Download Japan and the US: Mutual Alliance, Unbalanced Fear

Geopolitical Futures
Keeping the future in focus
https://geopoliticalfutures.com
Japan and the US: Mutual Alliance, Unbalanced Fear
Feb. 23, 2017 The integral alliance is driven by distinct motives and experienced uniquely by
each country.
By Xander Snyder and Cheyenne Ligon
In his recent trip to the Pacific, U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis reaffirmed the United
States’ commitment to guard Japan against foreign threats: “I made clear that our long-standing
policy on the Senkaku Islands stands – the U.S. will continue to recognize Japanese
administration of the islands, and as such, Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan security treaty applies.”
Both the United States and Japan have interests in the South China Sea. This is a shared interest
– and an increasingly important one – that ties the two countries together. However, overlapping
interests are not the same as identical interests, and while the United States and Japan both
want to protect sea lanes in the Pacific, the motivations driving each country’s national strategy
differ. Japan’s greater dependency on imports that must be transported across sea lanes and its
proximity to China, which could develop the capability to block them, makes events in the South
China Sea a greater threat for Japan than for the United States.
While China’s progressively aggressive posturing in the South China Sea is primarily designed
for domestic consumption – by stirring up national pride to legitimize the regime – Japan
nevertheless perceives these moves as serious threats. Japan must import nearly all the oil and
raw materials it requires to function both economically and militarily. Japan is an island nation
and must have all of its imports transported via maritime trade routes. Thus, it is imperative for
Japan’s survival to maintain open, unfettered access to critical shipping lanes in the South China
Sea. The United States is currently the dominant naval power in the Pacific and grants Japan, its
ally, freedom of movement in South China Sea. The current arrangement works for Japan, but it
means that Japan is dependent on its relationship with the U.S. to import required materials.
1/5
Geopolitical Futures
Keeping the future in focus
https://geopoliticalfutures.com
An aerial photo taken on Jan. 2, 2017 shows a Chinese navy formation, including the aircraft carrier Liaoning, center, during
military drills in the South China Sea. STR/AFP/Getty Images
Oil is one of Japan’s greatest vulnerabilities. According to a study by British Petroleum, Japan
consumes an average of 4.15 million barrels of oil per day. It has an estimated 500-600 million
barrels in strategic reserves. This is further bolstered by an agreement with South Korea to
share oil reserves in an emergency. South Korea’s oil reserves of approximately 81 million
barrels would give Japan extra time in a potential blockade or war. On its own, Japan only has
enough oil in reserve to last for about four months. In a best-case – but highly unlikely –
scenario, if South Korea were to give Japan all of its oil, it would only provide Japan an additional
three weeks’ worth of reserves. However, in such an emergency it is unlikely that South Korea
would be willing or able to grant Japan access to all of its oil reserves. This makes Japan hypervigilant toward any Chinese threat to block sea lanes. Cutting off oil from Japan is an existential
threat, the same one that drew Japan into the Pacific war with the United States.
On the other hand, the United States’ primary concern in the Pacific is preventing the rise of a
single state that could upset regional order and establish regional hegemony to challenge U.S.
naval supremacy. Currently, China has the largest economy and is pouring money into
increasing its military capabilities, which makes it the greatest threat to the existing regional
equilibrium. While this distribution of power is constantly in flux, China today remains the power
2/5
Geopolitical Futures
Keeping the future in focus
https://geopoliticalfutures.com
that the United States must balance. The U.S. has guaranteed the defense of Pacific countries
including Japan, the Philippines and Taiwan since World War II and is using this interwoven web
of alliances to balance China’s challenge. The United States is preoccupied with its allies’
defense not because of any moral benevolence but because those countries play a critical role
in its grand strategy for balance of power.
A credible U.S. guarantee means the United States must actually intervene if China were to
cross a red line, thus changing its strategy from one of deterrence to forceful ejection. There are
two clear red lines China could not cross without provoking a U.S. military response. One would
be any sort of offensive against Taiwan. The Senkaku Islands is the other. President Barack
Obama’s administration made clear that any assault on those islands would be considered an
offensive against Japanese sovereign territory, and Mattis reaffirmed that current U.S. policy
considers the Senkakus to be covered under the U.S.-Japan mutual defense agreement.
(click to enlarge)
Understanding Japanese fears requires understanding China’s own motivations in the South
China Sea. China also needs access to maritime trade routes. Unlike Japan, however, China is
more concerned with its ability to export goods than its ability to import them. China is afraid of
being boxed in by the United States and its regional allies, including Japan and the strategically
important Philippines, which could use their positions in the Pacific to block China’s access to
3/5
Geopolitical Futures
Keeping the future in focus
https://geopoliticalfutures.com
sea lanes. This mentality encourages its offensive posturing. By building artificial islands in the
Pacific, China is trying to secure additional territory to increase its area denial capabilities,
making any potential attack more difficult. China’s regional interests place it in direct conflict
with those of Japan. China is not currently ready for a real fight with either Japan or the United
States, but its threats are felt more acutely by its nearby neighbor than by the U.S.
Mattis’ recent remarks do indicate U.S. concern about Chinese aggression and territorial claims
in the South China Sea, but the U.S.’ preoccupation is more for Japan and other regional allies
than for the protection of its own economic or military interests. Mattis’ remarks show what the
U.S. would view as a red line for Chinese activity in the Pacific. Japan would prefer that the U.S.
enforce this line on all Chinese activity in this region. From the U.S. perspective, however,
China’s pursuit of the islands and activity in the region thus far are not serious enough threats
for the U.S. to respond with anything but posturing. China does not have an interest in provoking
a war, but Japan must base its national defense strategy on what is possible even if unlikely. And
since this dynamic has defined the geopolitics of the Asia-Pacific region for over a century, it is
important to be precise about both U.S.-Japanese shared interests as well as the gaps between
them.
The Origins of American Incivility and Fear
A fear has plagued the U.S. for decades that the country has lost its
greatness and is facing a looming catastrophe. But is this fear well-
4/5
Geopolitical Futures
Keeping the future in focus
https://geopoliticalfutures.com
founded? Find out with the free special report The Origins of American
Incivility and Fear. Click the button below to claim it now!
hbspt.cta.load(2632125, '73756375-5a05-44dd-8216-111b193540b7', {});
5/5
Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)