Download Are we Delivering Indigenous Biodiversity Conservation Outcomes

Are we Delivering Indigenous Biodiversity
Conservation Outcomes in the Best Possible
Way?
David A. Norton & C. Hamish Cochrane1, University of Canterbury,
Christchurch.
Introduction
Indigenous biodiversity, or natural heritage,
is widely seen as a key asset for New
Zealand. In their advice to the incoming
Minister of Conservation, the Department of
Conservation highlighted the importance of
natural heritage in three areas (DoC 1999).
They suggested that natural heritage is an
inseparable part of our sense of identity, as
providing a range of essential services
including clean water and carbon storage,
and as a major source of wealth through
tourism, our single largest export earner.
However, ongoing declines in the
abundance of indigenous species and in
ecosystem health (MfE 1997) raise
questions about the systems and structures
we have in place for delivering natural
heritage conservation outcomes.
It is increasingly being suggested that
insufficient resources are available to
address indigenous biodiversity decline. The
Draft New Zealand Biodiversity Strategy
(Anon 1998), for example, has highlighted
the need for substantial additional financial
resources to be made available if we are to
reverse the declines that are occurring in
New Zealand. As the conservation of
indigenous biodiversity is generally seen as
a public good it is primarily funded by the
taxpayer
through
various
central
government funding allocations (primarily
through Vote Conservation). However,
indigenous biodiversity is not restricted to
public lands and there is often tension
between private landowners and those
advocating for natural heritage on these
lands. The Draft New Zealand Biodiversity
Strategy (Anon 1998) has identified
biodiversity conservation on private land as
a key concern if we are to properly address
biodiversity issues in New Zealand.
Given that funding for biodiversity
conservation is limited and that this
conservation must focus on all land tenures,
it is important to ask if the present structures
for delivering biodiversity outcomes are
able to provide us with the desired returns
for our conservation investment? We
believe that the answer is no and in this
article outline an alternative approach that
we believe might better provide biodiversity
outcomes for New Zealand, especially with
respect to the goals outlined in the Draft
New Zealand Biodiversity Strategy.
Successful biodiversity conservation is of
course not only concerned with the delivery
of outputs. The effectiveness of outcome
delivery (supply) is very much dependent
on the nature of the demand side of the
system. So before discussing biodiversity
delivery, we first review some recent studies
on the value of biodiversity.
Valuing biodiversity
The importance of properly valuing
biodiversity has received considerable
recent attention. Costanza et al. (1997)
estimated that the total global value of
biodiversity (which they termed ecosystem
functions and services) ranged from US$1654 trillion (1012) per year compared to a
22 Victoria Economic Commentaries / March 2000
global gross national product total of around
US$18 trillion (all 1994 dollars). They
defined ecosystem functions to include both
the habitat, biological or system properties
or processes of ecosystems, and ecosystem
goods (e.g., food) and services (e.g., waste
assimilation) as the benefits that human
populations derive from ecosystem function.
They suggest that because ecosystem
functions and services contribute directly or
indirectly to human welfare, they therefore
represent part of the total economic value of
the planet. Patterson and Cole (1999) have
undertaken a similar assessment for New
Zealand where they estimated the total
economic value from New Zealand’s land
biodiversity as NZ$44 billion (1994 dollars)
and suggested that the value for marine
biodiversity would be higher. Their value
estimate included direct use value (e.g.,
commercial food production and forestry),
indirect use value (e.g., erosion control and
climate regulation) and passive value (e.g.,
the willingness to pay for the protection of
national parks). In comparison, New
Zealand’s gross domestic product was
NZ$84 billion in 1994.
While there is considerable debate about the
actual value that biodiversity has, it is clear
from both these studies that the value of
biodiversity is comparable to gross domestic
product and that biodiversity provides an
important portion of the total contribution to
human welfare on this planet. Costanza et
al. (1997) suggest that because such value is
largely outside the market and uncertain, it
is too often ignored or undervalued.
Because of these uncertainties, the costs and
benefits of different conservation actions
have often been difficult to quantify.
