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.ti. w" #-%, #rc ilft*m.fi *+u ffi Ru# Yfu* ffi*st { e? ft riLq tfl]t: ilfuffi rT#sr:q W#y"gd ffi*$*r:** This Persion-slyle pointing depicts the Ottomon Turks os they ottock the Hungorions with troops ond connons in o bottle in 1526. ' e The Decline of the Old Order c The Rise of the West @ VISUALIZING TIIE Pasz; Population Trends * D)CUMENT: Italian Renaissance Culture e Western Expansion: The Experirnental Phase a IN Dnrrut:The Problem of Ethnocentrism e Outside the World Network E CONCLUSION: Adding Up the Changes in 1400 was in fundamental transition. This chapter highlights the main features of this transition. The principal focus is on shifts in the balance of power betrveen civilizations in Asia, Africa, and Europe and related changes in the nature of international contact. This period of transition in dre l4th and early lSth centuries begarr with the decline of Arab strength-symbolized by the fall of the last Arab caliphate in 1258-and the disruptions that Mongol incursions caused elsehe world where in Asia and eastern Europe . These developments created new opPor- tunities in the international network that had been established in the postclassical centuries, initially under Arab sponsorship. Various candidates emerged to take a new international role, including for a short time China in its new Ming dynasty. The most dynamic new contender for international power ultimately proved to be western Europe, and the conditions that propelled Western civilization toward a new position around 1400 are the second key theme of this chapter. The West was not yet the world's major power; it did not replace the Arabs as international leaders quickly or easily. The first stages of the rise of the West were accompanie d by important changes in Western civilization itself, also taking shape by about 1400. At this point, Italy, Spain, and Portugal took a new leadership role in west European outreach, which they would hold for about two centuries. It is also vital to note changes in the societies outside the international network, in the Americas and Polynesia. New difficulties in the great American empires, in particular, inadvertently reduced the ability to respond to a European challenge that was about to arrive. Focusing on new frameworks for international contacts) this chapter inevitably d.eals with the question ofwhy individual civilizations reacted differently to key forces. This was a vital period of redefinition) comparable to the centuries that led from the classical to postclassical periods but with developments that had even wider sweep. 339 340 PART Irr The Poslclosirollro 1250 c.r. 1258 Mongol conquest of Bogh 1300 c.r. I dod; foll of Abbosid coliphote t.1266-1337 1275-1292 Giotto Petrorch; develop' menf of ltolion Renoissonce 1320s 1320r route fo lndies I begin First luropeon use I I Plogue reoches Sicily 348 Peok I 453 0tiomons copture Constontinople, foll of Byzonline Empire I 433 End of Chinese expeditions 439 Portugol tokes over Azores; 469 Union of Arogon ond [o$ile; rise of Sponish monorchy inoeosing expeditions into Atl0ntic, reoches Chino 347 1450 c.t. migrotions I 405 Chinese troding expediiions I 1330s Block Deoth Fint ltolion expedition seeks Chho; Ming dynosty 1400 c.r. 1400 tnd of Polynesion Spreod of bubonic plogue of ronnon in worfore New fomines in Europe I 368 Mongols expelled from in 6obi Desert Morco Polo in Chino 1290-1317 l29l 304-l 374 1350 c.s. olong northwest Africon roo$ of Block Deoth in Middle Eost 1348-1375 Plogue spreods in Europe, including Rusio TH E DECLIN E OF TH E CLD ORDER )1, The first steps in the new worltl. ord.er that was beg'inruing t0 enoeyge by 1400 inyohred. rnajor reshwfJli.ng in the Middle East and vtoYtb Afi.ica. In 1200, this region was still dominated by two powerful empires, the Byzantine in the northwest and the Islamic caliphate through much of the Middle Eastern heardand. By 1400, rhis srructure was in disarray. The Byzantine Empire still existed, but it was in decline, pressed by invading Ortoman Turks. The imperial capital, Constantinople, fell to the Turks in 1453, efTectively ending the empire. Two cenruries earlier, the caliphate, long sapped by increasing reliance on foreign troops and advisors, including the Turks, had fhllen to Mongol invasion. Arabs have never since been able to unite all of their region under their own rule. S*cial *ud eanitural tr}*cli*e t*ae &€iddi* Easc ix By about I300, religious leaders in the Islamic Middle East gained the r"rpper hand over poets, philoso- phers, and scientists. An earlier tension between diverse cr-rltural elements yielded to rhe predominance of the faith. The ,r.la, pietl associated with the rising Sufi movement, discussed in Chapter Z, was both the cause and the result of this development. In literature, emphasis on secular themes, such as the joys of feasting and hunting, gave wav to more strictly religious ideas. Persian poets, writing in their own language instead ofArabic, led the way, and reli- gious poetry-not poetry in general-became part of the education of upper-class children. In philosophy, the rationalistic current encountered new attack. In Muslim Spain, philosopher Ibn-Rushd (Averro€s) espoused Greek rationalism, but his efforts were largely ignored in the Middle East. In fact, European scholars were more heavily influenced by his work. In the Middle East proper, a more typical philosopher now claimed to use Aristotle,s logic to show that it was impossible to discover religious truth by in a book revealingly titled The Destrwct'iotc of Philosopby. Many Sufi scholars wrote human reason, excitedly of their mystical contacts with God and the stages of their religious passion, which led to dramatic new statements of Islam. Changes in society and the economy were as as the shifts in politics and intellectual life. As the authority of the caliphate declined, landlords seized power over the peasantry. As a result, fi-om about 1100 onward, Middle Eastern peasants increasingly lost their fieedom, becoming serfs on large estates, providing the [abor and produce landlords now sought. This loss was not the peasants, alone, for agricultural productivity suffered as a result. Landlords turned to sucking what they could from their estates rathcr than trying to develop a more vital agriculture. Tax revenues declined, and Arab and other Middle Eastern rraders began to lose ground. Few Arab coins have been found in Europe dating from later than I100. European merchants began to control their own turf and challenge the A.r-abs in other parts of the Mediterranean; initiative in this vital