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1. INTRODUCTION
Points of Departure
Given the important role that media propaganda played in the creation and
maintenance of the totalitarian National Socialist (Nazi) regime in Germany in the
1930’s and 1940’s, reviewing and understanding the latter’s methods and tools is
always a useful discipline for the vigilant citizen of today’s functioning democracies
blessed with a free press. The longstanding hope here is that by learning from
history, one can avoid similar errors in the present and future. The fact that Hitler’s
propaganda and media specialist, Joseph Goebbels (1897-1945, suicide),
recognized the potential of radio – the most modern mass medium of the times –
quickly took control of German broadcasting and harnessed it for the purposes of the
Nazi regime, can be considered a part of the conventional historical wisdom on the
subject of that specific medium and Nazism. Furthermore, Goebbels’ use and abuse
of radio accompanied the Nazis every step of the way along a path that would lead
to their expansion into virtually all of Europe and North Africa. Via radio, Goebbels
and his team created the justifications for – or as one might express it in modern
terminology: the spin – for those very imperialist acquisitions. Given the nature of
radio waves, which is to propagate for hundreds or even thousands of kilometers,
Goebbels had a tool at his disposal for influencing not only domestic public opinion,
but also that in the rest of Europe and even overseas. For example, in the first two
phases of their territorial expansion – the incorporation of Austria and the BohemianMoravian border regions (Sudetenland) into the German Reich in 1938 – Goebbels
and his subordinates employed radio as an important means of demoralizing their
opponents while rallying the indigenous German-speaking populations of those
regions to the Nazi cause. Given the enthusiastic welcome Hitler’s triumphant entry
into these territories received – images of the jubilant crowds thronging Vienna’s
Heldenplatz on 15 March and the main streets of Karlsbad (Karlovy Vary) on 4
October 1938 come to mind – it would seem obvious that this propaganda work was
a great success.
However, these were ethnic-German populations for many of whom – if definitely not
for all – unification in a greater German state was the fulfillment of their national
aspirations. For this reason alone, Nazi broadcast policy had an easy task with these
people. With large segments of the Austrian and Sudeten-German populations,
1
Goebbels was in effect “preaching to the choir”. The situation was radically different,
however, when the Czech provinces joined the ranks of Hitler’s objects of expansion
in March 1939. For the first time, Goebbels was dealing with a non-German
population for whom incorporation into a Great German Reich was not only not the
apex of their national and cultural aspirations, but rather the complete negation
thereof. Regrettably, however, very little specific or systematic information exists on
how Goebbels and the Nazi hierarchy dealt via the medium of radio with this first
conquest of a non-German-speaking part of Europe: the Czech provinces of the
former Czechoslovak Republic. It is the aim of this study to shed some light on these
matters.
Main Questions of the Study
The history of Nazi broadcast policy in the occupied Czech provinces raises a
number of interesting questions, which may also have relevance in the other nonGerman-speaking countries that came under Nazi occupation. Hopefully, this study
will inspire scholars in those areas to look more closely at these issues also within
the context of their own national histories and help paint a more detailed picture of
Nazi media policy throughout occupied Europe. Furthermore, as very little has been
written to date on this specific subject here in the Czech Republic, it remains
something of a blank spot on the pages of Czech history, and specifically, in the
annals of Czech media history. Some of the more important questions this subject
raises include:
•
What were the Nazis’ overall intentions with the Czech nation, and what role did
radio play in the implementation of their policies? The two extremes of Nazi radio
policy lay between the forced expansion of broadcasting in the German Reich
proper on the one hand, and the complete destruction of Polish-language
broadcasting in the Generalgouvernement on the other hand. Where does Nazi
broadcast policy in the Czech provinces fit between these two extremes?
•
Did Nazi broadcasting policy in the Protectorate play a role in their other strategic
goals and objectives throughout Europe?
2
•
What was the institutional framework with which the Nazis sought to implement
their broadcast policy? What role fell to the Czechs within this framework? Where
did the boundaries lie between resistance and collaboration? Regarding the
German element within the institutions, what resources, especially what human
resources, did the occupiers invest in broadcasting to the Protectorate’s
audience?
•
What specific strategies, if any, did the invaders develop to influence the Czech
population with radio programming after having so thoroughly offended and
maligned the Czech nation through this very medium in the period 1938/39?
•
What target-group-specific sub-strategies, if any, existed for influencing the
Czech population?
•
What periodization is applicable to describe the development of Nazi broadcast
strategy vis-à-vis the Czech nation, particularly with regard to the course of the
Second World War? For instance, did the progress to the “total war” phase of the
conflict mean an emphasis on light entertainment at the expense of Nazi political
indoctrination?
•
Specifically What effects did the invaders’ media policy have on program
structure and content? For example, how intrusive was German-language
programming? How much of programming was overtly pro-German or pro-Nazi
political propaganda?
Methodological Approach
In order to ascertain the answers to as many of these questions as possible, I have
employed two main methods of research. After briefly reviewing the background of
the German-Czech conflict in the Czech provinces and the position of Czech Radio
within the context of this conflict, I continue with a micro-historical review of the
institution of Czech Radio itself. This entails looking at the development of the
broadcast corporation’s actual institutional structure in terms of its ownership and
command hierarchy over the course of the entire occupation period from 14/15
3
March 1939 to 9 May 1945. Obviously, the nature of a broadcast corporation in the
context of mid-20th century Europe is extremely specific, which makes it different
from other institutions such as banks or even from other media of the day, such as
newspapers. Nevertheless, since there was only one official and legal broadcasting
organization during the Nazi occupation of the Czech provinces, namely Czech
Radio, a review of its institutional development over the course of the occupation
should yield relevant results with regard to Nazi policy in a broader context.
Thoughts in this regard include:
•
What can the micro-history of this one company tell us about Czech/German
relations close-up within an organization?
•
What does it reveal about everyday media work in the Protectorate?
•
What does it tell us about the level of professionals the Reich employed in the
Protectorate? Were they top-line radio experts or rather secondary staff?
•
Were they Reichs-Germans or were they Germans indigenous to the
Protectorate?
The second methodological approach is a program content analysis, i.e., an
examination of program content in terms of the percentage of airtime dedicated to
any individual topic. It is a relatively simple if also very time-consuming method for
obtaining a view of ratios of program content, which I developed in my work at Radio
Free
Europe/Radio
Liberty’s
Audience
Research
and
Program
Evaluation
Department in the late 1990’s. Simply put, one identifies broadcast topics in a
program log or broadcast schedule by minutes, tallies these and then quantifies
them as a percentage either of total airtime or a subsection thereof (e.g., percentage
of classical music in all music programming, percentage of German-language
broadcasts in all talks programming, etc.). The analysis of program content in this
study is based on the published broadcast schedules for nine weeks of programming
spread throughout the years 1939 to 1945. The main sources used are Czech
Radio’s official weekly radio program magazine Náš rozhlas (Our Radio”), and after
4
its discontinuation in May 1941 – concurrent with the discontinuation of all the
German radio magazines – its sister publication Týden rozhlasu (“Radio Week”). For
the German stations’ programming, which is relevant for comparison purposes, the
weekly German radio program guide Funk-Woche (“Radio-Week”) served as the
source material. “German” in this context means all stations run by the ReichsRundfunk-Gesellschaft (“Reichs-Broadcasting Corporation”) and intended primarily
for a German public in Germany, Austria, the Sudetenland and other territories
annexed to the German Reich, i.e., the Protectorate, the occupied Polish territories,
Luxembourg, Alsace-Lorraine, etc.
Choosing the relevant weeks for analysis was not a simple task. The Protectorate of
Bohemia and Moravia existed officially for approximately 289 weeks with the
German occupation starting in the 11th calendar week of 1939 and ending in the 19th
calendar week of 1945. Each of these calendar weeks corresponds to a broadcast
week of Czecho-Slovak/Czech Radio. Since the data input for a statistical
breakdown required at least 60 working hours for each broadcast week analyzed, it
was not practical to analyze the thousands of program hours broadcast on each of
the Czech medium- and short-wave stations during the course of more than six
years of occupation. Instead, a selection of representative broadcast weeks became
necessary. Finding representative or average broadcast weeks required the
elimination of periods in the year that for various reasons could contain large
amounts of unusual programming. In practice, that meant specifically not analyzing
the popular summer vacation period in July and August. Even in a time of “total war”,
not only the listener, but also the Czech Radio staff members were likely to go on
holiday at some point during this period, which could have had effects on program
content. Another concern in this regard involved the main growing and harvesting
seasons for farmers, and the potential for effects on programming stemming from
that.
Furthermore, it was necessary to exclude program weeks containing special
holidays: i.e., primarily Christmas and New Years, generally the 51st, 52nd and 1st
calendar weeks, and Easter, which in the years 1939 to 1945 fell variously between
the 12th and 16th calendar weeks. Further weeks with unusual programming were
those containing important anniversaries: i.e., the establishment of the Protectorate
on 15 March, Hitler’s birthday on 20 April, initially also the date of Jan Hus’s
immolation on 6 July, and St. Wenceslas Day on 28 September. At the same time,
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consistency required a comparison of the same program weeks throughout the entire
period. Ultimately the choice fell upon nine weeks for the overall period. These were
the
•
48th calendar weeks for 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1943 and 1944 and the
•
9th calendar weeks for 1939, 1942 and 1945
The logic of this choice was that the 48th calendar week, starting at the end of
November, met all of the above-listed criteria for ordinary programming. The same
was true for the 9th calendar week in the corresponding years. In 1939, the 9th
calendar week – running from 26 February to 3 March – provided a view to the
status quo ante, i.e., programming content just two weeks prior to the invasion. My
intention here was to provide a view of Czecho-Slovak Radio’s programming at a
point in time at which the political and state system of the Second Republic had
basically normalized, or at least progressed beyond the initial turbulent disruptions
brought on by the effects of Munich.
For comparison purposes between Czecho-Slovak Radio and the Reichsrundfunk, I
chose the same week of broadcasting for the Reichssender Berlin. Berlin seemed
the obvious choice, as, like Prague, it was the station located in the capital city
alongside the central offices of state institutions. Under Goebbels’ leadership, the
Reichssender Berlin also became the flagship station eventually merging with the
national long-wave station, the so-called Deutschlandsender. Thus, despite the
stronger tradition of regionalism in Germany’s station network and programming,
Goebbels centralization efforts eventually caused the Reichssender Berlin to play a
similar role to that of the station Prague I within Czechoslovakia/Czecho-Slovakia
and the Protectorate.
The 9th calendar week of 1942 also turned out to be relevant with regard to the era of
Fricke’s leadership at Czech Radio before the onset of Thürmer’s reforms. For the
sake of consistency then, I also chose the 9th calendar week in 1945 to cast light on
programming during the end phase of the occupation prior to the complete collapse
of the Third Reich. For the 48th weeks of 1939 and 1940, I chose the programming of
the Reichssender Böhmen (Mělník), as the relevant, local, German-language station
for the Protectorate. Regrettably, no explicit program magazines are available for the
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period after May 1941. Since we are dealing with radio programming as a tool of
Germanization of the Czech population and the imposition of the National Socialist
political regime on that population, we need to look at and compare several content
criteria over the course of the occupation. The most relevant of these appeared to
be:
1. Duration: Are there similarities in the duration of the broadcast day, i.e., the
period when stations are on the air between the start of broadcasting in the
morning and the end of broadcasting at night? In the Reichsrundfunk, Goebbels
increased the average length of broadcast day by nearly 50% between 1933 and
1938.1 If the same were true for the Czech stations, it would support the premise
of a similar Nazi radio policy towards the Czechs as towards the Germans.
2. Regionalization: Station of programming origin and type. Presumably, greater
levels of programming originating from Brno and Moravská Ostrava could imply a
strengthening of the position of the provinces/weakening of the position of the
central flagship station Prague. Secondly, were Brno and Moravská Ostrava
more subject to re-broadcasts of programs from the Reichsrundfunk than Prague
or did they start to produce more of their own programming? If yes, then these
factors could suggest the application of the same territorial policy of divide et
impera within the Protectorate itself as applied towards Austria after the
Anschluss.
3. Programming Structure: Similarities between the Czech stations and the
Reichsrundfunk in the structure of programming content (i.e., primarily music vs.
talks, politics versus entertainment, etc.) would show the extent of the application
of Goebbels’ broadcasting principles on Czech Radio. Regrettably, it is not
possible in detail for the German stations after May 1941 due to the
discontinuation of German radio program magazines.
1
From an average broadcast day of 13.37 hours in 1932 to 19.43 hours in 1938. See:
WEINBRENNER: Handbuch des Deutschen Rundfunks Jahrbuch 1939/1940, p. 315, graph
“Sendeleistung”.
7
4. Germanization: A) Music by German composers, which the Nazi broadcasting
authorities considered pro-German propaganda and B) German-language talks
programming on the otherwise primarily Czech-language radio stations, i.e.,
Prague I, Brno and Moravská Ostrava, later also Plzeň;
5. Nazification: Overtly pro-German or pro-National Socialist political propaganda in
the Czech language.
Although in totalitarian regimes like the Nazi-dominated Protectorate of Bohemia and
Moravia virtually all aspects of media production are subject to political manipulation
on some level, it would exceed the framework of this study to deal with all of them.
Obviously, no study can cover all aspects of the weekly 112 to 140 hours of
broadcasting for a period of more than six years in detail. Thus, while providing a
view to general program structures, this study also includes three short, separate
chapters on important aspects of programming to the so-called Protectorate of
Bohemia and Moravia for the following reasons:
•
Broadcasts to workers – an all important, i.e., weapons-producing target group
for the invaders, whose favor they courted.
•
Anti-Semitic broadcasts – as anti-Semitism was a core element of National
Socialist ideology on the one hand and a virtually universal and relatively “safe”
field of activity for Czech collaborators on the other hand. That is, while publicly
defaming exiled President Beneš or his colleagues could easily be interpreted as
treason – and frequently was in post-war trials – expressing anti-Semitic thoughts
was a far less serious offense.
•
Humorous programming in the form of the political sketches – as political humor
was not a propaganda tool the National Socialists used on the German
population as a whole, but rather a weapon turned specifically against the Czechspeaking population.
8
Regarding methodology, I employ basically historic-chronological approach to the
topics, describing developments over the period. The specific program content
analyses described above illustrate the overall structure and texture of programming
at specific historic junctures throughout the occupation. Finally, since he played such
an important role in pro-Nazi and pro-German radio propaganda to the Czechs,
especially in the beginning years of the occupation, I also review in brief and where
relevant some of the radio work of Emanuel Moravec.
Topics and Limitations of this Study
The National Socialist state was among the first of the many totalitarian regimes
inflicted on humanity since 1917 to mobilize the new electronic media for its own
political purposes. By the time the German Wehrmacht marched into Prague on 15
March 1939, radio as a medium had progressed well beyond infancy and Czech
Radio had grown into a complex public service provider of entertainment and
information to nearly three-quarters of a million radio receivers throughout the
country and to many thousands of Czechs abroad as well.2 Apart from a vast variety
of musical productions covering a range of genres from operas to symphonies to
folks music and popular dance tunes, there was specialized talks programming for
children and adults and also for women. There was religious programming for
believers.
Other
specialized
programming
addressed
factory
workers
and
employees, entrepreneurs and farmers respectively. For entertainment and
educational purposes, the new genre of radio drama had developed in the decade
and a half since the medium’s inception. Alongside all of this, there were the allimportant daily reportage and newscast programs targeted at the public as a whole.
Thus, radio programming in the Czech provinces was already an extremely complex
and highly developed media when Hitler’s Germany invaded in 1939.
Regrettably, I suffer from specific academic limitations, however, which rule out an
in-depth analysis of several interesting topics in this report. For example, music,
which covered no less than 69% of all broadcast hours in Goebbels Reichsrundfunk
2
JEŠUTOVÁ, Eva et al: Od mikrofonu k posluchačům, z osmi desetiletí českého rozhlasu, (“From
the Microphone to the Listeners, from Eight Decades of Czech Broadcasting”), Český Rozhlas,
Praha, 2003, Table II. Počet koncesionářů (“Number of Subscribers”), page 613. Hereinafter,
when referring to general parts of the book such as the tables section: JEŠUTOVÁ et al: Od
mikrofonu.
9
in 1938 and 19393, was definitely also a serious battlefield of the airwaves in the
Protectorate’s radio stations. Germans and Czechs fought to secure as much airtime
as possible for musical works by their national composers. Regrettably, I lack
specific musicological education that would reveal any finer nuances that might have
lain behind the broadcasting of specific pieces of music or combinations thereof.
Presumably only a profound musicological education could allow for a discussion
sufficiently intelligent or in-depth to identify all the subtleties of music as a weapon.
Nevertheless, I do not see this as a great failing of this study. First of all, this study is
primarily about the ideas and arguments used to influence listeners’ thinking, and
these are most easily examined in words. Secondly, and as the present-day
perspective of a unified Europe so often reminds us, the nature of music is such that
love of it often supersedes national boundaries. A Czech listener in the Protectorate
could conceivably enjoy Mozart, Beethoven or Brahms just as much as a German
listener could thrill to Dvořák, Smetana or Fibich. Thus, analysis of music content
alone may also not ultimately reveal a great deal about its reception by the audience.
Nevertheless, judging from discussions within the occupation authority and the great
extent to which the works of German composers came to make up airtime on the
Protectorate’s radio stations over the course of the occupation, the Nazi authorities
clearly did consider German music an important aspect of propaganda work.
Therefore, neglecting music as a subject entirely would have meant omitting an
important aspect of the overall picture of programming on Protectorate Radio.
“German music” in the context of the times meant the works of ethnic-German or at
least primarily German-speaking composers originating from and/or working in the
German-speaking and adjacent areas of Europe, i.e., pre-Versailles Germany,
Austria, Bohemia-Moravia and other territories annexed to the Reich after 1939, of
non-Jewish heritage and whose style was officially approved of by Goebbels’
ministry. This proved to be a rather complicated process, requiring an analysis of the
backgrounds of nearly 150 different composers. The result of this analysis is a
simple depiction of the percentages of “German music” as a part of programming.
Another limitation is to Czech-language broadcasts originating in the Protectorate.
There were, of course, German-language broadcasts that originated in the
3
WEINBRENNER, Hans-Joachim, (Ed): Handbuch des Deutschen Rundfunks Jahrbuch
1939/1940, (“German Broadcasting Handbook 1939/1940“) Kurt Vowinckel Verlag, HeidelbergBerlin-Magdeburg, 1939, page 317. Hereinafter: WEINBRENNER: Handbuch des Deutschen
Rundfunks Jahrbuch 1939/1940).
10
Protectorate from the Reichssender Böhmen (RSB) intended primarily for the local
German audience and financed through the Reichsrundfunk. However, the RSB had
only a limited independent life prior to being – for the most part – absorbed into the
unified Reichsprogramm, i.e., the common, nation-wide broadcasts of all German
stations, in June 1940. Thus, there is relatively little to deal with in this regard.
Similarly, while Czech-language broadcasts from Czechs in exile played a very
important role for the occupied nation, it would exceed the bounds of this study to
examine them in detail. Therefore, I only deal with them to the extent these
broadcasts by exiled Czech had direct effects on or provoked specific reactions from
the Protectorate’s broadcasting authorities.
Furthermore, initial research into this subject, which I conducted in 2003 to 2006,
implied that the occupiers sought to reach specific sub-sections of the population or
target groups with specialized programming. Some of the main target groups, which
received the most attention from the very beginning, were:
•
Factory workers
•
Youth
•
Women
•
Business people
•
Farmers
Of these, this report will deal with broadcasts to factory workers. Factory workers
produced weapons for the Wehrmacht and were consequently of prime importance
to the Nazi invaders, and received special treatment from them for this very reason.
Therefore, they represent a target group of special interest.
Regrettably, I lack a comprehensive background in gender studies, which would
allow for an intelligent examination of broadcasting to Czech women. Superficial
research into this subject suggests that precisely broadcasting to women in the
Protectorate could be a rich and interesting area for research. Unfortunately, we will
have to leave this potentially fascinating facet of Nazi policy vis-à-vis half of the
Protectorate’s population and specifically the role radio played in supporting that
policy to other historians with the relevant gender-studies expertise. The situation is
similar in broadcasting to youth and business people. A superficial review of
Protectorate-period broadcasts to farmers, on the other hand, revealed them to have
11
been mostly non-political and extremely practical in nature. While advice on
increasing yields undoubtedly also served the German war effort in the Protectorate,
I lack the specialized agricultural knowledge required to make any evaluation of
them.
Finally, the scope of this study deals with the period of the German occupation of the
Czech provinces, which means specifically 14/15 March 1939 to 9 May 1945.
Nevertheless, wherever information is available and relevant, pre- and post-war
destinies of the main actors in Czech broadcasting will be a subject of this report as
well.
Source Materials
Already for several years, the scientific community has been able to turn to a number
of good studies on National Socialist occupation policy in the Protectorate of
Bohemia and Moravia. Detlef Brandes’s famous work published in two volumes in
1969 and 1975 “Die Tschechen unter Deutschem Protektorat”4 is valued by
historians to this day as a standard work on the subject – and that despite the fact
that it was researched and written for the most part during the brief period known as
the Prague Spring of 1968 and prior to the onset of the so-called period of
‘normalization’. Since 2006, the Czech historians Jan Gebhart and Jan Kuklík have
contributed two more volumes on the subject of the German occupation of the Czech
provinces and the Czech response to that occupation.5 Their richly illustrated
editions concentrate especially on Czech resistance to the Nazi occupation and
touch on the importance of radio broadcasting from abroad for the Czech resistance.
Collaboration with the invaders and changes in Czech society brought on by the
occupation also play a role in these valuable works and were useful to this study.
4
5
BRANDES, Detlef: Die Tschechen unter Deutschem Protektorat, Teil I, Besatzungspolitik,
Kollaboration und Widerstand im Protektorat Böhmen und Mähren bis Heydrichs Tod (19391942), R. Oldenbourg München, Wien 1969 und Die Tschechen unter Deutschem Protektorat,
Besatzungspolitik, Kollaboration und Widerstand im Protektorat Böhmen und Mähren von
Heydrichs Tod bis zum Prager Aufstand (1942-1945), R. Oldenbourg München, Wien 1975,
Hereinafter: BRANDES: Die Tschechen I., and BRANDES: Die Tschechen II.).
GEBHART, Jan and KUKLÍK, Jan: Velké dějiny zemí Koruny české, svazek XV.a a XV.b 19381945 ("The Great History of the Lands of the Czech Crown, Volumes XV.a and XV.b 1938-1945“),
Paseka, Praha Litomyšl, 2006 and 2007 respectively. Hereinafter: GEBHART, KUKLÍK: Velké
dějiny XV.a and GEBHART, KUKLÍK: Velké dějiny XV.b.).
12
How Goebbels achieved control over the German media and employed it for the
National Socialists’ political goals, a process he famously called Gleichschaltung6 – a
term so successful that it has even made its way into English and Czech – has also
been the subject of considerable research. On the subject of broadcasting policy to
the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia specifically, there is very little specialized
literature, however. Ansgar Diller, the doyen of radio research from the period of the
Nazi era, devoted a chapter to the subject in his study Rundfunkpolitik im Dritten
Reich from 1980.7 Diller covers the topic succinctly within the over all context of Nazi
broadcast policy, using sources available in West Germany towards the end of the
Cold War. Diller’s Czech counterpart, František Hrdlička, also examined the subject
as part of an overall history of Czech broadcasting, which was published in 2003.8
However, given that the chapter on the occupation was just one out of many in the
book spanning 80 years of Czech Radio’s history, Hrdlička was unable to go into
very great depth. Nevertheless, both his and Diller’s works offer a useful overview of
the subject and in the case of Hrdlička’s publication, rich and attractive illustrations
as well.
An excellent resource that describes in detail specifically Goebbels’s radio campaign
against Czechoslovakia during the Munich Crisis and the poisoned atmosphere that
created in German/Czech relations is David Vaughan’s bilingual study on the subject
which came out on the 70th anniversary of the crisis.9 This very grippingly written
book is especially useful for setting the dramatic background and the poisoned
atmosphere against which the occupation then played out less than six months later.
A much older work that covers the period and the occupation is a short book by
Czechoslovak Radio’s long-term employee, Miloslav Disman.10 It provides a good
6
7
8
9
10
Gleichschaltung–from the German “gleich”, meaning “same” and “Schaltung” meaning “switch” as
in the switch of an electrical circuit. Expressed in modern American parlance, this might be:
having all media institutions “on the same page” or figuratively “on the same wavelength”.
DILLER, Ansgar: Rundfunkpolitik im Dritten Reich, in: BAUSCH, Hans (Hg), Rundfunk in
Deutschland Band 2, Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, München, 1980. Hereinafter: DILLER:
Rundfunkpolitik. The chapter on broadcasting to the Protectorate covers pages 387-399.
HRDLIČKA, František: Rozhlas v okupaci, IN: JEŠUTOVÁ, Eva et al: Od mikrofonu
k posluchačům, z osmi desetiletí českého rozhlasu, (“From the Microphone to the Listeners, from
Eight Decades of Czech Broadcasting”), Český Rozhlas, Praha 2003, pages 150-182.
Hereinafter: HRDLIČKA: Rozhlas v okupaci.
VAUGHAN, David: Battle for the Airwaves, Radio and the 1938 Munich Crisis/Bitva o vlny,
Rozhlas v mnichovské krizi, Radioservis Cook Communications, Praha, 2008. Hereinafter:
VAUGHAN: Battle for the Airwaves.
DISMAN, Miloslav: Hovoří Praha, Vzpomínky na revoluční květnové dny 1945 v rozhlase,
(“Prague speaks, Rememberances of the Revolutionary Days in May 1945 in the Radio“)
Nakladatelství Svoboda, Praha, 1975. Hereinafter: DISMAN: Hovoří Praha.
13
review of the atmosphere, at Czech Radio, but also in Prague in general, especially
in the initial days after the invasion. However, given that it was written in 1975, one
does also feel the period of its inception at times.
Regarding specifically Department IV – Cultural Policy of the Office of the
Reichsprotektor and later of the German State Ministry for Bohemia and Moravia, to
which Czech Radio was subordinated, a short study by Tim Fauth was very valuable
for its overview of the genesis, make-up and results of the work of the Nazi media
bureaucracy in the early phases of Department IV’s existence.11 One can only hope
that this talented historian will also produce a volume on the period 1942-45 as well.
Crucial to any general radio programming and especially subject to manipulation in
totalitarian regimes is also newscasting. However, this was not the domain either in
Germany or in the Protectorate of the broadcast companies themselves, but rather of
separate, centralized state news agencies. In Germany, the creation of four and later
seven daily newscasts fell to Der Drahtloser Dienst (DDD),12 which between 1 May
1933 and 15 September 1939 was simply a section of the Press Department of
Goebbels’ Propaganda Ministry. After September 1939, it became a sub-division of
the Reichs-Rundfunk-Gesellschaft,13 which was definitely more logical in terms of the
overall organizational chart. Nevertheless, the DDD’s newscasts remained a
centrally produced product simply for retransmission by the Reichssender. Similarly,
in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, newscasting was the job of the
Broadcasting Editorial Department (Rozhlasová redakce) of the official Czech News
Agency (ČTK). Thus, the history of newscasting in the Protectorate is actually part of
the history of ČTK. Happily, a new publication released on the 90th anniversary of
ČTK’s establishment14 examines the genesis of the company, including wartime
developments in it. Regrettably, since the ČTK building sustained serious damage
during fighting in the Prague Uprising in May of 1945, which destroyed a lot of the
original documentation, the work is not very explicit on the Broadcasting Editorial
11
12
13
14
FAUTH, Tim: Deutsche Kulturpolitik im Protektorat Böhmen und Mähren 1939 bis 1941, (“German
Cultural Policy in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia 1939 to 1941”), Berichte und Studien
edition 45, Hannah-Arendt-Institut für Totalitarismusforschung e.V. (Ed.), V&R unipress,
Göttingen, 2004. Hereinafter: FAUTH: Deutsche Kulturpolitik.
Literally “The Wireless Service”.
DILLER: Rundfunkpolitik, pages 105-107.
STEJSKAL, Jan: Zprávy z českého století, tiskové agentury a česká společnost 1848-1948,
(“News from a Czech Century, Press Agencies and Czech Society 1848-1948”) ČTK, Triton,
Praha, 2008. Hereinafter: STEJSKAL: Zprávy.
14
Department’s staff. Nevertheless, it makes for a very interesting read for media
historians.
Valuable for its general review of the context of the Czech media in the 20th century
is a study on that subject with the title “Dějiny českých médií 20. století” by Jakub
Končelík, Pavel Večeřa and Petr Orság.15 The book also provides a brief review of
Czech Radio and its development in the times. Given the breadth of the subject and
the long period reviewed, 1848 to the early 1990’s, the section on radio broadcasting
remains necessarily brief, however, with roughly ten pages dedicated to it for the
period of the First Republic and the so-called Protectorate. Nevertheless, it is a
helpful guide, especially in terms of the context of the profession of journalists,
including radio journalists for the period under discussion.
Very important sources of information on media policy and the situation of journalism
and journalists in the Protectorate, which were also relevant for radio broadcasting,
include the collection of notes from Wolfgang Wolfram von Wolmar’s infamous press
meetings during the Protectorate: Český tisk pod vládou Wolfganga Wolframa von
Wolmara by Jakub Končelík, Barbara Köpplová und Jitka Kryšpínová.16 This book
illustrates the concrete circumstances and instructions around Wolmar’s meetings
designed to guide, orientate and in many cases bully the Czech media into
compliance during the occupation as written up by a participant in the meetings.
Končelík, Cebe and Köpplová later followed this study up with a brilliant quantitative
analysis of the subject content, orientation and leading speakers at the press
meetings to provide an invaluable view of the nature and contours of Nazi media
policy in the Protectorate.17
Further extremely useful studies on the subject of Czech media under the Nazis are
the 2001 dissertation and another publication by Pavel Večeřa from Masaryk
15
16
17
KONČELÍK, Jakub; VEČEŘA, Pavel; ORSÁG, Petr: Dějiny českých médií 20. století, Portál,
Praha, 2010. Hereinafter: KONČELÍK, VEČEŘA, ORSÁG: Dějiny českých médií 20. století.
KONČELÍK, Jakub; KÖPPLOVÁ, Barbara; KRYSPÍNOVÁ, Jitka: Český tisk pod vládou
Wolfganga Wolframa von Wolmara, (“The Czech Press under the Hegemony of Wolfgang
Wolfram von Wolmar”), Univerzita Karlova v Praze Nakladatelství Karolinum, Praha, 2003.
Hereinafter: KONČELÍK, KÖPPLOVÁ, KRYSPÍNOVÁ: Český tisk.
KONČELÍK, Jakub; CEBE, Jan; and KÖPPLOVÁ, Barbara: Řízení tisku v letech 1939-1945:
Analýza protektorátních tiskových porad, (“Press Regulation between 1939 and 1945: Analysis of
Protectorate Press Meetings”), IN: Mediální studia, Český a slovenský čtvrtletník pro kritickou
reflexi médií, III/2007, pp. 272-290, Syndikát novinářů ČR, Praha, 2007. Hereinafter: KONČELÍK,
CEBE, KÖPPLOVÁ: Řízení tisku.
15
University at Brno.18 Especially interesting and helpful for understanding resistance
to the occupation is Večeřa’s systemization of typical resistance strategies in the
Protectorate print media into six main strategies, which I paraphrase and summarize
here:
•
Separation: emphasizing the national individuality of the Protectorate vis-à-vis the
Reich;
•
Preservation: attempting to maintain ideals, values and norms from the First
Czechoslovak Republic;
•
Retardation: concentrating on the postponed application of measures from the
occupiers or the weakening of their effect during actual application;
•
Blockading: the attempt to pre-empt measures from the occupation authorities
with one’s own measures in order ultimately to negate the occupiers’ intentions;
•
Ironizing: making fun of the occupation authorities and Protectorate realities;
•
Neutralization: avoiding support for the acts and intentions of the occupiers.19
In the context of Czech Radio’s resistance, I would also suggest a seventh category,
namely, “emulation”. Like separation, emulation worked on the principle of the
existence of a difference between the Nazi-led Germans and the Czech nation,
although it did not necessarily emphasize that difference explicitly. Instead, texts
employing an emulation strategy, openly praised Nazi methods and approaches for
dealing with a given subject while calling for Czechs to emulate and apply Nazi
principles. The particular cleverness of emulation was that on the surface it could be
interpreted as overt glorification of Nazism, of the Nazis and their behavior –
program content that no Nazi censor would find easy to forbid – while the actual
application in a Czech context of the methods praised would, in fact, have
counteracted the occupiers goal of Germanizing the Czech people. I would term
Hubert Masařík’s pilot lecture for the series on the “Causes of the German Victory”
from the summer of 1940 a carefully nuanced example of “emulation”.
18
19
In the original: separace, konzervace, retardace, blokace, ironizace and neutralizace. The English
language does not have equivalent noun forms for the verbs “to block” and “to ironize”. Thus, I
was forced to use the gerunds here. See: VEČEŘA, Pavel: Ošemetné Scylly a zrádné Charybdy
protektorátních novinářů. K projevům pasivní rezistence a kolaborace na stránkách českých
tištěných médií za německé okupace 1939-1945, (“Tricky Scyllas and Treachorous Charybdas of
the Protectorate Journalists: Manifestations of Passive Resistance in the Czech Print Media
during the German Occupation 1939-1945”), IN: Mediální studia. Český a slovenský čtvrtletník
pro kritickou reflexi médií, III/2007, s. 252-271. Hereinafter: VEČEŘA: Scylly a Charibdy.
VEČEŘA: Scylly a Charibdy, page 260.
16
A further relevant category might also be “fabulation”. Fabulation could describe
extremely bombastically worded praise for Nazis or Nazi institutions on the part of
Czechs, which ultimately said nothing of any meaning at all. Unfortunately, I was
only able to identify this approach in texts published by Czech Radio, however not
generally in the existing radio recordings from the time.20
Nevertheless, what is positive, specifically for Czech Radio, is that a complete
description of the programming planned for the period still exists. Unlike in the rest of
the Reich, where the radio program magazines discontinued publication in May
1941, the Czech weekly Týden rozhlasu remained in print throughout the entire
occupation and beyond with Hitler’s black-framed death announcement rapidly
making way for portraits of Stalin and Beneš in May 1945. Thus, the content and
texture of programming is clearly evident for analysis for the entire period. By
contrast, apparently no program guides were published for the Reichsrundfunk or the
post-war stations operating in the Allied zones of occupation between May 1941 and
December 1946.21 Reporting in newspapers did compensate for some of the
information vacuum, which ensued after the discontinuation of the German program
magazines, however it was often sporadic and, with the overall reduction of the
volumes of German newspapers due to paper shortages, became completely
unreliable and erratic in the later years of the war. Instead, the German radio
consumer had to turn to regular program announcements broadcast on the radio to
learn what programs were coming, and these announcements have not been
preserved. A drawback here is, however, that all program magazines have their
limitations. First of all, they reflect only the content of what was intended for
broadcast. They do not take account of last-minute strokes of censors’ pens – which
were reportedly quite frequent, especially in the period 1939 to 1942. Nor do
technical difficulties at the individual stations become evident in program magazines.
Another useful source for what was actually broadcast, however, is the informational
leaflet Rozhlasová korespondence. Published on a nearly daily basis at times during
the occupation, this short, generally two- to four-page publication dedicated to
highlights from broadcast programs intended for editors of the Protectorate’s
newspapers was helpful in illuminating some aspects of programming more prone to
20
21
Particularly Jan Bor’s contribution to the article comes to mind: “Jaký dojem jsem si odnesl z cesty
po Německu”, (“What Impression Did I Take Away With Me from the Trip to Germany”), in Náš
rozhlas, vol. XVIII, edition 40, (29 September-5 October 1940), pages 4-6.
Hör Zu!, Die Rundfunkzeitung, volume 1, Number 1, 15 to 21 December 1946, page 2.
17
such ephemeral disturbances. Nevertheless, only a few years of this publication are
available at the Library of the Czech National Museum (Knihovna Národního muzea)
in Prague-Bubeneč.
Extremely useful particularly in the context of the section on anti-Semitic broadcasts
was the essay Die Protektoratspresse und die “Judenfrage”22 by Jaroslava Milotová
from the Institute of the Terezín Initiative, which offered a most insightful and
thorough review of this crucial area of Nazi media policy in the Protectorate of
Bohemia and Moravia. Furthermore, the Institute’s website – holocaust.cz – has
developed in recent years into an extremely rich source of information featuring a
wide range of original documents, press articles and the like that deal specifically
with the Holocaust in the context of the Czech provinces.
Thus, given the relative dearth of published sources specifically dedicated to Czech
Radio and its programming in the period, I had to turn to archival material for more
information. Undoubtedly the most detailed source material concerning broadcast
texts and plans can be found in the post-war court cases against the main Czech
collaborators and against some German authorities as well. Necessarily, these are
organized around the prosecution of individuals involved in radio programming.
Those include particularly the case before the post-war National Court against Alois
Kříž23 and to a limited extent also material on Emanuel Moravec24 whose case was,
however, never fully explored, due to his suicide in May 1945. A further and often
extremely rich source of similar information can be found in the court files from the
Extraordinary People’s Court of Prague (Mimořádný lidový soud v Praze – MLS),25
located at the Státní oblastní archiv Prague (State Territorial Archive Prague). Here,
in particular, the post-war cases against Josef Opluštil26 and Jaroslav Mrkvička27 and
several others were important and rich in information on the fetid milieu surrounding
Czech Fascists and Nazi collaborators. The Archive of the Czech Interior Ministry
22
23
24
25
26
27
MILOTOVÁ, Jaroslava: Die Protektoratspresse und die “Judenfrage“, (“The Protectorate Press
and the ‘Jewish Question’”), IN: Theresienstädter Studien und Dokumente 1996, Nadace
Terezínská iniciativa, Academia, Praha, 1996, pages 153-184. Hereinafter: MILOTOVÁ: Die
Protektoratspresse.
Národní archiv (Czech National Archive Prague), archival collection Národní Soud (post-war
Czechoslovak National Court), Hereinafter: NA–NárS.
NA-MORAVEC-AMV 39.
SOA, Mimořádný lidový soud v Praze (post-war Extraordinary People’s Court in Prague),
hereinafter: SOA-MLS Praha.
SOA-MLS Praha, LS125/48, carton 741.
SOA-MLS Praha, LS104/48, carton 735.
18
(Archiv Ministerstva Vnitra ČR – AMV) also contains considerable information on
many of the main Czech collaborators.
A further and altogether invaluable source of information describing the situation in
the Protectorate’s broadcasting institutions is available at the German Broadcasting
Archives in Frankfurt am Main (Deutsches Rundfunkarchiv – DRA). This text of
roughly 20 pages is a post-war apology written by none other than Ferdinand
Thürmer, the director of broadcasting in the Office of the Reichsprotektor/German
State Ministry for Bohemia and Moravia from spring 1942 until May 1945.
Remarkably, Thürmer survived not only the Prague Uprising (5 to 9 May 1945), but
also internment by the Soviet NKVD. Thürmer wrote his apology in 1950.
Unfortunately, there is no information at the DRA as to why or for whom precisely he
wrote it at the time. While we need to regard the word of Nazi occupation official
Thürmer with a critical mind, a good deal of what he wrote seems borne out by other
sources. Most notably, Czech Radio’s personnel chief Karel Remeš’s post-war court
testimony describes the Thürmer era as relatively positive and seems to confirm
many of Thürmer’s claims. This is even more remarkable given the poisoned
atmosphere prevailing in post-war Czechoslovakia in connection with the retribution
of German crimes. Any statements perceived as pro-German could mean public
denunciation and even serious legal trouble for Czechs. As an illustration of this
atmosphere, one need only call to mind the public attacks and recriminations
targeted against the Czech humanitarian worker Přemysl Pitter after he dared to
criticize and took steps to alleviate the plight of civilian internees – Germans, Czechs
from mixed marriages and others – vegetating in camps spread throughout Prague
in the summer of 1945. For his efforts to help especially the children among these
people, including saving many lives, Pitter harvested a vicious media campaign that
was by no means limited only to the Communist daily Rudé Právo, but included parts
of the democratic press as well.28 Furthermore, as Benjamin Frommer pointed out in
his study on post-war retribution against Nazi collaborators, fraternization with
Germans – the declared enemies of the reestablished Czechoslovak state – became
an offense in the post-war period with the potential to cause Czechoslovak citizens
28
For instance, the Social Democratic Právo lidu and the organ of the Federation of Liberated
Political Prisoners, Hlas osvobozených. See: VAUGHAN, David: Přemysl Pitter: the good
fundamentalist. Available on-line at: http://www.radio.cz/en/section/books/premysl-pitter-the-goodfundamentalist (March 2011) and the biography of Pitter: KOSATÍK, Pavel: Sám proti zlu,
Nakladatelství Ladislav Horáček-Paseka, Praha-Litomyšl, 2009, pages 205-211.
19
very serious legal problems.29 Under the circumstances, Remeš would not have
risked even indirect praise for Thürmer’s rule at Czech Radio had he not had very
good reason. Most of all, Thürmer’s professed overall strategy of “giving the Czechs
in the Radio a useful cultural instrument, as much as possible connected with the
feeling that it was ‘their’ radio,” is clearly confirmed in Remeš’ testimony – two
sources, which arose in complete independence of each other. There are small
errors or inaccuracies in Thürmer’s essay. For instance, he did not actually manage
to raise the radio subscription fee in the Protectorate to Reich levels,30 but only to
75% of Reich levels. However, given that Thürmer was working five years after the
events described and presumably without access to detailed documentation located
in Communist-ruled Prague, this error might be forgiven. In general, Thürmer’s essay
seems very credible indeed.
With regard to original broadcast and background materials, it is unfortunate that
very little remains in the Czech Radio Archive (Archiv Českého Rozhlasu – AČRo) in
Prague itself. Much of the company’s correspondence – and especially that of the
German-language stations – was apparently shredded and pulped in the post-war
period. What survives can only be described as a tiny fragment of the original
documentation. Some of this state-of-affairs undoubtedly had to do with material
shortages during and after the war, but also with the intense anti-German sentiment
reigning in the immediate post-war period. However, some losses arose even in
much later periods. For example, one important document – the minutes from the
1941 program planning conference of Czech Radio – although documented as
belonging to the collection in the late 1960’s has disappeared in the course of the
ensuing years. The situation is similarly unhappy with regard to program recordings.
In the course of the Second World War, recording tapes (made of metal at the time)
and other resources became extremely short in supply and often had to be reused –
thereby erasing original broadcast records. Only a very small residue of the
thousands of hours of programming broadcast between 1939 and 1945 remains
today, and many of those are not of great relevance to this study. The most useful
29
30
The period in which such crimes as collaboration or fraternization could potentially occur was set
between 21 May 1938 and 31 December 1946! Thus even 19 months after the end of the war, a
person could potentially get into trouble in connection with the Germans. See: FROMMER,
Benjamin: National Cleansing, Retribution Against Nazi Collaborators in Postwar Czechoslovakia,
Cambridge University Press, New York, 2005, page 240. Hereinafter: FROMMER: National
Cleansing.
THÜRMER, Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, page 23.
20
material can be found in what were the employee files for each of the main actors
involved. Fortunately, at the outset of my research into this subject, it was still
relatively easy to access this material. In the ensuing eight years, Czech data
protection laws have tightened, making access to these personnel files very
problematic indeed.
Finally, important information on Thürmer, his predecessor in office Lothar Scurla,
and on the first director of Department IV – Cultural Policy, Karl Freiherr von
Gregory, is also available at the Bundesarchiv Berlin (German Federal Archive
Berlin). Particularly relevant correspondence regarding them in the Reichs-KulturKammer proved useful. In the cases of Von Gregory und Thürmer, who were
members of the SS, these were the files PK/Parteikorrespondenz and SSO/SSFührerpersonalakten.
21
2. Goals of the Nazi Occupation of Bohemia and Moravia in
General
Background of the Occupation
The dramatic development of events that culminated in the German Wehrmacht’s
occupation of the Czech provinces and the establishment of the so-called
Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia between 14 and 16 March 1939 had a very
long background. The final decades of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy prior to 1918,
had already been marred by incidents of conflict between indigenous Czech- and
German-speaking segments of the population in the Austrian regions that later
became the Czechoslovak provinces of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia.31 Expressed
very simply, bitter cultural and linguistic battle lines had arisen between some of the
German-speaking Austrians on the one hand – who sought to maintain their political
and cultural domination over an extremely ethnically diverse empire – and some of
the Czechs on the other hand, who, after reawakening to the fact of their own distinct
ethnic, linguistic and cultural identity in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, sought
to develop their own national culture in their homeland.
A few of the milestones along the path of this conflict, which erupted in seldom
violent, but usually passionate disputes, included the Czech intellectual František
Palacký’s rejection of the notion that the Czechs made up part of the German nationstate during the Frankfurt Parliament of 1848/49; Prague’s city government passing
from ethnically German leadership into the hands of the majority Czech population in
1861. The language dispute came painfully to the fore during the so-called Badeni
crisis of 1897 when the Austrian premier, Count Badeni, attempted to establish
Czech as a second official language in Austria’s predominantly Czech-speaking
provinces. After the establishment of the Czechoslovak Republic in 1918, German
was de jure relegated to the position of a minority language behind “Czechoslovak”,
the official state language of the republic. In practical terms, however, most
Czechoslovak citizens of German origin could study in and use their language freely
in most official settings.32
31
32
In Czech: Země Česká, Země Moravská and Země Slezská. In 1928 law no. 125/1927 came into
effect merging Moravia and Silesia to form the Země Moravskoslezská.
For an exhaustive review of Czechoslovak language law and practice during the First Republic,
see: KUČERA, Jaroslav: Minderheit im Nationalstaat, Die Sprachenfrage in den tschechischdeutschen Beziehungen 1918-1938, ("Minority in a National State, the Language-Question in
22
Against this background, language and nationality had the potential to act as fault
lines of approval or rejection towards the new democratic republic as a system per
se. Perspectives on the founding of the new state differed most radically between the
nationalistic wings of the political spectrum of the various ethnic groups.
Nevertheless, ethnicity was not a priori a determinant of approval or rejection of the
new state, however. There were Czechs, who sentimentally longed for the lost
Empire – such as Josef Opluštil, who will figure heavily in this study – and Germans
who worked constructively within the new state – such as the German Social
Democratic politician Ludwig Czech (1870-1942, in Theresienstadt).
Understandably, many and presumably even most Czechs – regardless of their
political couleur – came to see the new, democratic republic as the culmination of
their natural aspirations as a people, the high point of their culture after several
centuries of foreign domination. Even to this day, the period has an aura of a golden
age for the Czech nation. On the other side, many among the minority populations,
and especially among the no longer dominant Germans, frequently felt they had
been forced against their will to live in a new, and – for the most radical nationalists
among them, such as Karl Hermann Frank – “unnatural” or “artificial” state, created
by the peace system of Versailles, which they found unfair and which they sought to
revise.33 Furthermore, as many of them saw it, this smaller state had been created at
the expense of a large empire stretching from northern Italy into modern-day Ukraine
and from north Bohemia into the Balkans with its greater economic and strategic
opportunities.
Externally, years of uneasy neighborly relations between the German Reich and the
newly founded Czechoslovak Republic after 1918 had gone before. After 1933, when
Hitler’s National Socialist German Worker’s Party (NSDAP) eradicated German
democracy and embarked on its path of aggressive, nationalist authoritarianism,
these relations became overtly antagonistic. From the perspective of the aggressive,
pan-Germanic nationalists, which the German National Socialists indisputably were,
the establishment of the Czechoslovak Republic in 1918 had, in fact, been nothing
short of a catastrophe. Firstly, the disappearance of the Habsburgs marked the end
33
Czech-German Relations 1918-1938"), Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich, 1999. Hereinafter: KUČERA:
Minderheit.
FRANK, Karl Hermann: Böhmen und Mähren im Reich, (“Bohemia and Moravia in the Reich”), IN:
Böhmen und Mähren, official monthly periodical of the Reichsprotektor in Bohemia and Moravia,
State Secretary SS-Gruppenführer Karl Hermann Frank publisher, volume 1940, edition 1, pages
6-7. Hereinafter: FRANK: Böhmen und Mähren im Reich.
23
of the formal domination of the German-speaking Austrians over much of Central
Europe. Secondly, Czechoslovakia was established in close alliance with Great
Britain and France, Germany’s victorious enemies in World War I, backed up closer
to home by the Petite Entente, an alliance with Yugoslavia and Romania, countries
whose territories had also largely been component parts of the Austro-Hungarian
Empire prior to 1918. A very common image in Reich-German nationalist circles at
the time were maps depicting the flying distance for planes between the new borders
with Czechoslovakia and Poland and major cities in the Reich. Thus, from a National
Socialist perspective, control over Central Europe had essentially passed in 1918
from German into enemy hands, and ethnic Germans living there had been reduced
to the position of secondary, minority populations. The fact that the Germanspeaking citizens of Czechoslovakia enjoyed the same constitutional rights as the
Czechs or Slovaks carried little credence with the National Socialists, for whom
democracy and civil society themselves were simply anathematic tools in what they
considered a vast Jewish conspiracy to subjugate the Aryan race.34
In the course of the 1930’s, against the background of a severe global economic
downturn, and with the radical German National Socialists in power in the German
Reich itself, the situation between the ethnic groups within the Czechoslovak
Republic and between Czechoslovakia and its main neighbor – Germany –
worsened into a major international crisis.
As is also well known, the Munich Agreement of September 1938, which allotted the
Czech borderlands to Germany, did not bring peace to Europe. There was an
interlude of five and a half months, known as the Second or Czecho-Slovak
Republic, during which Hungary and Poland also annexed parts of the country, and
the Czechs, Slovaks and Sub-Carpathian Russians attempted to carry on without
allies in a strategically vulnerable, economically and territorially greatly diminished
state. Adding to the problems was the fact that the republic’s new borders bisected
nearly all main road, rail and telecommunication links at least once and in some
cases even at multiple junctures. For example, the main Czecho-Slovak telephone
lines, including those used for carrying radiophonic transmissions between the
stations, Prague-Moravská Ostrava and (Prague-) Brno-Bratislava – ran through
German territory. These phone lines were, of course, vulnerable to tapping and
34
HITLER, Adolf: Mein Kampf, volume II., Chapter I.
24
conceivably also to interruption. In any case, the Czecho-Slovak Post Office now
used them with permission of the German Reichspost.
In his own words, Goebbels emphasized to a meeting of the directors of Germany’s
radio stations on 25 March 1933 that he considered radio “the most modern and
most important instrument for influencing the masses that exists”.35 Of course, he
might have imparted similar sentiments to a meeting of the heads of film studios, but
given his subsequent instrumentalization of broadcasting for political purposes, these
words undoubtedly reflect a great deal of his actual opinion. Goebbels’s take-over of
German broadcasting commenced immediately. The triumphal torch-lit march of
Hitler’s followers through the center of Berlin on the very day the National Socialists
acceded to power in Germany, Wednesday, 30 January 1933, became the subject of
a
Reichssendung,
a
nation-wide
radio
broadcast.36
Nevertheless,
the
Gleichschaltung that followed was not a spontaneous and glorious National Socialist
radio revolution, as Goebbels and his followers later portrayed it, but rather the result
of wide-scale intimidation and the frequently brutal exclusion of non-National
Socialists from German broadcasting. In practice, a questionnaire action for radio
employees to determine their political, racial and other affiliations was implemented.
Prominent non-NS radio officials from the Weimar period became targets for
immediate dismissal.37 By 1 May 1933, eight of the eleven Intendanten38 (directors)
of
Germany’s
regional
broadcasting
companies,
the
super-regional
Deutschlandsender on long-wave and the German short-wave station had been
replaced. The remainder followed within a few months.39 De facto the National
Socialists transformed the nine originally independent broadcasting companies into
Reichssender40, regional subsidiaries of the Reichs-Rundfunk Gesellschaft (RRG –
35
36
37
38
39
40
In the original: “Ich halte den Rundfunk für das allermodernste und für das allerwichtigste
Massenbeeinflussungsinstrument, das es überhaupt gibt.” DILLER: Rundfunkpolitik, page 144
DILLER: Rundfunkpolitik, pp. 57-58.
DILLER: Rundfunkpolitik, pp. 71-76.
Intendant–the traditional title for the director of a German radio or television station used to this
day. Each individual Reichssender was subject to the rule of an Intendant.
DILLER: Rundfunkpolitik, page 118.
Reichssender–literally “Reichs-Station” were the main German radio stations equipped with both
production facilities and the strongest medium-wave broadcast towers (generally ranging between
60 and 120 kW antenna strength). They were situated in the most important regional
administrative and business capitals of the German Reich at Berlin, Königsberg, Breslau, Munich,
Stuttgart, Frankfurt, Leipzig, Cologne and Hamburg and after 1935 also at Saarbrücken. Most
Reichssender had smaller regional affiliates throughout their broadcast territory called
“Nebensender” (adjunct stations). During the Weimar Republic, these stations had arisen as
largely independent, in part privately owned broadcasting companies cooperating under the
Reichs-Rundfunk-Gesellschaft (RRG) as an umbrella organization. After the annexation of
25
Reichs Broadcasting Corporation), within a matter of weeks after taking power. De
jure, this process of Gleichschaltung (enforced political conformity, synchronization)
was completed by May 1934.41
Regarding program content, Goebbels and the bureaucrats around him were
remarkably open about their intent to manipulate or “lead” public opinion, as they
often termed it, with the media. This openness did not extend in general to the
specific means or arguments with which Goebbels intended to influence public
opinion. For example, the content of discussions at the Propaganda Ministry’s
famous editorial meetings was strictly confidential and intended only for the ears of
the participating editors and journalists. Naturally, the Reichsminister of National
Enlightenment and Propaganda did not want the public understanding how exactly
he was manipulating them. Nevertheless, that Goebbels and the National Socialists
intended to impose their world-view or interpretation of reality on the German people
was clearly a fact, and not one they kept secret. Against this background, Goebbels
specifically defined his view of the purpose of radio just a few weeks after the
establishment of Hitler’s government in Germany in 1933:
“To hammer and file and chip away at the people so long, until they fall for us. That
is one of the main tasks of German Broadcasting.”42
At the same time, Goebbels recognized that too much overt political manipulation
could make for a very unappealing radio program, i.e., one that the listener might
abandon, a danger he was not willing to take. Thus, already in his same address to
the assembled directors of the German radio stations on 25 March 1933, Goebbels
criticized the prevalence of political programming on the airwaves in the two months
following the Machtergreifung while outlining where he wanted to take broadcasting
politically:
41
42
Austria, the Reichssender Wien (Vienna) was added to this group. In the Protectorate, the
Reichssender Böhmen became the corresponding local German-language station.
DILLER: Rundfunkpolitik, page 93.
In the original: “Die Menschen so lange zu hämmern und zu feilen und zu meißeln, bis sie uns
verfallen sind! Das ist eine der Hauptaufgaben des Deutschen Rundfunks.“ Goebbels, after the
German elections in the spring of 1933. Found at: Unterhaltung bis zum bitteren Ende... Joseph
Goebbels und das Radio, Das junge Radio als Instrument der NSDAP, http://www.bronline.de/wissen-bildung/collegeradio/medien/geschichte/goebbels/hintergrund (Mai 2006).
26
“You have to help to bring a National Socialist art and culture into the light of the
world, which really corresponds to the modern pace and modern perception of time.
[Political] Conviction is necessary, but conviction does not need to mean boredom.
The imagination must avail itself of all means and methods to bring the new [political]
conviction to the broad masses’ ears in a manner that is modern, topical and
interested, interesting and instructive, but not didactic. Broadcasting should never fall
ill from the word; one notices the intention and becomes annoyed.”43
The National Socialist take-over of broadcasting also progressed relatively smoothly
with the Anschluss (annexation) of German-speaking Austria not quite five years
later. During most of the interceding years, Goebbels’ ministry had produced special
programming specifically aimed at undermining Austrian independence. This
strategy bore fruit in March 1938.44 At 19:47 hours on the evening of 11 March 1938,
Austrian Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg announced his demission due to the
threatened German invasion in a three-minute radio address.45 Simultaneously,
illegal groups of local, Austrian Nazis swarmed out across the republic occupying
strategic buildings and offices including the RAVAG radio headquarters in Vienna,
which fell into their hands between 22:00 and 23:00 hours on the very same
evening.46 Arthur Seyß-Inquart, a Nazi sympathizer in the Austrian government also
read an appeal, previously formulated in Berlin, over the country’s broadcasting
network for Hitler to send troops into Austria.47 Thus, even before German troops
entered the country, Austria’s broadcasting facilities were in National Socialist hands.
Similarly, the newest member of Germany’s Reichs-Rundfunk-Gesellschaft – (RRG
– Reichs-Broadcasting Corporation) the Reichssender Wien (literally Reich Station
43
44
45
46
47
In the original: “Sie müssen mithelfen, eine nationalsozialistische Kunst und Kultur ans Licht der
Welt zu bringen, die wirklich auch dem modernen Tempo und dem modernen Zeitempfinden
entspricht. Gesinnung muß sein, aber Gesinnung braucht nicht Langeweile zu bedeuten. Die
Fanstasie muß alle Mittel und Methoden in Anspruch nehmen, um die neue Gesinnung modern,
aktuell und interessiert den breiten Massen zu Gehör zu bringen, interessant und lehrreich aber
nicht belehrend. Der Rundunk soll niemals an dem Wort kranken, man merkt die Absicht und wird
verstimmt.” DILLER: Rundfunkpolitik, page 145.
DILLER: Rundfunkpolitik, page 226.
VENUS, Theodor: Bis zum Ende wird gespielt–zur Geschichte des ›Reichssenders Wien‹ im
Dritten Reich, (“Playing to the End–on the History of the ›Reichssender Vienna‹ in the Third
Reich“), IN: RATHKOLB, Oliver; DUCHKOWITSCH, Wolfgang; HAUSJELL, Fritz (Hg.), Die
veruntreute Wahrheit. Hitlers Propagandisten in Österreich '38, (“The Misappropriated Truth.
Hitler’s Propaganadists in Austria ’38”), Otto Müller Verlag, Salzburg 1988, pages 108-157, here
page 117. Hereinafter: VENUS: Bis zum Ende.
VENUS: Bis zum Ende, page 115.
DILLER: Rundfunkpolitik, page 226.
27
Vienna) – went on air with its new National Socialist management at the beginning of
April – more than a week prior to and clearly anticipating the pre-programmed,
overwhelmingly pro-Hitler outcome of the 10 April plebiscite approving the
Anschluss.48
Despite the clear enthusiasm for the Anschluss evident among much of the Austrian
population, Goebbels was not willing to leave anything to chance in broadcasting to
this newest part of the German Reich. In fact, he was suspicious of any potential for
regional independence within the Reich and quickly proceeded to implement “the
necessary destruction of any separatist special position of the Reichssender Wien.”49
In Austria, this uncertainty about the new Reichs-Germans, who had not experienced
the preceding five years of National Socialist rule, became evident in the geographic
reorganization of Austria’s regional network of stations located in the capitals of the
Länder (states) that had made up the republic. Here, Goebbels implemented a clear
policy of divide et impera. Apart from receiving an Intendant from Germany proper,
the new Reichssender Wien was only allowed to retain three of its original six affiliate
stations – namely Linz, Klagenfurt and Graz. The Reichssender Munich took control
of
Innsbruck
and
Salzburg,
while
the
Reichssender
Stuttgart
took
over
Bregenz/Dornbirn.50
Radio played a key role in Hitler’s expansion into neighboring Czechoslovakia as
well. The first act in the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia-Silesia occurred in
September/October 1938 with the well-known Sudeten or Munich Crisis, which
ended with Britain and France forcing Czechoslovakia to cede its predominantly
German-populated and heavily fortified border regions to Hitler’s Reich. Goebbels’
vitriolic and defamatory anti-Czechoslovak radio campaign, which included Czechand Slovak-language propaganda broadcasts via the Reichssender Vienna, Breslau,
Munich, Leipzig among others, all of which were easily audible on Czechoslovak
territory, not only accompanied the entire crisis, but, in fact, further transformed radio
into a tool for creating and shaping the crisis itself.51 One Czech listener described
the effect of this campaign as follows:
48
49
50
51
DILLER: Rundfunkpolitik, page 117.
In the original: “notwendige Zerstörung jeder separatistischen Sonderstellung des Reichssenders
Wien”. Ibid, page 123.
DILLER: Rundfunkpolitik, page 227
For a thorough analysis of the role of radio in the Munich Crisis see VAUGHAN: Battle for the
Airwaves.
28
“During an entire decade of European broadcasting, one could not hear as many lies
and low defamations of our nation, our institutions and our leaders as we have
witnessed in the past weeks. He, who at first perhaps listened to this abuse of our
mother tongue out of curiosity, […] today skips over the well-known places on his
radio dial with disgust.”52
That was a Czech opinion, however. As historic film footage clearly shows, much of
the Sudeten-German population enthusiastically welcomed Hitler and his troops.
Nevertheless, as with the case of Austria and despite the broad local support for the
Anschluss of the Sudeten-German areas to the Reich, Goebbels was also not willing
to leave anything to chance in broadcasting to these newly acquired territories and
population. Unlike Austria’s complete regional network, however, the acquisition of
the Sudeten-German territories only increased the Reichs-Rundfunk-Gesellschaft by
one new station. The broadcast tower for the Czech station at Moravská Ostrava just
happened to lie on the northern bank of the River Odra (Oder) in the suburb of
Svinov (Schönbrunn), which now belonged to the new Reichsgau (province)
Sudetenland. Although this station initially received the name “Sudetendeutscher
Sender Schönbrunn” (Sudeten-German Station Schönbrunn) and was intended to
“allow the Sudeten-German ethnic group to speak directly to the listeners,”53 nothing
of the sort apparently ever happened. On the contrary, a communications
detachment of the German Army connected the station – the studios of which
remained in downtown Moravská Ostrava, which was until March 1939 still Czechruled – directly to the Reichssender Breslau, which operated the station as its local
affiliate under the name “Nebensender Troppau” (Affiliate Station Troppau). I found
no indication of any independent program activity at Troppau (in Czech: Opava)
itself.54
52
53
54
In the original: “Za celé desetiletí evropského rozhlasu nebylo slyšet tolik lží a nízkého ostouzení
našeho národa, našich zřizení a našich vůdců, jak toho jsme právě svědky v posledních týdnech.
Kdo snad zprvu vyslechl jednou toto zneužítí naši rodné řeči ze zvědavosti […] přejíždi dnes
známá místa na stupnici přijímače s hnusem.” Radiojournal (official Czechoslovak radio program
weekly), No. 41, 9 - 15 October 1938, page 5.
DILLER: Rundfunkpolitik, page 387.
Email of 14 June 2004 from PhDr. Marta Medková, director of the Státní okresní archiv Opava
(State District Archives at Opava) to the author.
29
Establishment of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia
Finally, in March 1939, Hitler moved to finish off the enemy republic vegetating in the
middle of his Lebensraum. Again, Goebbels launched a radio campaign to
accompany and shape the path of history. Miloslav Disman, a long-term
Czechoslovak Radio employee described the atmosphere as follows:
“And at the beginning of March 1939 another attack on the nerves. From [Prague]
Castle an old man’s voice can be heard saying: ‘Remain calm’ – while in Prague
ushers from the German universities undertake provocations. Once again families
gather in distress around their radios and are once again startled when the harp of
[PRP: Radio Prague’s] call signal sounds more than thrice…”55
The “old man’s voice” from Prague Castle referred to was that of Czecho-Slovak
President Emil Hácha. The “ushers”, in German “Ordner”, were National Socialist
German activists, who swarmed out across the Czech capital in the night of 14 to 15
March 1939 to take control of strategic positions and facilities, including the
Radiojournal building in Prague-Královské Vinohrady, in anticipation of the arrival of
the German Wehrmacht.
Hitler and his subordinates orchestrated the invasion of Bohemia and Moravia in
March 1939 to appear as the official German reaction to a request by Czecho-Slovak
President Emil Hácha for “protection” by the Reich. Today it is common knowledge
that Hácha was aggressively blackmailed into accepting the German annexation of
his country, which had already been in preparation for several months. Further proof
of this state-of-affairs is the fact that German troops invaded parts of the Czech
provinces – notably the region around Moravská Ostrava – already on the afternoon
of 14 March 1939. News of that part of the occupation reached Hácha en route to
Berlin, i.e., several hours before he had any chance to deliver a “request for German
protection”.56 During their discussions in Berlin in the night of 14 to 15 March 1939,
Hitler offered Hácha in essence two alternatives intended to lead to the same result,
namely a German occupation of the country. The main difference between the
55
56
In the original: “A začátkem března 1939 nový nápor na nervy. Z Hradu zní stařeckým hlasem:
‘Zachovejte klid’–a po Praze provokuji ordneři z německých vysokých škol. Znovu se rodiny
v úzkostech shlukují kolem přijímačů a znovu se děsí, když zazní harfa znělky více než třikrát...”,
DISMAN: Hovoří Praha, page 28.
GEBHART, KUKLÍK, Velké dějiny XV.a, page 171.
30
alternatives was that the Wehrmacht could, depending on Hácha’s decision, invade
the Czech provinces with or without violence. Any resistance, Hitler and Göring
assured him, would be broken with all available military means. In the case of a
peaceful occupation, Hitler was prepared to allow the Czechs “an exalted life of their
own, autonomy and a certain national freedom”.57 Faced with these grim options and
perfidiously abandoned by all former allies, Hácha chose the non-violent variant of
occupation and presumably hoped Hitler would keep his word regarding the future of
a Czech national existence.
For the rest of the world, Hitler explained the reasons for his political reorganization
of Central Europe immediately in his decree of 16 March 1939, with which he
established the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, as the new region of the
German Reich was to be called. The first two sentences of this decree summarize
the German National Socialist position on the Czech provinces and the
developments since 1918:
"For a millennium, the Bohemian-Moravian lands have belonged to the living space
of the German people. Violence and lack of judgment ripped them arbitrarily out of
their old historic environment and ultimately created, by forcing them into the artificial
construct of Czecho-Slovakia, a source of a constant unrest."58
He continued to explain that, since the leaders of the “artificial construct” of
Czechoslovakia had been unable to arrange for the peaceful coexistence of the
peoples “arbitrarily united in it”, the German Reich had been forced to step in and
take control of the situation to preserve its own security and the peace in Europe in
general. The official National Socialist German line on Czechoslovakia, the
Czechoslovak State and, by association, the 20 years of culture it had produced
was, therefore, that it had been an unnatural political aberration created mainly by
the Western victors of World War I in collusion with misled Czech nationalists to
cement the subjugation of the German people in Central Europe. As such,
57
58
GEBHART, KUKLÍK: Velké dějiny XV.a, pages 169-170.
In the original: "Ein Jahrtausend lang gehörten zum Lebensraum des deutschen Volkes die
Böhmisch-mährischen Länder. Gewald und Unverstand haben sie aus ihrer alten historischen
Umgebung willkürlich gerissen und schließlich druch ihre Einfügung in das künstliche Gebilde der
Tschecho-Slowakei den Herd einer ständigen Unruhe geschaffen." See: Erlass des Führers und
Reichskanzlers über das Protektorat Böhmen und Mähren vom 16 March 1939, in: Sammlung der
Gesetze und Verordnungen 1939, edition 75, page 373.
31
Czechoslovakia had necessarily “come into conflict with the natural forces and
developments,”59 and consequently fallen apart of its own accord.
For those, disinclined to agree with the National Socialist German position on
Czechoslovakia as either a source of discord in Europe or a failed state – including
perhaps the duped signatories of the Munich Agreement of September 1938, the
political leaders of Britain and France – Article 3 of the decree included a conciliatory
note to the effect that the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia was "autonomous
and administers itself".60
This so-called autonomy and self-administration were definitely a useful tactical ploy
on the part of Hitler and his team at the time. First of all, given the National
Socialists’ plans for greater European conquests, the Reich could not afford to invest
the administrative manpower and resources required to control the Czech provinces
completely with German officials alone. Furthermore, immediate elimination or
degradation of the Czech administrative classes would have created opposition from
those directly affected and considerable economic and organizational disruption
within the Protectorate, while at the same time raising alarm among the other nations
of Europe as to Germany’s real intentions. For both internal and external
consumption, the Protectorate retained several trappings of an independent state,
such as, for example, a lightly armed Government Militia61 of around 7,000 men, the
state-run Bohemian-Moravian Railways, the Bohemian-Moravian Post Office, its own
currency the Krone-koruna,62 Czech Radio, as we will see, and most notably, its
original government under State President Emil Hácha. In dealing with the “Czech
problem”, the creation of an ostensibly autonomous Czech protectorate – whose real
59
60
61
62
FRANK: Böhmen und Mähren im Reich, page 7.
In the original: "Das Protektorat Böhmen und Mähren ist autonom und verwaltet sich selbst." See:
Erlass des Führers und Reichskanzlers über das Protektorat Böhmen und Mähren vom 16 March
1939, in: Sammlung der Gesetze und Verordnungen 1939, edition 75, page 373. Hereinafter:
referred to as Decree No. 75/1939.
In German: Regierungstruppe des Protektorates Böhmen und Mähren. In Czech: Vládní vojsko
Protektorátu Čechy a Moravy.
K = koruna (in German: Krone, in English: Crown), the official currency unit of the Second
Czecho-Slovak Republic and later of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. In order to
facilitate the exploitation of the Czech economy after 15 March 1939, the koruna was maintained
and the German Reichsmark was also introduced as legal tender. Thus all fees or debts private or
public were payable in either Krone-koruna or Reichsmark. The official exchange rate between
the currencies was pegged at RM 1 = K 10 [see:10 K = 1 M, Národní Politika, volume LVII, No. 76
(17 March 1939), page 4], which corresponded nearly to a doubling of the Reichsmark’s preinvasion value vis-à-vis the koruna. On 14 March 1939, the exchange rate had been RM 1 = K
5.25 [see Kurs koruny, Národní Politika, volume LVII, No. 74, (15 March 1939), page 4].
32
autonomy and circumstances could be adjusted as the geo-political situation
developed – was, therefore, as pragmatic and flexible as it was duplicitous.
Part of this sham included a move that might have appeared on the surface as a
conciliatory gesture towards the Czechs. That was the occupation authorities’
decision to ignore attempts by domestic Czech Fascists to seize control of the
government in the Protectorate. What developed in mid-March 1939 was not to be
the final attempt by local Fascists to take over power, but it was conceivably one of
the most tragicomic moments in Central European history. Already on 13 March
1939, i.e., prior to Hácha’s trip to Berlin, several Czech Fascist splinter groups had
started moving to seize power in the Czech provinces. The main formation among
them was the Národní obec fašistická (NOF – National Fascist Community) under
the leadership of former Czechoslovak General Rudolf Gajda.63 Secondarily, smaller
groupings such as the Vlajka (Banner) movement and the ANO64 formed what they
called the Czech National Council (ČNV) and placed demands for representation in
the government. On the evening of 14 March as Hácha arrived in Berlin, Gajda even
approached the German embassy and the local organization of German students,
who were already organizing the occupation of strategic positions throughout the
Czech capital, with a request to take over the government. However, the Germans
left Gajda with no official response.65 ČNV rallied around Gajda at the same time in
an attempt to transform him into a Hitler in Protectorate format. However, even a
radio address by Gajda on the morning of 15 March calling for Czechs to assembly
in front of the school building66 on Uhelný trh in downtown Prague gathered no more
than 300 participants.67 Apparently, it never occurred to the participants in this socalled National Council – including several people who were to attain high levels of
infamy as collaborators during the course of the occupation, such as Vlajka leader
Josef Rys-Rozsévač68 or youth leader František Teuner69 – that Hitler might not
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
Rudolf, also Radola Gajda (1892-1948). For a brief overview of Gajda’s life, see FROMMER:
National Cleansing, footnote 132, page 305.
Although a short-lived phenomenon, ANO must have been one of the best-chosen Czech
acronyms for a political party of all time, as it means literally “yes” in Czech. However it was
simply an abbreviation for Akce národní obrody (“Action of National Rebirth”).
BRANDES: Die Tschechen I., page 25.
The elementary school building at Uhelný trh 425/4 in present-day Prague 1.
BRANDES: Die Tschechen I., page 25.
Josef Rozsévač alias Rys (1901-1946, executed).
František Teuner (1911-1978, in Germany). After 1942, chief organizer of the Nazi Board of Youth
Education in Bohemia and Moravia, called the Kuratorium für Jugenderziehung in Böhmen und
33
desire a group of Czechs organized along the same lines as his own party in
Germany. Furthermore, and undoubtedly much to their dismay, neither Gajda nor the
people around him were in a position to claim representation of the Czech nation. In
fact, Fascism enjoyed only very marginal support among the Czech population. In
the parliamentary elections of 1935, the largest Fascist grouping, Gajda’s NOF, had
garnered a mere 2% of the vote in Bohemia and just 2.3% in Moravia-Silesia.70 In all,
they held only six seats in the 300-seat Czechoslovak National Assembly.
Ludicrously, these various elected and self-appointed representatives of a tiny
fraction of the Czech people spent the first several days of the German occupation
debating in the former Czecho-Slovak Parliament building in Prague’s Rudolfinum
under the watchful eyes of the Sicherheitsdienst, how best to divide up the ministries
in a government they would never ultimately run.71 In the meantime, Hácha returned
to Prague, united the two main parties of the Second Republic in the Národní
souručenství (National Solidarity). After 21 days of useless palaver, the ČNV was
officially disbanded.72
A further conciliatory gesture towards international public opinion was the
establishment of Konstantin von Neurath (1873-1956), an internationally well-known,
German diplomat, aristocrat and former foreign minister as the Reichsprotektor in
Bohemia and Moravia.73 Article five of Hitler’s decree made Von Neurath his
personal representative in the Protectorate and granted him sweeping authorities.
Among these was the right to abrogate any Czech law or rescind any legal decision
at will, while assuring that the political directives of the Führer und Reichskanzler
were respected.74 Towards the Czechs, however, Hilter’s choice of second-incommand could not have been less conciliatory or more antagonistic. Karl Hermann
Frank (1898-1946, executed), who after failing as the proprietor of a small bookstore
in the then predominantly German-speaking northwest-Bohemian town of Loket
(Elbogen), launched his career in Sudeten-German politics and devoted his efforts
inside and outside of the Czechoslovak Parliament to destroying the First Republic
70
71
72
73
74
Mähren in German and Kuratorium pro výchovu mládeže v Čechách a na Moravě in Czech. The
Board was essentially a Czech version of the Hitler Youth.
Annuaire statistique de la République Tchécoslovaque 1937, table XV.4, page 280.
SOA-MLS Praha, LS104/48, carton 735, page 43. Facts of the case against the defendant
Jaroslav Mrkvička of 13 March 1946.
SOA-MLS Praha, LS104/48, carton 735, page 43. Facts of the case against the defendant
Jaroslav Mrkvička of 13 March 1946.
BRANDES: Die Tschechen I, pages 28-29.
Collection of Laws and Decrees 1939, Decree No. 75/1939, page 374.
34
and uniting its territory with the German Reich. Moulis and Tomášek’s description of
Frank’s entire life’s work and his approach to the roughly 7.5 million citizens of the
Protectorate entrusted to his power as a “hate-filled and blindly irreconcilable
campaign against all things Czech”75 is not overstated.
Germanization as a Goal of Occupation Policy
The accepted view among historians of the Protectorate period is that the German
National Socialists’ ultimate aim was the complete domination and Germanization of
Bohemia and Moravia, turning these Czech provinces into component parts of the
Reich that would be ethnically indistinguishable from other German regions, such as
Bavaria, Silesia or Saxony. Nevertheless, both domestic and international
considerations forced the occupation authorities to view Germanization as a mid- to
long-term policy goal in Bohemia and Moravia. First and foremost, by the time of the
invasion in March 1939 the energy of the Nazi state was devoted to preparations for
war, and after its outbreak on 1 September 1939, to conducting that war. Obviously,
those priorities took precedence over immediate Germanization plans for the
Czechs, especially a too radical approach to solving the “Czech question” would
necessarily have led to social, political and economic disruption in the Protectorate –
something the regime could not afford with armies in the field. Thus, the regime
necessarily adjusted various aspects of its policy, including its approach to radio
programming in the Protectorate. Given that their ultimate goal was to Germanize a
sizeable portion of the Protectorate’s population at some point, the National Socialist
authorities applied many of the same broadcast policies to the Czech population as
they did to the ethnic-German population of the Reich itself. An additional benefit of
this pragmatism was that radio programming could contribute to keeping even that
segment of the population not deemed “worthy” of Germanization peacefully
entertained and productively working until after the war had been successfully
concluded. The invaders then fashioned their broadcast policy with greater and
lesser degrees of precision and skill according to the geopolitical situation, their
available resources and reflecting their own view of the Czech audience.
The question appears never to have been whether the Czechs would survive as a
separate people with their own distinct cultural identity intact within the Great
75
MOULIS, Miloslav and TOMÁŠEK, Dušan: K.H. Frank Vzestup a pád karlovarského knihkupce,
Epocha, Praha 2003, pages 18 and 26. Hereinafter: MOULIS and TOMÁŠEK: K.H. Frank.
35
German Reich or not. The National Socialists had decided at some point that Czech
culture would not survive, and left behind some plans outlining their strategy for
eliminating this foreign people resident in the middle of the German Lebensraum, as
they saw it.
The initial question was how to implement the Germanization process within the
context of the geopolitical realities in Europe after the invasion of 14/15 March 1939.
Regarding these realities, even the most objective observer would have to admit that
the circumstances greatly favored the National Socialist German position, while
simultaneously badly disadvantaging the Czechs. There were approximately 7.5
million Czechs76 surrounded on all sides – with the exception of the relatively short
Moravian-Slovak border to the East – by a roughly ten times larger German
population. Furthermore, there were indigenous German-speaking communities
living as ethnic islands within the territory of the Protectorate itself – for instance at
Jihlava (Iglau), and an influx of German soldiers and officials from the Reich itself.
Within the first year of the occupation, the Gauleiter – the heads of territorial
divisions of the NSDAP and politically the most important administrative chiefs of
regional entities of the Third Reich – from the regions bordering the Protectorate
launched an initiative to divide the territory of the Protectorate among themselves as
a means of eradicating Czech statehood and Germanizing the region. Presumably,
the Gauleiter assumed rather simplistically that the incorporation of Czech regions
into what were already German provinces would in and of itself Germanize the
Czechs. After consultation with Neurath and Frank, Hitler rejected the Gauleiters’
plan, however, and instead opted for a unified National Socialist approach towards
the Czech population as a whole. To these ends, Frank had written up a concept
entitled “Exposé on the Treatment of the Czech-Problem and the Future Formation
of the Bohemian-Moravian Area”, which dates from 28 August 1940.77 As Frank
reiterated in this updated concept for dealing with the “Czech problem”:
“The West-Slavic Czech People lie not only within the German political, but also
within the German national-ethnic living area. Their position in this area precludes
76
77
The 1941 edition of the Statistical Yearbook of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia
estimated the number of citizens of the Protectorate to be 7,456,121 as of 1 October 1940 based
on the food ration booklets issued for the XIVth supply period. See: Statistická ročenka
protektorátu Čechy a Morava 1941, page XXX.
NA-ÚŘP-ST 109-4-85, pp. 79-93.
36
[their] political independence. The inability of the Czechs to organize themselves
long-term as a state is the destiny of this area… If their position in the area compels
the incorporation of Bohemia and Moravia into the Reich, then the racial profile of the
Czechs allows for a policy of assimilation or rather the ethnic reorientation of the
larger part of the Czech People…”78
Given the fact that the war continued, millions of German settlers were not readily
available for the colonization of Bohemia and Moravia, and no interference could be
allowed to arise in the production and economy of the Protectorate, the plan took a
longer-term perspective and applied both incentives and deterrents to achieve the
ultimate goal of Germanization. The plan was stratified to approach a number of
important Czech social groups, namely: workers, farmers, civil servants, industry and
trades people and the young,79 for all of whom Frank developed simple target-groupspecific and incentive-based sub-plans. For instance, wages were to remain at a
slightly lower level in the Protectorate, so as to encourage Czech workers to take up
jobs within the Altreich, i.e., Germany-proper in the borders of 1937. As Frank noted,
some 95,000 Czech workers had already taken advantage of such options at that
point in time.80 Farmers were to receive better prices for their produce, however, not
achieve the position of Erbbauer, i.e., hereditary farmers, permanently established
on a piece of land, which could neither be used as collateral nor confiscated, as was
the National Socialist policy vis-à-vis German farmers. The middle classes were to
enjoy the benefits of a large Reich-wide market and greater chances for personal
advancement within the Reich itself.
In few instances does the overall intention of Germanization become so clear,
however, as in the National Socialist approach to the biological future of the Czech
nation – the Czech youth. Frank recommended raising the Czech youth in the
Reichsgedanke, the official National Socialist myth about the Czech provinces
belonging to a Greater German Empire, while foreseeing the “extermination”
78
79
80
In the original: “Das zu den Westslawen gehörige tschechische Volk liegt nicht nur im deutschen
politischen, sondern auch im deutschen völkischen Lebensraum. Seine Raumlage verbietet eine
politische Selbständigkeit. Die Unfähigkeit der Tschechen, sich dauernd staatlich zu organisieren,
ist Raumschicksal... Wenn die Raumlage zur Einbeziehung Böhmens und Mährens in das Reich
zwingt, so gestattet das rassische Bild der Tschechen für einen grösseren Teil des tschechischen
Volkes eine Assimilations- bzw. Umvolkungspolitik...“ NA-ÚŘP-ST 109-4-85, pp 80 and 82.
NA-ÚŘP-ST 109-4-85, page 90.
NA-ÚŘP-ST 109-4-85, page 89.
37
(Ausrottung) of what he termed the Czech national “historical myth”, which taught
that the Czechs were a separate nation distinct from the Germans. Frank’s paper
foresaw no advancement whatsoever for young Czechs without perfect use of the
German language. Furthermore, Czech youths would be subject to labor and
eventually military service within the German-speaking regions of the Reich, so as to
weaken their bonds to their own linguistic background. German-language middle
schools were to replace Czech education. Eventually elementary schools were to
have German exclusively as the language of instruction as well. There were to be no
Czech universities whatsoever. Only a “Collegium bohemicum” was to exist as a
sub-unit of the German Charles University in Prague for a temporary period of time.81
The National Socialist German administration was actually able to implement a good
deal of these plans during the relatively short existence of the Protectorate with the
first major issue being the closing of all Czech universities after 17 November 1939
and the deportation of hundreds of Czech students to Sachsenhausen concentration
camp and other penal institutions within the Reich itself. Post-war testimonies by
leaders of the Fascist Czech youth league – the Kuratorium für Jugenderziehung in
Böhmen und Mähren-Kuratorium pro výchovu mládeže v Čechách a na Moravě –
revealed the existence of a detailed plan, named the Gladrow Plan after its author
SS-Bannführer Walter Gladrow, a German adviser to the Kuratorium. This plan,
which apparently dated from late 1941 or early 1942, divided the Czech youth into a
range of six categories according to their adherence to the criteria of “politically
positive”
towards
the
Reich
and
“rückvolkungsfähig”.82
The
concept
of
Rückvolkungsfähigkeit, was a peculiar National Socialist German linguistic construct,
which is difficult to express in English. This one word means approximately: “those
who are capable of having their ethnicity re-defined to a previously existing (rück)
state”. Ideationally Rückvolkungsfähigkeit originated from the same National
Socialist perspective that the Czechs – or as they saw it, positive elements among
the Czechs – were originally Germans who at some point had begun speaking
Czech.
81
82
NA-ÚŘP-ST 109-4-85, page 90.
NA-NárS, case against František Teuner et al., carton 144, order number 85, page A-322a,
testimony of Ladislav Válek of 4 June 1945 and also SOA-MLS Praha, LSXIII 588/48-29, case
against Miroslav Potužník, page 37, protocol of an interrogation of the accused, Miroslav
Potužník, of 26 June 1945.
38
In terms of its ideological approach to its specific subsection of Czech society – the
youth – the Gladrow Plan was somewhat more radical and arguably less realistic
than Frank’s original concept. While Frank foresaw an undefined “transition period”
(Übergangszeit), Gladrow anticipated a three- to 10-year time frame83 for the full
implementation of his plan. Whereas Gladrow’s plan attributed the origin of anything
positive or worthy of maintenance in the Czech youth as having been derived from
their originally German heritage, Frank’s concept for the Czechs foresaw simply the
achievement of their “Umvolkung” – a term meaning the “re-orientation of their
ethnicity” – from um – a prefix meaning “about” or “from one point to another”.
Conceptually at least, Frank’s plan seems slightly less radical even allowing for the
absorption of originally non-German elements into the German nation. In fact, he
argued that precisely this absorption had already occurred to a large extent. As
Frank expressed it, due to centuries of intermarriage between Czechs and Germans,
there existed “an extensive racial equality of both the peoples in the Bohemian area,
so that today only a minority has retained original [PRP: Czech] racial characteristics
in their pure form”.
84
As absurd as that sentence may seem to the 21st century
reader, from the perspective of the racist National Socialist ideology, the statement
could virtually be termed a compliment.
In practical terms, however, the differences between Rück- or Umvolkung would
presumably have been minimal in the event that the National Socialist program
succeeded. Inclusion in either plan was open only to members of the Czech nation
deemed “racially suitable”. For those deemed racially unsuitable, and for the antiGerman elements of the Czech intelligentsia and “all destructive elements”, Frank
recommended
radical
punitive
measures,
including
deportation
and/or
“Sonderbehandlung”85, the applicable euphemism among leading National Socialists
for “extermination”, while Gladrow’s plan, intended for František Teuner and other
leading Czech staff of the Kuratorium, foresaw delivering all politically negative
elements and those not deemed “rückvolkungsfähig” to “police justice”.86 Given the
83
84
85
86
NA-NárS, case against František Teuner et al., carton 144, order number 85, page A-322a,
testimony of Ladislav Válek of 4 June 1945.
In the original: “eine weitgehende rassische Niveaugleichheit der beiden Völker im böhmischen
Raum, so dass heute nur noch eine Minderheit ursprüngliche Rassenmerkmale rein bewahrt hat“.
NA-ÚŘP-ST 109-4-85, page 81.
NA-ÚŘP-ST 109-4-85, page 88 and BRANDES: Die Tschechen I. pp.124-137.
NA-NárS case against František Teuner et al., carton 144, order number 85, page A-322a,
testimony of Ladislav Válek of 4 June 1945.
39
nature of the police and justice system in the National Socialist dictatorship, the two
terms would no doubt ultimately have been synonymous in their implications for
hundreds of thousands, or perhaps even millions of Czech citizens: genocide.
Nevertheless, as we will see, it appears that the National Socialist occupation
authorities, like Frank, expected a very large portion of the Czech nation to be
Germanizable, and this had its effect on their policies towards the Czechs, including
on their broadcast policy.
40
3. Means of Propaganda
Bohemia and Moravia
within
the
Protectorate
of
The National Socialist Cultural System in General
The task of Hitler’s Reichsminister of National Enlightenment and Propaganda
(Reichsminister für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda) Joseph Goebbels, about
which he and others were again remarkably frank, encompassed “all matters
concerning information on and propaganda about the policies of the Reich’s
Government and the national development of the Reich, particularly all work related
to the spiritual and cultural influencing of the people.”87 To this purpose, the Reich’s
Government issued the so-called Reichskulturkammergesetz on 22 September
193388, a law establishing a Reichs Cultural Chamber (Reichskulturkammer – RKK)
a public corporation and umbrella organization for all producers and distributors of
culture in the German Reich. This law and the first of its two subsequent
implementation provisions – issued on 1 and 9 November 193389 – created an
institution with all-encompassing control powers over virtually every aspect of
information and cultural production within the German Reich. The RKK was
subdivided into seven individual chambers by specialization with one chamber each
for music, art, the theater, literature, the press and broadcasting.90 Paragraph 4 of
the first implementation provision of the law specified that “Whoever is involved in
the production, reproduction, intellectual processing, distribution, preservation, sale
or mediation of the sale of cultural goods must be a member of the individual
chamber that is responsible for his activities. Distribution includes the production and
sale of the technical means of distribution.91 Paragraph five defined cultural goods as
any creation or performance intended for presentation to the public, including by
means of printing, film or broadcasting. Paragraph 10 determined that acceptance
into the mandatory membership in a given chamber could be denied or the
87
88
89
90
91
Meyers Lexikon, 8th edition, volume nine, Bibliographisches Institut A.G., Leipzig, 1942, page
222.
Reichskulturkammergesetz, Reichsgesetzblatt (Reichs Legal Codex–RGB) 1933 I., pp. 661-662.
RGB 1933 I., pp. 797-800 and page 969 respectively.
The German terms are: Reichsmusikkammer, Reichskammer der bildenden Künste,
Reichstheaterkammer,
Reichsschriftumskammer,
Reichspressekammer
and
Reichsrundfunkkammer respectively.
RGB 1933 I., pp. 797. § 4. “Wer bei der Erzeugung, der Wiedergabe, der geistigen oder
technischen Verarbeitung, der Verbreitung, der Erhaltung, dem Absatz oder der Vermittlung des
Absatzes von Kulturgut mitwirkt, muß Mitglied der Einzelkammer sein, die für seine Tätigkeit
zuständig ist. Verbreitung ist auch die Erzeugung und der Absatz technischer Verbreitungsmittel.“
41
revocation of an existing membership could be undertaken, should it become
apparent that the “person in question does not possess the required reliability and
aptitude for the exercise of his activity.”92 Paragraph 25 defined the first duty of the
RKK and its individual sub-chambers as stipulating conditions for the “operation,
opening or closing of enterprises in the area of their jurisdiction”93, while paragraph
26 explicitly ruled out any legal recourse to compensation due to confiscation of
property based on an application of paragraph 25. For the press specifically, the
National Socialist government had issued the Law on Editors (Schriftleitergesetz) of
4 October 1933, which restricted the practice of this profession to German citizens
who among other things were of “Aryan parentage” not married to a person of “nonAryan parentage” and who were considered to have the “characteristics required by
the task of mentally influencing the public.”94
Thus, Goebbels, who became the president of the Reichskulturkammer, and his
subordinates were empowered to determine who was politically, racially or otherwise
“reliable” enough to work in the realm of German culture. In practice, anyone from a
performing artist to a writer, sculptor, editor or manufacturer of radio sets, who was
not accepted into the corresponding chamber for his or her profession, became
subject to a professional ban. Businesses involved in one of these professional
activities – theaters, publishing houses, artistic agencies, circuses, newspapers, etc.
– could be confiscated and or closed down without compensation for damages. In
essence, this was the legal framework for the practice of purging the German cultural
professions of people and organizations unacceptable to the National Socialist
authorities, which had already commenced in the months following the National
Socialist assumption of power in January 1933. With the expansion of the Reich into
new territories, these same policies took effect for German cultural workers.
By contrast, with the exception of Jewish employees, who had to leave institutions
like ČTK and Radiojournal very soon after the German invasion,95 the policy of
92
93
94
95
RGB 1933 I., pp. 798. § 10. “Die Aufnahme in eine Einzelkammer kann abgelehnt oder ein
Mitglied ausgeschlossen werden, wenn Tatsachen vorliegen, aus denen sich ergibt, daß die in
Frage kommende Person die für die Ausübung ihrer Tätigkeit erforderliche Zuverlässigkeit und
Eignung nicht besitzt.“
§ 25. “Die Reichskulturkammer und die Einzelkammern können Bedingungen für den Betrieb, die
Eröffnung und die Schließung von Unternehmungen auf dem Gebiete ihrer Zuständigkeit
festsetzen...“
RGB 1933 I., pp. 713, § 5 “ 7. die Eigenschaften hat, die die Aufgabe der geistigen Einwirkung auf
die Öffentlichkeit erfordert.“
STEJSKAL: Zprávy, pp. 269.
42
purging Czech institutions of non-conformist or “politically unreliable” Gentiles did not
commence immediately on 15 March 1939. There had, of course, already been
some purges during the period of the Second Republic. Many left-wing figures or
individuals too closely tied to Masaryk or Beneš, such as Antonín Pešl (1891-1942),
the director of ČTK’s Broadcasting Department, had lost their positions. However,
this was a case of Czechs purging Czechs. The invaders themselves seem initially to
have undertaken very little in this regard. Furthermore, Czech journalists and artists
were not herded into the various German Kulturkammer. It is quite obvious that the
invaders realized they were dealing with a different group of people than the
Germans in general, and at least initially they could not simply treat them in the
same way as they did Austrians or Sudeten-Germans. The bureaucratic response to
Czech cultural workers was Department IV – Cultural Policy in the Office of the
Reichsprotektor, after September 1943 in the German State Ministry for Bohemia
and Moravia.
Department IV – Cultural Policy in the Office of the Reichsprotektor
Shortly after 6:00 a.m. on the morning of Wednesday, 15 March 1939, German
troops continued their invasion of the Czech provinces, which as already mentioned,
had actually begun the previous afternoon. By around 9:00 in the morning, they
reached Prague and by the afternoon, all of Bohemia and Moravia were in German
hands.96 In the initial phase of the occupation, the German Army, the Wehrmacht,
implemented in collaboration with civilian advisers sharp supervision of the Czech
administration of the nascent Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. During this initial
phase, Czech media were placed under the control of the civil administration of none
other than Konrad Henlein97 – whose Sudeten-German Party (Sudetendeutsche
Partei – SdP) had been instrumental in causing the Munich Crisis of autumn 1938
and the demise of the First Czechoslovak Republic. The Czech government or rather
the government of the Protectorate could not even call together the Council of
Ministers without permission from the occupation authorities.98 On 5 April 1939,
Reichsprotektor Konstantin von Neurath arrived in Prague. Ten days later, the Office
96
97
98
FAUTH: Deutsche Kulturpolitik, page 90.
KONČELÍK, CEBE, KÖPPLOVÁ: Řízení tisku, page 274.
BRANDES: Die Tschechen I., page 24.
43
of the Reichsprotektor took over the work of the offices of the civilian advisers.99
Around this time, the Group for Cultural Political Matters (Gruppe Kulturpolitische
Angelegenheiten) set up offices in the mezzanine of Czernin Palace near the Castle
in Prague-Hradčany as a subsection of the Office of the Reichsprotektor under the
leadership of Karl Freiherr von Gregory. By 18 September 1940, this Group would
develop into the Department IV Cultural Policy (Abteilung IV Kulturpolitik).100
Forty-year-old SS-Obersturmführer101 Karl Freiherr von Gregory brought a number of
credentials to the position, which uniquely qualified him for it. First of all, he had been
a member of the NSDAP since 1931, which in National Socialist terms gave him the
certain predicate of Alt-Parteigenosse (Alt-Pg) or “old party comrade” from the muchextolled Kampfzeit or “struggle time” prior to the National Socialist takeover of power
in Germany. The position of Alt-Parteigenosse enjoyed the aura of the true believer
in the National Socialist cause, as opposed to the potentially more opportunistic
motivations often attributed to those who joined the Party after it took over power in
January 1933. At the same time, he collaborated with the Sicherheitspolizei and
Sicherheitsdienst (SD) in Prague.102 Secondly, and of great importance, he was
actually professionally qualified for the position. Alt-Pg von Gregory had long-term
experience at district press offices of the NSDAP in Silesia and Lower Saxony.103
That made him a successful subordinate of Joseph Goebbels. Thirdly, Gregory was
an aristocrat with diplomatic experience. Starting in May 1938, Gregory had
represented the Propaganda Ministry as a press officer at the German embassy in
Prague.104 These facts, presumably, would have made him an attractive candidate
for the job also for Neurath.
Over the course of 1939 and 1940, Gregory’s Gruppe (group) expanded, changed
and mutated into Department IV – Cultural Policy, with a staff of 76 divided into four
sub-units, also termed Gruppen. As of 15 October 1940, these were:
99
100
101
102
103
104
BRANDES: Die Tschechen I., page 29.
BRANDES: Die Tschechen I., footnote number 120.
An SS-Obersturmführer corresponded in rank to that of Oberleutnant in the German Wehrmacht
or First Lieutenant in the U.S. Army.
FAUTH: Deutsche Kulturpolitik, page 16.
Dr. Karl Baron von Gregory, born 1899. NA-ÚŘP-ST 109-2-104, pages 6-7. Curriculum vitae Von
Gregory and related papers.
NA-ÚŘP-ST 109-2-104, pages 6-7. Curriculum vitae Von Gregory and related papers.
44
Group I
General Cultural Tasks (general matters; theater; tourism;
economic advertising and congresses);
Group II
Propaganda
and
Ethnicity105
(propaganda;
cultural-political
questions of ethnicity; film; cultural-political research tasks;
literature; music; visual arts);
Group III
Press (press oversight; German domestic press; photographic
press; press agencies, foreign press);
Group IV
Broadcasting
(organization
of
broadcasting;
broadcasting
propaganda, economics, technology; broadcasting science and
literature; programming; broadcasting and Hell106 service.
Special
1) Office of the Press Chief, 2) Editorial Department.107
departments
Although the eventual staff size of 76 might seem quite large at first glance, the
Department was nonetheless very seriously understaffed given the wide range of
tasks it had to cover, which ranged from censoring the daily press to promoting
industry and trade through product fairs. As Tim Fauth noted in his recent analysis of
the Department, apart from Von Gregory and his deputy, the staff consisted of only
eight full-fledged Referente (advisers) and two Hilfsreferente (auxiliary advisers),
which meant that some Referente had to deal with three, and in the case of Lothar
Scurla, the Referent for broadcasting, even eight (!) separate areas of expertise.
Apart from that, the Department employed 17 censors and editors. The rest were
secretarial workers, messengers and the like.108 Counting the censors and editors
that meant 29 German overseers for an entire range of Czech and indigenousGerman cultural production, which in 1939 included some 41 full-length films,109
4,365 published books,110 at least 40 major theater companies,111 scores of daily
105
106
107
108
109
110
In the original: “Volkstum”, which can also be translated as “national traditions”.
In the original: “Helldienst” from Rudolf Hell, who in 1929 patented an early teleprinter or
rudimentary fax machine called the Hellschreiber. See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rudolf_Hell
(May 2009).
NA-ÚŘP, carton 1134, IV-1 Gen–0050, quoted in FAUTH: Deutsche Kulturpolitik, pages 18-19.
NA-ÚŘP, carton 1134, IV-1 Gen–0050, quoted in FAUTH: Deutsche Kulturpolitik, pages 18-19.
DOLEŽAL, Jiří: Česká kultura za Protektorátu, školství, písemnictví kinematografie, (“Czech
Culture During the Protectorate, Education, Literature, Cinematography”), Národní filmový archiv,
Praha, 1996, table on page 239. Hereinafter: DOLEŽAL: Česká kultura.
DOLEŽAL: Česká kultura, table on page 153.
45
newspapers, hundreds of other periodical publications112 and at least 16 hours of
original medium-wave and three hours of short-wave radio programming per day.
Thus, from the very beginning, Department IV was ill equipped to deal with the tasks
set it. Von Gregory and his employees must have found themselves in a permanent
state of stress, which will not have improved with the escalating war effort as military
conscriptions drained all sectors of the Reich’s economy of able-bodied and trained
professionals. By the time Reinhard Heydrich took over the reins in Prague in
September 1941, 40% of the Department IV’s Referente had already been drafted
into the Wehrmacht, leaving no Referente to cover film or music.113
This inappropriate under-resourcing of the area of propaganda to what was
essentially an occupied enemy population – the Czechs – did not pay off for the
National Socialists in the long run. On the contrary, by the time Heydrich took over in
Prague, the entire effort was considered an unqualified failure.114 Heydrich did not
hesitate to change the situation in the German media administration of the
Protectorate either. By early 1942, Heydrich replaced Von Gregory with SSSturmbannführer Martin Paul Wolf (1908-?) from the Sicherheitsdienst (SD), who
had been a shadowy figure in the background of the Protectorate’s cultural
establishments until that time. Wolf apparently arrived in the Protectorate with
German troops in 1939. He worked as the deputy director of the SD’s Prague office
for some time and also directed the SD’s cultural department Referat IIIC. He was to
remain in office through to the very end of the National Socialist occupation of
Bohemia and Moravia.115 Apparently, he managed to flee undetected and his postwar fate is unknown.116
111
112
113
114
115
116
In 1935. Source: Statistická ročenka Republiky Československé 1938, calculated from table XIII
37 on theaters in the 26 main cities of the Republic, using numbers only for those cities later
located in the Protectorate.
Even in 1941, after the occupation authorities had already discontinued several publications, the
Protectorate still had 55 daily newspapers, 144 political and provincial newspapers and scores of
other publications of varying periodicity (i.e., weekly, bi-weekly, monthly etc.). See: DRTINA,
Jaroslav; GRIMMOVÁ, Milada; HERRMANNOVÁ, Marie; HOFMANNOVÁ, Věra; JAROLÍMKOVÁ,
Milada; KAFTAN, Miroslav; MAIXNEROVÁ, Dorothea; NEVORALOVÁ, Věra; RIESS, Jiří; and
ZBOŘILOVÁ, Anna: Zeitungen und Zeitschriften im Protektorat Böhmen und Mähren,
(“Newspapers and Periodicals in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia”), Orbis, Prag, 1941,
pp. 5-30.