Stephens (1999) and Cullen et al. (1999)
have, however, recently presented methods
for quantifying conservation achievements
and for prioritising between different
conservation actions in the New Zealand
context. Stephens (1999) suggests that an
absence of methods and systems to measure
the state of New Zealand’s biodiversity
contributes to the poor visibility of returns
on society’s investment in conservation, and
also to doubt about the quality of
expenditure. He outlines a utility index
based on project return, urgency and
feasibility as a means to prioritise different
conservation actions. In contrast Cullen et
al. (1999) use an output measure called
Conservation Output Protection Years
(COPY) as a means for evaluating the
success of different biodiversity protection
projects. Both these approaches introduce a
new degree of rigor into the assessment of
conservation actions. But both approaches
are dependent on the correct system being in
place to deliver conservation outcomes. The
rest of this article considers the systems for
the delivery of these outcomes.
Biodiversity conservation in New Zealand
today
Conservation of indigenous biodiversity in
New Zealand is covered by a number of
Parliamentary acts including the Wildlife
Act 1953, Wild Animal Control Act 1977,
Reserves Act 1977, National Parks Act
1980, Conservation Act 1987, Resource
Management Act 1991, Forests Amendment
Act 1993 and Biosecurity Act 1993. Policy
development
falls
across
several
government agencies, although most is done
by the Department of Conservation,
Ministry for the Environment, Ministry for
Agriculture and Forestry, Ministry of
Fisheries, and Ministry of Research, Science
and Technology (Fig. 1). Delivery of
biodiversity outcomes is also spread
between several agencies including the
Department of Conservation, Ministry of
Agriculture and Forestry, local government
(both regional and city/district councils),
research institutes (universities and crown
research institutes), as well as many NGO,
community and iwi groups (Fig. 1).
Indigenous biodiversity conservation has
usually been seen as the responsibility of the
state and as something that usually occurs
on public land (e.g., national parks and
reserves), although some legislation also
Victoria Economic Commentaries / March 2000 23
covers indigenous species on private land
(Wildlife Act 1953 and the rarely used
Native Plants Protection Act 1934). There
has, however, been a shift in the way
biodiversity conservation is viewed in New
Zealand with recent legislation recognising
the importance of indigenous biodiversity
on private land. For example, the Resource
Management Act 1991 requires local
authorities to provide for the protection of
“significant areas of indigenous vegetation
and significant habitat for indigenous fauna”
(Section 6(c)) on all lands within their
administrative boundaries. The Forests
Amendment Act 1993, which prescribes the
way private indigenous forests can be
managed, defines sustainable
forest
management as “the management of an area
of forest land in a way that maintains the
ability of the forest growing on that land to
continue to provide a full range of products
and amenities in perpetuity while retaining
the forest’s natural value” (Section 2).
The Draft New Zealand Biodiversity
Strategy (Anon 1998) is perhaps the most
recent statement on the value of indigenous
biodiversity on private land. This strategy
highlights
the
importance
of
the
conservation of this biodiversity and
suggests that if we are to stabilise or even
reverse the decline that has occurred in New
Zealand’s indigenous species then we need
to focus on private lands as well as on
public lands as biodiversity issues occur
across all land tenures. The advice of both
the Department of Conservation and the
Ministry for the Environment to their
incoming
Ministers
reinforces
the
importance of biodiversity conservation on
private land (DoC 1999), (MfE 1999).
However, as the Ministry for the
Environment report highlights, rural
landowners are concerned that requirements
to protect biodiversity on private land will
threaten their property rights.
Draw backs in the present delivery of
biodiversity conservation
We see three major flaws in the way we
presently deliver indigenous biodiversity
outcomes in New Zealand. These flaws
reflect the systems that are in place not the
people who work within them who are
typically very hardworking and committed
to meeting biodiversity conservation goals.
(1) Indigenous
biodiversity
policy
development is primarily split between
two
government
agencies,
the
Department of Conservation and the
Ministry for the Environment. In general
this split is between conservation issues
on public and private land. However, as
our emphasis on indigenous biodiversity
conservation in New Zealand evolves
towards one that sees both public and
private land as important, it seems
illogical to maintain this distinction in
policy formulation. In fact this
distinction could lead to poor coordination of policy development and
ultimately to a poor return in
conservation
delivery
for
our
investment.