trading area was passing to their hands. Arab and persian commerce remained active in the Indian Ocean, but the time was not too distant when it would face new competition there as well. telling CIIAPTER 15 The decline of the Islamic caliphate and its economy was gradual and incomplete. It cannot be compared with the dramatic fall of the Roman Empire in the West many centuries befbre. A more subde model is needed. The reduced dynamism in trade did not take the Arabs or.rt of major world markets, for example' Finally, the political fragmentation of the Arab world did not produce prolonged confusion in the Middle East. The emerging Ottoman Turkish state soon mastered most of the lands of the old caliphate as well as the Byzantine corner) expanding into southeastern Europe. (See Chapter 20 in Volume II for the development of the new Ottoman Empire.) It is important to realize that the empire was far more por'verful, politically and militarily, than the caliphate had been for many centuries and thus more frightening to observers in neighboring civilizations such as western Europe . A P*war Vacuum in Internatioxrai Leadership Nevertheless, even the rise of the Ottoman Empire did not restore the full international vigor that the Islamic caliphate had at the height of its powers. Turkish rulers-scornful of their Arab subjects, although they shared their religion-did not promote trade, particularly maritime trade, as vigorously as in the past. The expansionist power of the Ottoman Empire was very real and persisted into the ITth century, but the fbcus on conquest and administration overshadowed wider commercial ambitions. The empire was not the sole hub of an international netu,ork, as the Arab caliphate rvas a few centuries before. The result was a Power vacuum beyond the borders of the emerging Ottoman Empire. A single replacement for the Arabs as hub of the loose international network was not necessarily inevitable, and no other civilization set out to advance itself, but a sorting-out process was well under way by 1400. The Mongols developed the first alternative irternational framework, with their interlocking holdings that included central Asia, China, and Russia, with thrusts into the Middle East and south Asia. l{ere was that actively encouraged international travelers and provided unprecedented opportunities for exchanges of technology and ideas-exchanges that particularly benefited Western Europe through contacts with Asia. The Mongol decline, first in China, then gradually elsewhere, raised again the question of domination of international contacts and trade. The end of the Mongol empires also turned attention to a system The Wesl und the (honging World Bolonte 34L sea-born trade, as the over land Asian trade routes were disrupted. Two societies, successively, stepped up to the challenge. Chi*ese Thrust end Wridldr*1v*"1 a brief time China took full advantage of the new opportunities in international trade' In a conscious policy decision, however, the new Ming dynasty took itself out of the main international arena, returning to long-standing traditions in the civilization that urged concentration on developing the Middle Kingdom and its evolving internal strengths. Rebellions in China drove out the deeply resented Mongol overlords in 1368. A rebel leader from a peasant farni\' seized the Mongol capital of Beijing and proclaimed For a new Ming-meaning "brilliant"-dynasty that was to last until 1644. This dynasty began with a burst of unusual expansionism. The initial Ming rulers pressed to secure the borders of the Middle I(ngdom. This meant pushing the Mongols far to the north, to the plains of what is now Mongolia. It meant reestablishing influence over neighboring governments and winning tribute payments from states in I(orea, Vietnam, and Tibet, reviving much of the east Asian regional structure set up by the Tang dynasty. Far more unusual was a new policy, adopted soon after 1400, of mounting huge, state-sponsored trading expeditions to southern Asia and beyond. A first fleet sailed in 1405 to India, with 62 ships carrying 28,000 men. Later voyages reached the Middle East and the eastern coast ofAfrica, bringing chinaware and copper coinage in exchange for local goods. Chinese shipping at its height consisted of 2700 coastal vessels, 400 armed naval ships, and at least as many long-distance ships. Nine great treasure ships, the most sophisticated in the world at the time, explored the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf, and the Red Sea, establishing regular trade all along the way. Between 1405 and their termination in 1433, these expeditions were commanded by the admiral Cheng Ho. A Muslim from western China, Cheng I{o was well suited to deal with Muslims in southeast Asia on his trade route. Cheng I{o was also a 'eunuch, castrated for service at the roltal court. China's Ming emperors retained a large harem of wives to ensure succession. and eunuchs were needed to guard them without threat of sexual rivalry; many gained bureaucratic powers well be.vond this service. Cheng llo's expeditions usually hugged the coastline, but he had an improved compass and excellent maps as well as huge vessels that contained ample 342 PARI rrr The Po$dossirolEro supplies-even gardens-as well as goods for trade. His fleets must have impressed, even terrified, the local rulers around the Indian Ocean, many ofwhom paid tribute to the emperor. Several missions visited China from the Middle East and Africa. From Africa also came ostriches, zebras, and giraffes for the imperial zoo; the latter became the unicorns of Chinese fable. But Cheng Ho was resented by the Confucian bureaucrats, who refused even to write much about him in t-heir chronicles. There is no question that the course ofworld history might have been changed dramatically had the Chinese thrust continued, for the tiny European expeditions that began to creep down the western coast of Africa at about the same time would have been no match for this combination of merchant and military organization. But the emperors called the expeditions to a halt in 1433. The bureaucrats had long opposed the new trade policy, out of rivalry with other officials such as Cheng llo, but there were deeper reasons as well. The costs seemed unacceptable, given the continuing expenses of the campaigns against the Mongols and the desire to build a luxurious new capital city in Beijing. This assessment was not inevitable and it must be explained. It reflected a preference for traditional expenditures rather than distant foreign involvements. Chinese merchant activity continued to be extensive in southeast