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JoMUN XIII Historic Security Council J 0 M U N X I I I Forum: Historic Security Council Issue: The Suez Crisis of 1956 Student Officer: Isabella Spivey Position: Deputy Chair INTRODUCTION The Suez Crisis of 1956, also referred to as the Tripartite Aggression, was a strategic military confrontation against the Egyptian government, and their president, Gamal Abdel Nasser. Led by France, Britain and Israel, this invasion into Egyptian territory intended to regain Western influence in the region, and ultimately withdraw Nasser from power. KEY TERMS Nationalization In short, nationalization can be defined as the process of a government assuming ownership of an industry, business or private property of the state. In some cases, previous owners and administrators of a corporation may or may not be subject to compensation from the loss of revenue. The initial motivation for nationalisation can differ, but often is driven from antipathy towards foreign control and influence in a department, upon which the state may be largely dependent on, or is deprived of. This can be seen more commonly in LEDC’s, where the state control of an organization can benefit the lack of a developed capital market. (Nationalization) The Suez Canal Opened in 1869, The Suez Canal was owned and operated by the Suez Canal Company, consisting mainly of French and British pilots and officials. It was responsible for the shipment of large amounts of oil and petroleum to western economies, accounting for nearly half of its transportation. As a major Egyptian waterway, it provided the shortest link between the Mediterranean and Indian oceans. This access assisted major colonial powers such as France and Great Britain, to secure governance in colonies of the Middle East and Africa. Despite this, resentment from the Egyptians gathered as the vast majority of earnings from the canal, never extended towards the government, the canal being operated predominantly by its former colonial rulers. Egypt, being in need of financial and economic support, began to resist this western influence, and sought to achieve greater independence and freedom. (Ben Miles) HISTORICAL BACKGROUND Great Britain & France Following the Anglo – Egyptian War of 1882, Britain agreed to remove all remaining troops stationed in Egypt, under the terms of the Anglo-­‐Egyptian Treaty (1936), with the exception of approximately 10,000 troops necessary to protect the Suez Canal Zone. The treaty also allowed Britain to maintain a 20 year military alliance with Egypt, including the posting of a small military, air force, and the occupation of several nearby naval bases. Even after British colonial rule ended in the early 1920’s, Egypt still remained largely a sphere of influence for Britain in the JoMUN XIII Historic Security Council Middle East. Britain’s economy relied heavily from the Suez Canal, providing shorter routes to the west, particularly in regard to oil transport from the oilfields of the Persian Gulf. The French became increasingly apprehensive, with the growing influence of Egypt amongst many of its North African colonies. As the partial owners of the Suez Canal Company, France saw the new Egyptian president, Gamal Abel Nasser’s support for the rebellion of the NLF against the French government in 1954 as a threat to its colonial rule over Algeria. (Suez Crisis) Egypt During the mid-­‐1950’s, Egypt was in a financial crisis, with low employment rates, and an outbreak of mass poverty. As a potential solution, President Nasser devised a plan to construct and manage the Aswan Dam, which would fuel the Nile River, provide hydroelectricity, and aid in the development of agriculture. However, to assist in funding for the dam, Egypt called upon western countries for support, notably the United States and Great Britain. As a result of almost a decade of tensions between the newly created state of Israel, Egyptian forces had been involved in several attacks and battles with the Israelis. Fearing attack, and concerned with the recent unrest and uprising between the two nations, President Nasser called upon the Soviet Union for military weapons. Likewise, Israel requested the same support from France. However, this potential military alliance between the Soviets and Egypt was not well received by the Americans or Great Britain. With both countries taking part in sponsoring the Aswan Dam project, they saw an Egypt allied with the Soviets as a potential threat to security and proposed a covert campaign against the Egyptian president. Part of this campaign included, Great Britain imposing sanctions on Egypt, blocking military aid, with both the British and the Americans cancelling the loan for the Aswan Dam. (Miles, Ben) TIMELINE th
