Download Joseph Meyer “The Roman Siege Strategy for the Siege of Masada

Joseph Meyer
“The Roman Siege Strategy for the Siege of Masada”
Joseph Meyer
AHS Capstone
Prof. Gillian Epstein, Prof. Guy Rogers
8 May 2012
“The Roman Siege Strategy for the Siege of Masada” – Final Draft
Figure 1 is an image of Masada, taken from the northwest. Visible items in the foreground include
various buildings atop the summit and the Roman siege ramp, and, in the background, the Roman
circumvallation wall and camps.i
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Joseph Meyer
“The Roman Siege Strategy for the Siege of Masada”
The siege of Masada presents a dramatic picture of the Jewish people in Judea during the Roman
control of the province in the 1st century CE. As the last battle during the Great Jewish Revolt of 66 CE to
74 CE, the conclusion of the siege has created great controversy: the conflict ended with the mass
suicide of 960 of the 967 Sicarii inhabitants of the fortress. The story of their demise is generally known
in some form by the Jewish community. However, accurate details about the siege are less well-known.ii
Lasting nine months between 73 CE – 74 CE, the Romans achieved victory in the siege of Masada
primarily through the use of a large siege ramp, a siege tower and a battering ram. iii The only existing
account of the siege is Josephus’. Josephus’ description of the siege of Masada occurs in Book VII of his
book The Jewish War. As a Jewish general who surrendered to and allied himself with the Romans
during an earlier part of the revolt, Josephus was not an eye witness to the siege of Masada. His
knowledge of the event was passed on from Roman officers who were there. During excavations of the
site from 1963 to 1965, Israel general and archaeologist Yigael Yadin verified many details of Josephus’
account. Accordingly, this document follows Josephus’ account and will cite deviations from this account
when warranted. iv
Masada is located along the southwestern shores of the Dead Sea. A plateau with steep cliffs on all
asides as shown in Figure 1, the terrain at Masada provides natural defenses against aggressors. With
additional fortifications built up primarily by Herod in the 1st century BCE, the fortress at Masada was
impressive. A stone casemate wall, dotted with 38 towers, encircled the entire summit. v Food stores
and large water cisterns provided the defenders of Masada with a vast quantity of supplies. The Sicarii
who defended the fortress were a group of Jewish extremists known to assassinate other Jews that
were sympathetic to Roman rule.
Knowing all of this, in 73 CE Flavius Silva, the new governor of the Roman province of Judea and
commander of Legio X Fretensis, laid siege to the fortress and its Sicarii inhabitants. vi To prevent any of
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Joseph Meyer
“The Roman Siege Strategy for the Siege of Masada”
the Sicarii from escaping, Silva built a circumvallation wall, along with eight camps, surrounding the
fortress, as shown in Figure 2. Typically, such a wall would have been built by timber; however, in the
dry climate around Masada, not enough wood was available. Instead, the wall was built from stone. This
wall did not physically contribute to the siege, but it is not unreasonable to suggest that it worked
towards breaking the motivation and will of the defenders.
Figure 2 depicts an aerial view of Masada along with the Roman camps and circumvallation wall.vii
As the siege commenced, Silva realized that he must act quickly and actively attack, due to a lack of
water and food. Indeed, the spring nearest to Masada is 10 miles north at Engeddi.viii With the food
stores and water cisterns available in the fortress, the Sicarii could have outlasted the Romans in an
attrition-based siege. To expedite the siege, the Romans built a large siege ramp, so that their siege
engines would be useful in engaging the Sicarii.
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Joseph Meyer
“The Roman Siege Strategy for the Siege of Masada”
Figure 3 shows a modern image of the Roman siege ramp during excavation.ix
This ramp was built upon the western side of Masada on a pre-existing natural spur known as the
“White Cliff” (shown in Figure 3). Josephus claims that this natural ramp projected to a point 450 ft
below the summit. Silva ordered his men to “heap earth on it” to create a ramp. Soon, they had raised
the earth to 300 ft above the level of the natural ramp. In addition, they placed a 75 ft stone platform on
top of that. Modern geology refutes some of these claims.x Current measurements show that the
vertical distance between the base of the ramp and its top is 243 ft, with a large portion of this being
natural and without any evidence of an additional stone platform. In addition, the distance from the top
of the ramp to Masada’s summit is only 43 ft, instead of 75 ft. In spite of the inaccuracy of Josephus’
figures, he knew that the siege ramp enabled the Romans access to Masada’s walls.
With the siege ramp prepared, the Romans hauled a siege tower up to the walls of the fortress. To
increase the fire-resistance of the siege tower, the Romans covered it iron plates. Josephus claims that
this tower was 90 ft tall, a reasonable height given the ramp dimensions that he provides. However
according to Gill’s dimensions, a 90 ft tall tower would have risen 47 ft over the height of the walls. xi It is
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Joseph Meyer
“The Roman Siege Strategy for the Siege of Masada”
possible that Josephus exaggerated the height of this tower. Armed with spear-throwers and stonethrowers, the tower forced the Sicarii defenders to take refuge away from the battlements of the wall.
After the siege tower cleared the ramparts of defenders, Silva ordered a large battering ram brought
up and swung repeatedly until a breach in the wall was made. It is unknown whether this ram was
integrated into the bottom story of the tower, as was common with many of the Roman siege towers of
the timexii, or a separate engine entirely. Eventually, a small section of the stone wall collapsed.