Asia. Chinese trading groups established permanent setdements in dre Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia, where they added to the cultural diversity of the area and maintained a disproportionate role in local and regional trading acrivities into the 20th centlrry. Nonetheless, China's chance to become a dominant world trading power was lost, at least for several centuries, with a decision that confirmed the low status of trade in the official Chinese scheme of things. To Western eyes, accustomed to judging a society's dynamism by its abiJiry to reach out and gain new territories or trade positions, China's decision may seem hard to understand-the precursor to decline. But to the Chinese, it was the brief trading flurry drat was unusual, not its end. China had long emphasized internal development, amid considerable international isolation and concern over protection against invasion from central Asia. Its leaders were suspicious of any policy that would unduly elevate commercial activity. Ming emperors consolidated their rule over the empire's vast territory. Internal economic develop- ment continued as well, with no need for foreign products. Industry expanded, with growth in the production of textiles and porcelain; ongoing trade with southeast Asia enriched the port cities; and agricultural production and population increased. The shift in Chinese policy unintentionally cleared the way for another, in most ways inferior civ- ilization to work toward a new international position. With the Arabs in partial eclipse and with China briefly moving into the resulting trade vacuum but then retreating, hesitant Western expansionism, ventured before 1400, began to take on new significance. Within a century, Western explorers and traders had launched an attempt to seize international trading dominance and had expanded the international network to include parts of the Americas for the first time. THE RISE OF THE WEST lll Westeruc Ewrope began to wndorgo inoportotr.t cbaruges in the l4th arutl l\tb centuries. Sl?u.e 'ittpolyed ruew problenoq others created tt.ew opportwnities. Exoru.ini,ng th e t oy'iows strengths and. wealenesses of this once bach.ward. region sets the stage in world. for Ewrop/s vtew yevtta?'es trnd.e. The West's gradual emergence into larger world contacts during the I5th century was surprising in many respects. Westerners remained awed by the powerful bureaucracies and opulent treasuries of empires in the traditional civilization centers such as Constantinople. Furthermore, the West was changing in some painfirl ways. The staples of medieval culture at its height were under new question by 1400. The church, which had long been one of the orgaruzing institutions of Western civilization, was under new attack. Medieval philosophy had passed its creative phase. Warrior aristocrats, long a key leadership group in feudal society, softened their style of life, preferring court rituals and jousting tournaments and adopting military armor so cumbersome that real fighting was difficult. Even more strikingly, the lives and economic activities of ordinary Europeans were in disalray. This was a time of crisis, and Europe's expanding world role could not reverse the fundamental challenges to its internal economic and demographic structure. Europeans began to suffer from recurrent famine CHAPTER 15 after 1300 because population outstripPed the food supply and no new food production techniques were discovered. Famine reduced disease resistance, mak- ing Europe more vulnerable to the bubonic plagues that spread from Asia. Bubonic plague, or Black Death, surfaced in various parts of Asia in the l4th century. In China it reduced the population by nearly 30 percent by 1400. Following trade routes, it then spread into India and the Middle East, causing thousands of deaths per day in the larger cities. The plague's worst European impact occurred between I34B and 1375,b1' which time 30 million people, one-third of Europe's population, died. The resulting economic dislocation pro- TheWeslondtheChungingWorldBolonce 343 the late 13th and early 14th centuries provided new access to Asian knowledge and technology. Political stability and an openness to foreign visitors by the great khans helped Westerners learn of Asian technologies, ranging from printing to the compass and explosive powder. Western Europe had ideal access in the Mongol period: It was not disrupted by the Mongols, as eastern Europe and so many parts of Asia were, but it was in active contact) unlike subSaharan Africa. Internal European warfare and merchant zeal made western Europe an eager learner, for the Asian technologies promised to meet existing military and commercial needs. The second international factor was the inten- duced bitter strikes and peasant uprisings. silication of European problerns in the existing world market and international arena. From the Sorrrces c:f }}vnan:is$l: &iledieval Crusades onward, Western elites had become used Yitatrity How could the West be poised for a new international rolel The answer to that question is complex. First, several key advances of medieval society were not really reversed by the troubles of the decades around 1400. For example, the strengthening of feudal monarchy provided more effective national or regional governments for much of the West. The Hundred Years' War between Britain and France stimulated innovations in military organization, including nonaristocratic soldiers recruited and paid directly by the royal government, that enhanced central political power. Strong regional monarchies took hold in parts of Spain and in Portugal as Christian leaders drove back the Muslim rulers of this region. The growth of cities and urban economies continued to spur the commercial side ofWestern society. Even the church had made its peace with such key principles of capitalism as profit-seeking. Technology continued to advance, particularly in ironwork-used for bells and weapons-and timekeeping. In short, explaining the new Western vigor involves an understanding that some of the gains the West achieved during the Middle Ages continued even as certain characteristic medieval forms wavered' Imitstiora anC trnt*rnati*nal Prabler:as Two additional causes involved western Europe's international position. New opportunities for imita- tion were an obvious advantage. The Mongol Empire established in Asia and eastern Europe in to increasing consumption of Asian luxury products, including spices such as cinnamon and nurmeg, silks, sugar, perfumes, and je'rvels. In exchange for the luxury items, Europeans mainly had cruder goods to off'er: wool, tin, copper, honey, and salt. The value of European exports almost never equaled the value of what was imported from Asia. The resulting unfavorable balance of trade had to be made up in gold, but western Europe had only a limited gold supply. By 1400, the constant drain to Asia was creating a gold famine that threatened the whole European economy with collapse. Furthermore, there were legitimate fears of a new Muslim threat. The Ottoru.nn Ewpire was taking shape, and Europeans began to fear a new Muslim surge (see Figure ).5.I). Even before this, the Muslim capture of the last Crusader stronghold (the city of Acre in the Middle East) in 129), gave Muslim traders, particularly Egyptians, new opportunides to act as intermediaries in the Asian trade, for there were no Western-controlled ports left in the eastern Mediterranean. One response to this rvas a series of conquests by the city-state of Venice along the eastern coast of the Adriatic. A more important response was to begin exploring alternative routes to Asia that would bypass the Middle East and the feared and .hated Muslim realms altogether. S**lriar Fir*cticlms in th* It*liast Reraaissa**e The final major ingredient of the West's surge involved changes within the West itself, starting with 344 PART III lhe PostclosirolEro * T H t*Y#{l# T r PAST#, Population Trends Questions: Wlrat do these population charrs slrow abotrt relrriouships in popularion sizc, rnd comparativc rrends in population size. amorg the major inhabited regions of the rvorldf Population pressure did not drive European exprnsiorr irr the l5th centurr,, bec.rrrse population rvas falling tenporirrilv, bur were there longer-term trends, from the r.ear 1000, that rnighr hrve cncouragcd thc cxpansionist ffiffi Population kvels (Millions) 1000 1700 1800 t900 1s75 Europe 36 120 180 390 635 Asia 185 415 625 g7O 2300 (includes Middle East) Akica 33 61 70 110 Amclicas 39 I 3 24 145 Occania I.5 2.25 2.5 6.75 i 385 545 23 inclrrde s Arrsrraliel Totals What mighr have caused these changesf Finall1,, what do the charts suggest about the demographic position of Europe in the 20th centur,v compared to the r,vorld as a whoie i Reading population staristics provides vital inlbrmation, but it also raises questions, including ones about causation, which.numbers alone .*rrot an$l.er. \Vhat other data would be most helpftil to put these figures in appropriate worlcl history contextsi \4trich figures are more revealing: absolute numbe rs or pcrccntrgcs) Why? Tears Contiruents eflbrtf Slhat societies shorv the gieatcst changes in population levels benveen I000 and 18001 294.5 611.25 901.5 1627.75 3888 Nole: lorlier figures ore only e$imules; they ore fuirly o((urote indko- wasffis&m& Percentages or Proportions of Total World Population Europe Asia r2.2 19.6 19.7 24 16.3 9 67 .6 69.3 59.8 59.2 62 Afiica I|.2 t0.0 7.8 6.8 Americas L3,4 2.I Occuria 0.4 0.4 2.7 0.3 8.9 0.3 9.9 14.0 0.6 lors of relolive size. Sazlrr; A.irpted lronr I)enni. H. Wrong, cJ.. I'opulatiott &'rirr! 1Q71 ald t. Italy, r.vhere rnedieval fbrms had ncvcr ful1y taken hoid. In 1400, Italy r.vas in rhc midst of a vital cultr,rral ancl political movement knou.n as rhe Rennissarucq or rebirth. The carly pl-rases of the Renaissancc stressed more secular subjects in litcrature and art. Religious art remained dominant but used more realistic portrayals of pcople and nature, and some r-ronreligious therles surfaced outright. The doings of human beings dcserved attention lbr their otvn sakc. in the Soarrr.'Aclapte d Sociel' (.\.977), liom Derinis }1. Wrong, cd., ?opulation and. Renaissance vie$,, not as thev reflected a divine plan. Artists and writers became more openlr, ambitious for person'al replrtiltion and glory. Italv the centcr of initial ltenaissance culture had more contact $,ith Roman traclition than did the resr of Europe and because by tl"re 14th centurv it led the West in banking and trade. Active becanse r,vas it commcrce and urban manufacturing ga\re Italiar-r cities the u,calth to sponsor nelv cultural activities, CHAPTER I5 TheWeslondtheftongingWorld Bolonte 345 omid old volues. Donfe, ltolion wrifer of the 1.4th cenfury,, h|tdt o ,opy oi hi, greot work, the Divine Cgmedy, with both religious (souls tormented in Figure 15.1. Europe's new spirit hell) ond d"noirrorl" bhe solid, clossicol-style urbon buildings of the city.of.Florence) symbolism greeting him. The poinfing wos designed by Domenico di Michelino for the cothedrol of Florence in 1465. launched in Florence and manifesting itselfin literature and various arts. The Renaissance focused on a ne\\' interest in stvlistic grace and a concern for practical ethics and codes of behavior for urban gendemen' One and contacts rvith some foreign scholars, particularly in Byzantium, helped revive Greco-Roman styles. Finally, the attention to government and diplomacy by the competitive governments of Itah"s city-states led intellectuals and political leaders to emphasize r'vorldly culture. ffiunta* Vatrues and Renaissarace ilu}.t$re Despite its political and commercial roots, the Renaissance was first and fbremost a cultural movement) ' Ieading l4th-centurlt r'vriter, Frato ces co P ett'arch, not only took pride in his city and his age but explored the glories of personal achievement with new confidence. Innovation flourished in the visual arts and music rvell. The subject matter of art moved tor'vard nature and people, including cityscapes and portraits of the rich and powerful, whether the dtemes u'ere religious or secular. Florentine painter Giotto led the u'ay, as 346 PART III The Po$closkolEro ffiffiffi&mffiffiffiffi' Italian Renaissance Culture lrf t riters in the first phase of the Italian Renaissance I V *... aware rhar r;.r;.;;;.;";;; .;i;i. qri,. different from that of medieval theologians and philosophers. In the passages that follor.v, Petrarch (1304-1374) writes about his priorities in literature, inclucling the kind ofclassical examples he revered, first in a letter to another major writer, Boccaccio, and then in a poem. petrarch,s cultural interests and his definition ofpersonal goals form part of a movement called humanism (see Chapter 16). |udging by the following documenrs, whar defined Renaissance humanistf [rom Petrurdn, letter to Bortoccio (1362] Neither exhortations to virtue nor the argument of approaching death should divert us fi-om literature; for in good mind it excites dre love ofvirtue, and dissipates, or at least diminishes, the fear ofdeath. To desert our studies shorvs want of selficonfidence rather than wisdom, for letters do not hinder but aid the properly consdruted mind r.vhich possesses