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Democracy and Ethical Citizenship
________________________________
Politics of Participation –Focus on the ‘Third Sector’
Civil Engagement and Dimensions of Citizenship -Session
Helsinki, August 2005
Annukka Hulkko
University of Tampere
Department of Teacher Education
Email: [email protected]
Introduction: The Politics of Das Man
The purpose of this paper is to examine the concepts of democracy and citizenship from the viewpoint
of existential phenomenology. Furthermore these ideas of citizenship and democracy are indisputable
factors of the political reality that as an allegedly absolute also governs the relations between people.
The ontological presumption of politics seems to rely on a supra-individualistic and universal
metaphysics that is characteristically instrumental and based on submission. As such politics itself
constantly denies the condition of both the life-world and the Being as the ground of it. This
metaphysical and ethical instrumentality, which has developed within power relations, annihilates
individuated subjectivity – ethical citizenship – and the possibility of democratic action within society.
Due to the reduction of being, a novel political actor – das Man – has overtaken the moral agencysubject and thus overlooks the ethical ground and the ontological imperative of being.
In this paper I will focus on the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, Simone de Beauvoir, Emmanuel
Levinas and Luce Irigaray in order to establish an existential-phenomenological conception of being
which will thus be the ground for the theoretical and critical attitude towards the ideas of democracy
and citizenship. Equally the questions of mass society, value subjectivism, consumism, instrumentality
and technology are also essential. The fundamental argument of the paper is then that politics as such
has created an abstract environment that is constantly alienating Beings; it is a reality opposed to ours
and experienced through intercessors. And it is these intercessors who tell us what is real and true.
However truth does not have a despotic feature; in the polis there is no monopoly of one truth. If there
is, this so called truth is based on a life-lie and self-deception, in where being has been robbed from its
own most being; it is the condition of das Man. I do argue however that truth is the fundamental
ground of an authentic being and being-with in politics as well as in society. It is a matter of the
political and ethical meanings of being; the conditions and limits of being in the with-world.
1
The overpower of economy and increasing demands of efficiency at the cost of equity –that also aptly
describes the crumbling condition of the western welfare states – does fall directly on to the questions
of authentic being, democracy and citizenship. In the context of existential phenomenology these
subjects are interrelated due to the condition of an authentic being as a Da-sein; being happens always
in a polis. However, overcomed by usefulness and competence, being is signified through its purpose
and function of use; Being has a kind of “so that or in order to” -relation to society and state and
furthermore to other people as well. Due to the priory-setting of production and consumption of
commodities the role of democracy and citizenship are in danger to be reduced to a simple act of
consumption of das Man rather than a social and moral choice that challenges power relations and
moral principles. Furthermore the formations of social organizations, policies and investments that
mobilize social resources have fallen behind the global economy.
I do argue that the essence of democracy is in confrontation and in diversity. The idea of democracy
can thus be placed explicitly between people as a matter of being-with in a way that does not terminate
the historical and situational context of Da-sein itself. Furthermore the ethical character of citizenship –
that is rooted in the idea of Da-sein – demands moral agency-subject that has an infinite responsibility
for resisting all attempts to create an absolute power. Ethical citizenship is thus a conception that
includes both the ideas of unity and diversity; the unity of being-with and the diversity of Da-seins. I do
see that ethical citizenship forms both the ground the aim of politics. It combines subjectivity and
collectivity, diversity and unity and as such answers for polis and being, for Da and sein. The
phenomenological conception of democracy can thus be placed between the Hegelian-Marxist tradition
and the liberal view. On the ontological level there are both individual actors as well as a collective
subject, i.e. common will. On the one hand the self-governing subject is the agent of phenomenological
thought but on the other hand collective subjectivity describes the condition of Da-seins’everyday life.
However it is quite clear that political activity and participation are valued within the phenomenological
view: Political life as such can never be disconnected from the being of a Da-sein; the political space is
2
within the life-world. Polis – the Da – thus combines both the ideas of civil society and state and
furthermore includes a moral aspect into it. It is evident then that politics and political decision making
is characteristically moral even though the dominance of institutions and different kind of economical
forces. Therefore polis has to also form such an institutional space where subjectivity is constantly been
emerging and thus recognized.
