Download Recovering the wisdom of Protagoras from a reinterpretation of the

Recovering the wisdom of Protagoras from a reinterpretation of
the Prometheia trilogy
By: Marty Sulek, Ph.D.
Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy
For: Workshop In Multidisciplinary Philanthropic Studies
February 10, 2015
In the sunken plaza in front of #30 Rockefeller Center, New York, stands a famous statue
sculpted by Paul Manship that depicts Prometheus bringing to mankind the fire he has stolen
from the wheel of the Sun. On the wall behind the statue is an inscription paraphrasing a
passage from Prometheus Bound that reads:
Prometheus, teacher in every art, brought the fire
that hath proved to mortals a means to mighty ends. (110-1)
On the opposite side of the plaza, on a stairway landing whence the statue is best viewed, is a
plaque, installed in 1962, listing the moral principles to which John D. Rockefeller, Jr. personally
subscribed, and that he first expressed in 1941.
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Recovering the wisdom of Protagoras from a reinterpretation of
the Prometheia trilogy
By Marty Sulek
The Greek culture of the Sophists had developed out of all the Greek instincts; it belongs to the
culture of the Periclean age as necessarily as Plato does not: it has its predecessors in Heraclitus,
in Democritus, in the scientific types of the old philosophy; it finds expression in, e.g., the high
culture of Thucydides. And – it has ultimately shown itself to be right: every advance in
epistemological and moral knowledge has reinstated the Sophists – Our contemporary way of
thinking is to a great extent Heraclitean, Democritean, and Protagorean: it suffices to say it is
Protagorean, because Protagoras represented a synthesis of Heraclitus and Democritus.
Nietzsche, The Will to Power, 2.428
Introduction
Protagoras of Abdêra (c.490-c.420 BC) is widely regarded, by both ancients and moderns, as the first and
greatest of the sophists, and as one of the chief harbingers of the 5th century Sophistic Enlightenment in
classical Athens. So widely influential was his philosophical humanism, in fact, that it was literally
chiseled into stone as the dominant political ideology of Periclean Athens. 1 Indeed, the philosophical
idealism expressed by Socrates and Plato, rooted in the Parmenidean doctrine of being, may be largely
read as a reaction to, and critique of, the philosophical pragmatism of Protagoras, rooted in the
Heraclitean doctrine of flux. Despite the wide renown and influence of Protagoras in classical Athens,
though, very little of his authentic writings survive. All that remain are a few disconnected fragments,
the titles of several of his books, commentaries on his thought, and depictions of Protagoras by later
authors, many of which are likely apocryphal. One of the most notable of these depictions is, of course,
Plato’s Socratic dialogue Protagoras, the veracity of which has long been regarded with suspicion.
In this essay, I present a case for considering the tragic play Prometheus Bound (Promêtheús Desmôtês,
hereafter ‘PB’) and the trilogy to which it belonged, to be best understood as a mythological
representation of the thought of Protagoras. This may seem a bold claim on its face. If it can be
substantiated, though, it would multiply several times over what is positively known of one of the most
renowned thinkers of the classical age of Greece, the writings of whom have since sunk into near total
obscurity. Furthermore, establishing the Protagorean provenance of the Prometheia trilogy would help
corroborate the accuracy of Plato’s portrayal of the great sophist in Protagoras. In particular, it would
go a considerable way toward validating the authenticity of the Great Speech (epideixis) he gives in that
dialogue (320c-324d) to explain how and why it is that virtue is teachable; a display speech that he
revealingly presents in the form of a Promethean myth.
In order to substantiate the thesis that the Prometheia trilogy is essentially the mũthos of a Protagorean
lógos, I address four main points in this essay. First, I summarise what little is positively known of the
thought of Protagoras, as primarily gleaned from the few extant fragments of his writings accepted as
authentic. Second, I briefly review scholarly reappraisals of the traditional dating and authorship of the
Prometheia trilogy that squarely situate it at the time when Protagoras’ influence in Athens was at its
zenith. Third, I analyse seven distinct elements of PB and the Prometheia trilogy to demonstrate how
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they reflect aspects of Protagorean thought. I then conclude by drawing out the implications of
understanding the Prometheia trilogy as a reflection of the philosophy of Protagoras, including the
insight it grants into both his extant fragments, and Plato’s portrayal of him.
What is known of the thought of Protagoras
What little remains of the writings of Protagoras consists of the titles of sixteen of his books, 2 some of
which are likely spurious, and fewer than a dozen fragments collected by Diels, only five of which
Schiappa (2003) judges as being most likely authentic. Two of these authenticated fragments are taken
from the opening lines of books written by Protagoras, the single most famous of which is taken from
the opening sentence of his book entitled On Truth or Refutatory Arguments. This fragment delineates
the essential epistemological foundations of his philosophical humanism, as follows:
Of everything and anything the measure [truly is] human(ity): of that which is, that it is the case;
of that which is not, that it is not the case. (fr. 1 [Diels] trans. Schiappa, p. 121) 3
The other fragment from the opening lines of a book written by Protagoras is taken from On the Gods,
and reflects on the ontological status of the gods, as follows:
Concerning the gods I am unable to know, whether they exist or whether they do not exist or
what they are like in form. For there are many hindrances to knowledge, the obscurity of the
subject and the brevity of human life. (fr. 4 [Diels] trans. Schiappa, pp. 141-2) 4
The three other fragments Schiappa judges to be authentic, finally, consist of extracts of what were
thought to be essential features of Protagorean philosophy, addressing the problematic nature of the
relationship between lógos and reality. 5
Reappraisals of the authorship and dating of the Prometheia trilogy
The traditional authorship and dating of the Prometheia trilogy is the primary factor that has previously
impeded serious consideration of the possibility that it was influenced by Protagorean thought, despite
the acknowledged presence of parallels between the two. The notion that Protagoras (c.490-c.420 BC)
might have influenced the composition of the trilogy has rarely been entertained, 6 because scholars
have traditionally held the trilogy to have been composed by Aeschylus (c.525/4-456/5 BC), while
Protagoras is generally thought to have first arrived in Athens no earlier than 460, and no later than 454
(Morrison, 1941, p. 7). Given these dates, it was practically impossible to see how the great sophist
could have influenced the Prometheia trilogy, even if it’s considered to be one of the last plays of
Aeschylus. 7 More recent scholarship, though, has contested its Aeschylean authorship on the basis of
both textual analysis and historical evidence. Given its language, metre and poetic style, PB was likely
written by a later, lesser author who was a contemporary of Sophocles and Euripides (Griffith, 1979,
1983, pp. 32-4) – quite possibly Aeschylus’ own eldest son, Euphorion (West, 1990, p. 68-70). Finally, on
the basis of several historical considerations examined by West (1979), the likely date of the Prometheia
trilogy’s premiere can be further narrowed to sometime in the first half of the 430s.
This new dating for the premiere of the Prometheia trilogy situates it at the very apogee of the Periclean
age, and raises many interesting questions. As Meier (1993) conclusively demonstrates, classical
Athenian tragedies, while often depicting mythological subjects, also invariably commented upon the
contemporary social, cultural and political issues of their day. This consideration naturally raises the
question: to what salient issues does the Prometheia trilogy refer, given its newly situated historical
context in the early 430s? It will be my task, in the remainder of this essay, to present evidence in
support of the hypothesis that, not only is the Prometheia trilogy a mythological representation of
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Protagorean thought, but that the character of Prometheus may be read as no less than an allegorical
representation of the sophist. More generally, I seek to demonstrate how the central conflict depicted
in the trilogy, between Zeus and Prometheus, is best understood as an allegorical representation of the
perennial struggle between statesman and sophist, power and wisdom.
Protagorean elements of the Prometheia trilogy
In the following analysis, I examine seven elements of the Prometheia trilogy that I believe best
exemplify how it depicts Protagoras and the sophists and/or demonstrates their influence upon it. My
initial selection criteria for these elements was to identify the trilogy’s most significant departures from
traditional versions of the Promethean myth; the supposition being that these deviations were most
likely incorporated so as to better illustrate the novel subject matter the author intended to depict in
the trilogy. Given the paucity of reliable information on Protagoras’ own views, I also compare the
seven selected elements to views expressed by authors known to have strongly influenced him, such as
Heraclitus and Simonides, and those whom he is known to have decisively influenced, such as Sophocles
and Critias.