FAUTH: Deutsche Kulturpolitik, page 58.
FAUTH: Deutsche Kulturpolitik, page 73.
MILOTOVÁ, Die Protektoratspresse, Footnote 53, page 179.
ČVANČARA, Jaroslav: Někomu život, někomu smrt. Československý odboj a nacistická okupační
moc 1941-1943, (“For Someone Life, For Someone Death. Czechoslovak Resistance and the
Nazi Occupation Power 1941-1943”), Arguna Proxima, Praha, 1997, page 89. Hereinafter:
ČVANČARA: Někomu život.
46
The Czech Media at the Outset of the Occupation
Although broadcasting was growing in importance by the time of the German
occupation of the Czech provinces, we must remember that newspapers were the
traditional, universally affordable and, therefore, dominant source of information for
most media consumers in the first half of the 20th century. Providing and shaping
information for public consumption through the press was of vital interest to all
governments and parties active at the time. For this reason, the new Czechoslovak
authorities had established the Czechoslovak Press Office (ČTK) in 1918, as their
official mouthpiece. Initially, ČTK was launched as simply another division of
government, as a state office. On 3 October 1924 ČTK was transformed into a state
company along the lines of the State Spa Administration or the state tobacco
monopoly, the Czechoslovak Tabacco Directorate.117
ČTK‘s function was defined as to provide “the press, economic agents and the radio
with unbiased political and economic news, while also providing news to foreign
agencies”.118 Along with the State Publishing House119 and the Official Gazette
(Sbírka zákonů) in Prague,120 ČTK was subordinated administratively to the Press
Department of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers121 (TO PMR). The TO PMR
also had its headquarters directly in ČTK’s main offices in what was then Prague II.,
Lützowova 5.122 In the democratic First Republic, the TO PMR’s main duties included
informing the country’s press of important government decisions, while providing the
government with information on important press matters. The head of the TO PMR
starting from October 1934, Zdeněk Schmoranz (1896-1942), had been an editor at
117
118
119
120
121
122
The institutions mentioned here were the Státní lázně and Československá tabáková réžie. See
STEJSKAL: Zprávy, pages 185-186.
In the original: “Československá tisková kancelář jest agenturou zpravodajskou. Jest ustanovena,
aby obsluhovala tisk, obchodní činitele a rozhlas nestranným zpravodajstvím politickým i
hospodářským, jakož i dodávala zprávy agenturám zahraničním.” From the General Order on
State Companies page 2, as quoted at STEJSKAL: Zprávy, page 186.
Státní tiskárna–for the printing of official papers located at Karmelitská 6 in Prague-Malá Strana.
Úřední noviny–for the printing of official announcements, also located at Karmelitská 6 in PragueMalá Strana.
In the original: Tiskový odbor Předsednictva ministerské rady.
Prior to the Nazi reorganization of Prague’s street names and numbering in 1940, Lützowova was
named for the famous Czech diplomat and writer František Lützow (1849-1916). After 1940 it was
named Beethovenova for the famous German composer. Since 1952, it has been named after
Jan Opletal, a student mortally wounded by German forces during anti-Fascist demonstrations in
Prague on 28 October 1939. See: LAŠŤOVKA, Marek et al: Pražský uličník, Encyklopedie názvů
pražských veřejných prostranství, volume 2, pp. 29-31. Hereinafter: LAŠŤOVKA, Pražský uličník.
47
the Agrarian Party’s main newspaper Venkov before working at ČTK. He actually left
his position at ČTK to become director of the TO PMR.123
For most of the 1930’s, ČTK‘s leadership had reflected the pluralistic, democratic
nature of Czechoslovak society with a triumvirate of directors from three of the main
parties of the republic. Executive Director Ladislav Tvarůžek was a member of the
conservative Agrarian Party.124 Deputy Director for Administration Miloš Novotný was
a Social Democrat,125 while Karel Kraus, ČTK‘s editor-in-chief into whose domain the
output of ČTK’s Broadcating Department fell, was from President Beneš’
Czechoslovak National Socialist Party.126 Nevertheless, the Agrarians strengthened
their position at ČTK throughout the 1930’s. In May 1937, ČTK shifted further to the
right when Arnošt Bareš, a supporter of the Agrarian Party, took over the position of
editor-in-chief from Karel Kraus,127 and remained there until the summer of 1939.
The editor-in-chief of ČTK’s Broadcasting Department at the end of the 1930’s was
Antonín Pešl (1891-1942), a devoted follower of First Czechoslovak President
Tomáš Masaryk from his youth, who had also known and cooperated with President
Edvard Beneš as early on as 1911. Given his close association with Beneš, Pešl
was let go during the Second Republic, arrested by the Gestapo in September 1940
for his active resistance to Nazi rule working with the non-Communist resistance
groups such as the Ústřední vedení odboje domácího (ÚVOD)128 made up primarily
of former military personnel and the intellectual Petiční výbor Věrni zůstaneme!
(PVVZ)129 and executed at Plötzensee in December 1942.130 However, that is getting
a bit ahead in the overall story.
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
STEJSKAL: Zprávy, pp 257-258.
The Republican Party of the Agrarian and Small-landholding People was perhaps the strongest
political force in the First and Second Republics. In the parliamentary elections of 1935, it
achieved roughly 14.29% of the vote, making it the largest among the Czech or Slovak parties.
See: Čechoslovakische Statistik–Band 134, Reihe I (Wahlen, Heft 5), Herausgegeben vom
Statistischen Staatsamte in Kommission bei der Buchhandlung Bursík & Kohout in Prag–
Buchdruckerei Melantrich, Prag, 1936, page 9*. Hereinafter: Čechoslovakische Statistik.
STEJSKAL: Zprávy pp. 219-220. For its part, the Československá sociálně-demokratická strana
dělnická, was a party of the democratic left. It took second place among the Czech and Slovak
parties in the parliamentary elections of 1935 achieving 12.57% of the vote.
Apart from the similar-sounding name, the Czechoslovak National-Socialist Party
(Československá strana národně-socialistická–ČSNS) had nothing in common with Hitler’s
NSDAP. On the contrary, the ČSNS was a center-left party dedicated to the ideals of democracy.
In the parliamentary elections of 1935, it achieved roughly 9.33% of the vote, making it the thirdlargest Czechoslovak party. See Čechoslovakische Statistik, page 9*.
STEJSKAL: Zprávy, page 227.
In English roughly: Central Command of Domestic Resistance. The acronym ÚVOD also
corresponds to the Czech word for “preamble” or “prelude”.
In English roughly: Petition Committee We Remain Faithful!
48
On 15 March 1939, the Nazi invaders entered a Czech media landscape, which had
already mutated quite far from the censor-free system originally guaranteed in Article
113 of the Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic of 1920. Paragraph 10 of Law
No. 300 of 14 April 1920 had foreseen the possibility of pre-publication press
censorship, however only in the case of war or exceptional emergency situations
threatening the unity and existence of the state. With the rise of political extremism,
aggravated by the social upheavals of the Great Depression after 1929 and
especially among the Sudeten-German population after Hitler’s rise to power in
January 1933, laws No. 124, 125 and 126 of 10 July 1933 had strengthened these
control regulations and also explicitly protected various democratic state institutions
from libel, such as the National Assembly, and the democratic-republican form of the
country’s government itself. Sanctions for trespasses against these laws included the
confiscation of a periodical and the discontinuation of its right to publish. On 17
September 1938, in the midst of the Munich Crisis, Law No. 177 suspended freedom
of the press for a period of three months. A Central Censorship Commission was
established to control information the same month.131 After acceding to power on 1
December 1938, the conservative Agrarian Party government of Rudolf Beran not
only did not restore freedom of the press, but rather set about strengthening its grip
on the media.132 On 15 December 1938, the government passed Constitutional Law
No. 330, which essentially allowed for governmental rule by decree, including the
abrogation of otherwise guaranteed constitutional rights for a period of two years.
Governmental Decree No. 34 of 10 March 1939 extended the state’s right to prohibit
the publication of any periodical whose content was deemed likely to “threaten the
public peace and order with content that is untrue or that twists the truth”.133
Institutionally, considerable changes also arose in the area of information
procurement and distribution during the Second Republic. Although it was the official
press office, ČTK was not the First Republic’s sole news agency. Edvard Beneš,
who was Czechoslovak Foreign Minister between 1918 and 1935, built up a parallel
130
131
132
133
STEJSKAL: Zprávy, pp 222, 262.
KONČELÍK, Jakub: Řízení a kontrola českého tisku v Protektorátu Čechy a Morava, IN: FORET,
M.–LAPČÍK, M., ORSÁG, P. (Ed.). Média dnes: reflexe mediality, médií a mediálních obsahů. 1.
vyd., Univerzita Palackého, Olomouc, 2008. pp. 295-311. Here page 297. Hereinafter:
KONČELÍK: Řízení a kontrola.
MILOTOVÁ: Die Protektoratspresse, pages 153-184. Here page 158.
In the original: “Tiskopisy, které ohrožují veřejný klid a pořádek, zejména obsahem nepravdivým
nebo pravdu zkrucujícím, náležejí k tiskopisům, jichž kolportáž může býti zákázána.“ See: Sbírka
zákonů republiky Česko-Slovenské 1939, page 175.
49
international media empire with correspondents based in all the major capitals of
Europe and connected with the Information Department (Zpravodajské oddělení) of
the Foreign Ministry. The main objective of these media activities was to provide
positive information on Czechoslovakia to influence public opinion in other countries
through their local media. The main components of the Foreign Ministry‘s system
were the Orbis publishing house, the Central European Press (Centropress or Ceps)
agency, the Central European Radio (CER) radio-telegraphic news service and the
Prager Presse, German-language daily, all of which were centered around the Orbis
headquarters in Prague-Královské Vinohrady, Třída Maršála Foche 62134, just up the
street from Radiojournal’s main building at what was then Třída Maršála Foche
16.135 The developments of September 1938, including the implosion of Beneš’
position within and outside of Czechoslovakia, also led to a dismemberment of this
media empire. During the Second Republic, the Prager Presse was discontinued.
The Presidium of the Council of Ministers took over Orbis and Centropress, which
they were later forced to hand over to the Germans; CER was disbanded.136 In May
1941, Orbis was placed under the management of Friedrich Rudl (1902-?), a local
German from Prague-Smíchov, who had enjoyed a rather colorful career in the
1920’s and 1930’s spying for Germany in France, Belgium and other countries.137
For all practical, day-to-day purposes of censorship, the government established a
Central Press Overview Service138 (ÚTDS) on 17 March 1939 under the aegis of the
Press Office of the Council of Ministers (TO PMR).139 The ÚTDS, which after 1942
became Section II (Press) of the Protectorate Ministry of Education and People’s
Enlightenment – had the right to delegate its own people to editorial offices as well
as to issue instructions, which it did at regular intervals, delineating how editors
should deal with or conversely “suppress” (in Czech literally: “potlačit”) specific topics
or news items.140 Its main offices, including a 24-hour censorship service, were
located at ČTK with subsidiary regional offices at Plzeň, Brno, Olomouc and
Moravská Ostrava.141 Just like the print media, the informational programming of
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
STEJSKAL: Zprávy, page 155. The address is now Vinohradská 46.
Today: Vinohradská 12.
STEJSKAL: Zprávy, page 282.
NA-ÚŘP, carton 1142 and NA-PŘ Praha, II–všeobecná spisovna–1941-1950, carton 9686, file
number R2431/9.
In the original: Ústřední tisková dozorčí služba (ÚTDS).
KONČELÍK, CEBE, KÖPPLOVÁ: Řízení tisku, page 276.
MILOTOVÁ: Die Protektoratspresse, page 158.
KONČELÍK, CEBE, KÖPPLOVÁ: Řízení tisku page 276.
50
Český Rozhlas was also subject to the directives of the ÚTDS, as a copy of those
directives addressed to all major radio directors connected with spoken-word
programming from June 1939 in the Czech Radio Archives demonstrates.142 It is
noteworthy that many of the censors working in the ÚTDS had transferred to this
institution with the reduction of the Information Department of the Foreign Ministry.
Like the Czecho-Slovak armed forces, the Foreign Ministry was disbanded as
“unnecessary” after Germany took over the role of “protector” of the Czech
provinces.
As for radio broadcasts, the effects of this departure from press freedom during the
Second Republic would not have been felt very palpably within the institution of
Radiojournal itself, because as already mentioned, it was not Radiojournal that
produced the daily newscasts for radio, but rather ČTK. Thus, the most time- and
politically sensitive area of informational broadcasting – newscasting – was not the
work of an internal Radiojournal department, but rather the domain of ČTK’s own
Broadcasting Editorial Department (Rozhlasová redakce), which resided in the first
floor and broadcast from its own specialized studios in the fifth floor of ČTK’s main
offices at Lützowova 5.143
After the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia, ČTK, and with it the Broadcasting
Editorial Department, were limited to the use of news material from the official
German news agency, the Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro, which set up offices directly
in ČTK’s main building. It was here in June of 1939 that Von Gregory planted his
Referent for the press – an ambitious, young National Socialist, who knew the Czech
provinces well, by the name of Wolfgang Wolfram von Wolmar (1910-1987).144 As
with Lothar Scurla, Alois Kříž and others, Von Wolmar was only around 30 years old
at the time of his appointment. Thus, it seems to have been a common National
Socialist policy of promoting relatively young yet politically extremist individuals to
important positions of power within the Protectorate. The result among the affected
142
143
144
These directives were addressed specifically to: Ladislav Šourek, general director of Czech
Radio; Miloš Kareš, director of the Department for Spoken-Word Programming; Otakar Matoušek,
director of the Lectures Department; Jaroslav Prokop, director of the Central Programming Office;
Jiří Fořt, adviser of the Censureship Department; and Václav Linhart, director of spoken-word
programming for short-wave broadcasts. See: Czech Radio Archives (Archiv Českého Rozhlasu–
AČRo), HM 11/580, TO PMR-ÚTDS: Souborný přehled pokynů pro tiskovou přehlídku platných
dne 30. června 1939, (“Collective Overview of the Directives for Press Inspection Valid as of 30
June 1939“).
STEJSKAL: Zprávy, pp. 222-223.
STEJSKAL: Zprávy, page 271.
51
Czech staff was often a clear personal aversion to these appointees – not only due
to their National- Socialist convictions, but also for being subordinated to less
experienced and arguably less competent managers. One ČTK editor – Václav
Gutwirth – later described Von Wolmar, who worked in his uniform, as a “youth, who
compensated what he lacked in intelligence by systematically tugging on the holster
of his revolver.”145
With Von Wolmar, the entire Czech press was subjugated to a young, ambitious
Nazi bully. Von Wolmar introduced weekly meetings in the mezzanine of the ČTK
building for Czech editors of dailies and monthly meetings for other periodicals
according to Goebbels’ pattern in Berlin. He also held secret closed sessions with
the most active collaborators in the Czech press. At the open meetings, Von Wolmar
issued directives on how the press was to deal with various subjects and criticized
and sanctioned – including closing – individual publications that failed to implement
his press policies sufficiently. Like the print media, Czech Radio was also subject to
censorship guidelines coming from Von Wolmar’s department. After the Czech
Fascist Vlajka member Alois Kříž joined the Radio in June 1941, he regularly
attended the press meetings and reported back to his superiors on their content
when they themselves were unable to attend. Just to illustrate the nature of this
manipulation let us examine in summary the main points from one such report found
among evidence used against him in his post-war trial. It stems from the press
conference held on Thursday, 18 March 1943. The italicized texts are translations
into English of verbatim quotes from the document.
1.) “Great Britain close at the side of the Bolsheviks.” Based on a New York Times
article, the British would do nothing to help the rest of Europe in the case of a
Soviets victory. “The hopes of those, who had trust in Great Britain, are to be
considered as buried and depicted as such.”
2.) “A Communist murder.” According to Kříž a murder demonstrating all the telltale
signs of a Communist atrocity had taken place somewhere between the village of
Kozlov and Moravská Třebová, and the newspapers were ordered to report on it
two days later and to “exploit it propagandistically in a particularly conspicuous
manner.”
145
In the original: “mladíka, který ustavičným popotahováním opasku s revolverem vyvažoval, co mu
chybělo na duchu.” STEJSKAL: Zprávy, page 272 and footnote 785.
52
3.) “Explosion of a hand grenade of former Czechoslovak production in Louny.” Two
parents were killed and five children serious injured after the children brought
home a hand grenade they had found while playing under a bridge. “Once again
a victim of London’s vituperative attacks!” Wolfram’s orders were to treat this as a
case of Czechs, who had listened to London and not turned in their weapons and
then thrown them in a river in a cowardly manner. The story was to be reported
on Sunday, 21 March.
4.) “New social legislation, which was mentioned in the introduction, is to be
evaluated as a generous social act by the Reich in the interest of the Czech
workers. Especially the circumstance is to be emphasized that this is happening
despite the hindrances of the current war – in the 4th year of the war.”146
Von Wolmar’s rule was uncompromising and ultimately counterproductive. Although
Czech journalists developed a whole range of intelligent strategies to get around the
Nazi censorship,147 ultimately the legally published press and with it ČTK’s
newscasts were not in a position to fulfill their basic role of promoting open
discussion, debate or the solution of problems within society, but were inhibited from
reporting on some matters and forced to report about others tendentiously.148 The
result was, as Ferdinand Thürmer later reported, that by the time he arrived in
Prague in 1942, the Czech press had been so firmly regulated, that it had lost
virtually all of its credibility in the eyes of the public.149
Von Wolmar stayed in power until October 1943. His power started to wane,
however, already after Martin Paul Wolf took over the lead at the Department IV –
Cultural Policy in the spring of 1942. Wolf began directing the weekly press
meetings, which up to that point had been entirely or nearly entirely Von Wolmar’s
146
147
148
149
In the original: 1./ Grossbritanien eng an der Seite der Bolschewisten.... Die Hoffnungen
derjenigen, die zu Grossbritanien das Vertrauen hatten, sind als begraben zu betrachten und
darzustellen.... 2. / Ein kommunistischer Mord... propagandistisch besonder auffallend
aufzumachen... 3. Explosion einer Eierhandgranate ehem.tschechoslowakischer Erzeugung in
Laun... 4./ Die neue Sozialgesetzgebung, die einleitend erwähnt wurde, soll mit grösster
Aufmachung als eine grosszügige soziale Tat des Reiches im Interessen (sic!) der tschechischen
Arbeiter bewertet werden. Insbesondere ist der Umstand hervorzuheben, dass dies trotz
Hemmungen des gegenwärtigen Krieges–im 4. Kriegsjahr–geschieht. NA-NárS, carton 107, call
number 60. Report from the press conference of the Czech daily press of 18 March 1943.
See: VEČEŘA, Pavel: Scylly a Charibdy, especially page 260.
GEBHART, KUKLÍK: Velké dějiny XV.a, page 247.
THÜRMER: Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, an unpublished report of activities written in May
1950, Deutsches Rundfunkarchiv, Frankfurt am Main, page 8. Hereinafter: THÜRMER,
Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren).
53
domain. A much less colorful former subordinate, the Sudeten-German Artur Söhnel
(1906 – ?) later replaced Von Wolmar. Söhnel had been a long-term, Prague-based
correspondent for German newspapers such as the Stuttgarter Neues Tagblatt, the
Dresdner Neueste Nachrichten, but also the NSDAP’s official paper Völkischer
Beobachter. In the summer of 1939, he joined the ranks of German censors for both
the press and radio.150 In mid-1944, Söhnel was drafted into the Wehrmacht and
Julius Zwick (1901 – ?) a Carpathian German, i.e., an ethnic German from Slovakia,
replaced him. Zwick had moved to Prague to study medicine in 1919 and remained
there.151 However, as Končelík, Cebe and Köpplová demonstrated with their analysis
of speakers at the weekly press meetings, Wolf became the main German official
controlling the Czech press in the second half of the occupation.152 Söhnel and
Zwick will have functioned simply as his auxiliaries.
The Broadcasting Corporation and its Product – From Radiojournal to Czech
Radio
Originally founded as Radiojournal, Czechoslovak Radiotelephonic News Service
Ltd. in Prague,153 the Czecho-Slovak Broadcasting Corporation – Česko-Slovenský
Rozhlas – as it had been called since December 1938154, was one of the oldest and
broadcasters in Europe. In fact, the company was the very first on the European
continent to introduce daily program broadcasts, starting months or even years
earlier than Paris, Berlin, Vienna or Warsaw, namely on 18 May 1923.155 As was to
become the norm for other broadcasting corporations in Europe – and in contrast to
the often chaotic, free enterprise model employed in the United States –
Czechoslovakia placed broadcasting firmly into the domain of the state with Law No.
60/1923 on Telegraphy of 23 March 1923.156 Also completely within the norm for
continental-European broadcasting corporations, the Czechoslovak state put up and
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
SOA-MLS Praha, LS V 1392/46, pages 175-177.
NA, carton 13275, call number Z1804/4 Zwick, page 5.
KONČELÍK, CEBE, KÖPPLOVÁ: Řízení tisku, page 282.
In the original: Radiojournal, čs. zpravodajství radiotelefonické společnost s.r.o. v Praze.
Rozhlasová ročenka za období od 1. ledna 1938 do 15. března 1939, (Czechoslovak
“Broadcasting Yearbook for the Period of 1 January 1938 to 15 March 1939“), page 160.
Hereinafter: Rozhlasová ročenka 1939.
PATZAKOVÁ, A. J.: Prvních deset let Československého rozhlasu, (“The First Ten Years of
Czechoslovak Broadcasting“), Nákladem Radiojournalu čsl. zpravodajství radiotelefonického,
Praha, 1935 Hereinafter: PATZAKOVÁ: Prvních deset let, page 17.
MARŠÍK, Josef: První pokusy s rozhlasovým vysíláním (“First Attempts with Broadcasting“) IN:
JEŠUTOVÁ, Eva et al: Od mikrofonu k posluchačům, z osmi desetiletí českého rozhlasu, Český
Rozhlas, Praha 2003, pp. 8-12, here page 11. Hereinafter: MARŠÍK, První pokusy.
54
held 51% of Radiojournal’s equity capital (Kč 1,000,000) via the state-owned and
operated Czechoslovak Post Office,157 with the remaining shares being held by 21
private individuals and institutions including the Czechoslovak Journalists Guild and
the Radioslavia Ltd. station manufacturers, various radio set manufacturers and
even agricultural interests. As per the classical European broadcasting model,
subscribers paid a monthly license fee collected through the Post Office, and the
Post Office remitted a share of that fee to Radiojournal to cover its program
production costs. The Post Office then constructed, owned and maintained the
actual physical means of broadcasting, such as broadcast antennae and radiophonic
telephone lines, etc., and made these available for Radiojournal to use.
Radiojournal itself was managed by a board of directors (jednatelský sbor) with
seven members, four of which were state appointees: two from the Ministry of Posts
and Telegraphs and one each from the Foreign Ministry and the Press Department
of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers. The three remaining members were
elected to three-year terms by the general assembly of the corporation.158 A smaller
supervisory board (dozorčí rada) with four members oversaw the day-to-day
operations of the corporation.159 It would definitely be overstated to describe
Radiojournal as a project of Beneš’s Czechoslovak National Socialist Party (ČSNS),
as the political mechanisms of a pluralistic democracy did not allow for this.
Nevertheless, there are several moments illustrating very close contact and
cooperation between Radiojournal and structures associated with the Foreign
Ministry and or the ČSNS. For much of the First Republic, and without interruption
from 1929 to 1938 (Emil Franke or Alois Tučný), the ministers of Posts and
Telegraphs were members of the ČSNS. Virtually from its founding through March
1941, the company’s general director was Ladislav Šourek (1880-1959), a former
banker and director of the Radioslavia Ltd., who worked for the Czechoslovak
Foreign Ministry 1922-23 including a stint at the Czechoslovak embassy in Paris, the
157
158
159
MARŠÍK, Josef: Průkopníci rozhlasového vysílání (“Pioneers of Broadcasting”) IN: JEŠUTOVÁ,
Eva et al: Od mikrofonu k posluchačům, z osmi desetiletí českého rozhlasu, Český Rozhlas,
Praha 2003, pages 13-53, here page 36. Hereinafter: MARŠÍK, Průkopníci.
NA-NárS, carton 107, call number 60. Sketch of the organization and activity of the Czech
Broadcasting Corporation during the occupation by personnel manager Karel Remeš of 26 June
1946, page 1.
Ročenka Československého Rozhlasu 1938, (“Czechoslovak Broadcasting Yearbook 1938”),
published by Radiojoural čsl. zpravodajství radiotelefonické spol. s.r.o. v Praze, Státní Tiskárna
v Praze, ca. 1938, page 129. Hereinafter: Ročenka Rozhlasu 1938.
55
embassy in the capital of the new republic’s most important ally.160 Between 1925
and 1933, when it moved into its newly built administrative headquarters at Fochova
16 (today Vinohradská 12), Radiojournal’s main headquarters were in the Orbis
publishing house. Orbis in turn, published inter alia the official weekly program
magazines for the company – Radio-Journal, later Náš rozhlas and Týden rozhlasu.
In the last year of the First Republic, representatives of the Ministry of National
Defense joined the board of directors.
The Second Republic brought a considerable strengthening of the role of the state in
the organization of Radiojournal itself. In November, the government appointed a
broadcasting commissioner named Jaroslav Kose and assigned him the task of
studying how best to reform Radiojournal. He was to continue in this position until
June of 1939.161 Kose’s recommendations were apparently that the company should
remain a society with limited liability and the participation of private capital. In the
meantime, on 6 December 1938, the new government under the conservative
Agrarian politician Rudolf Beran had decided that the entire Czecho-Slovak press
should be directed by the Press Department of the Presidium of the Council of
Ministers (Tiskový Odbor Presidia Ministerské Rady – TO PMR). Regarding
broadcasting specifically, the state strengthened its control of Radiojournal. Of the
new 10-member board of directors, fully eight were government appointees: one
each from the ministries of National Defense, Education and National Enlightenment,
Foreign Affairs, and Transport (which had absorbed the former Ministry of Posts and
Telegraphs), one representative of the government of Sub-Carpathian Russia, two
representatives of Slovakia and Jindřich Dobiáš who was the section chief of the TO
PMR. Radiojournal General Director Ladislav Šourek and editor Miloš Čtrnáctý
remained as sole representatives of the private shareholders.162 Via the official news
agency ČTK, Radiojournal, which was renamed Česko-slovenský rozhlas (“CzechoSlovak Radio”) on 28 December 1939, fell under the direct censoring supervision of
the ÚTDS. Thus, still during Czecho-Slovak independence, the broadcasting
corporation had mutated legally, politically, and with regard to its freedom of speech,
into something perhaps comparable to Austria’s RAVAG network under the
government of the authoritarian Vaterländische Front.
160
161
162
MARŠÍK: page 18.
Rozhlasová ročenka 1939, page 10.
Rozhlasová ročenka 1939, page 10.
56
Organization of Programming
In terms of programming, Czecho-Slovak Radio was a highly developed
broadcasting organization by the time of the German invasion. The company had
three main departments – one each for Music (hudební uměni), Talks (slovesné
uměni) and Lectures (přednáškové oddělení). The Czech composer, Karel Boleslav
Jirák directed the Music Department from 1935 and 1947163 and broadcast a wide
range of foreign and domestic music from light dance music via folk music,
operettas, operas, to serious classical music. The department employed no fewer
than four orchestras: two in Prague (one large, one small) and one each in Brno and
Moravská Ostrava.164
The Lectures Department produced mostly literary and dramatic works such as radio
plays. Miloš Kareš (1891 – 1944)165 was its director. Kareš had come to the radio
already in the early days, in 1926, as an upper ministerial commissar on transfer
from the Press Department of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers (TO PMR).
Prior to that, he had worked as a journalist, including a stint (1919-1920) as an editor
at Tribuna under the legendary democratic Czech publicist Ferdinand Peroutka.
Kareš actively contributed to the production of artistic Lectures programming and
also authored dozens of radio plays, libretti and the like himself.166 He appears to
have been a high state official with a stronger tendency towards artistic activity and
to the theater than to politics. Nevertheless, from the existing documentation, it
becomes clear that Kareš was very well connected with the upper echelons of the
political and cultural establishment of the First Republic. For instance, Kareš was
even on familiar ty terms with the ČSNS parliamentarian and later member of the
Board of the National Solidarity (Výbor Národního souručenství) Karel Kut.167 Thus,
we can place Kareš politically firmly in the range of centrist-democratic
Czechoslovak establishment.
A related section, which developed out of the Lectures Department, was the
Reportage and News Features Department, (reportáže a aktuality), which was
renamed “Zeitgeschehen – Časovost” in early 1940. This department dealt with
163
164
165
166
167
AČRo, personnel file.
MIKOTA, Václav: Kalendář českých hudebníků na rok 1944, (“Calendar of Czech Musicians for
the Year 1944”), pages 145–151. Hereinafter MIKOTA: Kalendář.
AČRo, personnel file.
AČRo, personnel file.
AČRo, personnel file Dr. Miloš Kareš.
57
longer pieces of current events programming such as the funeral of Czechoslovak
President T.G. Masaryk in 1937, but also important sporting events like the Sokol
athletic meets in Prague. Josef Cincibus (1906 – ?) started working in the Artistic
Lectures Department in 1936. In May 1940, he became the Referent for
Zeitgeschehen – Časovost where he remained well into the 1950’s. Cincibus was not
apparently affiliated with any political party until 1946, when he joined the
Czechoslovak Communist Party.168
Alongside Talks, the Educational Lectures Department developed with time.
Professor Otakar Matoušek organized this department from 1931 until March of
1940. It produced programming on important historical personalities and events,
language courses, dance courses and the like. Between 1940 and 1942, Matoušek
led the Program-Research Department, which was a resistance cell within Czech
Radio.
Furthermore, Czech Radio had several specialized subdivisions, three of which
functioned as relatively independent external boards, providing programs to Czech
Radio from outside of the company. Among these were:
•
The Agricultural Radio (zemědělský rozhlas) – which went on the air already on 3
January 1926, and which was closely associated with or rather subject to the
Agrarian Party.169 It provided a range of programming from weather reports to a
set of humorous sketches featuring the characters Brázda and Rákos, who
discussed agricultural problems in an entertaining manner.
•
The Worker’s Radio (dělnický rozhlas) was founded at the same time as the
Agricultural Radio, but its first broadcast was delayed until 26 September 1926.
Its main purpose was to raise the cultural level of working-class people and
contribute to their moral and political education.170 The head of the Board for the
Worker’s Radio was the minister of social care. During the republic, the Worker’s
168
169
170
AČRo, personnel file Josef Cincibus.
MARŠÍK, Josef: Stabilizace vysílání 1926–1929 (“Stabilisierung der Rundfunksendung 1926–
1929“) IN: JEŠUTOVÁ, Eva et al: Od mikrofonu k posluchačům, z osmi desetiletí českého
rozhlasu, kolektív autorů pod vedením Evy Ješutové, Český Rozhlas, Praha 2003, pages 55–92,
here page 81. Hereinafter: MARŠÍK: Stabilizace. This party won 15% of the vote in the
parliamentary elections of May 1935. See: Čechoslovakische Statistik–Band 134, Reihe I
(Wahlen, Heft 5), Prag 1936, pages 9 und 9*.
Týden rozhlasu, volume VIII, edition 39, (27.IX.1941), page 10
58
Radio was “politically controlled by the National Socialist and Social Democratic
parties… even though it appeared to be a non-political organization from on the
outside”.171
•
The Industry, Trade and Business Radio (rozhlas pro průmysl, obchod a živnost,
POŽ, later Wirtschaftsfunk – hospodářský rozhlas or Economic Radio), was
under the control of the Czechoslovak Business Party (Živnostenská strana) and
produced various programs related to markets, industries and the like.172
•
Naturally, there were other specialized subdivisions such as the School Radio
(školský rozhlas) and Women’s Radio (rozhlas pro ženy).
Several important managers at Radiojournal, including the later Intendant, program
director Miloš Kareš and its administrative and personnel director, Karel Remeš173
were either closely associated with or members of Edvard Beneš’ Czechoslovak
National Socialist Party. After President Beneš’s fall from power in Munich, it
appears that, as in ČTK, the Agrarian Party, which in the Second Republic mutated
into the ruling Strana národní jednoty (Party of National Unity), sought to exert
greater influence on Radiojournal. As of 1 March 1939, Radiojournal’s central
editorial institution – the Programové ústředí – came under the direction of Jaroslav
Prokop,174 an Agrarian who had worked for several years in the Agricultural Radio
department. Furthermore, the most politically sensitive areas of broadcasting – the
specialized programming departments Worker’s Radio; the Radio for Industry, Trade
and Business and the Reportage Department (Reportážní oddělení) were put under
the direction of Bohuslav Horák also from the Agrarian Party’s Agricultural Radio.175
Another department, and one that would gain considerable importance during the
German occupation was the Censor Department (censurní oddělení). It was
apparently established by the board of directors already on 25 January 1938, and
placed under the direction of Jiří Fořt (1902-?), who had been an editor in the
171
172
173
174
175
MARŠÍK: Stabilizace, page 88
MARŠÍK: Stabilizace, page 90
AČRo, personnel file.
AČRo, personnel file.
AČRo, personnel file.
59
Lectures Department since 1932.176 Remarkably, Mr. Fořt was responsible for
censoring any texts broadcast by Czechoslovak stations with the exception of radio
dramas, which were the responsibility of Chief Editor Jaroslav Hurt (1877-1959) plus
Hungarian, Rusinian and Polish broadcasts, which were the responsibility of Pavel
Donner.177 Quite clearly, Radiojournal’s leadership did not expect censorship to
require very much work, if only three staff members sufficed to cover all of it. In the
course of the next year, however, censorship expanded, and Jiří Fořt became one of
the chief recipients of the TO PMR’s famous directives for censors.
Technical Infrastructure
In the period between the Munich Agreement of September 1938 and the invasion of
the Czech provinces on 14/15 March 1939, Czecho-Slovak Radio disposed of seven
functioning medium-wave178 stations and one short-wave station, varying in antenna
strength and distributed unevenly throughout the country. Of these, four of the
medium-wave stations and the short-wave station were located on territory, which
later became part of the Protectorate. All of them – with the exception of Banská
Bystrica in Slovakia – had their own broadcasting houses with studios, orchestras
and recording facilities and contributed to varying degrees to a joint republic-wide
programming schedule organized from the main headquarters in Prague. All of these
stations were connected to each other by a network of specialized, radiophonic
telephone lines, which allowed the high-quality re-broadcasting and exchange of
programming between them. In the Czech provinces, the stations were:
Prague I – Liblice, the flagship station with all the main administrative staff, editorial
desks and the most advanced equipment centered around Czech Radio
Headquarters in Prague-Vinohrady. It also had the strongest broadcast tower located
at Liblice roughly 20 km east of the capital city. With an antenna strength of 120
kiloWatts (kW), Prague I ranked among the strongest stations in Europe at the time,
176
177
178
AČRo, personnel file.
Tragically, Donner died after jumping from an upper-story window at the Czecho-Slovak Radio
headquarters building on 15 March 1939 as Nazi troops pulled up outside. HRDLIČKA: Rozhlas v
okupaci, page 150.
Prior to World War II, most broadcasting in the developed world took place on either medium- or
long-wave stations. Short-wave service came into use primarily for long-distance and international
broadcasts. Ultra-short-wave, commonly known in the English-speaking world as “FM” and the
main waveband for most radio broadcasting today, was largely an experimental phenomenon in
1939.
60
covering virtually all of Bohemia, most of Moravia and even parts of German Saxony
and Silesia during daytime hours.179 In 1937, Prague I employed 361 staff.180 The
station maintained a Large Radio Orchestra, which would grow to more than 80
musicians, and a Small Radio Orchestra, which by 1944 employed over 40
musicians.181 Prague I was the main central station, which directed the entire
Czecho-Slovak Broadcasting Corporation. Ferdinand Thürmer, who took over
broadcasting in the Protectorate in 1942, described Prague I as follows:
“Prague, as the main station, was very strongly built up, had about 750 employees182
and was in terms of quality excellently staffed. There was probably no German
station with even roughly equivalent personnel… Around 100 academics made it
possible to cover even subordinate positions well. Hardly a lady without a high
school diploma. Of the five to six state prizes awarded annually, regularly three to
four of them went to employees of the radio.” 183
Prague II – Mělník, whose studios were located in the Prague city district of Karlín
and whose broadcast tower was located at Mělník (in German: Melnik) circa 55 km
northeast of Prague, and which broadcast at 100 kW. This station took to the
airwaves on 1 May 1938 as Radiojournal’s full-fledged German-language service
with its own studios, musicians, etc. After Munich, however, it lost most of its raison
d’être and its staff was reduced from 62 to a bare minimum required to cover the
179
180
181
182
183
Medium-wave stations rely on two basic kinds of signal to distribute programming. The so-called
groundwave follows the curvature of the earth, radiating outwards from the point of broadcast. It is
audible within a certain distance from the broadcast tower day and night. After nightfall, the
ionosphere cools and becomes denser and reflects medium-waves back to earth over a far
greater distances through what is known as the skywave. Thus while, for example, Prague II–
Mělník’s groundwave was not audible either in Jihlava or Mariánské Lázně during the day, its
skywave was clearly audible in the Netherlands, Great Britain and anon after nightfall.
Ročenka Československého Rozhlasu 1938, page 131.
MIKOTA: Kalendář, pages 145–149.
If Thürmer’s numbers are correct, then the staff at the central broadcast station in Prague doubled
between 1940 and 1945. According to Scurla, at the beginning of 1940, Prague I had only 340
employees. Naturally, the closing of all Czech universities November 1939 threw hundreds of top
academics onto the labor market, many of whom then found employment in broadcasting. See
also: NA-ÚŘP, carton 1134, page 343 on the structure of the Broadcasting Sub-Group of the
Group for Cultural-Political Affairs of the Office of the Reichsprotektor.
In the original: “Prag war als Hauptsender sehr stark ausgebaut, hatte etwa 750 Angestellte und
war qualitativ hervorragend besetzt. Es gibt wohl keinen deutschen Sender mit einer auch nur
annähernd gleichwertigen Belegschaft... Rund 100 Akademiker gaben die Möglichkeit, auch
untergeordnete Posten gut zu besetzen. Fast keine Dame ohne Abitur. Von den fünf bis sechs
Staatspreisen, die jährlich verliehen wurden, fielen regelmäßig drei bis vier auf
Senderangestellte.” THÜRMER: Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, pages 1 and 16.
61
greatly reduced German-language broadcasts.184 Prague II came mainly to rebroadcast a selection of programming produced by other Czecho-Slovak stations,
but also broadcast informational programs about Czecho-Slovakia in various foreign
languages, including German and Spanish.
Prag Stadt – Prag Město (Prague City). Also known as Prague III – Strašnice due
to its location in an eastern suburb of Prague, this was the original 5 kW station set
up to cover the capital in the 1920’s. It re-attained significance only at the very end of
the war.
Brno I – Komárov (Brünn I – Kumrowitz), broadcasting from within the city itself in
the district of Komárov at 32 kW, equipped with modern facilities. In 1937, Brno I
employed 94 staff, including a 35-member-strong radio orchestra,185 which expanded
to nearly 60 members during the period of the Protectorate.186 As Thürmer later
reported: “With around 250 employees, the station Brünn corresponded to a smaller
Reichssender, placing approximately between Danzig and Frankfurt…”187 Ferdinand
Thürmer also set about expanding German programming production at Brno by
creating a small subsidiary station of the
Moravská Ostrava – Mariánské Hory (Mährisch Ostrau – Marienberg), a small
station broadcasting at just 1.5 kW from the city district of Mariánské Hory, which
replaced the original, much stronger radio tower at Svínov (Schönbrunn – 11.2 kW),
which Czechoslovakia forcibly ceded to Germany after the Munich agreement in
October 1938.188 In 1937, Moravská Ostrava employed a staff of 68, including 26
musicians.189 Developments remained relatively stable at Moravská Ostrava
throughout the course of the Protectorate period. Thürmer described it as “a
184
185
186
187
188
189
Rozhlasová ročenka 1939, page 12.
Ročenka Rozhlasu 1938, page 131.
MIKOTA: Kalendář, pages 149–150.
In the original: “Der Sender Brünn entsprach mit rund 250 Angestellten einem kleinerem
Reichssender, lag etwa zwischen Danzig und Frankfurt... ” According to the Broadcasting SubGroup of the Office of the Reichsprotektor, Brno (in German: Brünn) employed a staff of 130 at
the beginning of 1940. THÜRMER: Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, page 1.
Radiojournal, volume XVI, (1938), edition 50 for the week of 11 to 17 December 1938.
Ročenka Rozhlasu 1938, page 131.
62
subsidiary station with a team of around 50 and a small orchestra,”190 numbering
around 20 musicians.191
Poděbrady (Podiebrad), a short-wave station located ca. 50 km east of Prague,
which started broadcasting in May of 1937192 with the main intent of servicing
international broadcasts, especially to North and South America where an estimated
2.25 million Czechs and Slovaks were said to live in Diaspora communities.193 For
the most part, Poděbrady’s eight speakers simply re-broadcast a selection of
programming from the Czechoslovak medium-wave stations, while interjecting
special programs in 15 international languages, including mainly English, French and
German, but also Persian.
Brno II – Dobrochov (Dobrochau) construction completed only in the spring of
1940. The original intent of Brno II was to be a Moravian counterpart to Liblice. With
its broadcast tower located at Dobrochov about 50 km northeast of Brno and a
planned antenna strength of 100 kW, its signal would have covered virtually all of
Moravia and neighboring regions during the daylight hours, thereby perfecting
coverage of Brno’s broadcast area. Instead, the Propaganda Ministry turned Brno II
into the “Reichssender Donau” for broadcasting propaganda to the southeastern
European countries. It was hurriedly finished and went on the air in mid-1940
allowing for several months of propaganda broadcasts in the run-up to the German
invasion of Yugoslavia and Greece in early 1941.194 Apart from occasional efforts by
Hans-Günther Marek to absorb it into his domain, Brno II was to remain of no
consequence for Czech- or local German-language programming during the entire
duration of the Protectorate.195 Instead, the Reichssender Donau was simply a rebroadcasting facility for Goebbels’ efforts vis-à-vis the southeast-European peoples.
Since the programming of the Reichssender Donau originated out of Berlin and was
190
191
192
193
194
195
In the orginal: “...Mährisch Ostrau war ein Nebensender mit 50 Mann, dazu ein kleines
Orchester.” THÜRMER: Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, page 1. See: NA-ÚŘP, carton 1134,
page 343, Aufbau der Untergruppe Rundfunk (der Gruppe Kulturpolitischer Angelegenheiten).
MIKOTA: Kalendář, page 151.
Ročenka Rozhlasu 1938, page 8.
Ročenka Rozhlasu 1938, page 95.
NA-ÚŘP-ST 109-4-1423, page 153, Niederschrift über Besprechungen betr. beschleunigter
Inbetriebnahme des neuen Grossrundfunksenders Brünn-Dobrochov am 19.1. und 20.1. 1940.
NA-ÚŘP, carton 1164, RF-Versorgung des Protektorats.
63
not intended for an audience in Bohemia or Moravia, it is of no direct relevance to
this study and we can ignore it. It was destroyed in fighting at the end of the war.196
Plzeň (Pilsen). During the course of the Second World War, the German Luftwaffe
set up a 500 Watt medium-wave station in a bunker in Plzeň near the confluence of
the Radbuza and Mže rivers. According to Klausnerová, until 5 May 1945, its main
purpose was to broadcast information on the movements of Allied bomber
squadrons – the famous Luftlagemeldungen – and to jam BBC Czech-language
broadcasts.197 However, the magazine Týden rozhlasu lists Plzeň as re-broadcasting
Prague I’s programming as of 10 December 1944. Nevertheless, there appears to
have been no meaningful programming activity at Plzeň itself prior to the end of the
Protectorate. The station is essentially irrelevant for the purposes of this study, apart
from the fact that its very creation – even at such a late date in the war – illustrates
the Nazi intent to expand broadcasting in the occupied Czech provinces.
The town of Kroměříž (Kremsier) was also the site of a short-wave station. However,
the occupation authorities appear to have used this entirely for German propaganda
purposes during the war. Thus, we need not examine it closely.
The first Czechoslovak television station launched test broadcasts in Prague during
1937.198 However, the events of 1938 put these plans on hold in Czechoslovakia and
the outbreak of war in 1939 delayed the development further. During the occupation,
occasional articles on the state of German television broadcasts – which had
commenced regular broadcasts in January 1936199 and which continued throughout
most of the war in Berlin – did appear in Czech radio magazines. Presumably, the
sense of such information was to propagate National Socialism’s efforts in this area
of societal modernization.200 Ultimately television broadcasting did not return to the
196
197
198
199
200
Svět v obrazech (“The World in Pictures”), týdeník Ministerstva Informací, volume 1, edition 3, (6
July 1945), page 14.
KLAUSNEROVÁ, Eva et al: Svobodná Plzeň hovoří, Příběhy vzepětí i pokoření Českého rozhlasu
Plzeň, (“Free Plzeň Speaks, Storys of the Rise and Prostration of Český Rozhlas Plzeň”), NAVA,
Plzeň, 2005., page 11. Hereinafter: KLAUSNEROVÁ et al: Svobodná Plzeň.
Ročenka Rozhlasu 1938, page 13.
DILLER: Rundfunkpolitik, page 193.
See for instance: ŠAMLA, J.V., Zapnout plné světlo Jedeme! (sic! “Switch on full lights We’re
on!”), Týden rozhlasu, volume X., edition 1, (2 January 1943), pp. 8-9.
64
Czech provinces, however, until 1953-1954.201 Thus, we can disregard television
entirely as a medium of any real relevance for the population of the Protectorate.
The Audience Compared with Germany and its Development During the
Occupation
In the early days of radio broadcasting, before radios – let alone televisions –
became ubiquitous pieces of household equipment, the common measurement for
progress in the spread of radio use was “listenership density”, or essentially the ratio
of radio receivers to inhabitants. By the 1930’s, broadcasting in Czechoslovakia was
very highly developed in terms of program quality and signal distribution, however it
still lagged behind Germany in terms of listenership density or its reach within the
population. While the ratio of radios to inhabitants was approximately 1:16 in
Germany in 1932, it was roughly 1:31 in Czechoslovakia for the same year.
Furthermore, Czechoslovakia’s radio listeners were unevenly distributed, with the
Czech lands, i.e., Bohemia and Moravia-Silesia, contributing roughly 87% of all
listeners. However, even if we factor out Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Russia,
listenership density in the Czech provinces in 1932 still only reached a level of
approximately one radio set for every 26 inhabitants.202
Nevertheless, there was a steady rise in the rates of radio listenership throughout
Europe in the 1930’s. Means of expanding the audience varied from state to state.
Expressed simply, Czechoslovakia’s democratic and free-market-oriented economic
system relied primarily on demand from the population for access to radio
programming as the stimulus for market growth and on radio propagation by
Radiojournal itself. This generated an increase in listenership rates from 472,187 at
the end of 1932203 to 1,128,055 on 30 September 1938,204 which corresponds to a
growth factor of 2.39.
By contrast, the National Socialist regime in Germany initiated a state-sponsored
policy of directly stimulating consumer demand for radio programming. Already at the
201
202
203
204
Vývoj televizního vysílání v datech, archivní záběry, kuriozity. (“Development of TV Broadcasting
in Data, Archive footage, Curiosities”) www.ceskatelevize.cz/ct/historie/index.php (February
2010).
Based on population estimates for the two countries taken from: Die Welt in Maß und Zahl,
Statistische Beilage zu Herders Welt- und Wirtschaftsatlas, Herder & Co. G.m.b.H.
Verlagsbuchhandlung, Freiburg im Breisgau, 1932 and official listenership numbers as of 31
December 1932 as given in LERG and JEŠUTOVÁ.
JEŠUTOVÁ et al: Od mikrofonu, table II. Počet koncesionářů, page 613.
Rozhlasová ročenka 1939, page 38.
65
beginning of the regime, Goebbels and his Propaganda Ministry forced several
individual companies of the German radio industry into a cartel, which then created
and manufactured an inexpensive “People’s Receiver”, the famous Volksempfänger,
which the state then also helped to market for purchase at very affordable rates – 76
RM – and with variously attractive installment payment schemes. The manufacturers
developed new and even cheaper models of Volksempfänger up to the outbreak of
the Second World War, which they continued to sell at comparatively low prices. For
instance, the Deutscher Kleinempfänger (DKE), which came onto the market in
1938, cost only 35 RM, or roughly one week’s average wage for a worker.
These projects were themselves a many-facetted success for Goebbels and his
ministry. First of all, the Volksempfänger provided the technical means for reaching
the population with propaganda in their homes. Secondly, the higher the number of
listeners, the higher the income the ministry received through subscription fees.
Furthermore, the Volksempfänger was itself also an example of technical
modernization, which the Nazi regime could use as a tool of propaganda. From the
rural backwaters of East Prussia to the forests of the Hunsrück in the west, the
National Socialists could truthfully claim to have connected formerly isolated
communities and citizens with the outside world through the most modern medium of
radio. For an even greater propaganda effect, Goebbels routinely donated radio
receivers to individuals and groups and then published reports about it. For example,
he distributed 5,000 DKE’s to war invalids, war widows and orphans on the occasion
of Hitler’s birthday in 1942.205 Such efforts made for good public relations, while
further helping to raise the number of listeners.
The effect of all these efforts was, in fact, the sale of millions of inexpensive radio
sets and a dramatic increase in listenership levels. In turn, the rising numbers of
radio listeners served to justify the “proof of trust in the leadership of the Reich and
the people, a proof of trust that no other country could demonstrate.”206 This claim,
however, was not entirely justified. Despite all its propaganda, the rate of radioownership in the Altreich, i.e., Germany in the borders of 1937, rose only marginally
faster between 1933 and 1938 than it did in Czechoslovakia – namely by a factor of
205
206
Der Neue Tag, volume 4, No. 107, (18 April 1942), page 3.
In German: “Denn einmal bedeutet diese außerordentliche Zunahme der Zahl der
Rundfunkteilnehmer (PRP: auf 15 Millionen)... einen ganz besonderen Vertrauensbeweis für die
Führung des Reiches und Volkes, einen Vertrauensbeweis, wie ihn kein anderes Land
aufzuweisen vermag.“ 15 Millionen Rundfunkteilnehmer, IN: Funkschau, volume 14, Issue 4, April
1941, page 50.
66
2.63 versus Czechoslovakia’s 2.39. In absolute numbers Germany’s listenership rate
increased from 4.1 million in January 1933207 to over 10.8 million on 31 December
1938.208 Naturally, the higher initial rate of radio listenership in Germany – or initial
market saturation – affected the equation there somewhat. Nevertheless, in the
same period in neighboring Belgium, the number of radio receivers more than
tripled,209 while in France they more than quadrupled.210 Thus, while the overall
effect of Goebbels’ campaign to increase listenership rates must qualify as a
success, it is also true that his ministry exploited a development for its propaganda
purposes, which was just as common to other industrialized European countries at
the time.
By comparison, at the time of the establishment of the Protectorate on 15 March
1939 the ratio of radios to inhabitants in the German Reich ranged between
approximately 1:5 and 1:6, in the Protectorate the ratio was just above half that level
at between just 1:9 and 1:10.211 In absolute numbers, a total of 719,771 radios were
registered on the territory of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia as of 31
March 1939. By 31 December 1944, the number of registered radio sets rose to
1,068,058,212 which corresponds to an increase of roughly 48%! With an estimated
population of roughly 7.23 million213 at the time, this means an increase of radio
density to 1:6.8 inhabitants or 1 radio set per every 2.12 households in the
Protectorate. This was a remarkable increase, especially given the general shortage
of equipment and raw materials, including radio tubes, caused by the war.
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
LERG, Winfried B.: Rundfunkpolitik in der Weimarer Republik, IN: BAUSCH, Hans (publisher),
Rundfunk in Deutschland Band 1, Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, München, 1980, page 528.
WEINBRENNER: Handbuch des Deutschen Rundfunks Jahrbuch 1939/1940, pp. 312-313.
In Belgium, from 339,635 at the beginning of 1933 to 1,126,218 at the beginning of 1939.
WEISFLOG, R.: Rundfunkwirtschaft und Rundfunkverbreitung in Belgien, IN: Rundfunkarchiv,
Rundfunk und Fernsehen in Wissenschaft und Praxis, volume 14, edition 1 (January 1941), page
28.
In France, from an estimated 900,000 in mid-1932 to roughly 4,164,000 on 1 January 1938.
Compare LERG, Winfried B.: Rundfunkpolitik in der Weimarer Republik, IN: BAUSCH, Hans
(publisher), Rundfunk in Deutschland Band 1, page 526 with WEINBRENNER: Handbuch des
Deutschen Rundfunks Jahrbuch 1939/1940, page 314.
REIM, Rudolf: Rundfunkarbeitsgemeinschaft in Böhmen und Mähren, Rundfunk-Archiv, volume
14., edition 2 (February 1941), page 44.
JEŠUTOVÁ et al: Od mikrofonu, table II. Počet koncesionářů, page 613.
Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Protektorat Böhmen und Mähren 1944, (“Statistical Yearbook for
the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia 1944“), Statistisches Zentralamt in Prag (publisher),
Verlag des Statistischen Zentralamtes in Prag, Buchdruckerei Melantrich in Prag, 1944.
calculated from Table 13, Haushaltungen nach ihrer Art und Größe in den Oberlandratsbezirken
und Ländern 1943, page 11. Hereinafter: Statistisches Jahrbuch 1944.
67
The logical consequence one must draw from these facts is that not only did the
occupation regime not seek to roll back Czech radio listenership, but on the contrary,
it propagated the spread of radio usage on a massive scale and to a similar extent
as among the ethnic-German population of the Reich itself.
Subscription Fees
The policy on radio subscription fees also remained consistently benevolent
throughout the entire Protectorate period and was even more favorable than the fees
valid in the “rest of the territory of the Reich”. The monthly radio concession fee in
Czechoslovakia was set at Kč 10 starting on 1 April 1926214, and remained at that
level even after the establishment of the Protectorate. On 1 June 1940, the Ministry
of Transport, which was responsible for the Post Office and, therefore, also for the
technical side of broadcasting, raised the monthly concession fee to K 12215, which
was the equivalent of Reichsmark (RM) 1.20 at the official exchange rate of RM 1 =
K 10. As of 1 September 1942, the rate was adjusted once again to K 15216 monthly
(RM 1.50) and remained at that level until well after the end of the Protectorate itself,
rising again only after 1 January 1946.217 By contrast, in the Altreich (i.e., Germany
proper) the monthly radio concession fee remained steady at RM 2 (corresponding
to K 20) throughout this entire period. Thus, even the highest Protectorate
concession fee remained at a level 25% below that in Germany proper. This further
suggests that the occupation authorities sought to encourage radio listenership
among the Czech population by keeping it relatively cheap.
214
215
216
217
JEŠUTOVÁ et al: Od mikrofonu, table I. Rozhlasové poplatky (“License fees”), page 612.
Amtsblatt des Verkehrsministeriums für den Bereich der Protektoratspost Böhmen und Mähren
(PAB) (“Official Gazette of the Ministry of Transport for the Area of the Protectorate Post Office of
Bohemia and Moravia”), Jahrgang 1940, Verkehrsministerium (Postverwaltung) in Prag (Hg.),
Druck E. Beaufort A.G., Prag, PAB No. 26b/1940 of 21 May 1940, page 226.
Postamtsblatt des Ministeriums für Verkehr und Technik in Prag (“Official Postal Gazette of the
Ministry of Transport and Technology in Prague”), Jahrgang 1942, Ministerium für Verkehr und
Technik (Postverwaltung) in Prag (Hg.), Druck E. Beaufort A.G., Prag, PAB No. 41/1942 of 29
August 1942, page 405.
Věstník Ministerstva Pošt (“Official Gazette of the Ministry of Posts”), rok 1945 (od 24. května do
31. prosince 1945), vydalo Ministerstvo Pošt, Tiskl E. Beaufort A.S., Praha, VMP No. 30/1945 of
23 October 1945, page 162.
68
Programming Just Prior to the Nazi Invasion
Program Analysis – the Method
As a point of departure, let us take a look at various aspects of Czecho-Slovak
Radio’s programming at the very end of the Second Republic. In order to retain
comparability, only stations located on the territory of what was to become the
Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia are included in this analysis, i.e., Prague ILiblice, Prague II-Mělník, later named Reichssender Böhmen and then Sender
Böhmen, Brno and Moravská Ostrava. Programs originating from Slovak stations are
included only when the Czech stations re-broadcast their programs. For comparison
purposes at the outset, I also included some material on Reichsrundfunk
broadcasting. Regarding the classification of program types, I employed a somewhat
more detailed version of the categories found in the Handbuch des Deutschen
Rundfunks Jahrbuch 1939/1940, identifying individual subject areas of talks
programming, instead of lumping, for example, women’s, worker’s and farmer’s
broadcasts altogether in one category. The main categories, which eventually proved
useful for classification were:
•
Culture/Entertainment: all non-musical programming intended to entertain or
educate and not classifiable in any of the specialized categories listed below.
This includes radio plays and dramas, educational lectures, travelogues, book
reviews, language courses, sports reports, in the first years of the occupation
also religious programming, etc.
•
Agricultural Radio (Landfunk-zemědělský rozhlas): specialized programming on
agriculture, foresting, hunting, bee-keeping and gardening, as classified at the
time by Czech Radio.
•
Industry, Trade and Business Radio (ITB – initially rozhlas pro průmysl, obchod a
živnost or POŽ, later Wirtschaftsfunk – hospodářský rozhlas, Economics Radio):
specialized programming for entrepreneurs, trades people and businesses in
general, including official announcements by various business cartels in the
Protectorate.
69
•
Music: all genres from serious, classical through to light dance music.
•
News/Reports: newscasts and topical reportages/features.
•
Morning: In some cases, the radio program magazines are not specific regarding
the exact content of morning programs. For instance, in February/March 1939
they indicate only: a wake-up call (budíček), morning exercises and music without
listing the exact durations of each item, which may have varied. Thus, this is
grouped simply where appropriate under “morning”.
•
Political programming: only programming with an obvious and overt political
agenda and/or produced specifically as party propaganda. This includes political
press reviews such as Hans Fritzsche’s Politische Zeitungs- und Rundfunkschau
and their Czech equivalent, Alois Kříž’s Politický přehled tisku; commentaries by
Emanuel Moravec, but also individual besídky by the Czech National Solidarity.
•
Women’s programming (Frauenfunk—rozhlas pro ženy): regular educational
lectures, but also entertainment programs centered on topics of interest to
women in the traditional gender roles prevailing at the time, i.e., of women as
housewives and mothers.
•
Worker’s Radio (Arbeiterfunk—dělnický rozhlas): specialized programming
intended for factory workers and employees and labeled as such in the radio
guides.
•
Youth programming (Jugend- und Schulfunk—rozhlas pro mládež a školský
rozhlas): including radio dramas for children and other programming centered on
youth interests as well as educational broadcasts for schools.
•
Other: various programs that did not fall into any of the above-mentioned
categories, such as announcements of up-coming broadcast schedules; so-called
security broadcasts (Bezpečnostní rozhlas), which covered police requests for
70
information on crimes and sought-after criminals; morning exercise programs and
the like.
With time, the occupation regime came to exercise greater influence on Czech
Radio’s staffing and penetrated ever deeper into all areas of program production,
individual genres, which one could initially consider non-political, became colored
with pro-German and/or pro-Nazi content. For example, a youth drama about the life
of Mozart218 may not appear to be a political broadcast on the surface. Classifying it
and similar programming as such would also create an undifferentiated and
monolithic image of the content of the broadcast week. However, Mozart was in the
parlance of the day a great “German” composer, and although we cannot listen to
the program and analyze its content precisely, we can with a reasonable degree of
certainty – and with regard to the official censorship instructions valid for Czech
Radio – assume that a program about Mozart’s life approved by several layers of
state-employed German and Czech censors will only have cast him in a positive
light. It is virtually certain that such a program will have played into a greater general
effort to depict the Germans as a nation of geniuses. Taken a step further, a nation
of great geniuses will only have chosen a genius to lead it and a system of genius
(Nazism) with which to organize itself. Thus, although the specific program in
question was actually a form of education or entertainment, it ultimately carried a
political message as well, albeit in a less overt or more subtle manner.
In order to differentiate then between overtly political programming, such as the
political press reviews on the one hand, and other, seemingly non-political genres of
programming – which however ultimately served a political agenda – on the other
hand, I developed the term Germanization/Nazification Factor (GNF). Here again,
the terms “German” and “Germany” are used in the global, pan-Germanic sense
typical for Nazism i.e., non-Jewish people, works, subjects etc. originating from
Germany, Austria and adjacent German-speaking areas. Specifically, the GNF
comprises all programming originating from or re-broadcast by Protectorate-based
stations (Prague I, Reichssender/Sender Böhmen, Brno, Moravská Ostrava, after
late 1944 Plzeň and the short-wave station at Poděbrady for as long as programming
schedules are available) falling into one or more of the following categories:
218
Broadcast on 6 December 1941, from 14:50 to 15:45 on all Czech stations.
71
•
Originating from the Reichsrundfunk itself, including all manner of music and
talks;
•
Talks originating from Protectorate stations, but in the German language –
including German-language teaching programs for the Czech public;
•
Talks programming by German authors, even if in Czech translation;
•
Talks programming in Czech about Germans or topics related to Germany or any
aspect of German culture, history, geography, etc.;
•
All political programming, as anti-German or anti-Nazi sentiments were
suppressed by the censors;
•
All music by “German composers” whether interpreted by German, Czech or
other musicians.
However, the GNF also encompasses some programming, which one might
categorize as a gray area. In early 1942 for example, all Protectorate medium-wave
stations started re-broadcasting the so-called Kameradschaftsdienst (“Comradeship
Service”) between 05:00 and 06:00 hours, i.e., prior to the start of the Czech
broadcast day. The mission of the Kameradschaftsdienst was to provide German
soldiers listening in the field in the various theaters of war with urgent information
from their families and communities on the home front. In April 1940 for example,
35% of the Kameradschaftsdienst programming was made up of news about the
births of soldiers’ children; 17% was pre-recorded music, much of it from a series
with the title “Neue Soldatenlieder” (“New Soldiers’ Songs”); and the remaining 48%
entailed a vast array of various announcements including news of the deaths of
relatives.219 Obviously, the intended target audience of the Kameradschaftsdienst
was not the Czech radio public at large, but rather active German soldiers and their
loved
ones.
Presumably,
the
primary
objective
of
re-broadcasting
the
Kameradschaftsdienst via Protectorate radio stations was also not to Germanize the
Czech listenership. More important factors will have been the good audibility of some
of the Protectorate’s stations at the front – e.g., Prague I in North Africa – and the
goal of maintaining a connection between the front and Germans living or stationed
in the Protectorate and adjacent regions. It was rather the use of Czech resources, in
this case, the Czech station network, to serve the German public. Nevertheless, re219
See: Beim Kameradschaftsdienst, Funk-Woche, volume 15, number 42, (13—19 October 1940),
page 6.
72
broadcasting the Kameradschaftsdienst via the Protectorate’s station network meant
that Czech radio listeners had the sole option of listening to German-language
programming interspersed with music and originating from the Reichsrundfunk on
their domestic stations between 05:00 and 06:00 hours. Thus, while presumably not
the primary intent of the program, the potential for Germanization/Nazification was
also present in this programming, and I decided to include it in the GNF. Every
chapter entails a breakdown by percents of the programming discovered in the
weeks analyzed. To illustrate the nature of these broadcasts, each chapter also
provides a review of the most relevant pro-German or pro-National Socialist
programming for the period, i.e., concrete series, their apparent intent and intensity
(frequency of broadcast, stations of broadcast, primetime220 or not, etc.) and where
relevant, Czech Radio’s alternative programming to them.
The five main program content criteria of relevance are: duration of broadcast,
regionalization, programming structure, German music, and language of broadcast.
In the period just prior to the Nazi invasion, however, it is not appropriate to speak of
a Germanization/Nazification factor. Czecho-Slovak Radio’s mission at the end of
the Second Republic was neither to Germanize the population nor to propagate
Nazism as a state doctrine. Nevertheless, there were relevant German-language
talks and German music programming on Czechoslovak stations, which require
examination. Thus, only Nazification can be left aside entirely at this point, while
language of broadcast, programming structure, regionalization and duration all
remain valid objects of investigation. Nota bene: The numbers in the charts are
rounded to full digits to make their depiction more legible.
220
Radiojournal considered “primetime” as the main evening listening period between 19:00 and
22:00 hours. This is logical given the better propagation of radio waves after sunset and the
longer work weeks at the time. Ročenka Rozhlasu 1938, page 27.
73
Status Quo Ante – Analysis of the Program Week Starting 26 February 1939
Figure 1.1: Average duration of broadcast day in hours:minutes:seconds
Week starting 26 February 1939
All Czech (CZ) medium-wave (MW) stations = Prague I, Brno, Moravská Ostrava, Prague II-Mělník
All CZ MW stations
13:48:41
10:11:19
Prague I
14:22:51
9:37:09
Brno
14:30:43
9:29:17
Moravská Ostrava
14:16:26
9:43:34
Prague II-Mělník
SW-Poděbrady
Berlin
RRG 1938/39
12:04:43
11:55:17
14:20:51
9:39:09
16:40:00
7:20:00
19:40:00
Broadcast hours
4:20:00
Station breaks
Duration of Broadcast Day
Figure 1.1 shows the average durations of the broadcast day, i.e., the time when
programs were on the air versus station breaks or so-called dead airtime over the
week starting on Sunday, 26 February 1939. From the perspective of the year 2010
with its 24 hours per day/seven days per week media coverage, Czecho-Slovak
Radio‘s average broadcast day was very short with most medium-wave stations on
the air for roughly 14.5 hours per day. In the remaining approximately 9.5 hours
nothing was broadcast. Logically, the dead airtime was primarily in the nighttime
hours when most of the population was sleeping. On weekdays, this generally meant
no broadcasts between 23:00 and 06:15 hours. However, there were also regular
station breaks of more than one hour’s duration in the morning (08:05-09:45) and
afternoon (14:05-15:10) as well. This pattern of programming versus station breaks
was very common at the time. Broadcast technology was relatively new and both
state-run and private carriers in other countries also instituted station breaks to
maintain equipment at times of the day when listener numbers were presumably
relatively low, i.e., when the population was likely to be at work or school.
By comparison, the Reichssender Berlin had a considerably longer broadcast day
with over two more hours of programming than any of the Czech stations. Berlin’s
broadcast day started at 06:00 and continued for one hour longer than the Czech
74
stations until 24:00 hours. During the day, it included station breaks that were also
considerably shorter (e.g., 11:00-11:35, 13:15-14:00 hours) than the Czech stations.
If we look at the Reichsrundfunk’s aggregate numbers for 1938/39, the difference is
even more pronounced with the German network broadcasting more than five
additional hours (19:40:00) or 35% more programming than Brno, the Czech station
with the longest average broadcast day! In concrete terms, much of this difference
came from concerts broadcast by the various Reichssender between 24:00 and
02:00 or even 03:00 hours in the night. In the week analyzed, that meant primarily
pre-recorded concerts of light music from Breslau, Cologne, Frankfurt, Stuttgart and
Vienna. Thus, although most of the listening population will have been sleeping
during these hours, the comparison makes clear that the Reichsrundfunk was
providing a more comprehensive service to the listener than Czecho-Slovak Radio.
In practical terms, no Czecho-Slovak Radio subscriber inclined to listen late at night
had the option of tuning in to any Czecho-Slovak medium-wave station after 23:30
hours at the very latest (on Saturday and Sunday nights) and 23:00 hours the rest of
the time. Poděbrady did broadcast throughout the night, but reception obviously
required ownership of a radio receiver with short-wave capacity and knowledge of
one or more foreign languages to enjoy non-musical programming.
Figure 1.2: Regionalization – stations of origin as a percentage of TOTAL AIRTIME
Week starting 26 February 1939,
All Czech (CZ) medium-wave (MW) stations = Prague I, Brno, Moravská Ostrava, Prague II-Mělník
53
All CZ MW stations
16
Prague I
4
13
7
81
Brno
60
Moravská Ostrava
59
Prague II-Mělník
5
4
SW-Poděbrady
5
3
11
30
18
15
%
12
7
1
7
1
81
1
76
10
%
7
33
10
Berlin
0% 5%
1
14
58
6
20
%
25
%
30
%
35
%
40
%
24
45
%
50
%
55
%
60
%
65
%
70
%
75
%
80
%
85
%
90
%
95 100
% %
Prague I
Brno
Moravská Ostrava
Prague II-Mělník
SW-Poděbrady
Bratislava
Berlin
Other RRG
75
Regionalization
Figure 1.2 shows the stations of origin for programming by each station in the
Czecho-Slovak Radio network, i.e., what percentage of airtime was produced by
each of the stations for its own use, and how much each station contributed to the
other stations’ programming. The greater the percentage of self-produced
programming, the stronger and more important was the station in general. In the
case of this percentile break-down, we can see the structure of a network built
around a flagship station – Prague I – which contributed more than half (53%) of all
medium-wave programming for the network as a whole. By contrast, Brno produced
only 16% of overall airtime, Prague II only 13% with the other stations in the single
digits. Furthermore, the flow of programming was for the most part from Prague I out
to the subsidiary stations in both talks and music. While Prague I did re-broadcast
programs originating from the smaller stations, most of that was musical
programming. In the case of Brno, Prague I regularly re-broadcast some talks, for
instance educational lectures for schools or Agricultural Radio in the week reviewed.
However, even here, re-broadcasts of music dominated the mix. Moravská Ostrava,
by contrast, only contributed 1% of Prague I’s airtime, or concretely, one concert on
Saturday morning between 11:00 and 11:55 hours.
Conversely, Prague I produced by far the largest percentage of airtime for its own
broadcasts (80%) and for those of Brno and Moravská Ostrava (60% each). By
contrast, only one-third (30%) of Brno’s programs originated from its own studios,
while for Moravská Ostrava the figure was just 14%. It is also apparent that the
Slovak stations played only a very minor role for the Czech listener at this point in
time with Bratislava providing just 7% of their airtime and Prešov not providing any.
In terms of content, these programs were, with the exception of a 15-minute morning
news bulletin Monday through Saturday, also entirely musical in nature. A quick
glance at the program schedules for Bratislava and Prešov reveals that they rebroadcast somewhat more programming from the Czech stations than vice-versa,
but essentially Czecho-Slovak Radio was functioning virtually as two separate
networks at this time.
The two divergent cases among the Czech stations were again Prague II and the
short-wave station at Poděbrady, which cooperated intensely with each other, while
also originating large percentages of their own programming. Nevertheless, these
76
figures are misleading. Firstly, much of their musical programming consisted of prerecorded pieces produced in Prague, some of which had already been broadcast live
by the other Czech stations. The reality of the situation was that Prague II and
Poděbrady were editorial sub-divisions within broadcast headquarters in Prague and
not truly independent stations of their own. At the same time, very little of their
programming was re-broadcast on any of the other stations, underlining their primary
missions as external broadcast services.
In terms of regional provenance, Berlin’s programming was most comparable to
Prague, originating more than three-quarters (76%) of its own programming with
other stations in the German network providing the remaining airtime. In the case of
the week reviewed, however, there was also a concert re-broadcast from Milan
between 21:00 and 22:00 hours on Tuesday, 28 February 1939, which was part of a
regular series of musical programs exchanged between the German and Italian
stations and undoubtedly intended to strengthen ties with Hitler’s main European ally
at the time.
Figure 1.3: Programming structure -- subjects as a percentage of TOTAL AIRTIME
Week starting 26 February 1939,
All Czech (CZ) medium-wave (MW) stations = Prague I, Brno, Moravská Ostrava, Prague II-Mělník
All CZ MW stations
58
Prague I
10
56
Brno
9
49
12
Moravská Ostrava
57
121
14
1 3 2
12
5
5
1 3 2
5
2
6
12 2
62
Berlin
11
72
RRG-1938/39
20
%
25
%
30
%
35
%
11
40
%
45
%
50
%
55
%
60
%
65
%
70
%
75
%
5
2
1
5
3
1
5
3
21
2 11
11
Culture/Entertainment
Workers
News/Reports
German Program
2
17
5
8
69
15
%
12
9
1 4
1
17
72
SW-Poděbrady
0% 5% 10
%
3
3
10
Prague II-Mělník
Music
Youth/School
Women
Morning
2
10
13
4
80
%
1 3
85
%
90
%
4
4
95 100
% %
Farmers
Economics
Politics
Other
Programming Structure
Figure 1.3 shows that the three main Czech stations (Prague I, Brno and Moravská
Ostrava) broadcast similar levels of the same topics. In all cases, music was the
largest single component, making up around half (between 49 and 57%) of all
77
airtime. In the area of talks, news programs made up the largest individual segment
at around 12% for Prague and Moravská Ostrava. For Brno, this figure is higher –
17% – due to additional German-language newscasts not broadcast by the other
stations. Otherwise, the breakdown of talks programming indicates a highly
diversified program content with specialized broadcasts for individual population
groups in the categories as indicated. Especially noteworthy for this study are the
very low levels of overtly political programming, which made up only 1% of airtime for
the domestic medium-wave stations. Such political programs were occasional, five to
ten-minute pieces from the ruling party of the Second Republic called “Rozhlas
Národní jednoty” (“Radio of National Unity”).
The only medium-wave station in Bohemia and Moravia that varied greatly from the
norm was Prague II-Mělník. Prague II had a somewhat simplified program structure
with nearly three-quarters (72%) of airtime made up of music. Again, music can
appeal to people of any language and does not require costly translation. Prague II’s
talks programming concentrated heavily on news (17%) and culture (9%) and
contained only bits of youth (1%) and women’s (1%) programming. There were no
broadcasts for farmers or workers or any overtly political programming in that week.
There were also no general morning programs, as Prague II’s broadcast day started
much later at 10:39.
As for the short-wave station Poděbrady, with target zones in the Americas, Asia and
Africa, its programming was also overwhelmingly musical (62%) with greater levels
than the other stations for the genres of news (21%), Czecho-Slovak culture (11%)
and economics (5%). Again, this finding is logical given the short-wave station’s
mission.
By comparison, the Reichssender Berlin had a much simpler program structure than
the domestic Czech stations. In fact, it nearly mirrored the patterns found on Prague
II-Mělník with virtually identical quantities of music, culture, youth and women’s
broadcasts. The large degree of musical programming (72%) echoed Goebbels’
emphasis on pure entertainment at the expense of lectures and general education
echoing perhaps in a quantitative sense his general theory that radio “should never
fall ill from the word...”221 As a consequence, Goebbels intentionally forced up the
percentage of music in German radio programming from roughly 60% in 1934 to
221
In the original: “Der Rundfunk soll niemals an dem Wort kranken...” DILLER: Rundfunkpolitik,
page 145.
78
these levels evident at the Reichssender Berlin just five years later. These figures
also correspond well with the Reichsrundfunk’s aggregate numbers for music versus
talks programming in 1938/1939, which was 69% music (64% light or entertaining
music plus 5% serious music) versus 31% talks.222 In times of important political
actions such as the annexation of Austria and the Sudeten crisis, this overall trend to
greater quantities of music programming was reversed briefly – for a few days or
weeks – to allow for more news and informational programming.223 The
Reichssender Berlin’s program schedule for the calendar week analyzed is rather
low in overtly political broadcasts (0.43% versus the aggregate 3.5% for 1938/39).
Figure 1.4: Music by German composers as a percentage of TOTAL AIRTIME
Week starting 26 February 1939
All Czech (CZ) medium-wave (MW) stations = Prague I, Brno, Moravská Ostrava, Prague II-Mělník
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
11.1
7.1
5.8
5.9
6.4
All CZ MW stations
Prague I
Brno
Moravská Ostrava
Prague II-Mělník
Music by German composers
Music by German Composers
Figure 1.4 illustrates perhaps the “natural” degree of German music on CzechoSlovak Radio, i.e., the quantities of German music the network broadcast while it
was still a relatively free agent in an officially independent state. Generally speaking,
the musical programming broadcast was immensely diverse in terms of provenance
and type, featuring all genres from traditional folk music via operettas, modern dance
music to religious and serious classical pieces. Of those programs, an average of
222
223
See: WEINBRENNER: Handbuch des Deutschen Rundfunks Jahrbuch 1939/1940, p. 317, graph
“Programmgliederung–Zusammensetzung des deutschen Rundfunkprogramms 1938/39”.
See: WEINBRENNER: Handbuch des Deutschen Rundfunks Jahrbuch 1939/1940, p. 318, graph
“Entwicklung des gesamten Musikteils im deutschen Rundfunkprogramm 1934-1938”.
79
7.1% of airtime (or 12% of musical programming) for the medium-wave stations were
compositions by German composers. These broadcasts included the main classics,
many of which would feature greatly during the Protectorate period as well, such as:
Bach, Beethoven, Händel, Haydn, Mozart, Schubert, and Carl Maria von Weber.
However, there were also pieces by less known composers such as Paul Lincke,
Friedrich von Flotow, Ludwig Siede and others. Noteworthy for this study is also the
fact that, unlike the Reichsrundfunk, Czecho-Slovak Radio did not limit itself only to
those German and Austrian composers officially sanctioned by the Nazis. On the
contrary, there were several programs throughout the week featuring works by
composers, whom the Nazis considered Jewish and whose works had long been
banned from the German airwaves. These included popular, lighter operetta pieces
by Léon Jessel, who was to die tragically after physical abuse in a Gestapo cellar in
1942,224 and Leo Ascher,225 who had fled Nazi Vienna for New York. Further
examples were works by Felix Mendelssohn-Bartholdy and Jacques Offenbach.
Figure 1.5: Broadcast language as a percentage of ALL TALKS PROGRAMMING
Week starting 26 February 1939
All Czech (CZ) medium-wave (MW) stations = Prague I, Brno, Moravská Ostrava, Prague II-Mělník
All CZ MW
80
3
Prague I
3
81
3
Moravská Ostrava
16
97
Prague II-Mělník
19
39
0% 5% 10
%
3
49
SW-Poděbrady
225
11 111
97
Brno
224
12
15
%
20
%
2
25
%
30
%
35
%
6
4
40
%
7
26
45
%
50
%
55
%
12
60
%
65
%
70
%
75
%
Czech
Slovak
German
English
French
Romanian
Serbo-Croatian
Spanish
Ruthenian
Other
80
%
6
5
3
10
2 3
85
%
90
%
95 100
% %
5
3
Italian
See Lexikon verfolgter Musiker und Musikerinnen der NS-Zeit Universität Hamburg, entry for
Léon Jessel. www.lexm.uni-hamburg.de (March 2011).
See Lexikon verfolgter Musiker und Musikerinnen der NS-Zeit Universität Hamburg, entry for Leo
Ascher. www.lexm.uni-hamburg.de (March 2011).
80
Broadcast Language
Figure 1.5 illustrates a breakdown of programming by language. The main findings
here are that Czecho-Slovak Radio continued to broadcast in a multitude of
languages despite the reduction of the country’s territory to virtually only Czech,
Slovak and Ruthenian-inhabited regions. Presumably, this reflects the will of the
crippled republic to propagate its interests in the wider European and even
international context. The largest and the smallest stations – Prague I and Moravská
Ostrava – broadcast exclusively in the official state languages, i.e., Czech (97%) and
Slovak (3%), however. Identifiable Slovak-language programming on the Czech
stations entailed only one 15-minute newscast in the early mornings (07:15-07:30)
re-broadcast from Bratislava Monday through Saturday. There were no rebroadcasts of programming by Czech medium-wave stations from or specifically
about Sub-Carpathian Russia, although it did still constitute a part of the Republic at
the time. By contrast, Brno featured no less than 16% German-language news and
cultural programming, catering to the needs of the more than 20% of the city’s
population that was German-speaking226 and other German-speaking communities,
which remained in Moravia in the Second Republic.
In the context of the late Second Republic, Prague II’s mission was primarily to
represent the best of Czecho-Slovakia to the outside world, while stimulating trade
and promoting the country’s interests by informing about it. Judging by its program
schedule Prague II-Mělnik remained a primarily German-language station with nearly
half of all talks (49%) – mostly news and information – broadcast in that language
and only around one-fifth (19%) in Czech. Given the geopolitical situation of the
Second Republic with its Czech heartland surrounded on all sides by German
territory, this is hardly surprising. Presumably, information from Prague would also
have remained of critical interest for example to the local branch offices of banks and
other businesses headquartered in Prague but still operating in the Sudetenland. We
also see single-digit levels of programming in French (7%), English (6%) Italian (6%),
Romanian (5%) and Serbo-Croatian (5%), attesting to Czecho-Slovakia’s will to keep
listeners in countries formerly allied with it informed, including the other two former
members of the Petite Entente – Romania and Yugoslavia – with whom
Czechoslovakia had developed extensive cultural, economic and military ties during
226
KUČERA: Minderheit, footnote 19, page 207.
81
the First Republic. Furthermore, the good audibility of this medium-wave station in
much of Europe becomes clear. Apart from ČTK newscasts in all of these six
languages, programming on Prague II-Mělnik also included a special series titled
“Poznejte Česko-Slovensko” (“Get to know Czecho-Slovakia”), the intent of which
was to propagate Czecho-Slovak business, trade, tourism to Czecho-Slovakia, spas
and the like.
As for the short-wave station at Poděbrady, its main role was to address audiences
at greater distances with concentrations on North, Central and South America, the
Far East, South Asia and the Mediterranean/North African regions. Virtually all of the
talks programming on this station was news and information from or about CzechoSlovakia. While there were Czech-language broadcasts to all of these continents,
undoubtedly intended for immigrants and Czecho-Slovaks stationed overseas in
some capacity – the global dimensions of the Baťa shoe concern comes to mind in
this context for example – broadcasts in Slovak and Ruthenian (2% of talks on shortwave) were aimed only at speakers of those languages living the Americas. After
Czech, English-language programming played the largest role in Poděbrady’s talks
programs (26%) with broadcasts to North and Central America. Given the great
European colonial empires still functioning at the time, broadcasts in English also
concentrated on South Asia (India) and the Far East (Hong Kong, Australia). French
broadcasts aimed primarily at North Africa and the Far East (French Indochina)
made up a further sizeable portion of broadcasts (12%). Concentration on these two
languages in its programming most likely reflected the will to maintain a flow of
information to Czecho-Slovakia’s erstwhile allies, and with the democratic world as a
whole, of which the Republic still considered itself a member.
82
Figure 1.6: German music and talks as a percentage of TOTAL AIRTIME
Week starting 26 February 1939
All Czech (CZ) medium-wave (MW) stations = Prague I, Brno, Moravská Ostrava, Prague II-Mělník
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
13.5
12.3
Total German
influences
8.3
5.1
7.1
5.8
5.9
6.4
All CZ MW
stations
Prague I
Brno
Moravská
Ostrava
11.1
Prague II-Mělník
Music by German composers
German-language talks
Czech-language pro-German/Nazi
Total German influences as % of all airtime
Germanization/Nazification Factor
In summary, Figure 1.6 refers to German cultural values present in the programming
of Czecho-Slovak Radio, which in the context of the Second Republic obviously
cannot be termed a Germanization/Nazification Factor. Rather, these are the
endemic levels of German-language talks and German music identified in the
program week analyzed. We can see here that just over 12% of all airtime on Czech
stations contained some programming with a German background. However, the
distribution of this programming was uneven across the stations. While Prague I and
Moravská Ostrava filled just around 6% of airtime with German music, they
broadcast no German-language talks. For Brno, nearly one hour in six (14.2 %) was
dedicated to German programming of some type, while the rate at Prague II – Mělník
was nearly one program hour in four (24.6%).
83
4. Broadcasting in the Newly Established Protectorate –
15 March 1939 to February 1940
Programming for Germans
The effects of the German invasion of 14/15 March 1939 were immediate and very
palpable at Czecho-Slovak Radio. Although, Czech programming is the main focus
of this study, the story would not be complete without at least a brief review of the
main German-language station located in the Protectorate. With the invasion,
Prague II – Mělník entered a new phase of its existence, which included efforts to
turn it into a tool of local Germanization/Nazification. In the night of 14 to 15 March
1939, its offices on the first floor of Broadcasting House in Fochova Street 16227 in
Prague were occupied rather dramatically by a group of Prague Germans led by the
former Radiojournal German Department employee, Georg Schneider, who then
proceeded to broadcast news of the approach of German troops.228 The same thing
apparently occurred under the leadership of Erich Smutnik in Brno.229 Diller treated
these reports with a certain degree of skepticism while writing his Rundfunkpolitik im
Dritten Reich in the late 1970’s, and he was correct to do so at the time. Such stories
smack of common, post-factum Nazi legend-building such as the stylization of the
Hitler’s thoroughly unspectacular constitutional assumption of power on 30 January
1933 as a “Machtergreifung”, a “seizure of power”, and Reichssendeleiter Eugen
Hadamovsky’s corresponding depiction of his takeover of German broadcasting the
same day with nation-wide broadcasts from the Nazis’ triumphal torch-light parade.
Like the “Machtergreifung” itself, Hadamovsky’s “Rundfunkrevolution”, “radio
revolution” was actually a completely normal technical linkage of the German radio
stations heroicized to create a broadcasting-specific National Socialist fairytale.230
Diller was apparently concerned that the same situation might be true of Schneider’s
and Smutnik’s “take-overs” of broadcast headquarters in Prague and Brno.
Nevertheless, documents located in the Archive of the Czech Interior Ministry231 and
Miloslav Disman’s description of events232 suggest that at least in the case of
227
228
229
230
231
232
NA-ÚŘP-ST 109-4-1423, page 180-183, visit by State Secretary K.H. Frank to the Reichssender
Böhmen on 5 July 1939.
AMV, Z-43642/45.
DILLER: Rundfunkpolitik, page 389.
DILLER: Rundfunkpolitik, pages 56-61.
AMV, Z-43642/45.
DISMAN: Hovoří Praha.
84
Schneider the account is true, and by analogy it may also have been true for
Smutnik in Brno. Diller will not have had access to the Interior Ministry files in the late
1970’s, nor is Disman’s account likely to have been circulated in German translation
in the Federal Republic of Germany at that time.
However, Czech radio facilities came into German hands, initially, as they had done
with the creation of the Deutsch-österreichischer Rundfunk (“German-Austrian
Broadcasting”), the pre-cursor to the Reichssender Wien (Vienna) after the
annexation of Austria in March 1938, and the Sudetendeutscher Sender Troppau
(“Sudeten-German Station Troppau”) after the seizure of Moravská Ostrava – Svinov
in October 1939, the occupation forces renamed Prague II – Mělník: “Volksdeutscher
Sender Melnik” (“Local-German Station Melnik”). The intent behind this move was
obviously not to frame the seizure as a German imperial conquest, but rather to lend
it a certain legitimacy, in National Socialist terms, as representing the indigenous
German minority of the Protectorate, which, in fact, made up less than 4% of the
population.233 Mělník was easily connected to the German radio cable network and
started re-broadcasting a good deal of programming from other German stations.234
Goebbels did not leave the station in local-German hands for long, however.
Regardless of how much local Germans like Schneider had assisted in the
destruction of Czechoslovakia, the Reichs-German National Socialists preferred to
have their own people at the helm. Thus, either simultaneously or immediately after
the invasion of German troops, Hans-Günther Marek235 arrived in Prague to take
over the reins at the “Volksdeutscher Sender Melnik”. A photo published in the
Czech radio weekly Náš rozhlas shows Marek standing next to Radiojournal
broadcaster František Kocourek236 on the balcony of Hotel Šroubek237 on Wenceslas
Square in Prague during Kocourek’s cryptically derisive impromptu reportage on the
Day of the German Wehrmacht in Prague on 19 March 1939.238
233
234
235
236
237
238
After Munich, the German population was estimated at only 3.98% of the population of CzechoSlovakia. Map in the weekly Ozvěny, Number 50/1938 (14 December 1938), pages 12-13.
Lagerbericht über den Rundfunk im Protektorat quoted at DILLER: Rundfunkpolitik, page 390.
Hans-Günther Marek (born in 1902 in Forst, near Berlin–died in 1967 in Hamburg). NSDAPmember since 1 May 1933. Moved into the villa of the Rosenkranc family in Prague’s villa district
of Bubeneč in 1941. Email from the Standesamt Forst (Lausitz) to the author from 21 December
2004 and Archiv Ministerstva Vnitra (AMV) NSDAP membership card of Marek.
František Kocourek (1901–1942 in Auschwitz-Birkenau).
Today Grand Hotel Evropa.
Náš rozhlas, volume XVII, (1939), No. 14, (2–8 April 1939), page 5.
85
On 18 June 1939 the station was renamed Reichssender Böhmen and became a
further affiliate of the Reichs-Rundfunk-Gesellschaft, however, with a somewhat
nebulously defined relationship to the Office of the Reichsprotektor.239 Officially, the
Reichsprotektor was directly subservient to Hitler and took only orders from him and
had the right to determine broadcast policy in the Protectorate. As an affiliate of the
RRG, however, the Intendant of the Reichssender Böhmen was also the direct
subordinate of Joseph Goebbels. Thus, the Reichssender Böhmen had to serve at
least two masters from its very inception, and Goebbels delineated its broadcast
region as “...the Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia, as well as the Gau Sudetenland
with the exception of the District of Troppau.”240 Thus, also vis-à-vis the SudetenGermans, a broadcasting policy of divide et impera came into play.
The existing documents suggest that the new Reichssender never really emerged as
a full-fledged station during the occupation, and that was mostly due to the outbreak
of war and the war’s consequences for the German economy. As Ferdinand Thürmer
later described the situation:
“The station was and, as something founded in the war, remained a torso. It was
never capable of competing with Czech Radio, even though in a complete
misjudgment of the situation, it may have thought it had to do so. The station had no
orchestra of its own and existed fundamentally in the feeling of an insulted step-child,
i.e.: its management did.”241
Thürmer was not altogether accurate with the expression “something founded in the
war”, but the fact is that the founding of the Reichssender Böhmen predated the
outbreak of hostilities on 1 September 1939 by less than six months, and this was to
have a very serious effect on the station’s staffing, as German radio people faced
conscription into the Wehrmacht. In March of 1940 the Reichssender Böhmen’s staff
numbered only 35, or just roughly one-tenth the staff levels of Prague I.242 Thus, the
239
240
241
242
THÜRMER: Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, page 2.
NA-ÚŘP-ST 109-4-1423, PAGE 133, Goebbels order on broadcasting in the Protectorate,
undated, but presumably from May/June 1939.
In the original: “Der Sender war und blieb als Kriegsgründung ein Torso, der niemals mit dem
tschechischen Rundfunk in Wettbewerb treten konnte, soweit er dies in völliger Verkennung der
Sachlage überhaupt glaubte tun zu müssen. Der Sender hatte kein eigenes Orchester und befand
sich grundsätzlich im Gefühl eines beleidigten Stiefkindes, das heißt: seine Leitung.” THÜRMER:
Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, page 3.
NA-ÚŘP, carton 1134, page 343. Structure of the Sub-group Broadcasting.
86
Reichssender Böhmen was never really in a position to develop a full-fledged
program service of its own. Nevertheless, prior to the introduction of the unified
Reichsprogramm on 9 June 1940,243 the Reichssender Böhmen managed to
produce some programming of its own that focused not only on the Sudetenland, but
also on the Protectorate and especially on Prague. A few examples of such
broadcasts, which can offer a taste of their general nature include:
• Poets of the Sudetenland.244 A series of poems and stories broadcast Sundays
from 10:45 to 11:00 hours.
• Walks about Prague: At the Bertramka.245 Dr. Adolf Kußl. Tuesday, 3 October 1939
from 18:00 to 18:15 hours.
• Oh Germany, Take Us to Thy Great Heart! The Sudetenland’s Homecoming to the
Great German Reich. Memories in documents, reports and poetry with music by
the Sudeten-German Philharmonic. Tuesday, 3 October 1939, from 20:30 to 22:00
hours.246
• From the Estates Theater in Prague: Eine Kleine Nachtmusik. A promotional
evening on the occasion of the world premiere of the Tobis film “Eine kleine
Nachtmusik”. Sunday, 17 December 1939, from 20:15 to 22:00 hours.247
• From Brünn: An Estates Concert in front of the Estates House. Sunday, 21 April
1940, from 12:00 to 13:00 hours. 248
Even after the introduction of the unified Reichsprogramm, Böhmen, like the other
German stations, was allowed to produce some of its own regional programming. In
243
244
245
246
247
248
DILLER: Rundfunkpolitik, page 375.
In the original: Dichter des Sudetenlandes
In the original: Prager Spaziergänge: Auf der Bertramka. The Bertramka is an estate in Prague’s
district of Smíchov where Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart stayed when in Prague.
In the original: “O Deutschland, nimm uns an dein großes Herz! Sudetenlands Heimkehr ins
Groß-deutsche Reich.” Funk-Woche, volume 14, edition 40, (1-7 October 1939). Pages not
numbered.
In the original: Aus dem Ständetheater in Prag: Eine Kleine Nachtmusik. Funk-Woche, volume 14,
edition 51, (17-23 December 1939). Pages not numbered.
In the original: Aus Brünn: Ständekonzert vor dem Ständehaus. Funk-Woche, volume 15, edition
17, (21-27 April 1940). Pages not numbered.
87
terms of content, it remained very much like that listed above, dealing with people
and places of local interest. One regular series from among the mix deserves special
attention due to its specific relevance to Sudeten-Germans serving in the
Wehrmacht:
•
From the Sudeten Homeland. A Radio Field-Post Letter. Sundays from 9:00 to
9:30 hours.249
“Now this audio field-post letter from the Reichssender Böhmen speaks to its
listeners in a special way... which allows a picture of the landscape to arise by
means of reports from the Party’s work, radio reports about important events in the
homeland, or ... by means of sports reporting (as was the case for example during
the German War Championships in Spindelmühle in the Riesengebirge etc.), a
bridge is built to a personal experience of it.”250
In June of 1942, the station was renamed simply Sender Böhmen (“Station
Bohemia”) and absorbed into Ferdinand Thürmer’s Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren
(“Station-Group Bohemia-Moravia”). However, that is getting ahead of the story.
Czech Radio at the Start of the Protectorate
Czecho-Slovak Radio, which hastily resumed its pre-Munich name of Radiojournal,
was thrown into a state of flux and chaos with the arrival of Wehrmacht troops in the
country. However, the invasion did not lead to the eradication or even a serious
interruption of Czech-language programming, at least not from Prague. The smaller
stations at Brno and Moravská Ostrava were initially taken out of the Czech radio
network and connected to re-broadcast the programs of the Reichssender
249
250
In the original: Aus der Sudetenheimat. Ein Rundfunkfeldpostbrief. Funk-Woche, volume 16,
edition 11, (9-15 March 1941), page 7.
In the original: “Nun spricht dieser tönende Feldpostbrief des Reichssenders Böhmen seine Hörer
noch auf besondere Weise an,... die ein Bild der Landschaft erstehen lassen, durch Berichte aus
der Parteiarbeit, durch Hörberichte von bedeutenden Ereignissen in der Heimat, oder... durch
Sportberichte (wie es im großen Umfang z.B. bei den Deutschen Kriegsschimeisterschaften in
Spindelmühle im Riesengebirge der Fall war usw.) eine Brücke zum persönlichen Erleben
geschlagen wird.” Spindelmühle is a ski resort in northeastern Bohemia called Špindlerův Mlýn in
Czech, while Riesengebirge is the German name for the Krkonoše Mountains. Funk-Woche,
volume 16, edition 11, (9-15 March 1941), page 9.
88
Breslau.251 However, since Prague I’s medium-wave signals from Liblice and the
shortwave signals from Poděbrady were readily audible throughout most of Europe,
it would have been strategically inopportune to treat them in the same manner. While
a complete replacement of Czech-language broadcasts with Reichsrundfunk
programming would have automatically secured the content for the Nazis, it would
also have immediately signaled to the rest of the world that the invasion was not
merely the pacification of a disintegrating country, as Hitler’s official narrative
claimed, but quite clearly an imperialist conquest. Thus, apart from the work of
German censors, which commenced immediately on 15 March 1939,252 Prague I
was able to maintain Czech-language broadcasts in the initial post-invasion period.
The short-wave station at Poděbrady was cut back to just three hours of night-time
broadcasts made up mostly of music and ČTK news bulletins, which in turn came
from Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro sources.253 Thus, immediately from day one of the
occupation, all main newscasts were under active German control, while other
programming came under passive control via censorship. For the staff of
Radiojournal, however, the censors’ activity was immediately palpable and intrusive.
As Miloslav Disman later recalled:
“On the same day, [PRP: 15 March 1939] our ‘protector’ in a black uniform and
guarantor of ‘broad autonomy for the Czech nation’ – with the broken cross on his
sleeve – struck words about ‘fortitude and hope’ from our Okénko254 program directly
in the broadcast inspectorate, while adding the lecture: ‘Why fortitude and why
hope? The Czech nation has to realize now what situation it is in and how it has to
act, because nothing can be changed about that situation.’ – The next day, the
251
252
253
254
Výroční zpráva Českého rozhlasu společnosti s r.o. v Praze za správní rok 1939 (“Annual Report
of Český Rozhlas Ltd. Prague for the Administrative Year 1939“), page 1. Hereinafter: Výroční
zpráva Českého rozhlasu 1939.
DISMAN: Hovoří Praha, page 30.
Výroční zpráva Českého rozhlasu 1939, page 2.
Originally, this program was called “Okénko čs. rozhlasu” (in English: “Little Window of
Czechoslovak Radio”). It was a daily broadcast of circa 10 minutes duration, generally in the best
airtime starting around 18:50 to 19:10 and dedicated initially to cultural topics. The first Okénko
went on the air on 8 May 1938. As the threat to the country from Nazi Germany increased, military
topics were added. After Munich, in October of 1938, Okénko dealt with economic and transport
questions arising from the new situation. Furthermore, practical tips for citizens fleeing the
Sudeten area for the inner-regions of the country were broadcast. During the Second Republic,
the program appeared occasionally under the title “Okénko Národní jednoty” (“Little Window of
National Unity”) after the governing right-wing party of the same name. See AČRo recording
AF2093/3 and Náš rozhlas, vol. XVII, edition 4, (22—28 January 1939, page 5.
89
Czech broadcasting manager informed me that, regrettably, the Okénko programs
had been discontinued as part of programming, effective immediately.”255
After roughly one month, as the situation stabilized, Brno was ostensibly allowed to
broadcast 50% Czech programming, and as of 1 May 1939, the Czech-language
contingent increased to 70%.256 On the same day, Moravská Ostrava-Mariánské
Hory returned to broadcasting a 100% Czech-language program.257
After the end of the immediate military occupation regime with the transition to
civilian administration around mid-April 1939, radio broadcasting, all things
connected with it and a few technical communications matters barely related to it
became the domain of the broadcasting sub-unit of Von Gregory’s department. Like
the department itself, the name of the subunit varied over the first 18 months of the
occupation, which shows that this unit was more a pragmatic work in progress than a
carefully planned and implemented project. Only in October 1940 did this institution
finally receive a stable designation as the Gruppe Rundfunk (“Broadcasting Group”)
within Department IV. However, Ferdinand Thürmer referred to himself as the
“Generalreferent” for broadcasting in his post-war treatise, as opposed to the more
accurate term “Gruppenleiter”. Thus, the terminology for describing the group of
German officials dealing with broadcasting in the Protectorate appears to have
remained fluid throughout the entire duration of the group’s existence.
At the very beginning of the occupation, Rolf Wenzel, a high official from the
Broadcasting Department of the Propaganda Ministry in Berlin, was Von Gregory’s
adviser in radio matters. Radiojournal’s management, including General Director
Ladislav Šourek, would already have been well acquainted with Wenzel,
Reichsintendant Heinrich Glasmeier and other high Nazi broadcasting officials, from
the Czechoslovak-German radio negotiations held in Berlin in December of 1938.258
255
256
257
258
In the original: “V týž den nám černě uniformovaný “ochránce“ a ručitel “široké autonomie pro
český národ“–s lomeným křížem na rukávě–přímo v rozhlasové inspekci vyškrtal z našeho
Okénka slova o “statečnosti a naději“ s poučením “Proč statečnost a proč naděje? Český národ si
nyní musí uvědomit, v jaké situaci je a jak má jednat, poněvadž na této situaci se nedá nic
změnit.–Druhého dne ráno mi český vedoucí vysílání s politováním oznámil, že Okénka jako
součást programu jsou s okamžitou platností zrušena.” DISMAN, Miloslav, Hovoří Praha, page
32.
Výroční zpráva Českého rozhlasu společnosti s r.o. v Praze za správní rok 1939 (“Annual Report
of Český Rozhlas Ltd. Prague for the Administrative Year 1939“), page 1. Hereinafter: Výroční
zpráva Českého rozhlasu 1939).
Výroční zpráva Českého rozhlasu 1939, page 1.
HRDLIČKA: Rozhlas v okupaci page 155.
