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E IKE M ARK R INKE & J ULIA LÜCK
Cognitive Style, Selectivity, and Reinforcement: Toward
Clarifying the Role of Political Ideology in the Reception of
Political Communication
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If political communication does not entail uniform effects, what is it really that
conditions the consequences of political messages for their recipients? Communication researchers have asked this question for a long time and »political
predispositions« has been a popular answer for nearly as long. It dates back at
least to Lazarsfeld et al.’s familiar »People’s Choice« study (1944) and Hyman
and Sheatsley’s (1947) statements that »people seek information congenial to
their attitudes« (p. 417) and »people will interpret … information in different
ways, according to their prior attitudes« (p. 418). These phenomena have later
been referred to as selective exposure and selective perception (Klapper, 1960).
For various reasons, there has been a resurging interest in scholarship on
partisan selectivity in political communication of late. The purpose of this
paper is to contribute to this line of research by envisaging an integration of
concepts, theories and methodological instruments from the »motivated social
cognition approach« (Jost et al., 2003) in political psychology. We take the first
steps of this integrative enterprise: First, we outline the relevance of motivated
selectivity research in the context of ongoing minimal effects debates. After
that, we present readers with the current scope of research in the field of
selective exposure and perception. Finally, we sketch a novel approach to
research on political partisan selectivities in political communication, one that
should pave the way for a better understanding of the nature of such selectivities and, by extension, of the different patterns of media effects as they occur
along lines of ideological difference.
1
»Minimal Effects«: The Resurgence of a Familiar Paradigm
In a recent article, Bennett and Iyengar (2008) suggest that today we are facing
»a new era of minimal effects« referring back to a notion developed in 1940s
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and early 1950s media effects research. Lazarsfeld and his colleagues (1944)
proposed a substitution of the commonsensical paradigm of strong media
effects with a model of »limited effects« and Klapper (1960) maintained that if
there are any media effects at all they would be highly conditional and depending on predispositions of the audience – thus, what media can do is reinforce
existing attitudes and opinions rather than change them. According to Bennett
and Iyengar (2008) as well as Stroud (2008), the major difference between the
historical situations in the 1940s and the beginning twentieth century is that in
the mid-twentieth century social networks (e.g., churches and parties) exerted
a stronger influence on the individual predispositions of citizens compared to
today’s situation in which ties to such networks have become looser, more
flexible, and more temporary. At the same time, opportunities to primarily
attend to information that fits existing beliefs have grown due to greater choice
of media options. These complementary developments have led to a resurgent
interest of scholars in the minimal effects paradigm. In light of these developments Bennett and Iyengar (2008: 724) conclude: »As media audiences devolve
into smaller, like-minded subsets of electorates, it becomes less likely that
media messages will do any other than reinforce prior predispositions« This
view suggests that sweeping effects of political communication are highly
unlikely. But, as Iyengar and Simon (2000) suggest, this does in no way entail
that »effects« should be discarded completely. Rather, what we are confronted
with is an increasing need to properly conceptualize media effects in order to
better understand them. They propose what they call a »resonance model« of
political communication effects. Such a model is meant to account for interactions between features of content or sources of political communication and
audience characteristics in the emergence of political communication effects.
Underlying this model is the recognition that even if voters might not be
persuaded by any particular political message this does not mean that it has no
effect at all. As has been shown by Holbert (2005), for example, viewing
debates between US presidential candidates tends to reinforce voting decisions
of Democrats and Republicans rather than to reverse them. However, the
reinforcement hypothesis has not gone uncriticized. An illustrative case in
point is a study conducted by Chaffee and Miyo (1983), who tested the hypothesis in a panel study of adolescents and their parents concluding that
reinforcement based on political partisanship only occurs under specific
circumstances (e.g., among people with less political experience) – which led
them to reject a straightforward generalization of the hypothesis. However,
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Selective Exposure and Perception: Mechanisms of Partisan
Reinforcement
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enormous social and technological change has occurred since the 1980s which
seems to warrant a reconsideration of the claims associated with the minimal
effects paradigm.
A common denominator of early minimal effect theories and their today
equivalents is the assumption that people choose and perceive media information according to their existing predispositions. As was noted above, the two
most prominent mechanisms which work to produce minimal effects understood as »reinforcement effects« have been those of selective exposure to and
selective perception of messages received through mediated communication.
