Download Giora Hon It is undisputed that experimentation is a core procedure

Giora Hon
GENERATING EXPERIMENTAL KNOWLEDGE:
EXPERIMENTAL SYSTEM, CONCEPT FORMATION, AND THE PIVOTAL ROLE OF ERROR
It is undisputed that experimentation is a core procedure of the scientific enterprise. Indeed, it has
for decades received the attention of historians, philosophers, and sociologists of science. New
perspectives have been explored but no comprehensive account has been achieved. We propose that
the three elements which comprise what we call, “generating experimental knowledge”, namely,
“experimental systems”, “concept formation” and “the pivotal role of error”, are invariably engaged
in the process of experimenting. We observe that, generally, experimental systems constrain the
kinds of concepts that are formed in the attempt to comprehend the material setting under study,
while the process of concept formation is in turn susceptible to failures and errors arising from the
tenuous relation that holds between a certain concept and its material subject. Our proposed
approach of generating experimental knowledge is designed to provide a better understanding of
this complex epistemic structure and the associated dynamic of knowledge claims which
experiment is designed to yield.
My part in this collaborative research project with the Max Planck Institute for the History of
Science, Berlin, concerned the third and the last element that contributes to “generating
experimental knowledge”, namely, “the pivotal role of error”. Like any goal-oriented procedure,
experiment is subject to many kinds of error. They have a variety of features, depending on the
particulars of their sources. For the experimenter these pitfalls should be avoided and their effects
minimized. For the historian-philosopher of science, on the other hand, they are instructive points
for reflecting on science in general and scientific practice in particular. Often more is learned from
failure than from confirmation and successful application. That is, a failed experiment may provide
new insights; a confirming experiment may add nothing to the theoretical framework. The
identification of error, its source, its context, and its treatment shed light on both practices and
epistemic claims. Understanding an error amounts, inter alia, to uncovering the knowledge
generating features of the system involved—the very features that are the object of study of the
historian-philosopher when it comes to evolving systems in scientific practice. The experimenter’s
suspicion that “something is going wrong”, that “something is not working”, and indeed the
recognition of an error is a pivotal element in concept adjustment and ultimately in securing
stability of the design. Thus, I study how precisely the recognition of different kinds of error affects
the development and amendment of concepts in experimental practice.
SCIENCE AND INSTRUMENTS:
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EARLY TELESCOPIC OBSERVATIONS
What is the nature of scientific change? A common philosophical stance maintains that, as great as
was the influence of instrumental ingenuity at the beginning of the 17th century upon the course of
modern science, such ingenuity was not at all responsible for the way science has since then
developed. However, theories of physical science need an interface between symbolic
representations and the real world. Observations, experiments, and the technological means that
facilitate them, provide this interface. No matter how intuitively appealing and mathematically
advanced the physical theories may be, they only enter the domain of standard physical science
when confronted, tested, checked, and modified by the measure of the real world which is provided
by observations and experiments.
In 1610 Galileo introduced the telescope as a scientific instrument into astronomy. This proved
to be of significant importance for the course of modern science. One goal therefore of this study is
to document and analyze in detail the complex relations between theory and instrument. The tracing
of the origin of the theory of the telescope as it emerged in the transition from the study of
reflection to that of refraction, that is, from the study of mirrors to the study of lenses, opens up
novel perspectives on the history of optics. A second objective of this study has a wider perspective.
The introduction of the telescope posed a fundamental question to the historiography of the
development of modern science: how are we to understand an instrument—that is, a scientific
instrument—as an object that encapsulates knowledge in contradistinction to a manuscript that
exhibits knowledge in the standard way, e.g., knowledge cast in propositions?
Together with Yaakov Zik (University of Haifa), I propose to establish a new methodology: the
study of a scientific instrument as an object that bears knowledge. In contrast to the traditional view,
we “read” the instrument—in this case the telescope—as if it were a manuscript that exhibits
propositional knowledge. For example, the way an instrument was manipulated shows with
hindsight whether or not the scientist had knowledge of the functioning of the instrument. In sum,
we conduct a study of instrumental modeling and its role in scientific change.
THE CONCEPT OF SYMMETRY:
A CASE STUDY FOR THE DYNAMICS OF SCIENTIFIC CHANGE
A prominent feature of philosophy of science in the last century, beginning with the forceful views
of the logical positivists, has been the attempts at rational reconstructions of scientific theories. This
feature may be characterized as a cluster of problems whose solution—so the belief went—would
offer answers to questions such as, how does science progress? and specifically, how does one
theory emerge from another? Clearly, the growth of science became at the time an issue of much
philosophical concern. In view of the dramatic, indeed revolutionary changes in scientific theories
on the one hand, and the exponential growth of science on the other, it became urgent to understand
this cumulative nature of scientific knowledge which, in an apparent paradox, is based on change—
often of a radical kind. Put bluntly, previous theories are declared inadequate or outright false, and
yet science is cumulative. Is it then the case that science accumulates knowledge of dubious value,
knowledge that has been refuted? To approach scientific activity from this perspective is, however,
absurd (despite attempts to the contrary). So what actually accumulates? What, then, is the nature of
this change? What drives it and on what is it based? Most importantly, can we grasp the change, this
transition from one theory to the other, in rational terms? Convincing answers to this set of
questions will undoubtedly increase our understanding of the nature of science and the paradox of
its growth.