1. The Need for Guarded Speech
The first indication of the presence of Protagorean ideas in the Prometheia trilogy occurs, appropriately
enough, in the only extant fragment from its first play, Prometheus Fire-Carrier (Promêtheús Purphóros).
In that fragment, one unidentified character speaks to another with the following words:
Both silent, when there is need, and speaking in season
Aeschylus fr. 118, Trans. Smyth
It is difficult to assess the precise significance of this passage without the larger context of the play.
Very little is known about Prometheus Fire-Carrier, except that it most likely depicted Prometheus’ theft
and gift of fire. When fr. 118 is compared to very similarly worded passages in Aeschylus, though (cf.
Seven Against Thebes 619, Libation Bearers 582), it becomes apparent that someone in it, perhaps even
Prometheus himself, is counseling circumspection regarding a plot; quite likely his own secret plan to
steal fire and give it to humans.
The primary issue addressed in the sole extant fragment from Prometheus Fire-Carrier, then, is the need
to employ guarded speech, likely with regard to Prometheus’ secret plan to give fire to humans. As it
happens, the issue of guarded speech also receives prominent attention in Plato's depiction of the great
sophist in Protagoras. In that dialogue, Protagoras asserts that the wise have always attempted to
disguise the precise nature of their teaching activities, including the use of secrecy and deception, in
order to avoid arousing the suspicions of the powerful (cf. Protagoras 316c-e). He then goes on to
explain that he does not conform with his predecessors in this regard, as they failed to successfully
deceive the powerful anyway. Instead, he says, he openly admits to being a sophist, although he points
out that he is still careful to take “other precautions” in teaching the youth of a city (316e-317c). On the
face of it, then, the theme of employing guarded speech from the only surviving fragment of
Prometheus Fire-Carrier aligns rather well with Protagoras’ assessment, as depicted by Plato, of the
circumspection the wise have traditionally employed in teaching their wisdom to the young of the
powerful.
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2. Prometheus as the Sophist
One of the more obvious factors pointing to Prometheus as an allegorical representation of Protagoras,
and the sophists generally, is that he is explicitly called a “sophist” twice in PB. In the prologue, Kratos
orders Hephaestus to securely rivet Prometheus to a rock, and then sneeringly adds: "that he may learn
[máthê], a sophist [sophistês] is no match for Zeus." (62) Kratos thus names Prometheus a sophist with
specific reference to the very word – máthê, from manthánô, to learn – from which his name is
constructed as an appellative (Narten 1960). In the exodus of PB, by comparison, Hermes addresses
Prometheus with the following words:
Thou, cunning wit [sophistês], outbittering bitterness,
Who gave to creatures of a day the gods’
High privileges, thee, thief of fire, I call.
The Father bids thee instantly reveal
This vaunted marriage, whate’er it be, whereby
His power shall fail,
944-9, trans. Thomson
In the two instances in which Prometheus is called a sophist in PB, then, albeit somewhat ironically, he is
described as such with specific reference to his identity with learning (máthê), his theft of fire, and the
secret he holds of a marriage that will eventually result in Zeus’ fall from power.
As noted above, Protagoras was the first person in all of Greece to openly "admit to being a sophist
[sophistês] and to educate [paideúein] human beings" (Plato, Protagoras 317b). While he did not coin
sophistês as a word, Protagoras is the first to impart it with the particular inflection of meaning to
specifically describe a talented educator. Previously, the only people described as sophists were poets
and musicians. 8 Even after Protagoras coined its novel usage to describe a skilled teacher, it continued
to be primarily employed in the classical age to describe a skilled poet or musician. 9 Protagoras even
recognises this more common usage, where he states that “sophistry [sophistikên] is an ancient art,”
encompassing the entire musical-poetic tradition of ancient Greece (Plato, Protagoras 316d).
Interestingly, the only contemporary of Protagoras who also describes skilled teachers as sophists is his
associate, Herodotus (c.484-425 BC). 10 Given this background, the descriptions of Prometheus as a
sophist in PB clearly follow the usage established by Protagoras; for Prometheus is the consummate
educator, whose very name is derived from the verb ‘to learn’, and who claims nothing less than to have
discovered and taught all the human arts (PB 506).
3. The Philanthrôpía of Prometheus
PB is notable for containing the first two extant occurrences of the word philanthrôpía in all of Greek
literature (De Ruiter, 1932, p. 272; Sulek, 2010, pp. 337-8). There, it is employed both times in adjective
form to describe the “philanthropic way [philanthrôpou trópou]” of Prometheus (11, 28). In the
prologos of the play, Kratos (‘Power’) and Hephaestus, the god of fire and craft, both condemn
Prometheus for his crime, before the latter fastens him to a stone with adamantine chains and a spike
driven through his torso. While the condemnations of Kratos and Hephaestus contrast in many ways,
they nevertheless agree in condemning the “philanthropic way” of Prometheus for motivating his gift of
fire to humans. 11
The strong emphasis on the philanthrôpou trópou of Prometheus invites comparison to Odysseus, who
is introduced in the Odyssey as the man of “many ways [polútropon]” (1.1). In contrast to the many
faceted intellect of Odysseus, though, the thought of Prometheus is primarily directed by his human
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loving ways. Far from denying this love, and the gifts to which it gave rise, Prometheus trenchantly
affirms them. Shortly after his tormentors exit the stage, he laments his punishment for “bestowing
gifts on mankind” [thnêtoĩs gàr géra] (107), and outright declares his “overmuch love of mortal men
[lían philótêta brotôn]!” (122) Later, at the beginning of the third èpeísodos, the only human in the play,
Io, also addresses Prometheus as "O bringer-to-light [phaneís] of universal benefit [ôphélêma] to
mortals" (613). Clearly, then, philanthrôpía constitutes an integral aspect of both the private character
and public persona of Prometheus.
Protagoras is associated with the concept of philanthrôpía in two ways: by textual evidence linking him
to its earliest occurrence as a word, and by the overall alignment of his philosophical humanism with the
earliest instances of that signal term’s usage. In terms of textual evidence, the only other authentic
work extant from the 5th century BC that employs philanthrôpía as a word, aside from PB, is
Aristophanes’ Peace (Sulek, 2010, p. 400), which premiered in 421. In that play, the Chorus praises
Hermes as “most philanthropic [philanthrôpótate] and most bountiful [megalodôrótate] of divinities
[daimónôn]” (395). In this nonce occurrence of philanthrôpía in the works Aristophanes, clear echoes of
its prior usage, to describe the character of Prometheus, may be detected. 12 Even more revealing,
though, is Plato’s use of both philanthrôpía and its perfect antonym, misanthropía, in several dialogues,
the dramatic settings of which date to the latter half of the 5th century. 13
The most revealing instances of Plato’s use of philanthrôpía in terms of drawing a connection to
Protagoras, are found in Laws and Protagoras. In Laws, the Athenian Stranger, in critiquing the
teachings of the sophists, describes a god who rules over those with intellect, and who is a
philanthropist for having sent daemons to rule over humans for their benefit (4.713d). 14 In Protagoras,
by comparison, Protagoras refers to the misanthropes who appeared in Pherecrates’ comedy, ‘Agrioi
(327d). 15 From these passages, it is reasonable to assume that, not only was Protagoras familiar with
the concept of philanthrôpía, but that it played an integral role in the expression of his philosophical
humanism, which saw the development and dissemination of technical knowledge as the key driving
force in the progress of human civilisation. This hypothesis is corroborated by its use in PB where the
philanthropic way of Prometheus is strongly associated with his disregard, defiance and/or hatred of the
established gods (10, 29, 975-6; cf. Protagoras, fr. 4), and his civilising influence on humans by
discovering and teaching them the various arts (447-506).