90
A document dating from 6 April 1939 identifies Wenzel as the Referent for Section C
of the Gruppe Volksaufklärung und Propaganda (Group People’s Enlightenment and
Propaganda) under Von Gregory.259 A later document outlining the broadcast work
of the department for Berlin, which is undated but presumably stems from autumn
1939, lists Wenzel as the Hauptreferent Rundfunk (“Main Adviser for Broadcasting”)
in the department and delineates the Hauptreferat’s duties as “watching over and
steering” the German station at Mělník (Reichssender Böhmen), a “mixed-language
station in Brno”, one Czech station each at Prague and Moravská Ostrava, and the
shortwave station at Poděbrady. Furthermore, the document indicates that planning
was needed for the deployment of two German program operations numbering 60
and 200 employees each, while the main political programs of five unnamed foreign
broadcasters – presumably the Czech-language broadcasts stations in France,
Great Britain and Schenectady, New York – required monitoring.260
It was precisely the work of foreign radio stations that caused so much concern
among the Nazi elite – in Berlin, but mainly in Prague. Goebbels did not want any
incursions into his monopoly on information from outside sources. Due to the longrange nature of radio waves, he faced an enemy for the first time in years whose
words neither the Gestapo nor the SA could silence. The most draconian measures
to combat listening to foreign radio broadcasts came with the outbreak of war on 1
September 1939. The Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich under Göring
issued its Decree on Extraordinary Broadcasting Measures of the same date, which
Von Neurath adopted verbatim for the Protectorate.261 His approach in this case was
as simple as it was indolent. The justification outlined in the original decree speaks of
radio as a weapon of the enemy intended to “damage the German people” by
spreading “lies”. The Reichs Government, the decree explained, expected every
German with a sense of responsibility to regard listening to foreign broadcasts as
incompatible with his/her “duty to be decent” (Anstandspflicht). For those,
Volksgenossen who lacked such a sense of responsibility, however, the decree
stipulated prison sentences. For those who intentionally spread information obtained
through foreign radio broadcasts, article 2 of the decree foresaw imprisonment and
in particularly grievous cases the death penalty. Absurdly, there was no mention of
259
260
261
NA-ÚŘP, carton 1134, page 266.
NA-ÚŘP, carton 1134, pages 267-314.
Verordnungsblatt des Reichsprotektors in Böhmen und Mähren, volume 1939, page 129.
91
the Czechs either in the original decree or in the official Czech translation of it. Since
it only referred to the “German people” or Volksgenossen, a Czech lawyer reading
the text could even assume that it had no validity for the non-German population of
the Protectorate. In practice, this was not the case, however. German broadcasting
legislation and the punishments it meted out, including the death penalty, also
applied to the Czechs and were carried out.262 As for the Czech cultural autonomy
guaranteed by Hitler, it exhausted itself in this case with the Czech translation of the
decree published in Von Neurath’s official gazetteer and repeated in the
Protectorate’s press.
Even these stringent measures did not deter the Czechs, however, which caused
considerable irritation among the occupation authorities, especially after the BBC
launched regular Czech-language broadcasts on 8 September 1939.263 As a result,
Karl Hermann Frank approached Goebbels in a letter on 24 November 1939, in
which he noted that, despite the punishments applicable for listening to foreign
stations, the Czech population did do so “on a large scale,” whereby it received “daily
material for the whispered propaganda campaign that it operates so skillfully and
sustainedly.” To combat this state-of-affairs, Frank suggested a regulation stipulating
“that the Czech population has to hand over their radios one and all.” Frank
considered the situation so serious, in fact, that he requested the Minister of
Propaganda take the matter up with Hitler personally.264 Berlin did not seem to take
the matter seriously, however, as Hitler’s response took two months and was a
rejection of Frank’s request.265
Thus, roughly nine months into the occupation the main emphasis of Nazi broadcast
work in the Protectorate focused on oversight of locally produced programming and
punishment of individual cases of listening to foreign stations. For Czech Radio, this
oversight primarily entailed the functions of censors eliminating content deemed
unfavorable or inappropriate by the regime. However, apart from Wenzel’s skewed
262
263
264
265
See for example: Vollstreckte Todesurteile, Der Neue Tag, volume 7, edition 82 (6 April 1945),
page 2.
“Historie
BBC
v češtině”,
(“History
of
the
BBC
in
Czech”
http://www.bbc.co.uk/czech/specials/934_bbc_history/page2.shtml, (February 2007).
In the original: “dass die tschechische Bevölkerung trotz der hierauf stehenden Strafen in
grossem Ausmass ausländische Sender hört und auf diese Weise täglich neues Material für die
von ihr sehr geschickt und nachhaltig betriebene Flüsterpropaganda erhält... dass die
tschechische Bevölkerung samt und sonders ihre Rundfunkgeräte abzugeben hat.” NA-ÚŘP-ST
109-4-5, page 4. Letter K.H. Frank to Goebbels of 24 November 1939.
NA-ÚŘP-ST 109-4-5, page 7. Note on Hitler’s decision regarding Czech radio sets of 24 January
1940.
92
article praising Nazi Germany’s largesse vis-à-vis the Czechs in radio in the
Protectorate for the 1939–1940 edition of the Handbuch des Deutschen
Rundfunks,266 few traces of his actual activity in Prague remain in the existing
documentation.
For their part, the Czech management of Radiojournal embraced an official policy of
cooperation with the German invaders. It was not an enthusiastic cooperation by any
means. There were no exhortations to proactive collaboration. At a conference of
program directors at Barrandov held on 3 May 1939, General Director Šourek gave a
short speech to his team. After acknowledging the painful developments of the past
year and praising his staff for doing their jobs under difficult circumstances, he
sought to underline the positive aspects of the new situation under German
occupation. First of all, the company was financially stable with a budget that he
expected to remain stable, as long as the Czech radio license-holders only had to
pay for Czech programs and not for German programming as well.267
At least initially, Šourek appears even to have been convinced that the Germans had
no intention of interfering too deeply in Radiojournal’s work and indeed no
representatives of the German authorities were even invited to the company’s
program conferences either in 1939 or 1940.268 He believed that “nobody is
demanding that we give up our national pride”.269 Further on, he summed up the
situation as he saw it:
“We get along fine with the Germans for now, perhaps that’s how things will remain,
because it also makes the work of the other side easier overall.”270
The expression “for now” (in Czech: zatím) suggests that Šourek considered the
current situation as only temporary when putting the speech together conceptually.
266
267
268
269
270
WEINBRENNER: Handbuch des Deutschen Rundfunks Jahrbuch 1939/1940, pages 156-159.
AČRo, ŠOUREK, Ladislav: Speech at the programming conference of 3 May 1939 at Barrandov,
page 2.
AČRo, the lists of attendees at the various seasonal company program conferences between May
1939 and September 1940 show only Czech staffmenbers. Neither Walter Maras, Georg
Schneider nor any of the German censors working at Brno or Moravská Ostrava attended these
meetings.
In the original: “nikdo vlastně nežádá, abychom svou národní hrdost zadávali.” AČRo, ŠOUREK,
Ladislav: Speech at the programming conference of 3 May 1939 at Barrandov, page 1.
In the original: “S Němci zatím vycházíme dobře, snad to potrvá, protože to celkem usnadňuje i
práci straně druhé” and with corrections: “S Němci vycházíme dobře. Příčiňme se, aby to
potrvalo. Usnadní se tím práce oběma stranám.” AČRo, ŠOUREK, Ladislav: Speech at the
programming conference of 3 May 1939 at Barrandov, page 2.
93
That may have been a reflection of the widespread opinion among Czechs that war
was coming soon and that France and Britain would easily defeat Germany. Thus,
Šourek’s initial advice to his Czech staff rather reflected Protectorate President
Hácha’s own practical admonition to continue working within the limitations of the
guaranteed Czech cultural autonomy. On the surface, he did not have many other
choices. According to Disman’s post-war work on the subject, however, an entire
range of illegal resistance work arose around a group of Czech Radio employees
from the very beginning. Their activities were reportedly manifold, ranging from the
copying and distribution of illegal leaflets via financial and other support for the
families of victims of Nazi arrest and persecution to preparations of machinery and
other technical equipment for the time of a future uprising against German rule –
which was, however, ultimately only to come six years later.
Regarding the organization of Radiojournal itself, which received the new name
Český Rozhlas (Czech Radio) on 10 June 1939,271 things initially stayed very much
the same as they had been during the Second Republic. First of all, as the ministries
of National Defense and Foreign Affairs had been dissolved as superfluous given the
Reich’s “protection” of the Czech provinces, their representatives were automatically
withdrawn. The two Slovak and one Sub-Carpathian Russian representatives were
no longer relevant, as those territories were no longer parts of the same state.
Slovakia was nominally independent, while Hungary had annexed Sub-Carpathian
Russia. Jindřich Dobiáš remained chairman and Ing. Josef Strnad from the Ministry
of Transport remained deputy chairman of the new board of directors. The Ministry of
Transport strengthened its position, however, by delegating a second representative,
Alois Burda. While two-thirds of the new board of directors were direct government
appointees, the board’s actual composition remained entirely Czech:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Jindřich Dobiáš, section chief of the TO PMR, chairman of the board
Josef Strnad, Protectorate Ministry of Transport, deputy chairman of the board
Alois Burda, Protectorate Ministry of Transport
Antonín Matula, Protectorate Ministry of Education and National Enlightenment
Radiojournal General Director Ladislav Šourek
Radiojournal editor Miloš Čtrnáctý272
271
Rozhlasová ročenka 1939, page 11.
Rozhlasová ročenka 1939, page 11.
272
94
In practical terms, however, German interference was present from the very
beginning and strengthened over time. In 1939, the main censorship authority fell
into the duties of German officials delegated to the individual Czech radio stations.
As per a practice, which was to become common in the Protectorate, these German
units within Czech institutions received completely innocuous names undoubtedly
intended to mask their real power and importance. In the case of Radiojournal/Czech
Radio, the institution of German control was called the “Deutsche Dienststelle”
(“German Service Office”).273 Apparently, already on 15 March 1939, Czech Radio
came under the command of a duo of former Sudeten-German Radiojournal
employees or Hauptzensorbeauftragte (“main censor representatives”), as they were
called. Walter Maras was responsible for the day-to-day control of Czech-language
broadcasts. His colleague, Georg Schneider, initially took over German-language
broadcasts via Prague II – Mělník then joined Maras’ team at Czech Radio.
Ultimately Maras came to command a group of roughly 15 regular censors, some of
them delegated from the Wehrmacht, and translators,274 and the Deutsche
Dienststelle became the de facto political directorate of Czech Radio.275
Maras and Schneider left a legacy at Czech Radio, which seems highly negative in
both Czech and German sources. The Czech documents reflect shock and betrayal
that long-term German Radiojournal colleagues suddenly turned into “big Nazis”.276
The main German source on the subject – Ferdinand Thürmer’s post-war apology –
describes a reign of chaos and corruption that set in under this duo. To illustrate the
atmosphere in the German administration of Czech Radio, and the difficulties under
which the Czech staff worked, it might be useful to take a closer look at these two
Sudeten-Germans. Both Maras and Schneider were very fluent in Czech, could
identify any divergence from censored texts277 and were, regarding their experience,
what in modern parlance might be termed “area specialists”. At the same time, by
National Socialist standards, both Maras’ and Schneider’s marital circumstances
273
274
275
276
277
Other examples of this practice included the “Verbindungsstelle des Reichsprotektors zu den
Gewerkschaften in Böhmen und Mähren” –“Liaison-office of the Reichsprotektor with the Trade
Unions in the Bohemia and Moravia” or the de facto Nazi mayor of Prague, Josef Pfitzner, taking
the official title of Primator-Stellvertreter “mayor’s representative”.
THÜRMER, Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, page 16.
NA-NárS, carton 106, inventory number 1536. Testimony of Karel Remeš of 26 June 1946, page
1.
In the original: “velicí nacisté”. AČRo, personnel file Josef Cincibus.
NA-NárS, carton 106, inventory number 1536. Testimony of Karel Remeš of 26 June 1946, page
2
95
were handicaps that cast doubts on their loyalty to the German nation. Presumably,
it was over-compensation for these “handicaps” that helped turn them into such “big
Nazis”.
Walter Maras, was born in 1908, in Polubný (in German: Polaun) near to Jablonec
nad Nisou in the then primarily German-populated northeastern region of Bohemia.
He received a doctorate in Slavic Studies at the German University of Prague,278 and
worked in the Literary-Dramatic Department of the German-language section of
Radiojournal starting in 1935. His wife, Ludmila née Samcová, was an ethnic
Czech.279 After the Munich Crisis, on 15 October 1938, Maras resigned from his
position at Radiojournal, but apparently, remained in Prague.280 Miloslav Disman,
described his shock upon arriving for work on 15 March 1939 to find that “…Dr.
Maras, who had announced in German the mobilization of our army with us just half
a year earlier, and who had just yesterday assured us that he regretted the
development of the situation, but hoped for a peaceful solution – is directing the
operations of the radio.”281
Georg Ottomar Schneider was born in 1906 in Litice (in German: Littitz) in western
Bohemia, which is now a city district of Plzeň. He studied Law in Prague and Vienna,
and started working as a free-lance announcer in Radiojournal’s German-language
broadcasts in 1934.282 In 1937, his position there became permanent. Alongside his
activities at Radiojournal, Schneider also apparently worked closely with the German
Abwehr military espionage network in Czechoslovakia. The Munich Crisis of
September 1938 caught Schneider reporting on a football match in Hungary.283 As
we already know, on the night of 14 to 15 March 1939, Schneider led a group of local
278
279
280
281
282
283
Charles University in Prague, founded in 1348, was basically two parallel universities–one in
th
German, one in Czech–by the beginning of the 20 century. The occupation authorities closed the
Czech Univerzita Karlova in November 1939. The Czechoslovak authorities liquidated the
Deutsche Karlsuniversität in May 1945 and renewed the Univerzita Karlova.
NA-Policejní ředitelství v Praze (Police Directorate of Prague–hereinafter: NA-PŘ), police
registration card for Walter and Ludmila Maras. See also See also: NA, Německé státní občanství
(NA-NstO–German state citizenship), F1 questionnaires for Walter and Ludmila Maras.
See especially AČRo personnel file for Walter Maras. Sources in the Archive of the Czech Interior
Ministry (AMV) in Prague place Maras’ last residence in Bohemia at the Reserve Military Hospital
in Prague-Střešovice in February 1945. His police registration card lists him as “missing”
(nezvěstný) in 1945.
In the original: “A prof. dr. Maras, který s námi před půlrokem ještě hlásil německy mobilizaci naší
armády a ještě včera ujišťoval, že lituje vývoje poměrů, ale doufá v smírné řešení–řídí provoz
rozhlasu.” DISMAN: Hovoří Praha, page 30.
AČRo personnel file.
SOA Krajský soud trestní v Praze (SOA-KST Praha, District Criminal Court in Prague),
TkXX15.682/47, carton 13, Public Prosecutor’s indictment of Georg Schneider (in absentia)
before the Extraordinary People’s Court of Prague, 27 September 1946.
96
Germans in the occupation of Czecho-Slovak Radio’s headquarters from where he
broadcast reports on the approach of German troops.284 This could not have made a
favorable impression on his Czech former colleagues.
In Brno, a local Nazi named Erich Smutnik (1907-?) set up the German Service
Office. Smutnik had also studied Law at the German University in Prague and
worked as the director of the Cultural Office of the German Labor Office in Brno. Like
Schneider, Smutnik apparently led the occupation of the Brno station in the night
from 14 to 15 March 1939.285 His official title was Sendestellenleiter, which in English
translates roughly to “transmission station director”. The distinction here is simply
that Brno was a subsidiary station of Prague as opposed to a full-fledged station like
Prague I. Smutnik left the company on 30 April 1942 – in the wave of purges
introduced by Ferdinand Thürmer. In Moravská Ostrava, a young Sudeten-German
journalist named Kurt Müller (1911-?), who was unfit for duty in the Wehrmacht,286
took charge, and apparently remained there until the end of the war.287 Given the
fact that most of Moravská Ostrava’s broadcast day consisted of re-broadcasts from
Prague and Brno, however, this will also have been a relatively subordinate position
within the German hierarchy of Czech Radio.
In contrast to their constant interference in programming via objections to individual
bits of program content, on the global or company-wide level of program planning,
these German censors initially remained very discreet, indeed. As mentioned
already, none of them attended the Czech program conferences conducted at
intervals of three to four months in 1939 and 1940. Nevertheless, even here they
were not inactive. The censors’ actual modus operandi was to call together a small
group of leading Czech Radio program directors outside of the program conferences
in order to express their approval or disapproval of proposed programming plans.
For example, Brno’s chief censor, Erich Smutnik, met up with a group of leading
284
285
286
287
WENZEL, Rolf: Der Rundfunk im Protektorat, IN: WEINBRENNER: Handbuch des Deutschen
Rundfunks Jahrbuch 1939/1940, page 158.
WEINBRENNER: Handbuch des Deutschen Rundfunks Jahrbuch 1939/1940, page 158.
NA, ÚŘP, carton 1134, Telex of 17 March 1940 on the structure and duties of the Sub-Group
Broadcasting (Untergruppe Rundfunk) of the Group Cultural-political Affairs. Moravská Ostrava’s
original programming consisted in this case mostly of local Worker’s broadcasts, literary
programs, local “Okénko” informational broadcasts by the Czech National Community, etc. It also
produced music programming from discs. Concerts by its “Salon-Orchester” were rebroadcast
frequently by Prague and Brno. See for instance Náš rozhlas volume XVIII, (1940), edition 42,
(13–19 October 1940). See also: NA, archival collection Německé státní občanství (NstO–
German state citizenship), F1 questionnaire for Kurt Müller.
SOA-MLS Praha, LS1427/46, carton 273, page 27. Testimony of Eva Hellerová in the case
against Horst Pabel.
97
Czech programming directors for that station on 6 June 1940 to discuss the station’s
program plans for September/October of the same year.288
Concrete Effects on Programming in the Period
In the Czech media, the proverbial Czech form of passive, or perhaps more
accurately passive-aggressive resistance known as “švejkování”, initially came to be
the norm. The term švejkování derives from the character of the same name in
Jaroslav Hašek’s classic tale from the early years of the First Republic “The Good
Soldier Švejk”,289 who dutifully and even obsequiously follows orders from his
superiors in the Austrian Army, but invariably in a manner that defeats the very
purpose of those orders. A good example of this approach was František Kocourek’s
legendary reportage from the German military parade in Prague on 19 March 1939
into which he skillfully wove the image of a great black crow moving down
Wenceslas Square towards Můstek. As few recordings of actual programming from
the period exist, let us take a look at the official radio program guides to get an
impression of this subtle and intelligent Czech reaction to the occupation. A great
deal of švejkování is evident in the initial post-invasion editions of the official radio
program guide Náš rozhlas. For example, the cover of edition 14 for the program
week of 2 to 8 April 1939 is graced by a photo ostensibly illustrating a broadcast from
Prague’s city zoo in Troja. Formally there is nothing at all about the illustration that
could engender the ire of a censor. The photo, taken from above, shows a lion in the
corner of a very tight cage. Behind the lion standing just outside the bars of the cage,
a man, holding a briefcase and clenching his teeth behind pursed lips, stares
unhappily at the photographer. It takes little fantasy to see the Bohemian lion, from
the country’s coat-of-arms in the caged animal, and even less to recognize the state
of mind of much of the Czech population in the man. Furthermore, the illustration
seems to be a reference to a famous poem by Jan Neruda with the title Jak lvové
bijem o mříže – Písně kosmické (“Like Lions We Beat Against the Bars – Cosmic
Song”).290 Although there is no reference to the poem itself, every Czech schoolchild
288
289
290
NA-ÚŘP, carton 1164. Letter Smutnik to Scurla of 7 June 1940, including a protocol of Smutnik’s
meeting with Czech program directors the previous day.
In Czech: Osudy dobrého vojáka Švejka za světové války.
In this deeply moving poem about the condition humaine, Neruda used the imagery of a lion
trapped in a cage as a metaphore for the struggle between the human spirit and its existence in
the material world.
98
of the period will have known the poem’s final line: “we beat against the bars, spirit of
lions, and we shatter them!”291
Further on in the same edition there is a related article ostensibly about
developments in military music and illustrated with more photos of German troops
from the 19 March parade. The center of the page includes a separate, black-framed
section with texts of jokes. It is the punch lines of these jokes that make the real
statement of the piece:
•
“tasteless idiots!”
•
“lower than any criticism!”, i.e., so bad it is not even worthy of criticism.
•
“finally, you also haven’t told me anything at all in the past two hours,”292 i.e., this
event is something meaningless, vacuous or insignificant.
The tendency of such texts is readily clear to the careful viewer, and completely in
the general trend of the Protectorate’s press at the outset of the occupation. In terms
of broadcasts we find that Czech Radio reacted to the occupation with a series of
programs about their home country broadcast in the prime weekend slot of Sunday
afternoon called Hlasy domova (“Voices of the Homeland”).293 The installment of this
series ran already on Sunday, 3 April 1939 between 12:00 und 12:25 hours and led
the listener into the world of foreign travelers in the Czech provinces in history.294
The Czech homeland, its natural and other beauties and cultural achievements with
an emphasis on the latter’s Czech origins were to become a constant feature of
programming in this time. Hundreds more editions of this series were to follow prior
to the end of the occupation.
A further example of Czech Radio’s resistance from this time might be the manner in
which Radiojournal covered Hitler’s birthday on 20 April 1939, which was already
more than a month into the occupation. While the German Reichsrundfunk spared
no effort to celebrate this holiest of Nazi holidays in a festive and dignified manner,
by broadcasting reportages from marches of Nazi Party and military formations,
concerts of Wagner and the like, Radiojournal apparently undertook nothing at all to
mark the day. On the contrary, Prague I broadcast a normal day’s programming,
which even included a few items that stand out as quite questionable in the context
291
292
293
294
In the original: “…my bijem o mříž, ducha lvi, a my ji rozbijeme!”
Náš rozhlas, volume XVII, (1939), edition 14, (2-8 April 1939), page 1 (17).
Náš rozhlas, volume XVII, (1939), edition 14, (2-8 April 1939), page 5.
Náš rozhlas, volume XVII, (1939), edition 14, (2-8 April 1939), page 3.
99
of the “Führer’s” birthday. For instance, from 11:15 to 11:55 there was a program of
“Beneš’s wind music.”295 This was a form of light dance and marching music based
mostly on wind instruments, which had a tradition at Radiojournal dating back to the
1920’s.296 However, in the context of the “holiday”, i.e., the celebration of the
German head-of-state, the band’s name might also have been reminiscent of exiled
President Edvard Beneš. One way or the other it was light music and by no means
serious. A bit later in the day, from 15:20 to 15:35, and quite at variance with the
solemnity of the occasion, Prague I played pre-recorded melodies from the film
“Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs.” 297
By contrast, Czech Radio broadcast very comprehensive celebrations of the holiday
dedicated to the Czech national hero and Protestant church reformer Jan Hus, on 6
July. In 1939 and 1940 as well, reports, concerts and plays highlighted the holiday,
while very little on the subject went on the air in the later years of the occupation.
Nevertheless, Jan Hus and by association the Hussites and their movement, which
also included some anti-German elements, were still an appropriate subject for
extensive coverage in the summer of 1939.
Remarkably, Czech Radio even broadcast a program on the 150th anniversary of
the French Revolution on 14 July! Unfortunately, no recording of the program exists,
and one also can not rule out that the censors did not “suppress” it at the last
moment. However, it was scheduled to occupy 15 minutes beginning at 19:40. Given
that the German National Socialists considered the French Revolution with its
emphasis on individual liberties and equality as one of the major mistakes of history,
and even dismissed the slogan of Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité as a mere Jewish
scam,298 such programming suggests that Maras and Schneider had overlooked
something. For its part, the Reichsrundfunk ignored the anniversary in its
programming for that day. However, despite all their cleverness, Czech Radio’s
resistance did not remain unnoticed. Presumably it was programs like the one on the
French Revolution that eventually raised the ire of the occupation authorities. In a
note that seems to speak precisely of švejkování, Von Neurath informed Von
Gregory on the eve of the outbreak of war:
295
296
297
298
In the original: Benešova dechová hudba.
MARŠÍK: Stabilizace, page 77.
Náš rozhlas volume XVII, (1939), edition 16, (16 to 22 April 1939), page 24
KŘÍŽ, Co víte o Židech? page 40.
100
“Czech Radio has disseminated numerous broadcasts recently, which while hard to
attack individually, do demonstrate through their choice and direction an antiGerman tendency. The Minister President [PRP: Eliáš] has already been made
aware of this matter. It was indicated that tendentious broadcasts would not be
accepted in the future.”299
By contrast, one holiday upon which both the Germans and Czechs conceivably
could agree was that of St. Wenceslas Day on 28 September.300 The Czechs honor
Wenceslas as a great Medieval Bohemian king, who lived over 1,000 years ago, and
who is to this day the main patron saint of Bohemia. For the Nazis he was a
particularly attractive figure, as he had invited German settlers into the country to
make arable and settle some of its less fertile regions while also making peace with
the German Reich in general. The very long tradition surrounding St. Wencelsas’s
policy in itself strengthened the image of Germans as an indigenous population of
Bohemia and Moravia while serving as a positive example of Czech-German
coexistence. Significantly, until 1941 this broadcast day always featured a church
service dedicated to St. Wenceslas. Thereafter, broadcasts of J.B. Foerster’s
oratorio “Svatý Václav” (“Saint Wenceslas”) had to suffice.
The Česká hodina Programs
The most obvious overt political manipulation of programming came in the summer
of 1939 with the introduction of the Česká hodina (“Czech Hour”) or in the diminutive
Česká hodinka series, which the Nazis launched as a response to Polish
propaganda directed at the Protectorate. On 6 June 1939, Polish Radio had started
broadcasting news in Czech from its station at Katowice. According to the Reichs
Interior Ministry these daily broadcasts from 20:15 to 20:25301 included “appeals for
the Czechs to withstand” the occupation, “unfavorable reports about the situation in
299
300
301
In the original: “Der tschechische Rundfunk hat in letzter Zeit vielfach Sendungen verbreitet, die
zwar im einzelnen schwer angegriffen werden können, in der Auswahl und Ausrichtung aber doch
eine antideutsche Tendenz erkennen lassen. Der Ministerpräsident ist bereits auf diese
Angelegenheit aufmerksam gemacht worden. Es wurde angedeutet, dass in Zukunft tendenziöse
Sendungen nicht mehr hingenommen werden können.” NA-ÚŘP, carton 8, page 428. Letter
Reichsprotektor to Von Gregory 24 August 1939.
Ca. 907 to 935 A.D. (murdered).
Polish radio magazines of the period identify Wiadomości programs (newscasts) from the station
at Katowice in Slovak from 20:00-20:05 h, Czech from 20:05-20:15 and German from 20:15-20:25
hours. See for instance Tygodnik Radio dla Wszystkich, for calendar week 31 of 1939 (31 July–6
August).
101
the Protectorate…” and portrayals “of progress in the unification of the democratic
front”302 none of which was agreeable to the occupation authorities. Thus, the latter
launched Czech-language broadcasts with leading collaborators among Czech
journalists called the Česká hodina (Czech hour). The Office of the Reichsprotektor,
conceivably Von Gregory’s assistant Wenzel, although it might also have been
Hans-Günther Marek – no precise documentation on this seems to have survived –
organized the beginning of the Česká hodina series. For tactical reasons, the
decision fell that the broadcasts should emanate from the Reichssender Böhmen
instead of from a Czech station. The main benefit of broadcasting overtly
propagandistic programs in Czech from a German station was that it suggested
conversely that there was no interference in Czech programming itself. It was
precisely this line of non-interference, which Wenzel had stressed in his article for
the Handbuch des Deutschen Rundfunks 1939 - 1940. Thus, the official line in the
summer of 1939, in accord with Article 3 of Hitler’s decree on the establishment of
the Protectorate, was still that the invaders were allowing the Czechs a free hand to
broadcast what they liked. Placing the Česká hodina series in the Reichssender
Böhmen supported this myth. According to Scurla in 1941, influencing the “smaller
peoples of Europe,”303 who in the Summer of 1939 lived in countries not yet
occupied by the Wehrmacht, was actually a greater priority than influencing the
Czechs via the Česká hodina series. As it happened, the Reichssender Böhmen’s
medium-wave signal was readily audible in the Netherlands, Belgium and even in
Great Britain. A further indication of how the priorities lay is the fact that the Česká
hodina was not re-broadcast by the local stations in Moravia.
As for the nature of the Česká hodina programs themselves and who made them,
only a few remnants remain in available sources to describe them. Whether
intentional or simply a coincidence, their broadcast time – starting generally between
18:00 and 19:15 hours – their frequency – daily except Sundays – and durations of
30 to 45 minutes mirrored rather precisely the placement of Radiojournal’s Německá
vysílání – Deutsche Sendungen (German Broadcasts) prior to the launch of the
German station Prague II-Mělník in May 1938. Thus, it seems that an element of
302
303
In the original: “Die Tschechen werden zum Aushalten aufgerufen. Es werden ungünstige
Berichte über die Lage im Protektorat durchgegeben und die Fortschritte des
Zusammenschlusses der demokratischen Front geschildert.” ÚŘP, carton 8, I1a3, page 426.
Letter Reichs Interior Ministry to Reichsprotektor of 20 June 1939.
NA-ÚŘP-ST 109-4-1423, page 109. Scurla’s justification letter of October 1941.
102
imitating former official Czech approaches to the Sudeten-Germans as a type of payback to the Czechs came into play here. In fact, the occupation authorities did
implement a certain degree of terminological revenge after the establishment of the
Protectorate, in general. For instance, the German parties and politicians willing to
work loyally within the framework of the First Republic’s political system had been
termed “activists”. In German, the noun is “Aktivisten”, in Czech “aktivista”; the
adjectives are “aktivistisch” and “aktivistický” respectively. In the context of the
Protectorate, the terms have a specific connotation, namely to describe Czechs, and
especially journalists, who proactively supported the Nazi regime and worked to
propagate it among the Czech nation. The virtually identical placement and format of
the Česká hodina when compared with Radiojournal’s Německá vysílání – Deutsche
Sendungen, therefore, appears indicative of this practice of reapplying First Republic
terminology and realities to suit the new geopolitical situation of the Protectorate with
the Czechs in the weaker position.
Regarding the team of contributors, the series seems to have been the work of
infamous Czech Fascist collaborators from the profession of journalists. This
included very prominent activists such as Karel Werner,304 who was a member of the
so-called “sedmička”,305 the group of seven leading pro-Nazi collaborators among
Czech journalists. Emil Šourek from the Vlajka movement306 and even Hugo
Tuskány307 from Arijský boj (“Aryan Struggle”) newspaper, which was a Czech paper
patterned on Julius Streicher’s semi-pornografic, anti-Semitic tabloid Der Stürmer.
Virtually no texts exist from the beginning of the series. Thus, we will have to take a
later program to illustrate its content. A look at part of a typical text from this series
suffices to illustrate the level of propaganda it offered:
304
305
306
307
Karel Werner (1906–1947, executed), editor-in-chief of České slovo and Večerní České slovo.
The other members of the “sedmička” were: Karel Lažnovský, Vladimír Krychtálek, Emanuel
Vajtauer, Vladimír Ryba, Jaroslav Křemen und Václav Crha. See KONČELÍK, KÖPPLOVÁ,
KRYŠPÍNOVÁ: Český tisk, page 222.
From the Czech word “sedm” = “seven”.
Emil Šourek (1884-1954) was editor-in-chief of the Czech Fascist party organ Vlajka. He was
condemned to 20 years of imprisonment after the war and died shortly after being amnestied in
1954. See KONČELÍK, KÖPPLOVÁ, KRYŠPÍNOVÁ: Český tisk, page 248, footnote 371.
Hugo Tuskány (1887-). NA-NárS, carton 106, call number 51. Testimony of the accused Alois
Kříž of 18 June 1946, page 6.
103
“Whenever Beneš can be seen on stage in front of the curtain, there’s always
Petschek308 and all the other Jewish slave-owners of our people from the former
republic standing behind him. Mr. Beneš was actually only ever a forward-thinking
politician for the benefit of the Jews and never for the benefit of the Czech people.
You can find an example for this, dear Listeners, in the fact that the Jew Petschek
sold his mines long before the Czechoslovak crisis and abandoned ship on ‘the
blessed Czechoslovak democracy’ together with a number of other long-noses. And
like it is between democrats – one service begets another – Mr. Beneš served the
Jews and the Jews served Mr. Beneš. In short: birds of a feather flock together and
like attracts like. ”309
There is a very rare response to such programming in the archival collection of the
Office of the Reichsprotektor from the end of May 1940, which we will add here for
the simple reason that it is so rare. The letter came from Moravia and apparently
from a listener, who aspired to being a Nazi-collaborator, but had so far been
frustrated in his or her efforts. The listener’s main complaint appears to be that the
nice words of the broadcast bore little resemblance to reality on the ground in the
Protectorate. The broadcast he or she mentions had the title “A German speaks to
the Czechs”:
“It is good for us to attempt to come closer together, but good will is needed on both
sides. We Czechs would be happy to collaborate with the Germans… We want,
however, for our culture and freedom to be respected… just like the Germans
demand for themselves. They can not build German structures in Czech areas and
slowly fill whole villages with German farmers. Only Germans can buy Jewish shops
now so that our Czech country towns are gradually being Germanized… So far we
308
309
Reference here is to a member of the Petschek family, originally from Kolín in Central Bohemia,
who owned a large coal and banking conglomerate with centers at Prague and Ústí nad Labem.
See: PEJŠA, Jaroslav; JOUZA, Ladislav; JOUZOVÁ, Miroslava: Moje Město Kolín, Židé v Kolíně,
(“My City Kolín, Jews in Kolín”) Regionální museum v Kolíně, Astroprint, Poděbrady, 2010, page
28.
In the original: “Je-li vidět na jevišti před oponou Beneše, stoji za ním v každém připadě Petschek
a všichní ti židovští otrokaři našeho národa z byvalé republiky. Pan Beneš totiž byl vždy jen
předvídavým politikem ku prospěchu Židů, ale nikdy ne ku prospěchu českého národa. Přiklad
máte, milí poslucháči, v tom, kterak Žid Petschek dávno před českoslovenkou krisi prodal doly a
včas spolu s řadou jiných dlouhonosých opustil palubu “požehnané československé demokracie”.
A jak to tak mezi demokraty bývá: službu za službu. Pan Beneš se zasloužil o Židy a Židé se zas
zasloužili o pana Beneše. Zkrátka vrána k vráně sedá a rovný rovného si hledá.” Author and
exact date not found. Rozhlasová korespondence, volume IX. (1941), edition 259.
104
have only experienced violence and woe to him who sought to speak reasonably and
wanted to demand understanding in a friendly way. The Gestapo abducts him and
causes him suffering and egregious violence.”310
Emanuel Moravec
The late summer of 1939 also saw the introduction of a specific form of Czechlanguage propaganda via the Protectorate’s own station network. These broadcasts
were supposed to seem a voluntary and purely Czech-made phenomenon, and on
the surface that is precisely what they were. It was namely at this time, in late August
1939, that the “Political considerations” and, after the outbreak of war on 1
September, the “Military-political considerations”311 of Emanuel Moravec (1893-5
May 1945, suicide), perhaps the most fervent and most visible executor of Nazi will
in the Protectorate, first started to fill the ether.312 These broadcasts are most
remarkable examples of high-profile pro-Nazi activism on the part of a Czech public
figure at a time when the overwhelming majority of Czech society rejected active
collaboration with a sense of both contempt and outrage.313 What makes these
broadcasts even more unique is that they came from a man, who had publicly
advocated entering a fight to the death against Nazi Germany just one year
previously. Moravec’s ruminations on the course of the war, the “New Order in
Europe”, the Czechs’ place in that order and many other topics were to become the
most visible example of pro-Nazi political programming prior to the establishment of
Alois Kříž’s Political Lectures Department in late June of 1941 and a thoroughly a
ubiquitous part of weekly programming over the course of the next three years. No
310
311
312
313
In the original: “Es ist gut, das wir versuchen, einander näher zu kommen aber es ist guter Wille
von beiden Seiten notwendig. Wir Tschechen würden gerne mit den Deutschen
zusammenarbeiten... Wir wollen aber, dass unsere Kultur und unsere Freiheit respektiert
werden... wie dies die deutschen (sic!) für sich beanspruchen. Sie dürfen uns in tschechischen
Gegenden keine deutschen Objekte bauen und langsam ganze Dörfer mit deutschen Bauern
besiedeln. Jüdische Geschäfte dürfen jetzt nur Deutsche kaufen und dadurch allmählich unsere
tschechischen Landstädte germanisieren... Wir haben indessen nur Gewalt kennen gelernt und
wehe dem, der vernünftig sprechen wollte und auf freundschaftlichem Wege eine Verständigung
verlangen wollte. Den verschleppt sofort die Gestapo und bereitet ihm Leid und unerhöhte
Gewalt.“ NA-ÚŘP, carton 1164, German translation of an anonymous letter to Czech Radio of 27
May 1940.
In Czech: “Vojensko-politické úvahy”.
For a thorough review of Moravec and his activities in this regard, see: UHLÍŘ, Jan B.: Emanuel
Moravec Český nacionální socialista (“Emanuel Moravec a Czech National Socialist”), IN: Historie
a Vojenství (“History and Warfare”), Časopis Vojenského Historického Ústavu, volume LV, edition
2/2006 pages 25 to 39, and edition 3/2006 pages 49 to 63. Hereinafter: UHLÍŘ, Moravec I. and
UHLÍŘ, Moravec II.
GEBHART, KUKLÍK: Velké dějiny XV.a, page 242.
105
discourse on Czech Radio history of the occupation period can be complete without
a review of this man and his radio work.
According to a short biography published in Polední list that Uhlíř quotes extensively,
Moravec grew up in very simple circumstances in Prague-Hradčany as the eldest of
eight children born to a Czech office clerk and his half-German wife, who had studied
at a German teaching institute in Prague-Malá Strana.314 With the outbreak of the
First World War, Moravec joined the Austrian Army. However, he eventually became
a Czech legionnaire, which means that, like tens of thousands of other Czech and
Slovak soldiers who saw no future for their country in the Hapsburg Monarchy, he
had deserted to the enemy. In the First Czechoslovak Republic, Moravec studied
Military Arts, graduating in 1923 as an officer of the General Staff and advanced to
become a professor of Military History and Military Theory at a military school in
Slovakia.315 At the same time, Moravec became a regular contributor to notable
newspapers such as Lidové noviny.316 Until Munich, Moravec was considered a loyal
follower of both Masaryk and Beneš with rather strong socialist tendencies. Moravec
was even one of the honor guards posted next to Masaryk’s coffin while the latter lay
in state in 1937.317 It was at the time of the Munich Crisis, however, that Moravec
broke with Masaryk’s successor Beneš. The disagreement came apparently because
Moravec insisted on defending the country despite Britain and France’s perfidy.
Moravec also joined a group of military leaders intent on deposing Beneš and
rejecting Munich.318 On 21 September 1938, at the height of the Munich Crisis,
Moravec published an article in Lidové noviny in which he wrote sentiments that
were at once defeatist and radically courageous – or perhaps nihilistic, depending on
the observer’s perspective: “If we are in a desperate situation, it is always more
honest to allow ourselves to be defeated, to succumb to a superior power, than to
surrender in a cowardly manner without resistance.”319 Apparently, Moravec did not
see much hope for the republic defending itself effectively against Nazi Germany,
314
315
316
317
318
319
Polední list, volume XVI, edition 48, page 1, 18 February 1942. Quoted in UHLÍŘ, Moravec I.,
pages 27-29.
Polední list, volume XVI, edition 48, page 1, 18 February 1942. Quoted in UHLÍŘ, Moravec I.,
page 28.
PERNES, Až na dno zrady, page 123.
PERNES, Až na dno zrady, fourth photo in illustrations after page 112.
PERNES, Až na dno zrady, pages 137-140.
In the original: “Jsme-li v zoufalé situaci, je vždy čestnější nechat se porazit, podlehnout přesile,
než se zbaběle bez oporu vzdát.” Lidové noviny, volume 46, edition 475, page 1, 21 September
1938. Quoted in UHLÍŘ, Moravec I., page 29.
106
and yet he also preferred annihilation over dishonorable surrender. As we know, the
Munich Crisis ended in a compromise that satisfied neither the war-mongering Hitler
nor the abandoned Czechoslovaks.
During the Second Republic, the period of “authoritarian democracy” under Rudolf
Beran from the conservative Agrarian Party,320 Moravec found himself marginalized
as a leftist outsider and was forbidden from publishing articles already in October of
1938. Nevertheless, he persisted by writing under the pseudonym Stanislav Yester,
a fact that came to light after a very short time, and which caused him more trouble
with his superiors.321 Robbed of his most profitable means of earning a living,
Moravec apparently considered emigration to South America, but did not manage to
carry out that plan prior to the German invasion on 15 March 1939.322 The
establishment of the Protectorate transformed Moravec from a marginalized but
tolerated leftist outsider into a Czech legionnaire with a known anti-German past,
which could also mean a prime candidate for a Gestapo cell.
Moravec moved to escape that fate, however. In the summer of 1939 he published
his book V úloze mouřenína, Československá tragédie 1938 (“In the Role of the
Moor, the Czechoslovak Tragedy 1938”).323 In it he undertook a bitter reckoning with
Britain and France, who, as he saw it, had not only perfidiously sacrificed their
erstwhile ally in Central Europe, but who had also in the course of the previous 20
years blocked any reasonable rapprochement between Czechoslovakia and
Germany for their own selfish reasons. Moravec’s conclusion from all of this, which
he had already published in an article for Lidové noviny on 5 October 1938 and
republished in his book V úloze mouřenína, Československá tragédie 1938 was the
following: “German policy succeeded perfectly at paralyzing us militarily. Let us not
have any illusions about this truth any more. For this reason, our policy has to be,
whether we want it or not, finally to find a good relationship to Germany, with which
we might already long since have settled matters had the ‘noble’ West not constantly
threatened to cancel the alliance with us... In the meantime, let us take an example
from the Germans, what they managed in the 20 years after their horrible humiliation
320
321
322
323
MILOTOVÁ: Die Protektoratspresse, page 158.
PERNES, Až na dno zrady, page 149.
PERNES, Až na dno zrady, page 152.
PERNES, Až na dno zrady, page 158.
107
in the year 1918.”324 Regarding the Czechoslovak state itself, Moravec completely
took on the official Nazi view that it had been an artificial or inorganic entity, which
was ultimately incapable of surviving on its own, essentially a house built upon the
proverbial sand of European great power politics. For example, Moravec told an
audience at the Herrenklub Berlin gentlemen’s club in December 1939:
“Czechoslovakia was only important for the West as an obstacle to a German
advance into the Danube states, the Balkans and Asia… For as long as French
military and financial power stood behind the Czechoslovak Republic, the Czech
economy was able to defend itself from German pressure and the natural
geopolitical context of the Bohemian Lands with the Reich.” 325
From a Nazi perspective, it was clearly considerably far more attractive to argue that
an aberrant and unnatural political state-of-affairs had been overcome with the
elimination of Czechoslovakia than to admit that Hitler’s underhanded treachery had
destroyed a civilized, successful and eminently functional democracy supported by
the overwhelming majority of its citizens. Thus, Moravec’s analysis of the situation
coincided completely with those of the Nazi occupiers. Undoubtedly, sentiments of
this type will have been attractive to the occupation authorities, especially given that
they were very rare among the Czechs, the overwhelming majority of whom
considered the Nazis illegitimate foreign usurpers of power in Bohemia and
Moravia.326 Apart from the welcome pecuniary benefits of publishing his first
Protectorate-era book, Moravec also received an invitation to tour Germany and
acquaint himself with the achievements of National Socialism, or as he explained,
why he went on the trip: “so that I could see what had been done there for the little
324
325
326
Emphasis also in the original: “Německé politice se podařilo nás vojensky dokonale paralysovat.
Nečiňme si o této pravdě už žádné iluse. Proto politika naše musí, ať už se nám to chce nebo ne,
najít nakonec dobrý poměr k Německu, se kterým bychom se byli snad už dávno dohovořili,
kdyby nám byl “šlechetný“ Západ stále nehrozil vypovědením spojenectví... Prozatím vezměme si
vzor z Němců, co dokázali za dvacet let po svém hrozném pokoření v roce 1918.” MORAVEC,
Emanuel: V úloze mouřenína, Československá tragédie 1938, II. edition, Orbis, Praha, 1940,
page 351. Hereinafter: MORAVEC, Emanuel: V úloze mouřenína.
In the original: “Die Tschechoslowakei hatte für den Westen nur die Bedeutung als Hindernis
eines deutschen Vormarsches in die Donaustaaten, auf den Balkan und nach Asien… Solange
hinter der tschechoslowakischen Republik die französische militärische und finanzielle Macht
gestanden hatte, konnte sich die tschechische Wirtschaft gegen den deutschen Druck und gegen
den natürlichen geopolitischen Zusammenhang der böhmischen Länder mit dem Reich wehren.”
NA-MORAVEC-AMV 39-1-9, carton 3, pages 18-20. Speech at the Herrenklub Berlin December
1939.
FROMMER: National Cleansing, page 145.
108
people during the time of the National Socialist government.” Moravec returned at
the end of August 1939 completely enthusiastic about what he had seen.327
A star servant of the occupiers had been born, who from the German perspective,
brought several very valuable characteristics to the table. First of all, unlike many of
the local Czech Fascists, Moravec was not a failed personality with a criminal record,
but a professional soldier with a respectable career behind him. Secondly, he had
never been overtly pro-German in his outlook, but had drawn his conclusions from
the Czech provinces’ highly unenviable geopolitical situation – i.e., surrounded by
Germany on all sides. It was precisely this unenviable geopolitical position that was
to remain the Nazis’ chief argument vis-à-vis the Czechs until well after Stalingrad.
From the perspective of late 1939, however, Stalingrad lay in a distant and nebulous
future, which after the Wehrmacht’s successful Blitzkrieg against Poland hardly
seemed like an imminent reality. Furthermore, Moravec had displayed a certain
admiration for the totalitarian regimes in the time well before Munich. Uhlíř maintains
that such sentiments were evident in Moravec’s writing as early as 1935.328 Thus,
Masaryk’s and Beneš’s former foot soldier mutated into an activist for the cause of
Adolf Hitler in Bohemia and Moravia, who developed the following typical mantra for
the Czech listener over the next five years:
1. The West and its system of parliamentary democracy failed at Munich – due to
the inner corruption of the plutocracy.
2. National Socialism is a socialist movement aimed at greater equality and security
for the working masses.
3. Bohemia and Moravia naturally belong to the German Lebensraum, and need to
act accordingly.
4. Later, after the German invasion of the Soviet Union, he emphasized the
primitive, poverty-ridden brutality of life in that country as a means of fighting panSlavic tendencies in the Czech population.
It is surprising, however, that the Nazi administration embraced cooperation with a
person, who had made a 180-degree about-face in his political convictions, and who
therefore might not ultimately be trustworthy. Yet, Heydrich and Frank clearly came
327
328
PERNES, Až na dno zrady, page 158.
UHLÍŘ, Moravec I., page 27.
109
to trust Moravec. It is not likely that they would have appointed Moravec to lead the
Board of Youth Education in Bohemia and Moravia or made him Protectorate
minister of Education and National Enlightenment had they not trusted him
completely. Heydrich judged Moravec as the Czech provinces’ “consistent defender
of a connection to the Reich” who possessed a “healthy portion of ambition” 329 and,
therefore, considered him the only appropriate interlocutor for the Reich from among
the Czechs.330 Karl Hermann Frank clearly opted to work with Moravec and against
the Czech Fascists from the Vlajka in 1942.331 Ferdinand Thürmer, who initially had
a great deal to do with Moravec because of the latter’s radio work, considered
Moravec to be both realistic with regard to the Czech provinces’ geopolitical situation
and courageous for publicly stating his views on the matter.332 At the same time,
unlike Heydrich or Frank, Thürmer took the fact seriously that the Czech people
“quite completely despised” Moravec333 or considered him the “most-hated man in
the country”334 and also worked to remove Moravec from the airwaves as soon as
possible. As Thürmer later described Moravec:
“He was really no friend of the Germans. He saw in us the lesser evil and believed
due his better insights that he had to save his people from a perhaps irreparable
catastrophe.” 335
If, then, we synthesize all this information and these views of the man Emanuel
Moravec, a certain inner logic to his actions and to his Nazi superiors’ acceptance of
him appears to emerge. First of all, Moravec was not a convinced liberal democrat in
the Masarykian sense of the term, but a soldier used to taking and giving orders and
who had sympathies for totalitarian regimes. His appraisal of the geopolitical
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
In the original: “einen konsequenten Verteidiger eines Anschlusses an das Reich...” and “...eine
gesunde Portion Ehrgeiz”. Report on the situation Heydrich to Bormann of 22 January 1942 and
Heydrich’s secret speech of 4 February 1942 quoted in BRANDES: Die Tschechen I., page 219.
UHLÍŘ, Moravec I., page 36.
PERNES, Až na dno zrady, page 189.
THÜRMER: Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, page 13
In the original:“Er wurde also von seinem Volk ziemlich restlos verachtet.” THÜRMER:
Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, page 13.
In the original: “Dieser bestgehasste Mann des Landes”. THÜRMER: Sendergruppe BöhmenMähren, page 13.
In the original: “Er war durchaus kein Deutschenfreund. Er sah in uns das kleinere Übel und
glaubte aufgrund seiner besseren Einsicht seinem Volk eine vielleicht nicht mehr gut zu
machende Katastrophe ersparen zu müssen.” THÜRMER: Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, page
13.
110
situation of the Czechs at the time was also altogether realistic. The Czech nation
was surrounded on three sides by at least ten times more German people, and
indeed, even hosted compact islands of German-speaking population within its
midst. The perspective that Czechoslovakia – let alone the Prussian provinces east
of the future Oder-Neisse Line – might one day be stripped of their German
populations would have been inconceivable in 1938. The Western Allies’ betrayal of
Czechoslovakia will not have enhanced Moravec’s opinion of liberal democracy as a
system. On the contrary, he will have loathed Chamberlain and Daladier as cowardly
traitors and with them, presumably their systems of government. Finally, the
apparent achievements of Nazi Germany, such as the recovery of its armed forces in
such a brief period after the debacle of 1918 and the elimination of unemployment
“among the little people” will have appealed to his political sensitivities. He could
convince himself that National Socialism was simply a specific variant of socialism
itself. To some extent, the strongly Germanized background and education of his
mother may also have played a role. At a time when the Czech nation was enjoying
a cultural rebirth in the late 19th century and fighting to reassert its rights to its own
language and culture, his mother had chosen to study at a German teacher’s
institute. Thus, like the collaborators Karel Korp and Alois Kříž, who both grew up
among the German minority in Bohemia, Moravec’s upbringing is likely to have
included the concept of German culture as a focal point of emulation and aspiration.
From the perspective of his Nazi superiors, Moravec’s only serious sin will perhaps
have been his defection to the enemy during the First World War. However, that
could be explained away as an act against the Hapsburg monarchy, a system that
Nazi ideology derided, albeit for diametrically opposite reasons as the Czech
legionnaires. Moravec’s appraisal of the Czech geopolitical situation dovetailed
perfectly with Hitler’s own view of Bohemia and Moravia’s position. Furthermore,
Moravec had published that view already in October 1938, long before the invasion,
and at a time in which it would not have been popular among the rest of his
compatriots. That fact lent Moravec considerable credibility from a Nazi perspective
and virtually gave him the aura of a courageous Alt-Parteigenosse, albeit in a Czech
context. Moravec’s applause of Nazi Germany’s social achievements will only have
encouraged the occupiers further to view him as someone of their own convictions,
and, in fact, it would seem they were correct in this view. Moravec did not really
undertake a 180-degree about-face in his political views, therefore. Instead, he
111
simply adjusted his own perspective to the new political realities in Bohemia and
Moravia after Munich, and from a Nazi perspective, seemingly due to the superior
truth of their Weltanschauung. The fact that he had previously been willing to give his
life fighting them only added credence to the notion that Moravec had “seen the light”
of a superior truth, as it were. In brief, Moravec spoke the language of the occupiers
so convincingly and thereby gained their trust so thoroughly, because he himself was
convinced of the Nazi perspective. For his part, he was not parroting a foreign
ideology to his own people, but speaking what he saw as an objective truth, as the
thoughts and convictions were de facto identical with his own. Jan B. Uhlíř’s thesis
that Moravec was not a collaborator per se, but rather an actual Czech Nazi appears
to be correct, and Thürmer’s assertion that Moravec was not a friend of the Germans
would appear to be untrue.
Apart from his messianic zeal to convert the Czechs to Nazism, however, Moravec
also had every personal reason to seek out radio work. His radio lectures were
remunerated. As Ferdinand Thürmer later explained, each broadcast had a
considerable pecuniary effect for Moravec, which was “one of the comfortable, but
impossible methods of rewarding Czechs, who had rendered outstanding services to
the Reich.”336 This method was “comfortable” for the occupation authorities, because
it was the Czech radio license-holders, who paid for Moravec’s work and not ReichsGerman sources. Thürmer considered the method “impossible”, however, as it
contributed to the rapid deterioration of Czech Radio’s financial situation, which by
late 1941 would mean de facto bankruptcy.337
Moravec’s Radio Work
There is a good reason why no historian has ever thoroughly analyzed the radio
work of Emanuel Moravec in great detail, despite the fact that Moravec published his
own radio speeches in at least two books already during the time of the Protectorate
itself.338 Moravec was boring. Even by the slower-paced, less media-savvy
standards of the time, when politicians regularly held forth at length on given
336
337
338
In the original: “eine der bequemen, aber unmöglichen Methoden, um das Reich verdiente
Tschechen finanziell zu entschädigen.” THÜRMER: Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, page 14.
THÜRMER: Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, page 22.
Ve službách Nové Evropy, Rok před mikrofonem, (“In the Service of the New Europe, a Year at
the Microphone”), Orbis, Praha, 1940 and Tři roky před mikrofonem (“Three Years at the
Microphone”), Orbis, Praha, 1942. Hereinafter: MORAVEC: Ve službách and MORAVEC: Tři
roky.
112
subjects before a microphone – for instance, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt
held his famous “Fireside Chats” to the American nation from Washington, D.C.
throughout this period – Moravec’s simplistic and frequently non-radiophonic manner
was often deadly dull, and perhaps even worse, it was ubiquitous. For instance, in
the not quite two and a half years between 26 August 1939 – when he launched the
first of his “Political Considerations” into the ether with the title “About Poland and to
Poland”339 exhorting the Poles to make peace with Germany quickly or suffer dire
consequences, and 17 January 1942, when he broadcast the last of the series prior
to taking office as a government minister, describing the leaders of the anti-Axis
coalition as “Political Ragpickers”340 – Moravec took to the microphone no fewer than
230 times. This means that he spoke to the Czech nation on average nearly twice
per week.341 By comparison, Roosevelt held only 30 “Fireside Chats” in over 11
years between 1933 and 1944. Clearly, something broadcast as frequently as
Moravec’s speeches could not carry the same level of importance or value.
Apart from the inflationary regularity with which he spoke, Moravec suffered from a
badly non-radiophonic style, for which even the deep and resonant speaking voice
evident on recordings at Czech Radio’s archives could not compensate. Naturally, it
would not be fair to judge Moravec by 21st century media standards. We need to
keep in mind that radio was a relatively new medium at the time and professional
styles of radio journalism were still developing. Nevertheless, Moravec’s style was
often badly unsuitable to the medium of radio. This stemmed presumably from two
main professional deformations derived from his previous work experience. First of
all, Moravec failed to recognize that radio is a very different medium than print
journalism and requires a different approach to be effective. While a well-trained print
journalist can usually learn to write for radio, it does, nonetheless, require the
acquisition of a different set of skills. Newspaper or magazine reports filled with
numbers, illustrated by maps, photos, statistics and the like can be very informative
to a reader, who can refer back up the column and remind him/herself of the facts as
necessary, at his/her own pace while the report progresses. In radio, the speaker is
dealing with something much more ephemeral – the voice alone and the ability of the
listener to comprehend what is said, and that often from hearing the information only
339
340
341
In the original: “O Polsku a k Polsku”, MORAVEC: Tři roky, page 11.
In the original: “Političtí hadrníci”, MORAVEC: Tři roky, page 404.
The exact average for the 124 weeks of the period is 1.85 radio addresses per week.
113
once. Perhaps for this same reason, much information in the electronic media has
degenerated over time to the present day to easily remembered “sound bites”
expressed briefly on air.
Secondly, Moravec was not mindful of his audience. While his years as a professor
at a military college undoubtedly lent him assurance as a public speaker, he forgot
that he was not lecturing to military cadets anxious to grasp the material and move
on in their careers, but to an audience that mostly loathed him as a traitor, and which
could in a matter of seconds either change the channel or switch off the radio
altogether. Very frequently, long sections of his speeches were spent concentrating
on and comparing troop numbers, types of armaments, their geographical
movements in the theaters of war and the like, which can ultimately be very hard for
a listener to grasp. For the sake of illustration, let us take a relatively mild example
and look at a segment from Moravec’s radio address of 26 September 1939 with the
title “What can be said about that?” dedicated to the end of the Wehrmacht’s
invasion of Poland:
“Poland had just 7 million fewer inhabitants than France. For that reason, it gathered
an army in the field of about the same size as France in 1914. Of that great Polish
Army, so far around half a million men have fallen into German captivity, around a
quarter million into Russian captivity, and during the next week one can expect that a
total of around 1 million Polish soldiers will be captured. We can estimate the fallen
and wounded at around a quarter million. And Poland even dedicated relatively the
most of all European states to its armed forces. It was 40-50% of the entire state
budget. And it did not help at all. In less than three weeks the Polish Army and the
Polish state perished.”342
342
From the broadcast “Co se k tomu dá říci?”. In the original: “Polsko mělo jen o 7 milionů méně
obyvatel než Francie. Proto svolalo do pole armádu asi stejné velikosti jako Francie 1914. Z této
veliké polské armády upadlo dosud do německého zajetí na půl milionu mužů, do ruského zajetí
čtvrt milionu a během příštího týdne lze očekávat, že v celku bude zajato na 1 milionu polských
vojáků. Padlých a raněných můžeme počítat asi čvrt milionu. A Polsko přece věnovalo na svou
brannou moc poměrně nejvíce ze všech evropských statů. Bylo to ročně 40-50% celého státního
rozpočtu. A nic nepomohlo. Za necelé tři týdny zašly polská armáda i polský stát.” MORAVEC: Tři
roky, page 18.
114
Expressed in a much more radiophonic and digestible manner, the essence of the
information would be: “With nearly the same strength as the French Army in 1914,343
and after spending nearly half its state budget on the military for years, the Polish
state and its armed forces have perished in less than one month.”
Furthermore, there was none of the spark, verve or scintillating scandal evident for
instance in the similarly loathed, but enormously listened-to radio broadcasts of
Goebbels’s “Lord Haw-Haw”, William Joyce (1906-1946, executed). With his lighter
and frequently vulgar, but entertaining style, the latter managed to draw up to 30% of
the British radio audience at times.344 Instead, for Moravec, everything was deadly
serious, at times rather pathetic and frequently very heavy with self-importance. For
example, in an address from the end of October 1939, Moravec even presumed to
speak for Bohemian Patron Saint Wenceslas, and that in the first person! In this
speech, in which he likened Hitler’s Germany with the civilizing forces of the Roman
Catholic Church in the Middle Ages, he also grouped “Western plutocrats” and their
Czech friends firmly with “Jewish slave traders” and Wenceslas’s fratricidal pagan
brother Boleslav.
“My good Czech people! Learn from your history! Do not repeat the mistakes and
experiments of my brother Boleslav! Do not cling to a faith that destroys the working
person, and which with cunning slogans enables wise guys to gather great wealth
without working. Reconciliation with the Germans will bring you strength; will
expedite the blossoming of Czech genius, which enriches greater tracts of land than
the earth on which it was born. The struggle of the Germans with the Czechs means
most of all perdition for the Czechs. Only unity and cooperation of the Germans with
the Czechs ensures great peace for the world, lifts the little man up and gives
everyone happiness… The next day after the lecture, St. Wenceslas could pick up
the following anonymous letter in the offices of Radiožurnál (sic!): ‘Dog – a thousand
years ago, you took Germanic hryvnias, today you take marks. Watch out for
yourself! Five agents of the British Secret Service have received orders to ring your
neck wherever they find you, should you once again risk descending to the earth.’”345
343
344
345
A fact, which Moravec later conceded to have overestimated, see: MORAVEC: Tři roky, page 18,
first footnote.
According to a BBC poll quoted in: KENNY, Mary: Germany Calling, a Biography of William
Joyce, Lord Haw-Haw, New Island, Dublin, 2004, page 196. Hereinafter: KENNY: Lord Haw-Haw.
In the original: “Země rodí politiku” (“The Earth Gives Birth to Policy”) broadcast on 29 October
1939. “Můj dobrý lid český! Uč se z svých dějin! Neopakuj chyby a pokusy mého bratra Boleslava!
Nedrž se víry, která ničí pracujícího člověka a která pod obratnými hesly umožňuje chytrákům
115
Apart from the strange analogy between the civilizing work of the Medieval Catholic
Church and the violent and brutal Nazi regime, in this particular example, we also
see the self-pitying tendency among Czech Fascists not to view themselves as
traitors, but as misunderstood national martyrs. In this case, Moravec’s selfcomparison with St. Wenceslas, the analogy is hubristically pompous. Taken
together with the relentlessly droning onslaught of military and geographic minutiae
in his lectures and the excessive frequency of his addresses to the nation, it
becomes evident that already at this early phase in the war, Moravec’s value for the
Nazi cause in Bohemia and Moravia will have been at best rather limited and
presumably even counter-productive. In fact, Thürmer was later to identify Moravec
as the main factor in the erosion of Czech Radio’s credibility among the Czech
listening population.346 Nevertheless, that realization still lay two years in the future,
and as of January 1940 the Wehrmachtpropaganda Group in the Office of the
Reichsprotektor started systematically supplying Moravec with material and
extensively supporting his radio work among the Czechs.347
Apart from Moravec, Czech Radio also started producing some programs, which
could be termed roughly pro-German in nature. Judging by their subject matter, most
of these broadcasts fall into the category of educational talks that had Germany or
some aspect of German culture as their focal point. The first noteworthy series of this
type stemmed either directly from the German censors or from people connected
with them. However, given the topics covered in this series, it does not seem to have
been obtrusively political in nature. The title was “Dnešní Německo”, which in English
could be called “Today’s Germany” and the series started on 20 September via
Prague I with a presumably economic lecture by one Jan Mertl who came from a
346
347
hromadit veliké bohatství bez práce. Smír s Němci přinese ti sílu, uspíší nový rozkvět českého
génia, který zúrodní větší lány než zem, na které s zrodil. Boj Němců s Čechy znamená
především záhubu Čechů. Jen svornost a spolupráce Němců s Čechy zajistí světu veliký mír,
povznese malého člověka a dá všem štěstí… Druhý den po přednásce mohl si svatý Václav
vyzvednout v kanceláři Radiožurnálu (sic!) tento anonymní dopis: >>Pse–bral jsi před tisíci lety
germanské hřivny, dnes bereš marky. Dej si pozor! Pět agentů britské tajné služby dostalo
rozkaz, aby tě odkrouhlo, kde tě stihnou, když by ses ještě jednou odvážil sestoupit na zem.<< ”
MORAVEC: Tři roky, pages 26-27.
THÜRMER: Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, pages 12-13.
BRANDES: Die Tschechen I., page 117.
116
local Trade Academy.348 Later, the other Protectorate stations started rebroadcasting the series:
•
On Tuesday, 3 October 1939, Walter Maras of the Reichssender Böhmen was
supposed to lecture from 19:45 to 20:00 on modern German literature,349
however for some reason the broadcast did not air until Wednesday, 18 October.
•
On Saturday, 4 November 1939, the Sudeten-German journalist and author
Frank Argus350 lectured from 17:30 to 17:45 on new German films.351
•
The series then concluded on Tuesday, 14 November 1939, with a talk on “caring
for the earth” by a lecturer from Brno’s Upper School of Agriculture. 352
Another pro-German form of programming also commenced in the autumn of 1939.
On 2 October 1939, Prague I and Moravská Ostrava launched a series for Germanlanguage learning, broadcast during primetime between 18:40 and 18:55 hours on
Mondays and Thursdays.353 On 9 October, Brno added the series to its schedule354
as well. Initially, such German-language courses only aired twice per week, but they
gradually expanded to all days except Saturday and Sunday, and remained part of
programming throughout the entire duration of the occupation. Even the final
Protectorate edition of Týden rozhlasu issued on 5 May 1945 lists planned
installments of this series.
Just a week and a half after the start of German language lessons, another cultural
series on Germany commenced as well. However, this one was to be short-lived.
Although Czechs authored it, it is evidence of the fact that Czech Radio staff did not
have their hearts in its production. The series broadcast variously on all Protectorate
stations,355 or just on Prague I356 or on Prague I and Brno357 but always during
primetime and had the title “Co dalo Německo světu”, in English: “What Germany
Has Given to the World”. The title itself can be interpreted as a very finely nuanced
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355
356
357
Náš rozhlas, volume XVII, (1939), edition 38, (17–23 September 1939), page 16.
Náš rozhlas, volume XVII, (1939), edition 40, (1–7 October 1939), page 14.
According to http://www.libri.cz/databaze/film/heslo/44, Frank Argus was the pseudonym of Hans
Heinz Schimbera apparently a Sudeten-German (1902, in Čáslav–1968, in Prague). In the 1920’s
Argus was the Prague correspondent for several foreign German-language publications including
Sozialdemokrat.
Náš rozhlas, volume XVII, (1939), edition 44, (29 October–4 November 1939), page 22.
Náš rozhlas, volume XVII, (1939), edition 46, (12–18 November 1939), page 12.
Náš rozhlas, volume XVII, (1939), edition 40, (1–7 October 1939), pages 12 and 18.
Náš rozhlas, volume XVII, (1939), edition 41, (8–14 October 1939), page 12.
On 12 October and 23 November 1939.
On 23 October 1939.
On 6 November 1939.
117
form of resistance, however. Had the authors wanted to indicate unequivocally that
Germany had contributed something to the world, the word order “Co Německo dalo
světu”, which corresponds exactly to the English translation above, would have been
more appropriate. The form “Co dalo Německo světu” took the grammatical form of a
question, and with the addition of a question mark or a specific tone of voice, could
mean “What Has Germany Given to the World?”, i.e., it could function as a negation
of the notion that Germany had contributed anything to the world at all. This four-part
and rather academic series delved entirely into the presumably safe area of German
history and focused on some of its more positive characters:
•
On Thursday, 12 October 1939, Professor František Žilka of the Hussite Faculty
of Charles University lectured from 19:30 to 19:45 on Martin Luther.358
•
On Monday, 23 October 1939, Czech Radio’s own Mirko Očadlík lectured from
20:10 to 20:25 on Johann Sebastian Bach.359
•
On Monday, 6 November 1939, Professor Josef Král of Charles University
lectured from 19:50 to 20:05 on Immanuel Kant.360
•
And on Thursday, 23 November 1939, Karel Polák lectured from 20:45 to 21:00
on Johann Wolfgang von Goethe.361
Undoubtedly, the benefit of broadcasting such general cultural programs was that
Czech Radio could show a certain level of “good will”, as it were, towards Maras,
Wenzel and Von Gregory, while not really compromising any of its own staff with
overt pro-Nazi collaboration.
358
359
360
361
Náš rozhlas, volume XVII, (1939), edition 41, (8–14 October 1939), page 18.
Náš rozhlas, volume XVII, (1939), edition 43, (22–28 October 1939).
Náš rozhlas, volume XVII, (1939), edition 45, (5–11 November 1939), page 10.
Náš rozhlas, volume XVII, (1939), edition 47, (19–25 November 1939).
118
The Maras Era I – Analysis of the Program Week Starting 26 November 1939
Figure 2.1: Average duration of broadcast day in hours:minutes:seconds
Week starting 26 November 1939
All Czech (CZ) medium-wave (MW) stations = Prague I, Brno, Moravská Ostrava
All CZ MW stations
15:20:43
8:39:17
Prague I
15:10:43
8:49:17
Brno
16:26:26
Moravská Ostrava
14:25:00
Reichssender Böhmen
SW-Poděbrady
7:33:34
9:35:00
19:04:17
2:30:00
4:55:43
21:30:00
Broadcast hours
Station breaks
Duration of Broadcast Day
Figure 2.1 makes evident a marked increase in the duration of broadcast day for
nearly all stations. Only Moravská Ostrava remained at levels similar to those
applicable prior to the invasion. Otherwise, Prague added an average of nearly one
hour while Brno added more than two hours of broadcasts per day! These extra
broadcast hours came from a prolongation of musical programming until midnight. In
the case of Brno, a further hour of German broadcasts followed until 01:00 hours in
the morning. Even more striking was the radical increase in broadcast day for the
Reichssender Böhmen, which rose to levels common within the remainder of the
Reichsrundfunk at more than 19 hours of broadcasts each day, an increase of nearly
two-thirds over pre-invasion times! By contrast, the short-wave station at Poděbrady
was reduced radically to just 2.5 hours of broadcasts aimed at Czechs living in North
and South America. At this point in time, the short-wave program consisted only of
ČTK newscasts and music.
119
Figure 2.2: Regionalization – stations of origin as a percentage of TOTAL AIRTIME
Week starting 26 November 1939,
All Czech (CZ) medium-wave (MW) stations = Prague I, Brno, Moravská Ostrava
All CZ MW stations
65
15
Prague I
7
86
Brno
40
9
20
Moravská Ostrava
2
14
37
22
9
SW-Poděbrady
5
39
71
Reichssender Böhmen
14
10
15
8
5
7
1
100
0% 5% 10
%
15
%
20
%
25
%
30
%
35
%
Prague I
Reichssender Böhmen
DLS
Cologne
40
%
45
%
50
%
55
%
60
%
65
%
70
%
Brno
SW-Poděbrady
Frankfurt
Leipzig
75
%
80
%
85
%
90
%
95 100
% %
Moravská Ostrava
Berlin
Hamburg
Other
Regionalization
Apart from the removal of all Slovak stations from re-broadcasting, Figure 2.2 shows
a relative strengthening of the position of Prague I as the origin of its own
programming (rising from 80% to 86% of airtime) and Moravská Ostrava (60% 71%) and a slight reduction of re-broadcasts from Brno on Prague I (11% 9%) and
Moravská Ostrava (18%14%). Here one can see the Nazi usurpation of Brno’s
airwaves most clearly with the significant reduction of re-broadcasts from Prague I to
a mere 40% – down from 60% of airtime in February 1939. At the same time, a full
39% of Brno’s airtime was made up of programming derived from German stations.
Taken together, that means that Brno’s airtime had nearly equal quantities of
programming derived from German sources and Prague I.
Regrettably, the official Czech and German program magazines listed these
programs via Brno in an extremely vague manner simply as “Německé vysílání” and
“Deutsche Sendung” (“German broadcast”) respectively without further elaboration.
For the public, these were most likely intended to appear as indigenous German
programming derived from Brno itself, while they were, in fact, programs produced
either
by
Marek’s
Reichssender
Böhmen
or
re-broadcast
from
the
Reichsrundfunk.362 Given the vagueness of the program logs, there is no way to
362
NA-ÚŘP, carton 1164, file note from Scurla of 3 October 1940 recording his telephonic
instructions to Marek on the need to finish German broadcasts by 21:00 h.
120
differentiate their exact provenance between the Reichssender Böhmen and other
stations of the Reichsrundfunk. However, it is very unlikely that either Brno or the
Reichssender Böhmen could have produced so much original programming, as the
Reichssender Böhmen with its greater resources only filled 22% of its own airtime
with its own productions. Therefore, it is much more likely that the majority of these
broadcasts originated from somewhere else within the Reichsrundfunk and were
simply re-broadcast by Brno.
As for the Reichssender Böhmen itself, we see more than one-third (37%) of airtime
consisted of re-broadcasts from Berlin, while a further 40% came from various other
Reichssender including the Deutschlandsender on long-wave (9%), also produced in
Berlin. Thus, in essence, nearly half (46%) of its programming came from sources
centralized in Berlin. By contrast, the Reichssender Böhmen did not re-broadcast
any programs whatsoever from Czech Radio’s network at this point in time. As the
name suggests, it had become part of the centralized German Reichsrundfunk.
However, even by Reichsrundfunk standards the Reichssender Böhmen produced
relatively little of its own programming with just 22% of broadcast hours originating in
its own studios compared to Berlin’s 76% of self-made productions in the week
analyzed from February 1939. This finding would seem to support Thürmer’s
characterization of the Reichssender Böhmen as a “torso”.
Figure 2.3: Programming structure -- subjects as a percentage of TOTAL AIRTIME
Week starting 26 November 1939,
All Czech (CZ) medium-wave (MW) stations = Prague I, Brno, Moravská Ostrava
All CZ MW stations
52
Prague I
Brno
12
62
14
35
9
Moravská Ostrava
1 3 111
16
61
Reichssender Böhmen
0% 5% 10
%
12
2
20
%
25
%
30
%
15
35
%
2
45
%
50
%
55
%
60
%
65
%
3
1 4
2
11
14
70
%
75
%
80
%
Farmers
Economics
Politics
Other
85
%
1 4
3
3
5
20
Culture/Entertainment
Workers
News/Reports
German Program
121
10
4 11 2
4 1 3
40
%
11
31
75
15
%
1
4 11 2
1
71
SW-Poděbrady
Music
Youth/School
Women
Morning
1 4 11 2
90
%
95 100
% %
Programming Structure
The main effects of the occupation on programming structure visible in the week
reviewed are apparent in Figure 2.3. The most noticeable difference is the intrusion
of Brno’s “German broadcasts” into the overall mix – 11% of total airtime on Czech
medium-wave, however exclusively from Brno. Another unusual aspect of these
programs is that they took considerable airtime away from musical productions,
leaving music at only around half the normal levels for Brno (35%). Naturally, without
more precise definitions of program content in the radio schedules, one cannot rule
out that music may also have made up part of the “German broadcasts” – and be it
only as filler sound from recordings between talks.
Another noteworthy point here were the relatively high levels of political
programming on the Reichssender Böhmen at 3% of airtime. However, this
programming was not meant entirely for the Sudeten-German population. These
figures include both daily Politische Zeitungsschau (political press reviews) from
Berlin by the director of the Broadcasting Department in the Propaganda Ministry,
Hans Fritzsche, as well as the Česká hodina programs intended for the Czech
population. Thus, they do not reflect an inordinate increase in the level of
politicization of programming to the Sudeten-German population per se.
A significant difference in programming content does become apparent for the shortwave station at Poděbrady, however, whose content was greatly simplified. Music
rose from 62% in February to 75% of airtime in November, while talks were reduced
to ČTK newcasts (20% of airtime), which in turn stemmed from DNB sources, and
moderation, i.e., program announcements (5%). All other genres, including economic
information and culture had been stripped away.
122
Figure 2.4: Music by German composers as a percentage of TOTAL AIRTIME
Week starting 26 November 1939
All Czech (CZ) medium-wave (MW) stations = Prague I, Brno, Moravská Ostrava
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
2.3
2.8
1.1
All CZ MW stations
Prague I
Brno
3.2
Moravská Ostrava
Music by German composers
Music by German Composers
Figure 2.4 illustrates that identifiable German music dropped to levels at just half or
even less than half of what they had been prior to the invasion. At Prague I, for
example, the percentage of airtime dedicated to music by German composers
dropped to just 2.8%, while the identifiable quantity at Brno was just 1.1%. If nothing
else, this fact alone speaks for the thesis that, even eight months into the
occupation, the Czech management of Czech Radio had considerable control over
program content and that they were clearly disinclined to broadcast German music.
123
Figure 2.5: Broadcast language as a percentage of ALL TALKS PROGRAMMING
Week starting 26 November 1939,
All Czech (CZ) medium-wave (MW) stations = Prague I, Brno, Moravská Ostrava
All CZ MW stations
70
30
Prague I
1
98
Brno
21
40
60
Moravská Ostrava
98
Reichssender Böhmen
6
2
93
SW-Poděbrady
1
100
0% 5% 10
%
15
%
20
%
25
%
30
%
35
%
40
%
45
%
50
%
55
%
60
%
65
%
70
%
75
%
80
%
85
%
90
%
95 100
% %
Czech
Slovak
German
English
French
Italian
Romanian
Serbo-Croatian
Spanish
Ruthenian
Other
Broadcast Language
Figure 2.5 illustrates considerable changes among languages of broadcast. Apart
from there being no Slovak-language programming on the Czech stations
whatsoever, the quantity of German-language broadcasts jumped dramatically from
an overall level of 12% of talks prior to the invasion to a full 30% of talks
programming. This figure does not include the Reichssender Böhmen. The most
noticeable change was in Brno, whose talks programming consisted of nearly twothirds (60%) German-language programming! Even taking into account Brno’s
“natural” levels of German-language programming, i.e., for its indigenous Germanspeaking population (16% of talks in the week starting 26 February 1939), these new
levels eight months into the occupation are inordinately high. While this meant a de
facto application of the principle of divide et impera in broadcasting to the territory of
Moravia, these extreme levels via Brno were to remain temporary, as we will see.
With the start of broadcasting by the station Brno II-Dobrochov as the Reichssender
Donau in June 1940, Brno I-Komárov reverted to more similar levels of Germanlanguage programming as the other Czech stations. As for Prague I and Moravská
Ostrava, Figure 2.5 shows German-language programming where there had been
none before. Although at this point it consisted of only two 20-minute Germanlanguage learning programs per week, they were situated rather prominently during
evening broadcast times between 18:00 and 19:00 hours.
124
As for the Reichssender Böhmen, it did still contain 6% of Czech-language talks,
which were the famous Česká hodina propaganda broadcasts mixed also with
German-language learning programs. In the week reviewed, there was also one
program of poetry re-broadcast from Italian Radio, part of the effort to propagate
relations within the German-Italian alliance. Another noticeable change was in the
languages from the short-wave station at Poděbrady. Paralleling Germany’s
assumption of representative functions for the Protectorate in all external relations,
Poděbrady was stripped of all foreign-language programming and most of its target
regions. Instead, in the week reviewed, there were only broadcasts in Czech to North
and South America.
Figure 2.6: Germanization/Nazification Factor (GNF) = as a percentage of TOTAL AIRTIME
Week starting 26 November 1939
All Czech (CZ) medium-wave (MW) stations = Prague I, Brno, Moravská Ostrava
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
0.1
39.1
0.5
17.2
14.4
Total GNF
0.7
0.6
0.6
2.3
2.8
All CZ MW
stations
Prague I
0.7
1.1
3.2
Brno
Moravská
Ostrava
Music by German composers
German-language talks
Czech-language pro-German/Nazi
GNF as % of total airtime
1.9
RS Böhmen
(Mělník)
Germanization/Nazification Factor
If we now look at the Germanization/Nazification Factor for the 48th broadcast week
of 1939 – i.e., the overall percentage of German-language programming, Czechlanguage pro-German or pro-Nazi talks plus identifiably German music, Figure 2.6
indicates a very uneven picture with 17.2% of all airtime falling into this category.
However, the largest part of that came from Brno, for whose broadcasts the GNF
made up nearly half of all airtime (40%). By contrast, Prague I (4 %) and Moravská
Ostrava (4.6%) demonstrated GNF levels at just one-tenth those of Brno.
125
5. 1940 – Lothar Scurla in Prague
The Making of a Sinecure
In late-January/early February 1940,363 the situation changed somewhat. Wenzel
appears to have returned to Berlin to take up a leading position in the Propaganda
Ministry’s Rundfunkkommandostelle (“Broadcast Command Office”).364 Referat IV –
Rundfunk received a new director in the person of 30-year-old Alt-Parteigenosse
Lothar Scurla.365 Prior to moving into office number 158 of Palais Czernin, Von
Neurath’s headquarters in Prague,366 Scurla, who was a former opera singer, had
managed a singularly unspectacular career in the Party’s broadcasting bureaucracy.
He had risen through the ranks of the NSDAP’s district party broadcasting
organization,
the
Gau-Funkstelle
of
Saxony,
to
achieve
the
position
of
Sachbearbeiter (administrative official) in the Reichsrundfunkkammer (“Reichs
Broadcasting Chamber”).367 The choice of Scurla for such a responsible position –
organizing broadcasting to what was essentially an occupied enemy population –
was a considerable gamble. Scurla was neither a trained journalist, propagandist nor
did he have any really meaningful radio experience. Prior to Prague, Scurla had not
directed a Reichssender or worked actively in the production of radio propaganda. At
most, he had contributed to the organization of some musical programming for the
Reichssender Leipzig. Instead, his career had included collecting membership fees
in the Reichsrundfunkkammer368 and occasionally writing articles for that
organization’s official periodical Der Rundfunk. It is not surprising, therefore, that
Scurla’s articles – although rich in National Socialist conviction – tend to lack any
practical or useful information for broadcasters.369 Furthermore, and perhaps most
363
364
365
366
367
368
369
Scurla was registered as living in Prague as of 1 February 1940 and namely just near to Czech
Radio in Prague XII., Fochova 9. See: NA-PŘ Praha, police registration card for Scurla.
DILLER: Rundfunkpolitik, page 364.
Lothar Scurla (born 1909 in Grube Ilse, Lausitz–1943? Eastern Front). See copy of a letter from
his brother Dr. Herbert Scurla to a relative of 11 July 1980 provided to the author by the Scurla
family.
NA-ÚŘP, carton 1164, document of 18 November 1940 with Scurla’s business address.
Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde, archival collection Personalvorgänge (Überw. der RRG) betr.
Rundfunkangehörige, Signatur 2500003113, film number L20, picture number 2615. Personnel
file der Reichskulturkammer.
Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde, archival collection RSK II, Personal- und Sachakten, A-Z,
Signatur 2101127718, film number I575, picture number 1417. Letter Scurla to Thürmer of 18
August 1939 regarding Thürmer’s membership fees in the Reichsrundfunkkammer.
See for example: “Tage des Deutschen Rundfunks, ein kulturpolitischer Ausblick”, Der Rundfunk,
volume 1, edition 5 (December 1937), pages 166-169; or “Gibt es eine Rundfunkwissenschaft,
Der Versuch einer wissenschaftlichen Auseinandersetzung mit dem Wissen im Rundfunk“, Der
Rundfunk, volume 1, edition 8 (March 1938), pp. 250-254.
126
critically, Scurla had no intimate knowledge of the Czech language, culture, mentality
or history whatsoever. The only skills he brought to the position in Prague were basic
organizational experience and an evident dedication to the National Socialist
Weltanschauung. At the same time, Scurla was threatened with unemployment, as
Goebbels had disbanded the Reichs Broadcasting Chamber as a superfluous
organization in October of the previous year, and distributed its membership among
the other chambers of the Reichskulturkammer according to their actual professions.
Against this background, Scurla’s posting to Prague seems more likely to have been
the securing of a sinecure for a veteran party official than a logical or carefully
considered step on the part of the invaders. It also raises questions about how
serious their plans were for winning over the Czech population through propaganda,
and suggests that the invaders did not consider a qualified propagandistic approach
to the Czech population as a top priority at the time. There can be several
explanations for this. Firstly, the Second World War had started on 1 September
1939. Berlin was concerned first and foremost with executing the war, and dealing
with the already occupied Czechs was less of a priority. Secondly, in this phase of
the war – late 1939/early 1940 – there were still several small, unoccupied countries
in Europe, whose populations might have reacted with alarm to too overt German
manipulation of Czech Radio. Thus, the intensity of that manipulation needed to
remain unobtrusive at this time for strategic reasons. Thirdly, Ferdinand Thürmer –
Scurla’s successor in office – speaks of a far-reaching ignorance about the situation
in Prague and an aversion to the problem of Prague and the Czech provinces within
the Reichsintendanz, the central broadcasting directorate in Berlin.370 Whatever their
considerations, Scurla received the position and worked diligently at developing it
and at expanding his own personal power. Already in March 1940, he described his
work in a telex for Berlin. Several of the items enumerated here will be clear to the
reader, however a discussion of the more important or controversial items will cast
light on the workings of the broadcasting administration within the occupation
authority. Due to the great array of topics it covers, the original text of the telex
appears in italics here with explanations and analysis in normal script:
370
THÜRMER, Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren pp. 5 and 20.
127
1. Administrative supervision of the Reichssender Böhmen within the framework of
the Decree of the Führer and Reichschancellor on the Establishment of the
Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.
ca. 35 employees
Scurla presumably placed supervision of the Reichssender Böhmen in first position,
because he accorded it the greatest importance and/or because it was the most
controversial item and he wanted to assert his authority in this regard. According to
Thürmer, Hans-Günther Marek,371 the Intendant of the Reichssender Böhmen, had
found the thought of taking orders from Scurla more than a minor imposition. That
was hardly surprising, however, given that Scurla was a minor Party bureaucrat
while Marek was something of a Nazi radio star. Marek had over a decade of
practical experience as a broadcaster, having started with the Norddeutscher
Rundfunk in Hamburg in January 1929 as an announcer and reporter. In an industry
as young as broadcasting was in 1940, that made him a seasoned and authoritative
pioneer. He advanced to the position of director of Hitler Youth broadcasts at the
Deutschlandsender on long-wave372 on 1 January 1935 and became chief of the
news desk (Zeitgeschehen) in May of the same year. In January 1937, his
department merged with the news desk of the Reichssender Berlin with Marek as
director. Needless to say, a man with this high-powered background was in no way
inclined to see the inexperienced and seven-years-younger Scurla as his superior.373
In a sense, this conflict was also pre-programmed from the outset and determined by
the general National Socialist administrative concept of the Führerprinzip, or the
principle of the leader, and the Nazi tendency to create competing administrative
institutions with overlapping areas of competence. The winner in situations like this
was frequently the more ruthless of the competitors. In this particular case, the
authority patterns were particularly complicated. On the one hand, Scurla was the
Führer of broadcasting within the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, which
371
372
373
Hans-Günther Marek (1902 in Forst, Lausitz–1967 in Hamburg). NSDAP-member as of 1 May
1933. Occupied the villa of the Rosenkranc family in Prague-Bubeneč in 1941. Email from the
Standesamt Forst (Lausitz) to the author of 21 December 2004 and Archiv Ministerstva Vnitra
(AMV), NSDAP-card of Marek.
The Deutschlandsender broadcast on long-wave as a nation-wide radio station audible in the
entire Reich and much of Europe. Much of its programming was made up of the best items from
the regional stations. Thus it was a highly prestigious station intended to represent Germany as a
whole.
“Rundfunksprecher sein heißt, diener am Werk sein!“ IN: Der Rundfunk, Blätter für
nationalsozialistische
Kulturgestaltung
mit
den
amtlichen
Mitteilungen
der
Reichsrundfunkkammer, 2. Volume, edition 4 (January 1939), page 81
128
officially included the Reichssender Böhmen and also held part of the
Reichssender’s target audience (i.e., indigenous Protectorate-based Germans
and/or Germans posted to the Protectorate from the Reich). Officially, he was
subordinate to the command-chain: Von Gregory Reichsprotektor Hitler, yet
also connected to and expected to coordinate with the Propaganda Ministry. At the
same time, the largest part of the Reichssender Böhmen’s broadcast territory (the
Sudetenland without Troppau District) lay within the Reich proper outside of the
Protectorate. Thus, Marek, as the Führer or in the specific terminology the Intendant
of a Reichssender, had to function also as a direct subordinate to Goebbels’s
Ministry in Berlin.
Furthermore, Marek also had years of experience doing so at the very heart of the
Reichsrundfunk in the Berlin-based central offices. This latter aspect itself will also
have been a sore point for Marek. His new position in Prague was on the surface a
promotion from news desk department chief to the Intendant of an entire station. At
the same time, it had meant a move from the center of the Reichsrundfunk to what
was de facto an insignificant and provincial station on the periphery of national
events. Furthermore, given Scurla’s complete lack of profile as a broadcast leader,
Marek apparently, and one can also say, reasonably, preferred the Berlin-based
chain of command, and he eventually moved to circumventing Scurla and Von
Gregory altogether and complaining directly to Reichsintendant Glasmeier for what
he perceived as a number of slights and injustices.374 According to Thürmer, given
this confusing constellation of overlapping authorities, an acrimonious conflict
ensued between Marek and Scurla over nearly the next two years, which involved
the Reichsintendanz in Berlin and the Office of the Reichsprotektor in Prague.
Ultimately, it thoroughly alienated both Marek’s and Scurla’s superiors, leaving the
highest Nazi officialdom in Berlin “hostilely disinterested” in broadcasting in the
Protectorate at all.375
374
375
NA-ÚŘP-ST 109-4-1423, page 109. Scurla’s justification letter of October 1941.
THÜRMER, Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, page 10.
129
2. Supervision and control of the entire program work and broadcast activity of the
Protectorate’s radio stations, namely:
a) the station Prague
ca. 340 employees
b) the station Brünn
ca. 130 employees
c) the station Mährisch Ostrau.
ca. 80 employees
d) the short-wave station Podiebrad
ca. 20 employees
Regarding Czech Radio, the situation was more straightforward. While Marek as a
Nazi radio star was well connected within the Reich’s broadcasting establishment, as
subjugated Czechs, Šourek, Kareš and their colleagues did not have access to the
same type of protection. Although they too were considerably more experienced than
Scurla, by comparison, they had fewer official options for resisting his rule.
Regarding the apparatus in place around Scurla, it consisted of his central office and
the chief censors, i.e., Maras, Schneider, Smutnik and Müller, at the individual Czech
radio stations. As had happened with the staffing of the Reichssender Wien after the
occupation of Austria, a mixture of Reichs-German and indigenous-German
employees took control with a Reichs-German (Scurla) ultimately in the leading
position. It would appear that Berlin preferred to see people from their own ranks in
power rather than take a risk with locals, regardless of how much those local
Germans had aided the National Socialist cause previously, for example by
undermining and subverting the Czechoslovak Republic prior to the Nazis’ takeover.
Scurla’s central office in Prague directly employed at least one assistant
administrator from Berlin376 named Walter Dittmann (1908-?)377 as well as the 23year-old Sudeten-German Wilhelm Ansorge.378
3. Surveillance of the construction work on the large-scale station Brünn-Dobrochau
[Station Danube], whose construction is currently being accelerated...
As discussed previously, this was the 100 kW medium-wave station originally
intended to improve reception in Moravia, named Reichssender Donau, which was
376
377
378
WEINBRENNER: Handbuch des Deutschen Rundfunks Jahrbuch 1939/1940, page 242
NA-PŘ Praha, Evidence obyvatelstva 1931-1940, policejní přihláška Dittmann, (NA, archival
collection Polizeidirektion in Prag, Einwohnerregister 1931-1940, Meldekarte Dittmann).
NA-PŘ Praha, Evidence obyvatelstva 1931-1940, police registration card for Ansorge.
130
then diverted to broadcasting propaganda programming especially to southeastern
Europe.
4. Planning, design and execution of the Czech Hour on Reichssender Böhmen:
circle of collaborators ca. 40 persons
In January and March 1941, Marek repeatedly requested the placement of the
Česká hodina broadcasts on the waves of the Reichssender Donau (BrnoDobrochov) or the Reichssender Alpen (Graz). However, this met with no success.
The fact alone that Marek was promoting better distribution of the programming
suggests that Scurla was also unable to exercise control over Item 4 of his own job
description. Nevertheless, Goebbels or his subordinates rejected the idea noting that
those stations were needed for propaganda broadcasts to Romania and for
broadcasts to German troops operating in the Balkans region.379 Apparently, the
Propaganda Ministry did not consider it a priority to assure easy access to the Česká
hodina throughout the entire Protectorate. Towards the end of 1941, with the
changes that ensued around the arrival of Reinhard Heydrich in Prague, the Česká
hodina programs were replaced by the series Hlasy doby (“Voices of the Time”) from
Czech Radio’s main station in Prague.380 However, they were eventually abandoned
in April 1942.381 Apparently, the invaders did not consider this series a success.
5. Radio- und Fax [Hellschreiber-] information service [for the entire Group]...
6. Supervision of the entire telex work of the Group for Cultural-Political Affairs...
These two items were more or less secretarial duties connected to the use of fax
machines (Hellschreiber) and telexes. Their inclusion in the job description of the
Broadcasting Sub-group was due simply to their technical similarity to broadcasting
as a means of electronic communication at the time, which is a fairly mechanical
consideration on the one hand, and which will also have greatly increased the work
load of Scurla’s office. Nevertheless, it will also have offered Scurla’s staff a view of
379
380
381
NA-ÚŘP-ST 109-4-1423, page 162, letter Promi an Marek vom 6.I.1941 und S. 163 letter Promi
an Marek vom 21.III.1941.
NA-NárS, carton 108, Note from Kříž to the programming directorate of Czech Radio from 6
January 1942.
NA-NárS, carton 106, inventory number 1537. Testimony of the accused Alois Kříž of 18 June
1946, and NA-NárS, carton 107, call number 60, note from Kříž to Maras of 1 April 1942.
131
important communications with Berlin and elsewhere, as these communications
passed through their hands.
7. Participation in the organizational reconstruction of the entire radio industry in the
Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, their sole political direction with the final
goal of centralization in a “Broadcasting Consortium of the Protectorate of
Bohemia and Moravia.”382
Item 7 of Scurla’s duties concerning the centralization of the Protectorate’s radio
industry into a Rundfunk-Arbeitsgemeinschaft383 was arguably an area of work better
suited to his skills. It was a purely bureaucratic undertaking aimed at controlling all
areas of radio production and distribution within the Protectorate of Bohemia and
Moravia.384 Surprisingly, it took Scurla no less than one year to achieve this
particular goal, however. On 6 February 1941, Reichsprotektor Von Neurath issued a
Decree on the Establishment of a Broadcasting Consortium in Bohemia and
Moravia,385 which took effect four days later. On the evening of 10 February 1941,
Scurla held a gala reception to celebrate the launch of the new organization, to
which he invited many of his colleagues from the Office of the Reichsprotektor, the
government of the Protectorate, the Propaganda Ministry, the Reichs Directorate of
the NSDAP, the Reichs-Rundfunk-Gesellschaft, Czech Radio and representatives of
the radio manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers.
The Broadcasting Consortium’s main objectives included:
a) the creation of the prerequisites for a unified broadcasting policy,
b) the maintenance and increase in the number of radio subscribers through
common work and common advertising,
c) common propaganda for broadcasting and for the radio industry. 386
382
383
384
385
386
In the original: Rundfunkarbeitsgemeinschaft des Protektorates Böhmen und Mähren.
In Czech, officially Rozhlasové pracovní společenství v Čechách a na Moravě. See
Verordnungsblatt des Reichsprotektors 1941 page 54. In English, the term “Broadcasting
Consortium in Bohemia and Moravia” seems most appropriate.
REIM, Rudolf, Rundfunkarbeitsgemeinschaft in Böhmen und Mähren, Rundfunk-Archiv, volume
14., edition 2 (February 1941), page 44.
Verordnungsblatt des Reichsprotektors in Böhmen und Mähren (Official Legal Gazette of the
Reichsprotektor in Bohemia and Moravia) Volume 1941, page 54.
REIM, Rudolf, Rundfunkarbeitsgemeinschaft in Böhmen und Mähren, Rundfunk-Archiv, volume
14., edition 2 (February 1941), page 43.
132
Thus, even as late as two years into the occupation, the Nazis themselves did not
consider their radio policy within the Protectorate “unified”, and set about to change
this state-of-affairs. To these ends, the consortium, which was modeled on and
worked closely with its Reichs-German counterpart, became a mandatory
organization for all producers, wholesalers and retailers of radios and their
component parts in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. Thirteen domestic
firms and local branches of international radio manufacturers (such as Philips,
Telefunken and Tungsram) joined the Cartell of the Radio Industry. Sixteen radio
wholesalers and 1,240 radio retailers were organized in the corresponding individual
cartels as well.387
Interestingly, the statutes of the Consortium stipulated that members of these
individual cartels were only authorized to supply and obtain radios and component
parts from other members of the cartels. This meant specifically a separation of the
Protectorate’s radio industry from the radio industry of the rest of the Reich.388 There
can be more than one explanation for this. In peacetime, such a regulation might be
imposed to protect Germany industry from competition from foreign imports. Given
the wartime shortages affecting every aspect of consumers’ lives in the Great
German Reich, however, it seems more likely that the authorities were trying to keep
the output of local radio production within the Protectorate itself, i.e., protect the local
market from shortages that would hamper an increase in listenership rates. Thürmer
confirmed this in his post-war apology of his time as Scurla’s successor.389
Whatever the exact motivation was in this case, the foundation of this consortium
ultimately produced a considerable reservoir of financial resources, which Scurla
controlled. All members, including Czech Radio, had to pay hefty membership
fees.390 Less than two months from the consortium’s inception, on 1 April 1941, the
fees for Czech Radio alone were estimated at no less than K 318,750.391
8. Participation in the determination of radio fees in the Protectorate.
387
388
389
390
391
REIM, Rudolf, Rundfunkarbeitsgemeinschaft in Böhmen und Mähren, Rundfunk-Archiv, volume
14., edition 2 (February 1941), pp. 45-46.
REIM, Rudolf, Rundfunkarbeitsgemeinschaft in Böhmen und Mähren, Rundfunk-Archiv, volume
14., edition 2 (February 1941), pp. 45-46.
THÜRMER, Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, page 27.
THÜRMER, Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, page 2.
NA, ÚŘP, carton 1134, page 22.
133
Participation in the determination of radio fees in the Protectorate – touches upon a
problem, which Scurla would not completely solve during his tenure in Prague.
9. Conducting of all sovereign duties of the Reichs-Propaganda-Directorate’s Office
of Broadcasting. [Dr. Goebbels-radio donation, receiver-distribution etc.]
The Dr. Goebbels-radio donation, receiver-distribution actions were, as already
mentioned, a form of public relations effort. They entailed the donation of free radios
to the needy, war invalids, war widows, etc., which Goebbels generally undertook to
celebrate the occasion of Hitler’s birthday. Clearly, this type of campaign served
multiple purposes at once. First of all, it directly increased radio listenership among
the population by as much as 5,000 listeners at once,392 which was not perhaps an
enormous number, but nevertheless noteworthy, and especially so after the onset of
war-time shortages. More importantly, however, media reports about these
donations enhanced the regime’s image as a modernizing force, i.e., by bringing this
most modern of mediums where it had not yet penetrated. Furthermore, it presented
the regime in the positive light of caring in a concrete, personal manner for those
who had served the Fatherland or for those who were otherwise excluded from
mainstream life due to poverty.
10. Closest cooperation with the Broadcast Command Office of the Reichs Ministry
for People’s Enlightenment and Propaganda. Participation of the director in all
important broadcasting discussions in the Reich and in the meetings of the
station directors of the Reichsrundfunk-Gesellschaft.393
The final item in the list is simply a declaration of loyalty to this highest body within
the Propaganda Ministry’s broadcasting establishment and the securing of political
backing from this important institution within the Propaganda Ministry. At the same
time, “participation of the director in all important broadcasting discussions in the
Reich and in the meetings of the station directors of the ReichsrundfunkGesellschaft” – was undoubtedly a great boon to Scurla, as it placed this “little man
392
393
Der Neue Tag, volume 4, No. 107, (18 April 1942), page 3.
NA-ÚŘP, carton 1134, telex of 17 March 1940 on the structure and duties of the Sub-group
Broadcasting of the Group Cultural-political Affairs of the Office of the Reichsprotektor in Bohemia
and Moravia.
134
from the District Party Broadcasting Directorate of Saxony”394 in the upper echelons
of the RRG itself. Taken together, this was however an extremely ambitious job
description and undoubtedly also a very heavy workload.
Almost immediately, Broadcasting Adviser Scurla had an effect on Czech Radio’s
management with an aim to manipulating its programming more closely. On 1 March
1940, just a few weeks after arriving in Prague a programming directorate395 was
constituted at Czech Radio. According to the model applicable in German
broadcasting, Miloš Kareš (1891-1944) was also named Intendant.396 The Eliáš
government had, in fact, established Kareš in this position already in the summer of
1939, however without using the German title.397 Although originally a high official of
the TO PMR, most of Kareš’s actual experience in broadcasting had been in radio
drama. His university degree was in musical history, while he was also active in
literature and even translated poetry by Rilke into Czech.398 Thus, this appointment
appears somewhat apolitical, perhaps analogous to the appointment of Emil Hácha,
the former judge, to the position of Czecho-Slovak and later Protectorate president.
Around this same time, Germany’s propaganda officials in the Protectorate also
decided to circumvent Czech Radio’s management and approach some of its staff
members directly. From 22 February to 1 March 1940, the Propaganda Ministry
organized what was to become a relatively common event: a tour by Protectorate
journalists to important military sites. In later years, such tours included conquered
Benelux and France, occupied Soviet territories, etc. Goebbels’s intention with such
activities, which he would later expand to include important Czech personalities from
the world of culture, was to make an impression on the guests about Germany’s
military prowess in the hope that they would then pass on their first-hand
impressions to their surroundings and, in the case of journalists, obviously also to the
public at large. In essence, it was a type of public relations for the might and
invincibility of the Wehrmacht, the achievements of the Nazi system, the unity of
Germany, etc. In this particular instance, the tour included several top people from
394
395
396
397
398
THÜRMER, Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, page 15.
