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Co-decision or delegation? Direct democracy, social interests and the
transformation of the political.
Dr Alex Koutsogiannis, Scientific Associate, Scientific Council, Hellenic Parliament. Adjunct
Lecturer in Political Theory, Department of Political Science, University of Crete.
E-mail: [email protected]
If in representative democracy the body-politic is commonly demarcated
around a broad understanding of nationhood, in direct democracy processes of
collective deliberation appear rather more ‘localized’, specific or interest-based. This
general trend however, is considerably relativized or differentiated under the pressure
of structural conditions, such as political cultures, constitutional traditions, social
relations, and as always, material and knowledge resources. The paper argues that a
number of fundamental changes in the forms and practices of modern citizenry –
conceived either as an electorate or as a direct political agent – is intrinsically
concomitant to current directions of political and institutional transformation. One key
aspect of the latter is depicted in modern processes of governance in which direct
democracy may appear once again relevant, especially in view of an acknowledged
deficit in political representation.
In the implicit setting of a juxtaposition between representative and direct
democracy, the paper aims in contributing to the clarification of the principles that
may guide current discussions on constitutional revision. Its central argument is that
delegatory governance may involve a co-existence of representative with direct
democracy, ‘without prejudice’ to the indispensability of the former and without
sacrificing recent developments in direct political engagement.
Keywords: democracy; governance; interests; representation;
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Introduction
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Among the numerous analytical distinctions between various forms of
democracy the opposition between direct and representative democracy has been most
indicative of the historical-political embodiment of the concept. In its primogenital
appearance democracy exists only as direct. Representation would seem strange to
this model since it would involve the alienating side effects of any sort of mediation.
The archetype of ancient Athens outlives many alternate versions in two respects.
Firstly as a judgment criterion of modern democracies and secondly as a political
practice of a rather fractional nature. Nonetheless, the political decisiveness and
constitutional gravity of various forms of referenda assessments, betray a different
picture as to any surviving modalities of direct democracy. In the institutional front, a
tendency of dispersal of powers has followed developments in forms of political
associations that grew at a distance from representational politics.
The paper situates a discussion of direct democracy in the contemporary
framework of a theory of governance (1st section). It particularly designates a number
of problematic areas in both modern aspects of the classical distinction (2nd and 3rd
section) and attempts at an empirical redirection of the ‘interested parts’ of
democratic politics into the actuality of a directly involved body-politic (4th section).
Direct democracy is approached from a non-procedural standpoint, as an ongoing
political activity that is concerned with the materialization of collective and political
decisions, powers, or influences within an infrastructural context of representational
democracy.
1. The transformation of the political: governance in state politics
Over the last decades, a number of theoretical tools have been recruited by
political scientists for both policy and explanation purposes: third way politics,
communitarianism, participatory democracy, re-institutionalization, deliberative
democracy, etc. It appears, that in comparison to many of these popularized concepts
the term governance withstands the course of time. It is also true that a growing
complexity in the political organization of modern societies corresponds to the
differentiation of areas that do not pertain to, a strictly speaking, political domain:
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developments in scientific knowledge and communication technologies, changes in
social stratification, expansion and differentiation of markets and businesses, new
values and rights. An underlying principle of specialization of activities along with
the gradual diffusion of pyramidical administration in many informal and professional
domains, have resulted in a de-concentration of traditional governing apparatuses.
There have been numerous debates as to the democratic consequences of this trend.
In this last respect, much of the current debate in the European world relates to
what has been termed as the “hollowing out” or the “retreat” of the state 1. Broadly
speaking there are three major areas in which such development is experienced 2: in
government in the context of supranational trans-governmental relations (for example
in issues of dual sovereignty), in the national boundaries of statehood, where many
collective agents (from cultural minorities to businesses) act at a distance from
centralized governance and of course in the economy itself, where national economies
are much less self-sustained than they used to be (from the recent crisis of the public
sector to the well established strategies of public/private partnerships and all relating
issues of accountability).
The arising question for political science concerns the degree in which the
diffusion of authority in new political forms results in the demise of the autonomy of
political institutions that are traditionally gathered around the trichotomy of the
separation of powers. The route of self-sustenance and non-intervention which
attributes to a constitutionally safeguarded authority the control of the state, is
gradually being redirected to a condition of ‘post-sovereignty’ with more involved
international
and
non-state
actors:
cross-border
environmental
coalitions,
multinational corporations, political and non-profit institutions, regional economic
and political blocs, intergovernmental agencies. 3 In this much debated context of
multilevel governance a new array of complications arises the most prominent of
which are: demands for citizen participation and calls for more transparency and
accountability as tools of legitimation, increased individuation of political interests,
opaque forums of public discussion and representation deficits. Scholars agree
however, that the normative and juridical foundations of parliamentary democracies
1
See Strange (1996) and Sørensen (2004).