4. Orientation toward Hope
In the first èpeísodos of PB, Prometheus makes a significant addition to the gifts he claims to have given
humans, relative to traditional accounts; describing how he implanted "blind hope" (tuphlàs èlpídas) in
the hearts of mortal men (252). This radical reappraisal of hope, or expectation (èlpís) – as nothing less
than one of the gifts of Prometheus, that "causes mortals to cease foreseeing their doom" (250) –
represents a marked departure from traditional Greek views of hope, which tended to be considerably
more negative in outlook (Schmid, 1929, pp. 95-6; Herington, 1963, p. 191). In Hesiod’s Promethean
myth, for instance, hope is the one thing that Pandora manages to retain in a jar, after haplessly opening
its lid and releasing all the evils that afflict men into the world (Works & Days 90-105). Hesiod thus
implicitly portrays hope as an evil, albeit one that can thankfully be contained. Hesiod’s negative
assessment of hope is consistently maintained in subsequent archaic Greek literature. 16 Only in the
mid-6th century BCE, does a more favourable assessment appear, 17 although hope continues to be
regarded throughout the classical age with either outright suspicion 18 or, at best, a high degree of
ambivalence, with a clear differentiation drawn between disastrous foolish hopes, and justified wise
ones. 19
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Two of the more significant positive re-assessments of hope in the classical age, in terms of their
connections to Protagoras, occur in the writings of Heraclitus (c.535-c.475 BCE) and Sophocles (c.497/6406/5 BCE). Heraclitus invokes the concept of hope in two fragments from his book On Nature. In one,
he describes the necessity of hope for discovering new paths to knowledge (fr. 18, Diels); and in the
other, he refers to the hope of men in an afterlife (fr. 27, Diels). Scholars have long thought Heraclitus
to have decisively influenced the thought of Protagoras (cf. Nietzsche, 1967, p. 233; Schiappa, 1991, p.
108). Likewise, scholars have long thought Protagoras decisively influenced the composition of
Sophocles’ renowned ‘Ode to Man’ in the first stasimon of Antigone (332-375) (Burton, 1980, pp. 100101; Morrison, 1941, pp. 13-14; Segal, 1964, p. 53 ff.; but especially Crane, 1989, p. 109 20).
In the Ode to Man, the Chorus of Theban Elders express the hope inspired by various human
contrivances, concluding with praise for human “skill in technical inventiveness beyond all expectation
[sophón ti tò mêchanóen téchnas ùpès èlpíd’]” (365) albeit sometimes for good, sometimes for evil. The
date of the premiere of Antigone, in 441 or slightly before, temporally situates it just prior to the new
dating of the Prometheia trilogy, in first half of the 430s. Taken together, then, Heraclitus’
unprecedented reassessment of the epistemological value of hope, along with his acknowledged
influence on Protagoras, in combination with Protagoras’ acknowledged influence on a passage of
Sophocles in which the poet invokes hope in human inventiveness, suggest that Protagoras is also
behind the unprecedented depiction of hope in PB, as the other great gift of Prometheus, in addition to
fire.
5. The Gift of Fire
In the second èpeísodos of PB (436-525) Prometheus presents a highly elaborate description of his gifts
to humans, in which fire is revealed as a metaphor for him having implanted “mind [ënnous]” and the
“gift of understanding [phrenôn èpêbólous]” in humans (444), and discovered and taught them all the
human arts [téchnai brotoĩsin]” (506). The significance of this central èpeísodos of the Prometheia
trilogy has long formed a sharp point of controversy among classical scholars. Schmid (1929) was among
the first to explicitly argue that the progressive conception of human history it presents was derived
from the teachings of the sophists (pp. 93-6). This hypothesis is corroborated by "parallel accounts"
between the central èpeísodos of PB and Sophocles’ Ode to Man (White, 2001, pp. 113-4), the latter of
which classical scholars have long maintained was decisively influenced by Protagoras, as noted above.
Building on Schmid’s work, Davidson (1949) even went so far as to argue that Prometheus is nothing less
than an allegorical representation of Protagoras. 21
While the theories advanced by Schmid and Davidson were considered far fetched at the time (cf.
Bacon, 1930; McKay, 1955, p. 149), they have since been vindicated by subsequent scholarly analysis.
Building on the work of Guthrie (1971), West (1979, p. 147) notes that the closest parallel to the central
èpeísodos of PB in the classical age is found in none other than the Promethean myth Protagoras relates
in his display speech (epideixis) in Plato’s Protagoras (320c-324d). 22 Scholars have long recognised that
the Promethean “myth related by Protagoras is a re-elaboration or an imitation of a theory on the
formation of human civilisation given by the sophist in his Περὶ τῆς ἐν ἀρχῇ καταστάσεως (“On the
Primitive Condition [of Mankind]”).” (Levi, 1940, p. 289; cf. Maguire, 1977, p. 113-4). Given that
“accounts of man’s progress from a beastlike condition and of his development of technical skills
appear” in these works, and nowhere earlier, it seems likely that the central episode of PB was largely
derived from Protagoras’ book, On the Primitive State of Mankind (West, loc. cit.). In this light, the
hypotheses of Schmid and Davidson become not only plausible, but compelling; namely, that the author
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of the Prometheia trilogy was decisively influenced by the revolutionary teachings of Protagoras, and
that Prometheus is an allegorical representation of the sophist. 23
6. Zeus as Subject to Necessity
A sixth factor pointing to Protagorean influence on the Prometheia trilogy is its unprecedented depiction
of Zeus as subject to Necessity, Fate and the Furies. At the end of the prologue of PB, Prometheus
alludes to the irresistible nature of necessity (ànágkês) with regard to his own fate (104-5). At the end
of the key, central èpeísodos, though, he further announces that Zeus, too, is subject to the "helmsman
of necessity [ànágkês èstìn oìakostróphos]”; this helmsman consisting of: the "three-shaped Fates
[Moῖra trímorphoi]” and "mindful Furies [mnêmonés t' 'Erinúes]” (515-521). This is a rather startling
assertion, given the traditional Greek understanding of Zeus as undisputed master of the Fates. 24 Zeus'
mastery of the Fates in archaic sources is all the more significant in light of how all the other gods
nevertheless remain subject to them. Hesiod, for instance, writes that the three ruthless avenging Fates
(Moíras) "prosecute the transgressions of men [àndrôn] and gods [theôn]." (Theogony 220) He then
later describes, though, how Zeus gave the Fates (Moíras) "honor supreme" (ibid. 905); a dispensation
that clearly implies his power over them.
Besides Hesiod, only three Greek authors writing prior to the premiere of the Prometheia trilogy
positively assert that the gods, too, are subject to necessity, fate and the Furies. The earliest is
Simonides (c.556-468), who wrote "even the gods [theoì] can't fight necessity [ànágka]." (fr. 542.21, ed.
West) Herodotus of Halicarnassus (c.484-c.425), by comparison, records the Delphic Oracle as having
stated that "No one may escape his fate [moĩran], not even a god [theô]." (History 1.91.1). 25 And
Heraclitus of Ephesus (c.535-c.475 BCE), finally, asserts that the sun god, too, is subject to the avenging
Furies (Erinúes) (fr. 94, cf. fr. 80). 26 Heraclitus also observes that “thunderbolt steers [oìakízei] the
totality of things” (fr. 64); 27 language that Prometheus closely echoes when he declares that the Fates
and Furies are the “helmsman [oìakostróphos]” of necessity (PB 515-6). As Herington observes,
Heraclitus is alone among the Pre-Socratic philosophers in his "use of compounds of οϊαζ in describing
the guidance of the universe" (1963, p. 191); a point also noted by Gladigow (1962).
Heraclitus, Simonides and Herodotus are all closely tied to Protagoras. Heraclitus' influence on him has
long been recognised, as noted above. Protagoras’ familiarity with Simonides, on the other hand, is
reflected by Plato’s depiction of him citing from memory an ode by the poet (Protagoras 339b-c,
Simonides fr. 542.1-6) in his debate with Socrates on the nature of virtue. In a slightly later passage of
the very same Ode, Simonides goes on to write that “even the gods can't fight necessity” (fr. 542.21).
Regarding Herodotus, finally, both the great historian and Protagoras were members of Pericles' inner
circle of friends and advisors, and presumably knew one other well. Both of them are also known to
have travelled to Thurii, in southern Italy, in the late 440s, further hinting at the possibility of some level
of association, and perhaps even collaboration, between the two. 28
Protagoras may be seen to have held the view that the gods are subject to necessity, as may be
discerned from the Promethean myth he tells in Plato’s Protagoras (320c-324d). Interpreting the lógos
concealed in that mũthos, Protagoras would appear to have considered worship of the gods to be one of
the earliest innovations of human society (322a; cf. PB 457-8, 484-498). 29 The view that the gods were
created by people for social benefit is also found in the writings and reported views of Protagoras’ most
infamous student, Critias (fr. 25; cf. Plato, Charmides 164e). Given this background, it seems highly likely
that the historically determined nature of the traditional gods, including Zeus, and their consequent
subjugation to fate and necessity, formed a primary subject of Protagoras’ lost book, On the Gods. If so,
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it also seems likely that Protagoras was the primary transmitter of the revolutionary idea expressed by
Prometheus: that all the gods, even Zeus himself, are subject to Necessity, the helm of which is steered
by the three-formed Fates, and the remembering Furies (PB 515-6).