In German: Programm-Intendantur. In Czech: programová intendantura.
AČRo historic archival collection Kareš and NA-NárS, carton 107, call number 60. Sketch of the
organization and activity of the Czech Broadcasting Corporation during the occupation by
personnel manager Karel Remeš of 26 June 1946.
AČRo historic archival collection Kareš.
See: 50 let dr. Miloše Kareše (“50 Years of Dr. Miloše Kareš”), Týden rozhlasu, volume VIII,
edition 46, (15 November 1941), page 5.
135
the ranks of the Protectorate’s media system. In fact, the group was a virtual who’s
who of activist journalists, several of whom were to face long jail sentences or even
the death penalty for treason after the war. Also traveling along were the top
echelons of Department IV – Cultural Policy and several influential Protectoratebased German media officials. The participants were:
1. Major Franz Ritter von Goss from the Wehrmacht’s liaison office with the Office
of the Reichsprotektor;
2. Karl Freiherr von Gregory, director of Department IV – Cultural Policy in the
Office of the Reichsprotektor;
3. Wolfgang Wolfram von Wolmar, director of Department IV’s Press Group;
4. Georg Schneider, main censor representative at Czech Radio;
5. Max Karg, director of the influential Prager Zeitungsdienst news agency;
6. Erhart Herzig, from the NSDAP’s official daily in the Protectorate Der Neue Tag;
7. Wolfgang Trübwasser from the Volksdeutsche Zeitung in Brno.
8. Václav Linhart, the 25-year-old organizer of Czech Radio’s short-wave
broadcasts, on assignment with ČTK at the time;
9. Emil Vrba, chief of Czech Radio’s announcers;399
10. Viktor Srkal from Národní Politika daily in Prague;
11. Ctibor Melč, from the Press Department of the Presidium of Council of Ministers;
12. Vladimír Ryba from Národní Práce daily in Prague;
13. František Paulus from “Tempo” publishing house in Prague;
14. Valerij Vilinskij, from Centro-Press in Prague;
15. Jaroslav Křemen from A-Zet daily in Prague;
16. Ant. J. Kožíšek from Moravská Orlice daily in Brno;
17. Jaroslav Pelíšek, from the Baťa shoe concern in Zlín;
18. and Bohuslav Raymann, from Prague-Braník.
It was not the Germans alone, however, who sought to interfere with Czech Radio’s
programming at this time. The spring of 1940 saw the strongest intensification of
attempts by the main Czech political party, the National Solidarity, to exert influence
over Czech Radio. A tighter programming secretariat formed around Kareš, which
included three rather problematic individuals, two of which the National Solidarity
399
HRDLIČKA: Rozhlas v okupaci, page 153.
136
directly imposed on the company. Judging from correspondence connected with their
appointments, the management of Czech Radio resented these individuals at least
as much as they disliked their German minders. The more important of the two was
Břetislav Zahradník, the broadcasting adviser of the National Solidarity, who started
on 1 April 1940.400 Josef Nebeský, a leading former Agrarian politician and one of
the main leaders of the National Solidarity had personally organized Zahradník’s
appointment via the Ministry of Transport, and arranged for Zahradník to have an
advisory role in Czech Radio’s board of directors as well as daily contact with
Intendant Kareš. Zahradník’s role at Czech Radio strengthened after the arrest of
Bohuslav Horák for activities in the PVVZ resistance group in August 1940 as
Zahradník was appointed to work coordinating the overall line of the specialized
Workers’, Agricultural and Trade broadcasts thereafter.401
The second was an organist from a Catholic school in Prague-Dejvice named
Ladislav Vachulka (1910-?). Vachulka came from the milieu of the former Catholic
People’s Party through which he had become involved in the National Solidarity’s
broadcasting committee. He received the position of chief music censor at Czech
Radio on 1 March 1940. Vachulka and Czech Radio had had a 10-year-long and
often unhappy relationship at this point. In the late 1930’s Radiojournal had dropped
a ladies’ vocalist group Vachulka managed called the Bajo-Trio. Thereafter,
Vachulka had directed the radio rubric of the Catholic paper Lidové listy, from which
he frequently attacked the Radiojournal’s “music programming hatefully and
unjustly.”402 The main duties of the music censor entailed eliminating the
broadcasting of works by Jewish and other proscribed composers. This did not
require a great deal of work, however, which left Vachulka plenty of time to interfere
in other affairs at Czech Radio. Ferdinand Thürmer eventually dismissed Vachulka in
June of 1942 as completely superfluous.403
The last member of this unpopular trio was an internal appointment, which however
can only have come at the behest of the Deutsche Dienststelle. Bedřich Pěkný
(1904-?) had been a long-term member of staff with an unremarkable career in the
400
401
402
403
AČRo, personnel file Zahradník.
AČRo, personnel file Zahradník.
AČRo, personnel file Vachulka. Unsigned confidential letter, most likely from K.B. Jirák, to
Thürmer on 5 May 1942.
In the original: “Tschechischer Rundfunk hatte während der ganzen Vertragszeit für Herrn Dr.
Vachulka, Doktor musikalischer Wissenschaft, keine zweckmässige Beschäftigung und er kann
ihn auch derzeit nicht entsprechend verwenden.” See AČRo, personnel file.
137
School Radio (školní rozhlas) starting in 1931. At some point, he became a confidant
of Georg Schneider, whom he helped in machinations that eventually led to the
removal of General Director Šourek in March 1941.404 After the war, Personnel
Manager Remeš testified that these three men “abused the circumstances to
interfere all over the company.”405
In the spring of 1940, Hubert Masařík, director of the Coordination Department of the
Presidium of the Council of Ministers, was appointed director of the board of Czech
Radio to replace Jindřich Dobiáš.406 Masařík was a close collaborator of General
Alois Eliáš, who had become head of the Protectorate’s government on 27 April
1939. Masařík, a former Czechoslovak diplomat in Brussels and Sofia and
parliamentary adviser to foreign ministers Beneš and Krofta, had also been a
member of Beneš’s Czechoslovak National Socialist Party.
However, staffing was not only an area subjected to change in 1940. Scurla also
moved to reorganize the status of Czech Radio as a company. On 27 September
1940, the Reichsprotektor in Bohemia and Moravia ordered the Protectorate’s
government to hand over 49% of the shares in Czech Radio and to confiscate the
remaining 51% of the company’s stocks from the private shareholders.407 The official
explanation for the change was that, Czech Radio’s activity (i.e., through its farreaching radio waves) had an effect beyond the borders of the Protectorate itself.
This qualified Czech Radio not only as a subject of the Czech cultural autonomy
alone, but also as a matter that touched upon the interests of the Great German
Reich.408 Furthermore, as Lothar Scurla later explained in German to an assembly of
Czech Radio staff, an institution as important as Czech Radio had no business
paying out dividends to private shareholders, when all of its resources were needed
to serve society as a whole.409
Even this late into the occupation, however, the Nazi authorities took great pains to
uphold the pretence of a Czech cultural autonomy. First of all, the government of the
404
405
406
407
408
409
See AČRo, personnel file Pěkný.
NA-NárS, carton 107, call number 60, Sketch of the organization and activity of the Czech
Broadcasting Corporation during the occupation by personnel manager Karel Remeš of 26 June
1946, page 1.
HRDLIČKA: Rozhlas v okupaci page 157.
HRDLIČKA: Rozhlas v okupaci page 157.
NA-NárS, TNS 17/46, carton 60, page 127/2, speech by Hubert Masařík to the staff of Czech
Radio on 9 April 1941.
NA-NárS, TNS 17/46, carton 60, page 127/6, speech by Lothar Scurla to the staff of Czech Radio
on 9 April 1941.
138
Protectorate officially held a majority of the shares in the company. Furthermore, the
new three-member administrative council was made up of two Czechs –
Radiojournal founder and long-time company director Ladislav Šourek and Hubert
Masařík – and one German, namely Lothar Scurla. Publicly, Scurla even took on the
title of “deputy head” (místopředseda) of the board behind Masařík, who figured as
its official head.410 This gave the appearance of a majority Czech institution. Along
with the board, the government of the Protectorate and the Office of the
Reichsprotektor were to appoint, in parity, a supervisory council numbering between
eight and 10 members, although Von Gregory’s concurrent appointment as head of
that council somewhat undermined its superficial appearance of national balance.411
Nevertheless, on the surface at least, the new state of the company’s ownership and
administration appeared to be predominantly in Czech hands.
The reality was quite different, however. A separate, syndicate contract – also
between the German Reich, represented by the Office of the Reichsprotektor, and
the government of the Protectorate – stipulated that “In all matters that exceed the
framework of the autonomous Czech cultural work or which directly touch on the
interests of the Great German Reich, the voice of the Reich or of the members of the
administrative and supervisory board appointed by the Reichsprotektor decides via
decision-making in the General Assembly, in the administrative and supervisory
council of the company. Should doubts arise as to whether a question falls into this
category, the Reichsprotektor decides.”412 Naturally, since the Reichsprotektor could
also annul and replace any legal act or administrative measure he deemed contrary
to the interests of the Reich – according to article 5, paragraphs 4 and 5 of Hitler’s
decree on the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia – it was quite clear where the
real decision-making power at Czech Radio lay. In effect, Scurla or the men behind
him – Von Gregory and the Reichsprotektor – had the final authority in all matters of
410
411
412
NA-NárS, carton 106, order number 51. Testimony of Dr. Josef Zdeněk Morávek, former technical
director of Český Rozhlas, of 18 June 1946.
NA-NárS, TNS 17/46, carton 60, page 127/2, speech by Hubert Masařík to the staff of Czech
Radio on 9 April 1941.
In the original: “In allen Angelegenheiten, die den Rahmen der autonomen tschechischen
kulturellen Arbeit überschreiten oder unmittelbar die Interessen des Grossdeutschen Reichs
berühren, entscheidet bei Beschlussfassung in der Generalversammlung im Verwaltungs- und
Aufsichtsrats der Gesellschaft die Stimme des Reiches bezw. Der vom Reichsprotektor bestellten
Mitglieder des Verwaltungs- und Aufsichtsrats. Sollte Zweifel entstehen, ob eine Frage in diese
Kategorie fällt, entscheidet der Reichsprotektor.” NA-ÚŘP-ST 109-4-1423, page 131, Syndicate
contract between the German Reich and the government of the Protectorate of 27 September
1940.
139
dispute.413 As Karl Hermann Frank explained in a letter to Goebbels, given the
syndicate contract, the actual stipulations of the agreement granting the official
dominance to the Czechs in terms of capital shares etc., were “practically
meaningless”.414
As for Scurla himself, the new position must also have been rather pleasing
personally. Not only did he have a grip on the reins of power at Czech Radio, but the
new “deputy head” of the board of directors was also eligible for a generous salary
for his efforts.415 As of 1 October 1940 Scurla’s Referat also advanced to the position
of an independent “Gruppe Rundfunk” within Department IV.416 On the one hand,
this development suggests that at least Von Gregory was satisfied with Scurla’s work
at the time. On the other hand, this change reflects a formalization or stabilization in
the institutional development of Department IV at this point in the occupation.
Concrete Effects on Programming in the Period
In terms of programming, the presence of the National Solidarity people coincided
with a marked increase in the frequency of various five- to ten-minute “Okénko”417,
“Hlídka”418 and “Beseda”419 broadcasts by the National Solidarity, which became
daily or nearly daily events. Unfortunately, very little remains of the content of these
programs, as National Solidarity staff members were allowed to liquidate the party’s
archives after liberation in 1945.420 Nonetheless, in this phase prior to the defeat of
France and the National Solidarity’s shift to abject collaboration, we can expect that
the programming emphasized Czech culture and Czech national values. This
appears to be the case for much of Czech Radio production at the time, which
concentrated heavily on non-political Czech cultural topics. For example, the Cultural
413
414
415
416
417
418
419
420
NA-NárS, carton 107, call number 60. Sketch of the organization and activity of the Czech
Broadcasting Corporation during the occupation by personnel manager Karel Remeš of 26 June
1946, page 1.
ST-AMV, 109-4-1423, page 126, letter Frank to Goebbels of 1 October 1940.
AČRo, personnel file.
Rundfunk-Archiv, volume 14, edition 1 (January 1941), page 35.
Starting in the spring of 1940 there were “Okénko Národního souručenství” (“Little Window of the
National Community”) or “Okénko Kulturní rady N.S.” (“Little Window of the Cultural Council of the
National Community”). See Náš rozhlas, vol. XVIII, edition 26 (23–29 June1940), page 14. The
“Okénko” programs were finally replaced by “Časové vložky” (“Time Inserts”) and “Politické
přehledy” (“Political Overviews”) as well as German language courses in October 1940.
In English: “Guard”.
In English: A “beseda” is generally a meeting or assembly of several people to discuss a topic.
This task kept National Community staff busy well into 1946 and allowed them virtually to
eradicate the party’s entire archives. See: NA, archival collection Národní Souručenství, research
aid number 301.
140
Council of the National Solidarity organized a large-scale campaign among theaters,
orchestras, choirs and other cultural institutions of the Protectorate, including Czech
Radio, declaring the month of May 1940 as the Český hudební máj (“Czech MusicMay”). This campaign led to broadcasts featuring a broad spectrum of Czech music,
ranging from classical works by Antonín Dvořák, Bedřich Smetana, Josef Suk etc.,
via Czech folk music to modern dance music by Karel Vlach and his swing orchestra.
The use of the word “máj” in the title of this campaign, instead of the more common
Czech word for the name of the month – “květen” – was definitely a reference to the
famous poem “Máj” by Karel Hynek Mácha, the Czech national poet of the romantic
period, the time in the 19th century of the cultural rebirth of the Czech nation. The
official radio program guide Náš rozhlas also dedicated a long article connecting
1940’s “musical máj” with older traditions dating back to the baroque period, but
more specifically to performances of Smetana’s works between 1866 and 1900 and
also in connection with Smetana’s interaction with Jan Neruda.421
Late 1939 had however also seen the introduction of occasional “broadcasts of
German content”422 at Czech Radio such as the German-language teaching
programs introduced at Prague I and Moravská Ostrava. The authors of most of
these broadcasts were not identified, but undoubtedly many will simply have been
translated programs produced originally in Berlin. In a compilation Maras prepared
for Von Gregory in August of 1940, he was able to identify no fewer than 169 hours
and nine minutes of such programming for the period of 1 January to 30 June 1940.
With an average broadcast day of approximately 16 hours, this would mean nearly
6% of total programming. While that may seem like a considerable amount of
airtime, nevertheless, when examined for content, it does not testify to the presence
of any strongly proactive role vis-à-vis the Czechs for Scurla or his subordinates.
421
422
See: Český hudební máj před šedesátí lety in: Náš rozhlas, vol. XVIII, edition 22, (25-31 May
1940), page 4.
In the original: “Sendungen deutschen Inhaltes am Tschechischen Rundfunk”. NA, ÚŘP, carton
1164. Letter Dittmann to Von Gregory of 20 August 1940.
141
Programs of German Content in the Czech Radio Percentage
1 January-30 June 1940
of
total
broadcast
time
%
Music
49
Reichssendungen (broadcasts by all German
27
stations in the German language)
Culture (including radio plays, theater, book
12
discussions, etc.)
Politics
4
School and youth broadcasts
3
Women’s broadcasts
1
German landscapes (the Rhine, Alps, etc.)
1
Economic broadcasts
1
Workers’ broadcasts
1
Agricultural broadcasts
1
First of all, nearly half of the items identified were musical productions. Just over
one-quarter of broadcasts were mandatory re-broadcasts from Berlin including entire
days in which the Czech stations simply turned their airwaves over to the
Reichsrundfunk’s reporting on the invasions of Norway, the Netherlands and
Belgium and later several hours dedicated to the fall of France and the signing of the
armistice. Although, there were Czech translations of the main news during the
broadcasts after 10 May covering the occupation of the Netherlands and Belgium,
most of the rest of this programming would have been entirely in the German
language and, therefore, of questionable efficacy in approaching Czech listeners.
The remaining programs were various pro-German broadcasts in the individual
genres as listed. Nevertheless, even these taken together made up no more than
1.5% of total air-time for the first six months of 1940. Unquestionably, this was too
little for an effective influencing of Czech public opinion.
142
On 2 June 1940, with much of Western Europe already occupied by the Wehrmacht,
daily broadcasts “together with the Reichsrundfunk”423 commenced at Czech Radio.
In reality, these were not broadcasts produced in cooperation with the
Reichsrundfunk, but simply re-broadcasts in German from the Reichsrundfunk.
Initially these newscasts only lasted for 15 minutes between 14:00 and 14:15 hours.
However, their duration increased with the success of Hitler’s armies in the West. As
of Monday, 17 June 1940, these broadcasts were lengthened to a full hour to include
a report from the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces and some musical
interludes!424
At around this time – spring of 1940 – Emanuel Moravec’s broadcast work also
started to intensify. As of May, his “Military-political considerations” had become a
weekly or even more frequent event425 and were to continue as such for nearly
another two years. For instance, he explained to the Czech listener the Wehrmacht’s
occupation of the Benelux countries as a matter of pre-empting ostensible FrancoBritish intentions of doing the same. That was surely a none too credible argument
given that France and Britain had had a full eight months to invade these countries
since the outbreak of war the previous September, had they chosen to do so.
Nevertheless, Moravec fully took over the Nazi official line that the invasion had been
an effort to “protect” these countries from Franco-British aggression. To support this
supposition, he then filled the Czech ether with lectures undoubtedly reminiscent of
his professorship at the military college. One dedicated to “Vanquished Holland” on
14 May 1940 clearly reads like a page from a military-geographic textbook.
“The common border of Luxembourg, Belgium and Holland with Germany measures
700 km, but the bisecting line connecting the southern tip of Luxembourg at the
German border with the Dutch coast at the mouth of the Ems measures 450 km. And
that is the width of the configuration of the German armed forces that started
marching towards the West on 10 May… If we connect Tilburg with Rotterdam and
Rotterdam with the southern bank of Lake Zuiderzee, we get the territory in Holland,
which was already under German control west of that line on 13 May… Previously
British airplanes from the southeastern coasts of England regularly chose the route
423
424
425
In the original: “Společně s Říšským rozhlasem”.
Týden rozhlasu, volume VII, (1940) edition 25, (15 June 1940), page 16.
PERNES: Až na dno zrady Emanuel Moravec, page 146.
143
via northern Holland. Today those airplanes will have German anti-aircraft fighter
planes and guns in their path 120 to 150 km to the west of the German border. To
Berlin, the closest distance was about 600 km from northern Alsace, from British
coasts 800 km, but from northeastern Holland only 400 km. Until 10 May, the
Germans had 400 km from their western border to London. Now from Rotterdam
they only have 300 km to there and to the eastern coasts of England only 180
km.”426
As the German offensive in Western Europe continued well into France, so too did
Moravec’s narration of events. Just one month later, he explained events to the
Czech listener as follows:
“The map shows that from 5 to 11 June, i.e., in seven days, the German armies
covered in hard fighting a straight line of 100-120 km from the Somme to the lower
Seine. If we add maneuvering to this, it will be 150 to 180 km. That means that they
progressed, while smashing Weygand’s defense, at a speed of 20-25 km per day.
The center of the German front, which aimed to the southwest via Soissons and
which in the first days of the operation actually represented the eastern wing of the
offensive, broke through from Aisne to the Marne and covered 40 km.”427
The medium of radio was becoming a serious point of contention in this period,
however, as well, and not only between Germany and other countries, but within the
426
427
From the broadcast “Zdolané Holandsko”. In the original: “Společná hranice Lucemburska, Belgie
a Holandska s Německem měří 700 km, ale přimka spojující při německých hranicích jižní cíp
Lucemburska s holandským pobřežím u ústí Emže, měří 450 km. A to je šířka sestavy
německých branných sil, které se 10. května daly na pochod k západu... Spojíme-li Tilburg
s Rotterdamem a Rotterdam s jižním pobřežím Zuiderského jezera, dostaneme území, které
v Holandsku na západ od této spojnice už 13. května bylo pod německou mocí... Dříve britská
letadla z jihovýchodních břehů Anglie volila pravidelně cestu přes severní Holandsko. Dnes těmto
letadlům na čáře Harlingen—Rotterdam bude v cestě německá protiletecká obrana stíhaček a děl
120 až 150 km na západ od německé hranice. Nad Berlin bylo nejblíže ze severniho Elsassu, asi
600 km, od britských břehů 800 km, ale ze severovýchodního Holandska jen 400 km. Ze
západních německých hranic do 10. května měli Němci nad Londýn 400 km. Nyní z Rotterdamu
tam mají jen 300 km a k východním břehům Anglie jen 180 km.” MORAVEC: Tři roky, pages 3436.
From the broadcast “Italie válčí” from 12 June 1940. In the original: “Mapa ukazuje, že od 5. do
11. června, tedy během sedmi dnů, německé armády od Sommy k dolní Seině urazily v těžkých
bojích v přímé čáře 100-120 km. Započteme-li do toho manévrování, bude to 150 až 180 km. To
znamená, že postupovaly, drtíce Weygandovu obranu, rychlostí 20-25 km za den. Střed německé
fronty, který směroval na jihozápad přes Soissons a který v prvých dnech operací představoval
vlastně východní křídlo ofensivy, postoupil od Aisny na Marnu a urazil 40 km.” MORAVEC: Tři
roky, page 56.
144
German Reich itself. This struggle was to have direct and negative effects on Czech
Radio’s output by causing the broadcast day of Czech stations to end already at
20:15 hours. There is a greater story behind this than one might first expect. It was
not Scurla, Maras or even Goebbels who caused the situation, and indeed it ran
rather contrary to their overall goal of reaching the population via radio. Instead,
none other than Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring, the head of the German Air
Force, the Luftwaffe, had ordered the shutting down of broadcasting in the evening
hours. Apparently driven by concern that British bomber squadrons could tune into
the individual Reichssender and thereby guide themselves better to targets in the
Reich, Göring ordered that individual stations either be shut off with the approach of
darkness, or with the approach of foreign bombers or broadcast on different or
common frequencies with other stations. Already on 10 May, with the invasion of the
Benelux countries, all Reichssender with the exception of the Deutschlandsender,
Böhmen, Bremen, Breslau, Danzig and Königsberg had been ordered to shut down
at 22:15 hours. The Reichssender Köln (Cologne), in the exposed, western-most
region of the country even had to shut down one hour earlier.428
One of the most problematic aspects of Göring’s policy towards broadcasting was
that it was not well planned or well thought out. Göring kept changing demands over
the summer of 1940 as the air battle over Britain reached its climax and even into the
Christmas season. For example, on 1 October 1940, the most important stations had
to switch evening broadcasts to the frequency of the Reichssender Breslau.429
Initially, this change was scheduled for 20:15 hours, but on 11 November 1940 with
the shorter winter days, the switch was brought forward already to 19:30 hours.430
Furthermore, a complicated extra pattern of shut downs came into force for stations
in close proximity to each other when enemy aircraft approached their area. Thus,
when British bombers closed in on Berlin, Leipzig also went off the air. Apart from
the potential for the stations to jam each other mutually on the common frequency,
these constant changes caused considerable chaos primarily among the German
radio audience, and created the danger of them tuning into non-German stations.
After months of negotiations on the subject, Goebbels only managed to reestablish
primacy of radio work after Christmas 1940.
428
429
430
DILLER: Rundfunkpolitik, page 378.
DILLER: Rundfunkpolitik, page 378.
DILLER: Rundfunkpolitik, page 379.
145
As for the German censors around Scurla, they were also becoming more proactive,
however, perhaps not as successfully as they would have liked. As already
mentioned, they remained outside of the official program planning meetings and
conferences even in 1940, preferring instead to have smaller meetings with selected
members of Czech Radio’s staff. When studying the protocol of one such a meeting
between Erich Smutnik on the one hand and leaders of Czech Radio in Brno –
Vetterl, Pulkrábek, Chalupa and Chief Conductor Bakala – on the other, the reader
can not fail to gain the impression that at least this German censor was dealing with
Czechs far his superior in terms of intelligence and cunning. Vetterl and colleagues
rather cleverly sought to instrumentalize Smutnik for their own purposes, and judging
by the innocent tone of his letter to Scurla, Smutnik fell for their strategy completely.
As he reported: “At the start it should be emphasized that in the course of this
program meeting, the wish was expressed spontaneously by the Czech gentlemen
to work as closely as possible with the German official representative for
broadcasting [PRP: i.e., Scurla], with the assurance of their strictest loyalty, and
even with the request to protect them from aspersions from the public and the press,
of which the first [group] describes them as traitors, because in their efforts to abide
by German directives they allegedly forget Czech national interests; from the second
[group], which accuses them of Beneschism (sic!), because for this group no
accommodation or cooperation is ever sufficient.”431
This strategy on the part of Czech Radio’s staff was as clever as it was duplicitous.
In one short meeting they managed A) to paint themselves as the most loyal of
subordinates working in the German interests against a negative Czech general
public, while B) potentially enlisting German protection against rogue elements of the
Czech nation – i.e., presumably the Vlajka and potentially the more collaborationist
elements among the National Solidarity. Smutnik, for his part, evidently accepted the
spontaneity of his interlocutors’ declarations of loyalty as proof their genuine
431
In the original: “Eingangs sei betont, dass im Verlaufe dieser Programmsitzung von den
tschechischen Herren spontan der Wunsch geäussert wurde, aufs Engste mit dem deutschen
Beauftragten für den Rundfunk zusammenarbeiten zu wollen, mit der Versicherung ihrer
strengsten Loyalität, ja sogar mit der Bitte, sie zu unterstützen gegen Anwürfe aus dem Publikum
und der Presse, von denen erstere sie als Verräter bezeichnet, weil sie in ihrem Bemühen sich an
deutsche Weisungen zu halten, national tschechische Interessen vergässen von den zweiten, die
ihnen nach wie vor Beneschtum vorwerfen, weil diesem Teile alles Entgegenkommen und
Mitarbeit noch zu wenig ist.” NA-ÚŘP, carton 1164. Letter Smutnik to Scurla of 7 June 1940,
including a protocol of Smutnik’s meeting with Czech program directors the previous day, page 1
of the protocol.
146
sincerity. In practical terms, the result was that Vetterl and his colleagues managed
to avoid any further serious intrusions into Brno’s programming for the immediate
future. No changes to the summer program schedule could be made, as the “Czech
gentlemen” apparently informed Smutnik, because “...for the most part it has already
been determined, and on the other hand, due to the war and its political effects,
states of emergency exist.”432 The states of emergency were Göring’s shut-downs
connected with the fear of air raids. However, in this concrete situation, the question
arises as to what could have been more clever than using the Nazis’ own excuse for
so many unfortunate circumstances – the war – to avoid changing programming
plans?
Against the background of the specter of an unhappy Czech radio public, which
Vetterl and colleagues had created in the meeting, Smutnik was apparently prepared
to accept the notion that “naturally, the path of the new program line can only be
taken slowly”433 and discuss programming plans for the period of September/October
1940. Apart from the continuation of a series on the modernization of Czech villages
(e.g., on the introduction of sewer systems and telephones), Vetterl and colleagues
then proposed several program lines of German content, including radio plays based
on the works of by Nazi authors (e.g., Hans Johst, Erwin Kolbenheyer or Richard
Billinger); features on famous German generals such as Moltke and Clausewitz “to
be framed with characteristic military marches” naturally; a not clearly delineated
series with the title “On Common Ground” (“Auf gemeinsamen Boden”) ostensibly
intended to highlight the coexistence of Czechs and Germans in the region; four
more audio pictures of German cities (e.g., Berlin, Munich, Hamburg and
Königsberg) as well as a plethora of musical programming, which on the surface at
least appeared to be a perfect synthesis of German-Czech cultural interaction, while
nevertheless focusing on Czech issues. For instance, one such program would
examine the fact that the Czech composer Václav Jan Tomášek had set ballads by
Goethe to music. Another would look into what Zdeněk Fibich had gained from his
432
433
In the original: “…da es schon zum grössten Teile feststeht, zum anderen durch den Krieg und
seine politischen Auswirkungen Ausnahmezustände bestehen.” NA-ÚŘP, carton 1164. Letter
Smutnik to Scurla of 7 June 1940, including a protocol of Smutnik’s meeting with Czech program
directors the previous day, page 1 of the protocol.
In the original: “…auf der anderen Seite ist natürlich nur langsam der Weg der neuen
Programmlinie zu begehen.” NA-ÚŘP, carton 1164. Letter Smutnik to Scurla of 7 June 1940,
including a protocol of Smutnik’s meeting with Czech program directors the previous day, page 1
of the protocol.
147
studies in Leipzig. Yet others would explore the work of Jan Václav Antonín Stamic
and the Mannheim School of musicians and composers around him; parallels
between Mysliveček and Mozart, etc.
As the rapidly approaching defeat of France became evident, the Protectorate
government undertook some cosmetic actions to engage at least outwardly in a
public display of collaboration with the occupation authorities. After the capitulation of
Belgium on 28 May and then again after the fall of Paris on 14 June, State President
Hácha sent a congratulatory telegram to Hitler.434 On 20 June, Hácha received the
leadership of the Czech Association for Cooperation with the Germans435 in his
offices at Hradčany Castle,436 which was undoubtedly intended more as a signal to
the Germans regarding cooperation than as a real attempt to increase the
organization’s prestige. After the French capitulation at Compiègne on 22 June 1940,
Nazi Germany became the only real super power remaining on the Continent of
Europe with the exception of its partner the Soviet Union. For the Czechs, all hope of
a quick end to the occupation became distant and completely unrealistic. Hácha
telegraphed again to Hitler assuring him of the loyalty of the Czech nation.
Furthermore, both Hácha and Minister President General Alois Eliáš addressed the
nation via radio in rapid succession with carefully worded statements. Eliáš called on
the Czech people to attempt to progress within the framework of the “New
Europe”.437
Further declarations of loyalty were to follow, and the leadership of Czech Radio
realized that, given the new situation, it also had to embrace at least a superficially
more obvious form of collaboration. For example, Hubert Masařík, the right-hand
man of General Eliáš and Czech Radio’s chairman of the board, contributed a
broadcast to launch a series called “Příčiny německého vitězství”, which in English
translates as the “Causes of the German Victory”. Again, while correct on the surface
and unassailable for a censor, the word “příčina” can also connote a negative, such
as the “cause of an accident” or the “cause of death”. An unequivocally more
positive-sounding title would have been “Důvody německého vitězství” or the
“Reasons for the German Victory”. Masařík’s program broadcast on Tuesday, 27
August 1940 via Prague I in the prime-time broadcast slot between 20:00 and 20:20
434
435
436
437
BRANDES: Die Tschechen I., pages 110-112.
In Czech: Svaz pro spolupráci s Němci.
Ruzné události posledního týdne in: Pestrý týden, volume XV, edition 26 (29 June 1940), page 5.
BRANDES: Die Tschechen I., page 112.
148
hours and had the specific sub-title “Foreign and Diplomatic Preparation”.438 Even in
the now virtually hopeless geopolitical situation in which the Czechs found
themselves, Masařík’s talk was not ultimately in the interest of his Nazi minders.
Instead, he employed what could be termed the strategy of “emulation” to sabotage
the superficial goal required of him in this speech – to celebrate the German victory
over France. After a few obligatory words on the brilliance of Hitler as a strategist,
Masařík launched into a very carefully worded review of the failure of the democratic
system in the face of an “unusually solid, enduring and discreet preparation over the
course of years in all areas of activity by the German nation”439 who were “prepared
to make any sacrifice”.440 The broadcast ends with an appeal to the Czech listener to
consider the geographic realities of the country, but remarkably also with the
following message: “And precisely that German sober [PRP: or “calculating”]
evaluation teaches us that the best guarantee of our future, just like for the Germans,
is the maintenance and strengthening of our national solidarity.”441 Thus, in essence,
Masařík continued the tradition of švejkování by calling on the Czechs to emulate the
Germans’ approach to dealing with threats to national unity. What those threats were
and from whom they emanated, he left open for the listener to identify for
him/herself. This was intelligent, passive resistance at its very best. No German
censor could reasonably object to a call to the Czechs to emulate the Germans after
all. Nevertheless, given that they ultimately wanted to dissolve Czech national
identity, appeals to Czech national solidarity of this type were also not really a useful
message for the occupiers.
The remaining three programs in the series broadcast via all Czech stations.
Perhaps with a view to the imminent customs union between the Protectorate and
the Reich, planned for 1 October 1940, at least two of them dealt with economic
issues:
438
439
440
441
In the original: “Zahraniční a diplomatická připrava”. Náš rozhlas, vol. XVIII, edition 35, (25-31
August 1940), page 30.
In the original: “…neobyčejně solidní, vytrvalá a diskretní příprava po dlouhá léta na všech polích
činnosti německého národa.” NA-NárS, TNS 17/46, carton 60, page 118. Broadcast text for
Masařík’s program of 27 August 1940.
In the original: “hotov k všem obětěm.” NA-NárS, TNS 17/46, carton 60, page 121.
Ibid, page 125. In the original: “A právě to německé střízlivé odhadování nás učí, že nejlepší
garancií naší budoucnosti stejně jako u Němců je zachování a posílení národní, soudržnosti.” The
Czech term “střízlivé” can mean both “sober” and “calculating” in English.
149
•
Tuesday, 3 September 1940, 20:40-20:50 hours, Alois Král, lecturer at the Czech
Technical University (ČVUT) on the “External Economic Policy of the Reich”.442
•
One week later, a Leopold Chmela lectured on the “War-time Economy of the
Reich”. 443
•
The series wrapped up then on 25 September 1940 with a lecture by General
Libor Vítěz, the commander of the Protectorate’s Government Militia on the
Reich’s “Military Preparations”. 444
On 11 September 1940, Goebbels received a group of Czech cultural workers and
journalists, including, among others, several stars of the Czech cultural scene, who
had just spent over a week touring the Reich. The group included among others the
poet Josef Hora; Czech National Theater Director Václav Talich; the National
Theater’s drama director Jan Bor; Karel Pečený, director of the weekly film newsreel
Aktuality; Czech Radio’s Intendant Miloš Kareš and the Czech Fascist journalist,
Alois Kříž. For his part, Kříž had spent most of the summer touring the sites of the
recent German victories in France.445 After a long-winded review of the geopolitical
reality the Czechs faced in the center of the Great German Reich, Goebbels moved
to the subject of collaborators and their perspectives for the future: “Now, I am of the
opinion that, if one cannot change anything about a situation, and has to accept the
disadvantages that are certainly also present with this situation, then one would be
foolish, if one did not seek to secure his own advantages.”446 It was a direct appeal
to the activists’ sense of ambition and greed. Upon his return, Kareš published a
collection of opinions from six of the participants in the trip – notably not including
Kříž – which could also qualify as švejkování, or more specifically, as prime
examples of Večeřa’s strategy of “neutralization”. That is, while the common line of
442
443
444
445
446
In the original: “Vnější hospodářská politika Říše”. Náš rozhlas, vol. XVIII, edition 36, (1-7
September 1940), page 30.
In the original: “Válečné hospodářství Říše”. Náš rozhlas, vol. XVIII, edition 37, (8-14 September
1940), page 30.
In the original: “Vojenská připrava”. Náš rozhlas, vol. XVIII, edition 39, (22-28 September 1940),
page 32.
“Jaký dojem jsem si odnesl z cesty po Německu”, (“What Impression Did I Take Away With Me
from the Trip to Germany”), Náš rozhlas, vol. XVIII, edition 40, (29 September-5 October 1940),
pages 4-6.
In the original: “Nun bin ich der Meinung; wenn man an einem Zustand nichts ändern kann und
die gewiss auch vorhandenen Nachteile dieses Zustandes sowieso in Kauf nehmen muss, dann
würde man töricht sein, wollte man sich nicht auch seine Vorteile sichern.“ AMV 301-92-1, page
41. Speech by Reichsminister Dr. Goebbels at the reception for Czech journalists and cultural
workers on 11 September 1940.
150
the essays can only be interpreted as very positive about the trip, the final summary
of the results of the tour were not really a vote of confidence for the Germans or the
Nazi system either. In fact, the participants managed to avoid expressing any real
support for the “New Europe” at all. For example, the trip inspired Talich to think
about 18th century German music and its connections to Czech music of the times –
surely a pleasant example, but one that had nothing to do with Nazism. Pečený
employed aspects Večeřa’s “separation”. That is, he simply parroted facts about
Germany’s cinema industry, for instance that it included over 7,000 cinemas and was
devoted to “the nation” i.e., the Germans, and then emphasized Goebbels’s call for
Czech filmmakers to “use all the possibilities of the organization of German film in
the interest of the nation and in their own interests”.
447
What precisely those
interests were, he left up to the reader. Bor’s essay also drew no meaningful
conclusion from the trip, but was phrased so bombastically as to border on the
ridiculous and, therefore, very subtly fulfilled the requirements of “ironizing”.
“[Goebbels] Precisely outlined the moral responsibility and leading calling of cultural
workers in the ideational and emotional area of the nation; against the background of
the newly organized Europe [Goebbels] deduced the historic and economic
necessity, the prerequisites and advantages of a good co-existence in the CzechGerman area of the German Reich with such dispassionateness and sincerity, with
such refinement of each thought, with such naturally convincing and exact vividness
of principles, of prerequisites and conclusions that the hour spent at the Propaganda
Ministry blossomed forth into an event of historic scope for me and for us all.” 448
One week later, on 18 September 1940, Goebbels also met with the “envoy” of the
Protectorate in Berlin, František Chvalkovský (1885-1945, killed in an air raid on
Berlin) to strengthen his message to the Protectorate’s establishment. Goebbels
447
448
“Jaký dojem jsem si odnesl z cesty po Německu”, Náš rozhlas, vol. XVIII, edition 40, (29
September-5 October 1940), page 6.
In the original: “Přesně vymezil mravní odpovědnost a vůdčí poslání kulturních pracovníků
v myšlenkově a citové oblasti národa, na pozadí nově organisované Evropy historicky a
hospodářsky vyvodil nutnost, předpoklady a výhody dobrého soužití česko-německého v prostoru
německé Říše s takovou věcností a upřimností, takovou vybroušeností každé myšlenky, s tak
přirozeně přesvědčivou a přesnou názorností zásad, předpokladů a závěru, že hodina ztrávená
v ministerstvu propagandy, vyrostla mi a nám všem v událost dějinného dosahu.” “Jaký dojem
jsem si odnesl z cesty po Německu”, Náš rozhlas, vol. XVIII, edition 40, (29 September-5 October
1940), page 5.
151
pointed out to Chvalkovský that the Czechs enjoyed a privileged position within the
Reich that could be adjusted – should they lack the necessary understanding for
National Socialist demands – to mirror the realities of the totally oppressed Poles in
German-occupied Poland.449 As a reaction to this and earlier threats, the
Protectorate’s political establishment, especially the National Solidarity, launched a
policy for the propagation of the Reichsgedanke. The Reichsgedanke, literally “idea
of the Reich” underlined Bohemia and Moravia’s role as constituent parts of the
German Reich throughout centuries of history, while seeking to eradicate any
mention of periods in which the Czechs and Germans were enemies. The reception
of this propaganda campaign in the press among the Czech population was,
however, exceptionally cool and reserved.450 The same was also true for Czech
Radio. Even at this late date, more than 18 months into the occupation, Czech Radio
appears to have been able to resist a great deal of this pressure, and not to have
been particularly proactive in the political propagation of the Reichsgedanke. On the
contrary, Intendant Kareš still considered and also emphasized to his subordinates
at the programming conference held in September 1940 to plan programming
between October 1940 and 4 January 1941 that “Broadcasting today is the best
expression of cultural autonomy”.451 Instead of propagating the Reichsgedanke,
programming continued into the winter of 1940/41 in the very same spirit as it had so
far with an emphasis on programming such as:
•
“Czechs in the Eyes of Foreigners”452 – six lectures in 14-day intervals on foreign
travelers to the Czech provinces from the 14th to the 19th centuries;
•
“Let’s Speak and Write Correct Czech” including a short daily program on the
subject in the morning hours.
•
“Walks about Old Prague”.
•
A fortnightly series, whose title was not worked out at the time, but which was to
cover the most important adjudications of the Czech Supreme Court.
449
450
451
452
AMV 301-92-1, page 57. Letter Chvalkovský to Eliáš and Masařík on his conversation with
Goebbels of 18 September 1940.
BRANDES: Die Tschechen I., page 118
In the original: “Rozhlas je dnes nejlepším výrazem kulturní autonomie”. AČRo, Autumn Program
Conference, 12, 13 and 25 September 1940.
The names of the series in the original were: “Češi očima ciziny”, “Mluvme a pišme správně
česky”, “Procházky starou Prahou” and “České hlavy”. See: AČRo, Podzimní programové porady,
(“Autumn Program Meetings”), 12, 13 and 25 September 1940, pages 9-10.
152
•
Then a series with the title “Czech Heads”, about great Czech thinkers. As
examples, the program conference discussed three installments – one each on
the Czech physician, poet and translator Edvard Albert (1841-1900), the poet and
author F. X. Svoboda (1861-1943), and Jindřich Fügner (1822-1865), one of the
founders of the patriotic Czech Sokol athletics movement in the 19th century.
Even the work of the Reportage and New Features Department, which under normal
circumstances might have concentrated more on current events, heavily accented
either completely neutral, timeless subjects or the Czech past. As František Kožík
informed the Autumn Program Planning meeting,453 among other things, this
department intended to do features on subjects such as:
•
A visit to a fox farm in Moravia;
•
Moravia’s caves.
•
Scenes from the experiences of a traveling theater troupe;
•
What happens when a dog goes missing/report from a rendering works;
•
A workshop for deaf-mutes;
•
From artistes’ dressing room;
Apart from that, Kožík’s department also concentrated rather heavily on issues
connected to the police and penal institutions. These subjects were perhaps the
most current of the topics covered and perhaps an oblique reflection of the reality of
living in a police state.
•
Reportage from a work house;454
•
The Registry Office of the Police Directorate of Prague; 455
•
One night with a police doctor;
•
Experiences of crime unit investigators during interrogations.456
453
454
455
See: AČRo, Podzimní programové porady, (“Autumn Program Meetings”), 12, 13 and 25
September 1940, page 17.
In the original: reportáž z donucovácí pracovny. Such institutions were already established in the
19th century to punish and/or discipline vagrants, drunkards, prostitutes and the like. While also
part of the penal system, and perhaps reminiscent of Dickensian tales, these institutions were
also essentially non-political.
In the original: Popisný úřad Policejního ředitelství v Praze. People visiting or residing in any
community of the Protectorate had to appear at this office with their identification papers to
register their address. Generally, hotels or pensions took care of this duty for short-term visitors.
153
Furthermore, there were several subjects connected with the past:
•
The neo-Gothic Hall of Mirrors on Petřín Hill, which opened across from
Hradčany Castle in the late 19th century;457
•
Impressions from the starvation cell of the Daliborka, a Medieval tower of
Prague’s Hradčany Castle used in the past as a prison;458
•
Report from an antiques shop/flea market.
Clearly the main thrust of talks programming still concentrated on the Czech past
and in most cases studiously avoided links to political present-day realities. The
focus was also still on Czech personalities, tourist sites and institutions. Thus, even
18 months into the occupation and against the background of Hitler’s victories on all
fronts, Czech Radio can not be accused of proactively propagating the
Reichsgedanke. This latter fact is even more remarkable given that the National
Solidarity had officially embraced an active form of collaboration with the Nazis in the
summer of 1940459 while its representatives, Zahradník and Vachulka, sat in Czech
Radio’s program secretariat. Czech Radio’s management was apparently able to
sideline both of these people, thereby keeping them out of the planning phase for the
company’s programs to a large extent. This is evident from the fact that, while
Zahradník attended none of the autumn program planning meetings at all, Vachulka
and Pěkný only took part in the meeting on 18 September, which unlike those of the
week before did not deal in detail with program content, but rather concentrated on
training issues for actors and producers, organizational matters as well as with
technical concerns. 460
Czech Radio’s resistance to pressure – not only from Maras, but also from the
National Solidarity – paid off rather well at this time. A few weeks after the program
planning meetings, in October of 1940, the Sicherheitsdienst determined that the
Czechs were laughing at much of the propaganda around the Reichsgedanke and
456
457
458
459
460
In this case, it was the Kriminální policie, the crime investigations division of the police, which was
the subject of the report. The focus here will have been on actual criminality like theft and robbery
and not on political offenses.
In Czech: Bludiště na Petříně.
In the original: dojmy z hladomorny v Daliborce.
BRANDES: Die Tschechen I., page 116-118.
See: AČRo, Podzimní programové porady, (“Autumn Program Meetings”), 12, 13 and 25
September 1940, page 1 and 36-41, lists of meeting participants.
154
that the campaign had in essence failed.461 Furthermore, the National Solidarity itself
was in serious trouble financially, as well as politically with the closure of the Prague
District offices after the arrest of its leader Nestával on 6 August.462 The National
Solidarity actually faced an exodus of members, who preferred to leave rather than
sit through more meetings propagating cooperation with the Germans.463 To
summarize, even this late into the occupation, Czech Radio’s management was still
largely capable of retarding and avoiding Germanizing and Nazifying effects on its
programming.
The Maras Era II – Analysis of the Program Week Starting 24 November 1940
Figure 3.1: Average duration of broadcast day in hours:minutes:seconds
Week starting 24 November 1940
All Czech (CZ) medium-wave (MW) stations = Prague I, Brno, Moravská Ostrava
All CZ MW stations
13:23:34
10:36:26
Prague I
13:23:34
10:36:26
Brno
13:23:34
10:36:26
Moravská Ostrava
13:23:34
10:36:26
20:40:00
Reichsprogramm
SW-Poděbrady
4:27:26
3:20:00
19:32:34
Broadcast hours
Station breaks
Duration of Broadcast Day
Figure 3.1 indicates the radical shortening of the duration of broadcast day for all
Czech stations, caused by Göring’s concern about enemy aircraft. Czech listeners
were not subjected to the same extreme chaos evident among the German stations.
It would not have been possible to have the Czech stations start broadcasting their
different program in a different language on Breslau’s common frequency, for
example, as the German and Czech programs would have jammed each other in
461
462
463
BRANDES: Die Tschechen I., pages 118 and 120.
BRANDES: Die Tschechen I., page 114.
BRANDES: Die Tschechen I., page 118.
155
regions of overlapping reception. Nevertheless, all Czech stations were forced to
shut down as early as 20:15 hours.
Figure 3.2: Regionalization – stations of origin as a percentage of TOTAL AIRTIME
Week starting 24 November 1940,
All Czech (CZ) medium-wave (MW) stations = Prague I, Brno, Moravská Ostrava
All CZ MW stations
70
Prague I
9
80
Brno
66
Moravská Ostrava
65
Reichssender Böhmen
13
7
21
11
15
8
5
8
5
8
16
8
85
SW-Poděbrady
100
0% 5% 10
%
15
%
20
%
25
%
30
%
35
%
40
%
45
%
50
%
55
%
60
%
65
%
70
%
75
%
80
%
85
%
90
%
Prague I
Brno
Moravská Ostrava
Reichssender Böhmen
Reichsprogramm
SW-Poděbrady
95 100
% %
Regionalization
Figure 3.2 shows something of a stabilization in Czech broadcasting particularly via
Brno, which at this point in time was deriving fully two thirds (66%) of its
programming from the center in Prague I. Re-broadcasts from the Reichsrundfunk
are evident at identical levels of 8% throughout the Czech station network and
included particularly the listeners’ choice musical program for the army
“Wunschkonzert für die Wehrmacht” broadcast on Sunday afternoon of the week
reviewed from 15:30 to 18:00 hours, as well as the daily broadcasts “With the
Reichsrundfunk” between 14:00 and 14:45 hours on all Czech stations. For its part,
the Reichssender Böhmen had declined to producing only 15% of its own
programming after the institution of the unified Reichsprogramm of all German
stations in June 1940. In the week reviewed, and consistent with practice at most
other Reichssender, Böhmen’s own production was limited to a few programs in the
morning hours – on Youth, Women’s and Agricultural Radio topics – and the Česká
hodina programming in the early evening around 18:00 to 18:30 hours.
156
Figure 3.3: Programming structure -- subjects as a percentage of TOTAL AIRTIME
Week starting 24 November 1940,
All Czech (CZ) medium-wave (MW) stations = Prague I, Brno, Moravská Ostrava
All CZ MW stations
64
Prague I
63
9
2
10
2
Brno
64
10
Moravská Ostrava
65
8
Reichssender Böhmen
Music
Youth/School
Women
Morning
20
%
25
%
30
%
10
1 4
2 2 2
10
1 4
2
4 11 2
10
1 4
2
10
1 4
5
12 2
2 111
64
15
%
12 2
4
76
SW-Poděbrady
0% 5% 10
%
5
6
35
%
40
%
45
%
50
%
55
%
Culture/Entertainment
Workers
News/Reports
German Program
60
%
65
%
14
25
70
%
75
%
80
%
85
%
4 1
5
90
%
95 100
% %
Farmers
Economics
Politics
Other
Programming Structure
Figure 3.3 shows a virtually identical composition of programming by topics
throughout the entire Czech radio network. Levels of overtly political programming
remained low at only 1% of airtime. Included in that quantity, however, is a “Militarypolitical” consideration by Emanuel Moravec broadcast at the prime Sunday time of
10:50 to 11:00 hours. This was a hitherto unheard of intrusion of political subjects
into a broadcast day that had otherwise been used for high-quality cultural
programming. Further such changes included the introduction of short ZeiteinlagenČasové vložky, which literally means “Time Inserts”, which started to appear towards
the end of October 1940 and are included in Figure 3.3 under political programming.
The so-called “Time Inserts” were short five- to ten-minute-long reports, which
replaced the more traditional “Okénko” programs. At first, the “Time Inserts”
generally ran around 19:15 to 19:20 hours. Who precisely the author of these
otherwise unexplained programs was at the time of their inception is unclear.
Nevertheless, they later fell at least in part into the domain of Alois Kříž and
eventually included political content.464 At this point in time, they very likely included
news shorts sent from the Wehrmachtpropaganda Office. The main benefit of these
reports was, of course, their brevity, which meant that they could be slipped into
464
NA-NárS, carton 106, inventory number 1537, order number 57.
157
short gaps between longer programs. The higher levels of political programming
(4%) visible at the Reichssender Böhmen were again caused by the inclusion of the
Czech-language Česká hodina propaganda programs.
Figure 3.4: Music by German composers as a percentage of TOTAL AIRTIME
Week starting 24 November 1940
All Czech (CZ) medium-wave (MW) stations = Prague I, Brno, Moravská Ostrava
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
11.9
12.5
11.9
11.5
All CZ MW stations
Prague I
Brno
Moravská Ostrava
Music by German composers
Music by German Composers
Regarding German music, Figure 3.4 shows a relative increase in its quantity to
levels around 12% of airtime or just under twice as high as in pre-invasion times. As
with other segments of programming, the levels were fairly even throughout the
entire Czech radio network. The head of Czech Radio’s Music Department, J. B.
Jirák, did not indicate any intention to include more German music during the
program planning meetings for this period in September. On the contrary Jirák
planned to fashion the majority of music programming around purely Czech aspects
such as the 70th birthday of the Czech composer Vítězslav Novák on 5 December,
the 90th birthday of the Czech composer Zdeněk Fibich on 21 December and the
20th anniversary of the Ondříčka Quartet, which frequently performed for Czech
Radio already starting in the 1920’s. Nevertheless, more music by German
composers is clearly apparent in the week analyzed than in the previous year. A
reasonable explanation under the circumstances would seem to be that, since Maras
and his colleagues considered German music a type of pro-German broadcasting,
158
as evident in the list of “broadcasts of German content”465 for Von Gregory in the
spring of 1940, music may have served as a less objectionable means of fulfilling a
quota of German program content. Although they may not have felt naturally inclined
to broadcast more works by German composers, Czech Radio’s management likely
seized the opportunity to do so as a matter of a lesser evil. The logic here would be
that, although they had been German speakers, performances of Mozart, Beethoven
or Brahms made for considerably more attractive programming than lectures on the
wonders of Germany and Nazism from Goebbels’s Ministry.
Figure 3.5: Broadcast language as a percentage of ALL TALKS PROGRAMMING
Week starting 24 November 1940,
All Czech (CZ) medium-wave (MW) stations = Prague I, Brno, Moravská Ostrava
All CZ MW stations
93
7
Prague I
93
7
Brno
93
7
Moravská Ostrava
93
7
Reichssender Böhmen
9
91
SW-Poděbrady
100
0% 5% 10
%
15
%
20
%
25
%
30
%
35
%
40
%
45
%
50
%
55
%
60
%
65
%
70
%
75
%
80
%
85
%
90
%
95 100
% %
Czech
Slovak
German
English
French
Italian
Romanian
Serbo-Croatian
Spanish
Ruthenian
Other
Broadcast Language
Figure 3.5 shows identical levels of German-language intrusion into all Czech radio
stations’ programming, however to a degree that was still relatively limited at just 7%
of all talks programming. At this point in time, much of these German-language talks
consisted of the news programming re-broadcast from the Reichsrundfunk. As
opposed to the previous year reviewed, Brno had resumed its position as a primarily
Czech-language station. Nevertheless, the only station that still broadcast 100% in
the Czech language was the short-wave station at Poděbrady intended for Czechs
living in North and South America.
465
NA, ÚŘP, carton 1164. Letter Dittmann to Von Gregory of 20 August 1940.
159
Figure 3.6: Germanization/Nazification Factor (GNF) = as a percentage of TOTAL AIRTIME
Week starting 24 November 1940
All Czech (CZ) medium-wave (MW) stations = Prague I, Brno, Moravská Ostrava
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
18.4
4.6
3.9
Total GNF
3.6
2.6
2.6
11.9
12.5
All CZ MW
stations
Prague I
3.5
2.6
2.6
11.9
11.5
Brno
Moravská
Ostrava
Music by German composers
German-language talks
Czech-language pro-German/Nazi
GNF as % of total airtime
2
RS Böhmen
(Mělník)
Germanization/Nazification Factor
Figure 3.6 shows actually only a slight increase in the GNF over the previous year
from 17.2% to 18.4% on average. The noteworthy aspect of this change, however, is
the shift in its composition and location of broadcast. While 14.4 of the 17.2
percentage points in the previous year came from German-language talks rebroadcast via Brno, the week reviewed for 1940 shows an even distribution across
the entire Czech network. That means the intrusion of the GNF into Prague I’s and
Moravská Ostrava’s programming. Furthermore, two-thirds of the GNF consisted of
German music, even higher levels than found in Maras’s estimate for the first half of
1940. There is also a marked growth in Czech-language programming about or in
favor of the occupiers. The figure includes no fewer than three lectures by Emanuel
Moravec, for example, broadcast on Sunday, Wednesday and Thursday of the week
reviewed. Furthermore, there was a review of the 65th week of the war on Friday and
several cultural programs dedicated to German content, such as a talks program on
Wagner’s dramatic works, a school broadcast on the Brother’s Grimm, Lessing’s
work in the area of drama and the like.
160
6. 1941 – Scurla Tightens the Screws
The New Year of 1941 was to witness some of the most radical changes that Czech
Radio had encountered since the start of the occupation. On 11 March 1941,
company founder Ladislav Šourek was sent into pension on the grounds that he had
reached the official pension age of 60.466 The real reason was that Schneider had
conspired to have Šourek removed after receiving information from Pěkný that
Šourek was having their offices spied on.467 Undoubtedly, Šourek’s removal also
played rather well into Scurla’s hands as it eliminated a Czech director with
considerably more experience than Scurla himself had. From Maras’s and
Schneider’s perspectives this also meant that their former boss, from pre-Munich
days, was gone. Furthermore, it reduced the numbers on the company’s board to
just two: Masařík and Scurla, as no replacement for Šourek was sought in this
capacity.
Six weeks later, on 28 April 1941, it was these two remaining board members,
Masařík and Scurla, who signed a contract with a cartel of seven recording
companies binding Czech Radio to use these companies’ products for any
recordings Czech Radio did not produce itself.468 The five Berlin-based companies in
the cartel included well-known brands such as Deutsche Grammophon, Electrola
and the Telefunkenplatte GmbH. Of the two Prague-based firms – Esta and
Ultraphon – the latter was also the general representative of Telefunkenplatte for the
Protectorate. Article 10 of the contract stipulated a minimum fee of 60,000 RM
(600,000 K) regardless of the number of recordings Czech Radio actually used
before 31 December 1942. Thus, a certain monetary incentive was built into this
contract for Czech Radio to get its money’s worth by using the products of this
predominantly German cartel as extensively as possible.
On 4 June 1941, Scurla ordered Masařík to send Jaroslav Prokop, on immediate
healthcare leave. Prokop had joined the Radio in 1925 working in Agricultural
programming, and was at the time of his de facto dismissal, the head of Educational
Lectures, Worker’s, Agricultural and Industry and Trade radio departments, as well
466
467
468
NA-NárS, carton 107, call number 60. Sketch of the organization and activity of the Czech
Broadcasting Corporation during the occupation by personnel manager Karel Remeš of 26 June
1946, page 1.
AČRo, historic collections Pěkný and Šourek. Letter Schneider to Scurla of 21 September 1940.
NA, ÚŘP, carton 1164. Contract between Czech Radio and the recording industry of 28 April
1941.
161
as a leading member of the close circle of programming executives in the
Programové ústředí around Intendant Kareš. In practical terms, Prokop’s dismissal
meant the loss of a long-term and highly professional expert on broadcasting. More
importantly, however, his removal was a serious blow to the ranks of the Czech prewar establishment within programming management itself. Two weeks later, on 20
June 1941, Von Gregory sent a handwritten note confirming Prokop’s dismissal with
reference to the Decree of the Reichsprotektor on the Dissolution of Employment
Relationships under Private Law Due to Enemy Activity Against the Reich from 2
May 1941.469 This decree defined enemy activity as any “act, toleration or omission
aimed against the inner or external permanence and security of the Great German
Reich.”470 Von Gregory allowed Prokop’s wages to continue officially through 30
September 1941, which implies a degree of forbearance in the case. Nevertheless,
the application of the Decree on Enemy Activity and the connotations it carried will
not have gone unnoticed by the remainder of Czech Radio’s management.
As for the structure of the broadcasting company itself, it took until the summer of
1941 to formalize a complete reorganization of Czech Radio along the simple,
tripartite lines valid for all of the Reichssender in the remainder of the
Reichsrundfunk, i.e., the entire company was divided into Programming, Technical
and Administrative divisions.471 At the time of this reorganization, Czech staff
members still directed all three main divisions. Intendant Kareš was ultimately the
person responsible for all of Czech Radio, however in the reorganization he also
officially became the director of the Programm-Intendanz—Programová intendantura
and thus, the director of the Programming Division. Eduard Svoboda continued to
direct the Technical Division, as he had since the founding of the company. Zdeněk
Morávek directed the Administrative Division, which included Personnel, Legal and
other subdivisions.472
469
470
471
472
AČRo, personnel file Prokop.
In the original: “Als reichsfeindliche Betätigung im Sinne dieser Verordnung gilt jede Handlung,
Duldung oder Unterlassung, die sich gegen den inneren oder äußeren archival collection und die
Sicherheit des Groß-deutschen Reiches richtet.” See: Verordnungsblatt des Reichsprotektors in
Böhmen und Mähren 1941, page 241.
The original terms in German and Czech were: Sendung–Program, Technik–Technika and
Verwaltung–Správa. NA, ÚŘP, carton 1164, organizational statutes of Czech Radio presented to
the meeting of the supervisory board of Czech Radio on 15 July 1941.
NA, ÚŘP, carton 1164, organizational statutes of Czech Radio presented to the meeting of the
supervisory board of Czech Radio on 15 July 1941, pages 8-9.
162
For the most part, this structure is obvious and logical. Only the Programming
Divisions is of particular interest to this study. After the reorganization, it
encompassed the following main subdivisions:
1. Censorship, (i.e., Czech censors only)
2. Press,
3. News and Current Affairs,
4. Specialized Radios (i.e., Worker’s, Agricultural, Industry and Trade radios)
5. Short-wave Broadcasts
6. Religious Broadcasts
7. Radio Research
8. Music (subdivided into Serious, Entertaining and Folk’s music)
9. Literature and Radio Dramas
10. People’s Education (General Lectures, Language Courses, Women’s Radio,
Regional Broadcasts, School Radio, Youth Radio)
It must be noted here, however, that not all programming was produced internally by
the above-named subdivisions. Much of the content of the Worker’s Radio, for
example, was still greatly derived from outside of the company, namely from the
Press Department of the unified Czech Trade Unions NOÚZ, which at this time was
coming under the leadership of the Nazi collaborator Karel Korp.
The Political Lectures Department
Nearly simultaneously with these developments and concurrent with Nazi Germany’s
attack on the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941, Lothar Scurla also moved to strengthen
the National Socialist position in the political programming of Czech Radio. To these
ends, and apparently after discussion with Georg Schneider and Walter Maras,
Scurla decided that Czech Radio should hire the Czech Fascist Alois Kříž.473 The
Office of the Reichsprotektor then issued an order to the Protectorate’s government
to implement that decision. When Hubert Masařík, tried to object on the grounds that
employing a member of the Vlajka at Czech Radio would be highly unpopular with
the public, Scurla told him firmly that the decision was definitive and immutable.
When Masařík objected further that a member of the Vlajka would cause dissent
473
NA-NárS, carton 106, call number 51. Testimony of Karel Remeš of 13 June 1946.
163
among the Czech staff, Scurla informed him that Kříž would have nothing to do with
the Czech staff, but would work directly under instructions from Maras.474 Thus, for
the purposes of political programming, Scurla side-stepped Czech Radio’s
programming administration altogether and created a parallel unit, the Political
Lectures Department, subordinate to himself under the command chain Scurla Maras Kříž.
The exact reason for this move at this juncture in time is not explicitly clear from the
existing materials. Nevertheless, given the escalation of the war, the potential for
pan-Slavic sentiment within the Czech population and conversely its hatred of the
Germans, it seems reasonable that Scurla felt the time had come to take political
programming out of the insufficiently enthusiastic hands of long-term Czech Radio
employees. Another explanation likely lies in the fact that the Wehrmacht had
invaded and occupied Yugoslavia, Greece and Crete between April and June 1941.
Romania and Bulgaria were allied with Germany. There was, therefore, no longer
any reason to be concerned about portraying Czech Radio as an independent
institution either to these peoples or the embattled Britons. Thus, Scurla appointed
Alois Kříž, a leading member of the Czech Fascist organization ČNST-Vlajka,
(“Czech National Socialist Camp-Banner”) as a political adviser – politischer
Referent – in the News Features Department (Zeitgeschehen-Časovost). Given that
Alois Kříž would become the main Czech political collaborator within Czech Radio, it
is necessary to take a closer look at him and the milieu from which he emerged.
Alois Kříž was a 30-year-old former bookkeeper in the Accounts Department of the
Office of the State of Bohemia and a regular contributor to the sports sections of the
conservative papers Polední list and Národní noviny.475 Born to Czech parents
working in Hamburg, Germany in 1911, Kříž’s father was drafted into the AustroHungarian Army and wounded during the First World War on the Russian front. The
family later moved to Duchcov (Dux) in the then mostly German-inhabited northern
region of Bohemia, where Kříž senior, as a war invalid, earned a meager living
running a newspaper stand. Nevertheless, the First Republic offered promising
students many options for advancement. Alois Kříž graduated from the Czech State
Reformed Secondary School in Prague XIX.-Bubeneč in 1929. He then went on to
474
475
NA-NárS, carton 106, call number 51. Testimony of Hubert Masařík of 24 June 1946.
NA-NárS, carton 106, call number 51. Testimony of the accused Alois Kříž of 29 November 1945,
page 1.
164
study eight semesters of Law at the Czech Charles University in Prague and
completed the first and second state exams in that subject.476 Throughout this time,
he earned money for his own upkeep by tutoring “better off, but less-gifted fellow
students”.477 Starting in 1931, he also started at the Accounts Department of the
Administrative Offices of the State of Bohemia, which apparently paid very little.478
Presumably, Kříž’s tendency to social envy, which would later play such a role in his
anti-Semitic broadcast propaganda, started in these circumstances. Due to the
unplanned pregnancy of his partner, a German woman from Děčín (Tetschen)
named Martha Langer, Kříž was forced to marry in September 1935 and to support a
family.479 Although his Law studies were virtually complete, there was no way that he
could take the unpaid position of paralegal in a law firm, which however would have
been necessary for him to start a career as a lawyer. To earn additional funds, Kříž
started reporting for the Polední list, a yellow-press product from Jiří Štřibrný’s
Tempo publishing house. He also contributed to Národní noviny, a low-circulation
weekly founded by the Baťa shoe concern,480 and produced reporting on German
sports events for ČTK. After the establishment of the Protectorate, he joined the
ČNST-Vlajka and advanced as an editor in their main party paper Vlajka481 and to
the position of deputy leader of their paramilitary sub-unit fashioned on the German
SA called the Svatopluk-Guards.482
476
477
478
479
480
481
482
NA-NárS, carton 106, call number 57. Personnel file of Alois Kříž.
NA-NárS, carton 106, inventory number 1537. Testimony of the accused Alois Kříž of 18 June
1946, pages 1-2.
NA-NárS, carton 106, inventory number 1537. Testimony of the accused Alois Kříž of 18 June
1946, pages 1-2.
NA-NárS, carton 106, inventory number 1537. Testimony of the accused Alois Kříž of 29
November 1945, page 1.
Handbuch der Deutschen Tagespresse, Institut für Zeitungswissenschaften an der Universität
Berlin, 7. Auflage, Armanen Verlag, Leipzig 1944, page 311. (Hereinafter: Handbuch der
Deutschen Tagespresse).
NA-NárS, carton 106, inventory number 1537. Personnel file Kříž. Since the ČNST-Vlajka were
only a splinter group on the margins of Czech society, the newspaper Vlajka suffered throughout
its entire existence from a lack of readers and consequently a lack of funding. This led to sharp
variations in its periodicity. Vlajka started originally as a monthly in 1928 and continued in this
format through to 1939. In January 1939, it became a daily and the central mouthpiece of the
ČNST. As of January 1941 it appeared as a weekly paper. From January 1942 through to its
dissolution the same year, it appeared three times per week. See KUBÍČEK, Jaromír et al, Česká
retrospektivní bibliografie, Noviny České Republiky 1919-1945, volume 1, page 409.
The Svatoplukovy gardy (SG) apparently formed originally in the area of Moravská Ostrava, and
then became an official formation of the ČNST-Vlajka. The orginal idea for the SG was no doubt
to perform functions like Hitler’s SA, such as undertaking violent acts of intimidation against
political opponents. Nevertheless, the main difference between the SG and the SA lay in the fact
that the SA was a mass organization with millions of members, while the SG counted only a few
hundred. The largest event the SG managed to put together was a meeting on Prague’s Střelecký
ostrov on 17 March 1940, to which a total of 147 participants came. Most of their meetings
165
In the summer of 1940 the Supreme Command of the German Wehrmacht invited
Kříž and a dozen other collaborating German and Czech journalists to visit the
scenes of the very recent fighting on the Western Front. The Protectorate-era
director of Centropress, Václav Fiala (1896-1963),483 later published a richly
illustrated book on this excursion, in which Kříž, Karel Lažnovský and other leading
Czech “activist” journalists are visible in several pictures.484 Kříž, a tall slender figure,
does not look pleased about being photographed.485 Nevertheless, he wrote a series
of articles for the newspaper Vlajka with a clearly pro-German message and
tendency from the various stations of the trip. Examples included: Muselo to byt
peklo! (“It must have been hell!”) from conquered Dunkerque486 or Orlové Albionu
nedoletěli (“Albion’s Eagles did not reach their goal!”)487 from Lille. Barely home from
this excursion, Kříž received an invitation to a tour of the Reich from the Propaganda
Ministry, the high point of which was the famous audience with Goebbels on 11
September 1940.488
Around this time, Kříž wrote a book of 162 pages, celebrating the German victory
over France. The German director of Orbis, Friedrich Rudl, published the pamphlet
with a print run of 3,200 copies. The title was: Krev za novou Evropu (“Blood for the
New Europe”).489 The main propaganda points of the work were:
1. Western plutocracy, infiltrated by Jews and Free Masons, caused the demise of
Czechoslovakia and is now experiencing its own well-deserved end.
2. The whispered propaganda passed on in the Protectorate about the Western
Allies having damaged Germany is untrue.
3. National Socialism is building a more equitable social system in Europe, in which
obedient Czechs will have a place along side their German comrades.
483
484
485
486
487
488
489
counted no more than 50 participants. See NA-NárS, carton 106, call number 52, 11810/1077/45
extract from the criminal charges against Alois Kříž of 20 December 1945.
KONČELÍK, KÖPPLOVÁ, KRYŠPÍNOVÁ: Český tisk, footnote 19, page 24.
FIALA, Václav: Na křižovatce nových dějin, Český novinář v Belgii a ve Francii roku 1940, (“At the
Crossroads of Recent History, A Czech Journalist in Belgium and in France in 1940”), Orbis,
Praha, 1942. Hereinafter: FIALA: Na křižovatce nových dějin.
FIALA: Na křižovatce nových dějin, illustrations 80, 96 and 249.
Vlajka, volume X. edition 160, 18 July 1940, page 3.
Vlajka, volume X. edition 164, 23 July 1940, page 3.
NA-NárS, carton 106, inventory number 1537. Personnel file, curriculum vitae of Alois Kříž of 7
March 1942.
NA-NárS, carton 107, inventory number 1538. Krev za novou Evropu, (“Blood for the New
Europe”), self-published in general commission by the publishing house “Orbis”, Praha XII,
December 1940.
166
The book ends with a mixed message that is both an appeal to Czech selfpreservation through subservience and a crescendo of National Socialist pathos:
“...No one can stand against this German Army... Let’s be thankful that we at least
saved our lives, the lives of our dear ones and the material possessions of the
nation. We have made sacrifices... And what are our sacrifices in comparison with
the sacrifices of our German comrades, who faithfully and, with dedication,
consciously bring their blood to the altar for the New Europe?”490
This type of writing undoubtedly appealed to the German invaders. For this effort,
Kříž received the very considerable sum of K 7,500491 or nearly seven times an
average monthly wage for a factory worker at the time.492 Although he was
completely lacking in broadcast experience, Kříž was received the position of
political adviser for news programming (“politischer Referent für die Sendung des
Zeitgeschehens”) on 1 July 1941 at Czech Radio.493 Speaking with obviously
perturbed Administrative Director Zdeněk Morávek494 at Czech Radio, Kříž explained
his mission in German (!) as: “the political orientation of Czech Radio along National
Socialist lines,” for which he was to be granted “the possibility of influencing all
segments of our programming activity.”495 This new phase of collaboration was to
remain extremely lucrative for Kříž in the future. After the war, Karel Remeš, the
personnel director of Czech Radio, described Kříž’s hiring at the extraordinarily high
net monthly salary of K 5,000 as follows:
490
491
492
493
494
495
KŘÍŽ, Krev za Novou Evropu, page 162.
NA-NárS, carton 106, call number 1532, call number 45, page 233, Indictment of Alois Kříž of 1
July 1946.
The average monthly wage was 1,147.92 K in July 1941. See: Statistisches Jahrbuch für das
Protektorat Böhmen und Mähren 1942, page 140.
NA-NárS, carton 106, call number 57. Personnel file of Alois Kříž, report of work for the period
from 1 July 1941 to 30 April 1942.
Dr. of Law Josef Zdeněk Morávek (born 1904), joined Radiojournal in 1926 working in various
positions. During the occupation, he first became administrative director of the company. As of
1942, he became the director for non-political programming directly subordinate to Intendant
Thürmer. See AČRo, historical collection file of Josef Zdeněk Morávek.
In the original: “die politische Ausrichtung des Tschechischen Rundfunks im
nationalsozialistischen Sinne.” “...die Möglichkeit des Einflusses auf alle Ressorts unserer
Programmtätigkeit.” NA-NárS, carton 106, inventory number 1537. Morávek, notes on the
employment and start of work of Alois Kříž as political adviser of 27 June 1941.
167
“The method of the German management at the time, which they generally did not
conceal
during
negotiations,
was
to
purchase
political
collaborators
for
themselves.”496
For Kříž, this new position meant a trebling of his meager and often irregular
earnings at the unpopular and consequently permanently under-funded newspaper
Vlajka.497 By comparison, experienced Czech Radio personnel in similar positions
earned only K 4,000 in gross wages at the time.498 Compared to his colleagues at
the RRG in Berlin, such as the English-speaking broadcaster Norman BaillieStewart, who earned between RM 400 and 600 (K 4,000 to K 6,000), however, Kříž’s
wages were only average. Although Kříž was to become Goebbels’ main man for
political broadcasts to the Czechs, he still earned well below the levels of Goebbels’
star broadcaster to Great Britain, the infamous “Lord Haw-Haw” William Joyce, who
took home RM 1,200 per month, or the equivalent of K 12,000.499 This discrepancy
might be an indication of the comparative position that political broadcasts to the
Czechs played within Goebbels’ list of priorities.
According to several reports in his personnel file, the invaders had indeed
“purchased” a very diligent political employee. In an application for the granting of a
monthly performance bonus of RM 75 from 14 September 1943, one can read:
“K. operates far beyond his official duties as head of the main subject area Political
Lectures also as an independent author of at least three weekly lectures in the
political programs of Radio Prague and the shortwave broadcasts… The same
services by comparable employees do not exist... ” 500
496
497
498
499
500
In the original: “Metoda tehdejšího německého vedení, jak celkem při jednáních neskrývali, byla
kupovat si politcké spolupracovníky.” NA-NárS, carton 106, call number 51. Testimony of Karel
Remeš of 13 June 1946.
See NA-NárS, carton 106, call number 56, testimony of the accused Alois Kříž of 19 August 1946,
pp.1-4.
NA-NárS, carton 106, call number 51. Testimony of František Zeman of 14 June 1946.
KENNY: Lord Haw-Haw, page 207.
In the original: “K. arbeitet weit über seine dienstlichen Obliegenheiten als Leiter des
Hauptsachgebietes Politische Vorträge hinaus als selbstständiger Verfasser von wöchentlich
mindestens 3 Vorträgen an den politischen Sendungen des Senders Prag und der
Kurzwellensendungen mit… Gleiche Leistungen bei vergleichbaren Mitarbeitern liegen nicht
vor...” NA-NárS, carton 106, inventory number 1537. Personnel file, Application for the granting of
a performance bonus of 14 September 1943.
168
Just nine months after his appointment, on 1 March 1942, Kříž was promoted to the
position of director of the Political Lectures Department.501 The steady upward trend
of his career and financial perspectives was interrupted briefly, however, after
Ferdinand Thürmer took over Czech Radio in early 1942, which we will discuss in
greater detail below. This was only a short setback however. As of 1 July 1944,
Kříž’s title was “Main editor and responsible staff member for political editorial
desk”.502
Regarding his political sympathies, Kříž listed in a hand-written curriculum vitae from
7 March 1942 in the section concerning pre-1939 political affiliations “none” and
elaborated: “I was not organized in any political party in the former Czechoslovakia.
Since I spent the largest part of my life in the so-called mixed area of the
Sudetenland, and since I then – given my sincere affection for the German people –
married a German, I was not able to be active in any of the parties at the time, which
‘excelled’ by virtue of their strong Chauvinism. After the establishment of the
Protectorate, I joined the pro-German Czech ‘Vlajka’ movement, in which I am very
active.”503
These few short sentences reveal a great deal about Kříž, his political thinking and
his character in general. First of all, his reference to the “so-called mixed area of the
Sudetenland” is rather striking. Historically, those regions of Bohemia and Moravia,
which later became known as the Sudetenland, had for centuries been ethnically
mixed and even were so at the time of Kříž’s writing. Kříž’s own ethnic background
and biography confirm this. Casting doubt on that fact with a “so-called” was, from a
Czech national perspective, exceedingly obsequious, as it demonstrated adherence
to the National Socialist narrative that these were simply ancient German lands,
which providence and the unfaltering will of the “Führer” had returned to the Reich.
Kříž’s reference to the “chauvinist”, i.e., in this context anti-German and/or anti-Nazi
501
502
503
NA-NárS, carton 106, inventory number 1537. Personnel file, curriculum vitae of Alois Kříž of 7
March 1942.
In the original: “Hauptschriftleiter und verantwortlicher Sachbearbeiter für politische Redaktion”
(sic!). NA-NárS, carton 106, inventory number 1537. Personnel file, contract of 16 June 1944.
In the original: “Ich war in der ehem. Tschechoslowakei bei keiner politischen Partei organisiert.
Da ich den grössten Teil meines Lebens im sog. gemischten Gebiete des Sudetenlandes
verbrachte und da ich dann–meiner aufrichtigen Zuneigung zum deutschen Volke gemäss–eine
deutsche geheiratet habe, konnte ich... in keiner der damaligen Parteien, welche sich durch einen
starken Chauvinismus ‘auszeichneten’ tätig sein. Nach der Errichtung des Protektorates bin ich
der deutschfreundlichen Bewegung ‘Vlajka’ beigetreten, wo ich mich sehr aktiv betätige.” NANárS, carton 106, inventory number 1537. Personnel file, curriculum vitae of Alois Kříž of 7 March
1942.
169
nature of the political parties of the First Czechoslovak Republic also affirmed his
adherence to the National Socialist line on the Republic as an anti-German, Czech
national state.504 On the other hand, his emphasis of activity in the Vlajka movement
is in retrospect rather comical or at least tragi-comic. Kříž undoubtedly thought it a
positive point. Otherwise, he would not have mentioned it. At the time of his writing,
however, the occupation authorities had already rejected the Vlajka in favor of
working with the group of collaborators around Emanuel Moravec. It was precisely
this activity in the Vlajka that caused Ferdinand Thürmer a great deal of trouble in
retaining Kříž at Czech Radio in 1942.505
For its part, the Český národně socialistický tábor-Vlajka, (ČNST-Vlajka, Czech
National Socialist Camp-Banner) was a collection of disparate Fascist groups from
the fringes of Czechoslovak society, many of whom had been sharply anti-German in
their ideologies during the First Republic. After the establishment of the Protectorate,
however, this group sought by all means to curry favor with the invaders, supported
their policies and attempted initially even to seize power in the Protectorate
government.506 Concerning broadcasting specifically, the Vlajka leadership even
addressed a letter to Goebbels in June 1940 offering to “work over” any
Czechoslovak soldiers captured with the Allied armies in France “in an appropriate
manner so as… to obtain material for Prague Czech radio broadcasts.”507 For their
part, the occupation authorities never truly embarked upon a genuine partnership
with the Vlajka, although they were happy to use Vlajka members as Gestapo
informants and/or as a means of applying pressure to the Protectorate
government.508 There were several reasons for this state-of-affairs. First of all,
Fascists in general represented only a very minor grouping on the edges of Czech
society. In the elections of 1935, the largest Czech Fascist group – the Česká obec
fašistická – had received only 2.04% of the vote.509 Secondly, the Czech public
widely despised the Vlajka and its members as traitors who aided and abetted the
504
505
506
507
508
509
See for example: ULLRICH, Oskar: Der Grosse Irrweg der Tschechen, (“The Great False Path of
the Czechs”), Volk und Reich Bücherring, Prag 1943, p. 22.
NA-NárS, carton 106, call number 51. Testimony of Karel Remeš of 13 June 1946.
PASÁK, Český fašismus, page 278.
In the original: “auf eine entsprechende Weise... bearbeiten, um so... Material für Prager
tschechische Rundfunksendungen zu gewinnen“. NA-ÚŘP-ST 109-4-5, page 7, letter Count
Thun-Hohenstein to Josef Goebbels of 21 June 1940.
BRANDES: Die Tschechen I., page 55
See: Čechoslovakische Statistik, page 9*.
170
enemy.510 Ultimately, however, the retention of a separate Czech nationalist political
group – regardless of how servile, obsequious or fond of the Nazis’ own methods –
was at variance with the occupation authorities’ long-term goal of Germanizing much
or most of the Czech nation. As the representative of the German Foreign Office in
the Office of the Reichsprotektor described in a note to Berlin: “In reality, the Vlajkamembers are no tools in German hands… The Vlajka also aims for a maintenance of
Czech autonomy, just under their [own] leadership. We support them occasionally
according to the principle of: Divide in order to rule.”511
In the case of Alois Kříž specifically, his motivation seems to have been more
opportunism than genuine political conviction. There are several moments that
support this assertion. Firstly, there are no indications that he openly or actively
sympathized with Fascism during the First Republic. Kříž only became engaged in
Fascist political activism after the establishment of the Protectorate. When faced with
a choice between the Vlajka and his sinecure at Czech Radio in 1942, Kříž withdrew
from activity in the Vlajka.512 After the war, while on trial for crimes against the
national honor, Kříž is even said to have proclaimed to state officials that he would
now be willing to work for Communism just as he had done for Nazism.513 Given
such a high degree of pragmatism, Kříž was most likely not only disappointed, but
surprised that the Czechoslovak State Prosecutor did not accept his conciliatory
offer, but instead interpreted it as further proof of Kříž lacking character.514 Whether
out of deep conviction or opportunistic pragmatism, Kříž convinced the occupation
authorities and his Czech colleagues alike that he meant to support Nazism
completely. In a letter addressed to Ferdinand Thürmer in 1942, Kříž stated:
510
511
512
513
514
Countless denunciation letters by Vlajka members of other Czechs can be found in the Czech
National Archives, in which the Vlajka members complain of discrimination, insults and even
physical attacks due to their “loyalty to the Reich”. See for example: NA-NárS, carton 21, call
number 452, complaints by Vlajka-members via the Gestapo agent G. Schneider.
In the original: “In Wirklichkeit sind die Vlajkisten keine Werkzeuge in deutscher Hand… Auch die
Vlajka erstrebt die Aufrechterhaltung der tschechischen Autonomie, allerdings unter ihrer
Führung. Wir stützen sie gelegentlich nach dem Grundsatz: Teile, um zu herrschen.” Report of
the representative of the German Foreign Office in the Office of the Reichsprotektor to the
Foreign Office in Berlin (VAA-AA) of 5 November 1940–PA, AA/Inland II g, No. 417, 217416.
Quoted in BRANDES: Die Tschechen I., page 122.
NA-NárS, carton 106, call number 51. Testimony of Karel Remeš of 13 June 1946.
NA-NárS, carton 106, call number 46, characteristics of the accused Alois Kříž, page 1.
NA-NárS, carton 106, call number 46, characteristics of the accused Alois Kříž, page 1.
171
“Within the framework of my professional activities at the radio… and through all of
my other work, I have certainly proven sufficiently my sincerely positive attitude to
the Reich, to National Socialism and to the struggle for a new World Order. And I am
prepared to sacrifice everything for that that a Czech activist can sacrifice. Heil
Hitler!” 515
Kříž’s colleagues were not always certain about what his exact motivation for
collaboration was. They did take him at his word regarding political conviction,
however. Personnel Director Remeš testified in court after the war that, unlike other
collaborators, Kříž “never played a double game”, but rather behaved “the entire time
like a person 100%-devoted to the idea of German National Socialism.”516 Several
other colleagues concurred in their testimony against him that Kříž was, as one of
them put it, an “enthusiastic 100% proponent of Nazism”.517 Nevertheless, Remeš
did not discard the notion of sheer ambition as a motivating factor for Kříž. As Remeš
stated: “Alois Kříž did not work under any pressure, but rather wrote his lectures of
his own initiative and in the interest of the success of his work.”518 In 1946, these
were damning testimonies, which undoubtedly helped send Kříž to the gallows.
Returning to 1941, however, Kříž’s beginnings at Czech Radio were, despite the
high salary, otherwise under-resourced. Kříž worked alone and did not even have his
own secretary until 1 December 1941.519 Only after that point can one speak of the
existence of the Political Lectures “Department”.
515
516
517
518
519
In the original: “Im Rahmen meiner dienstlichen Tätigkeit im Rundfunk habe ich… und durch die
ganze übrige Arbeit meine aufrichtig positive Einstellung zum Reich, zum Nationalsozialismus
und zum Kampf um die neue Weltordnung sicher genügend unter Beweis gestellt. Und ich bin
bereit dafür auch alles opfern (sic!), was ein tschechischer Aktivist opfern kann. Heil Hitler!” NANárS, carton 106, inventory number 1537. Personnel file, curriculum vitae of Alois Kříž of 7 March
1942.
In the original: “Po celou dobu se KŘÍŽ choval jako člověk 100%-oddaný německé nacionálněsocialistické myšlence,... Na rozdíl od jiných kolaborantů nehrál nikdy dvojí roli...” NA-NárS,
carton 106, call number 51. Testimony of Karel Remeš of 13 June 1946.
In the original: “KŘÍŽ byl nadšeným 100% propagátorem nacismu a netajil se tím.” NA-NárS,
carton 106, call number 51. Testimony of Antonín Paleček of 13 June 1946.
In the original: “Alois KŘÍŽ nepracoval pod žádným nátlakem, ale svoje projevy psal iniciativně a
se zájmem o zdar své práce.” NA-NárS, carton 106, call number 51. Testimony of Karel Remeš of
13 June 1946.
NA-NárS, carton 106, call number 57. Personnel file of Alois Kříž, report of work for the period
from 1 July 1941 to 30 April 1942.
172
Scurla’s Final Days
Given unrest, including acts of violence and sabotage, in the late summer and early
autumn of 1941, the Nazi regime dispatched SS-Obergruppenführer and Police
General Reinhard Heydrich to Prague to pacify the Protectorate. Replacing Von
Neurath as acting Reichsprotektor, Heydrich set about implementing radical changes
to the administration in the Protectorate, including its broadcasting corporation.
Despite the draconian measures introduced to punish listening to foreign radio
broadcasts at the outbreak of war in September 1939, calls via radio by the
Czechoslovak Government in Exile for various actions had a resonance with the
Czechs at large. For example, after such a call for the population to boycott the
Protectorate’s press in the week from 14 to 21 September 1941, up to 70% of daily
print runs remained unsold!520 Slogans from the Government in Exile were painted
on walls as graffiti and passed from hand to hand as leaflets. Due to this and other
serious resistance activity, such as the bombing and destruction of a large fuel depot
in Náchod,521 the Nazi leadership in Berlin decided the time had come to make order
in Bohemia and Moravia. Reinhard Heydrich, Himmler’s right-hand man, who was
soon to organize the Holocaust, took up office in Prague for the specific purpose of
making order. In an effort to avoid showing the public that Von Neurath’s
appointment had been a mistake, which obviously would not have been in
accordance with the image of Hitler as an infallible leader, Von Neurath’s departure
was termed a vacation for health reasons.
After Heydrich’s arrival in Prague on 27 September 1941, he declared martial law
and unleashed a wave of terror with the summary arrest of hundreds of people. One
of the individuals arrested in the first waves was none other than Hubert Masařík,
whom Gestapo agents led away directly from his office at broadcasting headquarters
in Schwerinova (today Vinohradská) Street 12.522 That left Lothar Scurla as the sole
member of the board of Czech Radio. However, Scurla’s days were also numbered
at this point. The arrest of such an important figure in the Protectorate’s
administration linked so closely with its broadcasting corporation obviously did not
speak for Scurla as an administrator and ultimately cast a bad light on Von Gregory’s
520
521
522
See: MILOTOVÁ, Jaroslava, KÁRNÝ, Miroslav: Od Neuratha k Heydrichovi. Na rozhraní okupační
politiky hitlerovského Německa v “Protektorátu Čechy a Morava“. IN: Sborník archivních prací 2
(1989), page 383, doc. 53.
GEBHART, KUKLÍK: Velké dějiny XV.b, page 27.
NA-NárS, TNS 17/46, carton 60, page 84. Causa Hubert Masařík. Curriculum vitae of Hubert
Masařík from 1938 to 1945.
173
leadership as well. There is again regrettably very little information on the exact
course that the events around Scurla took, but it appears that Heydrich sorted the
situation with great rapidity and opted to establish a simplified chain of command.
One of the last indications of Scurla’s activity at Czech Radio is an administrative
note from Personnel Director Remeš documenting receipt of Scurla’s order for the
dismissal of Břetislav Zahradník, the liaison of the National Solidarity at Czech
Radio. This note dates from about 23 October 1941 or less than one month after
Reinhard Heydrich’s arrival in Prague.523
The exact timing of Scurla’s departure from Prague is difficult to pinpoint, however.
Neither Scurla’s police registration nor the records of his military career stored at the
Deutsche Dienststelle (WASt) in Berlin lists the date of his conscription into the
Wehrmacht. Surviving records for Scurla from the Bundesarchiv in Berlin in NSDAP
correspondence about him only cover the period prior to his departure for Prague. A
letter from Scurla’s brother Herbert to a relative written in 1980, a copy of which the
Scurla family kindly supplied to the author, suggests that Lothar Scurla had been
sent to occupied Prague with the mission of “supervising the musical content of
programming”. However, as Lothar Scurla had supposedly “‘overheard’ certain news
items in the moderation” Goebbels had “with the outbreak of the war against the
Soviet Union” sent Lothar Scurla to the Eastern front “to prove himself”.524 Apart from
distorting Lothar Scurla’s actual mission in the Protectorate – of which, Herbert
Scurla as an important figure in the Reichskulturkammer must have been completely
aware – this letter also does not aid in dating Lothar Scurla’s departure from Prague.
As we have seen, Scurla was clearly in office more than four months after the start of
the Wehrmacht’s attack on the Soviet Union.
Another administrative note from Remeš, dated 29 November 1941, refers to
Intendant Fricke having approved the text of a disciplinary letter issued against
Bedřich Pěkný, due to baseless accusations the latter had made against other
Czech employees. When, precisely, Scurla’s initial replacement, Hanns-Otto Fricke,
arrived in Prague is unfortunately also not evident in surviving archival materials. No
police registration for Fricke exists in the Czech National Archives. For his part,
523
524
AČRo, personnel file Zahradník.
In the original: “Er... wurde zur Kontrolle der musikalischen Darbietungen in das besetzte Prag
versetzt, wo er viele Freunde gewann und manche Nachricht in der Programmansage ‛überhörte’,
was Goebbels dann veranlaßte, bei Ausbruch des Krieges gegen die UdSSR ihn ‛zur Bewährung’
an die Front zu schicken.”
174
Ferdinand Thürmer later claimed that “When Fricke came, Scurla disappeared with
the secret bank account and some of the censors. Everything else remained the
same.”525 While Thürmer’s report must be based on hearsay, as he was not present
in Prague at the time, it does sound credible with regard to dating Scurla’s departure.
The notion that Hanns-Otto Fricke, the long-term Intendant of the Reichssender
Breslau and a close collaborator of Goebbels, would have agreed to come to Prague
to work under Scurla is ludicrous. At most, he might have met Scurla to take over the
latter’s office. Thus, it seems very likely that Scurla left Prague on his way to the
Eastern front at some point between 23 October and 29 November 1941. Ironically,
Scurla’s great rival and detractor, Hans-Günther Marek, lost his position at the
Reichssender Böhmen around the same time.526
Outside of Czech Radio, Heydrich implemented other policies that had direct
consequences on broadcasting. A specific reaction to the problem of Czechs
listening to foreign stations included the confiscation in mid-October of the radio
receivers from all Czech residents of the Prague districts of Vřsovice and Jinonice as
well as a few smaller communities in the Protectorate.527 This policy apparently then
caused some Czechs to panic and sell their radio sets in order to avoid losses due to
potential future confiscations. Karl Hermann Frank used this situation as an excuse
to attempt to limit Czech broadcasting once again. In a meeting with SS-Oberführer
Berndt, Von Gregory, and the man who was soon to replace Von Gregory, Martin
Paul Wolf from the Sicherheitsdienst – on 13 November 1941, Frank decided that
“…the extent of cancellations [PRP: of radio subscriptions] will prove that the Czechs
have no interest in their own radio and that, therefore, an increase in the German
broadcasting of Radio Bohemia-Moravia should be made at the cost of Czech
programs.” Further results of the meeting were that the Reichssender Böhmen was
eventually to discontinue the Česká hodina programs, while the Wehrmacht reports
were to be broadcast bilingually with one sentence in German followed by another in
Czech.528
525
526
527
528
In the original: “Als Fricke kam, verschwand Scurla mit Geheimkonto und einigen Zensoren. Alles
andere blieb.” THÜRMER, Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, page 16.
THÜRMER, Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, page 2.
The other towns were Lysá, Čelákovice, Heřmanův Městec, Litomyšl and Úvaly, from which a
total of 5,479 radios were confiscated. KONČELÍK, KÖPPLOVÁ, KRYŠPÍNOVÁ: Český tisk page
447. See also: NA-ÚŘP, IV P Tiskové zprávy 1941, carton 1152. Czech press reports of 16
October 1941.
In the original: “Durch den Umfang der Abmeldungen wird unter Beweis gestellt, daß die
Tschechen kein Interesse am eigenen Rundfunk haben und demzufolge ein Verstärkung des
175
Concrete Effects on Programming in the Period
Despite Goebbels’s thinly veiled threats and attempts to recruit more collaborators in
the autumn of 1940, Czech Radio’s leadership still failed to initiate much in the way
of pro-German or pro-Nazi programming. In fact, prior to the arrival of Alois Kříž at
Czech Radio in late June 1941, Czech-language programming of this type mostly
only entailed Emanuel Moravec’s weekly to thrice-weekly (during major military
activities) speeches and occasional lectures on Germany subjects. This still meant
the launch of a plethora of pro-German series in the Czech language starting in early
1941. Nevertheless, judging by the program announcements in the official program
guides, it was still Czech Radio employees, who produced these programs, although
they very likely used sources and information from Germany itself to do so. The first
series from this period was called Mužové německé práce (“Men of German Work”).
This series investigated the lives of famous German industrial innovators such as
Kaplan (water turbines), Zeppelin (dirigibles), Zeiss (optical products), Siemens,
Diesel, Krupp, Frauenhofer, Bosch, Junkers, etc. As an otherwise unidentified
contributor to Týden rozhlasu with the initials L.P. explained:
“It was chosen deliberately and intentionally, because German civilizational
endeavors are characterized by something different from the working methods of
other nations: by the organization of the work, by the scientific methods worked out
in detail and by the persistence with which the problem is observed.”529
While all of those were undoubtedly sentiments with which any German censor could
easily agree, the actual implementation of this series was extremely limited. Its first
installment appears to have aired on 27 January 1941 in which one František
Novotný reviewed the life of Viktor Kaplan, the creator of the Kaplan water turbine.
The program ran on a Monday afternoon from 15:35 to 15:45 hours, however only
via Brno530 and there do not seem to have been any further installments for several
529
530
deutschen Programms im Rundfunk Böhmen-Mähren auf Kosten der tschechischen Sendungen
vorzunehmen ist.” NA, ÚŘP-ST-AMV 109, carton 88, call number 109-4/1423, page 57,
administrative note from Von Gregory detailing the content of the discussion on broadcasting with
K.H. Frank on 13 November 1941.
In the original: “Byl zvolen zaměrně a úmyslně proto, že německé civilisační usílí je
charakteristické tím, čím se líší od pracovních metod jiných národů: organisací práce, vědeckými
metodami do podrobna propracovanými a výtrvalostí s níž se problém stále sleduje.” Týden
rozhlasu, volume VIII, edition 26, (29 June to 5 July 1941), page 19.
Týden rozhlasu, volume VIII, edition 4, (26 January to 1 February 1941).
176
more weeks. It was only after late April, in fact, that the series started to increase in
frequency, and even then it remained centered around Brno without re-broadcasts
by Prague and basically in the same late Monday afternoon time slot. Given the
relative weakness of Brno’s broadcast energy (32 kW) and the pre-nightfall time slot,
that means that the series will mostly have reached only listeners within a 50 km
radius of Brno itself. Those living at greater distances will have required better quality
and more expensive receivers to tune in, if, in fact, they were inclined or at liberty
(during business hours) to do so. Apart from these concrete difficulties connected to
tuning in, the fact remains that these programs also focused on the past and will
hardly have served as great propagation moments for the present-day. It is hard to
imagine, for example, how a lecture on Heinrich Schliemann’s archaeological
discovery of the ancient city of Troy531 will have inspired enthusiasm for Nazism
among Czech listeners.
After the removal of Šourek and Prokop and the arrival of Kříž in the summer of
1941, the variety and intensity of these series increased. Prague I started series of
its own, which will have reached much more of the Protectorate’s territory. An
overview of these series, which mostly remained in the late Monday – later also on
other week days – afternoon lectures time slots, and which ran into the autumn
broadcast season still included subjects rather oriented on the 19th century as
opposed to contemporary Germany:
•
Významné německé ženy (“Important German Women”) on the lives of Johanna
von
•
Bismarck,
Cosima
Wagner,
Johanna
Schopenhauer,
etc.
and
Muži německé vědy (“Men of German Science”) e.g., Rudolf Virchow, Alexander
von Humboldt, Ferdinand von Richthofen, etc.
After July 1941, however, present-day Germany also started to receive some airtime.
Judging from the authors mentioned in the program schedules and his later listing of
activities for Thürmer,532 Kříž did not create any of these series himself.
Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that their launch coincides with the time just one
531
Týden rozhlasu, volume VIII, edition 29, (20 to 26 July 1941), page 24.
532
NA-NárS, carton 106, call number 57. Personnel file of Alois Kříž, report of work for the period
from 1 July 1941 to 30 April 1942.
177
month after Kříž’s arrival and establishment at Czech Radio. Thus, he may have had
some influence on their inception, or Czech Radio’s more senior staff may have
sought to deal with the subjects themselves, so as to keep them out of Kříž’s much
more activist hands.
•
Jak to dělají v Říši? (“How do they do that in the Reich?”), for example, the
German educational, technical training, fitness and sport, banking, library
systems, the organization of public life in general, etc.
•
Bereme si vzor z Říše (“Let’s take an example from the Reich”) on Speer’s plans
for recreating Berlin, etc.
If we summarize developments up to mid 1941, we can see that a number of factors
worked together to limit the appearance and propagation of pro-German or pro-Nazi
topics within Czech Radio’s programming. First of all, German strategic thinking visà-vis the as yet unoccupied peoples of Europe initially required the presence of
Czech cultural autonomy at least for appearances sake. The implementation of a too
obviously pro-German approach via Czech Radio programs, which were readily
audible in these other countries, might have alerted these peoples to the Hitler
regime’s real intentions in the region. Furthermore, and of at least equal importance,
Czech Radio’s original leadership implemented a strategy of passive resistance –
Večeřa would likely categorize it as “retardation” – concentrating mostly on the
broadcasting of otherwise innocuous German music and limiting pro-German talks to
the realm of the non-political, including to historical topics. Ultimately, these factors
combined to keep pro-German and pro-Nazi political programming at minimal levels
until the summer of 1941 – nearly two and a half years into the Nazi occupation!
Kříž’s Beginnings in Programming
It was only after Kříž’s appointment at Czech Radio that German and Nazi interests
really started to penetrate Czech broadcasting at what most Czech listeners will
have perceived as an acutely alarming rate. In the initial phase after being hired, Kříž
did something of a radio training course with the series zvukovy deník Doba – Práce
– Události (“sound diary Time – Work – Events”), which he reworked into a political
178
broadcast. This program was basically a newsreel summarizing the events of the
day with a particular emphasis on labor-related issues. It broadcast daily except
Saturdays and Sunday and at quite a prominent time slot around 18:30 to 18:50
hours. In the later phases, this changed to a weekly schedule, but always as a
Protectorate-wide broadcast, i.e., on all Czech medium-wave stations. Kříž took over
this series from former ČSNS Member of Parliament Karel Kut.533 According to postwar testimony by their colleague Václav Jindřich Linhart, Kříž and Kut came into
conflict with each other from the very beginning of their time together at Czech
Radio, and especially after Kut had tried to change a broadcast manuscript of
Kříž’s.534 Given his commanding mandate from Scurla, it is clear that Kříž would
have been little inclined to take orders from Kut, a representative of the old political
system that the Vlajka hated so much.
On 4 August 1941, Kříž also started preparing a “Press Review”, which ran at first
thrice-weekly, later daily.535 Undoubtedly, this 10- to 15-minute program was
modeled on Hans Fritzsche’s “Political Press- and Radio Reviews”536 from Berlin, as
it shared a similar duration around 15 minutes and broadcast similarly in the evening
after 18:50 hours. In the Czech version, the word “political” was left out of the title –
presumably so as not to frighten off potential listeners. Nevertheless, the intent was
clearly political, and as Kříž saw it, with the series “whispered propaganda was
combated and the positive contribution of the Czech press to the New Order was
recognized.”537 Just a few weeks into his time at Czech Radio the editors of Týden
533
534
535
536
537
Karel Kut, born 1902, ČSNS party official and member of Parliament (1935-1939); from 1927 to
1940 journalist and editor of the paper Polední list. Until June 1940 a member of the board of the
National Solidarity. On familiar “ty” terms with both Miloš Kareš and Hubert Masařík. Kut worked
at Czech Radio starting 1 May 1941 in the Industry, Trade and Business, Press and News
departments. Kut apparently belonged to a wing of the ČSNS that held a certain admiration for
Mussolini’s Fascists in Italy. For example he translated from the Italian and supplied the preface
and notes for a work from the Instituto Nazionale di Cultura Fascista on the Czechoslovak Crisis
of 1938: ERBA: Československá krise, Národní nakladatelství A. Pokorný, Praha, 1939. Kut’s
career with Czech Radio ended abruptly in December 1941 after the rejection of his manuscript
on Jewish humor for Kříž’s anti-Semitic series “What do you know about the Jews?” After the war,
Kut was charged with collaboration at the Extraordinary People’s Court of Prague and spent some
time in prison. Interrogations of him by the Communist State Security continued into the 1960’s.