See Sørensen (2006) pp. 204-207.
3
Obviously the concept of governance embraces both non-state actors and divisions of political authority (for
example in EU and federal governmental and legislative bodies). With a special emphasis to the second sector a
useful source can be found in Enderlein et al. (eds.) (2010).
2
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remain intact, notwithstanding debates on the breach of constitutional provisions. It is
true at the same time that governance is an inclusive concept encompassing both
spectrums of the political phenomenon: state and non-state actors. In this broader
sense, governance denotes simply a method or a practice-pattern of distributing
competences, responsibilities and functions. This trend emerges in a number of corelated or inter-dependent dimensions.
i. The juridical/political dimension
The uncontestable line of defense of the modern state is that of constitutional
national independence. This is the legal core of state power, depicted through the
delimitation of constitutional powers including of course all fundamental checks and
balances. Even if popular sovereignty is still the basis of constitutional independence
there are serious indications of its degradation. The so called ‘crisis of the state’ does
not unfold in the implementation of provisions on a ‘stage of siege’, but constitutional
endurance is measured against the loss of public guarantees, traditionally provided by
the state and questioned in the light of new forms of geopolitical and economic
power. It is certainly true, that unlike any public institutional arrangements, the
private sector, in its business with the state, cannot provide binding assurances as to
the application of the criterion of public interest, creating thus a severe legitimacy
problem.
In the face of new developments in political and economic organization the
analytical tools of this domain span from the role of political parties, to the function
of Independent State Authorities and the enhancement of processes of parliamentary
oversight. The debate is concerned with the directions that should be followed by
constitutional and political reform, for example in the instituting of effective
mechanisms of accountability, the constitutionalisation of public-finance strategies
and the constitutional empowerment of referendums.
ii. Civil Society
As relatively new actors in public politics, civil society agents are active both
at the policy (as service providers) and the political level (as pressure groups).
Questions have arisen as to the actual independence of these agencies, their political
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affiliations and the criteria of distinction between them. Financial dependency for
example undermines the impartiality of an organization. At the same time the typical
criterion of autonomy is not sufficient for an inclusion of an agent to the strong
normative dimension of civil society. This taxonomy would simply neglect all
practical aspects such as tools (violent or not) and scope of action. In either case one
can distinguish two major forms: A world of organized interests in which business
lobbying plays a leading role (2/3 of lobbying in the EU) and a world of social or
collective non state associations (such as NGOs) focusing on specific clusters of
rights: environmental, cultural, welfare, religious, etc.
iii. Inter-governmental Relations/Politics
This is the field of globalization proper, setting the question on the reduced
capabilities of national economic and social self-determination. Governance may
appear as a legitimation concept for various intergovernmental institutional
constructions. In the European context, this would involve relations between national
governments and the European Commission, or the enhancement of the role of
national parliaments in European legislation (following the Lisbon Treaty). For many
writers globalization is not a new phenomenon, while there is certainly a strong
economic substructure (investments and capital movements) that appertains to its
most characteristic aspects. In the political arena issues such as accountability and
transparency gain popularity, although there are no convincing envisions of
alternative mechanisms of popular control. 4 Finally in policy terms, there is a
considerable amount of technical, economic and legal problems that surround the
already established processes of decentralization and distribution of duties.
iv. The Economy
This is the less examined aspect of governance perhaps due to a supposed
loose affinity with the legal/political domain proper. Nevertheless private/public
partnerships are increasingly expanded as effective governance tools in almost all
4
Mark Bovens makes a useful comparison of traditional and new forms of accountability with special emphasis on
processes adopted within multi-level European Governance. (Ex. non-accountability of the Council in direct
contrast to the provisioned parliamentary oversight of the Commission). See Bovens, Mark (2007).
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central areas of public life (in welfare services and infrastructure projects). Given the
exigencies that characterize economic and monetary alliances the boundaries between
private and public interests do not remain unaffected. One essential issue concerns the
extent to which state institutions can operate within well-defined criteria of market
competition. In general however, the empowered role of the private sector in the
politics of public finance is largely unproblematic, at least in comparison to an
opposite and ‘outdated’ route, namely the return of –often– strategic enterprises to
public ownership.
It has to be made clear that the above dimensions of modern governance do
not exist in isolation to each other. This type of distinction has a methodological
character insofar as it does not correspond to clear empirical types. There is however
a common normative dimension in both political and academic rhetoric: the pluralist
intentions of a multi-level system of power result, by definition, in more democracy.