them; they facilitate our life, they do not retard it.... Ifit were otheru.isc, surely the zeal ofcertain persons u,ho persevered to the end could not have roused such admiration. Cato, I never forget, acquainted himself w'ith Latin literature as he was growing old, and Greek a when he had reallv become an old man. Varro, r.vho reached his hundredth year still reading and rvriting, parted from life sooner than from his love"ofstudlr Livius Drusus, although weakened by age and afflicrld with blindness, did not givc up his intelpretation of the civil law, rvhich he carried on to the great advantage ofdre state.... Besides these and innumerable others like them, have not all those ofour own religion whom rve should wish most to imitare dcvoted their whole lives to literature, and grown old and died in the same pursuitl Some, indeed, were overraken by death while still at work reading or r'vriting. To none of drem, so far as I know, did it prove a disadvantage to be noted for secular learning.... While I know that many have become famous for piety without learning, at tl-re same time I know ofno one who has been prevented by literature from following the path ofholiness. The aposdc Paul was, to tre sure, accused ofhaving his head turned by srudn but the rvorld has long ago passed its verdict upon this accusation. IfI may be allolved to speak for myself, it seems to me that, although departing from medieval formalism and sriflness. \44rile still a young apprentice to the painter Cimabue, Giotto painted a fly on the nose of one of Cimabue,s porrrair subjects, and it was so realistic that Cimabue repearedly a th9 nath ro virtue by the wa1, of ignorance may be plain, fosters sloth. The goal of all good people is tl-re iame, but the ways of reaching it are many and various. Some advance slou4y, others with more spirit; some obscurely, it others again conspicuously. One takes a lower path, another takes a higher path. Although all alike are on the road to happiness, certainly rhe more elevated path is the more glorious. Hence ignorance, however devout, is by no means to be put on a plane with the enlightened devoutness of one familiar r,vith literature. Nor ian you pick me out from the whole array ofunlettered saints, an example so holy that I cannot match it with a stiil holier one liom the other group. From Petrorch, the Sonnets k. 1535) Io o Friend, Encouroging Him lo Pursue Poelry Torn is each virtue from its ca-rthy t_hrone By sloth, intemperance, and voluptuous ease; Far hence is every light celestial gone, That guides mankind through life's pe rple xing maze . . .. Who now r.vould laurel, myrtle-wreaths obtainf Let want, let shame, Phitosophy attend! Cries the base world, intenr on sordid gain. What though thy favourite path be trod by fei.v; Let it but urge thee more , dear gende friend, Thy great design ofglory to pursue. Questions: \4rhat are the key purposes of intellectual activiry, according to Petrarchl IIow can these purposes be reconciled with Christianiryf To what extent does Petrarch's humanism suggest a more modern oudook than that of medieval Western culture| Does this Renaissance spirit suggest factors that might explain Europe's new expansionl Did the Renaissance encourage human agencyf How important were individuals in this major development, compared to the larger causes) tried to swat it off before going back to work on rhe canvas. Other painters, begiruring later in the l4th centurry, started to inffoduce perspective while using new colors and other materials. In architecture, favor shifted CHAPTER 15 away from the Gothic to a classicism derived from the styles of Greece and Rome. Vivid, realistic statues complemented the new palaces and public buildings. The impact of the early Renaissance must not be exaggerated. It had little influence outside of Italy. Even in Italy, it focused on high culture, not popular culture, and on the arts; there was little initial interest in science. And although it built on distinctive political and economic forms, it was not a full break from mcdieval tendencies. Nevertheless, these new cultural currents were an important innovation in Western history. The full ramifications of the Renaissance feed into. the next period of both world and Western history (see Chapter 16). The movement was only getting started by 1400. The wide range of Italian commerce and shippilg proved to be one of the building blocks of European outreach. By the l4th century, ships, particularly from the western Italian city of Genoa, which was less well placed than Venice for eastern Mediterranean trade and the resultant links to Asia, were ready f61 new roles. Ambitious city-state governments encouraged new ventures) eager to collect more tax money and promote commerce as one of their explicit ftinctions. A general "Renaissance spirit" could also spur innovation. !\4rereas people such as Petrarch defined human ambition mainly h cultural terms, other urban and commercial leaders, including seafaring men such as Genoa's Christopher Columbus, might apply some of the same confidence and desire for personal glory to different areas, such as exploration or conquest. ?he lberian $pirit *f Religious Mis*i*n Along with Italy, a key center for change by the 14th century \vas the Iberian Peninsula, where Christian military leaders had for several centuries been press- ing back the boundaries of the Muslim state in Spain. Soon after 1400, major regional monarchies had been established in the provinces of Castile and Aragon,which would be united through royal marriage in 1469. Even before the marriage between Ferdinand and Isabella, Spanish and Portuguese rulers had developed a vigorous military and religious agenda. They supported effective armies, including infantry and feudal cavalry. And they believed that government had a mis- sion to promote Christianity by converting or expelling Arabs and Jews and by maintaining doctri- TheWestondtheChongingWorld Bolonce 347 nal purity within the church. Close links between church and state, portrayed in art, provided revenues and officials for the royal government. In retllrn, the government supported church courts in their efforts to enforce moral and doctrinal purity. Later in the LSth century, this interaction led to the reestablishment of the church-run courts of the Inquisition in Spain, designed to enforce religious orthodoxy. In other words, Spain and Portugal were developing effective new governments with a special sense of religious mission and religious support. These changes promoted the West's expansion into wider world contacts. WESTERN TXPANSION: TH I EXPERIMEN]AL PHASI ll Specifi.c