Understanding the nature of minimal effects assumptions thus necessitates an
understanding of selectivity in media exposure and perception. We will provide a brief review of important milestones in selective exposure and perception research in the following section1, before we propose to draw on the
»motivated social cognition« model of ideology from political psychology as a
new direction in research on reinforcement effects in political communication.
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Selective exposure research has tried to clarify whether, why, how and under
which conditions media users tend to selectively expose themselves to media
information. Despite the age of the concept, the very concept of selective
exposure is still disputed in academic debate (Stroud, 2008; Smith, Fabrigar, &
Norris, 2008). The task before us here is to present the evidence for an assumption of widespread contemporary selective exposure and contrast it with
evidence for the alternative rival hypothesis that giving people access to more
and more information leads to them being confronted with diverse opinions
and worldviews as well as being more informed and open-minded. To this end,
our first step will be to explain the concept of selective exposure before giving
a brief review of traditional as well as more recent research in this field.
One of the first theories where selective exposure was a central approach to
explain how people choose information was Festinger’s »Theory of Cognitive
Dissonance« (1957). This work has been a frequent subject of academic
disputes, with some arguing for its validity (e.g., D’Alessio & Allen, 2002) and
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1
For a more extended recent review of selective exposure research, see Smith, Fabrigar, & Norris
(2008).
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others arguing against its empirical evidence (e.g., Donsbach, 1991). Notwithstanding these disputes, its heavy influence on selective exposure research is
beyond question. Festinger argued that an urge to avoid cognitive dissonance
is a universal human trait and that there is a universal need for cognitive
closure in humans. This means that people avoid information that is inconsistent to the existing opinions and more or less ignore information that does not
fit into their own worldview. Consequently, in his view, selective exposure is a
key strategic action to reduce intraindividual dissonance.
A decade later, Sears and Freedman (1967) published a widely regarded
overview of then-available selective exposure research, in an attempt to rectify
conceptual inconsistencies and clarify the empirical evidence available at the
time. One of their major conclusions was that rather than looking for selectivity in exposure to attitude-inconsistent information it might be more useful to
investigate partisan selectivity in the perception (in their words: evaluation) of
such information. In the conceptual part of their exposition, they distinguish
three different definitions of selective exposure. These distinctions are still
important to bear in mind when dealing with this concept. The first notion of
selective exposure they identified was as »[a]ny systematic bias in audience
composition« (Sears & Freedman, 1967: 195). Here, selective exposure is said
to occur whenever the audience of a program includes a particular group of
people more often than expected by chance. The second understanding of
selective exposure refers to it as »unusual agreement about a matter of opinion« (ibid.: 196). This second understanding actually represents an extension
of the first in that it also refers to a merely descriptive account of an imbalance
in an audience to communication content, only with an explicit focus on
imbalances with regard to audience attitudes towards the objects of the messages received. Both approaches to selective exposure are not offering an
explanatory account of selectivity in exposure to information and are therefore
referred to as »de facto selective exposure«. The authors present a third understanding which comes closer to explaining why selective exposure occurs: This
third view holds that people have a preference for supportive, rather than
nonsupportive, information (Sears & Freedman, 1967: 196). To serve this
preference, people actively seek out those kinds of information which do not
challenge their existing worldviews. Seeking out actively does not mean that
people need to be conscious of this process. On the contrary, unconscious
behavior plays an important role; this is why, later in this article, we are going
to explore how basic psychological conditions which mostly remain uncon-
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scious might exert an influence on the selectivity of people in the reception of
political communication. But first we will have a look at the selectivity research
that was published after the publication of Sears’ and Freedman’s influential
article. Did it corroborate their skeptical view with regard to the usefulness of
selective exposure as a relevant mechanism in information processing?