This is not necessarily so. The demand for more democracy is not a political
inspiration, neither the result of blind popular grievance. It is coterminous with a
dysfunction of a working apparatus, what has often been termed as representation
deficit. To this we shall now turn.
2. The crisis: some deadlocks of representative democracy
The response given to the crisis of Keynesianism and the welfare state did not
evolve around a substantive theory of democracy, starting for example from the
classical questions of legitimacy, representation, constitutional independence and
exercise of power. The response was a rather formal one, focusing mainly on
institutional reshuffling and bureaucratic expertise 5 . Today it has been partly
substituted by privatization and monetarism. Bureaucratic hierarchy is clearly on
retreat, at least with respect to the use of social agencies and the market in the
delivery of public services. But this development also entailed a parallel process,
towards the employment of new governance tools that involved public networks and
partnerships. The latter constitute a political response fused with the inventions of
corporate responsibility and employment policies. This non-state politics has strong
connotations of immediacy and directness not passing through the medium of
5
For this distinction and a critical juxtaposition of the historical contingency of governance with democratic
practice see Bevir, Mark (2010).
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representation yet not necessarily at odds with parliamentary democracy. Directness
does not entail the exercise of legislating powers alone, it acquires its legitimation
force from the political fulfillment of social and economic interests. So where are the
signs of crisis?
One major consequence of governance is that it blurs the borderlines of social
and political conflict. If democracy contains an antagonistic element, it must also
provide the means for social consensus. Nonetheless, governance has nothing or little
to do with juridical arrangements of social antagonisms. What is missing is the
political character of social inequalities and conflicts, an attribute that can be
measured neither by Jurisprudence nor by the allocation of administrative
competences. Political disputes as articulated through indistinct political identities
cannot absorb or reflect social disagreements, hence privileging the juridical function
and leaving law with the task of settling social conflicts or regulating social relations. 6
The absence of political representation through organic social affiliations
corresponds to the growing disenchantment with the inability to provide a political
answer to the economic crisis. This has significantly weakened the legitimacy of
political systems. Most popular discourses here are those of political apathy, loss of
confidence/trust, representation deficit and agency loss. In the representative domain,
what parliamentary democracy is facing today (apart from an overpowered executive)
is a parallel network of organized interests. The latter may be conceived on the basis
of a relation of ‘checks and balances’ among interest groups as in the classical
pluralist model in which government action is still one of the major concerns. 7
There is also a more elusive interpretation in the broader perspective of actors
in civil society. Political gains are obtained here through self-delegation, which is
neither concentrated nor antagonistic, yet its ultimate objectives are not fulfilled
outside state institutions. In this respect territorial representation based on the ‘people’
is unable to depict the differentiations at these levels of both public and private
interests (from private industrial interests to regional environmental concerns). 8 The
parliamentary world in particular faces a considerable competition from other forms
of collective deliberation (policy networks, communities, social forums and interests
6
See Mouffe (2000) pp.113-115.
See for example Bentley, Arthur (1967).
8
These collective actors emerging from civil society are elements of what Tom R. Burns termed ‘organic
governance’. For Burns these informal networks are not only knowledge competent but also enjoy a high level of
legitimacy insofar as they realize certain notions of democracy namely the right to form groups in order to advance
or protect interests. See Burns, R. Tom (1999) pp.167-194.
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groups), which prefer to deal directly with the issues that concern them and have more
targeted goals. Quite often parliaments are at variance with these collective actors
particularly when the latter prefer to employ strategies of direct negotiations with
central governments, rather than taking part in party politics or influencing Members
of Parliament. 9
In either case, it appears that popular - national sovereignty is facing a
considerable pressure from two parallel directions. On the one hand governments
have to cope with their interaction with lobbyists and pressure groups and eventually
with the conflict between private and public interests.
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At the same time
representative assemblies are in need of an adaptation mode with regard to the
representation of interests (in some countries in second Chambers) that are not
concerned with electoral politics. A change of paradigm would be required under the
persistence of certain discourses 11 that demand representation without necessarily
being affiliated to a partisan spectrum of political parties or make an aggregate of
eligible voters. Failures in representation have often been classified as a problem of
agency loss whereby a considerable gap exists between the policies obtained through
delegation and the citizens’ desires. One apparent justification for this, is that citizens’
demands at a national level are not only more complex and diverse, but also
impossible to meet, when for example the constant demand for public expenditures
contradicts a demand for tax reductions. Interests demands on the other hand are more
coherent and better researched. They have specific aims and tangible methods of
pursuing them. What however interests us here are the basic symptoms of democratic
deficit 12: a) conflicting decisions (in legislation) which result in problems of policy
co-ordination, b) rent extraction when representatives use their authority to obtain
private benefits, c), indifference and lack of effort and finally a deep, general
dissatisfaction with politics as such.