7. The Secret of Zeus’ Downfall and the Reconciliation of Power and Wisdom
The seventh and final factor examined in this essay indicating the influence of Protagoras on the
Prometheia trilogy regards two closely interrelated elements. The first is several references in PB to a
secret held by Prometheus, of a forced ‘marriage’ Zeus will one day perpetrate against Thetis that will
result in the birth of a son that will cast the new king of heaven down from power. 30 The second is a
ceremony reminiscent of a marriage celebration at the conclusion of the trilogy, in the ëxodos of
Prometheus Unbound (Promêtheús Luómenos), signifying the reconciliation of Zeus and Prometheus,
and the (re-)union of power and wisdom. 31 These elements are unprecedented in traditional, archaic
accounts of the Promethean myth; however, they comport quite well with what little is known of the
political philosophy of Protagoras. The danger of Zeus falling from power naturally flows from the
Protagorean idea that gods are a human creation, and are thereby also subject to necessity. That the
danger to Zeus’ reign emanates from a child yet to be born of his lustful impulses serves to underline his
subjugation, as a generated god, to the processes of becoming. This ontological reality is further
underlined by having Thetis, the primordial creator of the cosmos and mother of the gods, be the
prospective mother of this prodigious child. 32
The marriage of power and wisdom symbolised by the reconciliation of Zeus and Prometheus at the
conclusion of the Prometheia trilogy, on the other hand, is an apt reflection of Protagoras’ own efforts
to reconcile the sophistic tradition with political power. This may be seen, for instance, in his
declaration that he was the first to freely and openly declare himself to be a sophist and to educate
humans (Plato, Protagoras 317b). It’s further reflected in the primary subject matter he claimed to
teach: good counsel (euboulia) so as to make his students most powerful (dynatôtatos) regarding the
things of the city (ibid. 318e-319a), as opposed to the more technical subject matter of natural
philosophy (ibid. 318d-e). Having Prometheus employ his wise counsel to preserve the reign of Zeus is
also a fitting portrayal of what was likely one of the chief principles of Protagorean political philosophy,
given the view implicitly attributed to him by the Athenian Stranger, that:
laws ought not to look to war or to virtue as a whole, but ought to look to what is in the interest
of the established regime, to whatever will allow that regime to rule forever and avoid
dissolution. (Plato, Laws 4.714c)
In the same way, Prometheus, who had previously advised Zeus in overthrowing Kronos (PB 216-225),
reassumes his status at the conclusion of the Prometheia trilogy, as chief political advisor of the newly
established king of the gods, warning him of emergent threats to his continued reign. At the same time,
Zeus grants him a permanent place of honour in the new regime, symbolising the newly won public
status of the forethoughtful and philanthropic wise in Athens, thereafter designated ‘the school of
Greece’.
Conclusion
In this essay, I have presented evidence for the hypothesis that the mũthos of the Prometheia trilogy is a
representation of the lógos of Protagoras. In so doing, I identified and analysed seven elements of the
trilogy with an eye to demonstrating how they illustrate key aspects of his thought: the need for the
wise to employ caution in their speech vis-à-vis the powerful; the sophist as an educator of humanity;
philanthropy as a key value of the sophist’s philosophical humanism; wise hope for the progress of
9
civilised humanity based on the advancement of knowledge; the key role of the sophist in propelling
that ascent through the continued discovery and dissemination of knowledge; the subjugation of the
gods to necessity, as a human creation for fulfilling humane social and political purposes; and the
absolute need for power and wisdom to rule together in perpetuity for the continued good of the
human species. I realise that no one of these elements, on its own, could be accepted as definitive
proof that the Prometheia trilogy is a representation of the thought of Protagoras. Taken together,
though, I find they elegantly correspond with and illuminate many aspects of what little is known of his
thought.
Recognising that the mũthos of the Prometheia trilogy is a representation of the lógos of Protagoras
opens up many possibilities for both validating representations of the great sophist previously regarded
as suspect, and reconstructing various other aspects of his thought. In particular, it validates the
authenticity of the Promethean myth that Protagoras tells in his Great Speech in Plato’s Protagoras
(320c-324d), given how closely it is paralleled by Prometheus’ account of what he did for humans in the
central èpeísodos of PB (447-506). Furthermore, a close comparison of these two mythic accounts, plus
several other very similar accounts from the classical age, 33 provides a sufficient basis, I believe, for
substantially reconstructing the content of Protagoras’ lost book, On the Original State of Things, which
also likely documented the historical rise of human civilization stemming from the discovery and
dissemination of technical knowledge. Such analysis also provides considerable insight into the content
of another important lost book of Protagoras – On the Gods – which likely argued that human creation
of the gods represented not only an early phase in the development of human society, but also in the
development of abstract thought. All in all, then, a significant gain in knowledge of one of the greatest
Pre-Socratic thinkers of the classical age.
10
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12
Endnotes
1
The political philosophy of Protagoras was quite literally chiseled into stone in Athens, given the analysis of Mark
(1984), who inteprets the arrangement of the Gods on the East Frieze of the Parthenon, built between 447 and
432 BC, as depicting Protagorean ideas on the origins of society and political order.
2
Truth, On Being, Great Logos, On the Gods, Contradictory Arguments. Doubtful titles from Diogenes Laertius: Art
of the Eristics, On Mathematics, On Wrestling and the Other Arts, On Constitution, On the Original State of Things,
On Ambition, On Virtues, On Human Errors, Exhortation, Trial Concerning a Fee, On the Underworld. Collected by
Hermann Diels in Die Fragmente der Vorskratiker (1906).
3
A less literal, but more familiar wording of this fragment reads: “Man is the measure of all things, of things that
are that they are, and of things that are not that they are not.” [trans. Hicks]) This statement is often cited as the
single most succinct expression of the humanistic outlook of the 5th century sophistic enlightenment, which
Protagoras is widely acknowledged as having played a pivotal role in bringing to Athens (Schiappa, 2003, pp. 14-5).
It is also cited as evidence of Protagoras' philosophical relativism by Socrates, who characterizes it as asserting that
each person's view of the world is true to them as they perceive it, and that "knowledge is nothing but
perception." (Plato, Theaetetus 151e, 160c, 178b-c; cf. Cratylus 385d, Laws 716c). Shortly after citing this passage,
Socrates then goes on to argue that all the major Greek philosophers and poets – Protagoras, Heraclitus,
Empedocles, Epicharmus and Homer – agree that everything is in the process of becoming, the sole exception
being Parmenides (Theaetetus, 152d-e). Schiappa (2003) likewise maintains that the ‘Man is the Measure’
fragment constitutes the opening of a philosophical response to Parmenides' ontological claim that a single
unchanging being exists apart from our varying perceptions of it (pp. 121-5).
4
This statement was cited in later antiquity as evidence of Protagoras' alleged atheism (Sextus Empiricus, Against
the Physicists 9.50), and likely provided the basis for later claims that the Athenians expelled him from Athens and
burned his books in the marketplace (cf. Diogenes Laertius 9.51-2; Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods 1.23.6). This
alleged prosecution is most likely apocryphal, though, as it is contradicted by the more reliable statement of Plato,
that Protagoras maintained a consistently high reputation throughout his long life of 70 years (Plato, Meno 91e).
More recent scholarship has also reappraised the meaning the opening statement of On the Gods, interpreting it
as the expression of an agnostic, rather than atheistic, viewpoint. In the reading of Werner Jaeger (1968), for
instance, it does not so much deny the existence of the gods as it clears the way for a discussion of what can be
rationally said about the gods. In short, Protagoras would seem to have undertook a humanistic treatment of the
subject of religion in On the Gods; an approach that does not claim to know the gods, per se, but rather to
understand the role of worship of the gods has in human history, and thereby "the good things the gods bring."