Despite the emphasizing differences, the central themes of Heidegger, Beauvoir, Levinas and Irigaray
are both the being and the being-with, that are also essential to the consideration of democracy and
citizenship. Especially the ontology of Heidegger seems to open a path towards ethics based on
authentic being and difference that does not annihilate the authentic relations between Da-seins. I still
want to point out my heuristic use of the philosophers as well as my study’
s pragmatic interest; my aim
is to form a theoretical synthesis of the philosophers’thoughts. Therefore I do not specifically separate
the thoughts of the philosophers or study the differences between them.
I will discuss further the position of existential phenomenology as a reasonable as well as justifiable
ground for the ethical and democratic being-with that is loyal to the ontological imperative of being; that
values disclosure and confrontation in the polis. Firstly I will examine the concept of Da-sein and the idea
of polis as the there-place of a being and secondly the relation between democracy and being-with as well
as to the concept of ethical citizenship. In conclusion I will focus on to the present human condition that
has postponed being far away from authentic being.
Da-sein and the Polis
According to Heidegger (1967, 12) the being of a Being happens as a Da-sein; the being of a Da-sein
has an understanding relation to this particular being. Da-sein is thus fundamentally ontological because
it understands one’
s self in the opening (Lichtung) of its’own most being. The meaning of a being can
3
therefore be found from the understanding of a being. Being itself can be described as an existence that
can either be one’
s self as an authentic Da-sein or deny one’
s being. It is a matter of a Da-sein to
choose the possibility of an authentic (Augentlickeit) or inauthentic (Unaugentlickeit) being. The
existentiality of existence, the ontic-ontological character of Da-sein, places being to the world in which
it continuously discloses (erschlossen) being. However Heidegger (1967, 15-16, when examining the
specific condition of Da-seins ontic-ontological nature, writes:
“Das Dasein ist zwar ontisch nicht nur nahe oder gar das nächste – wir sind des sogar je
selbst. Trotzdem oder gerade deshalb ist es ontologisch das Fernste. - - Dasein ist ihm selbst
ontisch ‹
‹
am nächsten›
›
, ontologisch am fernsten, aber vorontologisch nicht fremd.“1
I do argue that the human condition today is one-sidedly governed by the ontic dimension of being and
nevertheless constantly denies the ontological demand of being itself. Even though Da-sein is ontically
nearest –it is just there; corporealistically situated –the ontological distance between Da and sein seems
to be increasing. Within the political context the question of being culminates thus to the fact that how
the current conception of being governs and directs the present. As mentioned earlier, present politics is
reclaimed by instrumental metaphysics, which is ontically justified but at the same time emptied from
ontological ties. In other words, the Da has overtaken sein. Being happens thus only at the “public
level”; being is signified and actualised only as an ontic thing. Not only is being been reduced to an
entity present-at-hand (Vorhanden) it is also been used as an entity ready-to-hand (Zuhanden) in a world
that can then be described as a totality of instrumental tool-beings (Zeugganze). However there are no
restrains what so ever to Da-sein to choose this way of being. As a matter of fact the condition of Daseins’everyday life is more or less defined by the condition of inauthenticity. However the decision
between authenticity and inauthenticity should be free and furthermost subjective in character. Polis
should thus present such a space for Da-sein in where this decision can be made; in where it is not
dictated from above.
1
“Though Dasein is not ontically only near or even the nearest –we even are it self. Nevertheless or just therefore it is
ontologically the furthermost. - - Dasein is nearest to itself ontically, furthermost ontologically, and not yet
preontologically foreign.”(Own translation.)
4
Especially Beauvoir has pointed out the meaning of both freedom and situational being; being is
existential and is thus signified and actualised within the dynamic contingency of being. Both
authenticity and inauthenticity are part of Beauvoir’
s view of ethics based on the idea of ambiguity.
Being is fundamentally a phenomenon of disclosing (dévoiler) a certain Da; it is an opening that is
additionally always thrown2 and is a state of becoming (devenir). Beauvoir (1947, 12) writes:
“… ce n’
est pas en vain que l’
homme néantise l’
être: grâce à lui être se dévoile et il veut ce
dévoilement. Il y a un type originel d’
attachement à l’
être qui n’
est pas la relation : vouloir
être, mais bien : vouloir dévoiler l’
être. Or ici il n’
y a pas èchec, mais au contraire succès :
cette fin que l’
homme se propose en se faisant manque d’
être, elle se réalise en effet par lui.“3
Disclosure is thus the condition of an authentic being but is still related to the world, to certain
conditions that are formed through socio-historical situations and accommodations to the surrounding
world. Therefore Da-sein is never infinitely free to be but still exists without a finite existence; being is
becoming in a certain situation.