(2) The Department of Conservation has a
mixture of roles including policy,
planning, contract management and
conservation delivery. It can also
advocate for conservation values on
lands it does not manage. It has been
suggested that the Department is under
resourced to carry out these diverse
tasks. Certainly staff have to deal with a
wide range of competing tasks under
often very-short time-frames and as a
result not all jobs are completed equally
well. The post-Cave Creek reforms in
the Department have addressed some of
these
issues,
especially
through
separating delivery and planning
functions in Area Offices, but the reality
is that the relatively small number of
staff in the Department must deal with a
wide range of issues. This situation has
24 Victoria Economic Commentaries / March 2000
several
consequences,
the
most
important being that we are almost
certainly obtaining a lower return on our
investment in conservation than perhaps
we could.
(3) Our third concern lies with the planning
for and delivery of biodiversity
conservation on private land as
envisaged in the Draft New Zealand
Biodiversity Strategy. The Department
of Conservation is not well liked or
trusted by many private land owners in
rural New Zealand, especially farmers,
and would not seem the appropriate
organisation to do this. The Ministry for
the Environment is a policy agency and
is not in a position to deliver
conservation outcomes. While local
authorities, and many non-government
groups, can do this, there is still a need
for a central government agency to
maintain oversight and to distribute
funds.
An alternative model for biodiversity
conservation
One model for addressing these concerns
separates policy, funding and delivery roles
with respect to indigenous biodiversity
conservation (Fig. 2) and focuses the
activities of the Department of Conservation
on planning and contract management,
while outsourcing delivery to contractors.
We
suggest
combining
indigenous
biodiversity policy activities from the
Department of Conservation and the
Ministry for the Environment, and where
appropriate from other central government
agencies, into one policy unit (perhaps
called ‘Natural Heritage Conservation New
Zealand’). This should have substantial
benefits by providing for co-ordinated
biodiversity policy development in New
Zealand, especially between public and
private land. This policy unit should cover
other environmental issues as well as
biodiversity conservation (e.g., pollution
and sustainable resource use). The
Department of Conservation’s Head Office
would still retain some policy functions, but
these would relate to operational matters
(e.g., development of systems for
classifying threatened species) rather than
national policy.
At present, funding for biodiversity
conservation is allocated from Government
to the Department of Conservation through
Vote Conservation. Other funds used for
biodiversity conservation are allocated
through other channels (e.g., Vote
Environment
funds
the
sustainable
management fund which helps support
many local conservation initiatives). With
the proposal to provide additional funding
for biodiversity conservation (including
implementation on private land) we suggest
that there is considerable merit in
establishing
a
stand-alone
funding
organisation that acts as a central clearing
house for all government biodiversity (and
other
environmental)
funding.
This
organisation would allocate funding in
accordance with government policy to all
agencies involved in delivering biodiversity
conservation outcomes including the
Department of Conservation. This model is
very similar to that used for science and
research where the Ministry for Research,
Science and Technology develops policy,
the Foundation for Research Science and
Technology allocates government funding,
while a range of organisations including
Crown Research Institutes and universities
deliver outcomes.
Finally, we believe that the Department of
Conservation would be better able to deliver
conservation outcomes if it focused on
planning and contract management while
out-sourcing most of the actual delivery
work. This system has many benefits over
the current model as it enables the
Department of Conservation to focus much
better on planning and especially on
monitoring or ranging. By not having to
spend time on actual delivery, Department
Victoria Economic Commentaries / March 2000 25
of Conservation field staff should be able to
“better know their patch” and thus be able
to identify problems/issues before they arise
and be effective in auditing the results of
contractors work. By contracting work out
there is also the opportunity to develop
more focused skills in areas like pest control
and threatened species management at a
lower cost (because of reduced overheads).
This should occur without staff also having
to be involved in the many other tasks that
Department of Conservation staff are
presently involved in.
Because biodiversity conservation is a
public good, it is essential that there is
strong community involvement in all
aspects of this. We suggest that this public
input should occur at two levels. While the
electoral system provides some public input
into general government policy, the new
Wellington based policy unit could benefit
from an appointed ‘Board’ comprising
suitably qualified and experienced people.