(Lampert, 2010, p. 60)
5
Regarding the fragments on lógos, Diogenes Laertius cites fr. 6a (Diels) where he writes that Protagoras "was the
first to maintain that there are two sides to every question, opposed to each other," (Lives 9.51, trans. Hicks). This
fragment, which Schiappa terms "the two logoi" fragment (2003, pp. 89-101), is a strong reflection of the
philosophical relativism usually ascribed to Protagoras. It's also clearly related to fr. 6b (Diels), which Schiappa
terms the "stronger and weaker logoi" (ibid., pp. 103-115). In Rhetoric (1402a), Aristotle writes that Protagoras
promised to teach how "to make the weaker argument stronger." (trans. Schiappa) In making such claims,
Protagoras may thus be seen to have posed fundamental challenges to more traditional arrangements of the
"relationship of stronger and weaker between conflicting logoi." (Schiappa, 2003, p. 107)
The third fragment of Protagoras on lógos states that "it is impossible to contradict [antilegein]." This phrase
is cited by a number of ancient authors without attribution; as Schiappa demonstrates, though, "the best available
evidence points to Protagoras" as its originator (2003, p. 134). The exact meaning of this fragment is somewhat
obscure, as it is quoted out of context in a kind of shorthand, but some scholars have conjectured that it
challenged what eventually became known as Aristotle's Law of Non-contradiction, whereby: "It is impossible for
the same attribute at once to belong and not to belong to the same thing and in the same relation." (Metaphysics
1005b19-20, trans. Tredennick)
6
One of the most notable exceptions to this is Davidson (1949).
7
Aeschylus left Athens for Sicily in 458, shortly after the premiere, and victory, of his Oresteia trilogy at the
Dionysia festival.
13
Sophistês is a noun derived from sophízesthai, the present infinitive verb tense of the root noun form, sophía
(Guthrie, 1971, p. 28). The earliest extant use of this specific word form – sophistês – is found in an ode written by
Pindar in 478, where he employs the term specifically to describe "skilled poets" (Isthmian 5.28). Aeschylus, by
comparison, in a fragment (314 Nauck, 174 Smyth) quoted by Athenaeus (632c), is said to have used the word in a
very similar sense, to describe the sophistês who plays the lyre with skill. As a preface to his citation of this
fragment, Athanaeus also writes that, in archaic times, all who dedicated themselves to the study of music were
called sophistês; however, no evidence for this usage survives in source texts predating Pindar's Ode and the
fragment of Aeschylus cited above. However, the comic poet, Cratinus (519-422), in a fragment (2K) cited by
Diogenes Laertius (1.12) is also said to have praised Homer and Hesiod in his comic play Archilochoi (c.448) by
giving them the title of sophist (sophistaí). Euripides, too, praises a musician as sophistê in Rhesus (924); however,
the authorial authenticity and date of this play is in considerable doubt. These four passages from Pindar,
Aeschylus, Cratinus and possibly Euripides, are the only verifiable extant instances of the use of sophistês as a word
that occur prior to Protagoras' arrival in Athens, sometime between 460 and 454.
9
Cf. Eupolis (c.446-411) fr. 447 K; Plato Comicus (fl. 428-389) fr. 140 K; Phrynichus Comicus (fl. 429-405) fr. 69 K;
Iophon (fl. 428-405) fr. 1 N².
10
In book one of his History, Herodotus writes that all the 'teachers' (sophistaí) of Greece who lived during the
reign of the Lydian king, Croesus (lived 595-c.54?, ruled 560-546) came to visit his capital, Sardis, including the
great Athenian statesman, Solon (c.638-558) (1.29.1). In book two, by comparison, Herodotus describes how
Melampus, a "clever and prophetic man [ändra sophòn mantikên]," introduced the worship of Dionysus, although
later 'teachers' (sophistaí) doubtless added to his teaching (2.49.1). And in book four, finally, Herodotus relates
how Zalmoxis consorted with Pythagoras, one of the greatest 'teachers' (sophistê) of Greece (4.95.2).
11
The indictments of Prometheus articulated by Kratos and Hephaestus differ in several significant ways. Kratos
highlights Prometheus’ disloyalty toward the rule of Zeus; while Hephaestus is more concerned with his lack of
outward displays of loyalty to an angry god. Kratos emphasises the need for Prometheus to requite an offence
against the Gods; while Hephaestus merely states that he exceeded justice in granting privileges to mortal men.
Kratos is concerned with Prometheus' inward disposition toward the regime of Zeus, while Hephaestus would
seem to be more concerned with his lack of outward displays of conformity to standards of justice of the Gods.
While these indictments differ in several significant respects, though, they are in complete concord in terms of
their mutual condemnation of Prometheus’ philanthropic way.
12
The Chorus’ praise of Hermes, the daemonic messenger of the Olympians, may be interpreted as a parody of the
praise of Prometheus, whom Hesychius describes as messenger of the Titans (Lexicon i387, s.v. Ithas).
Aristophanes’ usage of philanthrôpía in Peace is also strongly reflected in Plato’s depiction of the playwright’s
superlative praise of Eros in Symposium as “the most philanthropic [philanthropotatos] of gods, a helper of human
beings as well as a physician dealing with an illness the healing of which would result in the greatest happiness for
the human race.” (189c-189d) As Strauss (2001) observes, Symposium and Protagoras contain numerous parallels
in, for example, the characters that appear (p. 25), Socrates’ description of his situation (p.175) and the
employment of dramatic devices (p. 255), such that these two dialogue “very much belong together.” (p. 25)
Although Strauss does not directly mention it, Aristophanes’ speech in Symposium (189c193d), in which he praises
Eros as most philanthropic and then employs a myth to describe its genesis, finds its closest parallel in the Great
Speech (epideixis) Protagoras delivers in Protagoras (320c-324d), in the form of a Promethean myth. These several
parallels, I would maintain, collectively point to a level of association between the concept of philanthrôpía and
the philosophy of Protagoras.
13
Philanthrôpía in Plato: Laws 4.713d (dramatic date c. 550), Symposium 189c (421), Euthyphro 3d (399);
misanthropía: Laws 7.791d, Protagoras 327d (433), Phaedo 89d (399). Cf. Xenophon, who also employs
philanthrôpía in the context of depictions of conversations involving Socrates that occur in the latter half of the 5th
century (Memorabilia 4.3.5, 7; Oeconomicus 15.4, 19.17).
14
In Laws, the Athenian Stranger proposes a system of laws for a city that is to be newly founded. Before doing so,
he invokes the aide of “a god [theoũ] who truly rules as a despot [despózesthai] over those who possess intellect
[noũn].” (713a) He further describes this god as “a friend of humanity [philánthrôpos]” for having sent daemons to
rule over humans in a way that provided much ease for both, and “peace, awe, goods laws and justice without
stint.” (4.713d) This passage from Laws constitutes the earliest use of philanthrôpía within the dramatic setting of
Plato’s dialogues. Traditional scholarship has tended to maintain that Laws has no discernable dramatic date (cf.
Nails, 2002). Zuckert (2009, p. 8 & 11; 2004, p. 375), on the other hand, dates the dramatic action of Laws to
8
14
sometime between 460 and 450 BCE, primarily based on the fact that it contains many references to the Persian
Wars (which formally ended in 449 BCE, with the Peace of Callias), but no references to the Peloponnesian War
(which began in earnest in 331 BCE). At the same time, the Athenian Stranger’s reference to the opening of
Protagoras’ book, Truth (Laws, 4.716c; cf. Protagoras fr. 1) would seem to confirm that the dramatic setting of
Laws occurs after the arrival of Protagoras in Athens, sometime in the 450s.
The Athenian Stranger then argues how and why the best form of political rule must necessarily be
underwritten by this god of intellect. In so doing, he critiques a number of ideas attributable to other Pre-Socratic
philosophers, the common thread of which is their association, both direct and indirect, with Protagoras. The
Athenian Stranger prefaces his remarks by saying that: “there can be no rest from evils and toils for those cities in
which some mortal rules rather than a god” (Laws 4.713e, cf. Republic 5.473); that “we should obey whatever
within us partakes of immortality, giving the name ‘law’ to the distribution ordained by intelligence.” (Laws 4.714a,
cf. Heraclitus fr. 114). He then goes on to point out that there are “some who assert” that there are many forms of
laws and regimes, and that laws ought not to look to war or virtue, but “to whatever will allow that regime to rule
forever and avoid dissolution.” Furthermore, “they claim that the finest way to formulate the definition of justice”
according to nature is as “the interest of the stronger.” (Plato, Laws 4.714c) This last phrase is, of course, the exact
same wording the younger sophist, Thrasymachus (c.459-c.400 BC), employs in his infamous definition of justice in
the Republic, that it is “the advantage of the stronger [toũ kreíttonos sumphéron]” (1.338c). This parallel wording
is a clear indication that the “they” to whom the Athenian Stranger assigns this doctrine are the students of
Protagoras.