Beauvoir has also brought the idea of transcendence back to the real existing situation of a human being;
it is transcendence that determines the freedom of being. When attached to the gendered actualisation
of being transcendence however often terminates the disclosure. Therefore the state and the situation of
becoming are essential when considering the transcendence. Facticity is then unquestionably related
both to the possibilities (possibilités; Möglickeiten) and to the limitations4 of being. And when it comes
to the being of a woman these possibilities have been scattered. These moral false steps of humankind
2
Throwness (Geworfenheit) is a concept of Heidegger but according to Eva Gothlin (2003, 51) also Beauvoir sees the
human being “as thrown into the world and characterised by facticity (facticité), which is delineated with the concept
situation”.
3
”It is not in vain that man nullifies being. Thanks to him, being is disclosed and he desires this disclosure. There is an
original attachment to being which is not the relationship ››wanting to be‹‹but rather ››wanting to disclose being‹‹.
Now, here there is not failure, but rather success. This end, which man proposes to himself by making himself lack of
being is, in effect, realized by him.”(Translated by B. Frechtman 1996, 12.)
4
Since being is corporeal it is also lived (vécue) individually through the body; both the being and the world are
presented according to the body through they are been lived. Therefore it is fair to argue that limitations as such have
more of a corporeal that purely essential ground.
5
do not however eliminate the ontological imperative of being; being is towards transcendence, towards
an open future. Beauvoir (1947, 102) thus raises the ideas of freedom and responsibility also to the
centre of political thought, cause authenticity itself is a disclosure interrelated to other Beings:
“Vouloir qu’
il y ait de l’
être, c’
est aussi vouloir qu’
il existe des hommes par qui et pour qui le
monde soit doué de significations humaines - - faire ‹
‹
qu’
il y ait›
›de l’
être, cest communiquer
5
à travers l’
être avec autrui“.
As far as politics is in any level seen as an act of being, the ideas of responsibility and freedom must thus
accompany the concept of politics. Otherwise politics becomes the politics of das Man – of
inauthenticity –that closes the being by sovereignty and strangeness.
Levinas has moreover brought the idea of the other (autrui) into phenomenological thought. For
Levinas the origin of ethics is the other whose face (le visage) constantly claims for responsibility. In
Levinas the relationship between the other and the I is the ground of and for being. The I cannot then
be attached from the social world and intercourse; the I do not found a totality (la totalité) a priori from
the with-world. The same (le même) does not therefore dominate the other. Similarly to Beauvoir’
s’idea
of ambiguity Levinas has established a concept of alterity (alterité)6 to describe the fundamental
condition of human being. In the political context the idea of alterity is indeed quite a radical
presumption. In addition to the infinite (infini) human responsibility the philosophy of Levinas, in the
context of politics, returns the focus on to the face-to-face (face à face) encounter, to the proximity and
the remoteness between the I and the other. As argued before, remoteness and distance have increased
at the cost of proximity. Therefore it is essential to ask, what is there to remain after the reduction of
being. What is then the purpose of politics if being is grounded on instrumental metaphysics? What is
politics for? It seems however that the ideas of democracy and citizenship do require such metaphysics
5
”To will that there be being is also to will that there be men by and for whom the world is endowed with human
significations - - To make being ‘be’is to communicate to others by means of being”. (Translated by B. Frechtman
1996, 71.)
6
See Levinas 1961, where this”state of being different”is constantly been emphasized.
6
that has its’ground in authenticity, ambiguity and alterity. Is the present situation of politics only a
symptom of forgetting the authentic condition of being? Has politics become a totality of the same, of
the same truth?
From the viewpoint Irigaray the problem of politics could be interpreted moreover as a situation
desperate for a revolution. Even from the standpoint of sexual difference (la différence sexuelle)
Irigaray’
s’thoughts are inspiring. The ethics Irigaray is longing for is thus an ethics that allows at least
two different ways of being – of subjectivity – to occur. Irigaray’
s main argument is explicitly aimed
against the subjectivity that has traditionally been the manifestation of masculinity and paternality and as
such exclusive to feminine subjectivity7. As long as this condition remains, the ethical encounter
between Beings is impossible; the feminine (féminin) and the masculine (masculine) have divided into
two diverse worlds in where the difference does not function properly. For Irigaray the questions of
time and space are thus considerable because historically understood time has been an attribute of the
masculine and space instead an attribute of the feminine. Therefore the economy of space-time (espacetemps) has to be reinterpreted from the viewpoint of desire (desir) penetrated by difference in where
difference does not include the diversity of space and time. On the contrary these are the factors that
allow such an interval to form where subjectivity is constantly been emerging and thus recognized.