As was the case in the 1960s, further selective exposure research yielded
findings that, at first glance, appear inconsistent or even contradictory: some
studies supported the selective exposure hypothesis, whereas others did not
yield support or provided evidence of selective exposure to attitude-consistent
information under special conditions. Hence, the selective exposure debate is
far from finished and, as Knobloch-Westerwick and Meng (2009) note, the
question of whether and how selective exposure works in general as well as in
specific contexts is still unsettled. This is true mostly because of concerns
about the consequences of one of the most striking characteristics of the newly
emerging media environment: the rapid and drastic increase of choice for
media users between sources of mediated information brought about especially by the rise of the Internet as a means of communication and the multiplication of radio and television frequencies as a consequence of the widespread switch to digital media technologies (see, e.g., Prior, 2007). Since this
situation seems to make the exercise of partisan selectivity in audiences (a)
more likely and (b) more consequential for the political communication
system and the democratic system as a whole, exploring processes of selective
exposure and selective perception seems more important than ever. For
example, some recent scholarship argues that if new media technologies lead
people to only choose information that fits into their existing worldviews this
can lead to a more fragmented and polarized citizenry for which it is increasing difficult to find the kind of common ground needed in pluralist democracies (e.g., Kobayashi & Ikeda, 2009; Sunstein, 2007). Concerns about the rise of
cyber-balkanization and enclave partisan deliberation (see, e.g., Sunstein,
2007) entail a new demand for research on selectivity processes in political
communication. This demand has been met by a number of recent studies on
the topic. In what follows, we are going to review some of this research, concentrating on selective exposure and perception that is linked to political
ideology and partisanship in media users.
The roles of political ideology and partisanship for perception and interpretations of world events have long been studied – not only in the field of
selective exposure research, although we focus on this field here. The American
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Voter by Campbell et al. (1960) has become one of the classic studies with a
major conclusion being that political partisanship forms political opinions,
attitudes and perceptions. Ever since the publication of this book the question
of the relationship between political attitudes and perceptions has played an
important role in political communication research.
In a recent survey study, Stroud (2008) maintained that some topics (e.g.,
politics) are more likely to encourage selective exposure than others. As a
response to critics of previous selective research, she suggests investigating
people’s habitual exposure patterns rather than single exposure decisions – a
research strategy proposed by Sears and Freedman (1967: 213) as well. She is
also interested in the distinct features of relationships between selective exposure and different media types: Do some media encourage selective exposure
more than others? In order to examine the use of newspaper, political talk
radio, cable news and political websites she used data from the 2004 National
Annenberg Election Survey and found that selective exposure regularly occurs
across all of these media types.
Recent studies have further investigated the relationship between selective
exposure and political ideology. Iyengar and Hahn (2009), for example, provide evidence for media selectivity of users along lines of political party preferences. In an experimental design they investigated whether Republicans and
Democrats tend to prefer news sources that report in a manner consistent with
their beliefs and compared the outcome with the political preferences of
participants. They found that people prefer to encounter information they
judge to be supportive of their existing beliefs.
Knobloch-Westerwick and Meng (2009) report a similar study. They set up
an experiment with computer-based sessions during which participants were
asked to choose online news while the computer coded whether articles
chosen were attitude-consistent or counter-attitudinal based on opinions of the
participants that were tapped in advance of the sessions. Their results showed
that selective exposure prevailed regardless of issue types and was more pronounced for participants with high levels of habitual news consumption.
In another study, Graf and Aday (2008) investigated whether people choose
online political information that is consistent with or counters their previous
beliefs. They set up quasi-experiments and found that their participants
indeed spent more time reading online articles which were consistent with
their prior opinions.
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In two related recent selective exposure studies, Garrett analyzed survey data
(2009b) and data from a web-administered behavior-tracking study (2009a).
In both instances, he as well found that people tend to seek out information
consistent with their political viewpoints and have a higher likelihood of
attending to supportive than to opinion challenging information. However, he
qualifies older findings by showing that people do not actively try to avoid
challenging information but rather tend to seek out attitude-consistent messages. Similar results were presented by Kobayashi and Ikeda (2009) whose
analysis of US and Japanese survey data yielded evidence of selective exposure
to, but not selective avoidance of, information on the Internet.
A summary of these recent studies suggests a refinement of selective exposure hypotheses: While reduction of cognitive dissonance as a generalized
explanation for selective exposure seems more and more implausible, the
evidence for similarity effects in political information selection processes is
growing.2 In addition, there is another common feature of the cited recent
selective exposure studies that is of particular importance for us here: They
typically make an implicit assumption of equivalence of ideological predispositions. In this view, conservatism and liberalism/left-leaning political orientations are two sides of the same coin. Political partisans of both sides are assumed to act similarly while shaping their political information environment:
they try to bolster their own views with supportive information and (to a lesser
degree) avoid challenging messages. The point we are making in this paper is
that this view neglects important differences between political partisans and,
consequently, their information exposure patterns.