The inclusion of Protagorean political doctrines in Laws and Republic is not surprising, given Porphyry’s
observation that Plato plagerises Protagoras elsewhere on ontological matters:
At any rate, in the place where I happened to have been reading in Protagoras’ book On Being the
argument he uses against those who make Being One, I find that he uses the same refutatory terms.
(Eusebius, Praeparatio evangelica 10.3.25; Protagoras, fr. 2).
Given Plato’s documented plagerism of Protagoras regarding ontological matters, it is not unreasonable to assume
that he would do the same with his political doctrines. Most significantly, the Athenian Stranger critiques
Protagoras’ ‘Man is the measure’ doctrine; arguing, instead, that the only true measure of things is the god of
intellect (4.716c).
If there was ever any doubt that the Athenian Stranger is referring above to the sophistic doctrines of
Protagoras, though, these doubts are laid to rest in the denouement of his explanation as to why it is best to have
a god of intellect rule as a despot, where he makes a veiled reference to the single most famous maxim of the
great sophist:
For us, the god would be the measure of all things in the highest degree, and far more so than some
‘human being,’ as they assert. (Laws 4.716c)
This passage is, of course, an obvious reference to fr. 1 of Protagoras, albeit in the form of a critique of that
doctrine, that the human is the measure of all things. In so referencing one of the primary doctrines of Protagoras,
though, the Athenian Stranger is not critiquing it so much as recasting it to win over the more pious sensibilities of
his elderly Dorian interlocutors – the Cretan, Kleinias, and the Spartan Megillus – as well as to add an important
philosophical qualification to the statement. Later in the dialogue, he also notes the pernicious political influence
of “the contrivances [mechanaí] of those called ‘sophists’ [sophistôn]” (10.908d) in a manner strongly reflecting
Protagoras’ novel usage of that term.
In referencing Protagoras, then, the Athenian Stranger is actually correcting his openness and seeming
relativism regarding the role of the wise in educating people and establishing the measure of things. Instead, he
hides their preeminent role in defining the horizons of human culture by re-mythologising it, and substituting the
“human” with “a god who rules as a despot over those with intellect” as the true measure of all things. Given the
context in which this substitution occurs, though, it is clear that the mythological god to which he refers is thinly
veiled metaphor for the wise – the sophist even – whose perspective is more comprehensive than the merely
human. And, indeed, this is precisely the role the Athenian Stranger performs in Laws: acting as a philanthropic
philosopher, a god of intellect, who commissions Kleinias and Megillus to act as daemons in establishing just rule
over their newly founded city. This ‘philanthropic way’ of the Athenian Stranger – as a wise man seeking to
15
establish just and lasting rule through those in power – is, I would argue, simply a more cautious and furtive
implimentation of Protagoras’ own doctrine.
15
Protagoras’ own familiarity with the concept of philanthrôpía is most clearly demonstrated by his reference to its
conceptual opposite – misanthropía – in Plato’s Protagoras. Shortly after concluding his ‘Great Speech’ (447-506),
Protagoras further illustrates one of its key points – namely, that all civilized men have at least some small share of
justice, if only the desire to appear so out of an innate sense of shame – with reference to the “misanthropes
[misánthrôpoi]” that appeared in Pherecrates' comedy, 'Agrioi, that he says appeared the previous year (i.e. in 434
BCE) in the Lenaea (Protagoras 327d).
The Lenaea was an Athenian dramatic festival mounted primarily for the performance of comedies that also
included a competition for tragedies beginning in 432. Protagoras' mention of Pherecrates' comedy, 'Agrioi, being
stated in the Lenaea held in 434 has presented one of the major impediments to positively establishing the
dramatic date of Plato's Protagoras. However, the primary ancient source for dating the premiere of 'Agrioi is
Athenaeus (fl. late 2nd early 3rd century AD), who states that it was staged during the archonship of Aristion
(5.218d-e), i.e. in 421/0 BCE. In making this assessment, Athenaeus likely relied upon a didasclalia, an official
public record of a play's performance. However, he also lived more than six centuries after the facts he describes
in this case, and thus his assessments should be regarded with caution.
From other sources, it is also known that Pherecrates gained his first victory during the archonship of
Theodorus, i.e. 438 BCE (Anonymous, On Comedy, p. xxix, quoted in Smith [1867] vol. 3, p. 257). Given that
Aristophanes is known to have revised Clouds after it was first produced, in 423, it is not unreasonable to
conjecture that Pherecrates could have premierd 'Agrioi in 434, but revised and restaged it in 421/0, when he won
his victory with it. The single most decisive piece of evidence in assessing the date of 'Agrioi, though, comes from
inscriptions, in which Pherecrates is recorded as having been victorious in the City Dionysia festival in the mid-440s
(IG II² 2325. 56), and twice at the Lenaia festival, the first time in the mid to late 430s (IG II² 2325. 122). It is
tempting to conclude that this latter inscription records Pherecrates' victory at the Lenaia with ‘Agrioi, as the mid
to late 430s precisely matches the date Protagoras gives for its performance in Plato’s Protagoras; 434 BCE being
the year before the dramatic date of that dialogue.
‘Agrioi were wild folk, whose appellative literally translates as 'living in the fields', and who represented one
aspect of the antithesis of civilized humanity depicted in Pherecrates’ play. The other aspect of this antithesis is
embodied by its chorus, composed of misanthropes who, disgusted by the injustice they’ve experienced at the
hands of people in the city, flee to the countryside. Once in the wilds, though, they find themselves even further
dismayed by the outlandishly unjust behavior of 'agrioi; savages who make even the wickedest city-dwellers seem
positively just by comparison – a situation naturally ripe with comedic possibilities. The misanthropes who flee the
city for the wilderness in 'Agrioi may thus be construed as somewhat of a comic inversion of the philanthropic
Prometheus, whose gifts of discovering and teaching all human knowledge brought about the rise of human
civilization in the first place. Pherecrates' 'Agrioi thus appears to be the first in a series of prominent Old Attic
comedies that parodied various aspects of the Prometheia trilogy.
Protagoras' reference to misánthrôpoi in Plato's Protagoras is anamolous in the context of extant texts dating
from the 5th century. Plato, writing in the first half of the 4th century, is the first Greek writer to employ this
neologism in his extant works;15 and Protagoras' utterance of it in the dialogue named for him is one of the earlier
uses of the word within the dramatic frame of Plato's dialogues.15 Given the novelty of philanthrôpía as a word
and concept in the 5th century, its prominence in describing the character of Prometheus, the sophist, in PB, plus
Protagoras' reference to misánthrôpoi in the course of expositing upon the principles of his own pedagogical
philosophy, it may be reasonably inferred that these terms expressed conceptual opposites in the humanistic
ideals of Protagorean philosophy, and his novel conceptions of the development of human civilization.
16
Cf. Semonides of Amorgos (fl. 7th century), fr. 1.6-7 (ed. West); Solon (c.638-558), frs. 13.33-6, 34 (ed. West);
Theognis of Megara (fl. 6th century), fr. 333-4 (ed. West); Pseudo-Theognis, frs. 637, 639, 823; Simonides of Ceos
(c.556-468), fr. 542.13-8 (ed. West); Pindar (c.522-c.443), Nemean 1.32, 11.22, 11.42-6.
17
Cf. Theognidea 1135-46 (ed. West); Aesop, 'Zeus and the Jar of Good Things'.
18
Cf. Thucydides 2.56.4, 5.103; Sophocles, Oedipus At Colonus 1748-1750.
19
Cf. Herodotus on vain hope (1.80.5, 2.13.3, 3.112.2, 5.36.3, 6.5.1, 8.77.1) versus justified hope (3.119.2, 5.30.6,
5.35.4, 6.11.3, 9.61.3, 9.106.2); Antiphon fr. 58; Democritus frs. 58, 185, 292.