It is evident that being as a Da-sein is the fundamental structure of existential-phenomenological
ontology. What is essential then is the possibility of confrontation (Auseinandersetzung) and disclosure
in the there-place of a being, i.e. in the Da.8 Gregory Fried has broaden and deepened the interpretation
of the Da as a polis, that emphasizes spatial and polemical dimensions of being and thus combines
both time and temporality to the being of a Da-sein. Fried (2000, 139) writes:
7
See Irigaray 1984.
According to Fried (2000, 15-17) the confronting constitutes the fundamental condition of our existence and thus truth
–as the opening of the world –is something to be brought forth in the polis from concealedness (Verdecktheit).
8
7
“Heidegger confers an ontological status on the polis: the political, religious, and social
organization of the city appears only in the horizon of the polis as this abode, the Da of Dasein. As we have seen, this There, the Openness of Being, is set out and opened up through
polemos, the Aus-einander-Setzung of truth as unconcealment.”
Polis has thus to answer to and for the possibility of confrontation and disclosure; it has to share in the
polemical nature of truth as unconcealment. What are then the implications of polis’
s ontological status
to politics as such?
Democratic Being-with
It is apparent that existential-phenomenological understanding of politics is fundamentally ontological.
Thus everything “political” has a meaning for historical Da-sein. It could though be argued that
ontology has only a little to do with the realm of politics. I do however disagree with this view. Politics
cannot be disconnected from being’
s ontological conditions; it is a matter of encountering one another
in a social space that includes also those relations and phenomenons that we call political. What is at
issue then is the Being or should I say the non-existence of Being of our politics. Therefore it is
essential to examine the grounds and foundations of present politics, to focus on the ontological
commitments and uncommitments of it. Nevertheless it is a question of seeking a new language, new
substance for political community, civil society, citizenship and most importantly for democracy as
such.
We cannot escape the fact that present western societies and states are mainly organized
“democratically”; democracy is seen as the fundamental principle of them. However the substance of
democracy remains quite vague. As a historical concept democracy has had its’temporal interpretations
but yet the essence of it seems to be lost. What is democracy? And most importantly, what is
democracy within the phenomenological thought. My intention is not however, as one might expect, to
empty the meaning of democracy with the phenomenological understanding of it. On the contrary,
with the help of phenomenology, my aim is to conduct discussions more into the ontological sphere of
8
democracy. In the same way as with the conception of politics I see democracy as a space that both
establishes and governs polis, the there-place of a Being, and as such also dictates the forms and
possibilities of confrontation and disclosure. How does present democracy as such then operate from
the viewpoint of being? Is it a condition of confrontation and disclosure? Is there an opening in the
democratically organized polis that brings the truth forth from concealedness? Is there an opening at
all? Or is democracy characteristically concealing; denying the ontological condition of human being?
Does Being even exist in democracy? According to phenomenological conception, Being indeed exists
and is moreover –as a Da-sein –the foundation of politics and of democracy.
When considering democracy as such I do follow the conception of the two each-supporting
dimensions – technical and substantial – of it.9 Firstly the technical dimension can be defined as a
certain political institution and its’governing rules into which people are then accommodated. Secondly
the substantial dimension is basically a question of the intentions of democracy, i.e. how and why
democracy is been used. In any case it seems that democracy has been understood as a limitation of
power. Thus in order democracy to be democratic it has to be limited. Otherwise democracy becomes a
tyranny of the masses that submits different kind of minorities. This is nevertheless the standpoint of
the phenomenological democracy conception. Democracy can thus be seen as an answer to the reclaim
of diversity and difference in the hold of masses. Democracy does not essentially promote mass society
even though it is little by little going to that direction due to the overpower of global economy and
markets. As Alan Touraine (1997, 148) has stated, democracy is in danger to turn into political markets
in where consumers are searching for commodities. The way the present consumer based society is
glancing the social life and furthermore giving priority to the production and consumption of
commodities, has also began to control the political life as such. Political consciousness has been
replaced by the consciousness of competence; morality has been replaced by usefulness. Nevertheless
the dominance of institutions has risen above the moral decision making. There is no more an
9
See example Dahl 1963, Berger 1987 and Harissalo & Miettinen 1995.