However, the Sicarii had constructed a second wall behind the original. This wall consisted of a wooden
frame surrounding a large amount of earth. When the Romans attempted to penetrate this structure
with their siege engine, they were rebuffed. Instead of breaking apart the construction when the ram
head struck the wall, the earth compacted from the force of the battering ram. Since the Romans were
unable to breach this wall with their battering ram, the Romans shot incendiary missiles at the wooden
frame. The large resultant flame almost burned the Roman engines; however, a change in the wind
ultimately left the Romans undeterred and the Sicarii defenseless.
At this point, the Romans decided to launch an assault into Masada the next morning, while keeping
a strict watch on the fortress until then. Since the Romans typically withheld all rights to people who
refused to surrender before the beginning of a siege, the Sicarii knew that they were in a dire
situation.xiii Justifiably or not, they decided to commit suicide during the night instead of becoming
slaves to the Romans. When the Romans found the corpses of the Sicarii the next morning, the siege of
Masada ended.
The various pieces of siege equipment used by the Romans throughout the siege of Masada were
crucial to their victory; each piece built upon the last. The construction of the siege ramp brought the
walls of Masada within the Romans’ reach. Other devices that the Romans could have used to access
these walls included ropes and ladders. The purpose of both ropes and ladders was for Roman infantry
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Joseph Meyer
“The Roman Siege Strategy for the Siege of Masada”
to storm the walls en masse. However at Masada, a siege ramp would have been preferred. The steep
cliffs of Masada would have caused ropes and ladders to be difficult to secure in place and implement.
In addition, by using ropes or ladders instead of a siege ramp, the siege tower would not have been able
to be in a position to provide cover fire for the Romans. The embankment provided a flat, consistent
surface so that the tower could be easily transported into the proper location. Overall, the siege ramp
had various advantages over the alternate methods for reaching Masada’s walls.
Once the Romans put their siege tower in place, they had a number of different options. The
Romans used the ballistae atop their tower to clear Masada’s ramparts of the Sicarii defenders, while
the battering ram worked away at the fortifications. Alternatively, a draw bridge extending from the
siege tower to these battlements would have enabled the Romans to gain entry to Masada without the
need to destroy any walls. Either way, having a platform level with, or above, the wall neutralized the
Sicarii’s high ground. The siege tower provided the defense required to protect the battering ram
throughout its operation or an assault via draw bridge.
In this case, using the battering ram was preferred over the draw bridge. A wall breach created by a
battering ram was permanent, while a drawbridge was vulnerable to counter attack. It would have been
much easier for Sicarii to set alight a drawbridge or fire down upon soldiers crossing a drawbridge than
rebuild the wall or defend a wall breach. In addition, the battering ram was the most consistent wallbreaching method in antiquity. Ballistae would not be able to provide the consistent impact required to
dislodge stones. If given sufficient time, the battering ram would be able to break down any stone wall.
While the battering ram was the siege machine that eventually destroyed Masada’s walls, it would
have been unable to do so without the existence of both the siege ramp and tower. The ram required a
sufficient period of time to successfully collapse the defenders’ fortifications. Throughout that process,
the ram’s beam would have been vulnerable to heavy objects dropped from the ramparts above.
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Joseph Meyer
“The Roman Siege Strategy for the Siege of Masada”
Wooden rams would also have been susceptible to flame. Projectiles fired from the siege tower
provided the necessary protection against such actions. If the ram was integrated into the siege tower,
the iron plates on the tower would have negated the threat of burning the engines. However, neither of
these two engines would have even come close to the fortress without the construction of the
embankment. The ramp both brought the engines into proximity to the walls and provided a flat,
consistent surface to do so. The Romans’ success in the siege of Masada depended on all three of these
devices. Without any one, the siege could not have succeeded.
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Joseph Meyer
“The Roman Siege Strategy for the Siege of Masada”
Bibliography
Anglim, Simon, Phyllis Jestice, Rob Rice, Scott Rusch, and John Serrati. Fighting Techniques of the Ancient
World (3000 B.C. to 500 A.D.): Equipment, Combat Skills, and Tactics. 1st US Edition. Thomas Dunne
Books, 2002.
Ben-Yehuda, N. The Masada Myth: Collective Memory and Mythmaking in Israel. The University of
Wisconsin Press, 1995.
Campbell, Duncan. Greek and Roman Siege Machinery 399 BC-AD 363. Osprey Publishing, 2003.
Cotton, Hannah. “The Date of the Fall of Masada: The Evidence of the Masada Papyri,” Zeitschrift für
Papyrologie und Epigraphik , Bd. 78, 1989. pp. 157-162
Gill, Dan. “A natural spur at Masada,” Nature, 1993. pp.569-570.
Goldsworthy, Adrian. Roman Warfare. Phoenix, 2007.
Josephus, Flavius. The Jewish War. Penguin Classics, 1982.
Richmond, I. “The Roman Siege-Works of Masada, Israel,” The Journal of Roman Studies, 1962. pp. 142
Yadin, Yigael. Masada: Herod’s Fortress and the Zealots’ Last Stand. 12th Impression. Steimatzky LTD.,
1985.
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Joseph Meyer
“The Roman Siege Strategy for the Siege of Masada”
Endnotes
i
Yadin, pp. 228 - 229
Ben-Yehuda, pp. 10
iii
Cotton, pp. 158
iv
Josephus, pp. 393 - 405
v
Yadin, pp. 141
vi
Richmond, pp. 144
vii
Yadin, pp. 218
viii
Richmond, pp. 142
ix
Yadin, pp. 29
x
Gill, pp. 570
xi
Gill, pp. 570
xii
Campbell, pp. 37
xiii
Goldsworty, pp. 151
ii
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