A second important concept in research on selectivity in political communication is that of selective perception which was part of the minimal effects
paradigm formulated by Klapper and has been subjected to scrutiny by different lines of research since then.3 Bartels (2002), for example, made an effort to
clarify the relationship between political attitudes and perceptions via analysis
of panel data showing that political orientation significantly shapes people’s
perception of political events. These perceptual biases were also shown to
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2
Similarity effects in political communication, not only with regard to selective exposure but also
with regard to selective perception and evaluation, are one of the most promising research domains in political communication research. Of late, there have been several contributions to this
line of research (e.g., Bailenson et al., 2006; 2008), which draw on insights on similarity biases in
personal judgment from a long-standing tradition of similarity research in social psychology (e.g.,
Brock, 1965; Burger et al., 2004; Byrne, 1961).
3
For a brief, general overview of selective perception research, see Shrum (2008). For a broader
overview of perception and media effects in general, see Shrum (2006).
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reinforce differences between the opinions of Democrats and Republicans in
his study.
Lodge and Taber (2005) took a similar but slightly different approach by
examining the so-called hot cognition hypothesis which states that affective
ratings of former political situations are saved in memory and automatically
(and mostly unknowingly) become influential in new situations that involve a
similar stimulus which leads to a partisan perceptual bias in like situations. In
a 2006 article, Taber and Lodge further examined the phenomenon of »motivated skepticism« with which they sought to develop a psychological explanation for such biases. Using an experimental research design, they elicited a
strong prior attitude effect that consisted of two main biases: First, they detail a
»disconfirmation bias« (Lodge & Taber, 2005: 476) which means that people
tend to be critical of arguments that contradict their own standpoints while
they are less critical of arguments that underpin their own stances. Second,
Taber and Lodge establish a »confirmation bias« (Lodge & Taber, 2005: 476):
In their experiments, when given free choice, participants predominantly
chose sources of such information that confirmed their prior opinions. While
confirmation bias is akin to notions of selective exposure, disconfirmation bias
is closely related to selective perception meaning that people do not only
choose those media types and contents from which they presume to get
information that fits their existing opinions but also interpret information in
such a way as to maximize consistency with prior belief structures.
Recently, however, Prior (2009) provided experimental evidence suggesting
that partisan perception biases might in part be an artifact due to a consistency-maintenance bias of participants in survey interviews (i.e., perceptions
reported are made to be consistent with reported political partisanship). His
study further differentiates knowledge on partisan perceptual bias in that he
finds that the degree to which partisanship leads to biased perceptions of
objective conditions is lower for questions with less partisan relevance and no
express connection to political partisanship.
Given these findings on selective exposure and perception, an obvious
question is whether the occurrence of these processes in the reception of
political communication is systematically related to characteristics of different
available sources of political information. As was mentioned above, Stroud
(2008) found that selective exposure to political information occurs across all
media types. In her study, she examined the use of newspaper, political talk
radio, cable news and political websites with data from the 2004 National
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Annenberg Election Survey. However, as such, this finding does not invalidate
the assumption that the form of the medium is influential for selectivity to the
extent that it impacts the degree of user activity during reception. For example,
it is much easier to seek out (i.e., selectively expose oneself to and selective
perceive) information that is consistent with one’s existing predispositions
from a newspaper and on the Internet (so-called »pull media«) than on television (a so-called »push medium«). This is in line with the reasoning of Goldman and Mutz (2009). In a multi-nation survey study, they show that newspaper readers are more likely to exercise partisan selective exposure compared to
television viewers, presumably due to greater ease of identifying the political
slant of a newspaper and matching it with one’s own political views. In this
context, questions concerning the democratic role of the Internet as a new
medium are of special interest. By and large, speculations about the role of the
Internet are two-sided (see Valentino et al., 2009): One side argues that increased access to information and opportunities for political expression and
debates on the Internet will have positive net effects for democracy. On the
other side there are those who emphasize dangers of social fragmentation and
ideological polarization due to selective exposure to information which is
facilitated by the high degree of user-sovereignty and -activity in the process of
information selection. These issues indicate both, the timeliness and relevance
of addressing questions concerning selective exposure. There is only a realistic
chance for them to be answered, if future research succeeds in pinpointing the
ancillary conditions for the occurrence of selective exposure and perception.