It would seem that more direct forms of political engagement come at a rescue
when representational systems fail. But these new “non-national” forms of direct
democracy do not operate in a void. They are susceptible to a substantive kind of
9
This discussion with a particular emphasis on parliamentary governance is developed in Koutsogiannis, Alex
(2013).
10
In the European context a basic problem has been the adoption of regulative measures given the intensification
of lobbying in the European Parliament (opting for registration measures) and the Commission (which opts for
incentive measures). See Chabanet, Didier (2011) pp.1-20.
11
The practical prospects of the inclusion of interest discourse in representative politics (through a concept of
‘discursive representation’) are examined in Dryzek and Niemeyer (2007).
12
For an extended exposition of these particular aspects see Strøm, Kaare et al. (2007) pp. 708-747.
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critique coming from two directions: from the viewpoint of an inclusive (national)
legitimacy and from another on controlled or regulated action. In other words, direct
democracy involves a redefinition of the body – politic which brings to attention
current discussions and concepts of democracy, for example in citizenship studies and
debates on deliberative democracy. Direct democracy agents are specific and oriented
towards a limited structure of interests and values. Their ‘clients’ are not voters but
specific citizen groups with specific identities (religious, economic or regional, as
consumers, professionals, etc.). In this regard they are posed at a quite different
standpoint of the political spectrum, than for example the constitutionally safeguarded
possibility of holding a referendum on a national level. This lack of legitimacy works
as an ultimate dividing line setting a limit from which non-state agents can go no
further. In turn this creates a number of accountability issues for both business and
civil society governance partners.
3. Interests as mediums of direct democracy
Which are the main problems that accompany the political involvement of
new dispersed forms of governance 13 ? On the one hand, in comparison to state
controlled institutions, which have more profound normative bases in popular
sovereignty, modern organizations of self-representation are more flexible and
informal. Their non-public or non-state character however increases invisibility.
Many function at the fringes of law and are usually concealed from public scrutiny.
Governmental control in its attempt to safeguard accountability of actions may restrict
the autonomy of civil society agents. The proliferation of social interests in formal
politics raises questions as to the depths of governmental intervention in governance
processes. At the same time these new over-specialized and narrowly defined forms
of governance are unable to fully legitimize themselves under formal democratic
arrangements. The advantage of over-specialization may result in an obvious
disadvantage for the vast majorities of citizen populations with broad collective,
national or international interests.
By contrast, parliamentary proceedings enfold a wider debate - a principle that
guides the internal organization and function of parliaments themselves - in that MPs
13
For a comprehensive overview of these limitations see Burns, R. Tom (1999) pp.182-184.
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can express their dissatisfaction or at least reaffirm the power of the largest
parliamentary group. Similarly, in elections, voters may either express their
disenchantment or simply accede to a pre-structure of political arrangements. But
when it comes to the interplay of social agents with respect to political gains and
when this competition is situated in a background of distrust to the political system,
the vast majority of party-voters stay far behind in negotiations on policy-change.
Multinational corporations enjoy a better edge, which in itself implies a high risk of
power – abuse.
It is therefore obvious that a shift towards direct democracy of this form has
very special characteristics, which may potentially contradict its deep normative
roots. Even the latter however are built on an assumption of the best possible
conditions for political consensus, thus eliminating any empirical basis of social and
economic differences. And although a similar problematic is implicated on
dysfunctional representation, or on the maximalist state, the latter is better equipped
in the legitimacy field. Political institutions provide an agreed upon mechanism,
primarily through elections, for setting out priorities, that is making difficult choices
with respect to an expected shortage of means and contingent political costs. Those
choices are usually made through legislative initiatives in a context of legal mandates.
This may beg a question on a self-authorizing executive power but it cannot replace
parliaments
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. In addition, less formalized means of policy implementation
demonstrate a proven potential, but it is only through the mobilization of large-scale
resources and organization that co-ordination of policies is achieved. This is even
more intense in transnational (EU) or federalist contexts.
It is true that before employing all necessary means of implementation
(through public bureaucracies and ministries), the state resorts to the normativity of
public benefit. Both lobbying groups and civil society agents are in comparison
‘individualized’ and fractional providing a necessary backdrop of de-politicization.