See NA-NárS, carton 106, call number 51. Testimony of Václav Linhart of 14 June 1946. And
AČRo historical collection, Karel Kut, as well as AMV 301-88-1, page 201 and AVM-Z-7-20-73,
pages 2-4.
NA-NárS, carton 106, call number 51. Testimony of Václav Linhart of 14 June 1946, page 1
Presseübersicht—Přehled tisku.
Politische Zeitungs- und Rundfunkschau.
In the original: “Dreimal wöchentlich wurden Kurzberichte, in denen die Flüsterpropaganda
bekämpft und der positive Beitrag der tschechischen Presse zur Neuordnung gewürdigt wurde,
179
rozhlasu decided either to flatter Kříž, or what is more likely, to identify him quite
clearly for the public as a Nazi collaborator by publishing his photo with a caption
showing him at the microphone.538
Kříž’s main work for Nazi propaganda at Czech Radio came in the form of his
creation of series, however. The first one of these, which launched in mid-July 1941
dealt with the very topical issue of the Soviet Union. Its title was “Ein Tscheche kann
nicht Bolschewist sein!–Čech nemůže být bolševikem!” (“A Czech cannot be a
Bolshevik”). As Kříž later explained to Thürmer:
“On my initiative, Czech Radio intervened in the intellectual fight against Bolshevism
and its influence on the Czech mentality from 15 July 1941 on. And, in fact, through
the series ‘Ein Tscheche kann nicht Bolschewist sein. / / Čech nemůže být
bolševikem’. This series consisted of 22 lectures, discussions and reports by
prominent Czech journalists and by people who themselves were living in Russia a
long time or who as convinced Communists had left for the Soviet paradise only later
to return home. The lecture by editor-in-chief Dr. Emanuel Vajtauer appeared as a
pamphlet in the Orbis publishing house and created a lot of attention. The lectures in
the duration of 15 minutes, were broadcast thrice weekly.” 539
It would appear that Kříž, who wrote the above-quoted justification for Thürmer with
a view to the potential loss of his sinecure in the spring of 1942, may have
exaggerated a bit, as Týden rozhlasu only lists the series as of 12 August 1941, a full
month later. According to the magazine, it ran until 3 October 1941, however only
twice per week, namely on Tuesday and Saturday, in prime time with various starts
of transmission between about 20:00 and 21:30 hours with re-broadcasts via Brno
538
539
gesendet.” NA-NárS, carton 106, inventory number 1537. Personnel file Kříž, report of work for
the period from 1 July 1941 to 30 April 1942, page 1.
Týden rozhlasu, volume VIII, edition 32, (10 August 1941), page 5.
In the original: “Aus meiner Initiative hat sich der tschechische Rundfunk in den gestigen (sic!)
Kampf gegen den Bolschewismus und dessen Einflüsse auf die tschechische Mentalität schon ab
15. Juli 1941 eingeschaltet. Und zwar durch die Sendereihe “Ein Tscheche kann nicht
Bolschewist sein.//Čech nemůže být bolševikem!” Diese Senderreihe bestand aus 22 Vorträgen,
Gesprächen und Reportagen bedeutender tschechischer Journalisten und derjenigen Leute, die
539
selbst in Russland längere Zeit lebten oder als überzeugte Kommunisten ins Sowjetparadies
abgereist sind, um später wieder in die Heimat zurückzukehren. Der Vortrag des
Hauptschriftleiters Dr. Emanuel Vajtauer erschien als Broschüre im Orbis-Verlag und erweckte
ein großes Aufsehen. Die Vorträge in der Dauer von je 15 Minuten wurden dreimal wöchentlich
ausgestrahlt.” NA-NárS, carton 106, inventory number 1537. Personnel file Kříž, report of work for
the period from 1 July 1941 to 30 April 1942.
180
and Ostrava, and probably also via short-wave. The planning and execution of this
series can be described as relatively logical and multifaceted, because it was based
apparently not only on talks by activist journalists, such as Karel Werner, Emanuel
Vajtauer or Antonín J. Kožíšek, but also on reports by Czechs, who had allegedly
experienced the Soviet Union themselves. The latter were intended to support the
authenticity of the allegations and arguments made in the program by providing an
inside view of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the series addressed almost all strata
of Czech society. Here now are a few examples from the series:
•
Karel Werner’s “A word from a journalist” from Saturday, 23 August 1941 (20:15
to 20:30 hours, on all Czech stations) emphasized the foreignness of Bolshevism
to the Czechs – in a remarkable contradiction of Goebbels’s broadcasts painting
Czechoslovakia as a hotbed of Bolshevik murder and intrigue just three years
earlier.
•
Editor-in-chief of the Brno-based newspaper Moravské noviny (“Moravian
Newspaper”) Antonín J. Kožíšek rather incongruously took the listener not to the
Soviet Union but to Spain on 30 August 1941 (21:15 to 21:30 hours, all Czech
stations), where he had ostensibly gained experience with the Communists
during the Spanish Civil War.
•
From the field of personally experienced horror stories is an interview from
Saturday, 16 August 1941 (20:55 to 21:10 hours, all Czech stations) under the
not very enigmatic title “Conversation with a Czech woman who lost her husband
in Russia.” Apparently, this Czech woman had emigrated to the Soviet Union with
her husband, who was later imprisoned for alleged counter-revolutionary
offences, but finally returned home as the mother of two children and
penniless.540
•
Kříž also contributed a program of his own on 19 August 1941 (20:55 to 21:10
hours, all Czech stations and via short-wave to America) in which he revealed
pan-Slavic tendencies among the Czechs as a Bolshevik fraud.
Regrettably there is no way to judge what the average Czech listeners will have
thought of the information contained in these programs. Listeners with pan-Slavic
540
NA-NárS, carton 106, inventory number 1537. Personnel file Kříž, report of work for the period
from 1 July 1941 to 30 April 1942.
181
and/or Communist political orientation will not have greeted it with much sympathy.
As the Sicherheitsdienst reported regarding the populations mood towards the attack
on the Soviet Union, however, “Agricultural and Catholic circles have spoken of the
need to join ranks in the anti-Bolshevik front.”541 Thus, there may have been some
listenership for this series. However the situation actually was, “A Czech cannot be a
Bolshevik” was to serve as the template for Kříž’s later work. This will be the subject
of in-depth review in the chapter on anti-Semitic broadcasts.
Emanuel Moravec in the Period
Naturally, throughout this entire period Emanuel Moravec continued his narration
from the theaters of war with increasing frequency as the events unfolded. Apart
from a recurring theme of the nations of southeastern Europe having been duped by
Britain into sacrificing themselves unnecessarily in a war against Germany, Moravec
never failed to explain in detailed geographic and/or military-technological
terminology the progress from the front:
“On the territory of the former Yugoslavia after the fall of Belgrade and Zagreb it is no
longer possible to speak about any front. Yesterday was also Sarajevo’s turn, which
German fast units occupied. The Italian 2nd Army, moving along the coast from the
west, is reaching beyond the railway leading to Šibenik and to the north via Knin to
Zagreb. That means that the Italians have advanced 250 km from Rijeka to the
southeast in the costal mountains in 10 days of operations.”542
Or on the fall of Crete to the Germans:
“The latest events in the Mediterranean and in the Atlantic have once again
confirmed that, on the mainland and on the sea, he who has the advantage in the air
decides… The fate of the island of Crete is a direct schoolbook example of this fact
541
542
In the original: “Bäuerliche und katholische Kreise sollen dagegen von der Notwendigkeit
gesprochen haben, sich in die antibolschewistische Front einzuordnen.” SD-Meldungen aus dem
Reich edition 197 of 26 June 1941 quoted in BRANDES: Die Tschechen I., page 147.
In the original: “Jugoslavia se zhroutila” broadcast on 16 April 1941. “Na území bývalé Jugoslavie
se po pádu Bělehradu a Záhřebu už o žádné frontě nedá hovořit. Včera došlo také na Sarajevo,
které bylo obsazeno německými rychlými jednotkami. Italská 2. armáda, postupující podél pobřeží
od západu, pronikla až za železnici, vedoucí ze Šibeniku k severu přes Knin na Záhřeb. To
znamená, že Italové za 10 dnů operací ze Rjeky postoupili na jihovýchod v pobřežních horách o
více než 250 km.” MORAVEC: Tři roky, page 246.
182
from the new warfare… First of all, the British air forces capitulated in the battle for
Crete… It is not a confirmation by the Germans, but rather by seeing Anglicans that
England, despite all the vociferation about American aid, is still much, much weaker
in the air than the Germans… In May, the English lost 746,000 BRT. In order to
achieve the same total losses from the [PRP: First] World War, the German Armed
Forces would only need to sink a further 570,000 tons, because from the beginning
of this war, the Germans have sunk 11,670,000 BRT. During the entire [PRP: First]
World War, the Germans destroyed a total of 12,240,000 tons in 51 months. In this
war, as it appears, they will reach that number already in 22 months.”543
After the start of Nazi Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union, another broad range
of lectures and commentary opened to Moravec. Just two days after the start of
“Operation Barbarossa” on 22 June 1941, he broadcast a speech with the title “The
Liquidation of the Soviet Union has begun”,544 in which he rather bizarrely explained
the outbreak of Germany’s war of aggression against its erstwhile ally, Stalin’s Soviet
Union, as a preemption of a Jewish-Anglo-Soviet plot to threaten Germany. As
Moravec saw it, the inevitable defeat the Soviet Union, as the Soviets’ inability to
conquer the tiny nation of Finland the previous year portended, would lead to the
elimination of the “last bastion over which the Jews could still wave their flag of
spongers and schemers.” Furthermore, the “German Wehrmacht, which is now
breaking the influence of the Jews in the East, is also writing a chapter of new
opportunities for the Czech nation, which has always fulfilled its calling honorably on
the side of the West as an intermediary between the West and the East.”545
543
544
545
In the original: “Zahajovací operace skončeny” (“Starting Operations Finished”) broadcast on 4
July 1941. “Poslední události ve Středomoří i v Atlantiku znovu potvrdily, že na pevnině i na moří
rozhoduje ten, kdo má převahu ve vzduchu... Přimo školním příkladem pro tuto skutečnost
nového válečnictví je osud ostrova Kréty... Nejprve se vzdalo boje o Krétu britské letectvo... Není
to tvrzení Němců, nýbrž truchlivé přiznání vidoucích Angličanů že Anglie, přes všechen ten pokřik
o americké pomoci, je ve vzduchu stále mnohem a mnohem slabší než Němci... Za květen ztratili
Angličané 746 000 BRT. Aby dnes dosáhla celkových ztrát ze světové války, potřebuje německá
branná moc potopit už jen 570 000 tun, neboť od počátku této války potopili Němci celkem 11 670
000 BRT. Za celou světovou válku zničili Němci celkem 12 240 000 tun během 51 měsiců. V této
válce, jak se zdá, dosáhnou této cifry už za 22 měsíců.” MORAVEC: Tři roky, page 246.
In the original: “Začala likvidace Sovětského svazu” broadcast on 24 June 1941. MORAVEC: Tři
roky, pages 271-274.
In the original: “Začala likvidace Sovětského svazu” broadcast on 24 June 1941. “Tím padne
ovšem poslední bašta, nad kterou Židé mávali ještě svým práporem příživníků a intrikánů...
Německá branná moc, která nyní láme na Východě vliv Židů, píše také kapitolu nových možností
pro český národ, který vždy konal poctivě své historické poslání na straně Západu, jakožto spojka
mezi Západem a Východem.” MORAVEC: Tři roky, pages 271-274.
183
Just one day later, on 25 June 1941, Moravec followed up with another geographic
and military-technological song of praise for the Wehrmacht and its advances on the
new eastern front, in which he continued with the message of Britain as the deceiver
of nations, with the Soviet Union now ostensibly having fallen for selfish JewishBritish machinations.546 On Saturday, for the third time in the same week, Moravec
returned to the microphone, but this time he turned his rhetorical guns on the
Czechoslovak Government in Exile and specifically President Beneš, who had
heralded the expansion of the anti-Nazi coalition in a BBC radio address on 24
June.547 Moravec in response accused Beneš of trying to connect the fate of the
Czech nation to that of the Jews. As Moravec explained, such a connection had
already proven fateful for several countries in Europe and was now destroying the
Soviet Union also. Reminding the Czechs of Beneš’s defeat at Munich – which
Moravec referred to in truly servile Protectorate fashion not by its Czech name
“Mnichov”, but by its German name “München” – he endeavored to play down the
meaning of the expansion of the Anti-Hitler Coalition. “Dr. Beneš stated that the antiGerman front from the time before München is being renewed. I don’t see it
anywhere. Before München, only the abandoned little Czechs were in the antiGerman front… Why don’t I see any anti-German front here, and don’t want to see
one either? Simply because we’d end up alone in it again like back then when we
believed that Dr. Beneš has a plan.”548
However, Moravec also continued to deal with broader political topics of relevance to
the Czech people, including the Nazis’ intensifying policy of persecution of the Jews.
On the eve of the second anniversary of the start of the Second World War – and a
good month prior to the onset of Alois Kříž’s specialized series on anti-Semitism
called “What do you know about the Jews?” – Moravec held forth with Goebbels’s
explanation that the entire war had been forced upon Germany by a great
international Jewish conspiracy. Proof of this Moravec found “in the cooperation of
capitalism with communism, which originated on a racial basis. The Jew-millionaire
546
547
548
Sověty nalétly Anglii (“The Soviets fell or the England’s Tricks”) broadcast on 25 June 1941.
MORAVEC: Tři roky, pages 274-278
MASARYK, Jan: Volá Londýn, page 143.
In the original: “Beneš opět kombinuje” (“Beneš is Making Combinations Again”) broadcast on 28
June 1941. “Dr. Beneš tvrdil, že se obnovuje protiněmecká fronta z doby před Münchenem. Nikde
ji nevidím. Před Münchenem byli v protiněmecké frontě pouze opuštení Čecháčkové… Proč tu
protiněmeckou frontu nevidím a nechci ji ani vidět? Prostě proto, poněvadž bychom v ní opět
zůstali sami, jako tehdy, když jsme věřili, že dr. Beneš má plán.” MORAVEC: Tři roky, page 284.
184
came to an agreement with the Jew-commissar when it came to the struggle against
Germany…” The war was also not a fight the Jews took on by risking their own lives,
but through the sacrifice of the Aryan people in general, or as he mockingly noted:
“The Jews will fight with Adolf Hitler to the very last Englishman.” Furthermore,
according to Moravec, had it not been for the Jews starting the war in the first place,
Britain and the other nations of Europe would surely have come to an agreement
with Germany without any conflict ensuing at all. The logical consequence of the
Jews starting the war then, Moravec opined, would be the need to punish them; and
the longer they prolonged the war “the more severe the measures have to be that
are implemented against the Jews.” At the time of this broadcast, only six short
weeks separated the Jewish population of the Protectorate from the first systematic
mass deportations to the Ghettos and extermination camps of occupied Central and
Eastern Europe.549 Perhaps, Moravec was not aware that this was coming at the
time, but his words were helping to pave the way for what was to become the
Holocaust.
One of the most active roles Moravec attributed to the Jews in this broadcast was
also to foreshadow a broadening of the Second World War in general. As Moravec
saw it, Jews were most active in “propaganda of the British-American-Soviet antiGerman coalition.”
550
This last line especially touched upon a critical issue. As
United States’ material support for Britain and later for the Soviet Union and others
increased throughout 1941 via President Roosevelt’s Lend-Lease Acts of March
1941,551 so too did Moravec’s belligerent rhetoric towards the Americans and
President Roosevelt. Even several months prior to the outbreak of hostilities
between Germany and the United States, Moravec routinely placed the United
States rhetorically into the anti-German coalition alongside Britain and the Soviet
Union. For example, a Moravec speech broadcast on 3 December 1941 decried
549
550
551
SEEMANN, Richard (Ed.): Ghetto Litzmannstadt 1941-1944, Dokumenty a výpovědi o životě
českých židů v lodžském ghettu, (“Ghetto Litzmannstadt 1941-1944, Documents and Testimonies
about the Life of Czech Jews in the Ghetto Łódź“), Institut Terezínské Iniciativy, Praha, 2000., pp.
253-295. Hereinafter: SEEMANN: Ghetto Litzmannstadt.
In the original: “Válka Židů s Němci” (“The War of the Jews with the Germans”) broadcast on 30
August 1941. “To vidíme dnes na spolupráci kapitalismu s komunismem, která vznikla na
podkladě rasovém. Žid-milionář se dohodl se Židem-komisařem, když šlo o boj proti Německu...
Židé budou bojovat s Adolfem Hitlerem do posledního Angličana... tím přiísnější musí být opatření
učiněna proti Židům... hlavně v propagandě protiněmecké koalice britsko-americko-sovětské.”
MORAVEC: Tři roky, pages 325-329.
th
Issued during the term of the 77 Congress in March 1941 as Public Law 77-11. Text available
on-line at: http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Lend_Lease_Act,_11_March_1941 (March 2011).
185
Britain’s ostensibly ineffective offensive against Rommel in the deserts of North
Africa as a “very unpleasant thing” for both “England” (i.e., linguistically reducing
Britain to just one of its component parts) and the United States, the latter of which
he identified as the source of rich material support for the former.552 After one of his
typically detailed geographical reviews of the battle zone, Moravec then moved on to
assert that – unlike Germany’s experienced tank corps who had seen action in
Poland, Belgium and France – Britain’s and the United States’ forces had little or no
experience in tank warfare, a fact that would likely have dire consequences, he
warned.553
On 6 December 1941, just one day prior to Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, Moravec
continued in a similar tone. On this occasion he compared Britain to a ship that had
been hit, was taking on water fast and evacuating cultural treasures and the children
of the rich to America. British aristocrats and royals, once so popular in the United
States, ostensibly had to wait in the anti-chambers of cigar-smoking Jews to beg for
assistance. As Moravec saw it, this development meant the end of Britain as a great
power and the start of its subservience to the United States. In a colorful analogy, he
prophesized that this new relationship would not turn out well for Britain, however, as
the “American wolf, dressed in grandmother’s clothing of Democracy is about to
pounce upon and swallow the British Red Riding Hood.”554
The closing arguments of this particular “Political-military Consideration” aimed at the
Czech situation within the Great German Reich, however. The main thrust of this
part of the lecture was to exhort Czech workers and farmers, however also doctors,
engineers and civil servants to give their best for the Reich. To these ends the Czech
Nazi Moravec waxed poetic, spared no hyperbole and even reached for an analogy
from the Christian Holy Scriptures555 to drive his point home for the Czech listener:
“As far as our Czech management of things in the middle of the German Reich and
552
553
554
555
In the original: From the series Z válečného pole–Nový britský nezdar v Africe (“From the
Battlefied—New British Failure in Africa”) broadcast on 3 December 1941. “…a strategicky může
se stát celá věc Anglii a Spojeným státům velmi nepřijemnou...za podpory bohatého materiálu...”
MORAVEC: Tři roky, pages 372-373.
MORAVEC: Tři roky, pages 375.
In the original: From the series “Vojensko-politické úvahy–Válčíme prací” (“Political-military
Considerations–We Fight through Work”) broadcast on 6 December 1941. “Americký vlk, který se
oblékl do šatů babičky Demokracie, je na skoku pohltit britskou Karkulku.” MORAVEC: Tři roky,
page 379.
See the Gospel of St. Matthew 7:21-23.
186
at the heart of Europe is concerned, the balance sheet after Lažnovský’s556 death is
perhaps like this: Not words, but the labors of each of us are the path to a better
Czech tomorrow. Not he who says ‘Lord, Lord’ will enter into the kingdom of heaven,
but he who keeps the commandments.”557 Within one week of this broadcast,
Moravec’s idealized kingdom of heaven – Nazi Germany under the rule of Adolf
Hitler – would be at war with the United States
Georg Schneider – the Censor as a Program Maker
A “colleague” of Moravec, who started producing his own contributions for daily
broadcasts was none other than the censor Georg Schneider. While Schneider also
dealt with political and military subjects, he did so differently. In contrast to Moravec,
Schneider’s pieces were considerably more radiophonic. They were shorter, often
just two to four minutes long, and they rarely took on the form of detailed treatises on
geography or military technology. An innovation, albeit a rather shocking one, was
that Schneider employed a hitherto unacceptably low tone of language in these
pieces. While Moravec was not at all opposed to speaking in folksy analogies or
metaphors, and while he surely did not spare harsh criticism of the Jews in his
lectures, Schneider moved to a tone of speech that was frequently directly vulgar.
In the late summer/early autumn of 1941, several rather short commentaries by
Schneider on a number of current events made their way onto the Czech ether.
Some of them aired in the early morning hours of the broadcast day already at 07:00
hours including Sundays, the morning hours of which up until this point had generally
emphasized solemn music or religious themes! Schneider’s commentaries were
most frequently called Náš ranní komentář (“Our morning commentary”). Sometimes,
they were pegged to specific events from the previous year of German military
556
557
Reference here is to the activist journalist and member of the group of seven, Karel Lažnovský,
(1906-1941), who had died from a mysterious illness in October 1941 after an audience he and
others had had with Czech Premier Eliáš. The Nazis attributed the death to food served during
the meeting laced with biological contaminants. See KONČELÍK, KÖPPLOVÁ, KRYŠPÍNOVÁ:
Český tisk, footnote 16, page 23. In a pathos-ridden eulogy replete with references from Czech
history broadcast from Lažnovský’s funeral, Moravec sought to paint Lažnovský in the colors of a
faithful Czech patriot who had been martyred by cowardly poison-mixers. See: “Nad hrobem
Lažnovského!” (“Above Lažnovský’s Grave!”) broadcast on 15 October 1941. MORAVEC: Tři
roky, pages 350-353.
In the original: From the series “Vojensko-politické úvahy–Válčíme prací” (“Political-military
Considerations–We Fight through Work”) broadcast on 6 December 1941. “Pokud jde o to naše
české hospodaření uprostřed Německé říše a v srdci Evropy, je bilance po smrti Lažnovského asi
tato: Ne řeči, nýbrž práce každého z nás jsou cestou k lepšímu českému zítřku. Ne ten, kdo říká
‚Pane, Pane‛, přijde do království nebeského, nýbrž ten, kdo plní přikázání.”
187
victories or other events and included the subtitle Dnes před rokem (“A year ago
today”), or if the event were closer in time but not within the past 24 hours, Včera a
dnes (“Yesterday and today”), as in the case of the Finland retaking Vyborg from the
Soviets quoted below, which was already one week in the past by the time of
broadcast. The program magazines of the time identify the programs as Denní
kalendář (“Daily calendar”). That means that Schneider’s morning commentaries
were inserted into the announcements of up-coming programs for the day, which
generally ran between 07:00 and 07:10. On the one hand, that might have been a
clever time placement of these programs, as it connected them to the useful form of
program guide for non-subscribers to Týden rozhlasu. On the other hand, it remains
questionable how much Czech Radio listeners would have appreciated these ugly
tirades so early in the morning, even if they took a humorous tone at times. A review
of just a few excerpts offers a general view of the nature of this part of Schneider’s
work. The following broadcast excerpt was part of a running commentary on the Nazi
invasion of the Soviet Union.
“When the Finns reached the old borders of Karelia and conquered the city of
Vyborg shoulder-to-shoulder with the German comrades, Moscow Radio broadcast a
pious and naïve request into the smoke-filled heavens. One of the Jews from
Moscow Radio proclaimed in an innocent little voice that the Finns could end the war
against the lamentable Bolsheviks. ‘After all, they got back everything that Russia
had stolen from them before! They have Karelia again and with it her capital city
Viborg. What more do they want from us?’… The Finns really do know what they’re
fighting for today. Now it’s not just about their own security, but about destroying and
exterminating Bolshevism and with it also securing all of Europe from the danger
whose effects the Finns had to endure on their own hides for a whole year. And that
dreamt-up wish of Moscow’s propaganda kikes betrayed in short the inglorious
end.”558
558
In the original: Denní kalendář—Náš ranní komentář broadcast on 5 September 1941. “Když
Finové–bok po boku vedle německých kamarádů–dosahli starých hranic Karelie a dobyli města
Viborgu, tu vysílal moskevský rozhlas zbožnou a naivní prosbu k zakouřenému nebi. Vlástně by
tihle Finové mohli skončit s válkou–prohlašoval jeden ze Židů moskevského rozhlasu
neviňoučkým hlasem–proti ubohým bolševíkům. ‛Dostali přece zpátky všechno, co jim před rokem
Rusko uloupilo! Mají zase Karelii a s ní i její hlavní město Viborg. Co jen od nás ještě chtěji?'…
Finové dnes totiž... vědí, zač bojují. Nyní jde nejen o zajištění jejich vlastní, nýbrž o zničení a
vyhlazení bolševismu a tím také o zajištění celé Evropy před nebezpečím, jehož učinek museli
188
Reference in the next piece is to Soviet Marshal Semen Mikhajlovich Budennyj,
whose defeat in the battle of Kiev on 26 September 1941 is considered one of the
greatest routs of military history.
“The appalling catastrophe that has befallen the old sergeant and present-day Red
Marshal Budděný to the east of Kyiv did not suddenly stop the flow of the Moscow
radio kikes’ ranting, but it did at least make a serious impression on them and even
on their primitive brain convolutions.”559
Or from a broadcast a few weeks later:
“Even if the Moscow ‘Pravda’ hasn’t been published in Moscow for a good long time
already, it is nonetheless still the official organ of the propaganda kikes around
Stalin. But how such an expressly humoristic tabloid can call itself ‘Pravda’ (PRP:
‘Truth’) is a real riddle. And that daily definitively became a humoristic paper from the
moment that the Jewish editors stopped producing their so-called considerations in a
Moscow café between vodka and caviar, but rather in a bad mood somewhere in
Kuibyshev or Samara, sitting on an unpacked crate with sweat dripping off their
fingers that are stiff from the constant carrying of suitcases.”560
Very clear in much of these broadcasts is the composite enemy image made up of
“the Jew” and at this point the virtually synonymous Bolshevik, i.e., Communists. As
we will see later in the chapter on anti-Semitic broadcasts, the enemy image of “the
Jew” was extremely flexible and expandable as per the requirements of the
559
560
Finové po celý rok snášet na svém vlastním těle. A tak vysněné přání moskevských propagačních
Žiďáků vydalo v krátku neslavný konec.” SOA-KST Praha, file number TkXX15.682/47, carton 13.
In the original: Denní kalendář—Náš ranní komentář, 28 September 1941. “Strašná katastrofa,
která postihla starého šikovatele a nýnějšího rudého maršála Buděnného východně od Kijeva,
rozhlasovým Žiďákům v Moskvě sice naráz nezastavila tok jejich chvástání, ale přece je pořádně
dolehla i na jejich jednoduché mozkové závity…” SOA-KST Praha, file number TkXX15.682/47,
carton 13.
In the original: Denní kalendář—Náš ranní komentář, broadcast 30 November 1941. “I když
moskevská ‘Pravda’ už hezký dlouho nevycházi v Moskvě, přece jen stále ještě je oficiálním
orgánem propagadistických Židáků kolem Stalina. Jak ale se tak vyslovený humoristický plátek
může nazývat ‘Pravda’, to je opravdu hádankou. A humoristickým listem se tento deník stal
rozhodně od okamžiku, co židovští redaktoři své tak zvané úvahy o situaci nevyrábejí jíž v
moskevské kavárně mezi vodkou a kaviárem, nýbrž ve špatné náladě kdesi v Kujbyševu či
Samaře, sedice na vybalené bedně je poti z prstů ztuhlých od neustalého nosení kufrů.”
189
propaganda needs of the day. At this point in the war, the Nazis’ new great enemy
was the Soviet Union. Thus, there was an equation of Jews and Bolsheviks here.
Later it was to be Jews and Free Masons and even non-compliant other Gentiles
termed “White Jews”. Noteworthy here is that Schneider framed the enemy image of
“the Jew” using the pejorative racial slur “Žiďák”, the English equivalent of which
might be “kike”. One of the more striking aspects of these broadcasts is precisely the
introduction of terminology from this level of speech to the air waves. With it,
Schneider marked a departure from Czech Radio practice which had always been
“...connected to high culture...” and intended to “assist universally the cultivation of
the citizen and externally represent the state in the most dignified manner
possible.”561 The average Czech listener can only have experienced Schneider’s
“innovation”, therefore, as a shocking lowering of the tone of discourse. In effect, the
gutter was suddenly speaking through the radio, a hitherto unthinkable reality. One
can only wonder whether this might have been part of a concerted effort to disgust
Czech listeners and drive them away from radio altogether. Certainly, such a move
would have played into Frank’s plans in the autumn of 1941. Apparently, Scurla was
so pleased with the results of Schneider’s work, however, that some of it was even
broadcast in the short-wave programming for Czechs in North and South America.
Around 250 pages of such commentaries can be found in the preparatory files for a
criminal case the Czechoslovak State Prosecutor launched against Schneider in
absentia after the war.562 It was Alois Kříž who undertook much of the translation
work for Georg Schneider’s various “Our morning commentary” shows, which
Schneider composed in his mother tongue – German. Between the autumn of 1941
and early 1942, Kříž translated more than 180 such programs for Schneider “free of
charge”, as he later informed Thürmer.563 Czech Radio’s personnel director Karel
Remeš later testified in court that these and similar programs the Radio received in
German, and which Kříž translated into Czech, known as Mittagseinlagen—Polední
vložky (“Noontime inserts”), were so coarsely formulated, that their broadcasting was
561
562
563
KONČELÍK, VEČEŘA, ORSÁG: Dějiny českých médií 20. století, page 62.
SOA-KST Praha, file number TkXX15.682/47, carton 13.
NA-NárS, carton 106, inventory number 1537. Personnel file Kříž, report of work for the period
from 1 July 1941 to 30 April 1942, page 2.
190
discontinued after approximately just half a year,564 which suggests that they fell
victim to Thürmer’s purges at Czech Radio.
The Maras Era III – Analysis of the Program Week Starting 30 November 1941
The week reviewed actually falls into the interregnum period, which started in
November 1941. However, as there is also data from a further week from that period
in March 1942, the findings for week 48 of 1941 will appear here.
Figure 4.1: Average duration of broadcast day in hours:minutes:seconds
Week starting 30 November 1941
All Czech (CZ) medium-wave (MW) stations = Prague I, Brno, Moravská Ostrava
All CZ MW stations
18:30:00
5:30:00
Prague I
18:30:00
5:30:00
Brno
18:30:00
5:30:00
Moravská Ostrava
18:30:00
5:30:00
SW-Poděbrady
4:26:00
19:34:00
Broadcast hours
Station breaks
Duration of Broadcast Day
Figure 4.1 illustrates not only a return to longer broadcast days after the confusion
and early evening shut-downs Göring had forced onto the Reichsrundfunk and
Czech Radio in 1940, but also an expansion of radio broadcasting well beyond the
original service Czecho-Slovak Radio offered prior to the invasion. This broadcast
week averaged just over 18.5 broadcast hours per day, which corresponds to an
increase of over five broadcast hours per day or by roughly 38%! In practice, this
meant that listeners could turn on the radio around 06:00 in the morning and – with
the exception of a station break between 08:00 and 09:45 hours – stay tuned until
02:00 hours the following morning. While the length of Czech Radio’s broadcast day
564
NA-NárS, carton 107, call number 60. Sketch of the organization and activity of the Czech
Broadcasting Corporation during the occupation by personnel manager Karel Remeš of 26 June
1946, page 2.
191
did not reach the same levels as the Reichssender Böhmen in 1939 or even the
Reichsprogramm’s emergency broadcasts via Breslau’s frequency in 1940 (20:40:00
hours per day), this finding nevertheless indicates a clear intent to expand Czech
Radio’s service to the listener and the steady implementation of that intent. Thus, at
this point in the occupation, we see a propagation of radio as a medium at levels
approaching those in the Reichsrundfunk and consequently evidence for similar
intentions in broadcasting policy in the Protectorate as in the German-speaking
areas of the Reich.
Figure 4.2: Regionalization – stations of origin as a percentage of TOTAL AIRTIME
Week starting 30 November 1941,
All Czech (CZ) medium-wave (MW) stations = Prague I, Brno, Moravská Ostrava
All CZ MW stations
66
Prague I
9
74
Brno
62
Moravská Ostrava
62
5
15
7
2
16
4
6
SW-Poděbrady
0% 5%
7
13
16
2
16
2
16
100
10
%
15
%
20
%
25
%
30
%
35
%
40
%
45
%
50
%
55
%
60
%
65
%
70
%
75
%
80
%
85
%
90
%
Prague I
Brno
Moravská Ostrava
Reichssender Böhmen
Reichsprogramm
SW-Poděbrady
95 100
% %
Regionalization
However, the expansion of broadcast day did not translate 1:1 into an expansion of
Czech Radio’s productions. Figure 4.2 illustrates that the share of programming rebroadcast from the Reichsrundfunk doubled between 1940 and 1941 to an even
16% of airtime across the entire Czech Radio network. That means that roughly one
in six broadcast hours came directly from the Reichsprogramm. Nevertheless, much
of this new German programming will not have been highly intrusive for Czech
listeners. For example, a large portion of it consisted of re-broadcasts of German
news and music between 00:15 and 02:00 hours in the night when the vast majority
of the population will have been sleeping. Exceptions to this rule were daily German
news programs between 14:00 and 15:00 hours, and much more noteworthy, the
192
Reichsrundfunk’s requisitioning of a prime Sunday daytime spot between 12:30 and
14:00 for news and musical programming.
Figure 4.3: Programming structure -- subjects as a percentage of TOTAL AIRTIME
Week starting 30 November 1941,
All Czech (CZ) medium-wave (MW) stations = Prague I, Brno, Moravská Ostrava
All CZ MW stations
59
7
Prague I
59
8
Brno
60
Moravská Ostrava
60
SW-Poděbrady
0% 5% 10
%
Music
Youth/School
Women
Morning
7
7
60
15
%
20
%
25
%
30
%
1
5
1
1
1
111
5
5
5
11 2
40
%
45
%
50
%
55
%
Culture/Entertainment
Workers
News/Reports
German Program
60
%
5
16
3
70
%
3
15
6
4
111
15
6
4
3
5
27
65
%
4
11 2
4
35
%
15
75
%
80
%
85
%
90
%
95 100
% %
Farmers
Economics
Politics
Other
Programming Structure
Regrettably, the lack of German program magazines after May 1941 makes it
impossible to compare programming structure to that in the Reich at this point.
Within the confines of Czech Radio programming, however, Figure 4.3 illustrates a
clear expansion of overt political programming from the previously minimal level
around 1% (in 1940) to an average of 5% throughout the entire network. This finding
includes the handiwork of Alois Kříž and his Political Lectures Department. In the
case of the week reviewed, that means especially programming such as Kříž’s
political press reviews, and the series “What do you know about the Jews?”.
However, it also contains two lectures by Emanuel Moravec – one broadcast on
Wednesday, 3 December between 19:15-19:25 hours with the title “Z válečného
pole” (“From the field of war”) and one of his “Military-political considerations” on
Saturday evening (6 December) at the same time and both broadcast via all Czech
medium wave stations. In terms of actual content, duration, format or pattern of
broadcast (on all Czech medium-wave stations), there does not appear to have been
any identifiable differences between Moravec’s broadcasts “From the field of war” or
“Military-political considerations”. He himself later collected the texts in his book Tři
193
roky před mikrofonem without making any distinctions as to these two different titles
of the series.
Regarding the double rates of political programming on Brno and Moravská Ostrava
at 6% of airtime versus Prague I’s 3%, this is attributable entirely to the fact that
Prague lay well within the Reichssender Böhmen’s range of audibility, while Brno
and Moravská Ostrava had to re-broadcast a series in the early evening hours,
generally around 17:00 to 17:30 hours called Protektorátní časovost (“Protectorate
news”). This broadcast time is remarkably close to the traditional airing of the Česká
hodina programs. It seems, however, that they may have been identical or at least
complementary series. Alois Kříž’s note on the discontinuation of the Česká hodina
programs suggests, that they ran unchanged until he took over supervision of the
series on 3 December 1941.565
In the program magazines for the week reviewed there is also no reference to Hlasy
doby (“Voices of the Time”), as Kříž later renamed the series. Thus, it seems that
Protektorátní časovost may simply have been an interim and more neutral-sounding
name for the activist journalists’ Česká hodina series at this point in time. As is also
evident from Figure 4.3, political programming had entered Czech short-wave
broadcasts via Poděbrady. These were three political programs of 10 minutes
duration per week. As Alois Kříž later explained for Ferdinand Thürmer: “They serve
as propaganda of the new circumstances in the circles of our countrymen in North
and South America.”566
565
566
NA-NárS, carton 108, Note from Kříž to the programming directorate of Czech Radio from 6
January 1942 and NA-NárS, carton 106, inventory number 1537. Personnel file Kříž, report of
work for the period from 1 July 1941 to 30 April 1942, page 2.
In the original: “Sie dienen der Propaganda der neuen Verhältnisse in den Kreisen unserer
Landsleute in Nord- und Südamerika.” NA-NárS, carton 108, Note from Kříž to the programming
directorate of Czech Radio from 6 January 1942 and NA-NárS, carton 106, inventory number
1537. Personnel file Kříž, report of work for the period from 1 July 1941 to 30 April 1942, page 2.
194
Figure 4.4: Music by German composers as a percentage of TOTAL AIRTIME
Week starting 30 November 1941
All Czech (CZ) medium-wave (MW) stations = Prague I, Brno, Moravská Ostrava
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
15.5
16
14.7
15.9
All CZ MW stations
Prague I
Brno
Moravská Ostrava
Music by German composers
Music by German Composers
Regarding German music, Figure 4.4 documents that it also increased from previous
levels by roughly one-third and now made up around one broadcast hour in six
(15.5%). Particularly evident in the broadcast week reviewed were programs
dedicated to and featuring music by Mozart connected to the 150th anniversary of the
composer’s death on 5 December. Noteworthy too is the fact that very many of these
broadcasts aired in the primetime evening listening period after 18:00 hours.
195
Figure 4.5: Broadcast language as a percentage of ALL TALKS PROGRAMMING
Week starting 30 November 1941,
All Czech (CZ) medium-wave (MW) stations = Prague I, Brno, Moravská Ostrava
All CZ MW stations
80
Prague I
19
78
19
3
Brno
80
20
Moravská Ostrava
81
19
SW-Poděbrady
0% 5%
1
100
10
%
15
%
20
%
25
%
30
%
35
%
40
%
45
%
50
%
55
%
60
%
65
%
70
%
75
%
80
%
85
%
90
%
95 100
% %
Czech
Slovak
German
English
French
Italian
Romanian
Serbo-Croatian
Spanish
Ruthenian
Other
Broadcast Language
Figure 4.5 illustrates a massive increase in German-language talks programming on
all Czech medium-wave stations to levels approaching 20% of all talks. However,
most of this again fell into the category of news programming re-broadcast from the
Reichsrundfunk mentioned above. An interesting aspect is the appearance of
Spanish-language news broadcasts via Prague I between 22:30 and 22:45 hours.
Like most of the other major stations in the German network, which also had to
dedicate some airtime to foreign-language broadcast propaganda, Prague I was
recruited into serving Spain in this regard, testifying to the station’s good audibility in
that part of Europe.
196
Figure 4.6: Germanization/Nazification Factor (GNF) = as a percentage of TOTAL AIRTIME
Week starting 30 November 1941
All Czech (CZ) medium-wave (MW) stations = Prague I, Brno, Moravská Ostrava
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
31.8
8.5
7.8
8
7.9
15.5
16
All CZ MW stations
Prague I
5
0
Total GNF
9.5
9.4
6.5
7.5
14.7
15.9
Brno
Moravská Ostrava
Music by German composers
German-language talks
Czech-language pro-German/Nazi
GNF as % of total airtime
Germanization/Nazification Factor
Most striking perhaps, and altogether logical given Kříž’s full-time employment as the
director of the Political Lectures Department, is the dramatic rise in Czech-language
pro-German or pro-Nazi programming to an average of 8.5% of all airtime. This
included the entire range of programs from several different genres, such as
Moravec’s regular ruminations on strategic developments via Kříž’s “What do you
know about the Jews?” to Protektorátní časovost to Worker’s Radio programming on
“Cooperatives in the Reich”567 and even a “Little Czech-German assembly for
youth”,568 as well as many other programs. Given these increases in German music,
German-language talks programming and pro-German and/or pro-Nazi Czechlanguage
programming,
it
is
not
surprising
that
Figure
4.6
shows
a
Germanization/Nazification factor at this juncture approaching nearly one third – on
average 31.8% – of all airtime on the Protectorate’s medium-wave stations. That
means that in nearly one out of three program hours a Czech listener could access,
he/she would have been bombarded with either German music, the German
567
568
Broadcast on Prague I and Brno on Tuesday evening of the week reviewed between 17:50 and
18:00 hours.
Česko-německá besídka pro mládež broadcast on all medium-wave stations on Tuesday
between 18:00 and 18:20 hours.
197
language itself or Czech-language productions dedicated in some way to
propagating Nazism or German interests.
198
7. The Interregnum – November 1941 to March 1942
Within weeks of Heydrich’s arrival in Prague, the decision was taken to reform the
entire structure of broadcasting in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. To this
end,
Goebbels
posted
Hanns-Otto
Fricke
to
Prague
to
function
as
Überleitungskommissar (“transitional commissar”). Why exactly there arose a period
of flux or interregnum between Scurla’s time in office and Thürmer’s take-over in
early 1942 is not precisely clear from the surviving documentation. The hypothesis
seems reasonable, however, that the heads of broadcasting in Berlin did not have a
clear picture of the situation in Prague,569 as Thürmer suggests in his apology.
Furthermore, since Goebbels had dispatched Fricke to deal with broadcastingrelated concerns in other conquered provinces (Reichssender Wien and Polish
stations), Fricke had experience in crisis management. Then after around one month
of activity in Prague either Fricke determined that the job required a full-time
manager and suggested calling Thürmer home from the front or someone else –
presumably Heydrich – lost patience with the pace of change and called for a
replacement.
Thus, began a period for Czech Radio, which one could describe as an interregnum
between Scurla and Thürmer. This time span also marks the beginning of the end of
the Maras era at Czech Radio. The starting date for the interregnum would be
identical with Fricke’s arrival in Prague, which must have been some time after 13
November 1941, as he would surely have attended the important meeting on
broadcasting with Karl Hermann Frank, Berndt, Von Gregory and Wolf, had he been
present in Prague at the time. Unfortunately, Thürmer dated the start of all of these
changes only very approximately as “November 1941”.570 Lacking a police
registration for Fricke, the closest we can date the start of this period is between 13
and 29 November 1941.
Unfortunately, the exact end date of the interregnum is similarly unclear. The
occupation authorities avoided informing the general public, even the German
general public, about the problems that had arisen in Department IV of the Office of
the Reichsprotektor. Obviously, it was not in the interest of the regime to appear to
be improvising some form of crisis management. A thorough study of Der Neue Tag,
569
570
THÜRMER, Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, page 5.
THÜRMER, Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, page 16.
199
the official organ of the NSDAP in the Protectorate, for the period revealed no
mention either of Fricke’s arrival in Prague or of Scurla’s departure. Furthermore,
whenever the changes taking place in the German occupation authority were
discussed, they received a positive spin. Although lower-echelon figures like Marek
and Scurla could simply disappear, more prominent members of the occupation
authority required a bit of public image management. In the case of Von Gregory, a
short note datelined 13 March 1942 in Der Neue Tag informed the public that
Goebbels had called him to Berlin to assign him a “special task”. The official
announcement of the start of Thürmer’s service as the Intendant of the StationGroup Bohemia-Moravia came with a similarly positive spin. It appeared in the 1
April 1942 edition of Der Neue Tag. Datelined the previous day, (31 March 1942)
from Reichenberg (Liberec), the article began by reporting the fact of Thürmer’s start
in office, mentioning without further detail that the new Intendant of the StationGroup Bohemia-Moravia, SS-Hauptsturmführer Thürmer, had “these days”571 paid
his inaugural visit to Gauleiter and Reichsstatthalter (governor) of the Sudetenland
Konrad Henlein. However, the article’s main emphasis and the bulk of its information
dealt with the launch of new programming for the Sudetenland via the Protectorate
stations Prague I, Brno and Moravská Ostrava. The reader could register that there
had been a change in broadcast management in the Protectorate, but his/her
attention should settle on the fact of the new programming, no doubt intended as a
positive feature for the Sudeten-German listener. For the purposes of this study, it
means that Thürmer’s official start in Prague dates from the last week of March
1942.
Most of the detailed information we have on this period stems only from Thürmer’s
post-war apology for his time of service in Prague, entitled Sendergruppe BöhmenMähren (“Station-Group Bohemia-Moravia”), which dates from May 1950, and which
appears in light of substantiating testimony by Dr. Karel Remeš, and several other
facts, which will be discussed below, to be largely credible. Nevertheless, there are a
few moments described in Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, which deserve a very
critical review.
The main reasons why such skepticism appears warranted are:
571
Neue Rundfunksendungen für das Sudetenland, Der Neue Tag, volume 4, number 91 (1 April
1942), page 3.
200
1) Thürmer depicted himself as an honest, upright soldier, who single-handedly
saved Czech Radio, while laying dry a swamp of local-German chaos and
corruption within the broadcast administration of the Protectorate. For an old and
active Nazi like Thürmer, whose engagement for the regime must have earned
him an unattractive denazification category after 1945 with all the professional
restrictions that entailed, the apology was an excellent opportunity to reconstruct
his image in post-war Western Europe.
2) Of the other characters closely involved in or who must at least have been
informed about the events, Goebbels, Fricke and Karl Hermann Frank were
dead. Scurla and Von Gregory were missing and presumed dead, as was
Glasmeier. Martin Paul Wolf had also disappeared without a trace at the end of
the war never to surface again. There was, therefore, nobody alive to contradict
Thürmer’s assertions at the time he wrote his apology in May 1950.
3) While much of Thürmer’s claims can be confirmed with other documents, there is
circumstantial evidence that some of his assertions did not completely reflect the
reality of the situation.
Berlin’s Crisis Management Team: Hanns-Otto Fricke and Ferdinand Thürmer
In order to understand this period better, let us first take a look at
Überleitungskommissar Hanns-Otto Fricke. There is virtually no archival material on
Fricke’s sojourn in Prague. From his activities in the Reichsrundfunk, it is clear that
he was rather prominent among the directors of the individual Reichssender,
especially at the beginning of the Second World War. Thürmer described Fricke as
someone who enjoyed the absolute trust of both the Propaganda Ministry, and more
specifically of Reichsintendant Glasmeier.572 Fricke was an Alt-Parteigenosse who
had worked as propaganda leader and deputy county leader of the Greater Berlin
Party District (Gau) of the NSDAP starting already in 1930.573 According to an official
biography published in the late 1930’s, Fricke was born on 16 November 1896 in
Braunschweig. He visited the Goethe-Gymnasium in Hannover and was decorated
for bravery on the Austro-Italian front during World War I. After the war, he made a
career in theaters in Hannover and Westphalia, eventually directing the Deutsches
Volkstheater on Hermannplatz in Berlin. On 1 March 1934 he advanced to the
572
573
THÜRMER, Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, page 5.
Der Rundfunk, volume 2, number 3 (December 1938), p. 59.
201
position of Intendant at the Reichssender Frankfurt.574 In the autumn of 1938,
Goebbels transferred Fricke to the Reichssender Breslau, which at the time was also
responsible for administering the Reichssender Wien.575 After the invasion of Poland,
Goebbels appointed Fricke to deal with the Nazi governor there, Hans Frank, (no
relation of Karl Hermann Frank) in matters concerning the broadcast service of the
Generalgouvernement.
Thürmer
considered
the
stations
of
the
Generalgouvernement de facto under the supervision of Hanns-Otto Fricke.576
According to Diller, this was also the case. Although he did his best to wrest control
over the Generalgouvernement’s stations, Hans Frank spent most of the war
complaining about the Propaganda Ministry’s paternalistic approach to “his”
stations.577
The second main figure in the interregnum was Ferdinand Thürmer, whose post-war
apology provides so much insight into events in the Protectorate’s broadcasting
administration. A very quick assessment of Thürmer would classify him as a
complicated character. Apart from being intellectually “active”, his SS personnel
report characterized him as “upright and straight”, “open straight and solid”,
“purposeful and uncompromising”.578 However, characteristics such as these can
become problematic when bestowed by an institution that organized the plunder and
murder of the Holocaust. Against that background, it is necessary to examine
Thürmer and his policies with a very critical eye. On the one hand, he had a perfect
National Socialist curriculum vitae or pedigree, as it were. He was an AltParteigenosse and had belonged to other extreme nationalist and anti-Semitic
organizations even prior to Hitler’s rise in Germany. On the other hand, his policies
as the man responsible for broadcasting in the Protectorate reveal pragmatism,
intelligence and an uncommonly non-dogmatic benevolence toward his Czech
subordinates. Thürmer was at once a creative and, perhaps in a personal sense,
also an honest individual. Nevertheless, he was completely dedicated to and
demonstrably willing to die for a thoroughly criminal ideology.
574
575
576
577
578
NA-AA (Zahraniční úřad Berlin-Foreign Office Berlin), carton 81, call number 136-81-3.
Der Rundfunk, volume 2, number 3 (December 1938), p. 59.
THÜRMER, Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, page 5.
DILLER: Rundfunkpolitik, page 407.
In the original: “geistig... rege”, “aufrecht und gerade”, “offen gerade und gefestigt”, “zielbewusst
und kompromisslos”. Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde, SSO/SS-Führerpersonalakten, call
number 6400045932, carton number 01727, film number–Findbuch. Personnel report of 23
October 1939.
202
Ferdinand Thürmer was born into the family of the famous Thürmer Pianoforte
Company in Meissen, Saxony on 16 March 1900. The company itself has a very long
tradition with roots going back to 1834 and exists to this day (2010) as a maker of
fine musical instruments. He learned piano construction as a trade. Thürmer served
as a naval cadet in the Imperial Navy from July to December 1918.579 After World
War I, he first joined the Brigade Erhardt, a right-wing paramilitary group that took
part in the Kapp Putsch in 1920. Thereafter, he moved to the Freikorps Oberland,
which later formed a core group in the Bavarian wing of the Sturmabteilung (SA),
Hitler’s shock troops for terrorizing political opponents and others. He remained
active in this group until 1930.580 During the Weimar Republic, he was also involved
in radically anti-democratic and anti-Semitic parties and groups including the
Deutsch-Völkischer Schutz- und Trutzbund (1919-1922) and the Deutsch-Völkische
Freiheitspartei (1922-1924).581 Thürmer’s political home lay clearly on the radical
right-wing of the German political scene, among people readily prepared to employ
violence to reach their political goals. Eventually Thürmer found his way to the
NSDAP, which he joined on 1 May 1930, becoming an SA-man on 1 July 1932 – just
as the Nazis were preparing for their final assault on the Weimar Republic. In
January 1935, he also became an honorary member of the Sicherheitsdienst (SD),
the Party’s own security police, and transferred from the SA – whose power was on
the wane after the Röhm purge – to the more promising Schutzstaffel (SS) under
Himmler and Heydrich.582 Thürmer’s career within the SS was relatively rapid and
ever upwardly mobile. Hitler’s birthday in 1938 found him already enjoying the rank
of SS-Untersturmführer (lieutenant). On 9 November 1939 he advanced to SSObersturmführer
(senior
lieutenant)
and
on
9
November
1942
to
SS-
Hauptsturmführer (captain).583 In November 1944, First Lieutenant of the Reserve
579
580
581
582
583
Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde, SSO/SS-Führerpersonalakten, call number 6400045932, carton
number 01727, film number–Findbuch. Personnel report of 23 October 1939.
Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde, SSO/SS-Führerpersonalakten, call number 6400045932, carton
number 01727, film number–Findbuch.
Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde, archival collection RSK II, Personal- und Sachakten, A-Z, call
number 2101127718, film number I575, picture number 1417. Personnel questionnaire
Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk Leipzig of 14 September 1933.
Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde, SSO/SS-Führerpersonalakten, call number 6400045932, carton
number 01727, film number–Findbuch.
Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde, SSO/SS-Führerpersonalakten, call number 6400045932, carton
number 01727, film number–Findbuch. Promotion recommendations of 28 February 1938, 23
October 1939.
203
Thürmer also became an Obersturmführer (senior lieutenant) in the Waffen SS, the
military arm of the organization.584
Apart from the political prerequisites, Thürmer also brought impressive educational
and broadcasting credentials to Prague. He studied six semesters of Law, History
and Art History at Marburg and Innsbruck. When, exactly, he started working in the
radio is not clear from his Party and SS files at the Bundesarchiv in Berlin. However,
a personnel questionnaire from the Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk in Leipzig from 14
September 1933 lists him as the director of the Talks Department there.585 In this
capacity, he created several radio lectures on historical and artistic topics as well as
programs concerning Nazi Weltanschauung. Outside the radio, Thürmer also
produced several articles and book reviews for the anti-Semitic periodical Der
Hammer, from the publishing house of the same name, which had brought Germany
a full range of anti-Semitic literature including the anti-Semitic classics Handbuch der
Judenfrage and the German version of The Protocols of the Elders of Zion.586 With
these credentials Thürmer advanced to become the director of the Department for
Weltanschauung at the Reichssender Leipzig.587 In the autumn of 1938 he
transferred to the Reichssender Frankfurt,588 where he became Sendeleiter – the
right-hand man of the Intendant, responsible for planning program content in
general, as well as the organization of the human and technical resources required
for broadcasting. With the outbreak of the Second World War, Thürmer was
delegated first to the newly acquired Reichssender Danzig,589 and then took over
duties in the reorganization of the stations in occupied Poland. In May 1940, he was
a lieutenant in charge of broadcasting operations on the Western Front, and later
became the director of a Wehrmacht propaganda company on the Eastern Front.590
584
585
586
587
588
589
590
AMV 301-5-1, page 67. Undated letter referring to letter of K.H. Frank to Waffen SS Führer of 27
November 1944 stressing support for Thürmer’s induction into the Waffen SS.
Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde, archival collection RSK II, Personal- und Sachakten, A-Z, call
number 2101127718, film number I575, picture number 1417. Personnel questionnaire
Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk Leipzig of 14 September 1933.
Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde, archival collection RSK II, Personal- und Sachakten, A-Z, call
number 2101127718, film number I575, picture number 1417. Letter Thürmer to the
Reichsverband deutscher Schriftsteller (German writers´ organization) of 21 October 1934.
Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde, SSO/SS-Führerpersonalakten, call number 6400045932, carton
number 01727, film number–Findbuch. Personnel report of 23 October 1939.
Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde, SSO/SS-Führerpersonalakten, call number 6400045932, carton
number 01727, film number–Findbuch. Letter Thürmer to Reichsführer SS of 24 April 1942.
Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde, SSO/SS-Führerpersonalakten, call number 6400045932, carton
number 01727, film number–Findbuch. Promotion recommendation of 23 October 1939.
Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde, SSO/SS-Führerpersonalakten, call number 6400045932, carton
number 01727, film number–Findbuch. Promotion recommendation of 26 August 1942.
204
According to Thürmer, Goebbels’ order regarding Prague reached him just west of
Moscow, forcing him to abandon his troops there. Karl Hermann Frank later reported
that it was around this same time, mid-December 1941 – after Soviet resistance had
stopped the Wehrmacht’s advance on Moscow and even reversed it slightly for the
first time, and after Germany’s declaration of war against the United States on 11
December 1941 – that it started to dawn on him and Heydrich that the war would not
end in a quick victory after all. This new state-of-affairs necessitated a rethink in
occupation policy from the short-term to a more long-term wartime orientation, which
would keep long-term goals in sight, while getting the most out of the Protectorate’s
population and resources.591 Apparently, Fricke did not fit into a long-term solution of
the problem.
Station-Group Bohemia-Moravia
It is at this juncture, we can move to Thürmer’s description of events, and it is here
that fact seems to mix to some extent with post-war efforts at image-management.
The hypothesis seems reasonable, given the events described below, that Thürmer
took part in a strategy vis-à-vis the management and staff of Czech Radio, which
was intended to gain their trust or at least to secure their active cooperation with the
Nazi occupiers. His role was to appear to be the savior of Czech Radio from its
would-be liquidators, primarily Karl Hermann Frank, Maras and Schneider. At the
very least, Thürmer was to appear as the lesser of two evils in comparison with the
former regime, and as we will see, in comparison to his second-in-command at
Czech Radio, Horst Pabel. It seems reasonable to assume that Thürmer built upon
the same strategy that he had employed in 1942, and simply adjusted it to his postwar needs.
According to his post-war apology, Thürmer reported for duty at the Propaganda
Ministry in Berlin on 21 December 1941,592 and was informed there of his new
mission. He claimed to have received no explicit orders, but was told to follow
guidelines laid down by Von Gregory. Reichsintendant Glasmeier informed him that
Fricke had already done most of the work as Überleitungskommissar, and that
Thürmer simply had to finish the job. Thürmer later wrote that he had the impression
that the officials in Berlin had no accurate idea of the situation in Prague, but that
591
592
BRANDES: Die Tschechen I., page 218.
THÜRMER: Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, page 3.
205
they expected him simply to “bury” Czech Radio and that he felt “furious” at being
called away from the front for a mission that was “obviously disagreeable and of little
importance.”593 Whether Thürmer truly regretted exchanging a foxhole on the
outskirts of Moscow in the middle of a Russian winter for a desk job in Prague, is a
matter that cannot be clarified from the documents at hand. Nevertheless, with the
Cold War raging at the time he wrote the apology in May of 1950, the image of the
soldier unhappy to be called away from active duty against the Russian enemy will
presumably have had a positive resonance among Western European and/or
American readers.
According to Thürmer, he arrived in Prague on 2 January 1942, which he also
described as the founding date of the Station-Group Bohemia-Moravia.594 This
arrival date basically matches that on his police registration, which is 4 January
1942.595 Thürmer’s official report for duty to Karl Hermann Frank dates only from 29
January 1942, which was nearly a full month into his stay. This suggests that either
Thürmer was uncertain about whether he would stay in Prague or that the nature of
his mission was secret enough that not even the second most powerful man in the
Protectorate after Heydrich was deemed worthy to know about it. The letter is written
on Station-Group Bohemia-Moravia letterhead,596 which does confirm the StationGroup’s founding date at least as of January 1942. Thürmer’s explanation of events
was that he discovered a very problematic situation and that he decided to take on
the role of an observer for 14 days, after which he would either sort things out or
volunteer to return to the front after writing a correspondingly negative report on the
situation.597
According to Thürmer, Fricke had set about implementing his own ideas as to what
the Station-Group should become without informing Berlin. Fricke’s policies entailed
creating a large Southeast-German broadcasting network with Breslau at its center
that included the Reichssender Böhmen, the stations of the Generalgouvernement
and the stations of the Protectorate. Fricke reportedly also hoped ultimately to add
the Slovak stations Bratislava, Banská Bystrica and Prešov to round out the
593
594
595
596
597
In the original: “...und ich war wütend, dass ich aus einem doch offenbar unerfreulichen und wenig
wichtigen Anlass meine Kompanie verloren hatte.” THÜRMER: Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren,
pp 3-5.
THÜRMER: Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, page 4.
NA-PŘ Praha, police registration card for Thürmer.
NA-ÚŘP-ST 109-4-696.
THÜRMER: Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, page 4.
206
broadcast region. That such a policy was neither planned in Berlin nor ultimately in
the interest of any of the peoples involved – in this case, the Czechs and the
Slovaks, as Generalgouverneur Hans Frank had ordered the confiscation of Polish
radio receivers already in December 1939598 – Thürmer felt, was readily obvious.599 It
is not possible to refute this claim directly. Fricke’s alleged moves actually betray a
certain inner logic from the perspective of the Führerprinzip, the ruthless imposition
of a strong man’s vision and will upon his environment, which was so integral to
National Socialism. It was only natural from that perspective for Fricke to seek to
create as large a fiefdom for himself as possible. Furthermore, Fricke had also
outlined very similar ideas in his ruminations on the Reichssender Breslau serving as
a “bridge to the Southeast”600of Europe rather prominently in the Handbuch des
Deutschen Rundfunks Jahrbuch 1939/1940. There is some evidence of at least
partial implementation of such a plan as well. Der Neue Tag of 5 February 1942
reported
that
the
Reichssender
Breslau
and
the
stations
of
the
Generalgouvernement were planning a joint Wunschkonzert (listeners’ choice
concert) between 16:00 and 18:30 hours on Sunday, 22 February 1942 from a sports
stadium in Reichenberg (Liberec), the capital of the Sudetenland. The article states
expressly that the event was taking place under the patronage of Konrad Henlein,
while Generalintendant Fricke was responsible for its entire organization.601 Given
that the announcement was published a week after his report for duty to Frank, it
seems highly unlikely that this could have taken place without Thürmer’s knowledge.
Thürmer must have at least acquiesced to this broadcast.
According to Thürmer, upon his arrival in Prague, he had faced all manner of
intrigues against his person, especially from the Reichssender Böhmen whose staff,
he claimed, decided to boycott him; denied him access to business correspondence
and even returned letters to his family marked “addressee unknown”, although he
had visited the station on a daily basis.602 These claims do seem credible. The local
German administration of broadcasting cannot have been happy to have outsiders
598
599
600
601
602
DILLER: Rundfunkpolitik, page 404.
THÜRMER, Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, page 5.
See: FRICKE, Hanns-Otto: Der Reichssender Breslau im südosteuropäischen Raum, IN:
WEINBRENNER: Handbuch des Deutschen Rundfunks Jahrbuch 1939/1940, pages 136-140.
In the original: “Die Veranstaltung steht unter der Schirmherrschaft des Gauleiters und
Reichsstatthalters Konrad Henlein... Die Gesamtleitung hat Generalintendant Hans Otto Fricke
inne.” See: Wunschkonzert des Reichssenders Breslau, Der Neue Tag, volume 4, number 36, (5
February 1942), p. 3.
THÜRMER: Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, pp. 5-6.
207
thrust upon it from Berlin. For Von Gregory, the arrival of both Fricke and Thürmer
testified to the fact that he had not managed things appropriately as the director of
Department IV at least with regard to broadcasting. Thürmer described the meeting
with Von Gregory as a reception to which “for better or worse” the latter had to
agree.603
Thürmer’s final claim regarding the interregnum is that he discovered a plan by
Fricke to disband the Czech station at Moravská Ostrava, so as to eliminate a
competitor to Breslau’s subsidiary station at Kattowitz. At that point, Thürmer later
wrote, he issued an ultimatum to Fricke to hand over control of Czech Radio within
two days and to leave Prague within a further 24 hours.604 Regrettably, Thürmer did
not mention when precisely all of this supposedly occurred. Nor is there any
evidence to support this claim in other existing documentation. However, this
description of events does not sound altogether credible. First of all, Fricke was a
prominent Intendant in the confidence of Goebbels and Glasmeier. Thürmer, a
former Sendeleiter, will hardly have had the authority to issue ultimatums to a man in
a superior position like Fricke’s. Secondly, an ultimatum of this type – attempted as a
threat to report Fricke to Goebbels – would have turned Fricke into a powerful
enemy. Such a policy would have been tactically unwise, and it is unlikely that
Thürmer would have risked such enmity merely for the sake of Czech Radio –
despite it offering a relatively safe and comfortable sinecure far from the front. There
also can not have been great enmity between Fricke and Thürmer, however, as
Fricke felt free to return to Czech Radio after fleeing the Soviet advance on Breslau
in the winter of 1945.605 Thus, Thürmer’s talk of issuing an ultimatum to Fricke is
more likely to have been part of his post-war image building effort than anything else.
The supposition seems much more reasonable that a considerably higher authority
than Thürmer issued orders for Fricke to leave Prague so precipitously, and under
the circumstances, that authority can only have been Heydrich. Heydrich was
Thürmer’s superior in the SS after all. Conceivably, Thürmer reported his findings on
the situation in broadcasting in the Protectorate to Heydrich, including any selfaggrandizement on Fricke’s part, and then Heydrich issued the ultimatum for Fricke
to leave, perhaps ordering Thürmer to pass on the message to Fricke. In 1950
603
604
605
THÜRMER: Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, page 11.
THÜRMER: Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, page 6.
THÜRMER: Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, page 29.
208
however, it would hardly have been opportune for Thürmer to mention the
involvement of a chief Nazi war criminal like Heydrich in his promotion to director of
broadcasting in the Protectorate.
As for the Reichssender Böhmen, which Thürmer described as the “source of
constantly flowing intrigues”,606 he appears to have solved a lot of the problem by
firing someone from the Deutsche Dienststelle. Regrettably, Thürmer did not divulge
the name of the official. Perhaps, he had forgotten it in the meantime, or did not want
to risk litigation from a living participant in the events. Given Schneider’s history of
active intrigue at Czech Radio, the fact that – unlike most of the other top German
officials involved in Protectorate Radio – he had survived the war, it seems very
likely that Thürmer was referring to him, and may not have wanted to risk a libel suit
with a living witness. It also seems logical that, after the recall of Scurla and Marek,
Schneider would have resumed duties at the Reichssender Böhmen, while Maras
remained in charge of Czech Radio.607 Regrettably, none of these assumptions can
be proven from the existing documents. Late winter 1941/42 was however also an
extremely active time for Georg Schneider at Czech Radio. For example, transcripts
of no fewer than 249 pages of his commentaries exist in the archives for a period
starting 1 November 1941, but ending abruptly on 17 February 1942.608 By Nazi
standards, Schneider was working under a serious handicap. His wife Gertrude was
half-Jewish, or in Nazi terminology: a Mischling I. Grades (literally “first-degree
mongrel”) and their son Erich was one-quarter Jewish (Mischling II. Grades –
“second-degree mongrel”). For this reason, he was also deprived of his membership
in the NSDAP by court order on 2 May 1942.609 There is no evidence that Thürmer
had anything to do with Schneider’s expulsion from the Party, but since the
procedure for expelling a member from the NSDAP will have taken some time, there
appears to have been a virtual simultaneity between Schneider’s removal from
broadcasting and his expulsion from the Party. Due to his loyal efforts on behalf of
the Nazi cause in Czechoslovakia and the Protectorate, however, Schneider
survived all of these setbacks and reportedly became the second German director of
606
607
608
609
In the original: “Die Quelle ständig fliessender Intrigen…” See THÜRMER: Sendergruppe
Böhmen-Mähren, page 11.
NA-NárS, carton 107, call number 60, note from Kříž to Maras of 1 April 1942.
SOA, archival collection KST Praha (District Criminal Court of Prague), TkXX15.682/47, carton
13.
AMV, NSDAP membership card of Georg Schneider.
209
the Prague affiliate of International Business Machines (IBM)610 where he worked
until the end of the occupation.611
According to his apology, Thürmer eventually called for and received a broadcast
director from the Reich, who “knew the area, was neutral towards its conflicts and
who was used to ‘sober’ work”.612 With that the “seat of disruption” called Böhmen
had been eliminated.613 The new broadcast director was Emil Eugen Hohrath (1889?), who transferred from the Reichssender Leipzig. He arrived in Prague on 3 March
1942614 and remained in Prague through the end of the Protectorate. According to
Remeš, Hohrath initially worked under Thürmer at Czech Radio but transferred very
soon to the position of Sendeleiter at the Reichssender Böhmen. Hohrath is listed as
the “Sendeleiter des Senders Böhmen” in the Prague Telephone Directory for
1944615 and his police registration card records him as having been detained on 5
May 1945.
The Czech Part of the Station-Group in the Interregnum
As for the Czechs, Thürmer wrote in his apology that the Czech staff in particular
was kept in the dark as to his actual mission in Prague.616 This point does, in fact,
seem entirely plausible. It is not likely that the occupation authorities would have
discussed potential plans for reforming the situation with the subjugated Czech
company leadership. Instead, they will have decided on the situation and presented
that decision to the Czechs as a fait accompli from a unified German leadership. As
for Czech Radio, Thürmer’s main claims were that Scurla and his subordinate
censors, i.e., Maras and Schneider, although he never mentioned either of the latter
two by name, had driven the company into a state of bankruptcy and that Fricke had
then spent most of his effort on determining the company’s remaining value in
610
611
612
613
614
615
616
AMV Z-C-3062/143-11.9.46. According to Edwin Black’s IBM and the Holocaust, IBM functioned
without interruption in Germany throughout all of World War II. In Prague specifically, IBM worked
under the name Elektrische Buchungs- und statistische Maschinen Gmbh.–Elektrické úctovací a
statistické stroje, společnost s r.o. at its offices in Prague II, Žitná 30-32.
AMV Z-C-3062/143-11.9.46.
In the original: “Dann wurde ein Sendeleiter aus dem Altreich geholt, der den Raum kannte,
seinen Konflikten neutral gegenüberstand und an ‘sachliche’ Arbeit gewöhnt war.” See
THÜRMER: Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, page 11.
In the original: “Zersetzungsherd Böhmen.” See THÜRMER: Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren,
page 11.
NA-PŘ Praha, police registration card for Hohrath.
Amtliches Fernsprechbuch für Prag 1944, page 146.
THÜRMER: Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, pp. 5-6.
210
preparation for its liquidation.617 Given Personnel Director Remeš’ testimony on
remunerations for Schneider’s “extraordinary efforts,”618 Thürmer may have reported
the truth on this issue. We will deal with aspects of Czech Radio’s finances in greater
detail a bit farther on.
With the Reichssender Böhmen under control, the time had now arrived for Thürmer
to sort out Czech Radio. This interregnum period coincided with several noteworthy
events. On 13 March 1942, the Reichs-Rundfunk-Gesellschaft officially took over
100% of the shares in Czech Radio and fused it organizationally with the
Reichssender Böhmen to create the Station-Group Bohemia-Moravia.619 Finding the
Czech version of this designation was not simple, as very little correspondence from
the period exists in which the Czech version of the new name appears. Even the
Czech section of the Landesadressbuch von Böhmen und Mähren-Zemský adresář
pro Čechy a Moravu 1943/44 refers to the new network using a combination of
German and Czech terms, namely: “Sendergruppe Čechy-Morava”.620 As Dr. Remeš
reported after the war, the fusion also did not mean the dissolution of Czech Radio
per se. On the contrary, Czech Radio’s legal existence continued uninterrupted
throughout the entire occupation period.621 Thus, for most of the Czech staff it was
more common to use the simple, and more specific Czech company name – Český
rozhlas – instead of the rather cumbersome translation of the German term: Vysílací
skupina Čechy-Morava.622
About one week after Von Gregory’s departure for Berlin, on 21 March 1942,
Intendant Miloš Kareš resigned his position at Czech Radio.623 Thürmer may have
touched upon this situation in his apology, but the description is a bit unclear. He
wrote: “General Director Naresch (sic!) had been ousted in my opinion without any
objective or political necessity.”624 Presumably, Thürmer muddled two situations in
617
618
619
620
621
622
623
624
THÜRMER: Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, page 6.
NA-NárS, carton 106, inventory number 1536. Testimony of Karel Remeš of 26 June 1946, page
2.
NA-NárS, carton 107, call number 60. Sketch of the Organization and Activity of Czech Radio
During the Occupation by Personnel Director Dr. Jur. Karel Remeš of 26 June 1946, cover page.
Landesadressbuch von Böhmen und Mähren, Handbuch der Wirtschaft - Zemský adresář pro
Čechy a Moravu, Hospodářský almanach 1943/44, page 47.
NA-NárS, carton 107, call number 60. Sketch of the Organization and Activity of Czech Radio
During the Occupation by Personnel Director Dr. Jur. Karel Remeš of 26 June 1946, page 1.
AČRo, SM-7/22, Hausrundschreiben Nr. 35/Oběžník číslo 35 (company circular No. 35) on travel
cost per diems of 8 June 1942.
AČRo, personnel file Kareš.
In the original: “Der Generaldirektor Naresch nach meinen Begriffen ohne sachliche oder
politische Notwendigkeit.” THÜRMER, Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, page 15.
211
that one sentence – the pensioning off of General Director Ladislav Šourek one year
earlier in March 1941, and the retirement of Intendant Miloš Kareš as of 31 March
1942. Thürmer can only have known about the Šourek situation through hearsay, as
he was not in Prague at the time. The second situation with Kareš happened with
Thürmer’s full knowledge and consent and at Kareš’s request.625 Over eight years
after the events and with Prague behind the Iron Curtain, Thürmer did not reproduce
the situation altogether accurately. As for Kareš, although he had just celebrated his
50th birthday in November 1941,626 and was of prime working age, he apparently
also suffered from a chronic lung condition and had been frequently ill since 1937.
Presumably, the illness provided him with either a real or at least an appropriate
excuse to withdraw from what had long since become a politically very exposed
position at about the half-way point of Heydrich’s reign in Prague. As Kareš died
suddenly two years later, the illness is likely to have played an actual role in his
resignation. Nevertheless, after Kareš’s departure – and with Šourek, Masařík and
Prokop all long gone – there were no original senior Czech staff members to impede
Thürmer’s reorganization of Czech Radio. Thürmer’s letter of acceptance to Kareš is
dated 23 March 1942, a full week prior to the official announcement in the press that
he had taken charge of the Station-Group.
If, however, the exchange of power in Prague’s broadcasting directorate did not
occur exactly according to Thürmer’s post-war report, how then did it happen? Given
the available documentation, the following scenario seems more plausible: Thürmer
arrived in Prague from Berlin in the first days of January 1942 and spent a few
weeks observing the situation, and deciding whether or not to get involved. Judging
from the Wunschkonzert program planned for 22 February, either Fricke had, in fact,
started to implement a policy of uniting the regional German stations under his
control, or he was playing the role as the negative character versus Thürmer as the
savior of Czech Radio in a strategy vis-à-vis the Czechs. According to Thürmer,
Fricke had dramatically increased the percentage of programs the Czech stations rebroadcast from the Reichsrundfunk and also ordered the production of much more
German programming at Czech Radio.627 These claims are borne out in this
chapter’s program analysis. I hypothesize that Thürmer exaggerated Fricke’s actions
625
AČRo, personnel file Kareš. Letter from Thürmer to Kareš of 23 March 1942 accepting his
resignation.
626
50 let dr. Miloše Kareš, Týden rozhlasu, volume VIII, edition 46, (15 November 1941), page 5.
627
THÜRMER: Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, page 16.
212
in this regard and instead the specter of the “greater evil” – i.e., the absorption of
Czech Radio into a greater southeast-German station group versus Thürmer’s
“lesser evil”, i.e., the Station-Group Bohemia-Moravia with its Czech component –
came into play. Whether Fricke remained in Prague long enough to take
responsibility for instituting bilingual German-Czech program announcements in midMarch 1942 regrettably is not clear from the documents at hand. However, that
measure, as well as the increase in specific Sudeten-German programming via
Prague, Brno and Moravská Ostrava, may simply have been presented as the price
the Czechs had to pay to maintain Czech Radio’s existence. This type of “good
cop/bad cop” strategy would not have been foreign to Thürmer. He apparently
developed it later in dealings with the Czechs with his director of Politics and Current
Affairs for Czech Radio, Horst Pabel cast in the role of the “bad cop”.
Concrete Effects on Programming in the Period
In
terms
of
German-language
and
pro-German/pro-Nazi
Czech-language
programming, the period of the interregnum can easily be likened to a tsunami
flooding the Protectorate’s ether with all manner of programming. Most obvious to
the listener, this period had the greatest levels of activity and influence by the Czech
Nazi collaborator Alois Kříž, whose Political Lectures Department churned out the
Hlasy doby (“Voices of the time”), “What do you know about the Jews and Free
Masons?” – the latter having expanded to cover another enemy group after the New
Year” – “Political press reviews” reports on the prowess of the Wehrmacht etc. Brno
started a lectures series with the title Taková je Amerika! (“That’s what America’s
like!”) investigating inter alia the yellow press and the role of Jews -- naturally. The
positive contrast thereto was another series aired via Brno about “The young Japan”,
Hitler’s Asian ally, which was even included in School Radio broadcasts.628 This
period also saw the initial surge of satirical, political sketches by Josef Opluštil, which
we will examine in a separate chapter.
Around the third anniversary of the founding of the Protectorate on 15 March 1942,
the exact date is not specified in the program magazines, Czech Radio also
instituted bilingual German-Czech program announcements. That is: the few lines of
moderation leading into and often out of the main body of a program known in
628
For example on 5 March 1942 between 10:30 and 10:55.
213
American broadcasting circles as “intros” and “outros”, such as “And now dear
listeners, you will hear a concert of chamber music by...” and “You just heard a
concert of chamber music by... ” had to be broadcast first in German and then in
Czech. The extremely belabored explanation to Czech radio listeners, who had
ostensibly accepted this move as a “m a t t e r o f c o u r s e”, was that bilingual
program announcements would make Czech culture more accessible to listeners
abroad. Or in the somewhat flowery wording of Týden rozhlasu: “In the global
language of the Reich, we announce to the new Europe the fruits of our Czech
cultural endeavors.”629 This explanation definitely fit the internal logic of the onesided bilingualism imposed on the Czechs during the occupation, i.e., that Czech
was a language of regional importance only. At the same time, the introduction of
bilingual program announcements simply meant the application of Nazi language law
to the medium of radio, as had otherwise already been applied to most other aspects
of life in the Protectorate with German in first place followed by a Czech
translation.630
Furthermore, there was a flood of re-broadcasting from the Reichsrundfunk including
at least five German news broadcasts scattered throughout the day (07:00-07:10,
12:30-12:45, 14:00-14:15,
17:00-17:10, 20:00-20:15 and
00:00-00:15), new
otherwise unidentified “German broadcasts” in solid blocks on all Protectorate
stations from 06:00-06:15, 19:45-20:00, Wehrmacht reports, etc. Every broadcast
day started with the Kameradschaftsdienst (“Comradeship Service”), which served
the purpose of passing on important messages between the home front and German
soldiers in the theaters of war. The re-broadcast of this program even on Moravská
Ostrava, whose very limited antenna strength of 1.5 kW will have been irrelevant for
the front, demonstrates that the Kameradschaftsdienst was as much a measure
629
630
In the original: “…dvojjazyčnost hlášení byla nejširšími kruhy poslucháčů přijata jako s a m o z ř e
j m o s t… Světovým jazykem Říše ohlašujeme nové Evropě plody svého českého kulturního
snažení.” Týden rozhlasu, volume IX, edition 14 (4 April 1942), page 2.
Official language practice in the Protectorate was such that all official verbal or printed texts
intended for public use–such as the greeting of an operator at a telephone exchange, driver’s
licenses, public announements, court decisions, business signs, hunting licenses, traffic signage,
entries in official telephone books, train schedules and even pedigree papers for rabbits–could
appear either only in the German language or in German with a Czech translation. In the latter
case, only the German original had a legally binding nature and it had to appear with precedence
either above or to the left of the Czech text. Exceptions to this rule were certain ephemeral texts
such as newspapers or books targeted only at a Czech audience. Nevertheless, even in these
cases, given ČTK’s subservience to the Deutsches Nachrichten Büro, much of the information in
newspapers originally appeared in German and was translated into Czech. See: KRIESLER,
Helmut: Das Neue Recht in Böhmen und Mähren, Sprachenregelungen, 1943, page AI 90.
214
aimed at the home front as anything else. This period also saw a constant flow of
Georg Schneider’s programs “Our morning commentary”, until they ended abruptly in
mid-February.
The only other respite for the beleaguered Czech listener will have been the
discontinuation of Emanuel Moravec’s regular “Military-political considerations” on 17
January 1942.631 This was by no means Moravec’s final lecture before a radio
microphone, but Heydrich’s re-ordering of the Protectorate’s government which was
in full swing at this point, meant a cabinet position for Moravec just two days later, as
education minister and also as the head of the Office, later the Ministry of People’s
Enlightenment.632 For his part, Thürmer claimed to have instructed Moravec that,
since the Station-Group had to serve the interests of both peoples in the
Protectorate, it had to function as a unified organization and could not under any
circumstances be split up between “the Reichsprotektor, the Government Hacha
(sic!), Reichenberg and Berlin. Furthermore, it was not possible for a minister to be a
part-time employee of the radio and thereby completely relinquish his authority in
serious matters.”633 Thürmer tells us that Moravec disappeared from programming at
this point, only reappearing thereafter for official functions and purposes.
631
632
633
MORAVEC: Tři roky, page 8.
BRANDES: Die Tschechen I., page 220.
In the original: “... dass die Sendergruppe... sich keinesfalls auf Reichsprotektor, Regierung
Hacha, Reichenberg und Berlin aufteilen lasse. Ausserdem ginge es nicht, dass ein Minister
nebenberuflicher Mitarbeiter des Rundfunks sei, und sich damit völlig seiner Autorität für
ernsthafte Angelegenheiten begäbe.” THÜRMER: Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, page 14.
215
The Maras Era IV – Analysis of the Program Week Starting 1 March 1942
Figure 5.1: Average duration of broadcast day in hours:minutes:seconds
Week starting 1 March 1942
All Czech (CZ) medium-wave (MW) stations = Prague I, Brno, Moravská Ostrava
All CZ MW stations
19:30:00
4:30:00
Prague I
19:30:00
4:30:00
Brno
19:30:00
4:30:00
Moravská Ostrava
19:30:00
4:30:00
SW-Poděbrady
4:26:00
19:34:00
Broadcast hours
Station breaks
Duration of Broadcast Day
Figure 5.1 shows the continuing expansion of broadcast day for all of the Czech
stations to levels similar as those introduced at the Reichssender Böhmen
immediately after the invasion in 1939 – to an average of 19.5 hours (19:30:00) per
day. In practice, this actually corresponded to 21 uninterrupted hours on Sundays
and 19:15 hours Mondays through Saturdays with the morning station breaks
between 08:00 and 09:45. Once again, however, this expansion did not derive from
an increase in Czech programming, but from an increase of re-broadcasts of
German-language productions. The start of the broadcast day in this period was
moved up to 05:00 hours. However, the new program hour at 05:00 served the rebroadcast of the Kameradschaftsdienst connecting the German home front with the
various battlefields of the war.
216
Figure 5.2: Regionalization – stations of origin as a percentage of TOTAL AIRTIME
Week starting 1 March 1942,
All Czech (CZ) medium-wave (MW) stations = Prague I, Brno, Moravská Ostrava
All CZ MW stations
56
Prague I
9
62
Brno
6
55
Moravská Ostrava
7
4
8
SW-Poděbrady
28
5
12
51
28
28
13
28
100
0% 5%
10
%
15
%
Prague I
20
%
Brno
25
%
30
%
35
%
40
%
Moravská Ostrava
45
%
50
%
55
%
60
%
RS Böhmen (Mělník)
65
%
70
%
75
%
80
%
SW-Poděbrady
85
%
90
%
95 100
% %
Reichsprogramm
Regionalization
Figure 5.2 shows a massive increase in re-broadcasts from the Reichsrundfunk to
28% of all airtime. That corresponds to a 50% increase in real terms over the week
reviewed in November, and confirms Thürmer’s assertions about Fricke’s policy in
this regard. Nevertheless, we need to keep in mind that Thürmer was already
entering the third month of his tenure at Prague at this point, and this result
demonstrates that he had not yet implemented large changes. For the regional
stations Brno and Moravská Ostrava, we see a reduction in Prague’s influence to
just around half of their airtime.
217
Figure 5.3: Programming structure -- subjects as a percentage of TOTAL AIRTIME
Week starting 1 March 1942,
All Czech (CZ) medium-wave (MW) stations = Prague I, Brno, Moravská Ostrava
All CZ MW stations
56
Prague I
4 1 4 111
54
Brno
5
55
Moravská Ostrava
1 4 111
0% 5% 10
%
15
%
20
%
25
%
30
%
17
40
%
45
%
50
%
5
2 3
5
3
3
5
5
1 3
3 1 4 111
17
5
5
1 3
3
5
4
35
%
5
17
60
Music
Youth/School
Women
Kameradschaftsdienst
5
4 1 4 111
57
SW-Poděbrady
17
55
%
Culture/Entertainment
Workers
News/Reports
German Program
60
%
27
65
%
70
%
75
%
80
%
85
%
90
%
95 100
% %
Farmers
Economics
Politics
Other
Programming Structure
Figure 5.3 shows stable levels of the various program genres throughout the Czech
medium-wave network, with music declining by 3 to 5 percentage points to just over
half of all airtime (56% on average), the daily Kameradschaftsdienst making up a full
5% of airtime and the “German broadcasts” accounting for a further 3%.
Furthermore, there are extremely high levels of overtly political programming (5%) on
all domestic Czech stations. Short-wave broadcasting from Poděbrady remained
stable in these areas at this point, however.
218
Figure 5.4: Music by German composers as a percentage of TOTAL AIRTIME
Week starting 1 March 1942
All Czech (CZ) medium-wave (MW) stations = Prague I, Brno, Moravská Ostrava
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
22.2
21.4
22.2
23.1
All CZ MW stations
Prague I
Brno
Moravská Ostrava
Music by German composers
Music by German Composers
Figure 5.4 shows a further increase in German music over the previous period to
more than one-fifth (average 22.2%) of all airtime. This corresponds to an increase
of German music by half (up from 15.5%) over the week reviewed the previous
November.
Figure 5.5: Broadcast language as a percentage of ALL TALKS PROGRAMMING
Week starting 1 March 1942,
All Czech (CZ) medium-wave (MW) stations = Prague I, Brno, Moravská Ostrava
All CZ MW stations
61
Prague I
61
Brno
62
38
Moravská Ostrava
61
39
38
36
SW-Poděbrady
0% 5%
1
3
100
10
%
15
%
20
%
25
%
30
%
35
%
40
%
45
%
50
%
55
%
60
%
65
%
70
%
75
%
80
%
85
%
90
%
95 100
% %
Czech
Slovak
German
English
French
Italian
Romanian
Serbo-Croatian
Spanish
Ruthenian
Other
219
Broadcast Language
Not surprisingly, Figure 5.5. shows levels of German-language programming having
progressed to more than one-third of all talks programming – not airtime in this case,
but as a percentage of all non-musical programming. This means that of every hour
of talks programming a listener could tune into, he or she would face an average of
38% of that time listening in the German language on Czech stations. Furthermore,
Spanish-language news broadcasts continued from Prague I. The corresponding
decline in Czech-language talks programs meant a level at just 61% of airtime.
Figure 5.6: Germanization/Nazification Factor (GNF) = as a percentage of TOTAL AIRTIME
Week starting 1 March 1942
All Czech (CZ) medium-wave (MW) stations = Prague I, Brno, Moravská Ostrava
50.0
45.0
40.0
35.0
30.0
25.0
20.0
15.0
10.0
47.3
8.7
8.8
8.3
16.7
16.7
22.2
21.4
All CZ MW stations
Prague I
7.6
16.7
16.7
22.2
23.1
Brno
Moravská Ostrava
5.0
0.0
Total GNF
Music by German composers
German-language talks
Czech-language pro-German/Nazi
GNF as % of total airtime
Germanization/Nazification Factor
Taken together then, all the Germanization and Nazification factors add up to a
staggering 47.3% of airtime, or just under half of all broadcasts, as Figure 5.6
indicates. This marks the high point of the GNF for the entire occupation period. In
practical terms it means that whenever a Czech listener tuned to Prague I, Brno or
Moravská Ostrava, he or she had a nearly 50/50 chance of encountering
programming either derived from German culture – as in the German music
programs (22.2%) and German-language talks (16.7%) – or intended to propagate
Germany or the Nazi system in some manner in the Czech language (on average
8.3%). The broadcast day had expanded in duration to levels far beyond
220
Radiojournal’s offerings, but the content offered was very heavily German- and Nazioriented. Thus, in early March 1942, we find Czech Radio’s programming in a state
very distant from Thürmer’s declared goal of making the Czech’s feel it was “their”,
Czech Radio.634
634
THÜRMER: Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, page 9.
221
8. The Early Thürmer Era – 1942 and 1943
Initial Reforms
Obviously, one German broadcasting official alone was not enough to control all of
Czech Radio. Thus, after taking over from Fricke and presumably after the removal
of Schneider, Thürmer called for reinforcements from Berlin. When exactly the man
who was to become his deputy, Horst Pabel, arrived in Prague is regrettably not
clear from Pabel’s police registration, which records only a move from the Grand
Hotel Šroubek to a flat near to Czech Radio at Gebauerova (now U Vodárny) 16 in
Prague-Vinohrady on 10 September 1942.635 A note from Pabel to Kříž dating from
13 May 1942 outlined the need to cut inappropriate suggestions and encourage the
inclusion of lively reportages in the new propaganda series Aufbau! – Budujeme!
(“We build!”).636 Post-war testimonies against Pabel by Czech Radio staff also make
it clear that Pabel was well established at Czech Radio at the time of the terror
associated with Heydrich’s assassination in late May/early June 1942.637 As he took
over from Hohrath, who reached Prague on 3 March 1942, Pabel’s arrival in Prague
presumably dates to a few weeks after that or approximately to April/May 1942. For
his part, Hohrath had taken over the Educational Lectures Department, which had
been directed temporarily since the departure of Prokop by a member of the Reports
Department named Josef Cincibus.638
By late spring 1942, Thürmer’s reforms led to the placement of Germans in nearly all
the leadership positions of the company, i.e., as heads of the Administrative,
Technical and Programming divisions. Thürmer placed an order for the
administrative director in Berlin, and received one Bruno Ehlert, who originally came
from the Reichssender Königsberg.639 Chief Engineer Gottfried Caspar, who came
originally from the Reichssender Wien, directed the Technical Division.640 For its
part, Programming was divided into two sub-groups: Politics and Art. The Artistic
635
NA-PŘ Praha, police registration card for Horst Pabel.
NA-NárS, carton 107, call number 60. Note Pabel to Kříž of 13 May 1942.
637
SOA, MLS1427/46, carton 273, page 15. Undated testimony of Josef Cincibus.
638
NA-NárS, carton 107, call number 60. Sketch of the Organization and Activity of Czech Radio
During the Occupation by Personnel Director Dr. Jur. Karel Remeš of 26 June 1946, page 2.
639
Ehlert’s police registration places him in Prague on 20 May 1942. See: NA-PŘ Praha, police
registration card for Bruno Ehlert. See also AČRo, personnel file Cincibus. Note, presumably from
Thürmer, to Administrative Director (Verwaltungsdirektor) Ehlert of 28 September 1942 requesting
a monthly performance bonus of 1,000 Kč for Josef Cincibus. See also: WEINBRENNER:
Handbuch des Deutschen Rundfunks Jahrbuch 1939/1940, page 243.
640
THÜRMER: Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, page 17.
636
222
sub-group came under the direction of a Czech – Zdeněk Morávek – who had
headed the Czech Administrative Division up until that point. While it came to supply
the majority of all programming due to the high percentage of music broadcast, the
Artistic sub-group comprised only the Music and the Literary departments.641
Horst Pabel took over control of the Political sub-group, called Politik und
Zeitgeschehen in German or Politika a Časovost in Czech, which corresponds to
“politics and current affairs” in English,642 and which encompassed all non-literary
areas of talks programming. Work records for Alois Kříž suggest the existence of this
group as early as 5 May 1942.643 The main instrument of political manipulation
remained the Political Lectures Department under Alois Kříž. To this, Thürmer and
Pabel added the School Radio Department, which had been virtually independent up
until that point; the Lectures Department; the Worker’s Radio, Agricultural Radio,
Women’s Radio and the Radio for Industry, Trade and Business, the last of which
was now renamed Wirtschaftsfunk – hospodářský rozhlas (“Economic Radio”);
furthermore the Reportage, the Regional Broadcasts and a bit later also the Short
Wave departments.
For all intents and purposes, it was Horst Pabel, the director of Politik und
Zeitgeschehen – Politika a Časovost, who was to become the unpleasant face of
quotidian broadcasting policy for his Czech subordinates. Like Scurla, SSUntersturmführer Horst Günter Botho Pabel was extremely young, only 30-years-old
at the time he came to Prague.644 Thürmer apparently knew him from his time in
Leipzig, which was Pabel’s hometown and home Reichssender.645 Pabel seems to
have followed Thürmer to the Reichssender Danzig646 and also to have collected
radio experience in the occupied territories after the outbreak of war among the team
that took over the Polish station at Katowice in September 1939.647 Pabel was an
641
642
643
644
645
646
647
NA-NárS, carton 107, call number 60. Sketch of the Organization and Activity of Czech Radio
During the Occupation by Personnel Director Dr. Jur. Karel Remeš of 26 June 1946, page 2.
NA-NárS, carton 107, call number 60. Sketch of the Organization and Activity of Czech Radio
During the Occupation by Personnel Director Dr. Jur. Karel Remeš of 26 June 1946, page 2.
NA-NárS, carton 108, order number 66, page 313. List of broadcasts in the series “Aufbau!Budujeme!” as of 9 January 1943.
Pabel’s police registration card lists his date of birth as 30 August 1911 in Leipzig.
WEINBRENNER: Handbuch des Deutschen Rundfunks Jahrbuch 1939/1940, page 259.
SOA, MLS1427/46, carton 273, page 17. Testimony of Josef Šváb of 20 July 1945.
See: KRIEGLER, Hans: Rundfunkmänner an der Front, Wie aus “Polski Radio Katowice“ der
deutsche Sender Kattowitz wurde, IN: Der Rundfunk, volume 3, edition 1/2 (October/November
1939), pp. 7-8.
223
honorary, i.e., unpaid member of the Sicherheitsdienst.648 In terms of demeanor,
Pabel must have been an extremely unpleasant superior. Post-war testimonies by
his direct subordinates all coincide to paint the picture of a threatening and arrogant
young man, who was completely besotted with Nazi ideology. Reportage
Department employee Josef Cincibus’ post-war testimony against Pabel offers a
fairly chilling view of what life was like working under him:
“I had the constant impression that he could have me arrested at any time. He was a
political proponent of Nazism, whose task it was to advocate Nazi theories
everywhere and always… I was not alone in fearing him. He pressured Dr. Heller
and Engineer Paleček in the same way and asserted his will everywhere... I think
that he had an inkling that his orders were not being fulfilled, as he had individual
reportages translated and listened to in 1943 and made accusations against me and
threatened me... I can not judge what he authored himself and what resulted from
T[h]ürmer´s will, but I will always remember with indescribable emotions his pressure
and elegant violence.”649
Josef Šváb from the same department offered a view of Pabel’s political convictions
and the arrogant manner in which he approached his Czech subordinates:
“In the entire time that he was in Prague, he did not learn even one word of Czech,
even though he had a talent for languages, with the justification that ‘diese Sprache
werde ich nie brauchen, also werde ich sie auch nie lernen’ [PRP: i.e., ‘I will never
need this language, so I will also never learn it’]… As far as his opinion of the world
and his position towards the other European states is concerned, it was the position
of Göbbels’ (sic!) propaganda, which was reflected in him like in a mirror. Germany
will be eternal, it will be the organizer of Europe, the Soviet Union will be defeated,
the Polish and west-Russian territories will be settled by German colonizers, the
648
649
AMV-305-570-5.
In the original: “Měl jsem stále dojem, že mě může kdykoli zavřít. Byl to politický exponent
nacismu, jehož úkolem bylo prosazovat nacistické these všude a vždy... nebyl jsem sám, kdo se
ho bál, naléhal tak na Dr. Hellera a Ing. Palečka a všude uplatňoval svou vůli... Myslím, že tušil,
že jeho rozkazy se neplní, dal si v roce 1943 překladat a odposlouchávat jednotlivé reportáže a
činil mi výtky a hrozil... Nedovedu posoudit, čeho byl autorem sám a co plynulo z vůle Türmerovy
(sic), budu však stále s nevyslovitelnými pocity vzpomínat na jeho nátlak a elegantní násilí.” SOA,
MLS1427/46, carton 273, pages 15-16. Undated post-war testimony of Josef Cincibus.
224
Allies will lose the war, hopes for an independent Czechoslovak Republic are an
empty illusion, Germany is the cradle of humanity etc., etc.”650
By contrast, Ferdinand Thürmer set about enacting the position of the firm but fair
“good cop” in this leading duo vis-à-vis the Czech staff. Nevertheless, he can not
have left many doubts in their minds that he intended to be a hands-on Intendant.
One of his first actions was to exchange Scurla’s office at Palais Czernín near
Hradčany Castle for an office in the Czech Radio headquarters building in
Schwerinova Street. In a conversation with leading staff, Thürmer claims to have
assured them that he was “a loyal servant of the Reich, and for this reason” wanted
to “make a conciliatory contribution to the unity of the Reich by the strengthening of
Czech cultural life and the action of the Station-Group within the framework of the
cultural autonomy”.651 At the same time, Thürmer appealed to the Czechs to
concentrate practically on performing their jobs. Thus, his message to the Czech
staff was essentially: “I expect you to do your jobs as professionals.” To highly
qualified radio people, who had endured the constant chicanery of various despised
German censors and institutions over the preceding two years, this must have been
an appealing idea.
To underline his point, Thürmer then undertook a number of actions, which were
quite visible and rather positive on the surface. After negotiations with the local
Wehrmacht commander, he dissolved the German Censorship Department and the
military censors stationed at Czech Radio departed. Thürmer then reversed a ban on
staff members belonging to other organizations, which he claimed that Fricke had
imposed.652 On the contrary, Czech staff members with higher-level military
backgrounds were ordered to join the official organization of former Czechoslovak
650
651
652
In the original: “Za celou tu dobu, co byl v Praze, se nenaučil ani slovo česky, i když pro jazyky
nadání měl, s odůvodněním, že ‚diese Sprache werde ich nie brauchen, also werde ich sie auch
nie lernen’… Pokud se týče jeho světového názoru a jeho postoje k ostatním evropským statům,
byl to postoj Göbbelsovy (sic) propagandy, který se v něm odrážel jako v zrcadle. Německo bude
věčné, bude organisátorem Evropy, Sovětský Svaz bude poražen, polská a západní ruská území
budou osídlená německými kolonisátory, spojenci válku prohrajou, naděje na samostatnou
Československou republiku je prázdná iluse, Německo je kolébkou lidstva, atp., atp.” SOA,
MLS1427/46, carton 273, page 20. Testimony of Josef Šváb of 20 July 1945.
In the original: “Ich liess keinen Zweifel darüber, dass ich ein treuer Diener des Reiches sei, und
in diesem Sinne durch Stärkung des tschechischen kulturellen Lebens und Einsatz der
Sendergruppe im Rahmen der Kulturautonomie einer versöhnenden Beitrag zur Reichseinheit
glaubte beitragen zu können.” THÜRMER: Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, page 19.
THÜRMER: Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, page 16.
225
officers.653 Thürmer claims to have explained this move to them as not wanting the
Czech “Radio people to become estranged from their nation.”654 At the same time,
he reportedly emphasized to them that, as soldiers, he and they could always
manage to find a way of communicating with each other in practical matters.
Privately, however, he felt that there was little he could do to control the participation
of staff in resistance groups in any case. However, by directing them to officially
sanctioned groups, he obtained at least a measure of control over their activities.655
Another very visible action Thürmer undertook was to have Czech technicians
remove an eavesdropping device, which had been built into the in-house telephone
system for listening to the conversations of leading employees. This move was both
psychologically beneficial for the Czechs and also practical, as like Scurla and Fricke
before them, neither Thürmer nor Pabel could speak Czech.656
In the course of his take-over, Thürmer introduced a questionnaire campaign along
the lines of Goebbels’ infamous Fragebogenaktion of 1933 to determine the political,
racial, military and organizational backgrounds of Czech Radio’s staff. It may be that
it was in this questionnaire campaign that Schneider’s, by Nazi standards,
problematic familial ties came to light. However, Schneider will have been on a
collision course with Thürmer in any case. Schneider and the censors connected
with him had not limited their activities only to censoring programs. Especially in the
period after Scurla’s departure, Schneider had moved to a more active role in
program creation. Instead of simply censoring programs, they implemented a
practice of disallowing previously approved programs in the last minutes before
broadcast. Obviously then, airtime had to be filled with other material. So, “the
censors made a lot of programs themselves, for payment naturally.”657 Personnel
Director Remeš later testified in court that the majority of these “various, occasional
broadcasts, which always had priority” came from Schneider, and that “Dr. Schneider
653
654
655
656
657
Author’s note: There were two main organizations of this type during the Protectorate period,
which concentrated on social and welfare issues: the Podpůrný svaz bývalých českých důstojníků
for officers and the Podpůrný svaz bývalých českých rotmistrů for sergeants. THÜRMER:
Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, page 18.
In the original: “... denn ich könnte es nicht für zweckmässig halten, dass gerade die
Rundfunkleute sich durch übertriebenen Neutralität von ihrem Volkstum entfremdeten.”
THÜRMER: Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, page 18.
THÜRMER: Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, page 19.
THÜRMER: Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, page 19.
In the original: “die Zensoren machten dann viele Sendungen selbst, gegen Honorar natürlich”.
THÜRMER, Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, page 16.
226
and the other contributors were remunerated for these extraordinary efforts.”658
According to Thürmer, “the sum for the accepted, but then cut programs ran into the
hundreds of thousands”659 of crowns, which gave the Czechs the not entirely
unjustified impression that “every German who belonged to the Radio was a priori a
bit of a pig.”660 Clearly, this practice could not continue if orderly programming were
to have a chance and also given that Czech Radio’s finances were in serious
trouble.