20
"Clearly Protagoras, or at least Protagorean thinking, lies behind this 'Ode to Man.' The emphasis on man and
lack of emphasis on the gods, the sense of human progress, and the stress on political skill all point to Protagoras."
16
(Crane, 1989 p. 109). The influence of the Ode to Man may be seen by its influence on Shakespeare, for whom it
is thought to have provided the inspiration for a equally notable soliloquy in Hamlet (Ferguson, December 01,
1974, p. 44), in which the Danish Prince morosely contemplates the state of humankind:
"What a piece of work is a man!
How noble in reason, how infinite in faculty,
in form and moving how express and admirable,
in action how like an angel, in apprehension how like a god,
the beauty of the world, the paragon of animals!
And yet to me, what is this quintessence of dust?"
Hamlet, act 2 scene 2, lines 305-310
21
The chronological difficulty raised by attributing sophistic influences to a work long attributed to Aeschylus was,
in fact, a decisive factor in Schmid (1929) adopting the then highly controversial hypothesis, first explicitly
articulated by Gercke (1911), though opposed at the time by Körte (1920) and Wilamowitz (1914), that PB is not an
authentic work of the great tragedian, but was rather the work of a later author. Building on Schmid's work,
Davidson (1949) further hypothesises that the character of Prometheus, as depicted in the Prometheia trilogy, may
be interpreted as an allegorical representation of Protagoras. Rather than explaining this Protagorean presence by
questioning Aeschylus' authorship of PB, though, Davidson instead argues that the chronological difficulty of
positing the presence of sophistic influences on a play attributed to Aeschylus is better resolved by assuming that
Protagoras first visited Athens much earlier than previously supposed.
In Davidson's view, the conflict between Zeus and Prometheus, as depicted in the Prometheia trilogy, is best
understood as an allegorical representation of Protagoras' participation in the stásis, or civil insurrection that
occurred in Athens in the late 460s. In this conception, the trilogy’s depiction of Zeus and the Olympians symbolise
the ascendant democratic faction led by Ephialtes and, after his assassination in 461 BCE, his deputy, Pericles
(c.495-429 BCE). The vanquished Kronos and the Titans, on the other hand, symbolise the aristocratic faction led
by Kimon (510-450 BCE), whose political power was significantly downgraded as a result of the conflict. As this
earlier presence of Protagoras in Athens, and his participation in these events, is nowhere supported by textual
evidence, though, Davidson's interpretive hypothesis was not widely adopted by other scholars.
In summation, while the controversial theories advanced by Schmidt and Davidson offer elegant solutions for
resolving the problems associated with properly interpreting the meaning of PB, and the trilogy to which it
belonged, the chronological difficulties of positing sophistic and/or Protagorean influence on a work of Aeschylus
perhaps resulted in them not being taken as seriously as they might otherwise have been. Their controversial
interpretations of the Prometheia trilogy have since been thoroughly vindicated, though, by the more recent work
of several prominent classical scholars, most notably Griffin and West, who have more forcefully called Aeschylus'
authorship into question.
22
“The poet's picture of the evolution of human civilization, with the gift of fire by Prometheus leading to the
growth of arts and crafts (PV 110, 254, 442 ff.) is most closely paralleled in the myth that Plato puts in the mouth
of Protagoras (Prot. 320c ff., 321d), which is generally agreed to follow the lines of Protagoras' own work περι της
έν άρχη καταστάσεως [On The Original State Of Things]. Accounts of man's progress from a beastlike condition
and of his development of technical skills appear in several tragedians and other writers from the second half of
the fifth century and nowhere earlier. It is likely that this conception originated in a particular sophist's account Protagoras'.” (West, The Prometheus Trilogy, 1979, p. 147)
23
Given the Prometheia trilogy’s traditional ascription to Aeschylus, scholars have long assumed that the central
èpeísodos of PB influenced the composition of Sophocles’ Ode to Man and the Great Speech of Protagoras. Taking
into account the findings of more recent scholarship on the authorship and dating of the Prometheia trilogy,
though, it now makes much more sense to suppose that its author was influenced by Protagoras, either indirectly
through Sophocles’ Ode to Man, or directly by his book, On The Original State of Things; or, what seems even more
likely, by the sophist himself in person.
Assuming the author of the Prometheia trilogy to have been Euphorion, and for him to have been the eldest
son of Aeschylus, he would most likely have been born around 490. (Aeschylus was born c. 525, and the average
age of a new father in ancient Greece was the mid-30s.) This would have made Euhporion an exact contemporary
of Protagoras, who is thought to have been born c. 490. As Pericles was a prominent patron of Aeschylus, having
launched his political career by acting as the chorêgos of his tragedy, Persians, in 472. Given his father’s close
17
connections with Pericles, Euphorion, too, would likely have been part of the prominent Athenian politician’s inner
circle of friends.
24
Cf. Homer, Iliad 19.87, 24.527-533, Odyssey 4.236-7, 5.188-9; Hesiod, Theogony 905; Semonides Fr. 1.1-2 (ed.
West); Pausanias 5.15.5, 8.37.1, 10.24.4. A fragmentary inscription from 5th century BCE Athens also mentions a
"Diì Moiragétê", translatable as "Zeus, the Guide or Leader of Fate" (Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu
Berlin, 1875, p. 1.93).
25
In his History, Herodotus relates a story of how Croesus (595-c.547?) sent a Lydian delegation to Delphi to
inquire as to why the god deceived him into initiating war with Persia, to the ruin of his kingdom. To which the
Pythian priestess replied: "No one may escape his lot [moĩran], not even a god [theô]." (1.91.1, trans. Godley)
26
In a fragment preserved by Plutarch in De exilio (604a), Heraclitus writes:
The sun <god> will not overstep <his> measures. Otherwise <the> avenging Furies [Erinúes], ministers of
Justice, will find him out.
Heraclitus, Fr. 94, trans. Robinson
27
Heraclitus employs this phrase in a fragment preserved by Hippolytus of Rome (c.170-c.236 CE) in his Refutation
of All Heresies (9.10.7):
And thunderbolt steers [oìakízei] the totality of things [tà dè pánta].
Heraclitus, Fr. 64, trans. Robinson
28
Protagoras was sent to Thurii by Pericles in 444 BCE, commissioned with drawing up the constitution for the
newly founded Pan-Hellenic city, while Herodotus travelled there sometime after 443, before touring on through
lower Italy and Sicily (Kirchoff, 1878, p. 26).
29
At the conclusion of his Promethean mũthos, Protagoras also explains in terms of lógos why Zeus was compelled
to give a sense of shame and justice to all humans, of necessity: “since otherwise there could be no cities.” (323a)
30
Prometheus first reveals his secret – that Zeus will one day have need of him to reveal a new design by which he
will be stripped of his scepter and dignities – to the Chorus in the parados of PB (168-179). He later reveals that
Zeus’ loss of the scepter of his sovereignty will be brought about by a ‘marriage’ he will one day forcefully
perpetrate that will result in the birth of a son more powerful than his father, and who will hurl him down from his
throne (ibid. 752-770, 907-927; cf. Hesiod, Theogony 207-210). The identity of who will give birth to this
prodigious son is not directly revealed in PB. But numerous references in subsequent classical literature make it
clear that the identity of Zeus' prospective rape-victim, and the mother-to-be of his child-nemesis, is eventually
revealed in Prometheus Unbound to be Thetis. (Cf. Pindar, Isthmean 8, 27-48; Hyginus, Astronomica 2.15 'Sagitta',
Fabulae 54 'Thetis'; Philodemus, De pietate Fr. 202b; Apollodorus 3.13.5; Lucian, Dialogues of the Gods
'Prometheus and Zeus'; Quintus Smyrnaeus, Fall of Troy 5.334ff; Nonnus, Dionysiaca 33.355ff; Servius, On Virgil's
Eclogues 4.42.)