Together with Bernard R. Goldstein (University of Pittsburgh), I have published a series of
papers that focuses on the use of symmetry in scientific contexts. We consider the evolution of this
concept throughout the ages a rich case for the study of scientific change and its dynamics. We do
not take the common approach of examining the evolution (and revolution) of scientific theories;
rather, we have found it insightful to address a concept—symmetry. After all, concepts are of
necessity more fundamental than theories; they constitute vital elements for constructing theories.
We study then the dynamics of change in scientific knowledge from the perspective of a concept
and not from the point of view of a theory. Symmetry is inherent to modern science, especially to
physics, and its evolution has a complex history that richly exemplifies the dynamics of scientific
change. The move to look afresh at the evidence concerning usages of symmetry on the basis of a
coherent methodology which explicitly seeks to avoid anachronism, has proved to be productive. In
this research project history of science plays a central role in anchoring firmly philosophical claims
about the dynamics of scientific change.
Johannes Kepler’s “reformation of all of astronomy” (1609):
The Role of Optics and Observations
The year 2009 marks the 400th anniversary of the publication of one of the most revolutionary
scientific texts ever written, Johannes Kepler’s Astronomia nova (1609). In it Kepler (1571–1630)
developed an astronomical theory that departs fundamentally from the systems of Ptolemy and
Copernicus, hence its distinctly appropriate title. One of the great innovations of this theory is its
explicit dependence on the science of optics. The declared goal of Kepler in his earlier publication,
Paralipomena to Witelo whereby The Optical Part of Astronomy is Treated (1604), was to solve
difficulties and expose deceptive visual illusions which astronomers face when conducting
astronomical observations with optical instruments.
Recent studies have been mainly concerned with three of Kepler’s major works—Mysterium
cosmographicum (1596), Astronomia nova, and Harmonices mundi (1619)—and considered
conceptual, theological, metaphysical, epistemological, methodological, and rhetorical aspects of
Kepler’s astronomical works. Against this rich background, we contend that (1) understanding
Kepler’s astronomical achievements takes more than seeking comprehension of his archetypal
principles and concerns for Aristotelian philosophy, Neo-Platonism, mathematics, mechanics,
and insights regarding a new synthesis of natural philosophy and mathematics; and that (2)
Kepler’s observational astronomy constitutes a complex practice that calls for a thorough
analysis.
A comprehensive grasp of Kepler’s astonishing achievements requires extending the
traditional approach to his writings and to study Kepler not only as a mathematico-physical
astronomer, but also as a designer of instruments and a practicing observer. We seek new
perspectives on the interdependence of optics and astronomy by tracing the origin of the theory
of optical instruments in Kepler’s astronomical works. We expect our research to arrive at
significant new insights into the interfaces among instrument, symbolic representation, and the
perception of the outside world. We will follow a novel methodology which, we hope, will result
in a substantial contribution to the understanding of scientific change.
Roger Bacon (1214–1294) and the Making of the Concept of Law of Nature
Ever since the seventeenth century “laws of nature” has become an essential element in the
conceptual vocabulary of modern science. Historians and philosophers of science regard the
concept constitutive of the structure and premises of early modern science, yet the questions of its
origin and development are still moot. Current literature makes three claims concerning its source:
Cartesianism, medieval voluntarism and medieval mathematics. A fourth claim considers the source
to be a combination of traditions and includes several lines of developments.
Studies of this concept had taken thus far a top-down approach. Taking the seventeenth
century as the point of departure, these studies characterize the concept as used by one or several
thinkers of the period and then proceed to look for the ancient or medieval antecedents. Such
approaches are prone to anachronism. Our study takes a different approach, namely, it analyzes
the concept as it appears in the writings of one medieval scholar, Roger Bacon. By developing a
thorough analysis, an adequate comparison between the medieval and the early modern concepts
can be maintained. The methodology that facilitates such a coherent account depends in large
measure on an essential distinction between the analyst and the actor. In historical writing on
scientific matters the analyst is the modern author and the actor is the scientist under
consideration.
It is the objective of this study to examine in details Roger Bacon’s corpus and offer a
comprehensive picture of the place and function of “laws of nature” in his general scientific
program. The comprehensive picture we aim to achieve will link Bacon’s account of efficient cause,
called the theory of “multiplication of species”, with his notion of physical and mathematical laws,
a link that has never been sought for in current research.
The historical continuity of Roger Bacon’s concept of laws of nature will be examined over two
parallel lines of development. The first deals with the distinction between universal and particular
laws beginning with Bacon himself, then through Pierre D’ailly’s Imago mundi and Francis Bacon’s
Novum Organon, to Boyle’s terminology of fundamental and general laws of nature, opposed to
“municipal laws” or “customs of nature”. The second line of development concerns the formulation
of mathematical-physical laws, beginning, again, with Roger Bacon then moving on to Peckham
and Maurolico’s Photismi de lumine et umbra where he cites Bacon and Peckham and uses the term
“lex” with reference to several optical phenomena.
Our research will consolidate insights into the move towards physical explanations in terms of
efficient cause and its link to the quantification of matter in the form of law of nature. The project
will thus make a significant contribution to some of the most pressing issues in the history and
philosophy of early modern science.