In the course of several months, a number of staff positions were identified as
dispensable and eliminated, including, for instance, that of Otakar Matoušek, the
former head of the Talks Department, whose Radio Research Department was
completely disbanded as unnecessary.661 Similarly, the last references to Maras
having an influence on programming at Czech Radio date to the first week of April
1942.662 Regrettably, there is no documentation as to whether he was dismissed or
left voluntarily. Either scenario is conceivable. Presumably, either Thürmer purged
Maras or Maras resigned of his own volition around the same time as Pabel arrived
in Prague in April/May 1942. At the beginning of July 1942, Walter Maras left
Prague, never to return to work at Czech Radio again.663 He was drafted into the
Wehrmacht and ultimately served in the Propaganda-Abteilung “Südost” (the
Propaganda-Department “Southeast”).664 Dr. Ladislav Vachulka, the music censor
imposed on Czech Radio by the National Solidarity in March 1940, was dismissed.
The reason given was that Czech Radio had had no practical use for Vachulka
throughout the entire period of his employment and no such practical use was
anticipated in the future.665 Within months, Bedřich Pěkný also lost his position after
repeatedly failing tests for German language proficiency. In a note tinged with
658
659
660
661
662
663
664
665
In the original: “...různé, přiležitostní relace, které měly vždy přednost. Většina těchto relací od Dr.
Schneidera... Dr. Schneider i ostatní přispívatelé byli za tyto mimořádné výkony honorováni.” NANárS, carton 106, inventory number 1536. Testimony of Karel Remeš of 26 June 1946, page 2.
In the original: “...der Betrag der angenommenen, aber gestrichenen Sendungen ging in die
Hunderttausende.” THÜRMER, Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, page 16.
In the original: “jeder Deutsche, der zum Rundfunk gehörte, a priori ein Ferkel sei.” THÜRMER,
Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, page 15.
AČRo, personnel file Matoušek.
NA-NárS, carton 107, call number 60, note from Kříž to Maras of 1 April 1942.
Maras’ police registration lists him as leaving Prague for Berlin on 2 July 1942.
Letter V/25 677/51 from Ms. Foth-Müller of the Deutsche Dienststelle Berlin (WASt), the office for
determining the fates of former Wehrmacht personnel, to the author of 19 July 2005.
In the original: “Tschechischer Rundfunk hatte während der ganzen Vertragszeit für Herrn Dr.
Vachulka, Doktor musikalischer Wissenschaft, keine zweckmässige Beschäftigung und er kann
ihn auch derzeit nicht entsprechend verwenden.” AČRo, personnel file Vachulka.
227
obvious annoyance at Pěkný’s “virtually complete ignorance of the German
language”, Pabel requested his dismissal at the earliest possible date.666
However, it was not only full-time staff members who lost their employment at the
Radio. As we have mentioned, Emanuel Moravec was gradually removed from
programming. According to Thürmer, his discussion with Moravec went well,
however, it was much more difficult to convince the German authorities to raise the
pay levels for Protectorate officials, so as to avoid the need for them to earn money
on the side.667 Thürmer reportedly also used Moravec’s departure from radio to
eliminate a number of ministerial officials, who had interfered in programming
decisions up until that point.668 Thus, within a few months of his arrival in Prague,
Thürmer had eliminated virtually all of the institutions and individuals who had been
such a plague to Czech Radio’s professionals in their work in the preceding years.
Czech Personnel Director Remeš described the change as follows:
“While the era of Dr. Maras left part of the program in its original form and only
introduced propagandistically and politically coarsely formulated inserts into it, the
second era changed the underlying idea of the entire program while at the same time
leaving it its Czech nature. It worked in a less conspicuous and not so vociferous
form. This meant a perceptible relief for all departments; for all except for the Political
Lectures Department, which retained – albeit in a more refined form – the original
line.” 669
The strategy seems to have paid off for Thürmer in terms of intra-company relations.
With time, Czech staff apparently came to value Thürmer quite highly as a leader. To
illustrate, let us look at an anecdote that reporter Josef Cincibus told an internal
company review committee in February 1950. In early autumn 1944, Pabel ordered
Cincibus to travel out to sites of the freshly suppressed Slovak National Uprising to
666
667
668
669
In the original: “...dank seiner nahezu vollständigen Unkenntnis der deutschen Sprache...” AČRo,
personnel file Pěkný. Note Pabel to Administrative Director Ehlert of 6 February 1943.
THÜRMER: Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, page 14.
THÜRMER: Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, page 14.
In the original: “Zatím co éra Dr. Marase ponechávala část programu v původní formě a vkládala
do něj pouze propagačně a politicky hrubě formulované vložky, éra druhá měnila nosnou
myšlenku celého programu a ponechávala mu při tom jeho český ráz. Pracovala formou
nenápadnější a ne tak křiklavou, pro všechna oddělení znamenalo to znatelné uvolnění, ovšem
mimo oddělení politických přednášek, které si podrželo–také v zjemněnější formě–původní linii.”
NA-NárS, carton 107, call number 60. Sketch of the Organization and Activity of Czech Radio
During the Occupation by Personnel Director Dr. Jur. Karel Remeš of 26 June 1946, page 2.
228
make a reportage celebrating the German victory there. Fearing the political
ramifications such an assignment might have – i.e., overt collaboration – Cincibus
sought to avoid going at all costs. Pabel insisted, however. According to Cincibus,
Remeš, using the familiar “ty” form for “you” in Czech, apparently then advised him,
to appeal to Thürmer, about whom Remeš allegedly said that he was “a fair person
and he will understand.”670 Cincibus then described how, on that occasion, Thürmer
asked him to sit down and have one of his cigarettes with him, while he explained
why it was important for Cincibus to travel to out Slovakia to make the story.
Cincibus had no way to avoid the assigment at that point. Apparently, he did
consider having a friend stab him in the leg in order to get out of it, but did not expect
such an “accident” would have been credible under the circumstances. By contrast,
Cincibus’s anecdote is highly credible, however. It is impossible to imagine what
benefit he could have derived from creating a story to tell to a Communist-led review
committee that depicted himself on familiar “ty” terms with Remeš, whom the
Communists had removed from office the day after their putsch in 1948,671 or
fraternizing with the Nazi Intendant Thürmer. Thus, the anecdote would appear to
illustrate faithfully that Thürmer employed an approach vis-à-vis his Czech
subordinates, which was uncommonly benevolent for a high Nazi official. It may
simply have been a strategic ploy on Thürmer’s part, but his Czech subordinates
appear to have believed it.
Czech Radio and the Specter of Bankruptcy
Simultaneously with the staffing issues, Thürmer had to deal with the unhappy state
of Czech Radio’s finances. According to his report, Scurla’s team had driven Czech
Radio into virtual bankruptcy through its corrupt practices; Fricke had spent most of
his time in Prague determining the value of the company’s assets in preparation for
its liquidation and had set about disbanding the station at Moravská Ostrava.672
Furthermore, Fricke had worsened the situation by ordering a great deal more
programming from the Reichsrundfunk and through local German productions. A
review of the existing documentation on the subject suggests that the situation was
670
671
672
In the original: “Dr. Remeš mi řekl: … musíš jít na intendanta Türmera (sic), aby tě tam neposlali.
Je to člověk spravedlivý a on to pochopí.” AČRo, personnel file Josef Cincibus. Interrogation by
the Czechoslovak Radio Company Commission of 23 February 1950.
AČRo, personnel file Remeš.
THÜRMER: Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, page 6.
229
somewhat more complex than that. As with most Central European broadcasters,
Czech Radio received its revenues from a share of radio subscription or license fees
collected through the state-run Post Office. For its part, the Reichssender Böhmen,
received its funding in the same manner, however, through the Reichspost and via
Goebbels’ Ministry in Berlin. It would appear that Thürmer also drew the salaries of
German employees at Czech Radio from Reichssender Böhmen funds.673 One
noteworthy exception to this rule, which Thürmer failed to mention in his post-war
apology however, were special costs related directly to the German occupation and
the war itself. These included the obligatory civil defense provisions aimed at
minimizing the loss of life and damage caused by potential air raids, but also
payments for the SS-guards he stationed at radio headquarters, which went directly
to the Reichsführer SS. Unfortunately, Thürmer combined these costs in his
proposed budget for 1942/43, but together they comprise the considerable sum of
RM 170,000.- or K 1.7 million!
674
Apart from this, however, the radio subscription
fees of listeners in the Protectorate appear to have been directed fully to funding
Czech Radio.
In 1939 and 1940, the Protectorate Post Office remitted between 38% and 40% of
radio subscription revenues to Czech Radio in order to cover the company’s
operating costs. For 1939, these funds amounted to just under K 35.4 million.675 At
the time of the handover of shares in the company to the Reich in 1940, an annual
report was issued for an abridged fiscal year from 1 January through 30 September
1940. For these nine months, the Post Office remitted a sum of approximately K 29.4
million,676 which would correspond to approximately K 37.3 million for a 12-month
period. In 1939, these payments were sufficient to cover the company’s financial
needs. The constant rise in the number of radio listeners on the one hand and an
increase in the monthly radio subscription fee from K 10 to K 12 starting 1 June
1940,677 on the other hand, also made a dividend in excess of K 1.6 million possible
673
674
675
676
677
NA, ÚŘP-ST-109-4-1505, carton 94. Letter from Thürmer to Wolf of 2 August 1942 including the
Sendergruppe’s financial plan for the period 1 April 1942 to 31 March 1943, pages 1-2.
NA, ÚŘP-ST-109-4-1505, carton 94. Letter from Thürmer to Wolf of 2 August 1942 including the
Sendergruppe’s financial plan for the period 1 April 1942 to 31 March 1943, pages 12-13.
The exact sum was K 35,337,192.40. AČRo, HM-7/391, Annual Report of Czech Radio Ltd., for
the fiscal year between 1 January and 31 December 1939, page 11.
The exact sum was K 29,388,023.10. AČRo, Annual Report of Czech Radio Ltd., for the fiscal
year between 1 January and 30 September 1940, page 6.
AČRo, Annual Report of Czech Radio Ltd., for the fiscal year between 1 January and 30
September 1940, page 6.
230
for the departing private shareholders at the time of the state take-over in 1940.678
Nevertheless, the final quarter of 1940 actually ended on a negative note with a
direct loss of around half a million crowns. When depreciations and pension fund
payments due in December 1940 were factored in, the year 1940 actually closed
with a financial loss of over K 2.5 million.679
This trend continued into the following year as well. As Thürmer reported in August
of 1942 to the new director of Department IV in the Office of the Reichsprotektor, SSSturmbahnführer Martin Paul Wolf, Czech Radio had created a loss of over K 4.24
million in 1941 and should have declared bankruptcy as of 31 December of that year.
In fact, only a loan from the Protectorate Post Office kept it afloat.680 Some of the
main contributing factors to the malaise will undoubtedly have been the costly and
obligatory membership in Scurla’s Rundfunkarbeitsgemeinschaft, but also the
dramatic increase in the length of broadcast time from initially around 13.5 to over
18.5 hours per day, which will have raised costs in all areas from the creation of
additional program content itself (i.e., wages for musicians, royalties to authors,
production staff, etc.) to costs for electrical fees, wear-and-tear on equipment, etc.
There will also have been costs associated with the remunerated programming that
the censors produced themselves and for external contributions by political
commentators such as Emanuel Moravec and Kříž’s party comrades from the Vlajka,
not to mention the generous remuneration of author’s royalties to Josef Opluštil for
his political sketches.
Apart from these direct factors, the effects of Nazi monetary policy in the
Protectorate and the costs of financing the war had created a general trend of
shortages and severe inflation within the Protectorate’s economy. For example, the
official cost of living price index for a worker’s family in May 1942 was nearly twothirds higher than it had been at the time of the establishment of the Protectorate,681
while black-market rates for scarce goods were often higher by a multiple of the
678
679
680
681
AČRo, Annual Report of Czech Radio Ltd., for the fiscal year between 1 January and 30
September 1940, page 7.
NA-ÚŘP, carton 1164. Proposal for a budget for 1941 dated 1 March 1941, page C.
NA, ÚŘP-ST-109-4-1505, carton 94. Letter from Thürmer to Wolf of 2 August 1942 including the
Sendergruppe’s financial plan for the period 1 April 1942 to 31 March 1943, pages 17-18.
The exact figure was an increase by a factor of 1.631. See: Statistisches Jahrbuch für das
Protektorat Böhmen und Mähren 1944, page 153.
231
official index.682 At the same time, the imposition of Reichspost practices on the
Protectorate’s Post Office in 1942 meant that Czech Radio would have to start
paying rent on its premises in Prague and Brno – a situation that Thürmer felt could
only be remedied either by the purchase of those properties or through the
construction of new buildings – and also paying for transmission fees via longdistance telephone cables. Given all of the above-mentioned problems, Thürmer
estimated the company’s financial needs for the business year 1942-43 at no less
than K 90,195,000. In order to secure this sum, he recommended raising the monthly
radio subscription fee as of 1 September 1942 to K 15 and reversing the proportion
of radio revenues shared between Czech Radio and the Protectorate Post Office to
levels similar as those in the Reich itself, which were namely 60% for the RRG to
40% for the Reichspost.683 Martin Paul Wolf passed on Thürmer’s requests with his
own support to Karl Hermann Frank. The result seems to have been nearly an
immediate victory for Thürmer, as an increase in monthly radio subscription fees to K
15 came into effect at the requested date.684
Thereafter, Thürmer claims to have purchased Czech Radio’s headquarters for the
Reichsrundfunk from the Protectorate Post Office for a sum of RM 2 million.685 The
increased liquidity then also allowed him to raise wages for Czech Radio’s staff.
Thürmer described top earners’ wages as reaching the Reich’s level, but 35% lower
for middle-range employees and even 50% under the Reich’s level for the lower
echelons. Numerous documents in the personnel files of Czech Radio staff testify to
the fact that Thürmer did actually raise wages consistently throughout the period of
his tenure, and did this often with significant regular performance bonuses of 10%
and more of the person’s gross earnings.686 Naturally, these facts may also have
contributed to some extent to the relatively positive post-war appraisal Thürmer
received from his former employees.
682
683
684
685
686
For example, the official price for horsemeat was K 12 per kilogram in May 1941, while it traded
on the blackmarket at 2.5 times that price (K 30). See: SOA Praha, Fond Německý zvláštní soud
Praha (Deutsches Sondergericht Prag), 4KLS170/42, carton 21, S. 7
NA, ÚŘP-ST-109-4-1505, carton 94. Letter from Wolf to Frank of 6 August 1942, page 1.
Postamtsblatt/Poštovní věstník (“Official Postal Gazette of the Ministry of Transport and
Technology in Prague”), No. 41/1942 of 29 August 1942, page 405 on the increase in radio
subscription rates.
THÜRMER: Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, page 24.
See for example the progression of pay for Josef Bezdíček, Josef Cincibus, Alois Kříž and others
in their personnel files.
232
The Station-Group’s New Image
The establishment of the Station-Group Bohemia-Moravia as a unified GermanCzech broadcasting corporation necessitated some complicated work in matters of
image. Ultimately, Thürmer seems to have found a solution that will not have
satisfied either side completely, but which – when observed against the background
of a raging Second World War – allowed for a relatively efficient modus vivendi. As
he reported after the war, Thürmer conceived of the Station-Group as an institution
whose job it was to “care for the common interests of both peoples”, who, as he
noted in typically euphemistic Nazi parlance, were “determined by the geographic
situation of the area.”687 In other words, since the Czechs and the Germans,
including the indigenous Sudeten-German population, had to live together in
Bohemia and Moravia, the Station-Group had to serve their cultural interests. Given
the exceedingly high levels of estrangement between the Czechs and the Germans
– whether indigenous to Bohemia and Moravia or transferred there for some reason
during the occupation – bringing them together in one organization was a Sisyphean
task at best. On the one hand, there were the sensitivities of the Sudeten-German
population to consider and these were very problematic indeed. Thürmer’s opinion of
the Sudeten-Germans was that the years of national struggle during the period of the
First Czechoslovak Republic had left them in a state of spiritual exhaustion and
“provincial retardation”, which he sought to remedy by creating greater connections
between them and the “intellectuality of the Reich”688 while making certain at the
same time that the German programming of the Station-Group “also served the unity
of the area”.689 As for his Sudeten-German colleagues’ view of the Czechs, Thürmer
described this as a “psychosis with corresponding visions of hatred”, which needed
to be overcome.690 On the other hand, as we already know from Thürmer’s report,
687
688
689
690
In the original: “Dagegen mussten die gemeinsamen Interessen beider Völker, bedingt durch die
geografische Lage des Raumes, sorgfältig gepflegt werden.” THÜRMER: Sendergruppe BöhmenMähren, page 9.
In the original: “Psychose mit zugehörigen Hassvorstellungen”. THÜRMER: Sendergruppe
Böhmen-Mähren, page 9.
In the original: “...dass auch der deutsche Programmanteil der Einheit des Raumes diente”.
THÜRMER: Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, page 20.
In the original: “Psychose mit zugehörigen Hassvorstellungen”. THÜRMER: Sendergruppe
Böhmen-Mähren, page 9.
233
after three years of occupation, the Czech Radio’s staff regarded any German
connected to the Radio as “a priori a bit of a pig.”691
Undoubtedly, the situation was also not improved by the assassination of Reinhard
Heydrich in late May/early June 1942, which according to the Sicherheitsdienst
infuriated local Germans and fostered expectations among them of the toughest
possible punishment of the Czechs. As for the Czechs, the ensuing terror that Frank
and the occupation authorities unleashed in their homeland and which climaxed in
the second half of June with the extermination of the towns of Lidice and Ležaky,
caused an atmosphere of mass anxiety and menace to spread among them.692
Thürmer’s answer to this was as tactically wise as it was practical. In his own words,
he was decided “to give the Czechs in the Radio a usable cultural instrument, which
was connected as much as possible to the feeling that it was ‘their’ radio.”693 Against
the background of Nazi terror and the systematic repression against Czech cultural
life, which was altogether palpable by early 1942 with the micro-management of the
content of the Protectorate’s newspapers, the closure of Czech universities etc.,
Thürmer’s approach must have had considerable appeal to his Czech subordinates.
To them, it must also have seemed an unusual gesture, indeed, when starting with
its 13 June 1942 edition – the cover-page of which features a black-framed photo of
Heinrich Himmler laying a wreath against the coffin of the late Reinhard Heydrich694
– the Czech radio weekly Týden rozhlasu no longer listed the frequencies of the
“Reichssender Böhmen – Říšský Vysílač Čechy”, but instead those of the “Sender
Böhmen – Vysílač Čechy”. There was no explanation of this specific change or
indeed about the formation of the Station-Group itself for the reader either at this
time or in the preceding weeks. As with the rest of the Station-Group’s genesis, the
public was left largely in the dark about the details – presumably because explaining
the change would have entailed highlighting mistakes of the past. Furthermore,
Týden rozhlasu continued to refer throughout the end of the occupation to “Český
rozhlas” and not to the “Vysílací skupina Čechy-Morava”. Paradoxically, the
message to the Czechs with the “Sender Böhmen – Vysílač Čechy” was to promote
691
692
693
694
In the original: “jeder Deutsche, der zum Rundfunk gehörte, a priori ein Ferkel sei.” THÜRMER,
Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, page 15.
GEBHART, KUKLÍK: Velké dějiny XV.b, page 132.
In the original: “Ich war fest entschlossen, den Tschechen im Rundfunk ein brauchbares
Kulturinstrurnent zu geben, möglichst mit dem Gefühl verbunden, dass es ‘ihr’ Rundfunk sei.”
THÜRMER, Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, page 9.
See: Týden rozhlasu, volume IX, edition 24, (13 June 1942), cover-page.
234
a local nature for the station and diminish the overt visibility of its connection to the
Reich at a time when the Reich’s direct interference in broadcasting in the
Protectorate was greater than it had ever been before.
Against the background of the intensifying atmosphere of terror after Heydrich’s
assassination, Thürmer’s reorganization of broadcasting in the Protectorate seems
virtually like a gesture of good will. In practice it meant for the Czech radio listener
that his/her national broadcast service did continue to exist as a Czech institution,
albeit with somewhat greater German encroachment on programming, such as the
bilingual program announcements. While the vast majority of Czechs surely will not
have welcomed dual-language program announcements, they were at this point in
the occupation merely the application to radio of language practices they had
encountered in virtually all other aspects of daily life – whenever they looked at a
street sign, placed a long-distance telephone call or received a report card at school.
At the same time, although it will not have been much of a boon to the Czech
listener, the local German station had at least superficially returned to Bohemia and
Moravia.
For the German listener, the creation of the Station-Group was definitely a benefit.
First of all, the introduction of dual-language program announcements and local
German-language programming via the Czech stations meant that Prague I, Brno
and Moravská Ostrava had started to function virtually as accessible German
stations, especially in terms of music programming. Of course, Czech-language talks
programming still aired, and this may have been an annoyance to many.
Nevertheless, the “Sender Böhmen” continued to re-broadcast much of the
Reichsprogramm while regional German-language programming from Bohemia and
Moravia became accessible over all Protectorate stations. As for the Station-Group’s
image, German program magazines had ceased publication in May of the preceding
year. However, the official organ of the NSDAP in Bohemia and Moravia, Der Neue
Tag, continued to publish highlights from the radio programs in advance. In these
cases, Der Neue Tag simply replaced the term “Reichssender Böhmen” with
“Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren”. On occasions when reference to a specific station
within the Station-Group became necessary – for instance when Joseph Keilberth
conducted an orchestra broadcast over Prague I instead of Mělník – the program
announcement in the newspaper was quite straightforward: “Sender Prag” (i.e.,
Prague I-Liblice), “Sender Böhmen” (i.e., Mělník), “Sender Brünn”, “Sender Mährisch
235
Ostrau” of the “Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren”. In this way, the term “Sendergruppe
Böhmen-Mähren” will have suggested German hegemony in broadcasting terms
over the entire Protectorate. Thus the German listener could identify the StationGroup as a German institution, while for the Czechs it remained Czech Radio.
Concrete Effects on Programming in the Period
One of the immediate effects of Thürmer’s take-over at Czech Radio was a reduction
in the virtually free reign Kříž had enjoyed over political programming. Already on 28
April 1942, the long-running series “What do you know about the Jews and Free
Masons?” came to an abrupt end.695 Thürmer called on Kříž to justify his activities to
date and then moved to cut back Kříž’s broadcasts and reduced his wages.696 As of
30 June 1942, Thürmer even cancelled Kříž’s contract, however with the possibility
of continuing work under less attractive conditions.697 Kříž opted to stay on at Czech
Radio, albeit with much reduced airtimes and initially also with less money. A further
change that fell into this period of Thürmer’s clean-up policy was also the initial
sacking of Josef Opluštil, as of 31 March 1942, and the initial removal of his “Political
sketches” from broadcast at the end of January.698 After five lucrative months of
Opluštil premiering new sketches and repeating old ones, a further sinecure had
disappeared. It would not be until the summer months that Opluštil’s works returned
to regular programming, however also in the new form of short (generally ca. 10
minute) broadcasts in a regular series.
Nevertheless, the new leadership at Czech Radio was by no means inclined to leave
the population entirely without Czech-language, pro-German and pro-Nazi
propaganda. Kříž arranged a new series under the watchful eyes of Thürmer and
Pabel, which soon took to the airwaves. With the title Aufbau! – Budujeme! (“We
build!”), it started broadcasting on 5 May 1942 and continued for the next 10 months.
These were mostly 10- to 15-minute lectures that ran about once to twice per week.
Judging by an overview of its contents, “We build!” was essentially a continuation of
“Voices of the time”. It featured contributions by activist journalists, the best known of
whom were Karel Werner, Karel Korp, A.J. Kožíšek, Vladimír Ryba and Kříž himself
695
696
697
698
Rozhlasová korespondence, volume X. (1942), edition 103.
NA-NárS, carton 106, call number 57. Personnel file of Alois Kříž. Note by Remeš of 8 May 1942
and Kříž’s personnel questionnaire.
NA-NárS, carton 106, call number 57. Personnel file of Alois Kříž. Note by Remeš of 8 May 1942
and Kříž’s personnel questionnaire.
AČRo, personnel file Opluštil.
236
and many others, who had already appeared in Kříž’s series. The main difference
was the orientation of the programming, which focused heavily on ostensible
improvements to social and working conditions in the Protectorate under Nazi rule.
Nevertheless, the series covered a wide array of topics, with several addressing
specific target groups of the population and others simply expounding generally on
Nazi topics, such as a piece by Kříž on “The social feeling of yesterday and today”699
or his colleague Josef Rejthar’s none-too-credible treatise on how “A new spirit rules
the attitudes of the Czech person.” 700 A percentile breakdown by subject matter from
the 54 known programs from the series offers the following content:701
Subject
%
Workers’ conditions/labor
26
New art/culture/theater/literature
13
Farmers/agriculture
9
Positve new Zeitgeist
9
Nazi system (education, city planning, legal system)
6
Economics/Czech economy booming
4
German language as a key to success
4
Germany/new colonies in East
4
Politics
4
Professionals (doctors, etc.)
4
Women
4
Anti-Soviet
4
Youth
2
Other
9
The titles of individual broadcasts mainly suggest the great care of the new system
for the working conditions of factory workers and farmers. However, there were also
699
700
701
In the original: “Das soziale Gefühl von gestern und heute.” Broadcast on 26 May 1942. NA-NárS,
carton 108, order number 66. List of broadcasts in the series Aufbau between 5 May 1942 and 5
January 1943, page 1.
In the original: “Ein neuer Geist beherrscht die Gesinnung des tschechischen Menschen.”
Broadcast on 26 May 1942. NA-NárS, carton 108, order number 66. List of broadcasts in the
series Aufbau between 5 May 1942 and 5 January 1943, page 1.
NA-NárS, carton 108, order number 66. List of broadcasts in the series Aufbau between 5 May
1942 and 5 January 1943.
237
specific, positive messages for a range of other population subgroups and also
generally positive reviews of various aspects of Germany and the Nazi system. The
only overtly negative subjects might have been two broadcasts on the “Soviet
paradise”, although feminists among the listeners are not likely to have appreciated a
piece by an A. Rosolová with the title: “The end of politicking women”.702 Coming
after the ugly, defamatory agitation of “What do you know about the Jews and Free
Masons?”, however, this series will at least have offered comparatively positive
subject matter to the audience. The series eventually wrapped up with a final
broadcast on Tuesday, 2 March 1943, which Kříž coordinated carefully with Pabel.
Noteworthy here is, however, that Aufbau!—Budujeme! ran in the later evening after
22:15 hours, which means that Thürmer and Pabel had relegated it to a nonprimetime slot.
From the documents at hand, it is quite clear that the working relationship of Pabel
and Kříž was that of master and servant. There was little or nothing Kříž could do
without Pabel’s approval, and Pabel was not always forthcoming with that – even visà-vis his most proven activist subordinate. Thus, Kříž was left with the task of making
suggestions for potential broadcasts, but the decision ultimately lay with Pabel. At
times, Kříž virtually begged Pabel to be allowed to start new propaganda
programming. For example, Kříž suggested a series entitled Wir lernen sie kennen! –
Poznáváme je! (“We recognize them!”) in which he wanted to investigate issues such
as “Bolshevism, the way Churchill used to see and criticized it; the ‘Friendship’ of the
Angloamericans and its economic face; Roosevelt’s brain trust etc.” In this case, Kříž
devoutly promised to make certain that the program was “really good” as it was a
matter “close to his heart.”703 On another occasion, Kříž returned from holiday to
learn that none of the broadcasts by his holiday replacement – Hugo Tuskány from
the semi-pornographic Arijský boj (“Aryan Struggle”) newspaper – had aired, but had
702
703
In the original: “Das Ende der politisierenden Frauen.” Broadcast on 11 June 1942. NA-NárS,
carton 108, order number 66. List of broadcasts in the series Aufbau between 5 May 1942 and 5
January 1943, page 1.
In the original: “Bolschewismus, wie ihn Churchill früher sah u.[nd] kritisierte, die ‘Freundschaft’
der Angloamerikaner und ihr wirtschaftliches Gesicht, Gehirntrust Roosevelts usw... Ich werde mir
grösste Mühe und Sorgfalt damit geben, dass die Sendung wirklich gut sei, da sie mir doch sehr
am Herzen liegt.” NA-NárS, carton 107, call number 60. Note from Kříž to Pabel on potential
closing broadcasts for the series Aufbau!–Budujeme! undated, but presumably from February
1943, page 2.
238
been replaced entirely by commentaries from Max Karg.704 Since there can be little
doubt about Tuskány’s pro-Nazi world view, Pabel’s objections are likely to have lain
in the areas of technical quality.
As for Emanuel Moravec, he returned to the microphone quite extensively again in
the period surrounding the assassination of Reinhard Heydrich. On 31 May 1942,
Moravec followed a radio speech, in which Protectorate State President Hácha had
branded exiled Czechoslovak President Beneš as the country’s “public enemy No.
1”, with a long tirade on how “adventurers” in London and Moscow had bought some
Czechs and sent them to the otherwise orderly and hard-working Protectorate to
disturb the peace. Worse perhaps from Moravec’s perspective was that with their
actions the parachutists had threatened the trust and endangered the magnanimity
of the Great German Reich towards the Czech people. With reference to the attack,
Moravec progressed towards his crescendo with the statement:
“In England they are happy when blood is spilled in our country. Czech blood
represents money to them. The more Czech blood is wasted, the higher the numbers
on the checks that the grateful British government writes out for that rabble.”705
In June, Moravec carried on with these types of sentiments in a series of public
gatherings in Prague and major cities throughout the entire Protectorate. Not even
Nazi forces’ obliteration of the town of Lidice and much of Lidice’s civilian population
on 10 June 1942 stopped Moravec, despite this rather palpable demonstration of the
limitations of the Great German Reich’s “magnanimity”. On the contrary, Moravec
managed two further pro-German, nation-wide broadcasts in this time period as
well.706 Despite Moravec’s departure from constant broadcasting, he still took to the
microphone throughout the end of the war whenever the seriousness of the situation
warranted. For instance, in the weeks after the defeat of the Wehrmacht at
Stalingrad and after Goebbels’s declaration of total war, Moravec spoke via Czech
Radio on a weekly basis again.
704
705
706
NA-NárS, carton 107, call number 60. Undated note from Kříž to Pabel, presumably from the
summer of 1943.
In the original: “V Anglii se radují, když v naší zemi teče krev. Česká krev představuje pro ně
peníze. Čím více české krve přijde nazmar, tím vyšší číslice na šecích, jež vděčná vláda britská
potom té sebrance vystavuje.” UHLÍŘ, Moravec II., page 51.
UHLÍŘ, Moravec II., page 52.
239
This was, however, programming for extraordinary situations. Naturally, regular
programming continued around the atrocities, and eventually resumed in its precrisis mode. Commentaries on the course of the war – weekly reviews of its progress
and also political commentaries in the form of the short Zeiteinlagen-Časové vložky
(“Time inserts”) and K politické situaci (“On the political situation”) continued. Most of
the information from the battlefields came directly from the Wehrmachtpropaganda
Office. K politické situaci (“On the political situation”) came from the offices of Max
Karg, the influential head of the Prager Zeitungsdienst, whose commentaries
essentially represented the official position of the Office of the Reichsprotektor.707
There were no changes throughout this period, for example, to the “German
broadcasts”, which filled prime time broadcast slots, such as 19:40 to 20:00 hours on
all Czech stations. Thus, although some of the most obtrusive political programming
may have been removed or reformed throughout 1942, the Czech listener still faced
considerable doses of German and Nazi propaganda. Nevertheless, also at Czech
Radio, the tide was turning a bit.
As Horst Pabel informed Kříž, Cincibus and others, Thürmer wished both a
relaxation of program content in terms of density – for instance in the evening
German-language courses – as well as a shortening and tightening up of other
programming, such as the reportage series zvukovy deník Doba – Práce – Události
(“sound diary Time – Work – Events”). In the case of this latter series, it was to bring
at least two, if not three reportages in a shortened ten-minute program format.
Program magazines of the period also illustrate that many of those reports no longer
had a primarily political intent, but rather dealt with more normal subjects such as
sporting events or even the particularly large blasting of stones in a quarry.708 Thus,
while political stories also broadcast around important happenings, Thürmer and
Pabel did a great deal to return this series to its pre-Kříž focus on interesting current
events. Furthermore, K politické situaci (“On the political situation”) was to be
anonymized, moving away from a first-person form of speaking (i.e., “I believe”, “It is
my opinion”, etc.) to a more general form of address.709 In modern radio terms, these
would be termed as moves to improve storytelling. There are many methods of
storytelling for radio broadcasts, of course. Less appealing varieties were
707
AMV 305-65-2, page 55.
Týden rozhlasu, volume IX, (1943) edition 23, (5 June 1943), page 7.
709
NA-NárS, carton 107, call number 60. Note Pabel to Kříž, Cincibus, Trepesch and Thürmer on
reforms to evening programming of 7 November 1942.
708
240
undoubtedly Moravec’s monotone droning-on about details of military activities on
the various fronts. A much more dynamic method is to get real people’s voices to tell
the events of a story in place of a reporter. Thus, particularly the “sound diary Time –
Work – Events” will have gained in radiophonic quality, with the inclusion of more
varied voices in a greater number of reports. In essence, these were moves to cut
out unnecessary blather and make listening more interesting and less arduous for
Czech Radio’s audience. From a Nazi perspective, Thürmer’s and Pabel’s skill as
radio professionals was starting to bear fruit.
The Thürmer Era I – Analysis of the Program Week Starting 29 November 1942
Figure 6.1: Average duration of broadcast day in hours:minutes:seconds
Week starting 29 November 1942
All Czech (CZ) medium-wave (MW) stations = Prague I, Brno, Moravská Ostrava
All CZ MW stations
19:30:00
4:30:00
Prague I
19:30:00
4:30:00
Brno
19:30:00
4:30:00
Moravská Ostrava
19:30:00
4:30:00
Broadcast hours
Station breaks
Duration of Broadcast Day
Figure 6.1 shows a stabilization of broadcast day in Czech Radio’s network at 19.5
hours on average in the same weekday versus Sunday pattern of the previous
period.
241
Figure 6.2: Regionalization – stations of origin as a percentage of TOTAL AIRTIME
Week starting 29 November 1942,
All Czech (CZ) medium-wave (MW) stations = Prague I, Brno, Moravská Ostrava
All CZ MW stations
49
17
9
57
Prague I
6
12
2
24
1
24
Brno
45
20
10
2
23
Moravská Ostrava
45
19
11
2
23
0% 5%
10
%
15
%
20
%
25
%
30
%
35
%
40
%
45
%
50
%
55
%
60
%
65
%
70
%
75
%
80
%
85
%
90
%
Prague I
Brno
Moravská Ostrava
Sender Böhmen-Melnik
SW-Poděbrady
Reichsprogramm
95 100
% %
Regionalization
Figure 6.2 shows a reduction in re-broadcasts from the Reichsrundfunk to just under
one-quarter of all airtime (24%) – down from 28% in the previous review period.
Nevertheless, an increase in re-broadcasts of programs from the renamed Sender
Böhmen have joined the mix and remarkably also on Prague I – despite its proximity
to Mělník. These were the additional programs for the Sudetenland announced along
with Thürmer’s take-over as Intendant of the Station-Group in April of 1942. The
greater levels of re-broadcasts from the Sender Böhmen via Brno and Moravská
Ostrava reflects an additional “German broadcast” by those stations on Sunday
morning between 09:00 and 09:45, which Prague I did not air. Furthermore, the
reduction of Prague I’s programming that Brno and Moravská Ostrava re-broadcast
(down to 45% in each case), and the increase in these stations’ own output likely
does suggest the application of a policy of divide et impera in the Czech provinces at
this juncture in the occupation.
242
Figure 6.3: Programming structure -- subjects as a percentage of TOTAL AIRTIME
Week starting 29 November 1942,
All Czech (CZ) medium-wave (MW) stations = Prague I, Brno, Moravská Ostrava
All CZ MW stations
64
Prague I
63
5
64
Moravská Ostrava
64
15
%
Music
Youth/School
Women
Kameradschaftsdienst
20
%
25
%
30
%
13
4 1 4 111
Brno
0% 5% 10
%
1 4 111
5
35
%
5
40
%
45
%
50
%
55
%
60
%
65
%
Culture/Entertainment
Workers
News/Reports
German Program
1
15
5
1
5
2 2
12
1 4 111
12
1
5
2 2
1 3 111
12
1
5
2 2
70
%
75
%
80
%
85
%
90
%
95 100
% %
Farmers
Economics
Politics
Other
Programming Structure
Figure 6.3. The most striking result of the analysis of this week’s broadcast content is
the return to lower levels of overtly political programming (down from 5% to just 1%
of airtime) to levels not seen since Kříž’s arrival at Czech Radio. Furthermore,
Thürmer has increased musical programming at the expense of talks on average
from 56% in March 1942 to 64% of airtime for this week in November.
Figure 6.4: Music by German composers as a percentage of TOTAL AIRTIME
Week starting 29 November 1942
All Czech (CZ) medium-wave (MW) stations = Prague I, Brno, Moravská Ostrava
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
24.6
23.1
25.4
25.4
All CZ MW stations
Prague I
Brno
Moravská Ostrava
Music by German composers
243
Music by German Composers
German music increased slightly compared to the previous week reviewed at nearly
one-quarter (average of 24.6%) of all airtime.
Figure 6.5: Broadcast language as a percentage of ALL TALKS PROGRAMMING
Week starting 29 November 1942,
All Czech (CZ) medium-wave (MW) stations = Prague I, Brno, Moravská Ostrava
All CZ MW stations
61
37
59
Prague I
2
34
7
Brno
62
38
Moravská Ostrava
62
38
0% 5%
10
%
15
%
20
%
25
%
30
%
35
%
40
%
45
%
50
%
55
%
60
%
65
%
70
%
75
%
80
%
85
%
90
%
95 100
% %
Czech
Slovak
German
English
French
Italian
Romanian
Serbo-Croatian
Spanish
Ruthenian
Other
Broadcast Language
German-language broadcasts remained steady at over one-third (34% for Prague I
and 38% for the other stations) of all talks programming. However, this is a relative
rate within talks programming. Due to the reduction of talks in favor of more music
over all, this result actually corresponds to a reduction in German-language talks by
an average of 3.3% of total airtime. Most of this change derived from the elimination
of the daily German news broadcasts between 12:30 to 12:45 and 17:00 to 17:10
hours. The first time slot returned to Agricultural Radio programming, while the
second was dedicated to more music. Czech Radio’s management will likely have
perceived this as one of Thürmer’s more sensible reforms. In a similar vein to his
having the telephone listening devices removed at Czech Radio headquarters, this
move will also not have cost Thürmer much politically. After all, the main center of
the occupation authorities – Prague – remained well within Sender Böhmen’s
audibility range even via the simplest of radio sets and during daylight hours. The
same was true for Brno and the Reichssender Donau, Moravská Ostrava naturally
244
via Troppau. Thus, Thürmer could claim to have reduced the German-language
burden on the Czech Radio network without actually having diminished access
throughout the day to German-language newscasts – for those who sought them.
Remarkable here is also the doubling of Spanish-language news programming via
Prague I, which corresponded concretely to the introduction of an additional daily
newscast between 23:30 and 23:45 hours.
Figure 6.6: Germanization/Nazification Factor (GNF) = as a percentage of TOTAL AIRTIME
Week starting 29 November 1942
All Czech (CZ) medium-wave (MW) stations = Prague I, Brno, Moravská Ostrava
50
45
40
35
3.1
41.1
13.4
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Total GNF
2.5
4.5
13.7
12.8
24.6
23.1
All CZ MW stations
Prague I
2.2
13.7
25.4
25.4
Brno
Moravská Ostrava
Music by German composers
German-language talks
Czech-language pro-German/Nazi
GNF as % of total airtime
Germanization/Nazification Factor
If we then look at the GNF as Figure 6.6 depicts it, we find a significant drop in it
from an average of 47.3% in March 1942 to 41.1% towards the end of the StationGroup’s first year. Furthermore, this reduction in the GNF was achieved primarily at
the expense of Czech-language, pro-German/pro-Nazi political programming from
Kříž and his collaborators and German-language programming itself, while German
music rates remained virtually unchanged. Thus, also in programming terms, already
in the first year of his tenure, Thürmer achieved some of the “perceptible
relaxation”710 to which Personnel Director Remeš was to refer after the war.
710
In the original: “znatelné uvolnění”.
245
9. The Station-Group in the Context of Total War
Shortly after the turning point in the war with the defeat at Stalingrad in late January
and early February 1943, Goebbels made his famous speech from the Berlin
Sportspalast on 18 February 1943 ushering in what was to become the final phase of
the Second World War and of the Nazi regime itself. The marketing message for the
war-weary population of the Reich and the occupied territories was that of “total war
– shortest war”. In a brilliant, if also objectively untrue twist of reality, Goebbels
explained to the nation that the Reich had to marshal its reserves to defeat its
enemies in an heroic struggle which the enemies had ostensibly forced upon the
Reich. In practical terms, the advent of “total war” meant further restrictions on
cultural life intended to free up resources for an increase in the war readiness and
war production of the Reich. Palpable effects of the situation included a reduction in
the volume of newspapers and the drafting of hitherto unaffected journalists, artists,
musicians and others into the Wehrmacht. Simultaneously, Goebbels recognized the
need to offer respite from the strains of long working hours on the home front711 and
the constant strains of battle in the field. Radio, as Goebbels planned, was to
become one of the main means of compensating for these losses.712
The Short-wave Action
According to Thürmer, the Allies increased their broadcasting to the Protectorate via
short-wave after the capitulation of German troops at Stalingrad. He also claimed
that there was jamming of medium-wave broadcasts, as well as an increase in the
dropping of radio broadcasting and receiving equipment to the resistance within the
Protectorate itself.713 The results of this activity, he believed, were a gradual increase
in listening to foreign stations, which eventually became a “mass psychosis, to which
Germans and Czechs succumbed in the same way.”714 The result then were everstrengthening calls from the Reichspropagandaleitung, i.e., from the NSDAP’s
propaganda office, for the confiscation of all Czech radio receivers as enemy
property. Such calls, he claimed, resonated rather well among the lower echelons of
711
For example, the work week for public officials in the Protectorate was set at a minimum of 53
hours, running from 07:30 to 17:00 hours Monday through Friday, and 07:30 to 13:30 on
Saturdays. See: NA-ÚŘP, carton 46, circular of 9 May 1942 regulating official working hours.
712
DILLER: Rundfunkpolitik, page 432.
713
THÜRMER: Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, page 30.
714
In the original: “...wurde es im ganzen Raum zu einer Massenpsychose, der Deutsche wie
Tschechen in gleicher Weise unterlagen.” THÜRMER: Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, page 30.
246
Nazi leadership in the NSDAP Party District of the Sudetenland to which Prague
belonged, although not purportedly among Henlein and his top administrators. The
dispute apparently developed to a point at which the Reichspropagandaleitung
threatened to put the matter before Hitler himself for a decision.715 According to
Thürmer, however, not only was he himself opposed to such a move, but also Karl
Hermann Frank had had a radical change of opinion regarding Czech radio
ownership during the year of the Station-Group’s existence. By early 1943 Frank not
only did not want to confiscate Czech radios, rather he was unwilling to relinquish
radio as a “means of leading the Czechs”.716 As much as this description of the
situation may sound like indirect self-praise, i.e., Thürmer suggesting he had
managed to turn the Station-Group into a useful tool for influencing public opinion, it
does fit rather well into the general media situation of the Protectorate at the time.
The fact was that, after nearly four years under Wolfgang Wolfram von Wolmar’s
heavy-handed leadership, the Protectorate’s press had lost virtually all of its
credibility with the population, and some among the Nazi leadership in the
Protectorate had recognized that reality. As a consequence, by early 1943 Frank
was looking for alternative means of influencing Czech public opinion.717 Obviously,
the destruction of Czech Radio would have meant a restriction of the options for
doing so.
Faced with this direct assault from the Reichspropagandaleitung, Frank requested
that Thürmer draw up a memorandum explaining the situation for Berlin. Regrettably,
Thürmer does not mention for whom the memorandum was intended. However, a
matter of this magnitude would have undoubtedly been brought to the attention of
Goebbels and presumably also to Reichsintendant Glasmeier. Thürmer’s approach
was then reportedly quite straightforward. After reiterating the special status of the
Protectorate within the Reich – i.e., its direct administration by the Reichsprotektor,
which negated the authority of the Reichspropagandaleitung to interfere in the
Protectorate’s broadcasting policy – Thürmer emphasized the fact that, due to the
715
716
717
THÜRMER: Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, page 30.
THÜRMER: Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, page 30.
For example, at just this time–late winter/early spring of 1943–Frank himself was actively trying to
recruit an editorial staff for what was to become the risqué and at times critically satirical Czech
magazine Ejhle. Ejhle translates into English roughly as “Oh! Look at this”. For a closer
examination of the genesis and development of Ejhle, for which Josef Opluštil served as editor-inchief, see the following article, which is due to appear soon: KARLÍČEK, Petr and MOHN, Volker:
“Voller propagandistischer Erfolg“?–Das Karikaturblatt Ejhle (1944-45), IN: Bohemia, 51/1 (2011).
Volker Mohn kindly provided the author of this study with a copy of the manuscript.
247
close cohabitation of Germans and Czechs in the Great German Reich, it would be
unfeasible to eliminate radio listening for the Czechs entirely. First of all, there were
hundreds of thousands of Czechs who had been conscripted for work in the Altreich
and thousands more working in the Sudetenland, who would continue to have
access to radios in these areas. Secondly, there were, he claimed, hundreds of
thousands of German-owned radio receivers in the Protectorate, and nobody could
guarantee that Czechs would not be able to access these. Obviously, a confiscation
of German-owned receivers in the Protectorate was out of the question, an assertion
that Henlein vehemently supported. Furthermore, and rather logically, the
confiscation of Czech receivers and the consequent disbandment of Czech Radio
would drive the Czechs to seek other sources of information, one of which would be
contacts in Slovakia, Hitler’s vassal state that shared a long border with eastern
Moravia. Confiscation of legal Czech radio sets would also have no effect on the
Allies’ dropping of receivers to the Protectorate. Thürmer pointed out further that in
terms of crimes against national security, the Protectorate was less active
statistically than even some areas of Germany proper, and that there was therefore
no concrete or urgent security need to justify such an action. While he conceded that
the material derived from confiscated Czech radio sets would no doubt be useful to
alleviating wartime shortages of equipment among German listeners in the Reich,
Thürmer also noted that this was hardly a justifiable argument to support the loss of
such an important propaganda tool. In summary, the confiscation of Czech radio
receivers would not ultimately deprive the Czechs of access to information via radio,
but it would deprive the German occupiers of a useful tool for influencing the Czech
nation. In effect, a policy of this type would mean surrendering the Czech listenership
entirely to the enemy camp.718
Nevertheless, Frank, Wolf and Thürmer needed to find some means to placate the
criticism from the Reichspropagandaleitung while also reducing the population’s
ability to listen to foreign radio broadcasts. The result, which can only be described
as a compromise, was their well-known Kurzwellenaktion, i.e., “short-wave action”.
Acting Reichsprotektor Kurt Daluege issued a decree, dated 10 March 1943, whose
first paragraph ordered the owners of all radio receivers in the Protectorate with
short-wave reception capabilities to have these disabled or removed from their radio
718
THÜRMER: Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, pages 30-31.
248
sets.719 Failure to do so was punishable by five years imprisonment, while the
intentional reactivation of short-wave equipment carried a minimum ten-year
imprisonment. In reality, intentional reactivation ultimately even resulted in death
sentences.720 There are several noteworthy aspects about this decree. First of all it
applied not only to the Czechs, but to all owners of short-wave reception equipment
in the Protectorate, including the local German population. This approach made it a
general measure instead of a specifically anti-Czech punitive action, a fact the
Protectorate’s press hastened to emphasize.721 Secondly, paragraph 9 of the decree
stipulated in an uncharacteristically benevolent manner that the necessary work
conducted on the radios would be performed free of charge, while further ordering
compensation for confiscated receivers designed solely for the reception of shortwave transmissions.722 Thürmer estimated that the decree applied to no fewer than
850,000723 of the 987,327 radio receivers registered in the Protectorate at the
time.724 Not proven by an examination of the text of the law or Týden rozhlasu’s
official explanation of the short-wave action is Thürmer’s claim to have paid a
compensation of K 30 per receiver, for a total of RM 3 million, and to that he did this
using only German and not Czech state funds.725 What definitely can not have been
true, however, were the altogether hyperbolic explanations in the press on the
measure to the effect that “the issuance of this decree will be received with a feeling
of great relief and general satisfaction by the entire Czech population” who
719
720
721
722
723
724
725
Decree of the Reichsprotektor in Bohemia and Moravia on the Short-Wave Reception Equipment,
No. 6/1943, of 10 March 1943. In the original: §1 (1) Die Besitzer von Rundfunkempfangsgeräten
mit Einrichtung für Kurzwellenempfang sind verpflichtet, diese Einrichtung durch amtlich
bestimmte Gewerbetreibende oder deren beauftragte abschalten oder entfernen zu lassen,
sobald eine behördliche Aufforderung hierzu ergeht.
See: Decree of the Reichsprotektor in Bohemia and Moravia on the Short-Wave Reception
Equipment, No. 6/1943, of 10 March 1943, paragraph 7. A post-war study on people executed at
Pankrác Prison documents no fewer than 23 individuals executed for radio offenses, including
those delineated in paragraph 7. In the case of 33-year-old František Ryšavý of Litovel,
sentenced to death for reactivating short-wave reception devices, the execution took place just
one month prior to the end of the war on 4 April 1945. See: KAREL, R.: Žaluji. Pankrácká
kalvárie, volume 2, pages I-XXVI.
In the original: “Vydáním tohoto nařízení splňuje se jíž dávné a vážné přání široké české
veřejnosti která... si přala aby bylo vyloučeno jakékoliv podezření, že chytá neodpovědné zprávy
štváčského cizího rozhlasu... nařízení bude tedy přijato s pocitem veliké úlevy a s obecným
uspokojením všeho českého obyvatelstva.” Odstranění krátkovlnných součástek u rozhlasových
přistrojů, Týden rozhlasu, volume IX, (1943) edition 14, (3 April 1943), page 2.
Decree of the Reichsprotektor in Bohemia and Moravia on the Short-Wave Reception Equipment,
No. 6/1943, of 10 March 1943, paragraph 9.
THÜRMER: Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, pages 30-31.
PABEL, Horst: Der Rundfunk im Protektorat Böhmen und Mähren, IN: Welt-Rundfunk,
Internationale Zeitschrift für Rundfunk und Fernsehen, volume VIII., edition 1-2 (January/March
1944), page 13.
THÜRMER: Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, pages 32.
249
ostensibly wanted to avoid any suspicion of listening to “the irresponsible news of
hatemongering foreign radio”.726
According to Thürmer, he called a meeting with over 100 leading business people
from the Protectorate’s radio trade and retail repair outlets, who as we know were
organized under the local Broadcasting Consortium (Rundfunkarbeitsgemeinschaft),
and explained to them the seriousness of the situation, the draconian measures
applicable for violation of the decree and the very real and direct threat to their own
economic existences should the short-wave action fail or suffer sabotage.727
Informed in this manner and armed with around 3,000 radio technicians, the
members of the Czech Broadcasting Consortium set about removing or disabling the
short-wave reception units of the Protectorate’s radio receivers and apparently
completed the task within three months. A team of 60 postal officials then undertook
random checks of radio receivers throughout the country to verify the correct
implementation of the short-wave action. Thürmer claims the final result of this
“mammoth undertaking” was satisfactory compliance.728
Nevertheless, despite the general success and relative speed with which the shortwave action took place, it could not end the listening to foreign radio broadcasts,
which remained available in German and Czech on medium-wave stations
broadcasting from London and Moscow. This was a fact of which the Nazi broadcast
leadership in the Protectorate was all too well aware. Naturally, none of that concern
was intended for public knowledge. Instead, Thürmer’s deputy, Horst Pabel,
explained to German radio professionals that the short-wave action had marked not
only a “particularly interesting chapter” in the history of the current broadcasting war
but also a “fundamental commitment” by the responsible authority in the Protectorate
to “broadcasting as its own political instrument of guidance,” which at the same time
had deprived “the enemy news service of the decisive medium”.729 The latter
726
727
728
729
In the original: “Vydáním tohoto nařízení splňuje se jíž dávné a vážné přání široké české
veřejnosti která... si přala aby bylo vyloučeno jakékoliv podezření, že chytá neodpovědné zprávy
štváčského cizího rozhlasu... nařízení bude tedy přijato s pocitem veliké úlevy a s obecným
uspokojením všého českého obyvatelstva.” Odstranění krátkovlnných součástek u rozhlasových
přistrojů, Týden rozhlasu, volume IX, (1943) edition 14, (3 April 1943), page 2.
THÜRMER: Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, pages 32.
THÜRMER: Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, pages 33.
In the original: “Damit bekannten sich die verantwörtlichen Stellen des Protektorats grundsätzlich
zum Rundfunk als einem eigenen politischen Führungsinstrument, auf das man nicht verzichten
wollte, und nahmen doch dem feindlichen Nachrichtendienst das entscheidende Mittel aus der
Hand.” PABEL, Horst: Der Rundfunk im Protektorat Böhmen und Mähren, IN: Welt-Rundfunk,
250
assertion was patently untrue, however, and in retrospect, Thürmer was
considerably less sanguine about the ultimate efficacy of the short-wave action. In
his post-war apology, he admitted: “We knew that the action could not bring about a
reasonable solution to the problem; under the given circumstances, it was the lesser
evil.” 730
Glasmeier in Prague
Shortly thereafter, in the spring of 1943, the Station-Group apparently attracted the
interest of the upper echelons of the broadcasting hierarchy in Berlin. Although, like
them, Thürmer had been unsuccessful in stamping out listening to foreign radio
stations, from a Nazi perspective his reforms of broadcasting in the Protectorate
could still be qualified as a genuine success. Viewed from Prague, Thürmer had
managed within one year to transform Czech Radio from a decaying institution
hobbled with debt and threatened with dissolution into an efficient broadcasting
operation with considerable financial and other resources. All the main positions in
the company were firmly in German hands and the basis for a systematic
propaganda work had been established. Viewed from the broadcasting directorate in
Berlin, one constant source of annoyance – the conflict between Scurla and Marek –
was long a thing of the past. At the same time, with the Station-Group a small and
semi-autonomous fiefdom had arisen within the otherwise unified structure of the
Reichsrundfunk itself. Small wonder then that Berlin wanted to be informed about
what was going on in this province.
At the beginning of May 1943, Reichsintendant Glasmeier decided to pay a visit to
Prague to take a first-hand look at the situation. Martin Paul Wolf, the director of
Department IV – Cultural Policy, made a record of this visit in the form of a file note
centered around a meeting he, Glasmeier and Thürmer had with Karl Hermann
Frank at Frank’s offices on 6 May.731 Wolf’s note provides both a report card for the
Station-Group one year into its existence and a review of the atmosphere in the top
echelons of Nazi propaganda administration at the time. Quite clear from the content
of the note is that Frank, Wolf and Thürmer functioned discretely as a unified local
730
731
Internationale Zeitschrift für Rundfunk und Fernsehen, volume VIII., edition 1-2 (January/March
1944), page 13.
In the original: “Dass die Aktion eine vernünftige Lösung des Problems nicht bringen konnte,
wussten wir; es war unter den gegebenen Umständen das kleinere Übel.” THÜRMER:
Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, page 33.
NA-ÚŘP-ST 109-4-1511. Wolf file note on meeting between Frank and Glasmeier on 6 May 1943.
251
team that expected Glasmeier’s visit to mean the imposition of some sort of
interference from the central office in Berlin. At the same time, although he remained
professional and sober in tone, it is more than evident that Wolf – and presumably
also Frank for whom the note was intended – considered Glasmeier a pompous
buffoon with little comprehension of the actual situation in broadcasting within the
Protectorate.
Against this background, the first and last effect of the meeting was a complete
confirmation of Thürmer and his work. Contrary to their expectations, Glasmeier
expressed no specific wishes of his own. Instead, Glasmeier asked Frank directly
whether he was satisfied with Thürmer’s performance and whether he had any
particular wishes for broadcasting. Frank confirmed that he was indeed satisfied with
Thürmer and that his particular wish was that nothing be changed with regard to
Czech Radio whatsoever “…since changes could impair the political peace in the
Protectorate.” 732 Glasmeier apparently accepted this response without objection and
brought up the matter of the short-wave action, confirming that Thürmer’s superiors
were so satisfied with its results that “something similar was planned in the Reich.
One no longer mentions the short-wave broadcasts in the radio at all, produces and
sells only sets without short-wave parts in the Reich and is considering, for
particularly susceptible regions similarly as in the Protectorate, having the shortwave reception equipment made unusable.”733
Glasmeier then launched into a lecture on technical developments in broadcasting
and the Reichsrundfunk’s plans for the post-war era, which included the
differentiation of broadcasting into serious-music, light-music, serious-talks and
regional stations, or as he termed it: “Beethoven-station”, “Lehar-station”, “Goebbelsstation” and “Homeland-station”.734 Glasmeier then continued with a monologue on
what was to become his very favorite pet project: the establishment of a large
732
733
734
In the original: “dass der bisherige Zustand hinsichtlich des tschechischen Rundfunks erhalten
bleibe, weil Änderungen die politische Ruhe im Protektorat beeinträchtigen könnten.” NA-ÚŘP-ST
109-4-1511. Wolf file note on meeting between Frank and Glasmeier on 6 May 1943, page 1.
In the original: “Eine Erwähnung der Kurzwellenaktion durch den Herrn Staatssekretär gab
Anlass, dass Glasmeier äusserte, im Reich sei Ähnliches geplant. Man erwähne im Rundfunk die
Kurzwellensendungen überhaupt nicht mehr, produziere und verkaufe im Reich auch nur noch
Geräte ohne Kurzwellenteile und erwäge für besonders anfällige Gebiete, ähnlich wie im
Protektorat, die Kurzwellenempfangseinrichtungen unbrauchbar machen zu lassen.” NA-ÚŘP-ST
109-4-1511. Wolf file note on meeting between Frank and Glasmeier on 6 May 1943, page 2.
In the original: “Beethoven-Sender”, “Lehar-Sender”, “Goebbels-Sender” und “Heimat-Sender”.
NA-ÚŘP-ST 109-4-1511. Wolf file note on meeting between Frank and Glasmeier on 6 May 1943,
page 1.
252
broadcasting center at St. Florian near Linz in Hitler’s own home territory. Glasmeier
even invited Frank and Wolf to visit him, after previously agreeing upon a date, at
this new center located in a former Augustinian convent.735 Had they chosen to do
so, Frank and Wolf would have experienced something very unusual indeed. Hitler’s
order to Glasmeier to create this center had led to the latter doing so in a very grand
manner. Instead of the grim austerity of the Great German Reich in the grips of a
“total war”, Glasmeier transported his guests back in time, as it were, to the era of
baroque princes feasting by candlelight off silver plates – in this case embossed with
the emblem of the Reichs-Rundfunk-Gesellschaft – in the grand marble hall of the
convent, while the newly formed Reichs-Bruckner-Orchestra played discreetly in the
background.736
Glasmeier further offered to show Frank and Wolf his ultra-modern tape recording
facilities in Berlin. He then requested that Wolf find a particularly representative
palace in Prague for the radio after the war and alluded to the fact that he had been
thinking about Prague Castle itself – a notion to which Wolf reportedly responded
with laughter.737 Pressed by Wolf as to whether there were any questions of serious
import that Glasmeier wished to discuss, the latter responded that there were not
and that he could sort everything internally in discussions with Thürmer. On the
contrary the “fact that he was only now coming to Prague on a visit, could be
considered proof that everything was fine with broadcasting here.” 738 Judging from
the tone of Wolf’s note, he and Frank will have been very pleased to see their
sudden guest depart. One way or the other, the visit was a solid vote of confidence
for Thürmer’s approach to managing broadcasting in the Protectorate.
Concrete Effects on Programming in the Period
The early Thürmer period saw the strengthening of the hand of external German
media officials’ in Czech Radio’s output. Judging by the people primarily involved,
735
736
737
738
NA-ÚŘP-ST 109-4-1511. Wolf file note on meeting between Frank and Glasmeier on 6 May 1943,
page 1.
ERGERT, Viktor: Die Geschichte des Österreichischen Rundfunks, (“The History of Austrian
Broadcasting”), Band I. 1924-1945, Österreichischer Rundfunk (Eds.), Carl Ueberreuter, Wien,
1975, pages 192-194. Hereinafter: ERGERT: Geschichte.
In the original: “...er habe früher einmal an die Prager Burg gedacht, was ich mit Lachen quittiert
habe”. NA-ÚŘP-ST 109-4-1511. Wolf file note on meeting between Frank and Glasmeier on 6
May 1943, page 1.
In the original: “Die Tatsache, dass er erst jetzt zu einem Besuch nach Prag komme, könne als
Beweis angesehen werden, dass der Rundfunk hier in Ordnung sei.” NA-ÚŘP-ST 109-4-1511.
Wolf file note on meeting between Frank and Glasmeier on 6 May 1943, page 1.
253
this meant a greater professionalization of programming work. Apart from Max Karg,
who essentially had taken over Moravec’s role as regular commentator on
developments, the Sudeten-German journalist Wilhelm Neumann started regular
contributions to political programming at this time. According to his police files at the
Czech National Archives, and judging by his ability to produce lectures, sketches and
radio plays, Neumann was an extremely flexible, all-round media talent, who had
several years of professional experience in journalism. Although, he apparently
considered himself a “philosopher”,739 Neumann worked in Prague as a local
correspondent for several German newspapers in the 1920’s and 1930’s, ranging
from the officious Vossische Zeitung to the tabloid B.Z. am Mittag, the Berlin-based
Ullstein News Agency, as well as for Prague-based, German-language publications.
After the establishment of the Protectorate, Neumann advanced to the position of
Obersektionsrat (“Senior Section Adviser”) in the Press Department of the Presidium
of the Council of Ministers (TO PMR). After 1942, this would have been the position
of a German “adviser” to Moravec’s Ministry of People’s Enlightenment.740
Furthermore, a great deal of political programming came in the form of current
events from the fronts, which the Wehrmachtpropaganda Office with the
Reichsprotektor delivered, and which was then translated into Czech.
As for Kříž, he was not removed from broadcasting, but his work suffered a large
degree of marginalization in this period. After the end of the series Aufbau!—
Budujeme! in early March 1943, Kříž launched a new series dedicated to antiWestern, anti-democratic propaganda. The new series was called Vorderseite und
Kehrseite – Líc a rub (“The front side and the back side”). As Kříž explained, the
intent of these short programs – generally running Monday evenings from 18:50 to
19:00 hours – was to uncover and depict the negative sides of “Anglo-American
things” or aspects of the democratic world in a broader sense.741 Kříž also pleaded
with Pabel to allow him to launch a similar anti-Bolshevik series to run Friday
739
740
741
NA-PŘ Praha, carton 7899, file number N963/5 and police registration card for Wilhelm
Neumann.
Wilhelm Neumann’s (1889 in Hřensko/Herrenkretschen Bohemia– ?) police registration card
indicates that he was arrested along with his family on 5 May 1945. However his further fate
thereafter is unknown. See: NA-PŘ Praha, carton 7899, file number N963/5 and police
registration card for Wilhelm Neumann.
In the original “…Líc a rub vorwiegend den angloamerikanischen Dingen (oder noch breiter: den
demokratischen) gewidmet...” NA-NárS, carton 107, call number 60, note Kříž to Pabel of 24
September 1943.
254
evenings, at the same time. However, the request was denied. Vorderseite und
Kehrseite – Líc a rub was to remain Kříž’s main series throughout 1943.
Around this same time, starting on 10 March 1943,742 regular political satire returned
to the Czech airwaves in the form of weekly or twice-monthly political sketches under
the title Einst und jetzt – Kdysi a dnes (“Once and today”) sometimes also called
Kdysi a nyní (“Once and now”). These programs were also rather shorter than the
earlier political sketches, generally only 10 to 16 minutes long, which undoubtedly
made them more coherent than those broadcast during the interregnum period.
These sketches ran on Wednesdays during primetime between 20:45 and 21:00
hours. Josef Opluštil contributed to them regularly, however not exclusively. Only a
few texts from these sketches remain. For illustration, we can note the subtitle of one
from Opluštil dated 26 May 1943: Kohn, poslední židovský Mohykán (“Kohn, the last
Jewish Mohican”), obviously alluding to James Fenimore Cooper’s famous novel
about a tribe of Native Americans.743 It depicts machinations by the last local Jewish
resident of the fictional town of Pocerapice, which prove to be dishonest. According
to a note to Frank and Wolf with an illegible signature, but which can only be from
Thürmer, this type of propaganda was much better received in the Czech population
than speeches by Emanuel Moravec.744
If we take a look at the main evening broadcast time for a week around the mid-point
of the year, we find first of all that the structure of overt political propaganda in the
Czech language has been greatly restricted compared to the pre-Thürmer period.
We will take broadcasting week No. 26 covering 27 June to 3 July 1942 and look at
nation-wide programs with a potentially political content. In order to catch potentially
political programming, we need to look beyond Radiojournal’s definition of primetime
from the 1930’s (19:00-22:00 hours) to cover the time slot 18:00 to 22:30 hours. Let
us also only look at Czech-language productions.745
742
743
744
745
NA-NárS, carton 107, call number 60. File note from Pabel dated 6 March 1943.
SOA-MLS Praha, LS125/48, carton 741, page 99.
SOA-MLS Praha, LS125/48, carton 741, page 59. Letter from SS-Hauptsturmführer (signature
unclear, but presumably Thürmer) to K.H. Frank and SS-Sturmbahnführer Wolf of 8 March 1943.
Týden rozhlasu, volume IX, (1943) edition 26, (26 June 1943), pages 8-14.
255
Sunday:
18:50-19:00, Bericht zur Lage–Aktualita (Wehrmachtpropaganda);
19:10-19:20, K politické situaci (Max Karg).
Monday:
18:00-18:15, Dr. František Tichý on Friedrich Schiller in Prague; 18:5019:00, Bericht zur Lage–Aktualita (Wehrmachtpropaganda); 20:1522:00, “Greetings to Czech workers in the Reich”.
Tuesday:
18:00-18:15,
Doba-Práce-Údalosti;
18:50-19:00,
Aktualita
(news
reportages); 22:15-22:30, Líc a rub (Kříž).
Wednesday: 18:00-18:15, Zeměpisně-politická čtvrthodinka (“Geographical-political
quarter-hour” lecture by Prof. Dr. Rudolf Wierer on the Mediterranean
region);
18:50-19:00,
Bericht
zur
Lage–Aktualita
(Wehrmachtpropaganda); 20:45-21:00, Kdysi a dnes (Kříž).
Thursday:
18:00-18:10 Worker’s Radio: Antonín Egerer: the cultural-social
mission of libraries, 18:10-18:15 news for employees; 18:50-19:00,
Bericht zur Lage–Aktualita (Wehrmachtpropaganda); 19:15-19:20,
K politické situaci. (Max Karg).
Friday:
18:50-19:00, Bericht zur Lage–Aktualita (Wehrmachtpropaganda).
Saturday:
18:00-18:10 Worker’s Radio: Dr. Oldřich Dočkal: on the worker’s honor,
18:10-18:15 news for employees; 20:45-21:00: Doba-Práce-Údalosti.
Naturally, on all days one needs to add the Reichsrundfunk’s main newscast
between 20:00 and 20:15; for Mondays through Saturdays the German-language
courses between 19:30-19:40 and the “German broadcasts” from the Sender
Böhmen between 19:40 and 20:00 to round out the picture. Most of the rest of
airtime was musical and entertainment programming.
Thus, as is evident from this schedule, Thürmer’s reforms had greatly reduced the
influence of Kříž, and in one case (Líc a rub on Tuesday) pushed his production out
of the primetime range altogether. Furthermore, a great deal of the potentially
political output of Czech Radio in this week comes in the form of news reportages,
which very likely covered events connected directly to the war or political actions in
some way, but did not necessarily have to do so. Even some of the Worker’s Radio
programming would appear to be non-political/more concretely cultural in nature, a
measure that Thürmer was to expand in the coming months. If we look at Friday
evening, there was virtually no political programming whatsoever. Politics-free Friday
evenings were to become a common aspect of Czech Radio’s broadcast weeks in
256
the coming months. Thus, Thürmer and Pabel had managed on the one hand to
increase the factual content of programming while also considerably reducing the
amount of airtime purely political programs filled in this most important primetime
listening slot. The constant barrage of primitive political messages of the Maras era
had given way to more professionally made and more fact-oriented programming
with a focus on current affairs.
A further change to programming evident above was connected with the
deterioration of Germany’s geopolitical situation after the defeat at Stalingrad. An
important addition to Czech-language programming was the institution of a regular
show for Czech workers in the Reich itself, which came as a 180-degree reversal of
previous policy on this subject. This new series started on Monday, 8 March 1943, in
the primetime evening broadcast slot from 20:15 to 21:00, and as is visible above,
later expanded to 22:00 hours. It was a show that ran on all Czech medium-wave
stations. With the title Pozdravy českým dělníkům v Říši (“Greetings to Czech
workers in the Reich”) the series essentially functioned along the same principles as
the Kameradschaftsdienst for German soldiers, combining music with personal
greetings from Protectorate citizens for Protectorate citizens working in the Altreich
and other areas annexed to it. The series was to remain in this time slot through to
the very end of the Protectorate itself. It will surely not have been a coincidence that
the appearance of Pozdravy českým dělníkům v Říši came such a short time after
Goebbels’s proclamation of the total war effort on 18 February 1943. Thürmer and
his team obviously recognized that the Reich’s situation was serious enough to
justify a reversal of the Maras-era policy dating from early 1940 when Schneider,
Smutnik and other censors had actively suppressed programming of this type.746
746
NA-ÚŘP, carton 1164. Letter Smutnik to Scurla of 7 June 1940, including a protocol of Smutnik’s
meeting with Czech program directors the previous day, page 1 of the protocol.
257
The Thürmer Era II – Analysis of the Program Week Starting 28 November 1943
Figure 7.1: Average duration of broadcast day in hours:minutes:seconds
Week starting 28 November 1943
All Czech (CZ) medium-wave (MW) stations = Prague I, Brno, Moravská Ostrava
All CZ MW stations
19:30:00
4:30:00
Prague I
19:30:00
4:30:00
Brno
19:30:00
4:30:00
Moravská Ostrava
19:30:00
4:30:00
Broadcast hours
Station breaks
Duration of Broadcast Day
If we turn now to a week analyzed from the end of 1943, Figure 7.1 illustrates that
the duration of the broadcast day at an average of 19.5 hours of programming per
day was unchanged from the previous period.
Figure 7.2: Regionalization – stations of origin as a percentage of TOTAL AIRTIME
Week starting 28 November 1943,
All Czech (CZ) medium-wave (MW) stations = Prague I, Brno, Moravská Ostrava
All CZ MW stations
55
9
64
Prague I
Brno
50
Moravská Ostrava
50
0% 5%
13
10
%
15
%
20
%
25
%
20
21
20
9
5 1
20
11
5 1
20
9
15
14
30
%
4 1
35
%
40
%
45
%
50
%
55
%
60
%
65
%
5
70
%
75
%
80
%
85
%
90
%
95 100
% %
Prague I
Brno
Moravská Ostrava
Sender Böhmen-Melnik
Sender Böhmen-Brünn
Sender Böhmen-M. Ostrau
Reichsprogramm
258
Regionalization
Figure 7.2 shows a marginal strengthening of Prague I’s position among the
programs of Brno and Moravská Ostrava to 50% of airtime. The levels of rebroadcasts from the Reichsprogramm have decreased by four percentage points to
just 20% of airtime. Simultaneously, however, re-broadcasts from the Germanlanguage section of the Station-Group have increased to a full 5% of airtime on
average and even to 6% in the Moravian stations. Most of this consisted of the
“German broadcasts” that Thürmer introduced at the time of his takeover. Also
evident in this chart is the fact that the “German broadcast” from the Saturday of this
week – between 19:40 and 20:00 hours – originated from Brno (Sender BöhmenBrünn), and aired also on Prague I and Moravská Ostrava. This finding reflects the
start of Thürmer’s policy of creating and expanding German-language subsidiary
stations of the Sender Böhmen in the provinces with “very little German
personnel”.747 To avoid confusion after this point, we will use the German names for
the stations: Sender Böhmen-Melnik, Sender Böhmen-Brünn and Sender BöhmenMährisch Ostrau, although the actual broadcast facilities used were in most cases
identical.
Figure 7.3: Programming structure -- subjects as a percentage of TOTAL AIRTIME
Week starting 28 November 1943,
All Czech (CZ) medium-wave (MW) stations = Prague I, Brno, Moravská Ostrava
All CZ MW stations
65
Prague I
65
Brno
65
4 1
5
2 11
11
1
5
4 1
Moravská Ostrava
64
4 1
5
2 11
11
1
5
4 1
0% 5% 10
%
15
%
Music
Youth/School
Women
Kameradschaftsdienst
747
20
%
25
%
30
%
4 1
35
%
40
%
45
%
50
%
55
%
Culture/Entertainment
Workers
News/Reports
German Program
60
%
65
%
5
2 11
4 1 4
2 11
70
%
75
%
12
1
14
80
%
85
%
5
1
90
%
3 1
5
11
95 100
% %
Farmers
Economics
Politics
Other
In the original: “Dem wurde begegnet mit Ausbau von Brünn und Mährisch-Ostrau als deutsche
Nebensender mit ganz geringem deutschem Personal.” THÜRMER: Sendergruppe BöhmenMähren, page 20.
259
Programming Structure
Figure 7.3 shows marginal gains in music programming up from 64% to 65% at the
expense of news and reportage broadcasts, which declined from 14% to 12% of
airtime on average for the Czech station network.
Figure 7.4: Music by German composers as a percentage of ALL MUSIC PROGRAMMING
Week starting 28 November 1943
All Czech (CZ) medium-wave (MW) stations = Prague I, Brno, Moravská Ostrava
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
16.9
17.6
16.5
16.5
All CZ MW stations
Prague I
Brno
Moravská Ostrava
Music by German composers
Music by German Composers
Figure 7.4 demonstrates a significant drop in German music by an average of 7.7
percentage points to levels close to those last seen in 1941. At this point in time,
music by German composers accounted for only 16.9% of all airtime on average
throughout the network.
260
Figure 7.5: Broadcast language as a percentage of ALL TALKS PROGRAMMING
Week starting 28 November 1943,
All Czech (CZ) medium-wave (MW) stations = Prague I, Brno, Moravská Ostrava
All CZ MW stations
56
42
58
Prague I
2
35
7
Brno
56
44
Moravská Ostrava
55
45
0% 5%
10
%
15
%
20
%
25
%
30
%
35
%
40
%
45
%
50
%
55
%
60
%
65
%
70
%
75
%
80
%
85
%
90
%
95 100
% %
Czech
Slovak
German
English
French
Italian
Romanian
Serbo-Croatian
Spanish
Ruthenian
Other
Broadcast Language
On the surface, Figure 7.5 would appear to indicate a dramatic increase in Germanlanguage programming on the Czech channels from 37% in November 1942 to 42%
in this week analyzed. However, this is again a relative change given the decline in
talks in favor of more music programming. More noteworthy perhaps is the uneven
development with significantly higher levels of German-language talks in Brno and
Moravská Ostrava from their more frequent re-broadcasts of programs from the
Sender Böhmen-Melnik. Spanish-language newscasts via Prague I remained stable
at 7% of talks programming.
261
Figure 7.6: Germanization/Nazification Factor (GNF) = as a percentage of TOTAL AIRTIME
Week starting 28 November 1943
All Czech (CZ) medium-wave (MW) stations = Prague I, Brno, Moravská Ostrava
50
45
40
35
30
25
35
3.4
2.9
4.2
14.7
12.1
2.9
16.3
15.8
20
15
10
5
0
Total GNF
16.9
17.6
All CZ MW stations
Prague I
16.5
16.5
Brno
Moravská Ostrava
Music by German composers
German-language talks
Czech-language pro-German/Nazi
GNF as % of total airtime
Germanization/Nazification Factor
Regarding the overall GNF then, Figure 7.6 indicates a considerable fall to just over
one-third of all airtime (35%). That is a significant decrease compared to the
previous year. However, virtually all of that decrease came at the expense of
German music broadcasts. Both of the other two factors of the GNF actually
increased, if albeit by very little. German-language talks grew by 1.4 percentage
points to an average of 14.7% of airtime across the network due to the activation of
Sender Böhmen-Brünn and Sender Böhmen-Mährisch Ostrau, which increasingly
developed German-language programming of their own after this point. Furthermore,
there was a very slight increase (by 0.3 percentage points to an average of 3.4% of
airtime) in Czech-language pro-German and pro-Nazi talks.
262
10. 1944 – The Station-Group at its Prime
By the beginning of 1944, the situation with Czech Radio had progressed to such an
extent that Thürmer felt confident enough to showcase the Station-Group in the
German professional radio press. Pegging the article to the fifth anniversary of the
establishment of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia on 15 March 1944,
Thürmer’s deputy, Horst Pabel, introduced the Station-Group in a lengthy essay for
the publication Welt-Rundfunk, which at this late stage of the war was no longer a
monthly but only a quarterly publication. After trivializing the existence of the First
Czechoslovak Republic as “only a short-term interruption of a millennium-old
tradition” brought about by thinking that was both “ahistorical and hostile to the
region,”748 Pabel defined the main goal of the Station-Group vis-à-vis the Czech
people as “to give it finally a firm position and connect it once and for all with the idea
of the Reich”.749 The three main difficulties on this path, according to Pabel, included
the fact that older Czechs, although they had mostly enjoyed a German education,
had also been raised with the destructive Catholic-Habsburg perspective on the
Reich i.e., the southern view of the formerly existing Prussian-Austrian dualism.
Younger Czechs, he pointed out disparagingly, had been raised with an entirely
foreign, Western-liberalistic perspective of the region, which had led to their
understanding of politics consisting of emotions lacking any actual basis in history or
Realpolitik.750 Finally, the task of educating this nation – as Pabel explained from a
pure, Nazi perspective – was complicated by the fact that the Czechs were not only
geographically most integrated into Central Europe, but also culturally and in terms
of their level of civilization most closely related to their German neighbors, with
748
749
750
In the original: “… nur eine kurzfristige Unterbrechung einer jahrtausendalten Tradition... als
Ergebnis geschichtslosen und raumfeindlichen Denkens.” PABEL, Horst: Der Rundfunk im
Protektorat Böhmen und Mähren, IN: Welt-Rundfunk, Internationale Zeitschrift für Rundfunk und
Fernsehen, volume VIII., edition 1-2 (January/March 1944), page 8.
In the original: “Ihm endlich einen festen Standort zu geben, es einmal für immer mit dem
Reichsgedanken zu verbinden, ist heute und die kommenden Jahre erste volkspolitische
Erziehungsaufgabe.” PABEL, Horst: Der Rundfunk im Protektorat Böhmen und Mähren, IN: WeltRundfunk, Internationale Zeitschrift für Rundfunk und Fernsehen, volume VIII., edition 1-2
(January/March 1944), page 9.
In the original: “Ihm endlich einen festen Standort zu geben, es einmal für immer mit dem
Reichsgedanken zu verbinden, ist heute und die kommenden Jahre erste volkspolitische
Erziehungsaufgabe.” PABEL, Horst: Der Rundfunk im Protektorat Böhmen und Mähren, IN: WeltRundfunk, Internationale Zeitschrift für Rundfunk und Fernsehen, volume VIII., edition 1-2
(January/March 1944), page 9.
263
whom they had also mixed biologically over the centuries.751 The unflinchingly
arrogant and racist assertion was that the Czechs were more like the Germans, i.e.,
more civilized, and consequently educating them was a more complex task than it
would be among the, by inference, less developed Slavic peoples.
Apart from these excursions into Nazi ideology, however, Pabel’s article focused
mainly on concrete reforms introduced to program content. Many of these, he felt,
were brought about by the concentration of decision-making in a German Intendant’s
hands. While the broadcasting corporation of the Republic had operated at the
mercy of numerous bureaucratic and ministerial offices – especially the Worker’s,
Agricultural and Economic radios as subdivisions of the old democratic parties – the
Station-Group with its Intendant at the head now determined what was broadcast
and what not.752
Overall, Pabel’s assessment of developments at the Station-Group is one of steady
growth in listener rates and the stabilization of the company’s program work. As he
saw it: “For Czech Radio the application of the German claim to leadership meant an
extraordinary stabilization of its circumstances.”753 Apart from his overtly ideological
assertions, the bulk of his description is borne out by fact, however. According to
official statistics, radio listener rates did continue to rise steadily for as long as
figures on the matter were published during the Protectorate and presumably
thereafter as well. As of 31 December 1944, there were 1,068,058 radio sets
officially registered on the territory of the Protectorate,754 which was just 60,000 short
of the total number for all of Czechoslovakia at the end of the First Republic.755
Regarding programming work specifically, Pabel explained the dual-language
program announcements, the various ratios of programs by type and emphasized
that of the roughly 21 hours of daily broadcasting, only four hours were dedicated to
751
752
753
754
755
PABEL, Horst: Der Rundfunk im Protektorat Böhmen und Mähren, IN: Welt-Rundfunk,
Internationale Zeitschrift für Rundfunk und Fernsehen, volume VIII., edition 1-2 (January/March
1944), page 9.
PABEL, Horst: Der Rundfunk im Protektorat Böhmen und Mähren, IN: Welt-Rundfunk,
Internationale Zeitschrift für Rundfunk und Fernsehen, volume VIII., edition 1-2 (January/March
1944), page 10.
In the original: “Für den tschechischen Rundfunk bedeutete bei völliger Wahrung der
tschechischen Kulturautonomie die Geltendmachung des deutschen Führungsanspruchs eine
außerordentlichen Stabilisierung seiner Verhältnisse.” PABEL, Horst: Der Rundfunk im
Protektorat Böhmen und Mähren, IN: Welt-Rundfunk, Internationale Zeitschrift für Rundfunk und
Fernsehen, volume VIII., edition 1-2 (January/March 1944), page 10.
JEŠUTOVÁ, Eva et al: Od mikrofonu, table II. Počet koncesionářů, page 613.
As we already know, Radiojournal had 1,128,055 subscribers on 30 September 1938. See:
Rozhlasová ročenka za období od 1. ledna 1938 do 15. března 1939, (Czechoslovak
“Broadcasting Yearbook for the Period of 1 January 1938 to 15 March 1939“), page 38.
264
German-language programming.756 He also published a visual breakdown of
program content across the week valid as of 1 January 1944, illustrating program
structure, as it was to remain throughout the end of the Protectorate. 757
Back at broadcast headquarters in Prague, the only major change in Czech Radio’s
structure at this time was the integration in February 1944 of the speakers from
ČTK’s Broadcasting Department, who had up until that point read the news directly
from a mini-studio at ČTK’s headquarters at Beethovenova, just off of Wenceslas
Square. Presumably, this move reflected Thürmer’s efforts to keep tight control on
the radio’s functioning as the political situation deteriorated from a Nazi perspective.
Obviously, having trained newsreaders in the building was a good move in this
regard. As Pabel noted, ČTK continued to write up the news bulletins, but then sent
them to Czech Radio via a special, subterranean vacuum tube postal system to
Czech Radio where Prague station staff read them on air.758
The chief among this new group of Czech Radio employees, with the title of
Chefsprecher – šéf hlasatelské služby (“chief announcer”) and the very attractive
wage of K 6,900, was another seemingly rabidly pro-Nazi activist by the name of
Bohumil Jaroš.759 Von Wolmar had been so certain of Jaroš’s dedication to the Nazi
cause that he even allowed Jaroš to produce his own commentaries on political
matters.760 From a political perspective, Pabel and Thürmer will most definitely have
been satisfied with their decision to employ Jaroš, although as it turned out, they had
made a potentially very dangerous error. In December of 1945, after seven months
in investigative detention by the Czechoslovak National Court, it was determined that
Jaroš had never been a Nazi collaborator at all. On the contrary, not only had he
hidden escapees from concentration camps in his own flat, but he had also waged
biological warfare against at least two of his German colleagues by poisoning their
756
757
758
759
760
PABEL, Horst: Der Rundfunk im Protektorat Böhmen und Mähren, IN: Welt-Rundfunk,
Internationale Zeitschrift für Rundfunk und Fernsehen, volume VIII., edition 1-2 (January/March
1944), page 5.
Graph titled: Der Rundfunk im Protektorat Böhmen und Mähren: Programmeinteilung vom 1.
Januar 1944. PABEL, Horst: Der Rundfunk im Protektorat Böhmen und Mähren, IN: WeltRundfunk, Internationale Zeitschrift für Rundfunk und Fernsehen, volume VIII., edition 1-2
(January/March 1944), page 11.
This vacuum tube postal system (in Czech “potrubní pošta”) opened for business in Prague
th
already in the late 19 century. Although inoperative since the floods of 2002, it still exists to this
day. Remnants of its machinery are displayed at the Post Office in Italská 3 in Prague 2 for
example. PABEL, Horst: Der Rundfunk im Protektorat Böhmen und Mähren, IN: Welt-Rundfunk,
Internationale Zeitschrift für Rundfunk und Fernsehen, volume VIII., edition 1-2 (January/March
1944), page 10.
AČRo, personnel file Jaroš.
AMV 301-34-2, page 98.
265
food with typhoid bacteria. He apparently even went so far as to deliver food parcels
to them in hospital contaminated with further bacteria that caused dysentery.761
Concrete Effects on Programming in the Period
Throughout 1944, the output of overtly political programming via Czech Radio
remained at similar levels with a comparable, regular schedule as developed in
1943. Judging from the incomplete and sketchy surviving materials on program
content,762 Kříž was eventually allowed to turn his attentions to the Soviet Union and
Bolshevism, especially after exiled President Beneš’s signing of an alliance
agreement with the Soviet Union in December 1943. At this point, for example, Kříž
produced a piece in cooperation with Neumann broadcast on 8 and 12 December
1943 with the title “Beneš’s trip to the USSR”.763 The topic of Soviet Russia received
a great deal of airtime also throughout the winter/spring of the year 1944 within the
framework of Kříž’s series Líc a rub.
An addition to the team in this period, as it were, was a specialist on all things Soviet
Union, who started a circa 10 to 15 minute, weekly political program about life there
with the title Über das Leben in der UdSSR (“About life in the USSR”). Little is known
about the author, whom Kříž identified as J.P. Gražděnko-Grinenko. In later
documetns, Kříž described him as the editor-in-chief of the newspaper Golos
Wolynie,764 but in that case, the name is listed as P.J. Grinenko-Jurijev.765 It would
appear that the person in question was one Jurij Grinenko (1912-1995), an editor-inchief – or “Hauptsrifleiter” as he indicated on his police registration card in imperfect
German – of Ukrainian nationality, who had moved to Prague from Zhitomir in
January of 1944 to escape the Soviet advance into the rapidly diminishing
Reichskommissariat Ukraine.766 Gražděnko and Jurijev were simply various
761
762
763
764
765
766
AČRo, personnel file Jaroš. Note to Dr. Remeš of 26 July 1947 concerning the trial of Bohumil
Jaroš at the National Court, signature illegible.
NA-NárS, carton 107, call number 60. Lists of political programming for the months April-MayJune 1944 and individual unnumbered lists of tapes for recycling.
NA-NárS, carton 107, call number 60. Individual unnumbered lists of tapes for recycling.
The State Archive of Zhitomir Oblast (Derzhavnyi arkhiv Zhytomyrs'koi oblasti) confirmed the
existence of the newspaper Golos Wolynie between 1941 and 1943 as well as the fact that
Grinenko was the responsible editor of the paper in an email to the author on 6 April 2011.
NA-NárS, carton 107, call number 60. NA-NárS, carton 107, call number 60. Note Kříž to Pabel
dated mistakenly as 1 November 1944, with excerpts from the most important political broadcasts
of October 1944.
Grinenko, whose police registration card also indicates that he was “Fhairatet” (i.e., verheiratet–
married), was drafted into the Wehrmacht on 19 March 1945. See: NA-PŘ Praha, police
registration card for Jurij Grinenko. According to his son, Alex Grinenko, he lived in Paris after the
266
pseudonyms he used, like Kříž himself frequently did.767 Grinenko’s contributions
started on 29 February 1944 with a broadcast that dealt with the question “What is
culture?”768 and progressed to a number of other topics about life in the Soviet
Union, such as “fathers and children” on 4 April 1944, “sport and sporting life” one
week later and “art as a weapon” one week after that.769 Undoubtedly, these
programs will have cast life in the Soviet Union in a negative light, while the use of
someone from the Soviet Union itself was intended to raise the credibility of the
broadcasts. Grinenko also contributed to a new series of short radio plays of the type
like Kdysi a dnes called Politische Bilder – Politické záběry (“Political snapshots”),
which launched in the spring of 1944 and to which Josef Opluštil also contributed
liberally. “Political Snapshots” ran on Wednesdays in the 20:45 to 21:00 evening time
slot.770 Grinenko’s play had the title Sowjetische Anekdoten – Sovětské anekdoty
(“Soviet anecdotes”).771 More editions of this series appeared in the autumn of 1944
as well.772
Kříž and his superiors also continued actively working current affairs into the political
production of Czech Radio. However, current affairs were definitely not functioning to
their advantage at this point. The Wehrmacht was on retreat on all fronts by the
summer of 1944, including on the long-awaited and newly opened Western front
after the Allied troop landings in Normandy, France on 6 June. Thürmer, Pabel and
their team greeted these events with a number of programs including a “Political
snapshot” piece by Neumann on Wednesday, 14 June 1944 about American soldiers
767
768
769
770
771
772
war and moved to the United States in 1959 where he worked as a mat maker and in the
restoration of artwork. An international genealogical site indicates that a person with the same
name, birthdate and city of origin Zhitomir died in Washington State, in the northwestern United
States
in
1995.
See:
www.familysearch.org/Eng/Search/IGI/individual_record.asp?recid=100264766415&lds=1&region
=5&regionfriendly=Continental+Europe&frompage=99 (March 2011). Alex Grinenko also
confirmed this information. Email from Alex M. Grinenko Sr. to the author of 19 March 2011.
For instance, Kříž used the pseudonym “František Kreuz” at times in his newspaper articles. In
English, Kříž and Kreuz both mean “cross” in Czech and German respectively. He also signed
some articles “afk”. Presumably, František was his baptismal name. See: NA-NárS, carton 107,
call number 62a with articles from various newspapers such as Svět.
NA-NárS, carton 107, call number 60. Note Kříž to Pabel dated 2 March 1944 with excerpts from
the most important political broadcasts of February 1944.
NA-NárS, carton 107, call number 60. Lists of political programming for the months April-MayJune 1944, pages 1-2.
NA-NárS, carton 107, call number 60. Lists of political programming for the months April-MayJune 1944, pages 1-7.
NA-NárS, carton 107, call number 60. Lists of political programming for the months April-MayJune 1944, page 5.
NA-NárS, carton 107, call number 60. Individual unnumbered lists of tapes for recycling.
267
ostensibly stealing artworks and trading in false French francs.773 Kříž added his
view of Franco-American relations in the Líc a rub series five days later, while
Opluštil created an entire radio play with the title Die Invasion des Optimismus –
Invase optimismu (“The invasion of optimism”) for the “Political snapshots” series,
which aired on Wednesday, 21 June 1944 between 20:45 and 20:58. As Kříž
explained to Pabel in undoubtedly ironic terms, the topic of the play was “the
whispered propaganda and the reality of the American blessing”. 774 Let us look now
at broadcast week No. 26 of 1944, the week starting Sunday, 25 June, to see the
structure of the overtly political programming:
Sunday:
K politické situaci – replaced by music.
Monday:
18:50-18:58, Líc a rub (Kříž) – the Lyttleton case775 and the U.S. public.
Tuesday:
18:01-18:26, “From the Diary of a Soviet Engineer – Moscow” (Wasilij
Kaschurow-Glebin. 19:15-19:20, K politické situaci (Max Karg).
Wednesday: 18:50-18:58,
Bericht
zur
Lage–Aktualita
(W.
Wild,
Wehrmachtpropaganda Office); 20:43-20:52, “Political snapshots”
Josef Opluštil’s radio play Ein Arbeitsjubiläum – Jubileum, (“A jubilee”;
according to Kříž about loyalty to work in the Protectorate versus in the
past).
Thursday:
19:17-19:22, K politické situaci (Max Karg).
Friday:
No political programming.
Saturday:
No political programming.
Further programming on current events included Wilhelm Neumann’s treatment of
the Slovak uprising, which aired on 13 September 1944 in the “Political snapshots”
series.776 Another item on “the current situation in Slovakia” was a commentary by
773
774
775
776
NA-NárS, carton 107, call number 60. Lists of political programming for the months April-MayJune 1944, page 6.
In the original: “die Flüsterpropaganda und die Wirklichkeit der amerikanischen Beglückung”. NANárS, carton 107, call number 60. Lists of political programming for the months April-May-June
1944, page 7.
Reference here is to Oliver Lyttelton, British Minister of Production 1942-45. Nazi propaganda
was trying to exploit a statement by Lyttelton at the time to depict Roosevelt as a warmonger, who
had systematically provoked America’s entry into the war, and the Protectorate’s press
reproduced this story. See for example: Další odhalení Rooseveltovy štváčské politiky (“Further
discovery of Roosevelt’s incendiary policy”), Národní Politika, volume LXII, edition 180 (2 July
1944), page 2.
NA-NárS, carton 107, call number 60. Individual unnumbered lists of tapes for recycling.
268
activist journalist Antonín J. Kožíšek that followed two weeks later on 28 September
between 19:15 and 19:22 in K politické situaci. 777 Shortly thereafter, on Tuesday, 3
October, Grinenko launched a ten-part weekly series dedicated to the Soviet Union
again, under the pithy and undoubtedly ironic title: Unter der Sonne der Stalin’schen
Konstitution – Pod sluncem stalinské konstituce (“Under the sun of Stalin’s
constitution”).778 It was a 15-minute program in the slot of Tuesdays from 18:00 to
18:15.
The Thürmer Era III – Analysis of the Program Week Starting 26 November
1944
Figure 8.1: Average duration of broadcast day in hours:minutes:seconds
Week starting 26 November 1944
All Czech (CZ) medium-wave (MW) stations = Prague I, Brno, Moravská Ostrava
All CZ MW stations
20:00:00
4:00:00
Prague I
19:30:00
4:30:00
Brno
19:30:00
4:30:00
Moravská Ostrava
21:00:00
Broadcast hours
3:00:00
Station breaks
Duration of Broadcast Day
At odd variance to the generally deteriorating political situation around the Great
German Reich in late 1944, Figure 8.1 illustrates a further increase in broadcast day
777
778
NA-NárS, carton 107, call number 60. NA-NárS, carton 107, call number 60. Note Kříž to Pabel
dated mistakenly as 6 September, should read 6 October 1944, with excerpts from the most
important political broadcasts of September 1944.
Grinenko, whose police registration card also indicates that he was “Fhairatet” (i.e., verheiratet–
married), was drafted into the Wehrmacht on 19 March 1945. See: NA-PŘ Praha, police
registration card for Jurij Grinenko. An international genealogical site indicates that a person with
the same name, birthdate and city of origin Zhitomir died in Port Orchard, Washington, in the
northwestern
United
States
in
1995.
See:
www.familysearch.org/Eng/Search/IGI/individual_record.asp?recid=100264766415&lds=1&region
=5&regionfriendly=Continental+Europe&frompage=99 (March 2011).
269
to an average of 20:00:00 hours. The average is, however, deceiving in this
particular case, as there was no change in the format of broadcast day for Prague I
or Brno at all. The increase came with the addition of musical programming for
Moravská Ostrava, which replaced the morning station break between 08:00 and
09:45 on weekdays. Nevertheless, given that this increase can only have come
through the mobilization of further resources, including the electricity required to
broadcast the programs, it seems a remarkable development this late in the war.
Figure 8.2: Regionalization – stations of origin as a percentage of TOTAL AIRTIME
Week starting 26 November 1944,
All Czech (CZ) medium-wave (MW) stations = Prague I, Brno, Moravská Ostrava
All CZ MW stations
51
13
62
Prague I
Brno
10
16
48
Moravská Ostrava
0% 5%
13
43
10
%
15
%
20
%
12
14
25
%
30
%
35
%
40
%
45
%
50
%
8
19
55
%
60
%
65
%
70
%
75
%
3 11
19
11
19
4 11
19
4 11
19
80
%
85
%
90
%
95 100
% %
Prague I
Brno
Moravská Ostrava
Sender Böhmen-Melnik
Sender Böhmen-Brünn
Sender Böhmen-M. Ostrau
Reichsprogramm
Regionalization
Figure 8.2 shows a drop in the relative importance of Prague I’s programming in the
Moravian provinces to under half of those station’s airtime (48% for Brno and 43%
for Moravská Ostrava) and a corresponding increase in the importance of selfproduced programming for those stations, with Moravská Ostrava producing nearly
one program hour in five of its airtime (19%). However, most of this increase came
simply from the extra morning music broadcast Moravská Ostrava enjoyed, which
the others did not. In terms of German-language programs produced at the provincial
stations, the week analyzed included one 50-minute “German broadcast” originating
from Sender Böhmen-Mährisch Ostrau and re-broadcast on the Sender BöhmenBrünn on Tuesday afternoon between 14:10 and 15:00 hours. Sender BöhmenBrünn also placed some similar programming on Mährisch Ostrau. Prague I did not
270
re-broadcast any programs from Sender Böhmen-Mährisch Ostrau in the week
analyzed. It is likely, therefore, that Sender Böhmen-Melnik re-broadcast much or all
such programming from the provinces. However there is no way to determine that
given the lack of German program schedules for the period.
Figure 8.3: Programming structure -- subjects as a percentage of TOTAL AIRTIME
Week starting 26 November 1944,
All Czech (CZ) medium-wave (MW) stations = Prague I, Brno, Moravská Ostrava
All CZ MW stations
65
6
1 4 111
67
Prague I
Brno
6
62
Moravská Ostrava
6
1
65
0% 5% 10
%
15
%
Music
Youth/School
Women
Kameradschaftsdienst
20
%
25
%
30
%
6
35
%
40
%
45
%
50
%
55
%
Culture/Entertainment
Workers
News/Reports
German Program
60
%
65
%
11
1 4 111
5
111
11
11
1 4 111
70
%
75
%
1
80
%
1
1
10
85
%
5
5
1
90
%
5
3 1
5
11
5
1
4 1
95 100
% %
Farmers
Economics
Politics
Other
Programming Structure
Figure 8.3 shows that programming structure varied only very marginally from station
to station throughout Czech Radio’s network. Music remained at levels around twothirds of all airtime for an average of 65%. The other topics of broadcast were
basically stable as well, including overt political programming at just 1%.
271
Figure 8.4: Music by German composers as a percentage of TOTAL AIRTIME
Week starting 26 November 1944
All Czech (CZ) medium-wave (MW) stations = Prague I, Brno, Moravská Ostrava
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
11.6
12.1
11.8
11
All CZ MW stations
Prague I
Brno
Moravská Ostrava
Music by German composers
Music by German Composers
Figure 8.4 describes a general decline in German music as a percentage of airtime
to just under 12%. This finding is, however, somewhat problematic and the reader
needs to view it critically. The problem here is that with the stresses of the war on the
economy of the Great German Reich, including the Protectorate, paper became
increasingly scarce. Thus, Týden rozhlasu needed to reduce the number of pages in
which it printed. The consequence of that was that the radio program guide became
less explicit about pre-recorded commercial music from gramophone disks and
about light, entertaining music (zábavná hudba) broadcast live. Thus, the exact
quantity of German music in these segments of the program can no longer be
determined after this point. It is likely, given Czech Radio’s agreement with the music
industry that some of this programming will have included works by German
composers. However, given that Thürmer had reduced German music somewhat in
previous years, and given that non-political programming fell into the domain of a
Czech – Zdeněk Morávek – it is equally likely that much of this programming will
have been largely Czech. In any case, only identifiably German music is included in
the figure listed above.
272
Figure 8.5: Broadcast language as a percentage of ALL TALKS PROGRAMMING
Week starting 26 November 1944,
All Czech (CZ) medium-wave (MW) stations = Prague I, Brno, Moravská Ostrava
All CZ MW stations
59
41
65
Prague I
35
Brno
56
44
Moravská Ostrava
56
44
0% 5%
10
%
15
%
20
%
25
%
30
%
35
%
40
%
45
%
50
%
55
%
60
%
65
%
70
%
75
%
80
%
85
%
90
%
95 100
% %
Czech
Slovak
German
English
French
Italian
Romanian
Serbo-Croatian
Spanish
Ruthenian
Other
Broadcast Language
The languages of broadcast illustrated in Figure 8.5 remained mostly stable
compared to the previous period. The one noteworthy exception was the
discontinuation of Spanish-language newscasts via Prague I, which led to an
increase of Czech-language talks programming by seven percentage points (from
58% to 65%) over the previous review period.