Eut'opean a.ttewpts to explore tbe (beyon.rl. the earlier Vi.ki.ng voyages Atlantic in the North Atlaru.tic) begatc i.n, the later l3th c e nt ur y. E ar ly d,'is c ot eri e s'ito a' e as e d. Ewr op e arus' interestiru settitcg up &. new coloni.ol systew. Exrly Explor*ti**s As early as 1291, two Italian brothers, the Vivald.i,s from Genoa, sailed rvith trvo galleys through the Straits of Gibraltar, seeking a Western route to the "Indies," the spice-producing areas of south and southeast Asia. They were never heard from again. Although they were precursors of a major Western thrust into the southern Atlantic, it is not even entirely clear what they meant by the "Indies." Early in the l4th century, other explorers from Genoa rediscovered the Canary Islands, in the Atlantrc, PoPulated by a hunting-and-gathering people' These islands had been known vaguely since classical times but had never been explored by Europeans. Genoese sailors also visited the Madeiras and probably reached the more distant Azores by 1351. Soon after this, ships from northeastern Spain, based in the port of 'Barcelona, sailed along the African coast as far south present-day Sierra Leone. Until 1430, technological barriers prevented further exploration for alternative routes. Without adequate navigation instruments, Europeans could not risk wider ventures into the Adantic. They also needed better ships than the shallow-drafted, oar-propelled as 348 PART III The PostdosirolEro :i.\iTS:':'.".,: 'x&''r.I N 't."' ''...r1-1::a '. .,:. tigure 15.2. Columbus is supposed to hove hod o copy of this world mop in spoin. The mop, doting from ob.out 1489., shows the old world os Europeons were incleosingly coming to' know il. Note how reochoble tndio looked fo Europeons using this mop. Mediterranean galle1,s. F{orvever, efforts were under way to develop an oceangoing sailing vessel. At the same time, the crucial navigational problems were met by the compass and the astrolabe, used to determine latitude at sea by reckoning from the stars. Contacts with Arab merchants (r,vho had learned from the Chinese) provided knowledge of these devices. European mapmaking, improving steadily during the l4th centurv. was also a key innovation. Be cause of these advances, as well as mistaken geographic assumptions shown on the map in Figure I5.2, Europeans were ready soon after 1400 to undertake voyages impossible just a century before. C,ftXrlmi;lE Fattersa* , Even as these rvider-ranging voyages began, in a familiar pattern detailed in Chapter 17, Westerners led by the Spanisl-r and Portuguese began ro take advantage ofthe new lands they had already discovered. A driving force behind both the further expeditions and the efforts to make already-discovered areas economicallyprofitable was Prince Henry of Portugal, known as lIenry the Navigator. A student of astronomy and nautical science, Henr1. sponsored about a third of Portuguese voyages ofexploration before his death in 1460. His mixture of motivation-scientific and intelIectual curiosity, desire to spread the name of Christ to unfamiliar lands, and financial interest-reflected some of the key forces in late postclassical Europe . Portugal by 1439 had taken conrrol of the to colonists. Soon Azores and had granted land Spaniards and Portuguese had conquered and colonized the Madeiras and Canaries, bringing in Western plants, animals, weapons) and diseases. The result was something of a laboratory for the larger European colonialism thar would soon rake shape, particularly in the Americas. European colonists quickly ser up large agricultural estates designed to produce cash crops that could be sold on the European market. CHAPTER 15 lheWeslondfie ChongingWorld Bolonce 349 the Atlantic began to occur as the island colonies were being fully settled. The ventures summed up the swirl of forces that were beginning to reshape the West's role in the world: inferiorities and fears, particularly with regard to the Muslims; new energies of Renaissance merchants and Iberian rulers; economic pressures; and a long-standing populatioll surge. in DEPTH The Problem of Ethnocentrism Many cultures encourage an ethnocentric outlook, and the culture of the West is certainly one of them. Ethnocentrism creates problems in interpreting world history. The dictionary definition of ethnocentrism is "a habitual disposition to judge foreign peoples or grouPs by the standards and practices of one's own culture or ethnic $roup"and often finding drem inferior. Most of us take pride in many of our own institutions and values, and it is tempting to move from this pride to a dis- Figure approval of other peoples when they clearly do not share our behaviors and beliefs. Many Americans have a difficult time understanding how other peoples have failed to establish the stable democratic political structure of our own country. Even liberals who pride themselves on a sophisticated appreciation of different habits in some areas may adopt an ethnocentric shock at the oppression (by current American standards) of women that is visible in certain societies today or in the past. Indeed, unless a person is almost totally alienated from his or her own society, some ethnocentric reactions are hard to avoid. 15.3. This I \th-century engroving portroys Vosco do oudience with the lndion ruler of Colicut in 1498. Go*o't First they introduced sugar, an item once imported from Asia but now available in growing quarltities from Western-controlled sources. Ultimately, other crops, such as cotton and tobacco, were also introduced to the Atlantic islands. To produce these market crops, the new colonists brought in slaves from nortlwestern Africa, mainly in Portuguese ships-the first examples of a new, commercial version of slavery and the first sign that Western expansion could have serious impact on other societies as well. These developments about 1400 remained modest, even in their consequences lbr Africa. They illustrate mainly how quickly Western conquerors decided what to do with lands and peoples newly in their grasp. The ventures were successful enough to motivate more extensive probes into the southern Atlantic as soon as technology permitted. Indeed, voyages of exploration down the coast ofAfrica and across ' Nevertheless, unexamined ethnocentrism can be a barrier in dealing with world history' We will grasp other times and places better, and perhaps use our own values more intelligendy, ifwe do not too readily dismiss cultures in which "objectionable" practices occur. Ethnocentrism is not just an issue for modern Westerners. Civilized peoples in the past routinely accused outsiders of barbaric ways, as