The New Zealand Conservation Authority
provides some degree of public input into
policy development within the Department
of Conservation Head office. However, the
new group should have a more formal role
to work with key staff in policy
development. Secondly we suggest that
there is a need to continue with the present
conservancy based Conservation Boards as
these enable the local community of interest
to be directly involved in regional level
conservation planning (as presently occurs
through the Conservation Management
Strategy process). Community Boards have
the potential to play a similar role for
biodiversity conservation work within the
jurisdiction of local authorities.
Our model sees local government playing
an important role in indigenous biodiversity
conservation delivery on private land.
However, many local authorities do not
have, nor can they afford to have, the
necessary technical expertise for managing
this (especially ecological expertise). It may
be that one component of the additional
private land biodiversity conservation
funding highlighted in the draft Biodiversity
Strategy should be directed towards
enabling local authorities to purchase this
expertise. However, to use these limited
resources
efficiently
adjacent
local
authorities may need to look at pooling
resources and sharing such expertise.
Conclusions
Our focus in this article is in looking at
ways to provide a better biodiversity
outcome for New Zealand given the limited
resources available for this work. Our
comments have been made recognising the
outstanding work that is already taking
place in this area but also recognising that
despite this the decline in indigenous
species is ongoing. It therefore seems
essential to us that we look critically at the
way we deliver conservation outcomes and
consider other approaches that might differ
from the currently accepted model. This is
not to say that our suggested approach is the
only one, rather we offer it as a contribution
to debate on this matter.
There are a number of other issues that we
have not discussed that also require some
consideration. For example, the Department
of Conservation also has functions under the
Conservation Act and Historic Places Act to
manage use of the public conservation lands
and historic resources. While our comments
have focused on indigenous biodiversity, it
would seem likely that similar comments
would also apply to these areas. We have
also not discussed issues of co-management
and the implications of recently settled and
pending Treaty of Waitangi claims, but the
results of these should not affect the basic
manner in which government achieves its
indigenous
biodiversity
conservation
outcomes although some of the players may
change.
VEC
26 Victoria Economic Commentaries / March 2000
REFERENCES
Anon. 1998. New Zealand's Biodiversity Strategy, draft. Department of Conservation and
Ministry for the Environment, Wellington.
Costanza, R. et al. 1997. The value of the world’s ecosystem services and natural capital.
Nature 387: 253-260.
Cullen, R., G. A. Fairburn, and K. F. D. Hughey. 1999. COPY: a new technique for
evaluation of biodiversity protection projects. Pacific Conservation Biology 5: 115-123.
DoC. 1999. A Briefing for the New Minister of Conservation. Department of Conservation,
Wellington.
MfE. 1997. The State of New Zealand's Environment. Ministry for the Environment,
Wellington.
MfE. 1999. Briefing for the Incoming Government. Ministry for the Environment, Wellington.
Patterson, M. and A. Cole. 1999. Assessing the Value of New Zealand’s Biodiversity.
Occasional Paper Number 1, School of Resource and Environmental Planning, Massey
University, Palmerston North.
Stephens, T. 1999. Measuring conservation achievement. Pages 13-39 in P. M. Blaschke and
K. Green, eds. Biodiversity now! Department of Conservation, Wellington.
FOOTNOTE
1.
David A Norton and C. Hamish Cochrane are from the Conservation Research Group,
School of Forestry, University of Canterbury, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch.
Victoria Economic Commentaries / March 2000 27
28 Victoria Economic Commentaries / March 2000
Victoria Economic Commentaries / March 2000 29
Figure 1. Summary of current structures for biodiversity conservation delivery in New Zealand
Central Government
POLICY
DELIVERY
Ministry for
the
Environment
Department
of
Conservation
Ministry of
Agriculture
& Forestry
Local
government
Victoria Economic Commentaries / March 2000 31
Figure 2. A possible revised structure for biodiversity conservation delivery in New Zealand.
Central Government
Policy
Policy
MRST
‘Natural Heritage
Conservation NZ’
Funding
Funding
FRST
‘Foundation for
Natural Heritage
Research
Providers
32 Victoria Economic Commentaries / March 2000
Local
Government
Othe
Governm
agenci
Service
Providers
Com
(inclu
Footnote:
1
David A. Norton & C. Hamish Cochrane, Conservation Research Group
School of Forestry,University of Canterbury, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch.
Victoria Economic Commentaries / March 2000 33