9
authentic being in our politics. It seems that politics and especially democracy –as a certain institutional
technology – have become between Da and sein and furthermore constantly preventing the
confrontation between them by totalizing the polis, the social and political space of being, and the
opening of truth.
Existential phenomenology establishes the idea of democracy explicitly between people as a matter of
being-with (Mitsein). Democracy can thus be defined as the possibility of both confrontation and
diversity that are seen as the fundamental factors of authentic being, i.e. being-in-the-truth (In der
Wahrheit sein). It is reasonable to ask what the practical implications of this authentic being are. Are we
not already in the truth? And if we are, then what is the problem after all. The problem is the situational
and historical context – the polis – of this being. Being does have a very dynamic and unavoidable
relation to polis and therefore the conditions of polis are essential to Da-seins’being-in-the-truth that
as such happens in the being-with. Even though the authentic condition of being is the disclosure of
truth it is not said that Da-sein even has a relation to it in its’everyday life in the polis. It is then the
lack of being, the desire and want to disclose being that becomes essential to phenomenological
thought. Is there a want to disclose being in the polis? Is this wanting to disclose being thus the essence
of democracy?
The phenomenological conception of democracy can be placed between the Hegelian-Marxist tradition
and the liberal view. On the ontological level there are both individual actors as well as a collective
subject, i.e. common will. On the one hand the self-governing subject is the agent of phenomenological
thought but on the other hand collective subjectivity describes the condition of Da-seins’everyday life.
However it is quite clear that political activity and participation are valued within the phenomenological
view: political life as such can never be disconnected from the being of a Da-sein; the political space is
within the life-world. Polis – the Da – thus combines both the ideas of civil society and state and
furthermore includes a moral aspect into it.
10
Despite the phenomenological truth-matter the question of contingency is still present in the polis.
However the contingency – on the contrary to Richard Rorty’
s idea of contingency10 – is associated
with the temporal being of a Da-sein and as such it does not annihilate the truth. Even though Da-sein
has an end of its’own, the being of a Da-sein is always being-ahead-of-itself and is therefore freed into
a certain kind of self-determined infinity that never – as such – limits the future or solidifies the past.
Thus democracy has an inevitable relation to time and temporal being; since Da-seins’temporal being
is never co-existent and is additionally always thrown and in a state of becoming, democratic being-with
– the possibility of confrontation and disclosure – is a matter of keeping the future open and not
dominating it by determined visions that are constantly postponing being farther of polis.
Ethical Citizenship
As argued above, democratic being-with is the condition of confrontation and disclosure. Furthermore
the ethical character of citizenship – that is rooted in the idea of Da-sein – demands moral agencysubject that has an infinite responsibility for resisting all attempts to create an absolute power. Ethical
citizenship is thus a conception which includes both the ideas of unity and diversity: the unity of beingwith and the diversity of Da-seins. Therefore polis has to also form such an institutional space where
subjectivity is constantly been emerging and thus recognized. It seems however that the idea of such
citizenship does not “take action”in present polis. On the one hand it could be argued that sein itself is
turning one’
s back on “the summon (Anruf) of conscience (Gewissen)”, that is to the condition of our
existence, but on the other hand polis can be so strongly administered that there is no possibility, no
space, for such an action. Then it simply recognizes such a citizenship that is commonly based on the
consumer model of politics and of democracy. Thus subjectivity has become a matter of collectivity
10
See Rorty 1989.
11
and polis a matter of mass society. However, in contrast to consumer model, citizenship is seen, from
the phenomenological point of view, as the counterforce of mass society and of das Man.
Tony Fitzpatrick (2001, 59) has stated that both a plural and democratic state as well as an open and
free civil society are the presumptions of citizenship. Equally the ethical citizenship is dependent on
these matters but due to the moral aspect, citizenship itself implies the idea of infinite responsibility.
Responsibility, which can be defined as a relation with truth and care, is the fundamental meaning of
ethical citizenship. What it follows then is that ethical citizenship has to keep up the diversity and
difference between the other and the self; never to submit itself to the tyranny of the masses or to the
same truth. Ethical citizenship is thus the actualization of confrontation and disclosure. It is the where
and what of the opening of truth; of the unconcealment (Unverborgenheit). It is about acclaiming one’
s
responsibility; wanting to disclose being in the polis.
However, this ontological imperative concerning responsibility is more or less repeatedly been denied.