Egyptian Nationalization, July 26 , 1956 In response to the western powers’ sanctions, Nasser decided to take a strategic leap in his pursuit to develop the nation and bring about freedom from western influence and his vision for pan-­‐Arabism by announcing the nationalization of the canal. This announcement put Nasser in direct confrontation with Britain and France and the US on economic, military and strategic levels. The Protocol of Sèvres Nearly three months following nationalization, representatives from the French, British and Israeli governments held a secret meeting in Paris to discuss their strategy to attack Egypt and regain control of the Suez. It was then assumed that Israeli forces were to invade Egypt via the Saini peninsula. Britain and France agreed to provide political cover to the Israelis by—once the attack had been initiated-­‐-­‐-­‐instructing the withdrawal of troops on either side of the canal. Therefore, it was then to be argued by the western powers that Anglo-­‐French administration and management was necessary for the productivity and workings of the canal, in belief that operating the canal company was far beyond Egyptian capabilities. Operation Kadesh In planning for the military invasion of Egypt, Israel identified four specific locations near the Egyptian-­‐Israeli border in the Sinai for its attack. If successfully executed, securing these locations would provide the Israelis with control over the Red Sea, restoration of trade to the Indian Ocean, and control of Egyptian military bases and command centers on the Sinai Peninsula. On October 26, the Israeli army and air force executed a series of consecutive attacks. The attack consisted of air-­‐
dropping paratroopers and battalions, disrupting Egyptian communications. The surprise attack was devastating, resulted in heavy Egyptian causalities, allowing the Israeli army a further advance westward. (Suez Crisis) JoMUN XIII Historic Security Council Ceasefire and Aftermath As a result of the recent attacks and nationalization from Egypt, the British government found itself under severe financial pressure. The country relied heavily on its oil revenues, which fuelled a major part of its economy, so the canals halt in operation hit hard. The loss of revenue and funding to Great Britain due to the nationalization of the canal and the resulting Anglo-­‐
French and Israeli attacks, imposed severe financial pressure on Great Britain. The United States, furious with Britain’s recent activities in the Middle East, denied any support of the military takeover of the Suez. The Americans threatened to sell their government’s Sterling Bond holdings, reserves intended to assist Britain’s economy during the Cold War, and as partial payment of debts to the American government after World War II. This, combined with efforts to engage Anglo-­‐French forces in a cease-­‐fire, the repercussions following the Suez Crisis would eventually leave the United States and two of its closest allies with damaged international relations. th
On November 6 , 1956, British Prime Minister, Antony Eden, reluctantly issued a cease-­‐fire, whilst troops were still stationed in Port Said, advancing towards the canal. Israeli then withdrew troops in March of the following year, having destroyed several villages and critical infrastructure along the Sinai Peninsula. (Rothwell) MAJOR PARTIES INVOLVED (Mentioned Previously in this Report) Egypt Great Britain Israel The United States Members of the UN Security Council in 1956 Permanent Members People’s Republic of China USSR United States United Kingdom France PAST UN RESOLUTIONS French and British Appeal to Security Council On September 23, 1956, both the French and British governments issued a request to the President of the Security Council in consideration of their current position within the conflict, affirming that “…situation created by the unilateral action of the Egyptian Government in bringing to an end the system of international operation of the Suez Canal, which was confirmed and completed by the Suez Canal Convention of 1888”. Likewise, Egypt responded in opposition stating that “…actions against Egypt by some powers, particularly France and the United JoMUN XIII Historic Security Council Kingdom, which constitute a danger to international peace and security and are serious violations of the Charter of the United Nations”. th
UN Resolution 118, October 13 , 1956 Backed by a recent initiative from the British and French Foreign Ministers, the United Nations adopted a resolution, highlighting its aims in a peacekeeping mission in light of the Suez Crisis and attacks against the Egyptian government. The resolutions attempted to administer the protection of Egyptian sovereignty, ensuring continuous operation of the canal, and the regulation of its finances. (United Nations Official Records) UN Resolution 997, November 1st, 1956 In response to a request from the United States, the UN issued a second resolution, calling for an immediate cease-­‐
fire and withdrawal of all troops and military arms, combined with the proposed re-­‐opening of the canal. WORKS CITED "First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) -­‐ Background (Full Text)." UN News Centre. United Nations, n.d. Web. 04 Apr. 2015. Miles, Ben, prod. "The Other Side of Suez." The Other Side of Suez. BBC Network. London, United Kingdom, 1 Nov. 2006. YouTube. Web. 3 Apr. 2015. "Nationalization | Investopedia." Investopedia. About.com & Dictionary.com, 02 Dec. 2009. Web. 03 Apr. 2015. United Nations Official Records, comp. Resolution of 2 November 1956 (ES-­‐I). Rep. no. A3354. Unsco.org, 1956. Web. 4 Apr. 2015. Rothwell, Jeremy J. "Eisenhower, Eden and the Anglo-­‐American ‘Special Relationship’ During the Suez Crisis." Eisenhower, Eden and the Anglo-­‐American ‘Special Relationship’ During the Suez Crisis XXXVI 917 (1957): 83+. Ipa.udel.edu. Department of State Bulletin, 21 Jan. 1957. Web. 3 Apr. 2015. JoMUN XIII Historic Security Council "Suez Crisis." JAMA: The Journal of the American Medical Association 254.21 (1985): 3037. Www.saylor.org. Narcotics Anonymous, 1985. Web. 3 Apr. 2015.