in the Islalnic characterizations of the Mongols described in Chapter 14. But the current power of Western standards makes our own ethnocentric potential a real issue today in dealing with world history, as in 350 PART Irr The PosrrlosirolEro the tendency to dismiss any people who did not exploit the latest available military technology as disapproval and understanding in dealing r,vith practices such as female infanticidef M/hat are some somehou, inferior. nonethnocentric rvays to interpret initial European Controlling ethnocentrism does not mean abandoning all standards, as if any social behavior were as good as any other. It does involve a certain open-mindedness and sophistication. Reducing distracting levels of ethnocentrism can be k aided by some specific procedures. is imporrant to realize that few cultr,rres behar.e irrationally over long periods of time. They may differ from our taste, but their patterns respond to valid causes and problems. Our orvn values are not without complexity. We sometimes believe things about our o\ /n society that are not as trlle as we want) or, in judging other socieries, we forget about drawbacks in our own surroundings. Perspective on our orvn habits, including awareness of how other cultures might judge us, helps us resrrain our ethnocenffism. However, ethnocentrism may become a particularly strong impulse in dealing with some of the changes in world history taking shape about 1400. The West was gaining strength. Bccause rnanv Americans identify with Western civilization, it is tempting to downplal, some of the subdeties and disadvantages ofthis process or to exaggerate the extent to which the West began to organize world history more generally. The balance of power among civilizations rvas beginning to shift abour 1400, and it is legitimate-not simply ethnocentric-to note that the West's rise was one of the leading forces of this change. It is unnecessary to ignore the many other patterns continuing or emerging-includ- ing nerv vigor in several other societies-or to gloss over the motives and results that the West's rise entailed. The rise of the West u,as not just "good." It did not result simply from a triumph of progressive values. At the same time , avoiding ethnocentric impulses in evaluating this crucial transition period in u,orld history does not require an anti-Western approach. Balance and perspective are essential-easy easy to sav) not ahvays to achieve. Ouestions: \4/hy can ethnocentrism complicate interpretations ofrvorld historyl l{ou, can one balance expansionl CUTSIDE TH E WCRLD NETWORK )j, The inteynationnl fi,arueworh that had deyel- oped d.wring the postclax,icol period enobraced naost of Asia, Ewrope, and. Afri.ca. This net- work left out ir.toportant!/?/lups on.d, regiotr,s that had thei.r, o'tyn ilgot,ous h,istot",ies/n the,ir centat".ies. Developments in the Americas and Polynesia were not affected by the new international exchange. During the next period of world history, these regions all r,vere pulled into a new level of international contact, but a lvorld balance sheet in 1400 must emphasize their separateness. At the same time, several of the societies outside the international neturork were experiencing some ner,v problems during the l5th century that would iear.e them r,.r-rlnerable to outside interference thereafter. Such problems included nerv political strains in the leading American civilizations and a fragmentarion of the principal isiand groups in Polynesian culture. F*{itie*.i {ssee*s ir: t}c* Am*ri*es As discussed in Chapter 11, the Aztec and Inca empires ran into increasing difliculties nor long after 1400. Aztec exploitation of subject peoples for gold, slaves, and religious sacrifices roused great resent- ment. What rvould have happened to the Aztec Empire if the Spaniards had nor inter\rened after 1500 is not clear, but it is obvious that disuniq, c1sated opportunities lbr outside intervention that rnight not have existed otherwise. The Inca system, though far less brutal than that of the Aztecs, provided ongoing tension betr.veen central leadership and iocal initiative. This cornplicated effective controi of the vast expanse of the Inca domains. Here too, ol,erextension made change likely by the I500s- indeed, the empire u.as already receding somewhateven rvithout European intervention. At the same CHAPTBR I5 TheWestondthe ChongingWorld Bolonce 351 these prer.iously uninhabited islands before the 7th century, traveling in great war canoes' From the 7th century until abor"rt 1300 or 1400, recurrent contacts time, other cultures were developing in parts of the Americas that might well have been candidates for new political leadership, ifAmerican history had proceeded in isolation. remained between the Hawaiian islands and the Iarger Society Islands group, allowing periodic new migration. From about 1400 until thc arrival of European explorers rn 1778, Hau,-aiian society was cut off even from Polynesia. Polynesians in Hawaii spread widely across the islands, in agricultural clusters and fishing villages Expansi*n, Migratiti*, *nd Cc"rnq**st i{t FalS'**sia A second culture that was later pulled into the expanding rvorld network was that of Polynesia. Here, as in the Americas, important changes took place during the postclassical era but with no relationship to developments in societies elser'vhere in the rvorld. The key Polynesian theme from the 7th century to 1400 was expansion) spurts of migration, and conquest that implanted Polynesian cul- amid the volcanic mountains. Hawaiians were inventive in using local vegetation, weaving fabrics as well as rnaking materials and fishing nets from grass. They also imported pigs from the Society Islands-a vital source of meat but a source of devastation to many plant spccies unique to Hawaii. Politically, Hawaii was organized into regional kingdoms, which were highly warlil<e. Society was structured into a caste system with priests and nobles at the top, who reserved many lands for their exclusive use. Commoners were viewed almost as a separate people, barred from certain activities. ture rvell beyond the initial base in the Societv Islands, as Tahiti, Samoa, and Fiji arc called collectively (Map 15.r). One channel of migration pointed northward to the islands of Hawaii. The first Polynesians reached Thus, with a Neolithic technology the Hawaiians created a complex culture on their islands. Without a written language, their legends and oral histories, tracing the genealogies of chiefly families back to the original war canoes, provided a shared set Hawaiian ]"6 ls/ands ofstories and values. Es*Iatcd Achicv*ettsslt* b3. tla* &{ar:ris arqu'esas lslands ' Samoa'" -. --a rtlt J Another group of Polynesians migrated thousands of 'c,\ ..d " tsocie tclan Easter I . PACIFIC OCEAN called Maoris, successfully adapted to an environrnent ISOOMiLES O l.