their own
oppression as women; ‘consequently the involvement of British women in
imperialism and colonialism is repressed and the benefits that they –as whites- gained
from the oppression of black people ignored (1992:221).
The complexity of mechanisms of identification with the other (because of a shared
identity as women or as human beings) and distance and differentiation from the other
(with religion, race, culture as a barrier) makes it imperative not to reduce the analysis
of the self-other relation to a simple ‘other as inferior’ interpretation. Rather as
Bhabha repeatedly points out his analysis of colonisation, sometimes using ‘mimicry’,
then ‘fetish’ or ‘hybridity’, the coloniser has an ambivalent relation with the
colonised, one characterised by ‘conflict of pleasure/unpleasure, mastery/defence,
knowledge/disavowal, absence/presence’ (2004:75). The Other is the object both of
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‘desire and derision’ (Bhabha 2004:67). Stereotypes of the other do not reflect a
stabilised fixed image of otherness; rather stereotypes in their constant repetitiveness
are used to attempt to fix the other, who escapes easy classification (Bhabha 2004).
Moreover, closer analysis shows that stereotypes itself contradict each other and crush
the unified image of the other, as for example with the stereotype of the black man as
being aggressive and sexually active and promiscuous existing alongside the image of
the black man’s passiveness and servitude (Bhabha 2004). In the context of
development work with a gender focus women appear in the myths, slogans and
fables of the development discourse ‘as abject victims, the passive subjects of
development’s rescue, and as splendid heroines, whose unsung virtues and whose
contribution to development need to be heeded’ (Cornwall 2007:4).
The forces of stereotypes and myths should not be ignored however. The workshop
‘Gender Myths and Feminist Fables: Repositioning Gender in Development Policy
and Practice’ held in 2003 at the produced a series of papers that critically reflect on
the production and the ambivalent effects of these myths; while in positive terms they
served to draw interest to gender, in negative terms they led to an oversimplified and
depoliticised discourse (Cornwall et al. 2007). Hence, ‘the use of particular
representations of those whom development seeks to assist are worked into ‘storylines’ that come not only to frame, but also to legitimise particular kinds of
intervention and forms of knowledge’ (Cornwall et al. 2007:6).
At the same time, the Other of course ‘speaks back’ as well, both in postcolonial
literature (see i.e. Minh-ha 1991) and in (the cross-section of) feminist and
development literature (see e.g. Win 2007). Win for example problematises the
simplistic representation of women in Africa in development discourses as poor,
pregnant and uneducated and calls for an appreciation of the complexity and diversity
of African women’s lives and an engagement with African women as allies rather
than victims (2007, see also Khan 2005). She points out: ‘But of course this means the
power relations between Northerners and African women must also shift dramatically:
from seeing us as objects of charity –which those of us who are not poor or powerless
and not likely to get pregnant are not- to seeing us as agents of our own change (…)
(Win 2007:85). On the other hand, it should be acknowledged that ‘the Other’ might
also play a role in reinforcing the values that class them inferior: “Once the link
between the privileged position and certain values has been socially constructed, the
disprivileged are prompted to seek redress for their humiliation through demanding
such values for themselves- and thereby further enhancing those values’ seductive
power (…). They demand the reshuffling of the cards, not another game.” (Bauman
1993:215-216).
Mohanty similarly speaks of the construction of the an ‘average third world woman’,
who ‘leads an essentially truncated life based on her feminine gender (read: sexually
constrained) and being ‘third world’ (read: ignorant, poor, uneducated, traditionbound, domestic, family oriented, victimised, etc.)’ (1984:337). According to
Mohanty, feminist discourse exercises power through this homogenisation of the
diverse group of women in the third world. Mohanty here identifies the very
significant theme of ‘other’ as the reverse image of the self, the dependence on an
image of otherness as ‘oppressed’ in order for the self to be ‘liberated’. Mohanty
speaks about a Western feminist self-presentation and a Western feminist representation of third world women (1984:335):
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“Universal images of ‘the third world woman’ (the veiled woman, chaste virgin, etc.),
images constructed from adding the ‘third world difference’ to ‘sexual difference’ are
predicated upon (…) assumptions about Western women as secular, liberated, and
having control over their own lives. This is not to suggest that Western women are
secular liberated and have control over their own lives. I am referring to discursive
self-presentation, not necessarily material reality” (Mohanty 1984:335).
Cook, in her ethnographic research on female Western development workers in
Pakistan identifies this same dependency on a representation of Pakistani women as
oppressed for the Western women to feel autonomous (2006). However, less attention
is being given to the predicament these female development workers are facing, the
difficulties related to Self-Other relations in a situation where one is supposed to help
the other, which inherently implies power inequality, in socially legitimated resources
and/or in knowledge.