Furthermore, as argued above, democracy as such is reduced to an open political market in which
citizens resembles no more than political consumers. Due to the priory-setting of production and
consumption, the role of democracy as well as the reclaim of ethical citizenship are in danger to be
reduced to pure consumism in where political activity and participation do no more consist in moral
and social choices that challenges power relations and moral principles. To be then is to posses and
consummate and politics is right there to offer a new kind of environment of commodities to be used.
And as long as political realm is ontologically disconnected from being – and as such characteristically
unlimited and centralized – and furthermore has hold on to politics as such – by politicizing – the
authentic responsibility of being is thus handed over to “politicians”. The political issues that are
authentically part of being’
s ontological condition have been removed into the institutionalized and
legitimized sphere of politics.
12
It is fair to argue that especially representative democracy is in a state where these issues of
responsibility and distance are in danger to become the stumbling blocks that eventually challenge –
and even overturn – the legitimacy and justification of the whole system. The Being of our present
representative democracy is estranged from its’being; polis and being do not confront, neither in
being-with nor in Da-sein. However, every choice and action as such has a moral dimension even if one
denies it; morality does not just disappear, even in politics. To be ethical is to be responsible; not
turning one’
s back on truth, on authentic human condition. It is true that especially moral political
decision-making has been taken over by more or less institutionalized system that is even supposed to
have “a life of its’own”. On the contrary I do see that this understanding of despotic institution-system
is just one of the abstractions that postpone the being out of the polis and furthermore annihilates the
ethical relations in the being-with. Do institutions allegedly really exist on their own? And what is this
existing like? Do they operate fundamentally on the linguistic level? If institutions do exist
independently and on one’
s own authority what does it tell about the human condition as such? That
one is the prisoner of ones’own language, just a servant of abstractions or the master that has
postponed being into those institutions and thus given the fate (Schicksal) of being – the truth – into
the hands of those supra-individual institutions?
From the viewpoint of existential phenomenology the ideas of responsibility and ethical citizenship do
not just disappear even though polis is seen to be possessed and dominated by supra-individual, and
more importantly, by supranational institutions. It is then the want to disclose being that is in the hands
of a being willing to take responsibility of one’
s being. The condition of a being as a lack – that is the
authentic condition of being – is constant striving for disclosure as confrontation. This is thus the
substance of the phenomenological politics-concept that includes both the ideas of democracy and
ethical citizenship. It does not priorize objects and entertainment, i.e. production and consumism. On
the contrary it establishes being and being-with as the foundations of politics. In other words, it
13
combines subjectivity and collectivity, diversity and unity and as such answer for polis and being, for
Da and sein.
Conclusion: the Present Petite Misery of Human Condition and the Possibility of Ethics
I do argue that the present petite misery of human condition is a symptom of such politics that fawns
upon the global economy and consumism.11 Democracy, in the pressure of market forces, is unable to
guarantee the possibility of confrontation. It could even be said, to retell Heidegger, that states have a
mind of an engineer; being and being-with are dominated and mastered by calculative and technical
thinking, which thus totalizes both the authentic being and polis. For an engineer there is no such thing
as a mystery; a being that is always thrown and in a state of becoming. On the contrary the fundamental
condition of being and the diversity of being-with are seen as a threat to society.
It is reasonable to ask whether the principle of truth, democratic being-with and ethical citizenship can
be part of a wider theoretical stance of politics and of society. I would argue that they are the very
essentials of it, at least from a phenomenological point of view. When considering the global change,
and of course the aspects of global citizenship, it is essential to have certain common features of
humanity that can be characterised as universal within the contingency of life itself. Otherwise the
whole question of being seems to be groundless and the idea of politics mislaid. For a phenomenologist
there is no reason to doubt that the ground of being –that can be found from our direct experience –
would not be in the being itself. In this sense is fair to argue that present politics and its’implications
have created an abstract environment that is constantly alienating beings; it is a reality opposed to ours
and experienced through intercessor; and it is these intercessor who tell us what is real and true.
11
I am referring to Pierre Bourdieu’s concept ”la petite misère”which he uses to describe such a social condition
where basic welfare is secured but still overshadowed by mental ailment (see Bourdieu 1993). I do however extent the
idea closer to condition where basic welfare is also in a state of collapsing.
14
However truth does not have a despotic feature; in the polis there is no monopoly of one truth. If there
is, this so called truth is based on a life-lie and self-deception, in where being has been robbed from its
own most being. The ontological imperative of being strives being for confrontation and disclosure.
Being-in-the-truth is the authentic human condition and as such the ground for being-with, in politics as
well as in society. Or is politics really a matter of concealing rather that unconcealing?
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