--.-----*----i .l o 1500 KTLOMSEBS , l5.l Polynesian Expansion. Storting in the 7th century, the Polynesions exponded north and soulh of their Mop stortinig point in lhe Society lslonds. miles to the southu,est of the Society Islands, perhaps as early as the Sth century, when canoe or raft cretl's discovered the two large islands that today make up New Zealand. The original numbers of people were small but were supplemented over the centuries that fbllowed by additional migrations from the Polynesian home islands.The Polynesians in Ner'v Zealand, considerably colder and harsher than that of the home islands. They developed the most elaborate of all Polynesian art and produced an expanding popu'lation that rnay have reached 200,000 people b)'the 18th century, primarily on the northern of the tlvo islands. As in Hawaii, tribal military leaders and priests l-reld great power in Maori society; each tribe also included a group of slaves drawn from prisoners ofrvar and their descendants. 352 PART rrr The PosrdosirolEro Overall, Polynesian society not only spread but also developed increasing complexity in the centuries of the postclassical era. Maoris produced a rich oral tradition in which fascinating legends combined with an emphasis on oratorical skill. Woodworking and decoration advanced steadily. The Polynesians did not work metals, but they produced a vigorous economy by combining imported crops and animals with veg- etation native to the new setdements. AII these achievements were accomplished in total isolation fiom the rest of the world and, particularly after 1400, substantial isolation of each major island grouping from the rest of the Polynesian complex. Polynesians were the last of the major isolated cultures to encounter the larger world currents brought forcefully by European explorers in the 18th century. When this encounter did come, it produced the same effects that it had in the Americas: r,rrlnerability to disease, weakness in the face of superior weaponry and technology, and cultural disintegration. i Conclusion Further Readings On the world network, see lerry Bentley, Old. Wortd Encoanters: Cros Cwbural Contacts and. Exchanges in preMod.eyn Tiwes (1993).Crucia-l changes in the Middle East are covered in F. Babinger's Mehmed. the Conqueror and IIis Titna (1978) on the Ottoman leader who captured Constantinople, and Bernard Lewis's The Arabs in lTistory (4th ed., l95B), which offbrs a brisk interpretation of Arab H. Islamoglu-Inan, ed., The Ottoruan Ernpire antl the World. Econorury (1987). On China under the early Ming dynasry see Charles O. Ilucker's Tbe Ming decline . See also Adding Up the Changes tiat began to take shape after 1400 was the most important change since the fall of the The world history framework classicai empires almost a thousand years before, and to last in broad outline for ce ntrrries. The overall result ofchange affected even societies whcre existing patterns persisted. Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, was not experiencing great political or cultural shifts around 1400. Regonal kingdoms fell and rose: The empire of Mali fell to regional rivals, but another Muslim kingdom, Songhay, soor arose in its stead, flourishing ber$reen L464 and 1591. African political and religious themes persisted for several cenruries, but the context for Aiiican history was shifting. The decline of the Arabs reduced the vitality ofAfrica,s key traditional contact with the international nerwork. In contrast to the Europeans, Africans had no exchange with the Mongols. Even as Africa enjoyed substantial continuity, its power relationship with western Europe was beginning to change, and dris became a source of further change. it was It is tempting to see some sort of master plan in the various changes that began to occur around 1400. People who emphasize an ethnocentric approach to world history, stressing some inherent superiorities in Western values, might be tempted to simplify the factors involved. However, a series of complex coincidences may be a more accu- rate explanation, as in other cases in which the framework of world history changed substantially. The causes of new western European activity were complex. They mixed new technologies, derived mainly from imitation, and a new set of economic problems, with elements of a new oudook (itseif both Christian and se cular) tossed in. Independent developments in the Americas and elsewhere flgured in, as did crucial policy decisions in places such as China. Each of the separate steps can be explained, but their combinarion was pardy accidental. Several eiements of the world history transition deserve particular attention. Technology played a roie, as opportunities to copy Asian developments were supple mented by European initiative , particularly in gunnery and ship design. The role of individuals, such as Prince Henry, must be compared with the impact of more general forces such as Europe's international trade woes. Itt Origint end. Etobing Institwtions (1978). An important, highly readable interpretation of the Dyruasty: West's rise in a world contexr is C. Cipolla's Guns, Sails and. Etnpires: Technologicnl Innoyation and the Eat ly Phnses of European Expansion, 1400-1700 (1985). See also ]. H. (f963) andThe Discotery of the Sea (1981). A.n important inre rpretation of new West- Parry's Age of Reconnaissance ern interests is S. W. Mintz's Sweetness and Powet": The Place in Modern Hixory (1985). On the Black Death and economic dislocation, see M. W. Dols's The Blach Death in ths Mid.dle East (1977),W. H. McNeill's Plagwes ontl. Peoples (1976), and the very readable B. Tuchman's ADistant Mityor: The Calnrnitous 14th Century (1979). Aprovocative study of relevant Western oudook is P. Arids's The How, of Owr Death (I9Bl). J. Huizinga's The Waning of the Mid.d.le Aga (1973) deals with dre decline of medieval forms in Europe . The early of Swgor Renaissance is treated in D. Hay's The Italian Renaissance (1977); see also C. Hibbert, Flot ence: The Biography of a City (1993)..For more cultural emphasis, see C. Trinkhaus's ZZe Scope of Renaissance llwru.aniswt. (1983). On Spain, see F. Braudel's The Med.iteyyanean and. the MetLiterraneoto World. (2 vols., 1978), and see E. Paris's The End. of Days (1995) on Spanish Jews and the Inquisition. On expansion in general, see Robert Bardett's The Mahirug of Europe: Conqwest, Colonization and Cultural Change (1993).