On the other hand, political institutions were designed under the assumption of
conflict. Markets tend to assume away social conflicts (and in the business world
simply assume that the most powerful actor will win). In contrast social agents and
networks such as NGO’s, non-profit and voluntary associations are generally co-
14
Even Habermas for example, in his justified critique of the European Union could not envision, under certain
preconditions, a European transnational democracy (as opposed to executive centralized federalism) without an
empowered setting of double mandates in the European Parliament. See Habermas, Jürgen (2012) p.20.
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operative and non-competitive having no ex ante mechanisms of coping with
fundamental disagreements. 15 In short, when it comes in discussing and deciding on
the implementation of an appropriate policy strategy there are certain institutional
structures that have the capacity to produce more coherent results. These structures
are both democratic (hence, non-static) and predominant. For example, in processes
of internal control (such as parliamentary oversight and constitutional control) certain
criteria of effectiveness are more likely to be compromised with the demand for
rational deliberation and criticism.
Central aspects of representative democracy, from electoral systems and
political parties to the juridical and political role of Members of Parliament, enjoy an
unparalleled durability. With regard to the issue of multilevel governance the role of
political parties is essential. Parties constitute the direct counterparts of civil society
agents to the extent that, apart from their juridical position, themselves constitute
primarily (or also) socio-ideological citizen-organizations. Research has shown for
example that parliamentary systems with cohesive and competitive parties tend to be
more effective and apparently restrict rent extraction. 16 Strong and clearly competitive
political parties may promote accountability at whichever direction and possibly
contain the above-mentioned negative effects of the external actors of civil society.
An atrophy of the political party may be accompanied by an atrophy in the partisan
bonds in the civil service and thus deal indirectly with the phenomenon of party
clientelism or favoritism. Yet, changing party affiliations or political views all that
often, may produce an obscure picture of commitment, leaving voters with simplistic
information and confused political ties.
Formal systems of direct democracy do not remain unaffected. The
erosion of representation in political parties affects different kinds of institutions of
direct democracy, such as citizen initiatives, or referendums (binding or consultative).
In all these incidents the engagement of citizens does not remain unmediated. Political
parties, the media and interest groups provide a platform of information and
mobilization, ‘pre-defining’ in essence the choices available to citizens. Although the
element of directness is formally protected (usually through the implementation of
particular decision and procedural rules), the element of democracy is more elusive,
as it depends on the quality of a wider public dialogue and on the ability of the public
15
16
See Peters, B. Guy and Pierre, Jon, (2006) p. 217.
See Strøm, Kaare et al. (2007) pp.733-735.
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sphere of civil society to open all possible spaces of deliberation and critique. 17 But
can this dialogue be monopolized by party politics and hindered ideological
differences? In either case it is obvious that the alleviating effects of direct democracy
necessarily pass through core territories of representative politics, namely parliaments
and political parties.
4. Conclusion or defining the body politic
It is equally more evident that the bridging of the gaps created by the
representation deficit must pass through the entire political system 18 . Arguing for
direct democracy in this regard presupposes, more than anything else, a foundational
endeavor, in suggesting an alternative definition of a targeted body-politic and of
those that from being represented are to become legislators. However, such
possibility cannot transcend the prerequisite of a common cultural/political identity.
National affiliation is a pre-condition for public policy (in welfare or taxation) and
constitutes an integral, cohesive element of a variety of institutional structures of
representative democracies.
When citizens are defined typically as bearers of duties and rights, citizenship
is an integral part of national sovereignty, which amounts for the constitutional
manifestation of direct democracy in referendums or citizen initiatives. But when
citizens are defined along the lines of common democratic norms and preferences,
political transformation and turbulence become more intelligible. The danger implied
in disempowered representation mechanisms derives from the persistence on a
superficial redistribution of political roles and the search for consent, leaving thus
structural relations of power untouched. In other words, the political efficacy of direct
democracy, in the perspective examined here, would depend on a dialectical
correlation between political/ideological argumentation (institutional or not) and a
notion of public interest. The latter is not only the legitimation basis of a shared
culture strico sensu (in variants of liberal nationalism) or shared political principles
17
See Chambers (2001) pp. 231-253. Chambers examines constitutional referendums by contrasting the
monological requirements of information and majoritarian rule with a deliberative framework of democratic
dialogue.
18
It is thus reasonable that a growing distrust to the political system (and not to particular political parties) may
explain the emergence of extreme wing politics much better than discourses on anti-globalization or xenophobia.
13
(in versions of Habermas' constitutional patriotism) 19. It must remain also an open
question, constantly juxtaposed to the emergence of new antagonistic fields of
political encounter. A political theory of direct democracy would involve here a
parallel examination of both legitimacy and legitimation problems.
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