Difference, Chaos and Confusion
Bauman, drawing on Castiadoris classifies society as one ‘cover-up operation’ to hide
the underlying chaos, which appears effective in so far that whenever we are
confronted with chaos we perceive this to be a disruption in the normal structured
routine of life, an exception rather than the rule (1995). According to Bauman, in
postmodernity people are finally ready to face the chaos, the complexity hidden by the
structures and systems of our society, but I would argue that his account of
postmodernity displays some misplaced optimism and that chaos and complexity (e.g.
of othernesses) are still often suppressed, denied, ignored and when it surfaces it
throws us. One example, outside the specific global justice practices referred to
above, might illustrate this point. Zarbafian in a contribution ‘Misreading Kundera in
Tehran’ observes that when she confronts Iranian students of literature and English
with the uncensored version of a novel (Kundera’s Identity) some actually do not
want to engage with the ‘new’ parts of the texts, they are not curious, they do not
want to enter this unknown territory (2006). Describing the reading of a book as two
voices attempting to communicate with each other (the character and the reader), she
writes: “Sometimes this searching voice –in this case, the voice of the reader- is
satisfied with what he or she hears or has not choice but to feel satisfied. And this
satisfaction is aroused not by the encounter with another voice but, to some extent, by
the echo of his or her own, mistaken that of the ‘the Other’. So the dialogue that was
to shape an identity to illuminate some kind of self-awareness through an encounter
with the other turns into a monologue shaped by the translator and the censor”
(2006:72-73).
Reading a book, as a metaphor and also as a real example of engagement with
otherness, also comes back repeatedly in Spivak’s calls for a re-appreciation of the
Humanities in education as a means to teach students to engage and imagine
otherness, to decentre their own lives (see e.g. Spivak 2001). So while literary
encounters and empirical encounters with the other can unsettle stable notions of Self
and other and show the chaos involved in their relation, these encounters do not
guarantee an engagement with the complexity of the other. Taylor quotes Davis
arguing about empathy that: “We may think that when we empathize we see and feel
through the eyes of [the textual other], but in fact what we are doing is reducing their
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Otherness to what can be misrecognized as their sameness to our imagined Selves”
(2007:62).
As self and other are intertwined, with also the dominant self being dependent on (an
image of) the other, the chaos and complexity does not lie merely with the other and
with difference but is as well situated in the self; “If you can’t locate the other, how
are you to locate yourself?) (Minh-ha 1991:73). Vaux, drawing on his own
experiences as a relief worker for Oxfam, describes how being confronted with the
weakness of others makes us feel confronted with the weakness in ourselves for
which we rather punish the other than ourselves (2004). Sereny argues that before we
can understand why we might feel dislike and rejection when confronted with other
ways of lives, other ways of looking, we need to acknowledge that we have these
feelings despite soothing our conscience with the thought that we are well-meaning
individuals and free of prejudice: [p]erhaps (…) we need to remember that this
innocence is only as real as our capacity to maintain denial (2001:249). Alcoff’s
recognition of the ‘pain’ that comes with deconstructing one’s privilege is helpful in
understanding why the well-intended NGO and development workers, the feminists
seeking to form a global alliance would hesitate to confront their power position and
relation to the other: “As whites lose their psychic social status, and as processes of
positive identity construction are derailed, intense anxiety, hysteria and depression
can result” (24:1998).
Amidst this anxiety and depression on the one hand, and denial and oppressive
innocence on the other hand, Spivak expresses the hope that we may discover ‘a
constructive rather than a disabling complicity’ recognising as well that indeed ‘there
often seem no choice between excuses and accusation, the muddy stream and
mudslinging’ (1999:3-4). Her move to draw on Levinas’s morality is significant in the
sense that it breaks with the (more naïve?) cosmopolitan tradition’s concern with
justice that imagines others always as the same, as fellow human beings who have the
same needs and desires. Levinas, in contrast to this cosmopolitan tradition of others as
same and equal stresses the uniqueness of each ‘other’, its individuality (Critchley
1992, Peperzak 2005). Moreover, he conceptualizes the intrinsic relation between self
and other as the responsibility towards the other is what makes the existence or being
of the self (1992, Peperzak 2005). Minh-ha also echoes this moral demand stating that
‘the understanding of difference is a shared responsibility, which requires a minimum
willingness to reach out to the unknown’ (1987:10). This is in line with the ‘feminist
transformation’ of moral theory that Held proposes, which should think of particular
instead of general others: “The region of ‘particular other’ is a distinct domain, where
what can be seen to be artificial and problematic are the very egoistic ‘self’ and the
universal ‘all others’ of standard moral theory. In the domain of particular others, the
self if already constituted to an important degree by relations with other (…)”
(1990:338). But while Levinas describes the ethical relation with the other as a
response to alterity that should keep intact alterity rather than appropriate it as
sameness, alterity does not seem to capture the full complexity of dealing with
difference. Levinas does not distinguish between degrees of difference (socially and
historically constructed) while the problems arising in global justice seeking practices
stem not only from difference per se, but also from perceived distance from the self.
This becomes clear when Vaux describes how the response of white relief workers to
white war victims in former Yugoslavia differed from their response to black people
in Africa: “It reversed their normal sense of what humanitarianism was about, and
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forced them to as different questions about themselves and their perceptions”
(161:2004). Spivak’s commitment to empirical examples, to thinking through real
situations, and to re-evaluating the colonial past suggests that she, more than Levinas,
is attentive to the different (degrees of) alterity. Her constructive complicity, repeated
acknowledgement of our complicity as interpreted by Keenan, should not paralyse us
but instead provide a very minimal foundation for our politics, ‘(and it is precisely not
a foundation, not a stable ground, even if it is a sort of inescapable condition) for
action and politics’ (2002:194). While I concur with Spivak’s assumption that
complicity is inescapable and hence more harmful when unacknowledged, the
question remains how constructive complicities can be embodied, how a mental or
verbal acknowledgement can affect our practices and our relation to difference.
Sara de Jong
Centre for the Study of Social and Global Justice
School of Politics and IR
University of Nottingham, UK
[email protected]
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