273
Figure 8.6: Germanization/Nazification Factor (GNF) = as a percentage of TOTAL AIRTIME
Week starting 26 November 1944
All Czech (CZ) medium-wave (MW) stations = Prague I, Brno, Moravská Ostrava
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
30.3
4.8
4.3
3.8
4.3
14.4
11.4
11.6
12.2
All CZ MW stations
Prague I
16.4
15.3
11.8
11
Brno
Moravská Ostrava
15
10
5
0
Total GNF
Music by German composers
German-language talks
Czech-language pro-German/Nazi
GNF as % of total airtime
Germanization/Nazification Factor
Figure 8.6 shows a continuation in the drop of the GNF overall to just 30.3% of total
airtime. However, this is due entirely to the problematic drop in identifiable German
music in the radio program guides. While German-language talks diminished only
very marginally to 14.4% of airtime on average, a drop of 0.3%, Czech-language proGerman and pro-Nazi programming actually increased to an average of 4.3% of
airtime up from 3.4% the previous year. Thus, although Thürmer did do more to
make Czech Radio seem more Czech in general, he also intensified the political
work slightly in this phase. Grinenko’s series “Under the sun of Stalin’s constitution”
made up part of this political work in the week reviewed.
274
11. 1945 – The Station-Group’s Final Days
The final phase of the German occupation of Bohemia and Moravia was
accompanied by a considerable increase in the strategic importance of the StationGroup itself. With the Soviet Army deep into Poland in the summer of 1944 and the
Western Allies liberating France and parts of Belgium, not to mention the sustained
Allied bombing of Germany’s cities with its effects on communications, Bohemia and
Moravia came to be seen as relatively safe territory. While there were numerous
Allied air raids on targets within the Protectorate – the industrial city of Plzeň
experienced no fewer than 12 air raids or example779 – they tended to concentrate
on specific industrial, communications or military facilities important to the German
war effort, as opposed to the massive and indiscriminate carpet bombing that
German cities like Hamburg, Dresden, Cologne or Berlin sustained. Thus, the Nazi
leadership started moving some offices and archives to the Protectorate to protect
them. For example, already at the end of July 1943, more than 6,000 prisoners were
displaced from barracks in the Theresienstadt Ghetto to make way for the archives
of Himmler’s Reichssicherheitshauptamt.780 This trend continued throughout 1944 as
well.
Given the strategic importance of radio stations, there was also considerable
physical damage to RRG property and facilities. Firebombs badly damaged the
Reichssender Köln (Cologne) already as early as June 1943. The Reichssender
Frankfurt’s subsidiary station at Kassel was destroyed in an air raid on 22 October of
the same year, while part of the Haus des Rundfunks in Berlin was hit in an air raid
in late November 1943. In July of 1944, the Reichssender Stuttgart was bombed and
burned to the ground. The Reichssender Frankfurt itself, originally intended to
replace Berlin as the Reichsrundfunk’s main emergency headquarters, was
damaged in air raids in March and then completely obliterated by bombs in
September 1944, although staff managed to move broadcasting to emergency
facilities at Bad Nauheim. How very different the situation was in the Protectorate is
perhaps best illustrated by the fact that 0.5 kW station at Plzeň started regular re779
780
GEBHART, KUKLÍK: Velké dějiny XV.b., page 510.
Some of the displaced prisoners were subsequently deported to Auschwitz-Birkenau in Poland
and exterminated. After a hiatus in deportations of some seven months, Transports Dl and Dm
departed Terezín on 6 September 1943 carrying 5,007 prisoners. See: BLODIG, Vojtěch,
Anmerkungen zu Maurice Rossels Bericht, IN: Theresienstädter Studien und Dokumente 1996,
footnote 13, page 303.
275
broadcasting of Prague’s programming in December 1944.781 Furthermore,
according to Thürmer, preparations were underway to launch a station at České
Budějovice in southern Bohemia,782 which insurgents did eventually take over and
start using on 5 May 1945.783 At the same time a station at Jihlava had also
progressed so far that it was possible to launch regular transmissions from it as of 21
May 1945.784
Apart from Allied military action, the Reichsrundfunk’s subsidiaries soon faced their
greatest danger from retreating German troops. On 31 January 1945, the
Reichssender Königsberg’s main transmitter, located near Heilsberg in East
Prussia,785 fell victim to an explosives demolition team of the Wehrmacht and
Reichspost. The Reichssender Breslau suffered the same fate on 7 February, while
in the West the subsidiary station at Trier was blown up on 26 February 1945.786 On
19 March 1945, Hitler eventually even expressly ordered the destruction of all
communications facilities, likely to fall into Allied hands.787
It was during the fighting around Breslau (now Wrocław, Poland) however, that the
war first intruded most palpably into the work of Czech Radio. With the Soviet Army
approaching Breslau in January 1945, former Überleitungskommissar Fricke decided
to flee for Prague. His decision was apparently born out of sheer panic and came
rather precipitously on 21 January 1945, which was nearly three weeks before the
main evacuation of the city’s non-combatants and nearly a month prior to the final
Soviet encirclement of the city. For this reason, Fricke and two of his colleagues
were arrested and sentenced to death for prematurely abandoning their posts.788
The sentence was later commuted on the proviso that Fricke take up service in the
SS penal battalion Dirlewanger. Faced with that also unappealing option, Fricke
instead shot himself on 21 March 1945 in an antechamber used by Thürmer’s
781
782
783
784
785
786
787
788
See: Týden rozhlasu, volume XI., edition 50, (10 December 1944).
THÜRMER: Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, page 1.
JEŠUTOVÁ, Eva et al: Od mikrofonu, page 507.
JEŠUTOVÁ, Eva et al: Od mikrofonu, page 596.
Since 1945, Lidzbark Warminski in Poland.
DILLER: Rundfunkpolitik, pages 434-437.
DILLER: Rundfunkpolitik, pages 437.
GLEISS, Horst G.W.: Breslauer Apokalypse 1945, volumes 3, page 654; volume 7, page 273;
volume 8, page 681 and volume 9, page 456.
276
secretaries at Czech Radio headquarters.789 Thürmer described this event without
sentiment as both “embarrassing and tasteless”.790
Thürmer soon had considerably more worrisome situations to deal with than the
cowardice of the former Überleitungskommissar, however. He claims that the
increasingly desperate situation of the Reich and the Protectorate led to conflicts
between Karl Hermann Frank, on the one hand, and the Wehrmacht leadership on
the other, which resulted in Thürmer receiving often contradictory orders from these
two camps. Whether Field Marshal Ferdinand Schörner actually threatened to have
Thürmer shot for treason after announcing that Prague had been declared an open
city, or whether this was simply post-war image polishing on Thürmer’s part, is not
clear from the existing documentation, except from the pen of Ferdinand Thürmer.791
By late April 1945, the Soviet Army reached both Moravská Ostrava and Brno
effectively removing them from the Station-Group. Undoubtedly preparing for any
eventuality, Thürmer had reactivated an old station located in the eastern Prague city
district of Strašnice, which joined the otherwise shrinking network again as PragStadt – Praha-Město (“Prague-City”) and re-broadcast the program of Prague I.792
Otherwise, the occupation continued in Prague in the same way as it had in the
previous six years right up until the beginning of May. The radio program weekly
Týden rozhlasu even appeared in a final occupation-era edition with a black-framed
portrait of Hitler on the cover, who had committed suicide in Berlin on 30 April, with
program schedules intended to cover the broadcast week of 6 to 12 May 1945.793
That week’s programming was never to materialize in the pre-conceived form,
however. On Friday, 4 May, Thürmer called up more military guards for Czech Radio
headquarters to protect it from sabotage and ordered the Czech staff to leave the
building. Nevertheless, at least announcer Zdeněk Mančal remained inside radio
headquarters, where on Saturday, 5 May 1945, he started the 06:00 o’clock
newscast with a strange mix of Czech and German, namely: “Je sechs hodin”, and
789
790
791
792
793
THÜRMER: Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, page 29. See also: GLEISS, Horst G.W., Breslauer
Apokalypse 1945, volumes 3, page 654; volume 7, page 273; volume 8, page 681 and volume 9,
page 456.
In the original: “Während der Kämpfe um Breslau kam es zu einem peinlichen und
geschmacklosen Zwischenfall...” THÜRMER: Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, page 29. See also:
GLEISS, Horst G.W., Breslauer Apokalypse 1945, volumes 3, page 654; volume 7, page 273;
volume 8, page 681 and volume 9, page 456.
THÜRMER: Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, page 29.
Týden rozhlasu, volume XII, edition 14, (31 March 1945), page 3.
See: Týden rozhlasu, volume XII, edition 19, (5 May 1945).
277
continued broadcasting thereafter only in Czech.794 This was meant as a signal for
the beginning of the Prague Uprising. Given that the Czechs had also managed to
remove much of the German-language signage for the various rooms of the building,
the Germans, including a further 60 armed soldiers, found it impossible to find their
way around the building and/or stop Mančal.795 Around noon, the Czechoslovak and
American flags were raised on the building. At 12:32, a group of Czech policemen
managed to break into the Radio headquarters and fighting broke out between them
and the armed German units. At 12:33, Mančal made his first call for people to come
to the aid of Czech Radio: “We call on the Czech police, Czech gendarmes, the
government troops to help Czech Radio!” 796 The effect was massive. Hundreds of
citizens started to infiltrate into the building by way of back entrances and even over
the roofs of neighboring buildings. By 18:00 hours, the building was entirely in Czech
hands, Intendant Ferdinand Thürmer as well as the collaborators Alois Kříž and
Karel Werner were in police custody. In the case of Kříž, the police had, in fact, had
to save him from lynching by an angry crowd. Revolutionary Czech Radio continued
broadcasting a mix of music and strategic instructions received from the Czech
National Council,797 which was coordinating the uprising against the occupiers.
The battle for control of broadcasting in the rapidly disintegrating Protectorate was
not finished with this, however. First of all, there was the most problematic fact that,
while the studios at broadcast headquarters were in Czech hands, Nazi soldiers still
held the broadcast towers of Prague I - Liblice, Mělník and Poděbrady. Having
noticed the unusual program, the German guards apparently disconnected Liblice
from the studios in Prague-Vinohrady. For their part, the Czechs managed to take
control of the transmission tower at Prague-Strašnice (Praha-Město), which started
broadcasting the program from Czech Radio headquarters on the legendary 415.5
meter wave as of 15:30 and continued doing so through the end of the uprising. After
taking control of the International Telephone Exchange building in Fibichova Street,
the revolutionaries were also able switch Mělník from the Sender Böhmen’s
794
795
796
797
Literally, in Czech: “je” = “it is”, in German: “sechs” = “six” and in Czech again “hodin” = “o’clock”.
HRDLIČKA: Rozhlas v okupaci, page 176.
In the original: “Voláme českou policii, české četnictvo, vládní vojsko na pomoc Českému
rozhlasu!” HRDLIČKA: Rozhlas v okupaci, page 176.
The coordination center for the domestic uprising in Prague called the Czech National Council,
should not be confused with the Fascist-run organization of the same name, which existed around
Gajda in the Parliament building immediately after the German invasion.
278
programming to that of the uprising for some time.798 On 6 May, fighting intensified
around radio headquarters and culminated in an aerial bombardment of the building.
For this reason, staff moved to provisional headquarters at Prague-Strašnice.
However, this building also came under attack, and Czech Radio staff moved again
to the Husův sbor building in Prague-Vinohrady. On 8 May, the revolutionaries
managed to connect Prague I – Liblice, Mělník and Poděbrady to the provisional
radio headquarters, while the main building remained under heavy attack and
sustained extensive damage. It was only at 18:55 in the evening of 9 May 1945 after
Soviet troops liberated the city that the revolutionary radio service ended its
broadcasts. At 19:00 hours, Otakar Matoušek, whom Thürmer had dismissed three
years earlier, opened the first broadcast of the renewed Czechoslovak Radio with a
greeting to President Edvard Beneš, his government and the people of the Republic.
A reading of Jana Neruda’s poetry and a performance of Smetana’s Bartered Bride
followed.799 The Nazi occupation and the German claim to lead Bohemia and
Moravia were finished. Thürmer and much of his staff were either in custody or on
the run. More than six years of attempts to subdue and Germanize the Czechs had
failed utterly. Some of its facilities lay in ruins, but essentially Czech Radio had
survived the Second World War intact and was ready to relaunch activity as part of
Československý rozhlas – Czechoslovak Radio.
Concrete Effects on Programming in the Period
Located at the heart of the Reich as it was and on relatively safe territory compared
to German cities, the Station-Group grew in importance for the Reichsrundfunk in
general. With the theaters of war on the eastern and western fronts drawing ever
closer geographically, and the damage to the German radio network and the
Reichspost’s communications systems, the Reichsrundfunk’s activities became more
and more difficult to maintain, and this led to responsibility for the organization of
reporting from the front ultimately being transferred to the Station-Group in
Prague.800
In terms of Czech Radio’s programming, the main effect in this end phase of the
Nazi occupation was that overt political propaganda went into a state of decline. With
798
799
800
HRDLIČKA: Rozhlas v okupaci, page 177.
HRDLIČKA: Rozhlas v okupaci, page 178.
THÜRMER: Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, pages 28-29.
279
the Reich falling to pieces, there was less and less about which Goebbels, Kříž or
even Moravec could boast in general. Nevertheless, in his radio address to the
population marking the anniversary of the founding of the Protectorate on 15 March
1945, Moravec summarized the many good moments of the preceding six years
under German occupation, as he saw them. One of the main benefits, he identified
was the fact that the Germans had managed to eliminate the evil influences of Jewry
– especially in Prague where one out of every ten residents had been Jews, as he
exaggerated – and after the Czechs had failed “to make order” in this regard
themselves.801 Moravec’s final radio address, for which a recording exists in the
Czech Radio Archives, was intended for Hitler’s birthday on 20 April 1945, but was
recorded oddly a full three weeks earlier on 31 March 1945.802 Perhaps, even
Moravec was so uncertain at that point in the war, as to whether he would be alive to
broadcast, that he thought it better not to wait. It is a longish, rambling speech of 13
minutes duration, in which Moravec stressed that the Protectorate’s government had
worked quietly for the good of the Czech nation throughout, and that they had largely
been successful in that regard. As he put it: “We have practically ridden out this war
like in a featherbed.”803 In other words, the Czech provinces had been virtually
unaffected by the violence of war in his opinion. It is doubtful that anyone who
remembered Lidice or Ležáky destroyed in 1942, or the residents of Ploština, Prlov,
Leskovice or Konětopy, who were to suffer a similar fate in the end phase of the
war,804 or the relatives of the tens of thousands of Czech workers doing long-term
forced labor in the Reich or interned in concentration camps would have been
inclined to accept Moravec’s appraisal of the situation.
Under the circumstances, a great deal of radio propaganda at this point concentrated
on the ostensibly negative aspects of life under Soviet or Western-Allied occupation,
which the official line attempted to paint in ever more drastic tones. In the same
speech, Moravec returned to his theme that Beneš had abandoned the country to its
fate at Munich – which he suddenly referred to again by the Czech name for the city,
“Mnichov”, instead of “München” – and that he now expected Beneš to play the
country into the hands of the Soviets. Proof of that, as Moravec saw it, was the fact
that the Beneš’s Government in Exile had agreed to hand over the pre-war
801
802
803
804
AČRo, recording AF00295/2.
AČRo, recording AF07873/5.
In the original: “My jsme tuto válku bezmála přečkali jako v peřince.” AČRo, recording AF07873/5.
GEBHART, KUKLÍK: Velké dějiny XV.b., page 570.
280
Czechoslovak province of Sub-Carpathian Russia to the Soviet Union. Furthermore,
nothing, not even the tangible proximity of Allied troops on the borders and in part
even on the territory of the Protectorate, could change the correctness of State
President Hácha’s decision of 15 March 1939 nor the existence of a common CzechGerman position (“společný česko-německý postoj”).805 The problem was for
Moravec that, at this point in time, a common Czech-German position existed solely
in the minds of people like Kříž and himself.
Otherwise, business continued as usual. The Nazi system was in severe crisis, and
there was no room or presumably any resources either for experimentation at this
point in time. In fact, the overall plan for the broadcast week Thürmer and Pabel had
presented in 1944 remained in effect through to the very end of the Protectorate
itself. For instance, the listeners’ greetings program for Czech workers in the Reich,
Pozdravy českým dělníkům v Říši, was scheduled to air on 7 May 1945.806 For his
part, Kříž continued broadcasting his Líc a rub series with the last documented
edition airing on Monday, 30 April 1945, the day that Hitler shot himself in his bunker
in Berlin. In it, Kříž emphasized that he had meant his collaboration with the
Germans honestly, as National Socialism was based on a combination of the two
grand principles of nationalism and socialism. Furthermore, he had considered it his
duty to help spare the Czech nation material and human damage by promoting
collaboration with the Nazis. As far as Kříž was concerned, he had a clear
conscience.807
Kříž’s last documented broadcast aired as late as 3 May 1945 between 19:20 and
19:25 hours, in the series K politické situaci. 808 To illustrate the extent of his loyalty
to the Nazi cause, the reader need only imagine that, at the time of the broadcast,
the outbreak of the Prague Uprising was less than 36 hours away. In the program,
Kříž reacted to an anonymous leaflet he claimed to have found accidentally, which
called on Czech workers to rise up and disarm the German occupiers. An important
slogan in the leaflet took the call a step further: “Death to the German occupiers!” 809
Apart from the Germans, the authors of the leaflet also had Czech collaborators in
805
806
807
808
809
AČRo, recording AF07873/5.
See the final edition of Týden rozhlas printed during the occupation: Týden rozhlas, volume XII.,
edition 19, (5 May 1945).
NA-NárS, carton 106, call number 1531, page 228. Indictment of Alois Kříž.
NA-NárS, carton 108, call number 65. Text of K politické situaci of 3 May 1945.
In the original: “Zatkněte české pomahače nacistických vrahů!… Smrt německým okupantům!”.
NA-NárS, carton 108, call number 65. Text of K politické situaci of 3 May 1945, page 1.
281
mind, as they exhorted the reader to “Arrest the Czech helpers of the Nazi
murderers!” Clearly Kříž, being a highly exposed helper of the Nazis himself, had a
personal interest in avoiding the fulfillment this latter call. His argumentation against
such actions was that it was a call to the passions of the mob, which could lead to
the destruction of Czech property and also to the lynching of innocent people, who
were actually “patriots”, as thieving partisans had ostensibly done with the mayor of
a village in Moravia. To make that latter point, he quoted a letter he had ostensibly
received from a resident of a neighboring town. Furthermore, Kříž pointed out that
the German soldiers in Prague were armed and not likely to risk their lives by
surrendering to the, by contrast, unarmed Czech civilians in any case. The
conclusion of the five-minute lecture was a call for the listener to decide whether it
was just to follow the dangerous calls of anonymous “liberators” to kill the German
occupiers and their Czech helpers, or rather to trust the advice of those who “openly
express their opinions”, and who ostensibly “love the Czech homeland and the
Czech nation above all else.”810 Ironically, after nearly four years of trying to dictate
what the listener was supposed to think on any given subject, Kříž apparently
thought the time had come to return to the democratic right to freedom of opinion in
this particular matter. Ultimately, public opinion did not decide as Kříž would have
wished. Within 48 hours of this broadcast, revolutionaries were to lead him away
from Czech Radio headquarters battered, barefoot and bleeding.811
The Thürmer Era IV – Analysis of the Program Week Starting 25 February 1945
Given the temporal proximity of this broadcast week, coming just three months after
the previous week analyzed, it is not surprising that most aspects of programming
content, duration etc. remained completely stable.
810
811
In the original: “Protože projevujeme svoje názory otevřeně a neanonymně, protože českou
domovinu a český národ nade všechno milujeme–proto rozšířujé ‘osvoboditelé’ letáky, ve kterých
provolávají smrt nejen ‘německým okupantům’ nýbž i nám ‘jejich českým pomahačům’–jak oni
lžou!”. NA-NárS, carton 108, call number 65. Text of K politické situaci of 3 May 1945, page 3.
NA-NárS, carton 114, call number 269. Photos of insurgents and Kříž.
282
Figure 9.1: Average duration of broadcast day in hours:minutes:seconds
Week starting 25 February 1945
All Czech (CZ) medium-wave (MW) stations = Prague I/Plzeň, Brno, Moravská Ostrava, Plzeň
All CZ MW stations
19:30:00
4:30:00
Prague I/Plzeň
19:30:00
4:30:00
Brno
19:30:00
4:30:00
Moravská Ostrava
19:30:00
4:30:00
Broadcast hours
Station breaks
Duration of Broadcast Day
Figure 9.1 shows a return to the pattern of broadcast day more common throughout
the Thürmer era, namely with an average duration of 19.5 hours for all stations.
Again, this corresponded to 19 hours and 15 minutes on weekdays and 21
uninterrupted hours on Sundays.
Figure 9.2: Regionalization – stations of origin as a percentage of TOTAL AIRTIME
Week starting 25 February 1945,
All Czech (CZ) medium-wave (MW) stations = Prague I/Plzeň, Brno, Moravská Ostrava, Plzeň
All CZ MW stations
55
12
62
Prague I/Plzeň
Brno
48
14
Moravská Ostrava
48
14
0% 5%
10
%
15
%
20
%
25
%
30
%
35
%
40
%
45
%
50
%
55
%
8
21
9
6
21
21
10
5
21
21
4 11
21
11
60
%
3 11
65
%
70
%
75
%
80
%
85
%
90
%
95 100
% %
Praha I
Brno
Moravská Ostrava
Sender Böhmen-Melnik
Sender Böhmen-Brünn
Sender Böhmen-M. Ostrau
Reichsprogramm
283
Regionalization
Regarding regionalization, Figure 9.2 demonstrates a return also to levels prior to
Moravská Ostrava’s extra morning music programming, while re-broadcasts from
Germany’s rapidly declining station network remained around one-quarter of all
airtime.
Figure 9.3: Programming structure -- subjects as a percentage of TOTAL AIRTIME
Week starting 25 February 1945,
All Czech (CZ) medium-wave (MW) stations = Prague I/Plzeň, Brno, Moravská Ostrava, Plzeň
All CZ MW stations
66
68
Praha I/Plzeň
Brno
64
Moravská Ostrava
64
0% 5% 10
%
6
15
%
Music
Youth/School
Women
Kameradschaftsdienst
20
%
25
%
30
%
6
40
%
45
%
50
%
55
%
Culture/Entertainment
Workers
News/Reports
German Program
284
60
%
65
%
1
11
1 4 111
6
6
35
%
1 4 111
5
1
11
5
1
3 1
5
11
111
11
1
5
5
1
1 4 111
11
1
5
5
1
70
%
75
%
80
%
Farmers
Economics
Politics
Other
85
%
90
%
95 100
% %
Programming Structure
Programming structure remained stable in this period as well, with roughly two-thirds
of airtime dedicated to music (66% on average across the network). The patterns for
“German broadcasts” and Kameradschaftsdienst programming also remained
consistent.
Figure 9.4: Music by German composers as a percentage of TOTAL AIRTIME
Week starting 25 February 1945
All Czech (CZ) medium-wave (MW) stations = Prague I/Plzeň, Brno, Moravská Ostrava, Plzeň
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
13.1
13.3
12.9
12.9
All CZ MW stations
Prague I/Plzeň
Brno
Moravská Ostrava
Music by German composers
Music by German Composers
Levels of identifiable German music rose slightly (by 1.5 percentage points) vis-à-vis
the week analyzed from November 1944 to 13.1%
285
Figure 9.5: Broadcast language as a percentage of ALL TALKS PROGRAMMING
Week starting 25 February 1945,
All Czech (CZ) medium-wave (MW) stations = Prague I/Plzeň, Brno, Moravská Ostrava, Plzeň
All CZ MW stations
60
40
65
Prague I/Plzeň
35
Brno
56
44
Moravská Ostrava
56
44
0% 5%
10
%
15
%
20
%
25
%
30
%
35
%
40
%
45
%
50
%
55
%
60
%
65
%
70
%
75
%
80
%
85
%
90
%
95 100
% %
Czech
Slovak
German
English
French
Italian
Romanian
Serbo-Croatian
Spanish
Ruthenian
Other
Broadcast Language
The Czech/German ratios in talks programming remained nearly identical to the
previous period at 60% Czech- to 40% German-language broadcasts with slightly
higher rates for the stations in Moravia.
Figure 9.6: Germanization/Nazification Factor (GNF) = as a percentage of TOTAL AIRTIME
Week starting 25 February 1945
All Czech (CZ) medium-wave (MW) stations = Prague I/Plzeň, Brno, Moravská Ostrava, Plzeň
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
29.6
2.8
2.8
2.8
2.8
13.7
11.4
15.9
15.9
13.1
13.3
12.9
12.9
All CZ MW stations
Prague I/Plzeň
Brno
Moravská Ostrava
15
10
5
0
Total GNF
Music by German composers
German-language talks
Czech-language pro-German/Nazi
GNF as % of total airtime
286
Germanization/Nazification Factor
Figure 9.6 shows that the GNF continued to fall, to 29.6% of airtime, thereby
reaching levels last seen at the end of 1941 at the start of the interregnum period.
Most of the decline came from a reduction in Czech-language pro-German/pro-Nazi
propaganda to just 2.8% of airtime on average. Concretely, this meant a Líc a rub
program on Monday evening, three broadcasts of K politické situaci and three
reportage broadcasts of Doba-Práce-Údalosti. There is no evidence of other series
such as “Under the sun of Stalin’s constitution” or the like in the week reviewed.
Presumably, manpower and other resources were simply lacking at this late point in
the war. According to his police registration form for example, Grinenko was drafted
into the Wehrmacht on 19 March 1945.812
812
NA-PŘ Praha, police registration card for Jurij Grinenko.
287
12. Anti-Semitic Broadcasts813
It would be a considerable understatement to maintain that the term “anti-Semitic
broadcasts” covers a large scope of material. As the Holocaust – the mass genocide
perpetrated against the Jewish people under Nazi occupation – so tragically
demonstrated, anti-Semitism was a crucial, one might even say one of the main, and
badly perverted “core values” of Nazi ideology. In short, hatred of the Jews and all
things Jewish functioned as a central topic for the Nazis and their ideology and
secondarily as the justification of repressive measures against the Jews, such as the
“Aryanization” or theft of their property. The sheer volume and range of anti-Semitic
sentiments Nazi officials and propagandists expressed during the existence of the
regime and the corresponding potential for the inclusion of anti-Semitic opinions,
images and motifs in media productions made anti-Semitism a key component of the
Nazi message to the world at the time. In essence, the enemy image of “the Jew” in
all of its varying guises – ranging the entire political spectrum from Communist
commissar on the left to capitalist plutocrat on the right; Orthodox believer to
Christian convert or atheist; whether a beggar, farmer, employee, shopkeeper,
physician, journalist or academician; male or female; infant or pensioner; war hero or
pacifist – in whatever form he or she existed, for the Nazis, “the Jew” was the enemy
and the original source of all the woes of the world. When they did not agree with
Nazi policy or ideology, the regime even branded Gentiles as “White Jews” or “Jew
lovers” to vilify and in many cases justify their liquidation. As Goebbels put it himself
in mid-November 1941: “In this historic conflict, every Jew is our enemy, whether he
is vegetating in a Polish ghetto or still eking out his parasitical existence in Berlin or
Hamburg, or blowing the trumpet of war in New York or Washington. By virtue of
their birth and race, all Jews belong to an international conspiracy against the
National Socialist Germany.” 814
813
814
For an exhaustive review of the series “What do you know about the Jews?” and “What do you
know about the Jews and Free Masons?” see: PINARD, Peter Richard: Alois Kříž und die
Rundfunksendereihe “Co víte o Židech a zednářích?”–(Was wissen Sie von den Juden und
Freimaurern?), IN: Theresienstädter Studien und Dokumente 2005, Institut Theresienstädter
Initiative (Hg.), Sefer, Praha 2005, S. 213–263; or PINARD, Peter Richard: Alois Kříž a cyklus
rozhlasových relací “Co víte o Židech a zednářích?“, IN: Terezínské studie a dokumenty 2005,
Institut Terezínské Iniciativy (Ed.), Sefer, Praha 2005, s. 193-245. Further: PINARD, Peter
Richard: Master’s thesis (Diplomová práce), Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University,
Prague, 2006.
In the original: “In dieser geschichtlichen Auseinandersetzung ist jeder Jude unser Feind,
gleichgültig, ob er in einem polnischen Ghetto vegetiert oder in Berlin oder in Hamburg noch sein
parasitäres Dasein fristet oder in New York oder Washington in die Kriegstrompete bläst. Alle
288
As the Second World War changed from a series of quick victories in the fashion of
the Blitzkrieg to a long-term struggle across thousands of kilometers of battle fronts,
Goebbels increasingly sought to blame the Jews for causing the war itself. In a logic
as twisted as it was self-serving, he endeavored to redefine the Anti-Hitler Coalition’s
refusal to allow Nazi Germany to implement its imperialist agenda in Europe as a
war of aggression that the Jewish enemy had somehow foisted upon the country.
Naturally, if he had succeeded in convincing the nation of this idea, it would have
been a great propaganda coup. For one thing, it would have formed a useful mental
channel among the population for all the grievances and unpleasant realities
connected with life in the midst of a major conflagration – from the daily shortages of
foods, goods and services to the deaths of loved ones on the front, and increasingly,
to their deaths and injuries during Allied air raids at home.
Given its universality, this enemy image of “the Jew”, and to a far less frequent
degree his “Aryan” counterpart the “White Jew”, had virtually universal potential for
application in the media and received a great deal of coverage in one form or other
during the existence of the Nazi regime. For the purposes of this study, we need only
concentrate on anti-Semitic radio broadcasts in Czech via the Protectorate’s station
network. That reduces the volume of material for review considerably. Nevertheless,
even with these filters in place, the amount of material to cover is extensive. As we
have already seen, Emanuel Moravec wove anti-Semitic thoughts and images into
his speeches from the very beginnings of his radio work in 1939 through to the very
end in 1945. As we will see in the other specialized chapters dedicated to the
political sketches and Worker’s Radio, anti-Semitism played a considerable role in
those areas as well. Even prior to the establishment of Kříž’s Political Lectures
Department in mid-1941, and apart from Emanuel Moravec’s and Georg Schneider’s
efforts, there are indications that anti-Semitic subjects may have started seeping into
Czech Radio’s programming in many forms. For example, a radio drama broadcast
on the evening of the Christian holiday of Good Friday, 11 April 1941 (via Brno
Juden gehören aufgrund ihrer Geburt und Rasse einer internationalen Verschwörung gegen das
nationalsozialistische Deutschland an.” GOEBBELS, Joseph: Das Eherne Herz, Reden und
Aufsätze aus den Jahren 1941/42 von Joseph Goebbels, (“The Iron Heart, Speeches and Essays
from the Years 1941/42 by Joseph Goebbels”), originally published by Zentralverlag der NSDAP,
Franz Eher Nachfolger, München, 1943, pages 85-86. Available online at Community Books
Open Source Internet Archive:
http://ia600400.us.archive.org/12/items/DasEherneHerz/GoebbelsJosephDasEherneHerz1942224S..pdf (April 2011). Hereinafter: GOEBBELS: Das Eherne Herz.
289
between 18:00 and 18:40 hours)815 with the title Jidáš (“Judas”) likely fell into that
category. Unfortunately, in the absence of a recording or of a printed text of the work,
only an educated guess on its content is possible. Authored by the Moravian writer
and artist Leopold Bena816 (1904-1978), who was later to have quite a political
career during the Communist era, this radio drama centered on Judas Iscariot, the
biblical character, who betrayed Jesus the Christ to the authorities in exchange for
payment. Perhaps in a typical National Socialist manner, the drama was sanitized of
directly religious content, for it did not include the character of Jesus himself,
although arguably precisely Jesus was the central figure in the events that led to the
Christian holiday of Good Friday. Instead, Bena seems to have concentrated on the
negative character of Judas Iscariot, whose name in a Christian context is
synonymous with low perfidy and treachery,817 while including other negative
individuals, such as the cynical Roman bureaucrat Pontius Pilate and “devils”. Thus,
although it is not possible to say with complete certainty that Bena’s drama was a
directly anti-Semitic broadcast, it does seem rather suspicious that, as radio
entertainment for the evening of the highest holiday in the Christian liturgical year,
the play concentrated not on Jesus’s sacrifice for mankind – a central theme of
Christianity – but on the perfidious Jewish character of Judas Iscariot. In brief, a
universal enemy image had universal applications in radio programming, as
elsewhere in the Nazi-dominated media world.
However, this chapter will deal with the only series dedicated specifically and solely
to the topic of the enemy image of “the Jew”. Continuing in weekday prime-time slots
on all Czech stations and also with the same basic structure as his anti-Soviet
series, Čech nemůže být bolševikem, (“A Czech cannot be a Bolshevik”), Kříž’s new
series started rather abruptly on 1 October 1941, so abruptly, in fact, that its
announcement apparently missed the deadline for publication in Týden rozhlasu, the
815
816
817
Týden rozhlas, volume VIII., edition 14, (6 to 12 April 1945).
Internet sources identify Leopold Bena as having been born at Orlová near to Moravská Ostrava
in 1904. He worked or several years in Slovakia, lectured in Budapest and taught at the Arts and
Crafts School of Uherské Hradiště starting in 1951. He served on the Krajský národní výbor Zlín–
the main political administrative body for Zlín District, worked as an ideological inspector
(osvětový inspektor) an author and illustrator, and died in Zlín in 1978. See:
www.slovacko.cz/osobnost/2/ (March 2011).
While no longer really socially acceptable in polite society today, the term “Judas”, in Czech:
“Jidáš”, would have been a common synomym for “traitor” in the 1930’ and 1940’s in German,
Czech and even in English. The German language includes the expression “Judaslohn” to
describe the wages of treachery; while Czech has the expression “jidášská zrada” for shameful
perfidy.
290
radio program guide for that week. However, “What do you know about the Jews?”
did receive a special edition dedicated solely to it and printed on red paper in
Rozhlasová korespondence,818 an information source for editors of the Protectorate’s
press. Numerous newspaper clippings in the Czech National Archives attest to the
fact that the Protectorate’s newspapers did, in fact, quote frequently from the
series.819
In order to understand the series “What do you know about the Jews?” properly, one
needs to put its launch into the context of the waves of terror sweeping over the
Protectorate already in the very first week after the arrival of acting Reichsprotektor
Reinhard Heydrich in Prague on 27 September 1941. From Heydrich’s perspective –
or at least according to the argument he had used to secure the posting as acting
Reichsprotektor – he had come to Prague to stamp out “a large-scale resistance
movement determined to stab Germany in the back by ‘sabotage, terrorist…
activities, destruction of the harvest [and] slowing down of work’”.820 That was
apparently the explanation for use by the SS and internal-Nazi power structures.
Externally or publicly, however, the myth had to be maintained that the Protectorate
was inhabited by dutiful citizens, who would happily go about their business in an
orderly fashion, were they only not disturbed by irresponsible elements from abroad
and at home. In this way, Heydrich set out to channel the apparent dissatisfaction
and consequent resistance among the Czechs, evident in the various acts of
sabotage and the Protectorate-wide newspaper boycott of late summer 1941, away
from the actual cause of the problem – the illegal Nazi occupation itself – and
818
819
820
Rozhlasová korespondence, volume IX. (1941), edtion 215, (1 October 1941). Rozhlasová
korespondence (“Broadcasting Correspondence”) was an informative newsletter that Czech
Radio published at the time on a nearly daily basis except Sundays and holidays. Intended to
cover sudden changes in programming that could no longer be announced in publications such as
Týden rozhlasu, Rozhlasová korespondence generally drew attention to important upcoming
broadcasts, while also providing quotations and sometimes background information on various
radio programs. The target group of Rozhlasová korespondence were the editorial staff of all the
main Protectorate newspapers, who frequently quoted programs verbatim in articles. In the
summer/autumn of 1941 an average edition of Rozhlasová korespondence generally included
one to two pages on upcoming programming and between one and three pages of quotes from
past broadcasts under the rubric Co řekli v rozhlase (“What did they say on the radio”). After the
start of the series “What do you know abou the Jews?” quotes from its various installments filled
whole editions of that rubric. In fact, the newsletter seems to have become a virtual printed
mouthpiece for Alois Kříž and his work. Starting in May 1942, the newsletter received the
bilingual, German-Czech title Rundfunkkorrespondenz-Rozhlasová korespondence, which was
either exaggeratedly servile, even by Protectorate language law standards, or intended to reflect
the German-Czech unity of the new Station-Group Bohemia-Moravia.
NA-NárS, carton 108, call numbers 70 and 71. Newspaper clippings.
MACDONALD, Callum: The Killing of SS Obergruppenführer Reinhard Heydrich, MacMillan
London, Ltd.–Papermac, London, 1993, page 109. Hereinafter: MACDONALD: Killing Heydrich.
291
towards politically more useful enemies: uncooperative old political elites, and the
Jews. Against this background, Heydrich declared martial law, had thousands
arrested and hundreds executed,821 including Czech Prime Minister General Alois
Eliáš, whom the notorious German Volksgerichtshof (“People’s Court”) sentenced to
death for “aiding and abetting the enemy and preparation of treason”822 already on 1
October 1941.823 Prague’s Mayor Otakar Klapka followed on 3 October 1941, and
the Protectorate’s press was ordered to make it front-page news.824 In order to
address an important source of dissatisfaction – food scarcity – the Prague-based
meat wholesaler Smrkovský received a death sentence for ostensibly inflating prices
and for sabotage, while Otakar Frankenberger, a department chief in the Ministry of
Agriculture involved in meat supplies, suffered the same fate after machinations
involving Jaroslav Mrkvička, whom we will also encounter again later.825 Von Wolmar
ordered the Protectorate press to deal with both of these cases extensively while
simultaneously identifying the culprits for food shortages among corrupt Czech
administrators. Clearly, sabotage by “the most irresponsible” Czech administrators in
the role of “parasites”826 was a more attractive message for the occupiers than
discussing the fact that Germany’s war effort was draining the economy of
resources. Von Wolmar even ordered the publication of articles attesting to public
satisfaction with Frankenberger’s arrest, “since he caused all the problems in
supplies”.827 Those were actions against the old Czech political elites in the
Protectorate.
As for the Jews, this general state of terror and upset played very well into the next
phase of persecution that Heydrich had planned for them: ghettoization. At the same
press meeting on 3 October 1941 at which he had instructed the press on how to
deal with Klapka, Frankenberger et al, Von Wolfram ordered the newspapers to
demand “with the greatest possible emphasis” the “evacuation” of Jews from all
821
822
823
824
825
826
827
BRANDES: Die Tschechen I., page 212.
NA-ÚŘP, IV P Tiskové zprávy 1941, carton 1152, Pressebericht der Abteilung Kulturpolitik des
Amtes des Reichsprotektors in Böhmen und Mähren, 2 October 1941, page 1.
The actual execution took place several months later, however. BRANDES: Die Tschechen I.,
page 214.
KONČELÍK, KÖPPLOVÁ, KRYŠPÍNOVÁ: Český tisk, page 433.
NA-ÚŘP, IV P Tiskové zprávy 1941, carton 1152, Pressebericht der Abteilung Kulturpolitik des
Amtes des Reichsprotektors in Böhmen und Mähren, 4 October 1941, page 2.
KONČELÍK, KÖPPLOVÁ, KRYŠPÍNOVÁ: Český tisk, pages 433-434.
KONČELÍK, KÖPPLOVÁ, KRYŠPÍNOVÁ: Český tisk, page 434.
292
cities of the Protectorate.828 Part of the effort to justify this policy was portraying the
Jews as the real culprits behind all of the problems in the country, a task which, for
example, activist journalist Karel Werner took up with great verve in Pondělní list829
and towards which Kříž’s new radio programming served so well. With the first in a
long series of mass deportations of the Protectorate’s Jewish population starting just
two weeks later, on 16 October 1941,830 it was also high time to start preparing the
Czech population to see their Jewish neighbors marched to collection centers and
deportation stations throughout the Protectorate and to disappear from their lives.
“What do you know about the Jews?” – the Technical Plan
Quite remarkable was the rapidity with which Kříž worked out a technical plan for the
series “What do you know about the Jews?” That fact that it was ready to launch
already on 1 October 1941, two full days prior to Von Wolmar’s press meeting on the
subject, suggests that Kříž must have been preparing an anti-Semitic series already
for some time. Unfortunately, it is impossible to know precisely from when. For
“psychological reasons,”831 as Kříž explained to his de jure Czech superiors, he
aimed for a multi-facetted approach to the subject matter. In order to avoid
information fatigue among listeners, he set the maximum length of the individual
installments at 15 to 20 minutes. Furthermore, Kříž rather cleverly envisioned
covering the heavier topics of a “documentary-educational” nature, i.e., the history of
the origins of the Jews and their distribution in the world etc., earlier in the week, on
Tuesday evenings, when workers were still relatively fresh from their free Sunday.
Farther along in the week on Thursdays, “interesting” and particularly “Czech”
subjects related to Jews were to air. Finally, for the close of the working week, on
Saturdays, Kříž reserved “popular”, i.e., lighter anti-Semitic fare apparently, for
interviews with people affected directly by the Jews or those who had themselves
“lived in a Jewish milieu and who had, therefore, been able to become acquainted at
828
829
830
831
KONČELÍK, KÖPPLOVÁ, KRYŠPÍNOVÁ: Český tisk, page 435.
Werner’s article led with a headline to the effect that “In the background of anti-state activity are
Jews”. See NA-ÚŘP, IV P Tiskové zprávy 1941, carton 1152, Pressebericht der Abteilung
Kulturpolitik des Amtes des Reichsprotektors in Böhmen und Mähren, 6 October 1941, page 11.
and KONČELÍK, KÖPPLOVÁ, KRYŠPÍNOVÁ: Český tisk, page 436, footnote 621.
Reference here is to Transport A, which carried 1,000 to the Litzmannstadt (Łódz) Ghetto in the
occupied Polish territories. ROTHKIRCHENOVÁ, Livie: Osud Židů v Čechách a na Moravě v
letech 1938-1945, IN: Osud Židů v Protektorátu 1939-1945, page 40.
NA-NárS, carton 106, call number 57. Personnel file of Alois Kříž, letter Kříž to Masařík vom 1.
Oktober 1941, appendix page 1.
293
close proximity to and through their own experience with the Jews’ characteristics,
interests and manner of acting, which arise from these [interests]”.832 In terms of
timing, the series ran in the best prime-time slot at 20:00 hours via all Protectorate
stations.833 Starting with 10 January 1942, the Saturday broadcasts even moved to
the earlier prime-time slot following the musical entertainment program K sobotnímu
oddechu po práci (“For a rest on Saturday after work”) starting around 16:25
hours.834
Product Delivery
For better or for worse, no recordings from this series apparently survived the war.
All that one has to work with are texts from Kříž’s book, quotations in Rozhlasová
korespondence and press clippings. The unfortunate aspect of working from printed
text only is that it eliminates an entire range of radiophonic clues – such as
background music, tone of voice and the like – which could help in evaluating the
individual programs. Regrettably, there are not even texts for all of the installments
broadcast. According to Kříž, 32 installments made up the first part of the series
dedicated solely to the Jews with the title “What do you know about the Jews?”.
Starting with the broadcast of 10 January 1942, the series expanded to cover Free
Masonry and received the new title “What do you know about the Jews and Free
Masons?”. This second part of the series included a further 42 installments, of which
25 dealt with Free Masonry and 17 included specifically anti-Jewish topics.835 In
total, the two halves of the series came to 74 installments, therefore.
Given that the time period from 1 October 1941 through to the final broadcast of the
series on 28 April 1942 would have allowed for 88 installments – i.e., two
installments per week from 1 to 23 October 1941 and three installments per week for
the remainder of the period – at least 14 potential installments must not have aired
as originally intended. Indeed, as Václav Jindřich Linhart, who was Kříž’s
subordinate at the time, later testified, the scripts that Kříž received from former
colleagues at the newspapers Vlajka or Arijský boj (“Aryan Struggle”), but also from
832
833
834
835
NA-NárS, carton 106, call number 57. Personnel file of Alois Kříž, letter Kříž to Masařík vom 1.
Oktober 1941, appendix pages 2-4.
Týden rozhlasu, volume VIII, edition 40, (4 October 1941), page 16.
Given the earlier onset of nightfall in the winter, the 16:25 hours start time was by no means a
downgrading for the series.
NA-NárS, carton 106, call number 57. Personnel file of Alois Kříž, report of work for the period
from 1 July 1941 to 30 April 1942, page 1.
294
a range of anti-Semitic doctors, lawyers, biologists, civil servants and in one case
even from a female “fashion and dance adviser”,836 were of such low quality that they
left Kříž scrambling to get the pieces onto the air at all. 837 Generally speaking, the
best-quality installments, i.e., in the sense that they at least exhibited some basic
logic of argumentation, came from leading activist journalists such as Kříž’s friend
Karel Werner,838 Antonín J. Kožíšek or Karel Korp.
In two of the 14 cases, we know that Kříž himself canceled their broadcast. The first
was a program by Karel Kut planned for Saturday, 6 December 1941 on the topic of
the “destructive Jewish humor”.839 This incident led directly to Kut’s dismissal from
Czech Radio,840 which suggests that Kut had dealt with the topic in a manner that
Kříž considered highly objectionable. Considering the theme of the intended
installment, presumably Kut had attempted to make a truly humorous program that
did not suit Kříž’s intentions. As for the second of these, investigators found a
manuscript in Kříž’s desk after the war for a broadcast by Karel Babka-Kasanda –
one of the founders of Štít národa (“Shield of the Nation”) newspaper, which later
became Arijský boj, the organ of the Anti-Jewish League. The manuscript bore the
title “Bloody Orgies of Jewish-Free Masonic Satanists”.841 Apparently, even by Kříž’s
standards, Babka-Kasanda’s ideas were too extreme or too vulgar to air.842 What
happened to the remaining twelve potential installments is not certain.
Of the 74 shows Kříž mentioned, at least limited documentation – and be it only the
title – exists for 70 of them, so that some indication of content is available for nearly
95% of the series. What we can say about product delivery in this case is that
virtually nothing of Kříž’s carefully conceived original plan came to fruition. His
original concept foresaw broadcasting equal quantities of three genres of programs,
i.e., “documentary-educational” items on Tuesdays, “interesting”, “Czech” subjects
on Thursdays and “popular”, lighter interviews on Saturdays. In reality, however, no
fewer than 51 of the 70 documented programs (or 73%) would fall into the heavier
classification of the “documentary-educational” genre. Roughly 17 installments (24%)
836
837
838
839
840
841
842
Rozhlasová korespondence, volume IX, edition 296.
NA-NárS, carton 106, call number 51. Testimony of Václav Linhart of 14 June 1946, page 1
NA-NárS, carton 106, call number 51. Testimony of the accused Karel Werner of 31 May 1946.
Rozhlasová korespondence, volume IX, edition 283.
AČRo, personnel file Kut.
In the original: Krvavé orgie židozednářských satanistů. See: AMV 301-59-3, page 165.
NA-NárS, carton 106, call number 51. Testimony of the accused Alois Kříž of 18 June 1946, page
13.
295
dealt primarily with subjects specifically related to Bohemia and Moravia, while only
two broadcasts (3%) fit the “popular”, lighter interview format with individuals, who
had in some way experienced the “Jewish milieu”.843 Furthermore, between 11 and
20 December at least two previously announced programs were suddenly postponed
or canceled, suggesting that Kříž ran into some serious problem with delivery around
that time.844
If we look at the series in terms of subject matter, we find that it breaks down into
nearly a dozen main concentrations, which one might term “strategies of libel”.
Subject
Number of
installments
Free Masons: the secret machinations of the Free
Masons and their connections to Jewry.
Religion: such as the Jews worshipping a
supposed God of revenge as opposed to the
Christian God of love; negative reinterpretations of
stories from the Old Testament, such as Abraham
engaging in wife-swapping with Pharaoh, etc.
Oppression of the Gentiles: ranging from Jews
starting the World Wars to abusing Gentile women.
Politics: Jewish influence on the First Republic and
the Czechoslovak Government in Exile, etc.
Liberal professions: Jews as ostensibly bad
doctors, lawyers, architects, etc.
Czechs: from why ancient Czechs hated the Jews
to famous historic Czechs’ ostensibly negative
opinions about the Jews.
Economics:
Jews
as
dishonest
bankers,
businessmen etc.
The Jews as the destroyers of national culture:
e.g., Jewish involvement with Bauhaus architecture
as opposed to baroque Bohemian farmhouses, etc.
Race: Jews as a mongrel/degenerate race.
Working class: Jews/Free Masons as oppressors
of the working class.
Other
12
Percentage of
documented
installments
(rounded to
full numbers)
17%
10
14%
8
11%
8
11%
7
10%
6
9%
6
9%
4
6%
4
2
6%
3%
3
5%
843
844
Antonín Jaromil Kožíšek’s program Poznal jsem Židy v bolševickém ráji (“I came to know the
Jews in the Bolshevik paradise”) on 15 November 1941 and an interview with the former
employee of a Jewish law office, Jaroslav Spaček, on 6 January 1942.
Rozhlasová korespondence–editions in the time period indicated.
296
Looking at the list of main subject categories, we can see that Kříž and his
colleagues concentrated most frequently on the subject of Free Masonry, its
practices and ceremonies. Naturally, several of these programs also drew ostensible
connections between leading members of the Czechoslovak Government in Exile
and Free Masonry. Jewish religion, especially negative reinterpretations of Old
Testament stories – some of them rather salacious in content, not to mention
blasphemous – was the second strongest element in the series. General oppression
of non-Jews with a wide range of claims – from starting the World Wars for financial
gain to inappropriate relations with “Aryan” women – was a strong element.
Naturally, Jews connected with the First Republic and its political class was very
important as an attempt to discredit the pre-occupation regime and the
Czechoslovak Government in Exile. If we take negative reporting on Jews in the
liberal professions and as businesspeople together, then they make up nearly 20%
of all content. Presumably this concentration was also an attempt at justifying the ongoing “Aryanization” of businesses in the Protectorate. Only 6% of all broadcasts
from the series actually dealt with the Jews as a race. That is relatively little
considering that one of the contributors to the series was Vladimír Teyrovský, a
zoologist from Brno University, who considered himself a “worker in the field of
“scientific racism”.845 Teyrovský only authored one of the identifiable installments in
the series.
If we now look at the series in terms of the authors of the various installments, we
find, not surprisingly, that a large part of them were either people affiliated with
Czech Fascist movements, employed by or contributing regularly to these
movements’ newspapers and/or activist journalists with other papers. The most
active of these people were identified in Končelík, Köpplová and Kryšpínova’s review
of Von Wolmar’s press meetings. 846 Dalibor Státník from the Archive of the Czech
Interior Ministry also contributed a great deal to identifying the contributors to this
series. Furthermore, Milan Nakonečný’s study on the Vlajka movement847 contains
information on several of them. However, a simple review of the newspapers Vlajka,
845
846
847
In the original: “pracovník v oboru vědeckého racismu”. See: Nástup Červenobílých , volume II,
edition 34, (24 August 1940), title page with photo.
KONČELÍK, KÖPPLOVÁ, KRYŠPÍNOVÁ: Český tisk pod vládou Wolfganga Wolframa von
Wolmara.
NAKONEČNÝ, Milan: Vlajka, K historii a ideologii českého nacionalismu, (“The Banner, On the
History and Ideology of Czech Nationalism”), Chvojkovo nakladatelství, Praha, 2001. Hereinafter:
NAKONEČNÝ: Vlajka.
297
Arijský boj or Nástup Červenobílých in the period, also revealed most of these
people contributing articles on a very frequent basis.
Author
Emil Šourek848
Mohamed
Abdallah
Brikcius849
František, Peiger850
František Šulc851
Karel Strejc852
Alois Svoboda853
Josef Hallman854
Institutional involvement
Vladislav Chmelař
Karel Loula855
Bruno Plch856
Emil Peřina, Senior 857
Oldřich Novotný 858
Jiří Lipanský859
Vlajka, editor-in-chief
Vlajka editor-in-chief for foreign political events
and convert to Islam
Vlajka, editor
Vlajka, editor
Vlajka, editor
Vlajka, editor
Vlajka, director of the newspaper’s rubric Česká
pracovní fronta (“Czech Labor Front”)
Vlajka, frequent contributor
Vlajka, organizer for Prague XVI
Vlajka, member/Vlajka, editor
Vlajka, member/Arijský boj, editorial staff
Vlajka, member and speaker
Vlajka, member
Otakar Polívka860
Oldřich Ducháč861
František Lelek862
Vlajka, member
Vlajka, administrator
Arijský boj, correspondent in České Budějovice
Karel
Babka- Arijský boj, founder
863
Kasanda
Jaroslava Tomášková Arijský boj,“fashion and dance adviser”
848
849
850
851
852
853
854
855
856
857
858
859
860
861
862
863
Number of
installments
authored
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
3
2
2
2
2
1
1
2
2
2
1
KONČELÍK, KÖPPLOVÁ, KRYŠPÍNOVÁ: Český tisk, page 248, footnote 371.
KONČELÍK, KÖPPLOVÁ, KRYŠPÍNOVÁ: Český tisk, page 394, footnote 549.
Peiger never tired of demanding ever more extreme persecution of the Jews and “White Jews”.
See: Zneškodnění i mišenců i bílých Židů. (“Disposing of mongrels and White Jews also”) Vlajka,
volume XI, edition 38, page 3 or Koho se ještě zbavíme? (“Whom else can we get rid of?”) Vlajka
volume XI, edition 32, page 6.
AMV 305-571-8.
NAKONEČNÝ: Vlajka, page 132.
NAKONEČNÝ: Vlajka, page 132.
NAKONEČNÝ: Vlajka, page 132.
AMV, 315-8-122, AMV, 312-15-2, und AMV 305-557-6.
Bruno Plch, (1913-?), Vlajka-member, director of the “Mladá generace” rubric of the newspaper
Moravské noviny. František Theuner from the Board or Youth Education in Bohemia and Moravia
evaluated Plch as a person “who wants to get somewhere at any price and uses all mean to do
that. See: AMV, 315-161-41, page 15. Letter Teuner to Moravec of 19 March 1942.
NA-NárS, carton 128. Letter from Svaz Českých Novinářů (Association of Czech Journalists) to
the investigation committee at Prague-Pankrác of 27 July 1945.
NAKONEČNÝ: Vlajka, page 132.
NAKONEČNÝ: Vlajka, page 222.
NAKONEČNÝ, Vlajka, page 54.
AMV 305-618-3, page 107.
AMV 301-92-1, page 141.
AMV 301-59-3, page 160.
298
(née Prášilová) 864
Hugo Tuskány865
Vilém Nejedlý866
Karel Werner867
Jaroslav Šticha868
Karel Korp869
Antonín J. Kožíšek870
Oldřich Sýkora871
Antonín Pekelský, MD
Vladimír Teyrovský872
L. Matouška
Alois Galus
Otto Albert Tichý
Other
Arijský boj, contributor
Pražský list, editor
Polední list, (“Noon paper”) editor-in-chief
Večerní České slovo, (“Evening Czech Word”),
editor
NOÚZ, (unified Czech trade unions organization),
director of the Press Department
Moravské noviny (“Moravian Newspaper”), editorin-chief
Nástup Červenobílých (“March of the RedWhites”, Fascist splinter group), member
Medical doctor
Professor of Zoology, Brno University
Professor?
Identified in Rozhlasová korespondence as a
judge at the District Court (Krajský soud) of
Prague873
Choir director at St. Vitus Cathedral, Prague874
3
2
1
2
2
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
24
Regrettably, only the authors of around two-thirds (65%) of all contributions were
identified explicitly in the existing materials. Some 23 installments, nearly one-third of
the total (31%), came from people associated with Kříž’s own political movement, the
ČNST-Vlajka and at least eight of these people were members of the editorial staff of
the movement’s main newspaper Vlajka (“The Banner”), including its editor-in-chief
Emil Šourek. A further 11% (eight programs) came from people associated with the
Arijský boj, the organ of the Anti-Jewish League, which is logical given that
movement’s orientation. At the same time, Emil Peřina, Senior875 was both a
member of the ČNST-Vlajka and of the editorial staff of Arijský boj. A further
contributor was identified as O. Sýkora, presumably Oldřich Sýkora from the Fascist
864
865
866
867
868
869
870
871
872
873
874
875
AMV 301-59-3.
Hugo Tuskány (1887-?). NA-NárS, carton 106, call number 51. Interrogation of the Alois Kříž of
18 June 1946, page 6.
KONČELÍK, KÖPPLOVÁ, KRYŠPÍNOVÁ: Český tisk, page 413, footnote 572.
KONČELÍK, KÖPPLOVÁ, KRYŠPÍNOVÁ: Český tisk, page 222, footnote 322.
AMV 305-327-3, page 39.
AMV, 315-57-55, pages 17, 35.
KONČELÍK, KÖPPLOVÁ, KRYŠPÍNOVÁ: Český tisk, page 199, footnote 299.
AMV, 315-28-50
PASÁK: Český fašismus, S. 65
Rozhlasová korespondence, volume IX, edition 233. His contribution also made it into the book on
the series: KŘÍŽ, Alois (Ed): Co víte o Židech?, page 91.
Rozhlasová korespondence, volume X, edition 6.
His son–Emil Peřina, Junior–contributed a program to the series on the subject of Free Masons
and youth on 10 February 1942. See: Rozhlasová korespondence, volume X, edition 34.
299
splinter group Nástup Červenobílých (“Roll Call of the Red-Whites”876), which we will
review in the chapter on the political sketches. Noteworthy here is also that none of
the people involved were professional radio journalists. Furthermore, the person with
the greatest radio experience among them, Alois Kříž, did not contribute any
installments to the series himself, but only edited and organized materials from the
various authors.
In terms of other journalists contributing to “What do you know about the Jews?” or
“What do you know about the Jews and Free Masons?”, we find Karel Werner from
the Polední list. Karel Korp, the director of the Press Department of the Czech trade
union organization, whom we will meet again later, provided two installments.
Jaroslav Šticha (1907-?) an editor from Večerní České slovo, who was sentenced to
13 years in labor camps after the war for his journalistic work during the Protectorate
and then made a career testifying against fellow inmates for the Czechoslovak
Security Service (StB),
877
also provided two installments. Antonín J. Kožíšek from
the Moravské noviny (“Moravian Newspaper”) in Brno also contributed a program –
on the Jews he had experienced in the Soviet Union.878 Otherwise, Kříž chose a
number of individuals from a wide range of professions, several of which were
surprisingly respectable to be cooperating in a questionable and so very public
venture likes this series. There were two professors, although it was not possible to
determine what or where L. Matouška taught, a medical doctor, a district court judge
and even the composer and choir director of St. Vitus Cathedral in Prague, Otto
Albert Tichý!879
Results of the Series
It is difficult to judge the ultimate effect of the series. If it failed to reach the listener
due to chaotic organization and qualitative deficiency at times, then definitely not due
to Kříž’s lack of effort or desire. As we already know, Kříž accompanied the launch of
the series with a special edition of Rozhlasová korespondence explaining the new
series’ mission rather unabashedly to the Protectorates’ press editors as follows:
876
877
878
879
The historical flag of Bohemia is red and white, as is the red-white-checkered Moravian eagle.
AVM 301-571-8, S. 92-103
Rozhlasová korespondence, volume IX, edition 259.
Czech Wikipedia identifies Otto Albert Tichý (1890-1973) as a composer, music teacher at
Prague’s Conservatory and also as a music director at St. Vitus Cathedral in Prague. See:
http://cs.wikipedia.org/wiki/Otto_Albert_Tichý (April 2011).
300
“Under this name [PRP: “What do you know about the Jews?”] Czech Radio
launched a series of lectures, interviews and reportages as an element of political
education and of the spiritual battle against Jewish influences and the Jewish
mentality on Czech people… With this Czech Radio is joining in the battle against
Jewry and will work psychologically on the listener from that perspective. This is
being done with a view to the current measures against the Jews, and also because
the Jewish influence on Czech life was extraordinarily strong and has not yet been
exterminated by far.”880
This was also not the last time that the concept of “extermination” was to appear
either directly or by inference in the course of this series either. As Kříž informed the
Protectorate’s press more explicitly at the beginning of November 1941:
“In the same way that Czech Radio joined in the spiritual war against Bolshevism
with the series ‘A Czech cannot be a Bolshevik’, it has taken a stand in the leading
group of warriors against the pernicious Jewish influence on the mentality of the
Czechs. By means of scientific analysis from the most varied perspectives, authentic
documents from the Czech past and concrete cases, the series of lectures,
interviews and reportages under the common name ‘What do you know about the
Jews?’ – until today no fewer than thirteen quarter-hour-long programs have been
broadcast – demonstrates the entire perversity of character, criminal disposition and
other truly inhuman elements – that are only common to the Jews. The purpose of
this series is also to show in its complete nakedness the horrible damage that
Judas’s race has perpetrated against our nation; and to open the eyes of those, who
have not yet allowed themselves to be completely convinced by the facts that the
Jews were only parasites among us, and that their extermination can only be in
our interest and in the interest of our children.”881
880
881
In the original: “Pod tímto názvem zahajil ve středu večer Český rozhlas cyklu přednášek,
rozhovorů a reportáži jako prvek politické výchovy a duchovního boje proti židovským vlivům na
mentalitu českého člověka... Tím i Český rozhlas připojuje se k boji proti židovstvu a bude
psychologicky působiti na své posluchače po této stránce. Děje se tak se zřetelem k nynějším
opatřením proti Židům, jakož i proto, že židovsky vliv na český život byl mimořádně silný a ani
zdaleka nebyl dodnes vyhlazen.” Rozhlasová korespondence, volume IX, edition 215, (1 October
1941).
Author’s note: emphasis on the word “extermination” is mine and was not underlined or bolded in
the original text, which read as follows: “Právě tak, jako se Český rozhlas zapojil do duchovního
boje proti bolševismu cyklem "Čech nemůže být bolševíkem," postavil se do čelné skupiny
301
Let us look more closely at this remarkable statement and call to mind the
circumstances in which Kříž wrote this text. In the preceding three weeks,
deportation transports A, B, C, D and E had precipitously wrenched 5,002 Jewish
men, women and children out of their lives in the Protectorate and carried them off to
an unknown fate in the Litzmannstadt (Łódź) Ghetto in occupied Poland.882 Thus,
persecution of the Jews was not an abstract idea at this point in time, but something
citizens living in the Protectorate, and particularly in Prague, could see for
themselves. Somewhat jarring about this text – apart from its belligerent anti-Semitic
content in general – is the fact that Kříž was writing openly, in a newsletter informing
colleagues from the Protectorate press that the Jewish people’s “vyhlazení” – the
Czech word for “extermination” or “annihilation” – could only be in the interest of the
Czech nation. At a time when Nazi officialdom itself was making every effort to
portray the “evacuation” of Jews simply as a necessary measure to eliminate
corruption, and more than ten full weeks prior to the top-secret Wannsee
Conference, at which Heydrich, Eichmann and others were to decide how to
progress with the “final solution of the Jewish question”, Kříž was openly calling for
the extermination of the Jewish people.
These sentiments raise several questions. First of all, what was Kříž’s motivation in
making such a bold statement and in such a public manner? And how could the
censors allow such potentially sensitive information to be published? As for Kříž’s
motivation, it would appear to be clear albeit multi-facetted. He was informing his
colleagues from the Protectorate press that he, and under his political direction
Czech Radio, had become leading factors in the spiritual struggle against the Jews,
and demonstrating that fact via the reference to the 13 installments in the series
already broadcast. In essence, he was marking off this subject as his own
professional territory at Czech Radio, while also demonstrating some of the concrete
882
bojovníků proti zhoubnému židovského vlivu na mentalitu českého člověka. Cyklus přednášek,
rozhovorů a reportáží pod souhrným názvem "Co víte o Židech"–až do dneška bylo vysíláno
neméně než třináct čtvrthodinových relací–vědeckým rozborem z nejrůznějších hledisek,
věrohodnými dokumenty z české minulosti i konkrétními případy prokazuje celou tu
charakterovou zvrácenost, zločinné založení I ostatní vpravdě nelidské prvky–jen Židům vlastní.
Účelem tohoto cyklu je také ukázat v plné nahotě strašné škody, které Judovo pokolení na našem
národě napáchalo, a otevřit oči i těm, kdož se snad ještě skutečnostmi nedali dokonale přesvedčit
o tom, že Židé mezi námi byli jen příživníky a že jejich vyhlazení je v zájmu nás všech i našich
dětí. Redaktorem cyklu je novinář a publicista Alois Kříž /Rozhl./” Rozhlasová korespondence,
volume IX, edition 253, (6 November 1941).
SEEMANN: Ghetto Litzmannstadt, pages 253-305.
302
results of his work. Furthermore, this information made clear to anyone potentially
interested in contributing to the series that they needed to turn to Kříž to do so.
Although he did not state it openly, as the editor responsible for the series, Kříž had
the power to accept or reject manuscripts of contributions and consequently the
lucrative remuneration of participation in the series. Thus, Kříž had suddenly become
a person wielding some financial power.
The extremity of Kříž’s statement also positioned him vis-à-vis the Nazi authorities as
the most radical or at least one of the most radical Czech proponents of their antiSemitic ideology. As for the Nazis, Kříž was giving them precisely what they wanted,
and what Von Wolmar and others consistently demanded from the Czech press. The
Nazis wanted their persecution of the Jewish population to appear to be a
reasonable response to demands coming from within the Czech population instead
of some evil by-product of their twisted ideology. If the Czech population failed to
promulgate such demands on its own, then the spiritual vanguard of Nazism among
them, the activist journalists, had to do it for them. Kříž was stepping up to take on
that role.
As for the Czech population itself, no listener hearing these words could have
harbored much doubt that their Jewish relatives, friends, neighbors or former
colleagues were indeed facing a very difficult time at the hands of the Nazis. Should
he/she wish to do so, the Czech listener could even check some of the thoughts
heard on the air, as Kříž had the 14 most-important programs published in book form
by the Orbis publishing house in their pamphlet series with the title “On the verge of
the new time”.883 There in black and white it was written quite clearly for example:
“The Jewish question will only be completely solved for Germany and Europe, when
there is no longer a single Jew in Germany or Europe.”884
In the absence of empirical studies among listeners, it is extremely difficult to know
what the full impact of the series “What do you know about the Jews?” and “What do
you know about the Jews and Free Masons?” really was. While much of the series
883
884
KŘÍŽ, Alois (Ed): Co víte o Židech?, Nakladatelství Orbis, Praha 1941. Hereinafter: KŘÍŽ: Co víte
o Židech?.
Lecture by the lawyer Al. Galus, Židovská otázka a její řešení–rozbor právní, (“The Jewish
Question and its Solution–a Legal Analysis”) broadcast on 21 October 1941. See: KŘÍŽ: Co víte o
Židech?, page 91.
303
was second- or third-rate in terms of content and logical argumentation, one cannot
rule out that it might have had an effect on some individual listeners – especially
those pre-disposed to anti-Semitic opinions. Taken together with the general terror
campaign commonly referred to in Czech as the first “Heydrichiáda” when the series
launched, the negative and depressing subject matter of the series can only have
contributed to an overall feeling of malaise and alarm among Czech listeners.
A very rare document that exists in Alois Kříž’s trial records in the Czech National
Archives does reveal how at least one listener viewed the series, however. Judging
by the numerous orthographical errors in the original version, one can only assume
that the author was either not a native speaker of Czech or had enjoyed only a very
limited education. The Polívka referred to in the letter may be Otakar Polívka, a
member of the ČNST-Vlajka, whose contribution to the series on 10 January 1942
launched its expansion to cover the topic of Free Masonry.885 The Rys mentioned is
undoubtedly Jan Rys-Rozsévač (1901-1946, executed) the leader of the ČNSTVlajka. The “Duce” is obviously Mussolini. The following translation tries to reflect the
content of the letter faithfully while retaining the original punctuation, if not the
extremely numerous orthographical errors.
“Oh hard-headed one. Don’t you know anything about the Jews yet? And don’t you
know that you’re an idiot? I lived among Jews for a long time, and it was always a
Jew who saved me someone Christian, he drove me into court. And such a Polívka
and Rys he can say shit and the Duce how I could laugh, earlier none of you knew
anything and now for money you scoundrels blither on. But you won’t convince us
we don’t want the German, regardless of how we are doing... You’ll be surprised at
how vulgar I am, but that doesn’t matter, since we hear how the great men are
vulgar, and the nonsense that you pack play at!”886
885
886
Rozhlasová korespondence, volume X, edition 8.
In the original, including the original orthographic and punctuation errors: “Ó berane. Už nevíte nic
o židech? A že jste blbec, to nevíte? Já jsem žil mezi židy dlouho a vždi je žid mně zachranil
nekdo křestan ten mě hnal k soudu. A takový Polívka a Rys ten muže řikat hovno a Duce jak
by[ch] smal, dríve jste zadný nic nevěděl a ted za peníze lupové máte řečí. Však nás
nepřemluvíte mí němce nechceme, at se máme jakkolív... Budete se divit jaký jsem sprostý, ale
to nevadí, však slišíme jak jsou velcí páni sprostí, a kecí co hrajete vi bando!”. NA-NárS, carton
107, call number 60. Undated anonymous letter to Alois Kříž.
304
Judging by the fact that this anonymous letter also included a drawing of Kříž
hanging from a tree or gallows, it is fair to assume that the series completely missed
the intended effect with this listener. More alarming for Kříž will have been the fact
that Ferdinand Thürmer apparently disapproved of the series. “What do you know
about the Jews and Free Masons?” disappeared suddenly from the airwaves, on 28
April 1942 with a final installment on the subject that the Jews were everywhere and
posed a danger to everyone. Judging from the correspondence in Kříž’s Czech
Radio personnel file,887 while the quality of production may not have pleased
Thürmer, there seems to have been rather greater surprise about the fact that Kříž
was not writing the series himself, but instead contracting it out to others. If this
series was remunerated at the same or a similar rate that Kříž had requested for
contributions to Hlasy doby – i.e., at RM 20 (K 200) per contribution888 – then the
“What do you know about the Jews and Free Masons?” will already have cost Czech
Radio thousands by the time of its final broadcast in April 1942. Given the financial
crisis of the company, presumably Thürmer did not consider that money well spent.
Furthermore, the essentially negative nature of “What do you know about the Jews
and Free Masons?” will not have fit well into Thürmer’s policy of making the Czech
listener feel that the Station-Group was his/her radio again. One week after the final
edition of “What do you know about the Jews and Free Masons?” the new series
Aufbau! – Budujeme! (“We build!”) launched. As for Kříž, Thürmer demanded that he
account for himself, and even canceled his original contract. Nevertheless, almost
immediately Thürmer rehired him – albeit on a lower pay scale (of K 5,000 gross
instead of the original K 5,000 net).889
887
888
889
NA-NárS, carton 106, call numbers 51-57. Personnel file of Alois Kříž, especially file note by Karel
Remeš of 8 May 1942 und Kříž’s personnel questionnaire.
NA-NárS, carton 108, call number 64. Note from Kříž to a Dr. Sommer of 6 January 1942.
NA-NárS, carton 106, call numbers 51-57. Personnel file of Alois Kříž, especially file note by Karel
Remeš of 8 May 1942 und Kříž’s personnel questionnaire.
305
13. Worker’s Radio
As mentioned above, the Worker’s Radio (dělnický rozhlas) was one of the oldest
specialized areas of broadcasting at Czech Radio, which started regular
programming already in September of 1926. Its original intention was to raise the
cultural level of the working class via educational measures and audienceappropriate information. In the context of democratic Czechoslovakia, the Worker’s
Radio was a natural expression of the cultural and informational needs of an
important segment of the population. A Board of Worker’s Radio (kuratorium
dělnického rozhlasu) established outside of Radiojournal organized the broadcasts
of this type. The patron of the Board within the Czechoslovak government was the
minister of Social Care, a ministry, which remained firmly in the hands of either the
German or Czechoslovak Social Democratic parties throughout the 1930’s, but
which passed into the hands of a minister originally from the Czechoslovak National
Socialist Party during the Second Republic. The Board itself was put together in a
highly democratic manner and encompassed representatives from workers’
educational institutions, from the various trade unions and representatives of
Czechoslovak production and consumer cooperatives. Over the course of its first
decade of service, the Worker’s Radio concentrated on three main subject areas:
first of all, care about questions of workers’ wages, which fell into the domain of the
Czechoslovak trade unions; secondly, economic self-help measures, covered by the
cooperatives; and general or political questions, which the workers’ educational
institutions addressed.890 On the surface, the Board appeared to be an apolitical
institution, but was, in fact, strongly influenced by the two main democratic workingclass parties of the republic, the Czechoslovak National Socialist and Social
Democratic parties.891
By 1938, the Worker’s Radio had developed a variety of approaches for speaking to
its listenership. These included lectures, short dramas, interviews and reportages
and programming broke down into eight main categories by number of broadcasts:
890
891
The names of the main institutions were: Dělnická akademie (Worker’s Academy), Ústřední škola
dělnická (Central Worker’s School), Československá obec dělnická (Czechoslovak Worker’s
Community), Odborové sdružení československé (Czechoslovak Trade Union Confederation),
Ústřední svaz československých družstev (Central Associaton of Czechoslovak Cooperatives)
and the Unie československých družstev (Union of Czechoslovak Cooperatives). See:
PATZAKOVÁ: Prvních deset let, page 433.
MARŠÍK: Stabilizace, page 88.
306
Category
Percentages dedicated to
the individual categories
out of the 462 broadcasts
for 1938892
Labor market information
32.5%
Social policy
16.5%
Economic policy
14.1%
Worker’s education
11.5%
Children, family and the woman
9.7%
Worker’s lives
6.1%
Industry
5.8%
Sports and recreation
3.9%
Democracies generally find ways to balance the various interests and needs of
groups, classes, and sub-sections of society against each other through
compromise. This appears also to have been the case with the three main
specialized boards likely to be susceptible to political pressures – Agricultural Radio
(zemědělský rozhlas), Worker’s Radio and Radio for Industry, Trade and Business
(rozhlas pro průmysl, obchod a živnost) – which produced programming for
Radiojournal externally. Nevertheless, and perhaps noteworthy as an indication of
the political power of the conservative Agrarian Party in the First Republic, Worker’s
Radio received slightly less than half (44%) of the air time of Agricultural Radio in
1938.893
Very little changed regarding the actual functioning of the Board of Worker’s Radio
during the course of the Second Republic, although the worker’s parties themselves
were reorganized into a loyal opposition known as the Národní strana práce, the
National Party of Labor.894 However, as we already know, the specialized
892
893
894
Rozhlasová ročenka 1939, page 135.
Agricultural Radio broadcast 342, Worker’s Radio 151 while Industry, Trade and Business Radio
broadcast 115 hours in 1938. HRAŠE, Jiří: Profesionalizace vysílání 1930–1938
(“Professionalization of Broadcasting 1930–1938“) IN: JEŠUTOVÁ, Eva et al: Od mikrofonu
k posluchačům, z osmi desetiletí českého rozhlasu, Český rozhlas, Praha 2003, pages 93–146,
here page 129. Hereinafter: HRAŠE, Profesionalizace.
GEBHART, Jan and KUKLÍK, Jan: Druhá republika 1938-1939 ("The Second Republic”), Paseka,
Praha-Litomyšl, 2004, pages 61-73. Hereinafter: GEBHART, KUKLÍK: Druhá republika.
307
programming sections Worker’s Radio and Radio for Industry, Trade and Business
were put under the direction of Bohuslav Horák from the Agrarian Party-dominated
Agricultural Radio as of 1 March 1939,895 and this led to a weakening of Worker’s
Radio’s position. This latter point seems borne out by the fact that in the broadcast
week starting 26 February 1939 analyzed above, Agricultural Radio made up eight
hours and one minute (8:01) of airtime, while the corresponding number for Worker’s
Radio is less than one-third (32.2%) that level at just two hours and thirty-five
minutes (2:35)! Even the Radio for Industry, Trade and Business received more
airtime than Worker’s Radio, with seven hours and thirty-five minutes (7:35) of
programming in that week. On the basis of these numbers, it would seem fair to
suggest that during the Second Republic, emphasis in broadcasting may have
shifted away from factory workers and towards the interests of farmers and
employers. However, it would be necessary to analyze several more programming
weeks to establish whether this was a general trend or just true for the particular
week analyzed.
The first two years of the Protectorate brought radical changes to the Czech trade
unions, which in the First Republic had been organized along a plethora of
confessional, political and specialization criteria, but which were very rapidly
subjected to a liquidation and concentration process. As of 30 June 1939,
Protectorate State President Hácha subordinated the 700 existing and various trade
unions, cooperatives and societies to his National Solidarity organization and
concentrated them in three main central offices (ústředí) – one each for workers,
employees and civil servants896 – under an umbrella organization known as the
Národní odborová ústředna zaměstnanecká (NOÚZ),897 which might translate into
English as the National Union Central Office of Employees,898 although National
Union of Employees is a simpler and more common English translation of the
895
896
897
898
AČRo, personnel file.
In Czech: Ústředí dělnických jednot (Central Office of Workers’ Associations); Ústředí jednot
soukromých zaměstnanců (Central Office of Private Employees’ Associations) and the Ústředí
veřejných zaměstnanců (Central Office of Civil Servants).
The name of this organization gives cause to speculation as to whether a bit of švejkování did not
come into play here also. First of all, the union’s name seems unnecessarily complicated.
Secondly, the pronunciation of its acronym – NOÚZ – is virtually identical to the Czech word
“nouze”, which means “penury”.
HUNÁČEK, Zdeněk: Český antifašismus a odboj. Slovníková příručka, (“Czech Anti-Fascism and
Resistance. Dictionary Handbook”), Naše vojsko, Český svaz protifašistických bojovníků, Praha,
1988, page 245. Hereinafter: HUNÁČEK: Český antifašismus.
308
name.899 The NOÚZ then had to coordinate with a subdivision within the Office of the
Reichsprotektor, which – according to the usual practice in the Protectorate –
received an innocuous-sounding designation. In this regard, the term – Liaison Office
of the Reichsprotektor to the Unions in Bohemia and Moravia900 – was to become
especially misleading, however. On 20 February 1941, Karl Hermann Frank
appointed Wilhelm Köster,901 an official from the unified German Labor Front,
(Deutsche Arbeitsfront, DAF) to head the “Liaison Office” and granted him
plenipotentiary powers at NOÚZ. By 23 December of the same year, Köster had
completely dissolved previously existing structures and transformed NOÚZ into the
sole, unified organization responsible or all Czech employees902 with the exception
of civil servants, who retained their own organization. Its mission, as per the example
of the depoliticized and regime-submissive German Labor Front, was primarily to
organize recreational and cultural activities for workers; improve their supply with
scarce goods; and to the extent possible given the exigencies of the war-time
economy, better the material working conditions at factories.903 However, none of
these points was to be achieved through strikes, which were illegal and punishable
as sabotage.
As for the Board of Worker’s Radio, its development went through several stages,
which reflected the changes in the trade unions themselves to some extent. During
the Second Republic, it fell into the domain of the Ministry of Social and Health Care
Administration and remained there also after the establishment of the Protectorate.
Nevertheless, the Board functioned initially along the very same lines as previously.
As of December 1939, it still met with two representatives each from the Worker’s
Academy and the Central Worker’s School, four representatives of the NOÚZ and
two representatives of the Central Association of Czechoslovak Cooperatives.904
However, by early January 1940, the Labor Commission of the National Solidarity
899
900
901
902
903
904
See for example: Benjamin Frommer’s: National Cleansing, Retribution Against Nazi
Collaborators in Postwar Czechoslovakia.
The German and Czech terms were respectively: Verbindungsstelle des Reichsprotektors zu den
Gewerkschaften in Böhmen und Mähren and Spojovací úřadovna říšského protektora k
odborovým organizacím v Čechách a na Moravě.
BRANDES, Die Tschechen I., pages 228-229.
With the exception of civil servants, who retained their own union. See: HUNÁČEK: Český
antifašismus, page 245.
BRANDES, Die Tschechen I., page 229.
Všeodborový Archiv, Česko-Moravská Konfederace Odborových Svazů (VOA-ČMKOS–PanUnion Archive of the Bohemian-Moravian Confederation of Trade Union Associations), archival
collection NOÚZ, carton 213, inventory number 97/1-7. Letter from Arno Hais to the Ústředí jednot
dělníků of 5 December 1939. Hereinafter: VOA-ČMKOS-NOÚZ.
309
reorganized the Board, reducing it to only four members – one each from NOÚZ, and
its two subdivisions, the Central Office of Workers’ Associations and Central Office of
Private Employees’ Associations and one representative from the Masaryk Institute
for National Education (Masarykův ústav pro národní výchovu), which met under the
chairmanship of the director of the National Solidarity’s Labor Commission, Oldřich
Matěcha.905 The person responsible for coordinating with the new board was the
long-term Czech Radio employee Dr. Jan Šnobr,906 who in turn reported to Bohuslav
Horák, until the latter was arrested for resistance work in August 1940. The
participation in the Board of an institution bearing the name of the liberal, democratic
President of the First Republic, Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk, itself suggests that its
work will not really have been to the occupation authorities’ liking. Not surprisingly,
therefore, the Board was reorganized yet again in November of 1940 to include only
four members: Dr. Jan Šnobr and the press officials from NOÚZ and its two subdivisions.907
NOÚZ’s Press Department
At this point in time, a young man named Karel Korp (1910) was the press official of
the Central Office of Private Employees’ Associations. As it turns out, Korp’s
curriculum vitae has some similarities to that of Alois Kříž. Like Kříž, Korp was in his
early 30’s at the time, and had also spent his formative years in the mostly Germanspeaking Sudeten region of Bohemia and had grown up in similar poverty. Korp was
born at Bílina (Bilin) in 1910 into the family of a none-too-prosperous potter’s
assistant and his wife. His maternal grandfather was a miner.908 Whether Korp and
Kříž knew each other personally is unfortunately not recorded. However, the
distance between their respective childhood homes (Bílina and Ledvice) is less than
five kilometers; so it is altogether probable. As in the case of Kříž, and despite the
extremely limited financial resources of his family, the First Republic enabled Korp to
obtain a higher education. He visited the Czech Commercial College at TepliceŠanov and then a trade academy in Prague, where he allegedly became a member
905
906
907
908
VOA-ČMKOS-NOÚZ, carton 213, inventory number 97/1-7. Summary of the meetings concerning
a reorganization of the Worker’s Radio on 23 December 1939 and 5 January 1940.
VOA-ČMKOS-NOÚZ, carton 213, inventory number 97/1-7. Letter from Václav Kříž, deputy
director of the Central Office of Private Employees’ Associations, to NOÚZ of 21 November 1940.
VOA-ČMKOS-NOÚZ, carton 213, inventory number 97/1-7. Letter from Václav Kříž, deputy
director of the Central Office of Private Employees’ Associations, to NOÚZ of 21 November 1940.
SOA-MLS, LS5994/46, carton 566, page 7. Birth and baptismal certificate of Karel Korp.
310
of the leadership of the Communist student faction. From 1934 to 1937 Korp was the
editor of the magazine ÚZ noviny connected to a completely unsuccessful political
party909 for public officials. From 1 January 1937 he worked in the Union of Private
Employees. From 1 September 1939 on, he was the press officer of the Central
Office of Private Employees’ Associations until its complete absorption into NOÚZ in
1941, at which point Korp became press officer of the entire organization of
NOÚZ.910 Unhappy with the cooperation he received from Czech Radio, Korp
complained to Köster that he was having problems arranging to have himself heard
by means of the Worker’s Radio.911 This was, in fact, true. As Worker’s Radio staff
later testified, after having heard a contribution by Korp, Hubert Masařík instructed
them to do everything in their power to keep Korp away from the microphone.912
Naturally, Köster was not prepared to tolerate this state-of-affairs indefinitely. On his
orders,913 and again in the radicalized atmosphere surrounding Heydrich’s arrival in
Prague, Korp replaced the entire Board of the Worker’s Radio effective from the end
of October 1941. How Korp saw his task at Worker’s Radio is best described in his
own words, perhaps. As he informed the director of NOÚZ, Václav Stočes, regarding
a proposal for a new five-minute worker’s program:
“The purpose of this program is to contribute to the re-education of the Czech worker
and private employee in the spirit of National Socialism, to explain to the working
population in a popular format the common interests that we have with the Reich,
which is the homeland of the Czech nation in the broader sense, and to strengthen
Czech workers and employees in the idea of the Reich.”914
909
910
911
912
913
914
The party had the exceptionally long name of: Národní sjednocení úřednicko-zřízenecké strany
(Československá strana státních, veřejných a soukromých zaměstnanců a pensistů a jejich žen),
which in English translates roughly into: National Unification of the Party of Civil Servants and
Clerks (Czechoslovak Party of State, Public and Private Employees, Pensioners and Their
Wives). It received only 0.12% of vote in the elections of 1935. See: Čechoslovakische Statistik,
page 9 and 9*.
AMV 305-575-3, pages 144-145. Interrogation of the prisoner Karel Korp of 20 January 1949.
In the original: “…zjednati si sluchu prostřednictvím Dělnického rozhlasu.” SOA-MLS, LS5994/46,
carton 566. File note on a meeting between Korp, Köster, DAF representative Morans, and NOÚZ
General Secretary Votický on 18 June 1941.
NA-NárS, TNS 17/46 case against Hubert Masařík, carton 60, page 35. Written statement by
Oldřich Matějka of 21 June 1945.
NA-NárS, TNS 17/46, carton 60, page 35. Oldřich Matějcha’s testimony on behalf Hubert Masařík
of 21 June 1945.
In the original: “Účelem této relace je přispívati k převýchově českého dělníka a soukromého
zaměstnance v duchu nacionálního socialismu, objasňovati pracujícím lidem populární formou
společné zájmy, jež máme s Říší, která je širší vlasti českého národa, a upevňovati české
dělnictvo a zaměstnanectvo v říšském myšlení.” VOA-ČMKOS, Fond NOÚZ, carton 213,
311
Korp’s radio work as well as his constant publications for the Protectorate press,
especially for the trade union newspaper Národní práci (“National Labor”), rapidly
made him quite infamous. Due to the international reach of radio waves for example,
the Czechoslovak Government in Exile listed him as a “radio commentator and
Czech Quisling”.915 Judging by his extreme diligence, Korp, like Kříž, seems to have
been a man who had found a profitable niche in collaboration, and who was willing to
walk over corpses to protect his sinecure. In the case of one of his subordinates, Jan
Jílovský (1916-1943), Korp was apparently even willing to walk over corpses in a
literal sense of the expression.916
Unhappily for Korp, however, his supremacy in the Press Department of NOÚZ and
influence on Worker’s Radio ended rather abruptly in September 1943, after he
became involved in a conflict with Wolfgang Wolfram von Wolmar himself.
Apparently Korp referred to an editorial917 by activist journalist Vladimír Krychtálek
(1903-1947, executed)918 as “providing an alibi” and suggested the latter should be
sent to prison for it, while adding that whoever allowed Krychtálek to publish such an
article – i.e., Von Wolmar – should be sent to the front.919 Within one week, on 11
September 1943, Von Wolmar ordered Korp dismissed from his position at NOÚZ –
oddly enough for “insulting the German Wehrmacht”.920 Although Von Wolmar was
915
916
917
918
919
920
inventory number 97/1-7. Letter from Karel Korp to NOÚZ Director Václav Stočes of 28 October
1941.
AMV-Z-10-6, page 206.
Jan Jílovský (1916-1943), one of the Czech students deported to Sachsenhausen concentration
camp following the crackdown on Czech universities on 17 November 1939. Amnestied after 29
months in Sachsenhausen, Jílovský came to work as a translator in Korp’s Press Department at
NOÚZ. Apparently Korp kept at Jílovský constantly to produce proof of “Aryan” parentage until
Jílovský finally admitted to being of Jewish ethnicity. Korp immediately discontinued Jílovský’s
employment and apparently also arranged for his denunciation to the police. To avoid being
returned to a concentration camp, Jílovský committed suicide by jumping from the window of his
flat. For a thorough analysis of the case, see: PINARD, Peter Richard: Jan Jílovský und Karel
Korp–Analyse einer Tragödie in der Presseabteilung der Nationalen Gewerkschaftszentrale der
Arbeitnehmer, IN: Theresienstädter Studien und Dokumente 2008, Institut Theresienstädter
Initiative (Hg.), Sefer, Praha, S. 288–313. Or: PINARD, Peter Richard: Jan Jílovský a Karel Korp–
analýza tragédie v tiskovém oddělení Národní odborové ústředny zaměstnanecké, IN: Terezínské
studie a dokumenty 2008, Institut Terezínské Iniciativy (Ed.), Sefer, Praha 2008, s. 124–146.
Čtyři roky války a české stanovisko k nim, (“Four years of war and the Czech position on it”),
Večer, volume 1943, edition 171, (3 September 1943), cover page.
KONČELÍK, KÖPPLOVÁ, KRYŠPÍNOVÁ: Český tisk, pages 101-102, footnote 133.
AMV 305-327-3, page 33. Interrogation of Jaroslav Šticha of 14 December 1949.
AMV, 10-6, page 204.
312
also soon to suffer the fate Korp had wished for him,921 that did not return Korp to his
leading position in the Protectorate’s labor-related media.
At this late stage in the war, Köster and his assistant for the press, Max Menzel,922
then enacted a policy rather like Kříž did with Grinenko by appointing someone with
negative experience from the Soviet Union. The person in question was one Josef
Klička (1890-?), and he became the new director of NOÚZ’s Press Department.
Klička who was originally from Hraběšín near Kutná Hora, had been a Czech
legionnaire, but had married a Russian woman in 1918 and remained behind in
Russia. He worked at several positions in the Soviet Union, eventually settling in
mining. Sentenced to 20 years imprisonment on ostensibly trumped-up charges of
sabotage and industrial espionage in 1938, the Soviet authorities then handed Klička
over to the Germans, in January 1941, at a time when the two countries were still
officially on friendly terms and cooperating closely with each other. Klička returned to
Prague at the beginning of February 1941. Initially he was unemployed. After the
outbreak of hostilities with the Soviet Union, Klička published a series of anti-Soviet
articles in Večerní České slovo newspaper and even published a book with the Orbis
publishing house in Czech with the title Žil jsem v SSSR (“I Lived in the USSR”),923
which was also translated into German. Given the general anti-Soviet propaganda
campaign running at the time – for instance the massive exhibition on the “Soviet
Paradise”, which opened at Prague’s Trade Fair building on 28 February 1942924 – it
is clear that someone with negative personal experience in the Soviet Union would
have been of considerable value to Nazi propaganda in the Protectorate.
Undoubtedly aware of this himself, Klička turned to Emanuel Moravec, who
supported his employment at NOÚZ,925 where Klička then found a permanent
position starting in June of that year.926 After Korp’s ouster, Klička took over and
remained in his position through the end of the Protectorate.
921
922
923
924
925
926
ČVANČARA: Někomu život, page 211.
SOA-MLS, LS2944/46, carton 402. Interrogation of the prisoner Josef Klička of 24 August 1945,
page 4.
SOA-MLS, LS2944/46, carton 402. Interrogation of the prisoner Josef Klička of 2 December 1945,
pages 1-2.
Pestrý týden, volume XVII, edition 10, (7 March 1942), page 2.
SOA-MLS, LS2944/46, carton 402. Letter from Moravec’s personal secretary to NOÚZ Director
Stočes of 27 May 1942.
SOA-MLS, LS2944/46, carton 402. Letter from the Investigatory Commission of the Central
Council of Trade Unions (Ústřední Rada Odborů) of 11 October 1945.
313
Development of Programming in the Worker’s Radio
The actual content of programming in the Worker’s Radio itself mirrored
developments in the rest of Czech Radio rather similarly throughout the period of the
German occupation. That is, Maras’s censors eliminated programming they found
objectionable – such as the musical greetings program Pozdravy českým dělníkům
v Říši airing irregularly as of autumn 1939, or programming on Czech colonies
outside of the Protectorate but within the Reich itself (e.g., in Vienna).927 At the same
time, the original Radiojournal staff and Protectorate government-imposed
authorities (Masařík) were largely resisted or sabotaged Nazi incursions into
programming until roughly spring/early summer of 1941. Thereafter followed a period
with the heaviest political manipulation under Karel Korp, which Ferdinand Thürmer
then eased after the inception of his Station-Group in the spring of 1942.
As an example of resistance in the early, pre-Korp period, let us look at the text of a
Worker’s Radio broadcast from 16 April 1940. It could serve as an example of a
rather clever variant of the Czech press’s resistance strategy, which Pavel Večeřa
identified as “separation”:
“We have to evaluate the position and the protection of the workers in Germany from
the perspective of the fact that, in the new Germany, it is about a new economic
order, which we can rightfully call a new German economic order. That economic
order stems from the assumption that the most important basis of the economy is the
nation. The working strength and the working performance of the nation are,
therefore, the decisive agent for the development of the German economy. For this
reason, we have to evaluate from this perspective everything that has been done in
Germany for the benefit of the worker and his protection in German enterprises.”928
927
928
NA-ÚŘP, carton 1164. Letter Smutnik to Scurla of 7 June 1940, including a protocol of Smutnik’s
meeting with Czech program directors the previous day, page 1 of the protocol.
In the original: “Postavení a ochranu dělnictva v Německu musíme posuzovati s hlediska
skutečnost, že jde v novém Německu o nový hospodářský řád, který právem nazýváme novým
hospodářským řádem německým. Tento hospodářský řád vychází z předpokladu, že
nejdůležitějším základem hospodářství je národ. Pracovní síla a pracovní výkon národa jsou proto
pro rozvoj německého hospodářství rozhodujícím činitelem. Proto musíme posuzovati z tohoto
hlediska vše, co bylo v Německu podniknuto ve prospěch dělníka a jeho ochrany v německých
podnicích.” Text of a program by Rudolf Hornig a Karel Šmíd, broadcast by Czech Radio on 16
April 1940 between 18:00 do 18:10 hours. See: VOA-ČMKOS-NOÚZ, carton 214, inventory
number 97/8.
314
This phrasing is a particularly good example of resistance, because it both avoids
saying anything at all of substance about the development of the workers’ position in
Germany under Nazi rule except that that development is new and German. At the
same time, since the authors constantly emphasized that their discussion was about
Germany, the German nation, the German economy and German enterprises, a nonGerman or specifically a Czech could conclude that the talk had nothing actually to
do with him or her. Thus, on the surface, a broadcast about workers’ in Germany
aired, but in the end effect it was hardly an impassioned vote of confidence in favor
of Nazism.
By contrast, under Karel Korp’s supervision, a great deal more National Socialist
ideology intruded into programming. On some occasions, his programs reached
something of an idealistic, or one might say, somewhat absurd nature, such as in the
next example of a program from September 1941:
“Camaraderie in the factory has to be honest, but first of all decent. In the community
of a factory built upon the basis of the ideological standards of National Socialism,
there is no place for envy or artifice.”929
However, even during the heaviest period of political manipulation of Czech
programs, the Worker’s Radio did not contain only ideological content. In week 48
starting 30 November 1941, reviewed in a previous chapter, there were broadcasts
on the labor market, about the development of wages and also a reportage from
Prague’s port for heating coal shipments on the river Vltava. Nevertheless, there
were also reviews from Korp’s press products as well as a report on “Cooperatives in
the Reich and here”, which will likely have contained political information.930
Similarly, the Worker’s Radio in the week reviewed at the end of the Fricke/Thürmer
Interregnum, starting 1 March 1942, featured quite practical programming on the
labor market, heart disease among workers, women with vocational certificates and
also a report on the wonders of Bakelite.931 However, there were also reviews of
929
930
931
In the original: “Kamarádství v závodě musí býti poctivé, ale především slušné. V závodní
pospolitosti, budované na podkladě ideologických směrnic národního socialismu, nemají místa
závist a úskoky.” Rozhlasová korespondence, volume IX, edition 198, page 2. Exact date of the
broadcast is unknown.
In the original: Družstevnictví v Říši a u nás, broadcast on Tuesday, 2 December 1941 between
18:50 and 19:00 hours on Prague I and Brno. See: Týden rozhlasu, volume VIII, edition 48.
A type of plastic from which telephones, radios and other such goods were made at the time.
315
Korp’s press products and a lecture on Thursday evening on “Public Service and the
Building of the New Europe.”932 Thus, the content of the Worker’s Radio remained a
mix of practical and political subject matter even in this period during which the
Germanization/Nazification Factor reached its heights.
After Thürmer’s arrival at Czech Radio, the reforms he set in motion throughout the
rest of programming also took effect in the Worker’s Radio. He determined almost
immediately that the Worker’s Radio would deal exclusively with practical matters
related to labor and labor issues as well as entertaining informational programming.
Already in the week of 17 May 1942, we find the Worker’s Radio dealing solely with
factual and non-political subjects, such as libraries (Sunday, 9:00-9:20), rations for
large families (Tuesday, 18:00-18:10), workers week in a film studio (Thursday,
18:00-18:10) and news for employees (Saturday, 18:30-18:45).933 That did not mean
that Korp’s political programs were banned from the airwaves. On the contrary, his
post-war trial records before the Extraordinary People’s Court934 virtually overflow
with Zeiterwägungen-Časové úvahy – short commentaries on current events. For
example, on 9 June 1942, just a day prior to the liquidation of Lidice and the murder
of much of its population, Korp informed the Czech public that “...the faith of the
Czech worker in the Führer, in the liberation of labor from the capitalist yoke, in the
happy future of the Reich and our homeland is deepening constantly.”935 However,
except in unusual cases, such as the period after the Killing of Reinhard Heydrich,
such broadcasts tended to be scheduled outside the normal Worker’s Radio
programming and ran as typical political commentary of the type of K politické
situaci.
Furthermore, the actual amount of airtime dedicated to Worker’s Radio increased
dramatically during the late Thürmer era. An analysis of the official radio program
guides (Týden rozhlasu) shows Worker’s Radio rising to seven hours (7:00) of
airtime (on all Czech medium-wave stations) in the week of starting 25 February
1945 compared to Agricultural Radio’s six hours for the same week. That was a clear
932
933
934
935
In the original: Služba veřejnosti a budování nové Evropy, broadcast on Thursday, 5 March 1942
between 18:50 and 19:00 hours on Prague I. See: Týden rozhlasu, volume IX, edition 9.
See: Týden rozhlasu, volume IX, edition 20.
SOA-MLS, LS 2944/46.
In the original: “…víra českého dělníka ve Vůdce, v osvobození práce z kapitalistického jha, ve
šťastnou budoucnost Říše a naši domoviny se stále prohlubuje.” SOA-MLS, LS5994/46 carton
566, page 150.
316
reversal of broadcast policy during the First and Second Republics and presumably
also reflective of the Nazi priorities in terms of what they wanted the Czech economy
to produce. Thus, at least in terms of broadcasting, the late Nazi regime clearly
favored factory workers over farmers.
Apart from making Worker’s Radio more factual and practical in content, as we
already know, Thürmer developed this programming in another very important way.
He later completely reversed Maras’s and Schneider’s policy of suppressing greeting
programs connecting the Protectorate’s population with compatriots working in the
Reich by re-introducing the regular Pozdravy českým dělníkům v Říši programs,
which within a short period of time came to take up virtually the entire Monday
evening prime-time program slot between 20:00 and 22:00 hours, and which lasted
through to the end of the Protectorate itself.
To summarize, Worker’s Radio never degenerated entirely into purely pro-German
or pro-Nazi political programming even during the otherwise politically over-saturated
Interregnum period. Instead, it always retained some practical and useful nonpolitical subject matter. Nevertheless, under Thürmer, its practical/informational
content became more important and it was even enriched with human-interest
programming intended to support connections between Czech workers in the Reich
and their families at home.
317
14. The Satirical “Political Sketches”
The satirical radio series known as the “Political sketches”936 started under
conceivably even worse societal circumstances than Kříž’s series “What do you
know about the Jews?” Launching on 1 November 1941, a full month into Heydrich’s
wave of terror in Prague,937 the “Political sketches” can only be described as a
somewhat bizarre innovation in Nazi broadcast propaganda to the Czechs. The
reader should stop and call to mind the situation surrounding the appearance of this
series, which was meant to be humorous: Czech Radio’s evening newscasts were
opening with lists of the names of Czechs executed for real or imagined resistance to
German rule – emphasizing the Jewish or part-Jewish background of the victim
wherever possible.938 For those who did not own a radio receiver or did not wish to
listen, loudspeakers blared out the same information from the Protectorate’s street
corners. In the preceding two weeks, deportation Transports A, B, C and D had left
Prague, taking 4,002 Jewish men, women and children to the Litzmannstadt (Łódź)
Ghetto.939 At the same time the occupation authorities made it clear in a broadly
conceived press campaign that “Jew-lovers will be dealt with in the same way as
Jews.”940 In other words, the same fate could await Gentiles who sympathized with
the Jews or aided them in any way.941 Thus, the atmosphere in Czech society was
one of police terror and anxiety about what the nearest future might bring. It was
precisely at this tense moment that Scurla decided the terrorized Czech public
needed some political humor. What was to follow was some of the lowest, most
mean-spirited and frequently most nonsensical broadcasts in Czech Radio’s history.