Thetis is described by Hesiod as a Nereid water-nymph, the sixth of the fifty daughters of Nereus and Doris
(Theogony 244). She does not appear in traditional, archaic versions of the Promethean myth, making her
appearance in the Prometheia trilogy anomalous, and thereby likely indicative of Protagorean influence, if one of
the primary interpretive assumptions of this essay holds true. The earliest extant mention of the prophecy that
Thetis was destined to give birth to a son stronger than his father in ancient Greek literature is in found in Pindar's
Isthmean Ode #8, first performed in 478 BCE. There, Zeus and Poseidon are described as having "contended for
marriage with Thetis, each wanting her to be their lovely bride; for desire possessed them." (27-30) But they are
warned against the union by Themis, who reveals the prophecy (30-48). When Zeus and Poseidon heard the
prophecy made by Themis, that Thetis was fated to bear a son stronger than his father, they desisted in their
rivalry over her and agreed that she would marry a mortal, Peleus, son of Aeacus, said to be the most pious man
living on the plain of Iolcus. Pindar's version of the Thetis myth was apparently incorporated into the Prometheia
trilogy wholesale, although there is no indication that Posiedon's rivalry with Zeus was included.
The earliest extant mention of Prometheus’ knowledge of this prophecy, on the other hand, is found in
fragment 9 of Melanippides, a lyric poet and contemporary of Protagoras, who wrote that when Thetis was given
to Peleus in marriage, due to the taunts of either Themis or Prometheus, she was already pregnant by Zeus. This
reference is found in a scholia to the Iliad, in the scene where Zeus and Poseidon contest with one another via
their proxies in respective form of the Trojan and Achaean armies. At the line where Homer remarks that Zeus, in
18
aiding the Trojans in battle, was "only giving glory to Thetis and her strong-spirited son" (13.350), the Scholiast
notes:
"Hence, Melanippides declares that Thetis was with child by Zeus when she was given in marriage to
Peleus, her marriage being due to the taunts of Prometheus or Themis."
(Melanippides, fr. 9, Edmonds, [fr. 765 Campbell])
The scholiast indicates that Melanippides makes this declaration to explain why Zeus aided the Trojans: in order to
give greater glory to his son, Achilles. However, given that this fragment contains the first mention of Prometheus
in relation to the prospective progeny of a union of Thetis and Zeus outside of the Prometheia trilogy, with which it
is contemporaneous, it seems likely that it constitutes a commentary on that trilogy. If so, then Melanippides
quite possibly means that the union at the conclusion of the trilogy will lead to the birth of a son greater than Zeus,
who will cast him down from power.
31
The conclusion of Prometheus Unbound is known only from prophecies and predictions made in PB by
Prometheus (167-179, 755ff, 989-991) and Hermes (1026-9), plus numerous later accounts in classical art and
literature. From these sources, though, it may be conjectured that, Heracles kills the eagle tormenting
Prometheus (Aeschylus, Prometheus Unbound, frs. 113, 114; Hyginus, Fabulae 31), by the will of Zeus (Hesiod,
Theogony 528-536.), and then frees him (Apollodorus 1.7.1, 2.5.11; Scholiast on Apollonius Rhodius’ Argonautica
2.1248, 4.1396; Diodorus Sicilus, History 4.15.2; Hyginus, Astronomica 2.15 ‘Sagitta’; Valerius Flaccus, Argonautica
5.155ff; Pausanias, Description of Greece 5.9.6; Servius, On Virgil’s Eclogues 6.42; Johannes Tzetzes, Chiliades
2.370). Prometheus then willingly warns Zeus to not rape Thetis (Hyginus, Astronomica 2.15 ‘Sagitta’, Fabulae 54;
Apollodorus, The Library 3.13.5; Quintus Smyrnaeus, Fall of Troy 5.394-401; Nonnus, Dionysiaca 33.354-360;
Servius, On Virgil’s Eclogues 6.42), and Zeus hands her over in marriage to Peleus. A ceremony then likely occurred
that Herington (1963, p. 241) argues is parodied by the marriage ceremony in the ëxodos of Aristophanes’ Birds
(1694-1765).
It is tempting to think this ceremony celebrated the marriage of Thetis and Peleus; however, it would have
been rather difficult to portray. In mythical accounts, Thetis expressed extreme hostility toward her marriage to
the mortal Peleus. Apollodorus writes that Chiron advised Peleus on how best to seize Thetis and hold onto her
fast despite her shape-shifting (3.13.5). According to other sources, Thetis variously transformed into fire, water,
wind, a tree, a bird, a tiger, a lion, a serpent, and a cuttle-fish before Peleus was finally able to seize her and hold
her fast (Tzetzes, Scholiast on Lycophron, 175, 178). More importantly, though, this marriage would have been
somewhat tangential to the plot of the Prometheia trilogy. More likely, the ceremony depicted in the ëxodos of
Prometheus Unbound celebrated the apotheosis of Prometheus, and his acceptance into the pantheon of gods
worshipped by the Athenians (Westphal, 1869, pp. 215-6). In this celebration, Prometheus would have been
crowned by Athena, as illustrated on an Apulian calyx-crater (III.I.27 [Berlin]) dating to the third quarter of the 4th
century BC. She would have crowned him with a wreath of withy (Hyginus, Astronomica 2.15 ‘Sagitta’; Athenaeus,
Deipnosophistae 15.672f, 674d), a symbolic binding of his own design signifying his voluntary submission to the will
of Zeus. The symbolic union of power and wisdom is thus consumated by the virgin daughter of Zeus, goddess of
power and wisdom. Honours are then paid to Prometheus, in recompense for his suffering and indignities, in a
celebration in the form of a torch-race (West, 1979, p. 144; Farnell, 1909, pp. 5.378 ff.; Willamowitz, 1914, pp. 1424; Deubner, 1956, p. 211-2; Eckhart, 1958, pp. 23.654-730) an event thereafter celebrated annually in Athens as
the Prometheia festival (Sulek, 2010, pp. 181-196).
32
The cosmological importance of Thetis, stemming from her generative powers, in combination with her seeming
powerlessness in the face of the mortality of her creations, explain why the author of the Prometheia trilogy chose
her to represent the mortal threat to Zeus’ reign; for she is the quintessential symbol of the sovereignty of
becoming. Thetis is a mysterious, yet highly significant figure in ancient Greek myth. Her name is apparently
derived from the verb tithénai – the present, infinitive, active form of the lemma títhêmi, generally meaning to set,
put or place. Thetis is thus constructed on the same etymological base as Tethys, whose name is derived from the
verb thésthai – the aorist infinitive form of títhêmi. Burkert notes that even in antiquity these two goddesses were
sometimes confused, and asserts they are linguistically cognate with "Ti-amat", the mother of the gods in the
Babylonian creation myth of Enûma Elish (Burkhert, 1992, pp. 92-3). Thetis and Tethys would thus appear to have
been imported from Semitic myth, although Thetis was likely absorbed at a much earlier date, given how much
better her character is integrated into the storyline of the Iliad.
19
Thetis is mentioned numerous times in the Iliad (1.351-457, 512ff, 8.371ff, 15.75ff, 598ff, 18.35-147, 19.3ff,
24.88, 137) and is a key driver of the plot, whereas Tethys is only mentioned in the story Hera tells Zeus while
seducing him (14.201, 302). Thetis presents somewhat of a paradox in the context of the Iliad, in that she
possesses a curious combination of power and powerlessness. Her powerlessness is most clearly illustrated by her
helplessness in the face of the mortality of her son, Achilles. At the same time, though, she is also credited with
having saved three important gods: Dionysus (Iliad 6.135, cf. Odyssey 24.75), Hephaestus (Iliad 18.369ff), and,
most notably, Zeus (Iliad 1.396-406). Thetis’ importance is also illustrated by her regular mention in the extant
fragments of other archaic epics (cf. Cypria arg. 9-11, fr. 2-4; Aethiopis arg. 2, 4, Returns arg. 3-4; Eumelus fr. 27,
ed. West.). It is in the lyric poet, Alcman (fr. 1; fr. 5, ed. Page-Davies), though, that Thetis is most clearly receives
her due, as a primordial goddess who apportions the essential póros (the way, the means) and tékmôr (limit or
goal) within and toward which the cosmos moves. For a more in depth discussion of Thetis’ cosmological
significance, as revealed by Alcman’s fragments, please refer to West (1963, p. 163; 1967, p.4) Kirk (1987, pp. 478), Slatkin (1991), Yasumura (2011), Steiner (2003), and Ferrari (2008).
33
A comprehensive listing of these accounts of human progress may be found in Guthrie (1971, pp. 79-84). This
kind of account is also indicated in Mark’s (1984) analysis and interpretation of the meaning of the Parthenon
Friezes.
20