This article is meant to propose a new direction in the study of political ideology of media users as such an ancillary condition in this specific context.
After this short review of recent work in the field of selective exposure and
selective perception research, we sum up by noting two points: First, taken
together, the presented studies show that, by and large, people tend to attend to
information from media sources with which they expect to agree and to
perceive in ways that are prestructured by their cognitive and attitudinal
apparatus. Second, political predispositions (i.e., partisanship and political
ideology) are a key factor in selective exposure to and perception of political
communication. One question that follows, though – and we have pointed to it
above –, is whether selective exposure works uniformly for people of different
political ideologies. In the next section, we present an argument for why we
think that while political ideology has been frequently cited as a condition of
political communication effects (see the studies presented above), some
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important differences between groups of differing political ideological orientation have been curiously neglected and should be taken in account more in
future media effects research. To do so, theories, models and findings from
social psychology need to be systematically incorporated in our models of
effects in political communication.
3
Political Ideology, Cognitive Style, and Differential
Reinforcement
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What does it mean to adhere to a particular political ideology? Of course, it
entails greater or lesser agreement with certain policy opinions. Accordingly,
political ideology has been utilized by much selective exposure research as an
indicator of whether or not people are experiencing affirmation or dissonance
when confronted with a particular political message. Research in social psychology, however, has shown that there is more to political ideology than
commitment to certain values or agreement to certain policy options. People of
different ideologies also differ systematically in terms of basic cognitive dispositions; differences that we argue are likely consequential for the reception of
political communication. Specifically, such differences in cognitive style might
bear an influence on the mechanisms of selective exposure and perception.
Social psychological studies of ideology have shown that politically conservative people exhibit a stronger need for cognitive closure than left-leaning
people; they are also less open towards new situations and experiences and put
greater confidence in authorities (e.g., Chirumbolo, Areni, & Sensales, 2004).
Studies that theoretically link people’s beliefs with underlying cognitive needs
and dispositions often pursue what has been labeled the »motivated social
cognition approach« (Jost et al., 2003) or the »cognitive conservatism approach« (Van Hiel, Pandelaere, & Duriez, 2004), both of which are concerned
with the consequences of need for cognitive closure levels of people for their
political orientations. Chirumbolo (2002) defines need for cognitive closure as
»a cognitive-motivational content independent construct, defined as preference for definitive order and structure, and desire for firm or stable knowledge« (p. 604). Referring to previous studies, Chirumbolo adds that »need for
cognitive closure affects the extent of information processing itself, the seeking
and processing of new information, the generation of alternative hypotheses,
the tolerance of ambiguity in perception tasks, and many other social and
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interpersonal phenomena like resistance to persuasion, rejection of opinion
deviates, impression formation and stereotypes and several group processes«
(p. 604). In his study, Chirumbolo investigated the relationship between need
for cognitive closure, authoritarianism and political orientation. He found that
need for cognitive closure and authoritarianism are associated with right-wing
political orientations and that this relationship is linear.
A study by Kemmelmeier (1997) mirrors these findings. Here, politically
conservative members of a sample of German students displayed a stronger
dispositional need for cognitive closure than their left-leaning counterparts.
Again, the relationship was found to be linear.
Another study by Crowson (2009b) showed that dangerous and competitive world beliefs in people were significantly associated with right-wing
authoritarianism for study participants. Right-wing authoritarianism, in turn,
mediated effects of these differences in cognitive style on opinions about US
anti-terrorism policies.
In a similar study, Jost and his colleagues tested different theoretical models
to examine the cognitive and motivational underpinnings of political orientation. Their results show that »uncertainty avoidance and threat management
are both associated with conservative (rather than liberal) opinions […]
add[ing] to a growing body of evidence suggesting that psychological needs
and motives pertaining to the management of uncertainty and threat are
related to individuals’ degree of attraction to liberal versus conservative ideologies« (Jost et al., 2007: 1004).
In yet another study of political ideology and related psychological dispositions, Thorisdottir et al. (2007) drew on data from the 2002 European Social
Survey and found that traditionalism, acceptance of inequality, the need to
follow rules and an authoritarian personality style are strongly connected in
right-wing adherents in Western Europe.
On the whole, then, empirical research provides strong evidence of systematic relations between political orientations of people (on the traditional leftright spectrum) and basic cognitive dispositions, some of which were addressed by the studies referenced above.4 But how do these cognitive differ............................................
4
A concomitant question which is important has been addressed in personality research is whether
the degree to which cognitive differences between political conservatives and liberals/left-leaning
people occur depends on individual agreement to specific values incorporated in these general
ideologies. For example, there is some evidence that cultural conservatism reflects a general need
for closure and obedience in authorities to a greater degree than does economic conservatism
(see, e.g., Cornelis & Van Hiel, 2006; Crowson, 2009a; Kossowska & Van Hiel, 2003).
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ences between ideological groups relate to political communication processes?
We suggest that, given the occupation of selective exposure and perception
research with dissonance reduction, confirmation and similarity biases, accounting for need for closure (and related cognitive style variables) would add
to the explanatory value of its theories.
A pioneering attempt at bringing together cognitive style and selective exposure was made by Lavine, Lodge, and Freitas (2005) who investigated the
influence of threat on people high and low on authoritarianism and their
selective exposure behavior in an experimental setting. Authoritarianism as a
concept is closely related to conservatism and regarded as an »ideological
response to reduce high levels of perceived threat and anxiety« (p. 220).
Results show that under threat high-authoritarians mostly select attitudecongruent information whereas low-authoritarians do not. We take this
finding as a useful hint for our study to the extent that it suggests that cognitive differences between people with right- and left-wing ideologies may affect
their selective exposure behavior.
We propose to step beyond this initial evidence and to further integrate research on the cognitive antecedents of political ideologies and research on
selective exposure and selective perception. Specifically, future research would
do well to consider the ways in which cognitive characteristics of different
ideological groups might lead to differential degrees of partisan reinforcement
as a result of political communication processes. Such efforts would open up
new perspectives for both theory and empirical analysis.
Theoretically, there is a need to develop models and hypotheses involving
specific personality traits and cognitive styles associated with political ideological dispositions as intraindividual factors in the reception of political
communication. Further, the interactions of these internal factors with situational and media-specific (external) factors are in need of investigation. Here,
relevant characteristics of media form and media content (i.e., its objects and
the framing of these objects) need to be considered. Relevant situational
factors encompass the degree of »objective threat« with regard to a politically
relevant question (see the experimental manipulation made by Lavine, Lodge,
& Freitas 2005). For example, more research is needed that compares different
cognitive and attitudinal domains (e.g., problem perceptions, policy support,
stereotyping) with regard to the degree to which differential reinforcement
through political communication occurs in them.
Empirically, considering the role that cognitive styles such as personal need for
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closure play in the reception process would allow us to predict more precisely
for whom cognitive – and, by extension, attitudinal – reinforcement due to
selective exposure to and perception of mediated political communication will
occur in what situations. The »new era of minimal effects« heralded by Bennett and Iyengar (2008), then, might turn out to be more accurately described
as a «new era of differential minimal effects” if we walk down this road of
inquiry. The development of a motivated social cognition model of political
communication will need to be the next step researchers take on this road.
The immediate methodological consequence of the ideas presented here is
a need to further integrate measures of cognitive style into media effect studies
in general and research on selective exposure or perception in particular. Many
such scales have been developed and tested in psychometric research and are
available for use in tests of refined theoretical models of political communication effects. The Need for Closure Scale (NFCS) has been in widespread use
ever since its initial validation (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994), and is itself a
multidimensional measure which can be broken down into several facet scales
(see Cornelis & Van Hiel, 2006; and, for a critical assessment, Neuberg, Judice,
& West, 1997). Other cognitive style variables or epistemic motivations for
which tested scales exist include personal need for structure (e.g., Schaller et
al., 1995), openness to experience (e.g., McCrae, 1996), intolerance of ambiguity (e.g., Sidanius, 1978), uncertainty avoidance (e.g., McGregor et al., 2001),
and need for order (e.g., Jost et al., 2003). Thus, methodological tools to
accommodate the kind of theoretical extensions of political communication
effect research proposed in this article are at the disposal of researchers.
To sum up, we have argued here that there are few reasons to believe that all
political partisans are created equal – and we have suggested some initial steps
to theorize and methodologically account for the role of partisan inequalities
in political communication processes in future research.
© Frank & Timme Verlag für wissenschaftliche Literatur
231
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