936
937
938
939
940
941
In the original: Politische Sketsche–Politické skeče. For an exhaustive review of this subject,
please see: PINARD, Peter Richard: Humor im Dienst der Verleumdung, Antisemitische
“politische Sketsche“ im Tschechischen Rundfunk 1941-1945, IN: Institut Theresienstädter
Initiative (Hg.), Theresienstädter Studien und Dokumente 2007, Praha, S. 92–155. Or: Humor v
službě pomluv, Prvky antisemitismu v tzv. “politických skečích“ vysílaných Českým rozhlasem v
letech 1941-1945, IN: Institut Terezínské Iniciativy (Ed.), Terezínské studie a dokumenty 2007,
Praha, S. 140–193.
BRANDES: Die Tschechen I., page 212.
NA-NárS, TNs 15/47 case against Václav Stočes, Arnošt Hais and František Kolář, carton 166,
call number 52-56, not numbered. Transcript of a newscast broadcast by Czech Radio at 18:00
hours on 11 October 1941.
SEEMANN: Ghetto Litzmannstadt, pages 253-295.
“Naše poznámky: Se židomily jako se Židy!“ (“Our Comment: Same treatment for Jews lovers as
for Jews!”), A-Zet, 14 November 1941. Available along with many other original documents from
the period at:
(April
www.holocaust.cz/cz2/resources/documents/antisemitism/cz_pbm/press/a-zet19411014
2009).
MILOTOVÁ: Die Protektoratspresse, page 173.
318
In terms of radio broadcast propaganda, the “Political sketches” represented a new
weapon in the battle for Czech public opinion. This new weapon’s primary target was
the authority of the Czechoslovak Government in Exile in London, whose image
Scurla and his collaborators sought to undermine, while at the same time promoting
a positive image of the New Order of the Third Reich. In both efforts, the pathological
anti-Semitism central to National Socialist ideology served not only as a main vehicle
for the message, but also as part of the message itself – i.e., on the one hand
through associating the Czechoslovak Government in Exile and other members of
the Anti-Hitler Coalition with the enemy image of “the Jew”, while conversely
emphasizing the elimination of the societal system, which the Nazis claimed the
Jews had dominated.
Externally, i.e., in the international arena, the timing for such overt interference no
doubt seemed correct. The Third Reich was at the zenith of its power and occupied
huge swaths of territory from northern Norway to northern Africa, from the borders of
Spain to deep into the Soviet Union. Most of the countries, about whose public
opinion the Nazis had previously been concerned, were now themselves occupied
by German forces. Hitler was at war with Great Britain and the Soviet Union already,
and the outbreak of hostilities with the United States was rapidly approaching. There
was very little reason left to make any pretenses about who was actually in power in
the occupied Czech provinces or who governed programming at their broadcasting
corporation. Within the Protectorate itself, Scurla and his team were also coming
under some very real pressure. The occupation authority’s propaganda efforts to the
Czechs, in which they had been involved over the past years, were coming under
scrutiny, and the appraisal was not favorable.942 Regarding humor specifically,
Scurla, Maras and Kříž were, in fact, scrambling to catch up with a response to the
satirical propaganda offensive the Czech section of the BBC had launched six
months earlier. Starting in May 1941 and featuring the famous pre-war theater duo
Voskovec and Werich943 from the Osvobozené divadlo (“Liberated Theater”), the
942
943
FAUTH: Deutsche Kulturpolitik, page 73.
Jiří Voskovec (1905-1981) and Jan Werich (1905-1980) were a pair of left-leaning actors, satirist
filmmakers and sharp-witted cabarettists and the main force behind the Osvobozené divadlo
(“Liberated Theater”), located in the “U Nováků” palace in Prague’s Vodičkova Street. The
Liberated Theater ranked among the cream of the European and Czech theater avante-garde in
the 1920’s and 1930’s. After Second Republic authorities ordered the theater’s closure at the
beginning of 1939, Voskovec and Werich emigrated to the United States along with their
colleague, the composer and pianist Jaroslav Ježek (1906-1942).
319
BBC had started a series of political-satirical broadcasts in the Czech language,
which regularly made fun of Hitler, the Axis and all things Nazi.944 Given the
considerable extent of Czech listening to foreign broadcasts,945 the BBC had
introduced a powerful weapon on the propaganda front.
At the same time, the introduction of political humor was not without risks for Scurla
and his team. Goebbels and his cultural bureaucrats did not have a good relationship
to humor in general. People laugh for an entire range of reasons, some of which –
such as nervousness, Schadenfreude or simple cruelty – they may not have a good
mental grip on. As it was, Goebbels had decided to cancel two satirical politicaleducational film series, Tran und Helle and Liese und Miese after discovering that
the German public much preferred the negative complainer Tran to his faithful and
obedient Nazi counterpart Helle.946 With the Czechs apparently, Scurla felt he could
take the risk. That approach presumably testifies either to his complete ignorance of
the target audience or the sheer desperation the Nazi media authorities felt in
dealing with the Czech population.
Josef Opluštil and Jaroslav Mrkvička
The result of this panicked quest for an adequate response to that weapon was the
introduction of the “Political sketches” series under the authorship of a young Czech
Fascist – or perhaps simply Nazi collaborator – named Josef Opluštil (1908-?). The
reason that care is necessary in labeling Opluštil is that his biography up to the time
of the Munich Crisis was relatively non-political. While he consistently engaged in
pro-Nazi, Czech-language Fascist propaganda as a journalist throughout the
occupation, Opluštil did so for reasons other than those of Kříž or Korp. Born the son
of a postal worker in Královské-Vinohrady947 near Prague towards the end of the
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, Opluštil grew up in humble circumstances, mostly in
944
945
946
947
See: Burian, Jarka M., Příhody Voskovce a Wericha v Americe 1939-1945 (“The Experiences of
Voskovec and Werich in America 1939-45”), found at: www.divadlo.cz/art/clanek.asp?id=9666
(Februar 2007).
THÜRMER: Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, page 9.
HERZOG, Rudolph: Heil Hitler, das Schwein ist tot! Lachen unter Hitler–Komik und Humor im
Dritten Reich, (“Heil Hitler, the Pig is Dead! Laughter under Hitler–Comedy and Humor in the
Third Reich”), Verlag: Eichborn Berlin, 2006, page 179. Hereinafter: HERZOG: Heil Hitler, das
Schwein.
Since 1920, the Prague city district of the same name.
320
the poor, working-class district of Prague-Žižkov.948 After co-authoring a series of
risqué and sometimes sexually rather explicit, but barely successful comedy plays as
a young man in his early to mid-twenties,949 the high points of Opluštil‘s career
throughout most of the 1930’s had been spent at subsistence-level editing jobs, for
Ilustrovaný Zpravodaj (“Illustrated Reporter”) magazine950 or Zájmy poštovních a
telegrafních zřizenců (“The Interests of Postal and Telegraph Clerks”).951 However,
much more often, these positions had alternated with bouts of complete
unemployment. At some points, Opluštil lived off the generosity of his politically very
active school friend Jaroslav Mrkvička (1909-?).952 At other times however,
circumstantial evidence suggests that Opluštil may also have earned a living as a
homosexual male prostitute.953 Thus, while he could accurately describe himself as
948
949
950
951
952
953
NA-PŘ Praha, Police registration card for Josef Opluštil (Senior) and his wife Karoline, as of
1938.
OPLUŠTIL and KONVALINKA: Děda na štaflu aneb Čudla v taloně: Fraška o 1 díle a 3
plnovousech a jedné vepřové měchuřině. (“Grandpa on the Ladder or Čudla in a Bind: a Farce in
1 Act about 3 Bearded Men and a Pig’s Bladder”), Nakladatelství Evžen J. Rosendorf, Praha,
1931. OPLUŠTIL and KONVALINKA: Pan Datel na semaforu, Edison na semaforu fraška o 3
dějstvích (“Mr. Datel at the Traffic Light, Edison at the Traffic Light, a Farce in 3 Acts”),
Nakladatelství Evžen J. Rosendorf, Praha, 1931. OPLUŠTIL and KONVALINKA: Fakíři pod
stolem, Fraška o 1 díle (“Snake-charmers under the Table, a Farce in 1 Act”), Nakladatelství
Evžen J. Rosendorf, Praha, 1932. OPLUŠTIL and KONVALINKA: Nešťourejte do Pumlaize,
Dědeček náhradník (“Don’t Mess About with Pumlaiz, Grandpa the Replacement Man”),
Nakladatelství Evžen J. Rosendorf, Praha, 1932. OPLUŠTIL and KONVALINKA: Tajemný hrad
Šprlovec, hrad na splátky, Fraška o 6 obrazech a 5 dekoracích (“The Mysterious Castle Šprlovec,
Castle in Installments, a Farce in 6 Scenes and 5 Decorations”), Nakladatelství Evžen J.
Rosendorf, Praha, 1932. OPLUŠTIL and KONVALINKA: Pán s padákem, letecká fraška o 3
jednáních (“The Man with the Parachute, a Flyer-Farce in 3 Acts”), Divadelní, hudební
Nakladatelství, zastupitelství, Evžen J. Rosendorf, Praha, 1937. OPLUŠTIL and SLADOVNÍK:
Dva četníci na štrozoku: Bodlo v fofru (“Two Gendarmes on a Straw Mattress: Bayonette in a
Panic”), Nakladatel Fr. Švejda, Praha, 1932.
SOA-MLS Praha, LS125/48, case against Josef Opluštil, carton 741. page 31. Testimony of the
accused Josef Opluštil of 12 June 1945.
SOA-MLS Praha, LS125/48, case against Josef Opluštil, carton 741. page 31. Testimony of the
accused Josef Opluštil of 12 June 1945.
NA-PŘ Praha, všeobecná spisovna–1941–1950, carton 8160, file O310/2. Letter from the Police
Directorate of Prague to the District Youth Welfare Home (Okresní péče o mládež) in Veselí nad
Lužnicí of 20 July 1941. The institution was trying to determine Opluštil’s ability to make support
payments for an illegitimate child he had fathered and abandoned.
Opluštil consistently based his works of fiction and also his newspaper articles on situations from
his personal life. One scene from an article of his describes hungry youths congregating in the
cold outside the Postillion Bar in Prague’s Dlouhá třída, waiting to beg some money from its
clientele, whom he described as Jewish homosexuals. Given his penurious existence on the one
hand and his well-documented erotomaniacal behaviour on the other, it seems likely that Opluštil
did more than simply beg for money. See: OPLUŠTIL, Josef: Žid-zednář a bílý Žid, nepřátelé
českého národa (“The Jew-Free Mason and White Jew, Enemies of the Czech Nation”), Nástup
Červenobílých, volume II, edition 31, (3 August 1940), page 6.
321
an “author”954 or “editor”,955 Opluštil was, in fact, a mostly desperate ne'er-do-well,
who simply took the opportunities the occupation authorities offered him.
The person responsible for involving Opluštil in politics was his much more dynamic
and successful former school friend, the lawyer Jaroslav Mrkvička. In the period
1935-1945, it was Mrkvička, who undertook political work and then always found
some job connected with it to support Opluštil. Characteristic for Mrkvička’s
approach to politics was not a firm belief in any particular ideology or orientation, but
rather a sense of where he might find personal benefit in the echelons of power.
Initially a member of the Catholic Československá strana lidová (“Czechoslovak
People’s Party”), he transferred to the Czech National Socialist Party (ČSNS) after
Edvard Beneš became president in 1935.956 By the time of the communal elections
in 1938, at the age of just 29 years, ambitious young Mrkvička had managed to rise
to the very responsible position of the party’s campaign organizer for Greater
Prague957 and a member of the electoral commission for the key voting district of
Prague I – VII.958 At the same time, Opluštil earned a bit of extra money as a clerk in
the party’s offices, while also directing the 364th unit of the Stráž svobody (“Guard of
Liberty”), a sports organization associated with the ČSNS.959 After Beneš’s
abdication at Munich, Mrkvička orchestrated his and Opluštil’s exclusion from the
ČSNS in order to gain the trust of Rudolf Gajda, the leader of the Národní obec
fašistická (“National Fascist Community”– NOF).960 Mrkvička and presumably
Opluštil started frequenting the Café Perla,961 a meeting place for Gajda’s supporters
954
955
956
957
958
959
960
961
NA-PŘ Praha, carton 67, 3/1168-II Nové Město, police registration form for the house Prague II.,
numerus conscriptionis 1168, Petrská 29, registration of Josef Opluštil of 6 April 1938.
AČRo, historic collection. Application letter of Josef Opluštil to the management of Czech Radio of
15 August 1941.
SOA-MLS Praha, LS104/48, case against Jaroslav Mrkvička, carton 735, page 42. Facts of the
case against Jaroslav Mrkvička of 13 March 1946.
SOA-MLS Praha, LS104/48, case against Jaroslav Mrkvička, carton 735, page 42. Facts of the
case against Jaroslav Mrkvička of 13 March 1946.
At the time, the Prague city districts I to VII encompassed the entire core of the Czechoslovak
capital, the most important center of economic activity in the republic, namely the neighborhoods
of: Prague I – Staré Město (Old Town), II – Nové Město (New Town), III – Malá Strana (Lesser
Town), IV – Hradčany (the Castle district), V–Josefov (the former Jewish Town), VI – Vyšehrad
and VII – Holešovice-Bubny.
SOA-MLS Praha, LS125/48, case against Josef Opluštil, carton 741. page 31. Testimony of the
accused Josef Opluštil of 12 June 1945.
SOA-MLS Praha, LS104/48, case against Jaroslav Mrkvička, carton 735, page 42. Facts of the
case against Jaroslav Mrkvička of 13 March 1946.
Opluštil is likely to have been well acquainted with Café Perla, as it was located in downtown
Prague at Perlová 7, next door to the publisher of his farces, Evžen J. Rosendorf, whose offices
were in the neighboring building at Perlová 5 throughout the 1930’s. See the entries for Evžen J.
Rosendorf in any Prague telephone directory for the period.
322
and also for “leaders of the German students, who turned up in the café in SSuniforms after the occupation in March 1939.”962 During the Second Republic,
Mrkvička, who was also a trained butcher,963 managed to gain Gajda’s trust also by
organizing well-paid lectures for the latter at meetings of the Association of Cattle,
Meat and Fats Importers and Exporters (Svaz dovozců a vývozců dobytků, masa a
tuků). Gajda then delegated Mrkvička as an economic expert to the Greater Prague
Council of the Party of National Unity,964 while Opluštil became the responsible editor
for the new NOF-Organ Boj národa (“Struggle of the Nation”) starting in February
1939.965 In the immediate phase after the German invasion, the somewhat farcical
Czech National Council (ČNV) held meetings in the former Czecho-Slovak
Parliament building in Prague’s Rudolfinum, which we have already discussed.
Mrkvička acted as the press officer for this body until Hácha had it dissolved.966 It
was apparently also around that time that Mrkvička found his first contacts to
Leopold Uebelacker from the German Sicherheitsdienst (SD), an organization which
Mrkvička would supply with information through to the end of the occupation
including from the upper echelons of the National Solidarity and later even about the
Justice Minister and Premier of the Protectorate Government, Jaroslav Krejčí.967
Thereafter, Mrkvička and other Fascist groups formed the Fašistická akční komité
(FAK – Fascist Action Committee) to demand greater influence for Gajda in the
leadership of the National Solidarity.968 Opluštil lent a hand in pressuring the
Protectorate’s political elites as well. On 1 June 1939, he was arrested with others –
including Josef Rejthar with whom he would later work very closely – at a
962
963
964
965
966
967
968
In the original: “vůdcové německých študentů (sic!), kteři se po okupaci v březnu 1939 v kavárně
objevili v uniformách SS.” SOA-MLS Praha, LS104/48, case against Jaroslav Mrkvička, carton
735, page 45. Facts of the case against Jaroslav Mrkvička of 13 March 1946.
His father owned a butcher’s shop in Čáslav.
SOA-MLS Praha, LS104/48, case against Jaroslav Mrkvička, carton 735, page 42. Facts of the
case against Jaroslav Mrkvička of 13 March 1946.
SOA-MLS Praha, LS104/48, case against Jaroslav Mrkvička, carton 735, page 42. Facts of the
case against Jaroslav Mrkvička of 13 March 1946.
SOA-MLS Praha, LS104/48, case against Jaroslav Mrkvička, carton 735, page 42. Facts of the
case against Jaroslav Mrkvička of 13 March 1946.
SOA-MLS Praha, LS104/48, case against Jaroslav Mrkvička, carton 735, page 168. Undated
interrogation of the former SD-employee Wernfried Pfaff. And page 138. Interrogation of the
former director of the SD in Prague, Walter Jacobi, of 14 May 1946.
SOA-MLS Praha, LS104/48, case against Jaroslav Mrkvička, carton 735, page 42. Facts of the
case against Jaroslav Mrkvička of 13 March 1946.
323
demonstration on Prague’s Wenceslas Square chanting slogans like “Out with the
Jews – In with Gajda!”.969
One month later, after Gajda and the National Solidarity had come to an
arrangement, the NOF was dissolved. Boj národa ceased publication in September
1939,970 which left Opluštil without a job again. In compensation for the leading
political role, Mrkvička received a lucrative position at Prague’s central Cattle and
Meat Cash Office (Dobytčí a masná pokladna), an establishment whose importance
would rise dramatically after the introduction of rationing and the establishment of the
black market with the outbreak of the Second World War.971 Furthermore, the
National Solidarity found a job for him in their offices where he quickly obtained the
reputation of a “political opportunist”
972
an appraisal of Mrkvička, which ironically
also matched the Sicherheitsdienst’s view of why he worked for them.973
Around the same time, Mrkvička came to an agreement with the National Solidarity
to found a right-wing group that would work to undermine the Vlajka.974 It was called
Nástup Červenobílých, (“Roll Call of the Red-Whites”). Starting on 21 October 1939,
the group published its own weekly newspaper with National Solidarity financial
support, which was also called Nástup Červenobílých. The Orbis publishing house
printed Nástup Červenobílých, which received the subtitle “The paper of proud and
honest Czechs,”975 an epithet that it in no way fulfilled. Opluštil obtained the position
of responsible editor.976 The paper did publish articles critical of the Vlajka
969
970
971
972
973
974
975
976
In the original: “Židé ven–Gajda sem!”. NA-PŘ Praha, carton 8160, Heft O310/2, nicht
nummeriert, Protokoll der Aussage des Polizisten Ladislav Muzikář of 1 June 1939.
SOA-MLS Praha, LS104/48, case against Jaroslav Mrkvička, carton 735, page 43. Facts of the
case against Jaroslav Mrkvička of 13 March 1946.
SOA-MLS Praha, LS104/48, case against Jaroslav Mrkvička, carton 735, page 43. Facts of the
case against Jaroslav Mrkvička of 13 March 1946.
SOA-MLS Praha, LS104/48, case against Jaroslav Mrkvička, carton 735, pp. 221-224. Recording
on 26 March 1946 of secret information from the archive of the former Presidium of the Council of
Ministers.
SOA-MLS Praha, LS104/48, case against Jaroslav Mrkvička, carton 735, page 168. Undated
interrogation of the SD-employee Wernfried Pfaff.
AMV-S-245-4, page 20. Protocoll of the interrogation of the prisoner Jaroslav Mrkvička recorded
at the District Criminal Court of Hradec Králové on 5 January 1949. And SOA-MLS Praha,
LS104/48, carton 735, page 93. Protocoll of the interrogation of Josef Nebeský, former leader of
the National Solidarity, of 18 September 1945.
In the original: “List hrdého a poctivého Češství”. SOA-MLS Praha, LS104/48, case against
Jaroslav Mrkvička, carton 735, page 44. Facts of the case against Jaroslav Mrkvička of 13 March
1946.
SOA-MLS Praha, LS104/48, case against Jaroslav Mrkvička, carton 735, page 44. Facts of the
case against Jaroslav Mrkvička of 13 March 1946.
324
movement,977 and the two groups apparently ended up embroiled in a series of libel
suits,978 which was certainly useful from the perspective of the Protectorate’s
government and the National Solidarity at the time.
As editor, Opluštil concentrated again and again on his favorite topics, some of
which he had also criticized in his farces. These included unemployment, crime and
poverty in the First Republic; the Czechoslovak health insurance industry,979 which
he castigated as criminal; the insurance industry in general, especially with regard to
the scandalous collapse of the Phönix/Fénix Insurance Company, which was an
actual corruption case from the mid-1930’s; and in connection to this, the ostensibly
negative Jewish influence on the First Republic in general,980 and especially on its
film industry. In connection with the latter, several important personalities from the
theater and film scene of the First Republic came in for special criticism by name:
film producer Josef Auerbach, E. A. Longen from Vlasta Burian’s comedy theater
Divadlo Vlasty Buriana,981 but also Voskovec and Werich.982 In essence, Opluštil
used the paper as a platform for tirades against an entire range of entertainment
industry luminaries, whose success and popularity had eluded him during the First
Republic. In the case of Longen, Opluštil’s attack appears to have been a form of
posthumous revenge for not staging a play Opluštil had dedicated to him.983 Apart
from political matters, a further main aspect of Opluštil’s work at Nástup
Červenobílých was his repeated treatment of sexual topics984 and the placement of
caricatures with sexual subtexts along the lines of Der Stürmer’s or Arijský boj’s hairy
Jewish men after lightly clad “Aryan” women, or illustrations containing nudity in the
977
978
979
980
981
982
983
984
For example criticising Rys-Rozsévač: Jak si dělá vedení t.zv. ČNST ze svého členstva kašpary
(“How the leadership of the so-called ČNST makes fools out of its members”), Nástup
Červenobílých , volume II, edition 33, (6 April 1940), front page.
SOA-MLS Praha, LS104/48, case against Jaroslav Mrkvička, carton 735, page 93. Testimony of
Josef Nebeský the former leader of the National Solidarity of 18 September 1945.
OPLUŠTIL, Josef: Fabriky na aspiriny, nebo péče o nemocné?, (“Aspirin factories or care for the
sick?”), Nástup Červenobílých, volume II, edition 31, (3 August 1940), page 3 including a picture
of the painting Diana’s bath by Ivo Saliger featuring three female nudes.
See: OPLUŠTIL, Josef: Jde to bez Židů–jenom chtit! (“It’s possible without Jews–just want it!”),
Nástup Červenobílých, volume II, edition 27, (6 June 1940), page 3.
Emil Artur Longen was a pseudonym for Emil Pittermann (1885-1936). See:
www.volny.cz/czfilm/Osobnosti/Longen.html
TIBERIUS: Nástup Červenobílých, volume II, edition 34, (24 August 1940) and edition 35, (31
August 1940), page 6. Tiberius is undoubtedly a pseudonym for Opluštil, as his criticism in the
report of film magnate Josef Auerbach matches passages from Opluštil‘s farce Tajemný hrad
Šprlovec, hrad na splátky from 1932.
OPLUŠTIL and KOVALINKA: Nešťourejte do Pumlaize, Dědeček náhradník, page 4.
OPLUŠTIL, Josef: Život za dvě koruny (“A life for two crowns”), Nástup Červenobílých, multiinstallment series. See SOA-MLS Praha, LS125/48, case against Josef Opluštil, carton 741.
325
paper.985 This secondary subject of interest apparently reflected a great deal about
Opluštil’s private life. According to his long-term best friend Mrkvička, Opluštil
suffered from “erotomania”, or what might be termed a sex addiction in modern
American terms.986 At some point, the National Solidarity determined that Nástup
Červenobílých “in no way lagged behind the periodical ‘Vlajka’ when it came to the
Fascist and activist line, the tirades against the Jews, against the republic and
democracy,”987 and discontinued financial support for it. Nástup Červenobílých
closed down on 5 September 1940 and Opluštil had to live off Mrkvička again.988
Opluštil’s Work at Czech Radio
In mid-August of 1940, about six weeks after the establishment of Kříž’s Political
Lectures Department, Opluštil applied for a job at Czech Radio.989 It is very unlikely
that Kříž will have welcomed Opluštil as a colleague, especially given the history
between the Nástup Červenobílých and the Vlajka. It seems, however, that Opluštil
had some hearty support from the influential German director the Orbis publishing
house,
985
986
987
988
989
990
Friedrich
Rudl990
(1902-?)
and
from
among
employees
of
the
For instance the caricature in the article OPLUŠTIL, Josef: Žid-zednář a bílý Žid–nepřátelé
českého národa, Nástup Červenobílých, volume II, edition 31, (3 August 1940), page 6. Or:
OPLUŠTIL, Josef: Fabriky na aspiriny, nebo péče o nemocné?, Nástup Červenobílých, volume II,
edition 31, (3 August 1940), page 3, featuring a print of the nude painting “The Bath of Diana” by
Ivo Saliger.
SOA-MLS Praha, LS125/48, case against Josef Opluštil, carton 741. page 29. Interrogation of
Jaroslav Mrkvička, undated but presumably from the summer of 1945. According to Mrkvička’s
testimony Opluštil’s father and grandfather had also died while engaging in sexual excesses with
their mistresses at the ages of 75 and 80 respectively. See also page 93. Interrogation of the
witness Jiří Stýblo of 13 August 1947.
In the original: “S časopisem “Vlajka” si nezadá, pokud jde o fašistickou a aktivistickou linii, štvaní
proti židům, proti republice a demokracii.” SOA-MLS Praha, LS104/48, case against Jaroslav
Mrkvička, carton 735, page 9. Judgment in the case against Jaroslav Mrkvička of 26 April 1948.
SOA-MLS Praha, LS125/48, case against Josef Opluštil, carton 741, pages 163-164.
Interrogation of the witness Jaroslav Mrkvička of 21 November 1947.
AČRo, historic collection. Application letter Opluštil to the management of Czech Radio of 15
August 1941.
Friedrich Rudl was born in the Prague suburb of Smíchov in 1902 to a German-speaking family.
He spent most of the 1920’s and 1930’s moving from country to country in Western Europe and
even North Africa, financing himself with occasional thefts and embezzlements and apparently
also working for the German secret services. After the establishment of the Protectorate, Rudl
returned to Prague where he became the director of the Orbis publishing house and moved
widely in influential Nazi and SD circles. He seems to have fled Prague at the end of the war and
then to have established the Friedrich Rudl Verlag in Frankfurt am Main, which published
American comics and the like. See his police file at NA-PŘ, carton 9686, call number R2431/9,
which reads like a crime novel. And SOA-MLS, LS125/48, case against Josef Opluštil, carton 741,
page 17.
326
Sicherheitsdienst itself.991 Presumably at the same time – although it is not clear, as
the documents are not dated – Opluštil approached the management of Czech
Radio with a plan for producing “Political sketches”.
992
It was a simple three-part
approach, which must have read like music to the ears of Maras and Schneider. He
recommended mixing roughly 50% political with 50% comical subjects that aimed at:
1. Denigrating of the image of the Czechoslovak Government in Exile using original
recordings of President Beneš and other political figures connected with political
discord and social scandals during the First Republic.
2. Reworking material from Voskovec and Werich to include Nazi ideology.
3. Involving, and consequently also compromising prominent Czech theater
personalities still living in the Protectorate. 993
To underline the third point, Opluštil noted that he had already discussed such a
project with the famous actor Čeněk Schlögel/Šlégl994 from Burian’s comedy theater.
Presumably, it was Scurla who marked the German version of the plan in red ink
with the comments such as “Yes, unemployment and social care” or, regarding the
misuse of Voskovec and Werich’s works, “simply good!”995 With that, Opluštil’s
career at Czech Radio could begin, and it did so at a remarkably profitable rate.
Starting 2 October 1941, he was hired as an auxiliary adviser in the LiteraryDramatic and Reportage Department with a monthly wage of K 2,750 plus K 1,000
for each premier of a new sketch and K 500 for every repeat broadcast thereof.996
After years as a penniless nobody, Opluštil must have felt he had reached the
promised land.
991
992
993
994
995
996
SOA-MLS Praha, LS125/48, case against Josef Opluštil, carton 741, page 17. Interrogation of the
former SD-employee Kurt Wilfer. And AMV301-76-2, page 215. Final report on the illegal activity
of Josef Opluštil of 28 August 1946.
SOA-MLS Praha, LS125/48, case against Josef Opluštil, carton 741, pages 38-39a. Opluštil’s
recommendations on short political plays, not dated.
SOA-MLS Praha, LS125/48, case against Josef Opluštil, carton 741, pages 38-39a. Opluštil’s
recommendations on short political plays, not dated.
The actor wrote his family name “Schlögel” during the Nazi occupation.
In the original: “Ja, Arbeitslosigkeit und soziale Fürsorge” and “Einfach gut!” SOA-MLS Praha,
LS125/48, case against Josef Opluštil, carton 741, pages 38-39a. Opluštil’s recommendations on
short political plays, not dated.
In November of 1941, or example, this would have meant a salary of K 9,250! By comparison, his
de jure supervisor Alois Kříž earned roughly K 6,000, while the average monthly earnings of an
industry worker in the Protectorate would have been roughly K 1,148 at the time. See: AČRo,
personnel file Opluštil and Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Protektorat Böhmen und Mähren 1942,
page 140.
327
Opluštil’s next step was to put together a team of collaborators to help him with the
series. For rhyming texts, he found a Czech Fascist named Josef Rejthar (1896-?),
who worked under the pseudonym “ERJÉ”. Rejthar was a former schoolteacher, who
had run into trouble and been convicted for committing “indecent acts with a female
minor”,997 after which he had been passed from boys school to boys school
throughout Czechoslovakia. At one school, he was found to be in possession of an
anti-Nazi leaflet and was imprisoned for eight months during the investigation. He
was eventually sentenced to time served after the German investigators determined
that he had a proven enthusiasm for Fascism and that he had denounced a Czech
officer for owning a weapon to the notorious Sicherheitsdienst informant Arwed
Georg Smichowski (1898-1951, in prison),998 with whom Mrkvička was also well
acquainted.999 The second member of the “Political sketches” team was a young
musician named Oldřich Šmatera (1920-?), whose main job it was to rework
melodies from Ježek, Voskovec, Werich and others and to fit with Rejthar’s or
Opluštil’s texts.1000 He then collected a team of actors and actresses to play the
parts, many of whom were not well known. Two exceptions to this rule were Vlasta
Burian in one case and Čeněk Schlögel/Šlégl.
The team set to work, and within the next two months premiered no fewer than nine
installments for the “Political sketches” series. Given the repeat broadcasts of
several of the sketches, collaboration rapidly became a very profitable undertaking
for Opluštil.
997
998
999
1000
AMV 141-150-59.
In Czech written also as “Arvéd Jiří Smíchovský”. Smichowski came from a wealthy mixed CzechGerman family, but opted for the German spelling of the name after the invasion. For a closer look
at Smichowski’s life, who seems to have been a secret police informant out of passion, and the
milieu in which he moved, see: STÁTNÍK, Dalibor: Agenti nacistických bezpečnostních složek
Gestapa a Sicherheitsdienstu ve službách StB (Kurt Wilfer a ti druzí.) (“Agents of the Nazi
Security Services Gestapo and Sicherheitsdienst in the Service of the StB (Kurt Wilfer and the
Others)”)
available
online
at:
aplikace.mvcr.cz/archiv2008/ministerstvo/oabs/sbornik/2003/agenti_upr.pdf.
AMV 141-150-59, Urteil im Namen des deutschen Volkes in der case against Josef Rejthar, 1940.
AMV 59-130-43, page 17.
328
The broadcasts were as follows:
1 November 1941
9 November 1941
10 November 1941
16 November 1941
17 November 1941
23 November 1941
24 November 1941
30 November 1941
1 December 1941
6 December 1941
8. December 1941
14 December 1941
15 December 1941
21 December 1941
22 December 1941
28 December 1941
31 December 1941
2 January 1942
Pan Čespiva se osvobodil
(“Mr. Čespiva Liberated Himself”)
Haló, volá vás Londýn
(“Hello, London is Calling You”)
Agent s panikou
(“Agent in Panic”)
Agent s panikou
Celý svět se směje
(“The Whole World is Smiling”)
Celý svět se směje
Velká konference
(“The Big Conference”)
Velká konference
Jeli tudy komedianti
(“Comedians Came by this Way”)
Hvězdy nad Baltimore
(“Stars over Baltimore”)
Hvězdy nad Baltimore
Jeli tudy komedianti
Celý svět se směje
Rudá nemoc
(“The Red Sickness”)
Rudá nemoc
Rudá nemoc.
Šuškanda potřebuje reklamu
(“Whispered Propaganda Needs Advertising”)
and Jeli tudy komedianti
Jeli tudy komedianti 1001
Now let us look a bit at some of the main plays listed above. Regrettably, it was not
possible to locate texts for all of them. The first one, Pan Češpiva se osvobodil
(“Mr. Čespiva Liberated Himself ”), was perhaps Opluštil’s best work, in the sense
that it at least had a coherent plot line. It tells the story of the butcher Čespiva who
reserves meat only to sell to Jews on the black market. During the course of a visit
from his Jewish customer Pereles, who is having an affair with Čespiva’s wife and for
whom Čespiva tunes the radio to London, an escaped patient from an insane
asylum, who looks like and also thinks he is Edvard Beneš, arrives at the butcher
shop and declares the country liberated. Quickly, old party officials arrive to divide
the spoils of victory, leaving Čespiva out and telling him that his shop will go to a
relative of Pereles. In the end, the false Beneš is revealed and Čespiva liberates
1001
AČRo personnel file Opluštil. Copy of a letter from the Intendant to Dr. Morávek of 2 January
1942.
329
himself from having anything more to do with Jews. The main target of attack in this
sketch were the Jews as well as the Czech political elites – both those remaining in
the Protectorate and those in exile. These messages fit very well with the general
media campaign on those subjects at the time, including the case against
Frankenberger connected to meat spoiling, in which Mrkvička may have played the
role of denouncer.1002
Undoubtedly the most infamous sketch of all was Hvězdy nad Baltimore (“Stars
over Baltimore”), however not because it was particularly engaging or effective
propaganda, but due to the trouble it later caused the famous comedian Vlasta
Burian for his role as the drunken Foreign Minister of the Government in Exile Jan
Masaryk. Hvězdy nad Baltimore did not have a recognizable plot per se. Roosevelt is
planning a pan-American meeting of Israelites. In the meantime, Jan Masaryk is
kidnapped by American gangsters, but manages to drink them under a table.
President Edvard Beneš, referred to as “Ben Eš Éda... formerly Pick”,1003 is shown
to be under the power of his greedy wife, First Lady Hana Benešová.
Presumably one of the more effective aspects of the sketch is likely Rejthar’s
composition, the Song of the Israelit-Boys, highlights of which are quoted here to
give an impression of the level of his work and the nature of the “Political sketches”
themselves. Please note that the Czech original contained intentional orthographic
errors. Generally these are ‘h’ sounds inserted around consonants to make them
sound less sharp and, presumably according to the author’s mind, intended to make
the language sound a bit like Yiddish. Furthermore, the Czech is in extremely
colloquial slang, e.g., “velkej demokrat” instead of the correct form “velký demokrat”.
1002
SOA-MLS Praha, LS104/48, case against Jaroslav Mrkvička, carton 735, page 44. Facts of the
case against Jaroslav Mrkvička of 13 March 1946.
1003
In the original: Ben Eš Éda... dříve Pick”, Pick being a common Czech-Jewish name at the time.
330
Refren I.
Je – je – je- je – Jehova
On nám kšefty zachová,
Aj vaj, vaj, vaj, oj, oj, oj
Thoule bude děsnej bhoj.
Song of the Israelit-Boys
Quickly, quickly all Jews
So the whole world sees now,
That we are greatly not afraid,
We’re going to bang into it,
We’ll go to it now,
The
world
will
go
mute
astonishment.
Refrain I.
Je – je – je- je – Jehovah
He’ll preserve our deals,
Aj vaj, vaj, vaj, oj, oj, oj
This will be a great battle.
Co by dělal Židík v bhoji,
Od thoho jsou přece ghoji,
V poli se nám špatně dhaři
Budhem dhoma khomisáři
Thole bude loghia,
Tha then Němec phobije.
…
But what should a little Kike do in war,
That is what the Goys are for,
We don’t make out well in battle,
We’ll be commisars at home,
That will be a lodge
That will beat the Germans.
…
S flintou se tho špatně miří,
My budheme oficíři
Ve fabrikách na khonservy
Pro flintky nemáme nervy.
Kdo se hlásí freiwillig,
první Honza Masaryk.
Refren III.
Aj va, aj vaj, aj vaj, vaj.
Thoho nám sem nedhávaj
Od thoho jdhou radši dhál,
On by nám tho prochlasthal.
We aim badly with rifles,
We’ll become officers
In factories making preserves,
For rifles we have bad nerves.
Who will sign up freiwillig
First Honza Masaryk.
Refrain III.
Aj va, aj vaj, aj vaj, vaj.
Don’t send him over here.
Rather go off some where with him.
He’ll drink through everything..
A thy malý, kam se ženeš,
vždyť je to přec Eda Beneš,
po světě se všude courá,
do rozhlasu časem kňourá.
Dbajli nebo nedbajli,
Jemu ňakou medhajli.
Refren IV.
Aj vaj, aj vaj, vaj
Thoho nám sem nevolaj
Aby nám nic neukrád,
On je velkej demokrat. 1004
And you little one, where you going,
After all it’s Eda Beneš,
You tramp around the whole world,
And speak on the radio at times.
Good or bad,
Give him some medal.
Refrain IV.
Aj vaj, aj vaj, vaj
Don’t call him over here,
He’ll steal everything,
He’s a big democrat.
Píseň Israelit-Boys
Rychle, rychle, všichni Židi
At tho celý svět thed vidi,
Že se vhojný nebojíme,
My do thoho uhodíme.
Thed do thoho pujdem my,
Svět úžasem oněmi.
1004
with
SOA-MLS Praha, 1261/45, case against Vlastimil Burian. Text from the sketch Hvězdy nad
Baltimore (“Stars over Baltimore”), pp. 4-6.
331
The sketch then ends abruptly with the greeting of the Czechoslovak Government in
London, “Khon greets Sara”.1005 The intention here was clearly to discredit the
Government in Exile by asserting its connection to Jews, gangsters and drunkards.
A further sketch that received three repeat broadcasts was Rudá nemoc (“The Red
Sickness”). Undoubtedly, referring to the famous anti-war drama from 1937 featuring
the Czech-Jewish actor Hugo Haas (1901-1968) with the title Bílá nemoc (“The
White Sickness”), this sketch had no coherent plot per se, but focused on Jan
Masaryk in exile reminiscing about the good old days of alcohol and women in
Prague with his drinking buddy, the Jewish film magnate Josef Auerbach. Again, the
sketch is simply a general collection of negative assertions around leading exile
politicians. The play features a parody of a song from the team of Voskovec, Werich
and Ježek. Instead of the original title “Pochod stoprocentních mužů” (“March of the
Onehundred Percent Men”) it is called “March of the Onehundred Percent Jews”,
and it took aim directly at Voskovec and Werich, whom it sought to portray as Jews,
in the case of Voskovec especially by playing on his original family name
Wachsmann.1006
1005
1006
In the original: “Khon zdraví Sáru”. OPLUŠTIL, Josef: Hvězdy nad Baltimore (“Stars over
Baltimore”), broadcast on 6 and 8 December 1941 betwe 20:50 and 20:20 Uhr on Czech Radio,
page 17. Source: SOA-MLS Praha, LS125/48, case against Josef Opluštil, carton 741.
Voskovec is basically a translation into Czech for the German name Wachsmann.
332
Pochod stoprocentních Židů.
March of the Onehundred Percent Jews.
My jsme ti Židi dva,
Za tisíc drzost máme,
Tam, kde se chystá boj,
Zbaběle utíkáme,
To není potíž,
My dva jsme totíž,
Mezi Židy dvě tváře známé....
We are those two Jews,
But we have the impudence of a thousand,
Wherever a battle brews
We run away like cowards,
We are after all,
Well-known faces among Jews…
/Refrén/
Protože my jsme stoprocentní Židi,
Za Beneše jsme směli trávit lidi,
My máme drzost Roosevelta a tupost
Ben Eš Édy.
Co Beneš se tu bohapustě chvastá,
My utekli s ním, den když nový nastal.
Teď každá vrána bezpečně to vidí,
Že přece my jsme stoprocentní Židi.
/Refrain/
Because we’re onehundred percent Jews
under Beneš we were allowed to poison
people,
We have the impudence of Roosevelt and
the obtuseness of Ben Eš Éda.
What’s Beneš blithering on about so Godforlorn here,
We ran away with him when a new day
dawned here.
Now every crow can see that we
Really are onehundred percent Jews.
Že my jsme Židi dva,
To zkušenost je stará,
Nám vždy zalahodí,
Kdyz usměje se Sára,
Proč pak se potíš,
Wachsmann se totíž
I s Verichem po světě cárá...
That we two are Jews
Is an old experience,
We’re always happy
When Sára smiles
Why are you sweating so,
Wachsmann is actually,
Roaming the world with Verich (sic!).
A completely unrelated scene follows in Café Urban on Wenceslas Square in which
two spoiled youths – Áša and Jack – make fun of their friend Mary who is following
the resistance slogan “p.p.” (“pracuj pomalu” – “work slowly”). Áša and Jack consider
themselves much better than others, as they do not work at all, preferring to spend
time in erotic endeavors. They then sing the Dueto šuškalů (“Duet of the
Whisperers”), in which they long for the return of Beneš and the Jews, particularly
Áša because of her implied previous sexual relations with them. A further unrelated
scene starts with “Beneš’s theme music”, the song of the Seven Dwarfs “Hi, Ho, Hi,
Ho it’s off to work we go” from Walt Disney’s animated film Snow White and the
Seven Dwarfs.
333
The final scene, which also has no apparent connection to any of the others, takes
place in the “Fatherland of the red and democratic sickness”, where a “band of red
commissars” plays the “Song of the Soviet government”. The main message here
was that the Wehrmacht was rapidly approaching Moscow and Stalin’s government
had fled the capital for the East, and that Communism is the ideology of poverty.
Píseň sovětské vlády
Song of the Soviet government
Nad Samarou hrdě vlaje
S rudou hvězdou vlajka,
Komsomolcům K tanci hraje
Rudá balalajka.
Tam, kde rudá hvězda svítí,
Zázraky se dějí,
Lidé se jak v nebi cítí,
.. v nebi se též nejí.
Over Samara proudly waves,
The banner with the red star,
A red balalaika plays dances
Komsomols.
There where the red star shines,
Miracles happen,
People feel like they are in heaven,
… in heaven one also does not eat.
Lidé věřte, nejsou bájí
Komunistů snahy,
Adam přeče, když byl v ráji
Také chodil nahý.
A když přece ňáký zrádce
Ocitně se velmi krátce
Hned v sibířském nebi.1007
People believe me the Communists’
endeavors are no fairytales,
When Adam was in paradise,
He also walked around naked.
And if there does happen to be
A traitor, he ends up very quickly
In a Siberian heaven.
for
The sketch that received the most repeats on the radio was Jeli tudy komedianti
(“Comedians came by this way”), which aired a total of four times. The title was
presumably lifted from the novel by the Dutch author Johan Fabricius, Komedianten
trokken voorbij, published in 1931, a Czech translation of which under the title Jeli
tudy komedianti had appeared as early as 1933.1008 Stealing a well-known title like
this was undoubtedly part of the strategy behind the “Political sketches”. It was in
many ways an unfair trick, as the listener would tune in expecting something else,
only to be served one of Opluštil’s farces.
If possible, this sketch was an even less coherent collection of political vignettes
derived from scandals from the First Republic, such as the Phönix/Fénix insurance
company collapse, interspersed with cries of unemployed workers living under a
bridge and committing suicide from desperation while the Jewish bandleader Harry
1007
1008
For the full text of the sketch see: LS2515/46, carton 372 and LS2829/46, carton 40.
FABRICIUS, Johan: Jeli tudy komedianti, Družstevní práce, Praha, 1933.
334
Osten1009 (1896-?) played English jazz at the Café National.1010 There is a nude
scene from the villa of Rebeka, the daughter of the Jewish banking and coal
magnate Peček1011 (sic!), who fills her bath with the perfume “Erotikon 460” while
flirting with an – as always drunk – Jan Masaryk.1012 A party follows at the Peček
palace with Masaryk and Beneš attending, at which Peček and ČSNS politician
Jaroslav Stránský1013 and Communist leader Gottwald1014 make a deal for coal
miners to go on strike so that Peček can sell off his reserves and then rehire the
miners at lower wages. The plot then jumps to the times of the Munich Crisis,
connecting Beneš’s activity to the title of the sketch: “Our comedians prepare to
move their circus away.”1015
The sketch also features an altogether primitive song, undoubtedly by Rejthar,
intended to make fun of Jewish family or company names:
První papal Khon
Druhý papal Teveles
Poppr Salamon
Za ním Efrain Karpeles
Winternitz a Sára
Maces Fresserscheim (sic!)
Blůmenfeld und Söhne
Za ním Wolf a Schleim1016
1009
1010
1011
1012
1013
1014
1015
1016
First of all ate Khon
As second ate Teveles
Poppr Salamon
After him Efrain Karpeles
Winternitz and Sára
The matzah-gorger scheim
Blůmenfeld und Söhne
After him Wolf a Schleim
Harry Osten (1896-?), alias Siegfried Grzyb, was born the son of a Jewish cantor at Fryštát,
(today Karviné) in what was then Austrian Silesia and grew up in Ústí nad Labem. He counted
among some of the best-loved band leaders in Central Europe the 1920‘s and 1930‘s. Until he
emigrated in April 1938 he had a fixed contract to play at Café National. See: Gössel, Gabriel,
Fonogram in Týdeník rozhlasu 2005, edition 12 (14 March 2005), http://www.radioservisas.cz/archiv05/1205/12pub3.htm (September 2007).
Renamed “Vltava” in the Second Republic, the Café National was located at Revoluční třída 23 in
close proximity to Opluštil’s flat at Petrská 29.
Sic! The correct spelling was “Petschek”.
The National Socialist press had already made considerable propaganda related to the villas of
the Petschek family. The SS newspaper Das Schwarze Korps (“The Black Corps”) even printed a
special edition dedicated to the subject in the spring of 1939 under the title “Benesch´s Hofjude”
(“Benesch’s Court Jew”), which juxtaposed the luxury of the villas with claims that Czechoslovaks
had been living in caves. See: Das Schwarze Korps die Zeitung der Schutzstaffeln der NSDAP,
Organ der Reichsführung SS, Verlag Franz Eher Nachfolger, Berlin, undated special editionof the
Reichs Propaganda Aktion 1939, presumably from May 1939.
Jaroslav Stránský (1884-1973 in London died). An important politician and publicist from the First
Republic and a minister of the Czechoslovak Government in Exile. Between August 1941 and
February 1945 he spoke regularly to the nation BBC. After the Communist putsch in February
1948, he emigrated again and continued his radio work via BBC and Radio Free Europe. See:
http://www.narodni.cz/cz/index.html.
Klement Gottwald (1896-1953), leader of the Czechoslovak Communist Party.
OPLUŠTIL, Josef: Jeli tudy komedianti (“Comedians came by this way”), broadcast on 1, 14, and
31 December 1941 and 2 January 1942 by Czech Radio. SOA-MLS Praha, LS125/48, case
against Josef Opluštil, carton 741, page 15.
OPLUŠTIL, Josef: Jeli tudy komedianti. SOA-MLS Praha, LS125/48, case against Josef Opluštil,
carton 741, page 20.
335
The Czech verb “papat” (here in the past tense, “papal”) corresponds to the English
verb for “to eat”, but only when speaking to children. Thus, it is an intentionally
immature form of speech. Khon, Teweles, Popper, Karpeles and Winternitz were all
common Prague-Jewish family names.1017 “Scheim” is unclear as is the reference to
the company “Blůmenfeld und Söhne”.1018 However, Wolf a Schleim was a wellknown textile shop in downtown Prague at Rytířská 26.1019
In summary, we can say that Opluštil’s “Political sketches” became a riotous free-forall of sounds and images intended to diminish the standing of the Czech political and
social elites whether in the Protectorate itself or in exile. The main tools of the
strategy was to associate leaders of the resistance abroad such as politicians like
Beneš, Masaryk, Stránský or Gottwald and the theater duo Voskovec and Werich
with Jews and also with moral and/or political corruption. With Beneš, who came in
for constant attack, it was his small physical stature – i.e., referenced with the song
of the dwarfs from Snow White – that served as a vehicle of humor with the intent of
portraying him also as unimportant on the world stage. With Masaryk, as we have
seen, the constant negative image was built on inebriation and womanizing.
Obviously, given his own dissolute lifestyle, depictions of the latter most appealed to
Opluštil as a writer. To some extent also subterfuge even came into play to lure the
listener to the radio receiver with false expectations, only then to serve him or her a
“Political Sketch”.
It is difficult to speculate what the Czech listener will have made of Opluštil’s work at
the time. Even if illogical or lacking in any recognizable plot, the sketches may still
have had some effect. Humor does not necessarily need to be logical after all.
Furthermore, parodied songs can be humorous in and of themselves. Nevertheless,
given the frequently indecent sexual, moral and racial references, the low ad
hominem attacks on well-known and respected members of the First Republic’s
elites, the audience is very likely to have experienced Opluštil’s sketches as an
1017
1018
1019
See the numerous entries for these names in the Pražský adresář 1937-1938 (“Prague Address
Book 1937-1938).
The Prague telephone directory from 1931 lists a Hans Blumenfeld as a partner in the company
Josef Sobotka a spol., in Prague VII, but whether that was Rejthar’s reference is unclear. See:
Seznam telefonních ústředen, hovoren a účastníků sítě pražské 1931, page 36.
See any Prague telephone directory from the 1930’s. Since the renumbering of Prague’s streets
undertaken early in the occupation, the building where Wolf a Schleim had their shop, numerus
conscriptionis 401, has the address Rytířská 20.
336
unforgivable descent into vulgarity on a par with Schneider’s series “Our morning
commentary”.
Opluštil was, however, not the only author contributing sketches to this series. On 23
January 1942,1020 Rejthar broadcast a sketch of his own. It was much more coherent
than Opluštil’s work for the simple reason that it was a parody of a famous work from
the 19th century by Jan Neruda with the title Kam s ním? (in English roughly “What
to do with this?” or “What to do with him?”). In the original, Neruda had dealt with the
difficulties of disposing of a used straw mattress in downtown Prague during a time
of cholera. In Neruda’s story, it can not be burned; the rubbish removers do not want
to take it; a good deal of bureaucracy comes into play, etc. Rejthar simply took the
same plot, but substituted the used straw mattress with a portrait of President Beneš.
Again, nobody, including the rubbish removers, wants to touch it. Eventually, the
Jewish house owner Pick takes the portrait and resells it at an exorbitant price to the
anti-German teacher Šuškáček, whose name means roughly “Little Whisperer”.1021
As low as it was, this sketch might be termed one of the better of the lot. First of all, it
has a certain logic to it, due to the original on which it is based. Furthermore, when
intelligently done, parodies live to a great extent from the quality of the original
parodied. A great deal of the humor is also generated then by the proximity of the
parody to the original work – only with a certain twist added to the story. In this case,
the portrait of Beneš instead of the used straw mattress served as the twist. Since
most listeners will have known Neruda’s work from their schooldays, there would
have been no need to explain it or indeed for Rejthar to conceive of an entirely new
work of his own. As with his parody, the “March of the Onehundred Percent Jews”,
he could rely on the quality of others’ work and simply feed off that.
Thürmer’s Reforms and the “Political Sketches”
Whether in the form of Opluštil’s mayhem or Rejthar’s well thought-out parodies, as
in so many other areas, the arrival of Ferdinand Thürmer in office brought an abrupt
end to the “Political sketches” series. One of the very first victims of Thürmer’s wave
of purges was, in fact, Josef Opluštil, who lost his full-time position as of 31 March
1942.1022 The reason was presumably not that Thürmer objected to the content of
1020
1021
1022
AMV 305-632-5, page 108.
SOA-MLS Praha, LS2515/46, carton 372, case against Čeněk Schlögel/Šlégl.
AČRo, historic collection.
337
the sketches per se, but simply their great financial cost. As we know, Thürmer found
a Czech Radio that was badly hemorrhaging money that it did not have, and the
“Political sketches” were an extremely costly item. Opluštil’s wages and royalties
alone – i.e., not counting expenses for Rejthar, Šmatera or the other members of the
team – for the period November 1941 to March 1942 will have totaled over K 26,000
or more than twice the total external costs for the series “What do you know about
the Jews?” Obviously, there was no way that the “Political sketches” could continue
as before.
Nevertheless, Thürmer did value political satire as an approach to propagandizing
the Czechs, and by the summer of 1942 after Czech Radio’s finances had stabilized,
Opluštil returned to the airwaves on a freelance contract with more sketches, and
others joined him.1023 Starting once again with a stolen title, this time from Voskovec
and Werich, Balada z hadrů (“Balad of Rags”), Opluštil recommenced his radio
career on 30 August 1942,1024 and continued producing a further 30 sketches at
irregular intervals up to the very last weeks of the occupation.1025 The main
difference to his work during the interregnum period was, however, that the sketches
were generally 50% shorter – generally 10 to 16 minutes in duration – and
coordinated through the series Einst und Jetzt-Kdysi a dnes or Kdysi a nyní, and
Politische Bilder-Politické zaběry. Thus, instead of Opluštil simply producing a jumble
of vulgar scandal, he worked according to orders placed for a certain topic. Some
motifs remained the same, presumably because Opluštil simply did not have any
others. For example, in Balad z hadrů there are still suicides by starving unemployed
workers in the First Republic as in Jeli tudy komedianti, but there are no more nude
scenes. Furthermore, “positive” actions by the regime, such as Protectorate workers
visiting the spa at Lázně Luhačovice – organized regularly under Heydrich and
thereafter – became part of the plot and serve as positive propaganda for the Nazi
system among workers at least. Thus, as in many other areas Thürmer made
political satire in the form of sketches less vulgar, more professional and
consequently potentially more acceptable to the Czech listener. According to
Thürmer, this approach also paid off. As he reported to Frank and Wolf in early 1943:
1023
1024
1025
SOA-MLS Praha, LS125/48, case against Josef Opluštil, carton 741, page 99. List of the works of
Josef Opluštil for the period between 1 November 1941 and 11 April 1945.
SOA-MLS Praha, LS125/48, case against Josef Opluštil, carton 741, page 99. List of the works of
Josef Opluštil for the period between 1 November 1941 and 11 April 1945.
The last sketch that the Czechoslovak State Prosecutor identified after the war aired on 11 April
1945.
338
“The sketch “Worüber man spricht”, which the Czech stations broadcast on 5.3...
seems to have had a larger circle of listeners than one originally could expect. Even
given the individual negative comments about it, this sketch achieved a thoroughly
favorable reception… The wish was expressed frequently that this sketch should be
repeated, after announcing it beforehand, and that in the future this type or similar
radio plays should be broadcast, as they have a deeper-penetrating propagandistic
effect than the usual Moravec speeches. 1026
Of course, “a deeper-penetrating propagandistic effect than the usual Moravec
speeches” was not saying much at all, but presumably in this case also, Thürmer
was working from the concept of the “lesser of two evils”, and political satire at least
had the potential to be amusing.
1026
In the original: “Der am 5.3. von den tschechischen Sendern übertragene Sketsch “Worüber man
spricht” hatte... offensichtlich einen größeren Hörerkreis aufzuweisen als man ursprünglich
annehmen konnte. Auch unter Berücksichtigung der vereinzelt negativen Stimmen hat dieser
Sketsch bei der tschechischen Bevölkerung eine durchaus günstige Aufnahme gefunden... Häufig
wurde der Wunsch ausgesprochen, diesen Sketsch nach vorheriger Ankündigung zu wiederholen
und in Zukunft solche und ähnliche Hörspiele zu bringen, da sie eine weit tiefer gehende
propagandistische Wirkung als die üblichen Moravecreden hätten.” SOA-MLS Praha, LS125/48,
case against Josef Opluštil, carton 741, page 59. Letter from SS-Hauptsturmführer (signature
unclear, but presumably Thürmer) to K.H. Frank and SS-Sturmbahnführer Wolf of 8 March 1943.
339
15. Epilogue
The Maras Era
Let us now review the effects that the Nazi occupation had on the lives of the main
people involved in the broadcasting in the Protectorate. We will review them
according to their positions in the hierarchy of power around and at Czech Radio and
in a basically chronological order. In the unhappy tradition of the Protectorate, we will
deal with German matters first. After leaving the Office of the Reichsprotektor in
1942, Karl Freiherr von Gregory took a post at the German Embassy in Bucharest.
There he went missing when Bucharest fell to Soviet forces in the summer of 1944.
Tim Fauth reported that Von Gregory died in prison in Moscow in 1955.1027
According to Čvančara, his press adviser, Wolfgang Wolfram von Wolmar, was
called up for military service and led troops fighting partisans in Italy, Yugoslavia and
also in Slovakia, where he sustained wounds, but ultimately survived the war.1028
Von Wolmar lived in hiding in Austria under a false name until 1950, but later moved
to West Germany, where he was safe from extradition. In Germany, he continued
working as a journalist, for instance for the Sudetendeutsche Zeitung for German
expellees from Czechoslovakia. He died in 1987.1029 After leaving Prague, Lothar
Scurla was also drafted into the military. The last listing for him with the office that
keeps track of the fates of Wehrmacht soldiers in Berlin, the Deutsche Dienststelle
(WASt), was as the commander of staff quarters with the 4. Luftwaffen-Felddivision
in May of 1944.1030 According to a letter from his brother Herbert to a relative in
1980, a copy of which the Scurla family made available for the purposes of this
study, Scurla went missing on the Eastern Front late in the war and was presumed
dead.1031 Scurla’s great detractor and nemesis in Prague, Hans-Günther Marek,
apparently survived the war in a Propaganda Company and died in Hamburg in
1967.1032
After leaving Czech Radio in the spring of 1942, Walter Maras served in the
Wehrmacht’s
Propaganda-Abteilung
“Südost”
1027
(the
Propaganda-Department
FAUTH: Deutsche Kulturpolitik, page 90.
ČVANČARA: Někomu život, page 211.
1029
KONČELÍK, KÖPPLOVÁ, KRYŠPÍNOVÁ: Český tisk, page 21, footnote 3.
1030
Letter V/25 677/51 from Ms. Foth-Müller of the Deutsche Dienststelle Berlin (WASt), the office for
determining the fates of former Wehrmacht personnel, to the author of 19 July 2005, page 2.
1031
Letter from Herbert Scurla to a relative named Hannelore of 11 July 1980, provided by the Scurla
family to the author.
1032
Email from the Registry Office (Standesamt) of Marek’s birth place Forst (Lausitz) to the author of
21 December 2004.
1028
340
“Southeast”).1033 After the war, his wife Ludmila, who was Czech and seeking to
remarry, claimed to have separated from him as of 29 July 1943.1034 Sources at the
Archive of the Czech Ministry of the Interior, particularly Maras’s Nazi Party file card,
place his last whereabouts as the Military Hospital of Prague-Střešovice in February
1945. Given that the last news his relatives had from him was October 1944,
however, it is very likely that Maras was seriously injured at some point between
October 1944 and February 1945. In 1953, he was officially declared dead as of 19
October 1944.1035 As for his faithful companion in the Deutsche Dienststelle, Georg
Ottomar Schneider, after leaving Czech Radio and after his expulsion from the
NSDAP in early 1942, went on to become the second German director of the Prague
affiliate of IBM (International Business Machines), which although an American
company, collaborated profitably with the Nazis throughout the entire period of the
Second World War under the innocuous local company name Elektrische Buchungsund Statistische Maschinen/Elektrické účtovací a statistické stroje (“Electric
Calculating and Statistical Machines”).1036 As the reader may recall, Schneider had a
serious problem in Nazi terms. His wife was half-Jewish. Presumably, he found it
necessary to compensate for this would-be handicap, and did so by demonstrating
particular severity vis-à-vis the Czechs. During the course of the war, Schneider
managed to have several Czech members of his staff sent for minor offenses either
to labor-education or concentration camps. For instance, he reportedly had an
employee named Černotová arrested and interned for six weeks after she missed
work on the day she learned of the sudden deaths of both her parents.1037 Although
Thürmer did not mention Schneider by name, it was very likely Schneider whom he
meant when he referred to Sudeten-German Czech Radio staff having a relationship
to the Czechs as a “psychosis with corresponding visions of hatred”.1038 In May of
1033
Letter V/25 677/51 from Ms. Foth-Müller of the Deutsche Dienststelle Berlin (WASt), the office for
determining the fates of former Wehrmacht personnel, to the author of 19 July 2005, page 2.
1034
Ludmila Marasová was saddled with the unenviable post-war situation of being Czech, but
officially having her husband’s German citizenship. NA-PŘ, carton 13028, call number Z682/12.
Záznam o hlášení cizince of 28 November 1945. (“Record of the registration of a foreigner”).
1035
Letter V/25 677/51 from Ms. Foth-Müller of the Deutsche Dienststelle Berlin (WASt), the office for
determining the fates of former Wehrmacht personnel, to the author of 19 July 2005, page 2.
1036
SOA, KSO Praha CXVI-142 carton 2398–announcement of change of company name in Prague
Trade Registry. After the war, the company changed its name to “International Business
Machines pro Československo” and collaborated with the Communist regime in Czechoslovakia
right through to 1989. See also: BLACK, Edwin: IBM and the Holocaust, Three Rivers Press, New
York, 2002. Page 432.
1037
AMV Z-C-3062/143-11.9.46.
1038
THÜRMER: Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, page 9.
341
1945, Schneider very wisely fled Prague for Bavaria, leaving his family behind. In
Munich, he continued his career at IBM and apparently even visited company
headquarters in the United States in 19461039 – a virtually impossible undertaking for
less well-connected Germans at the time. Mrs. Schneider and their son were
eventually interned by the Czechoslovak authorities as Germans and deported to the
American Zone of Occupation in Germany. In the rapidly developing Cold War
atmosphere, their story helped transform Schneider from a former Nazi activist into a
victim of Communist oppression.1040
As for the Czechs, Emanuel Moravec survived his idols – Hitler and Goebbels – by
less than a week. According to Pernes, at the request of the Nazi administration,
Moravec set out to make a final radio address to the Czech nation on Saturday, 5
May 1945. However, the outbreak of the Prague Uprising meant that he could not
use the studios at Czech Radio’s headquarters and had to head towards Mělník.1041
Given the all too obvious extent of Moravec’s treason, and faced with the outbreak of
the Prague Uprising – a situation, which could only have ended in a post-war death
sentence for him, had the revolutionaries not lynched him beforehand – Moravec
shot himself in the head in a car half way up the serpentines of Chotkova Street
heading towards Prague-Dejvice.1042
The Prague Uprising apparently took Alois Kříž by surprise at his offices at Czech
Radio headquarters on 5 May 1945. Kříž’s former colleague, Zdeněk Mančal, the
announcer whose early-morning broadcast famously opened the Prague Uprising,
testified that Kříž had a false passport with a German name and was planning to
leave Prague heading west towards the Bohemian Forest on a train due to leave
Prague’s Main Station at 18:00 hours on the evening of 5 May.1043 While the
passport was never found, it does appear from a letter found on Kříž’s person that he
was indeed intending to flee Prague at the time. Caught up suddenly in the fighting
around Czech Radio headquarters, Kříž at first attempted to join the other Czech
members of staff, but they drove him away.1044 Kříž then exited the building by a side
1039
1040
1041
1042
1043
1044
AMV, Z-43642/45.
See file for Georg Schneider: AMV Z-C-3062/143-11.9.46, as well as, SOA-KST Praha,
TkXX15.682/47, carton 13, page 2.
PERNES: Až na dno zrady Emanuel Moravec, page 205.
UHLÍŘ, Moravec II., page 61.
NA-NárS, carton 106, inventory number 1533, order number 51. Testimony of Zdeněk Mančal of
15 June 1946.
NA-NárS, carton 106, inventory number 1533, order number 51, post-war testimonies against
Alois Kříž, especially those of Jaromír Šimandl, Josef Šváb and Antonín Rakouš.
342
entrance, but was arrested by Prague citizens, who upon learning his name,
proceeded to beat him severely. Contemporary photos show him being led away
barefoot with blood streaming down his face.1045
The Czechoslovak National Court later tried Kříž on charges of propagating Nazism
together with four other activist journalists, two of whom – Antonín J. Kožíšek and
Emil Šourek – we have encountered frequently as contributors to Kříž’s various
series.1046 During the trial, Kříž admitted that his work “must have made a very bad
impression abroad” and that it certainly had also not been exactly useful for “our
resistance abroad”, i.e., for the Czechoslovak Government in Exile.1047 In his
defense, he blamed the content of his programming on his former German
supervisors,1048 while on the other hand, actually insisting that he had only taken on
the job to protect society from a far more “willing and compliant”1049 Czech
collaborator in Nazi hands. Undoubtedly, Kříž was referring to his long-term rival,
Vojtěch-Adalbert Musil, the SD and Gestapo informant who had broadcast antiCzechoslovak programming from Vienna during the Munich Crisis.1050 Not
surprisingly, Kříž’s excuse held little credibility given the sheer volume of his pro-Nazi
propaganda work and when compared to the score of testimonies from his former
colleagues, attesting to the fact that he was a “person 100%-dedicated to the idea of
German National Socialism”1051 and/or a “one-hundred percent activist”.1052 Perhaps
the least-incriminating statement among them came from his former secretary, Eliška
Hlochová, who said Kříž “wanted the good of the Czech people, but he imagined that
to be in a certain compromise with German hegemony”.1053
Undoubtedly more telling about Alois Kříž’s character were sentiments he expressed
in his trial after the war. In an offer that belied any insight into his own culpability let
alone any higher concept of morality, Kříž declared to investigators at some point
“that now he would be willing to work for Communism in the same way that he had
1045
NA-NárS, carton 114, call number 269. Photographs of Kříž during the Prague Uprising.
The other two were Rudolf Novák, who received the death penalty as well and Gustav Dörfl.
1047
NA-NárS, carton 106, call number 51. Testimony of Alois Kříž of 29 November 1945, page 2
1048
NA-NárS, carton 106, call number 51. Testimony of Alois Kříž of 29 November 1945, page 5.
1049
NA-NárS, carton 106, call number 51. Testimony of the accused Alois Kříž of 18 June 1946, page
5.
1050
AMV-Mapa 10/10, page 157 and NA-NárS, carton 114, call number 268. Letter from former
Vlajka-member Jindřich Hasman to Kříž’s attorney of 10 March 1947.
1051
NA-NárS, carton 106, call number 51. Testimony of Karel Remeš of 13 June 1946.
1052
Ibid. Testimony of Antonín Paleček of 13 June 1946.
1053
In the original: “chtěl dobro českých lidí, ale představoval si je v určitém kompromisu s německou
nadvládou.” NA-NárS, carton 106, call number 51. Testimony of Eliška Hlochová of 14 June 1946.
1046
343
worked for Nazism.”1054 Thus, in his own mind, the man who had inter alia publicly
called for the extermination of his Jewish neighbors1055 a few years earlier had only
been doing a job. Had she attended Kříž’s trial, Hannah Arendt could have
formulated her concept of the “banality of evil”1056 15 years earlier and based it on
the example of an arguably even more mediocre office clerk criminal than Adolf
Eichmann. Kříž and Kožíšek received death sentences and were executed on 26
March 1947.1057 Šourek was sentenced to 20 years hard labor, but died shortly after
an amnesty in 1954.1058
After leaving NOÚZ, Karel Korp, jobbed with the National Solidarity for several
months, but found a more permanent position as the secretary of the Czech League
against Bolshevism (Česká liga proti bolševismu) starting in March of 1944. There,
as the war progressed against Germany, he managed to reduce the League’s official
membership from 30,000 to 10,000. Furthermore, about one week before the
outbreak of the Prague Uprising, he managed to destroy the League’s main
documentation, which might otherwise have been unpleasant for many people
among the Protectorate’s Czech establishment.1059 He was tried for the same crimes
as Kříž and Opluštil, but ultimately sentenced to the minimum penalty of just five
years in a labor camp. Korp was released on 10 May 1950.1060 Initially, Korp was
also investigated for denouncing his young subordinate, Jan Jílovský as a Jew in
hiding, which had led to the latter’s suicide. However, three years after the events,
key witnesses were either dead, deported or unable to remember the exact
progression of events. Korp had been fortunate.
Although similarly culpable, Josef Opluštil was sentenced to only 16 years at hard
labor for the same crimes as Kříž, but was amnestied after 10 years.1061 Somehow, a
mitigating circumstance for Opluštil was that he had not created his sketches out of
1054
NA-NárS, carton 106, call number 46. Characteristics of the accused Alois Kříž.
Rozhlasová korespondence, volume IX, edition 253, (6 November 1941).
1056
See: ARENDT, Hannah: Eichmann in Jerusalem, A Report on the Banality of Evil, Penguin
Classics, New York, 2006. Originally published in 1963.
1057
Rudolf Novák, A. J. Kožíšek, Emil Šourek and Gustav Dörfl were all tried in the same case. Novák
and Kožíšek also received death sentences. Šourek and Dörfl received 15 and 20 years
respectively. NA-NárS, carton 115, call number 1609, order number 286-290. Recording of the
execution of Kříž, Novák, and Kožíšek of 26 March 1947.
1058
KONČELÍK, KÖPPLOVÁ, KRYŠPÍNOVÁ: Český tisk, page 248, footnote 371.
1059
SOA-MLS Praha, LS5994/46, carton 566, pages 98-102. Defense documents of Karel Korp of 2
April 1947.
1060
SOA-MLS, LS5994/46, carton 566, page 158. Announcement of the completion of the penalty of
10 May 1950.
1061
SOA-MLS Praha, LS125/48, case against Josef Opluštil, carton 741, pages 217 and 245.
1055
344
true Fascist conviction, but simply as a desperate ne’er-do-well. His friend Jaroslav
Mrkvička managed to escape Prague during the confusion of the uprising between 5
and 9 May 1945, initially even passing himself off as a partisan in the regained
Bohemian borderlands (Sudetenland). There, he joined the Social Democratic Party
(at least his fourth political home at that point) and presided over the District
Administrative Commission in Planá u Mariánských Lázní. In that position, Mrkvička
excelled in the confiscation of property – especially villas, automobiles, and precious
metals – from the German civilian population and at distributing national
administrator positions1062 in German firms among his friends and family. Mrkvička
was arrested in September 1945 and sentenced in May 1948 for propagating
Fascism and membership in Fascist organizations to 20 years in labor camps, of
which he served 12.1063 He was very fortunate that his involvement in the
Frankenberger case was not proven, or he could have received a death sentence for
denunciation.
Paradoxically, Josef Rejthar, alias ERJÉ, who had contributed some of the most
offensive parts of the “Political sketches” escaped justice after the war altogether.
After the “Political sketches” series ended, Rejthar assumed the position of the
director of a school for boys in Prague-Nusle.1064 At the end of the war, he managed
to flee Prague on 6 May 1945. His family, who remained behind in the Czechoslovak
capital, later told the authorities that Rejthar had fled to Austria, which under the
circumstances may or may not have been true.1065 Given his proven denunciation of
a fellow Czech during the occupation and his active propagation of Nazism at Czech
Radio, in Vlajka and other Fascist publications and as an active public speaker in
Moravec’s Veřejná osvětová služba,1066 Rejthar would very likely have followed Alois
Kříž to the gallows.
After his role as a drunk Jan Masaryk in Hvězdy nad Baltimore, Vlasta Burian spent
some months in prison after the war. He lost his theater and was forbidden to
1062
Czechoslovak Presidential Decree No. 5 of 19 May 1945 declared all property belonging to
Germans, Hungarians and other people deemed unreliable vis-à-vis the state, including also
ethnic-Czech members of the Vlajka and similar organizations, as subject to “national
administration”. Presidential Decree No. 108 of 25 October 1945 then legalized the confiscation of
this property. See Collection of Laws and Decrees of the Czechoslovak State 1945, pages 7 and
248.
1063
SOA-MLS Praha, LS104/48, case against Jaroslav Mrkvička, carton 735, Urteil im Namen der
Republik of 26.V.1948.
1064
AMV M2: 10024, page 256.
1065
AMV 305-632-5, pages 138 und AMV-M2, Signatur 10024, page 256.
1066
AMV-315-105-3, page 44.
345
perform in public for at least five years. Only in the 1950’s did he make a small
comeback, but he was never again to reach the heights he had previously. Burian
died in January of 1962.1067 A similar fate awaited actor Čeněk Schlögel/Šlégl who
received six months in prison and a fine for his activity in the “Political sketches”. The
court recognized the mitigating circumstance that he had acted as he had to some
extent to protect his Jewish son-in-law and half-Jewish grandchild. In the 1950’s
Schlögel/Šlégl worked delivering heating coal. He died in 1970.1068
The Thürmer Era
One of the most curious fates was that of Ferdinand Thürmer himself. Insurgents
reportedly arrested Thürmer at Czech Radio along with Kříž and activist journalist
Karel Werner already on the first day of the Prague Uprising, 5 May 1945.1069
Thereafter, the Czechs handed him over to the Soviet NKVD, the pre-cursor to the
KGB, at the end of May 1945.1070 As we know, Thürmer survived the war to write his
apology in the spring of 1950. Unfortunately, it is not known exactly under what
circumstances he wrote it. According to his relatives at the Ferdinand Thürmer piano
manufacturing company, Thürmer immigrated to Great Britain after the war. This
combination of facts has led some, notably the British author Stephen Weeks, to
speculate as to whether Thürmer might have been an agent working for the British.
Attempts to ascertain the truth on this matter with the British Secret Intelligence
Service MI6 in London, met with their traditional and altogether unsatisfactory refusal
either to confirm or deny such information. Thus, one is left with the knowledge that a
long-term Nazi and high-ranking SS-man initially handed over to the Soviet NKVD,
eventually returned to live out his life in Britain, while so many others, including for
example the Swedish diplomat and humanitarian worker Raoul Wallenberg,
disappeared forever in the Soviet penal system.
Thürmer’s second-in-command, Horst Pabel, failed to escape Prague at the end of
the war, was arrested and interned. The Czechoslovak authorities initiated
1067
http://www.csfd.cz/herec/1445-burian-vlasta/ Česko-Slovenská filmová databáze. Biografie des
Vlasta Burian (September 2007).
1068
SOA-MLS Praha, LS2829/46, carton 40, case against Čeněk Schlögel/Šlégl. Judgment of 12.
March 1947 and www.csfd.cz/herec/3301-slegl-cenek/ Česko-Slovenská filmová databáze.
Biography of Čeněk Schlögel/Šlégl (September 2007).
1069
NA-NárS, carton 106, call number 46. Letter of Major Antonín Rakouš to the National Court of 21
April 1946.
1070
AMV301-5-1, page 66.
346
proceedings against him with the intent of trying Pabel before an Extraordinary
People’s Court. While in internment, however, Pabel contracted dysentery and died
at a hospital for infectious diseases in Prague’s Salmovská Street on 17 August
1945, about two weeks short of his 34th birthday.1071 One can only assume that his
arrogant prophesy about never learning Czech, as he would never need the
language, did not prove true in the end. Perhaps symptomatic of the bureaucratic
process unfolding around the prosecution of post-war retribution cases, which were
to involve tens of thousands of individuals, the Czechoslovak authorities continued
collecting evidence against Pabel until well into the next year. The case against him
was only closed, in fact, on 21 September 1946, some 13 months after his death.1072
Unfortunately, I was unable to determine the fate of the Sendeleiter of the Sender
Böhmen, Emil Eugen Hohrath. His police registration card indicates that he was
detained on 5 May 1945. However, there appears to be no further information on his
fate in the Czech Republic’s main archives.1073 Presumably, he was either
repatriated to Germany or died an anonymous death in the difficult conditions
prevailing in one of the many internment centers in post-war Prague. Judging from
internet sources, the Station-Group’s director for all things technical, Gottfried
Caspar, returned to Austria after the war where he continued to work in
broadcasting, eventually representing Austria at European radio and television
frequency conferences held at Stockholm in 1952 and 1961.1074
As for the main Czechs who worked in the Radio during the Thürmer era, more than
a dozen faced suspension from service and in some cases prosecution after
liberation. Personnel Director Karel Remeš, by contrast, advanced to become the
head of Czechoslovak Radio’s administration after the war. However, as a highly
active member of the democratic ČSNS Party, the Communist-run Action Committee
within the company removed him from his position already on 26 February 1948, the
day after the Communist putsch. Thereafter, they assumed that he fled the
country.1075 Czech Sendeleiter Zdeněk Morávek lost his position with the company
already in June of 1945. Although, virtually all leading members of the Radio’s staff,
the Czech National Council and important political figures, such as Milada Horáková,
1071
SOA-MLS Praha, LS1427/46, carton 273, page 36.
SOA-MLS Praha, LS1427/46, carton 273, page 42.
1073
Email to the author from Mgr. Martin Sovák, archivist at the SOA, Prague of 15 October 2010.
1074
CASPAR, Gottfried: Ein Leben für den Rundfunk, article by Gerhard Hnatek 1993, Wiener
Phonomuseum, 1060 Wien, quoted at www.scheida.at/antennennostalgie.htm (April 2011).
1075
AČRo, personnel file.
1072
347
testified on his behalf and he was later cleared of any wrong-doing, Morávek still was
not allowed to return to post-war Czechoslovak Radio.1076 While the new authorities
around the Communist-led Ministry of Information could not disprove that Morávek
had faithfully served the interests of the nation during the occupation, Morávek was
also unable to dispute the fact that he had faithfully served Ferdinand Thürmer’s
orders until the outbreak of the Prague Uprising on 5 May 1945.
1076
JEŠUTOVÁ, Eva: Budovatelský rozhlas 1945-1948, IN: JEŠUTOVÁ, Eva et al: Od mikrofonu
k posluchačům, z osmi desetiletí českého rozhlasu, Český Rozhlas, Praha 2003, pages 183-232,
here page 190.
348
16. Conclusions
If now we look again at the questions raised at the beginning of this study, it seems
quite clear that, in terms of the physical nature of their broadcast policy, the Nazi
occupiers treated the Czechs in very much the same ways as they treated the
ethnic-German segments of the population. This is borne out by the facts of the rise
in radio listenership by 48% and the expansion of the station network – Plzeň with
preparation work in České Budějovice and Jihlava – during the Protectorate period;
the very limited instances of direct punitive confiscations of non-Jewish, Czechowned radio receivers; and the increase in the average broadcast day by more than
five hours between 1939 and 1945, etc. Whether that alone can serve as proof of the
Nazis’ intent to Germanize much of the Czech population is, of course, highly
questionable. Nevertheless, it does indicate that the Nazis approached the Czech
population in the same way in terms of promoting the medium of radio itself, if not
ultimately in terms of the actual content of radio programming.
Nazi broadcasting policy in the Protectorate did also play a role in their other
strategic goals and objectives throughout Europe. Most notably, the Česká hodina
programs’ broadcast via the Reichssender Böhmen was intended to deceive
listeners and policymakers abroad as to the real extent of Nazi interference in the socalled Czech cultural autonomy. The implications of that were necessarily the intent
to make the Nazi occupation regime appear to be more benevolent and liberal vis-àvis the Czechs living in the midst of the Reich than it was in reality. Judging how
efficacious that strategy ultimately was lay beyond the scope of this study, however.
There are fewer satisfactory answers to the question as to what specific strategies,
the invaders developed to influence the Czech population with radio programming
after having so thoroughly offended and maligned the Czech nation through this very
medium in the period 1938/39. In fact, they do not seem to have developed any
strategy in that regard at all. On the contrary, broadcast material maligning the
Czech Government in Exile and former leaders and institutions of the First Republic
continued unabated throughout the entire existence of the Protectorate including
even the, by contrast, more-subtle Thürmer era. The occupation authorities seem
simply to have relied on the fact that the Czechs were militarily occupied by the
German Wehrmacht and any offense they might have taken or might take from anti-
349
Czechoslovak propaganda was simply the Czechs’ own problem and no concern of
the Nazis.
Also, while this study has depicted in detail the contours of Nazi broadcast policy visà-vis the Czech provinces, which is presumably its main contribution to research on
the subject, it would not be inaccurate to claim that this study has portrayed
sufficiently all of the target-group-specific sub-strategies that existed for influencing
the Czech population. Quite clearly, the Nazi propaganda authorities used political
satire as a tool to influence the Czechs, which they did not use on the German
population in general. That was a general population-wide difference in strategy,
however. We have reviewed the important sub-group of factory workers. However,
there were also strategies to speak to specific sub-segments of society, such as
women, youths, farmers, businessmen and others. Regrettably I could not deal with
all of them. One can only hope that other researchers will dedicate time and energy
to looking into some of those important societal groups, as well, and further round
out the picture.
Figure 10.1: Germanization/Nazification Factor (GNF) = as a percentage of TOTAL AIRTIME
All Czech (CZ) medium-wave (MW) stations = Prague I, Brno, Moravská Ostrava
(Week 9/1939 includes Prague II-Mělník; week 9/1945 includes Plzeň)
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
8.3
3.1
16.7
8.5
3.4
13.4
7.8
0.5
5.1
3.9
2.6
14.4
11.9
4.3
2.7
14.4
13.6
11.6
13
14.7
22.2
24.6
16.9
15.5
7.1
2.3
Week
9/1939
Week
Week
Week
48/1939
48/1940
48/1941
Music by German composers
Week
9/1942
Czech-language pro-German/Nazi
Week
Week
Week
48/1942
48/1943
48/1944
German-language talks
Week
9/1945
GNF as % of total airtime
Now let us look at Nazi broadcast policy to the occupied Czech provinces across the
entire occupation, as expressed in the Germanization-Nazification Factor (GNF).
Figure 10.1 illustrates that, with the exception of the heavy German-language burden
imposed on Brno, which skewed the results for week 48/1939, it progressed from an
350
initial phase based on the passive measures of censorship in the period of 19391940 to a more active inclusion of pro-German and pro-Nazi program content in the
period of 1940 to early 1941. After the summer of 1941, the active intrusion of
Czech-Fascist-oriented personnel into Czech Radio (Kříž, Opluštil, Korp) and the
more proactive role by the likes of the Sudeten-German Georg Schneider led to a
political orientation of programming based primarily on ČNST-Vlajka precepts, but
also to a shocking lowering of the tone of discourse. This state-of-affairs worsened
dramatically during the period I have termed the Interregnum between Scurla and
Thürmer.
While Thürmer later redressed a lot of the worst abuses – made program content
more factual and more practically useful, eliminated the flagrant vulgarity of
Schneider and Opluštil and cut back on Czech-language pro-German or pro-Nazi
propaganda coming out of Kříž’s office – he by no means eradicated Nazi ideology
or emphasized pure entertainment alone. Furthermore, German-language talks
programming remained consistently high at Czech Radio throughout the entire
Thürmer era at around 15% of airtime. As we have seen, the GNF was at 31.8% of
airtime in November 1941, prior to Thürmer’s take-over. In the final week analyzed
from February 1945, it was only marginally lower at 29.6%. While that was a great
improvement over the 47.3% GNF from March of 1942, it was hardly the complete
fulfillment of Thürmer’s declared goal of making the Czechs consider Czech Radio
their “own” again. On the contrary, the consistently high level of German-language
programming speaks more to the abuse of Czech resources for specifically German
purposes, with little or no use for the Czech population, such as the
Kameradschaftsdienst. To this, we have to add the immeasurable bi-lingual program
announcements, which made much of the programming on the Protectorate’s
stations, especially its main genre music, virtually as accessible as any programming
on the normal German Reichssender.
This leads us then to the question of resistance and collaboration at Czech Radio
and the relations between Germans and Czechs within the institution during the
occupation. As we have seen, all of these factors varied greatly throughout the
course of the occupation and the changing circumstances that both of the two main
sides in the conflict faced. A key factor here, however, appears to have been the
degree of professionalism of the Nazi personnel delegated to deal with Czech Radio.
Scurla’s appointment to Prague in early 1940 suggests a very low priority ranking for
351
the propaganda needs of the Protectorate within the greater Nazi agenda of
conquest in Europe at the time. From the perspective of Berlin, the Czechs were
already occupied, in fact, occupied virtually without resistance. With more important
short-term goals at hand, Goebbels was not apparently willing to invest much of
value into a dialogue with the Czech nation via radio propaganda. Lothar Scurla’s
appointment to head broadcasting in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia was,
therefore, unfortunate for several reasons. As we have seen, he was much younger
than Czech Radio’s leadership, but far worse, he also lacked the meaningful
broadcasting experience to speak with professional authority. While his authority was
extensive, it was based only on the unhappy political realities of the day. Being
subjected to a supervisor so lacking in radio expertise must have felt like a direct
affront to Czech Radio’s management at the time. No highly experienced radio
professional would have found it easy or even acceptable to take orders from a
much less experienced party bureaucrat. The conflict between Marek and Scurla
illustrates that fact all too well. As for the Czechs, references to Scurla in post-war
testimony by Czech Radio staff, especially by Remeš, seem simply to radiate a
feeling of disaffection bordering on contempt. The relationship undoubtedly became
even more problematic when Scurla’s orders were passed on by Sudeten-German
former Radiojournal colleagues, Maras and Schneider, whom Czech Radio’s
leadership and staff viewed as perfidious traitors, or other Sudeten-German
employees, such as Smutnik in Brno and Müller in Moravská Ostrava. Thus, the
entire situation and the personal and professional relationships involved were highly
problematic from the very outset, and Czech Radio’s staff implemented a strategy of
passive resistance to the greatest extent possible.
After the removal or departure of nearly all of Czech Radio’s leading management in
the period 1941 to early 1942, the Nazis and Czech-Fascists implemented a virtual
free-for-all to the benefit of their own issues, world-view and for their own pecuniary
advantage as well. Post-war testimonies by studio technicians, producers and the
like attest to their frustration at having to work under people like Opluštil or Kříž, but
under the circumstances their only option for direct resistance would have been to
leave Czech Radio altogether.
By contrast, the advent of the Thürmer era attests to Berlin’s readiness to invest
greater resources in its media work vis-à-vis what Heydrich and others saw as an
unpeaceful territory of what was de facto a heartland of the Reich at the time. With
352
Thürmer’s emphasis on greater factual content and more professional approaches to
program creation and quality, e.g., the inclusion of more factual reportages at the
expense of poor-quality political lectures, seems to have made for a time of better
intra-institutional relations. Thürmer and even his negative counterpart Pabel were
after all radio professionals with considerable experience. Their Czech subordinates
may have regarded them with suspicion and in the case of Pabel, with fear or alarm
at times, but at least they did not have call to disregard either Thürmer or Pabel as
professionals. Undoubtedly, Thürmer’s improvement in staff wages, his call for
former officers to join the official Czech officers’ organization and his removal of the
telephone tapping devices will also have gone a distance to improving Czech Radio
employees’ confidence in his leadership. This seems to have been a successful
strategy in the end. Ultimately, while many of them prepared to help overthrow the
Nazi regime in the Czech provinces, and while some of them like Zdeněk Mančal
were even instrumental in starting the Prague Uprising, as Ferdinand Thürmer
himself noted, Czech Radio’s staff also went about their work faithfully as
professionals right up to the very end of the Protectorate.
If now we take a step back and ask the broader question – was National Socialist
broadcast policy in the so-called Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia successful? –
the answer would depend greatly on what segment of that policy the observer means
and what he or she expected the goals of that policy to be. Regarding programming
content, if the intent of such policy was to Germanize a large percentage of the
Czech population, we can state clearly that it failed utterly. The vigor with which the
Czechs and Slovaks expelled the indigenous German population of Czechoslovakia
and liquidated virtually all German institutions in post-war Czechoslovak society
attests to that fact. Most Czechs did not come to feel like “new Germans”, but
remained Czechs, and program content never changed that fact. If the goal of that
policy was to create a negative image of the Czechoslovak Government in Exile and
the Allies of the Anti-Hitler Coalition, then most likely it also failed. Photo
documentation of the warm reception with which the Czechs greeted their liberators
in May 1945 prove that.1077 The reasons for these failures presumably lie in the fact
that Nazi propaganda, which habitually worked with the lie, simply did not have any
credibility among the Czechs. Furthermore, Nazi broadcast policy vis-à-vis the
1077
See for instance the relavent editions of Svět v obrazech for the period.
353
Czechs aimed for a very low goal in general. In its initial phase it worked with
offensive arrogance. Even in the more tolerable Thürmer era, the best he hoped to
achieve was to give the Czechs the impression that Nazi hegemony was the “lesser
of two evils”. That was ultimately a false dichotomy, however. For the Czech nation,
the choice was not between German hegemony and something evil, but between
German hegemony and national existence itself.
If, however, we think of the segment of broadcast policy related to the expansion of
radio distribution among the Czech public in general, then we have to admit that this
clearly was a great success. An increase in radio ownership by 48% during the
course of the greatest war in human history is no small feat after all. At the same
time, it undoubtedly remains a great irony of media history that precisely this
expansion of the medium of radio within the Czech population, which the Nazi
occupation authorities supported and encouraged, made it possible for more Czechs
to tune into foreign broadcasts.
354
17. Source Materials
Unpublished Sources
Archiv České advokátní komory
(Archive of the Czech Bar Association)
• File of Jaroslav Mrkvička, Doctor of Law.
Archiv Českého rozhlasu, Prague
(AČRo – Czech Radio Archives)
• Personnel files for the main Czech Radio employees as quoted.
• HM 11/580, TO PMR-ÚTDS: Souborný přehled pokynů pro tiskovou přehlídku
platných dne 30. června 1939, (“Collective Overview of the Directives for Press
Inspection Valid as of 30 June 1939”).
• Minutes of the regular program conferences as quote.
• SM-7/22, Hausrundschreiben Nr. 35/Oběžník číslo 35 (company circular No. 35)
on travel cost per diems of 8 June 1942.
• Various recordings as quoted.
Archiv města Ústí nad Labem (Municipal Archive of Ústí nad Labem)
• České státní reálné gymnasium v Ústí nad Labem (archival collection Czech
State High School in Ústí nad Labem).
Archiv Ministerstva vnitra České republiky, Prague
(AMV – Archive of the Interior Ministry of the Czech Republic)
• Files for virtually all people mentioned in this study, as quoted.
Bundesarchiv, Berlin
(BA – Federal Archives, Berlin). Especially files on Von Gregory, Scurla, and
Thürmer from the collections:
• Personalvorgänge von Beschäftigten aller Kammern (Personnel files for
Employees of all Cultural Chambers).
• Personalvorgänge betr. Rundfunkangehörige, A-Z (Personnel files on Radio
Employees, A-Z).
• PK/Parteikorrespondenz (Party Correspondence).
• RS/Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamt SS (Race and Settlement Main Office
SS).
• RSKII, Personal und Sachakten, A-Z (Personell and Topical files A-Z).
• SSO/SS-Führerpersonalakten (Personell files on SS Leaders).
Česká pošta, s.p. Poštovní muzeum, Prague
(Czech Postal Museum)
• Maps.
• Collections of Legal Codes and Official Directives, volumes 1939-1945.
355
Deutsches Rundfunkarchiv, Frankfurt am Main
• THÜRMER, Ferdinand: Sendergruppe Böhmen-Mähren, [“Station-Group
Bohemia-Moravia”], an unpublished report of Thürmer’s activities dated May
1950.
Державний архів Житомирської області, Zhitomir, Ukraine
(Derzhavnyi arkhiv Zhytomyrs'koi oblasti, State Archive of Zhitomir Oblast)
• Information on Jurij Grinenko
Národní archiv, Prague
(NA, National Archive, previously SÚA), particularly the archival collections:
• Emanuel Moravec (Moravec - AMV 39)
• Ministerstvo vnitra – tajné 1938 – 1954 (MV-T – Interior Ministry – Secret 1938 –
1954), carton 443, inventory number 5178.
• Národní Soud (NS – National Court for Crimes Against the National Honor, in
post-war Czechoslovakia).
• Case against Alois Kříž (cartons 106—108).
• Case against Hubert Masařík (TNS 17/46, carton 60).
• Case against Václav Stočes, Arnošt Hais and František Kolář from NOÚZ
(TNS 15/47, carton 166).
• Case against František Teuner and accomplices (Board for Youth Education
in Bohemia and Moravia – cartons 142, 143, 151).
• Národní souručenství (Czech National Solidarity).
• Německé státní občanství (NstO – German state citizenship), registery F1.
• Policejní ředitelství v Praze (NA-PŘ Praha – Police Directorate of Prague),
Particularly police registration cards and general police files for individuals as
indicated.
• Státní tajemník při Úřadu říšského protektora a Německé státní ministerstvo
(ÚŘP-ST-AMV 109, State Secretary in the Office of the Reichsprotektor and
German State Ministry for Bohemia and Moravia – Karl Hermann Frank).
• Úřad říšského protektora (ÚŘP – Office of the Reichsprotektor).
• Zahraniční úřad Berlin (AA-Foreign Office Berlin), carton 81, 136-81-3.
Státní oblastní archiv, Prague
(SOA – State Territorial Archive), archival collections:
• Krajský soud obchodní v Praze (KSO – District Trade Court in Prague).
• File of the company International Business Machines (IBM), Prague (CXVI142, carton 2398 – Georg Schneider was an important official of this firm).
• File of the company Emanuel Egerer Sohn (A V104).
• Krajský soud trestní v Praze (KST – District Criminal Court in Prague).
• Case against Georg Schneider (TkXX15.682/47, carton 13).
• Case against Karel Hájek (NtII 9/46).
• Mimořádný lidový soud v Praze (MLS–Praha, Extraordinary People’s Court in
Prague, post-war Czechoslovak court).
• Case against Vlastimil Burian (LS1261/45).
• Case against Walter Jacobi, (LS 560/47).
• Case against Josef Klička, (LS 2944/46, carton 402).
• Case against Karel Korp (LS5994/46, carton 566).
356
Case against Jaroslav Mrkvička (LS104/48, carton 735).
Case against Josef Opluštil (LS125/48, carton 741).
Case against Anna Opluštilová (LS2231/46, carton 353).
Case against Horst Pabel (LS1427/46, carton 273).
Case against Miroslav Potužník (LSXIII 588/48-29).
Case against Čeněk Schlögel/Šlégl (LS2515/46, carton 372 and LS2829/46,
carton 40).
• Case against František Sedláček (LS5380/46).
• Case against Artur Söhnel, (LSV1392/46).
• Case against Jiří Arvéd Smichovský (LS5121/46).
Německý zvláštní soud Praha (German Special Court in Prague).
• Case against Karel Vaňa and 10 co-defendants (including the butcher Karel
Hájek – 4KLS170/42, carton 21).
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Státní okresní archiv Opava
(State District Archive Opava)
Information on the activity of the radio station Troppau/Opava.
Všeodborový archiv, Česko-moravská konfederace odborových svazů, Prague
(VOA-ČMKOS, Pan-Union Archive of the Bohemian-Moravian Confederation of
Trade Union Associations), archival collections:
• Čestný soud (Court of Honor, post-war period).
• Case against Josef Klička, carton 5, envelope 54.
• Case against Karel Korp.
• Case against František Sedláček.
• Národní odborová ústředna zaměstnanecká (NOÚZ, cartons, 213 and 214).
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Kolíně, (“My City Kolín, Jews in Kolín”) Regionální museum v Kolíně, Astroprint,
Poděbrady, 2010
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Gazette of the Ministry of Transport and Technology in Prague”), Jahrgang 1942,
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Beaufort A.G., Prag, 1942.
Pražský adresář 1937-1938 (“Prague Address Book 1937-1938”), Státní tiskárna v
Praze, 1937.
Ročenka Československého Rozhlasu 1938, (“Czechoslovak Broadcasting
Yearbook 1938”), published by Radiojoural čsl. zpravodjství radiotelefonické spol.
s.r.o. v Praze, Státní Tiskárna v Praze, ca. 1938.
ROTHKIRCHENOVÁ, Livie: Osud Židů v Čechách a na Moravě v letech 1938-1945,
(“The Fate of Jews in Bohemia and Moravia in the Years 1939-1945”), IN: Osud Židů
v Protektorátu 1939-1945, (“The Fate of Jews in the Protectorate 1939-1945”),
Trizonia, Praha 1991.
362
Rozhlasová ročenka za období od 1. ledna 1938 do 15. března 1939, ("Broadcasting
Yearbook for the period of 1 January 1938 through 15 March 1939”), Český Rozhlas
(publisher), Tiskárna Protektorátu Čechy a Morava, Praha, ca. 1939.
Sammlung der Gesetze und Verordnungen 1939—Sbírka zákonů a nařízení 1939
("Collection of Laws and Decrees 1939", legal code for the Protectorate of Bohemia
and Moravia), Tiskárna Protektorátu Čechy a Morava, Praha, 1939.
SEEMANN, Richard (Ed.): Ghetto Litzmannstadt 1941-1944, Dokumenty a výpovědi
o životě českých židů v lodžském ghettu, (“Ghetto Litzmannstadt 1941-1944,
Documents and Testimonies about the Life of Czech Jews in the Ghetto Łódź”),
Institut Terezínské Iniciativy, Praha, 2000.
Seznam telefonních ústředen, hovoren a účastníků sítě pražské 1931 (“List of
Telephone Centrals, Call offices and Subscribers in the Prague Network 1931”),
vydalo Ředitelství pošt a telegrafů v Praze, 1931.
Seznam telefonních ústředen, hovoren a účastníků sítě pražské 1939 (“List of
Telephone Centrals, Call offices and Subscribers in the Prague Network 1939”),
vydalo Ředitelství pošt a telegrafů v Praze, 1939.
Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Protektorat Böhmen und Mähren 1944, (“Statistical
Yearbook for the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia 1944”), Statistisches
Zentralamt in Prag (publisher), Verlag des Statistischen Zentralamtes in Prag,
Buchdruckerei Melantrich in Prag, 1944.
Statistická ročenka Republiky Československé 1938 (“Statistical Yearbook for the
Czechoslovak Republic 1938”), Orbis, Praha, 1938.
Terezínská Pamětní Kniha/Theresienstädter Gedenkbuch, Terezínská Iniciativa, vol.
I-II Melantrich, Praha 1995, vol. III Academia Verlag, Prag, 2000.
Theresienstädter Studien und Dokumente 1996; KÁRNÝ, Miroslav, KEMPER,
Raimund, KÁRNÁ, Margita (Eds.); Nadace Terezínská Iniciativa, Academia, Prag
1996.
UHLÍŘ, Jan B.: Emanuel Moravec Český nacionální socialista (“Emanuel Moravec
Czech National Socialist”), IN: Historie a Vojenství (“History and Warfare”), Časopis
Vojenského Historického Ústavu, volume LV, edition 2/2006 pages 25 to 39, and
edition 3/2006 pages 49 to 63.
ULLRICH, Oskar: Der Grosse Irrweg der Tschechen, (“The Great False Path of the
Czechs”) Volk und Reich Bücherring, Prag, 1943.
VAUGHAN, David: Battle for the Airwaves, Radio and the 1938 Munich Crisis/Bitva o
vlny, Rozhlas v mnichovské krizi, Radioservis Cook Communications, Praha, 2008.
VENUS, Theodor: Bis zum Ende wird gespielt – zur Geschichte des ›Reichssenders
Wien‹ im Dritten Reich, (“Playing to the End – on the History of the ›Reichssender
Vienna‹ in the Third Reich“), IN: RATHKOLB, Oliver; DUCHKOWITSCH, Wolfgang;
363
HAUSJELL, Fritz (Hg.), Die veruntreute Wahrheit. Hitlers Propagandisten in
Österreich '38, (“The Misappropriated Truth. Hitler’s Propaganadists in Austria ’38”),
Otto Müller Verlag, Salzburg, 1988.
Věstník Ministerstva Pošt, (“Official Gazette of the Ministry of Posts”), rok 1945 (od
24. května do 31. prosince 1945), vydalo Ministerstvo Pošt, Tiskl E. Beaufort A.S.,
Praha, 1945.
Die Welt in Maß und Zahl, Statistische Beilage zu Herders Welt- und
Wirtschaftsatlas, Herder & Co. G.m.b.H. Verlagsbuchhandlung, Freiburg im
Breisgau, 1932.
ZAJÍČEK, Karel, et al: Český národ soudí K. H. Franka, (“The Czech Nation Judges
K.H. Frank”), Ministerstvo Informace, Praha, 1947.
Internet-Based Sources
www.bbc.co.uk/heritage/in_depth/70tv/tvaswe/index.shtml Official BBC homepage
(April 2009).
On German radio history:
www.br-online.de/wissenbildung/collegeradio/medien/geschichte/goebbels/hintergrund (Mai 2006)
Genealogical website on Grinenko:
www.familysearch.org/Eng/Search/IGI/individual_record.asp?recid=100264766415&l
ds=1&region=5&regionfriendly=Continental+Europe&frompage=99 (March 2011).
Original Anti-Semitic articles and documents:
www.holocaust.cz/cz2/resources/documents/antisemitism/cz_pbm/cz_pbm
2011).
(April
On Frank Argus:
www.libri.cz/databaze/film/heslo/44 (March 2011)
On Leopold Bena.
www.slovacko.cz/osobnost/2/ (March 2011).
On Gottfried Caspar:
www.scheida.at/antennennostalgie.htm (April 2011)
GOEBBELS, Joseph: Das Eherne Herz, Reden und Aufsätze aus den Jahren 1941/42
von Joseph Goebbels, (“The Iron Heart, Speeches and Essays from the Years
1941/42 by Joseph Goebbels”), originally published by Zentralverlag der NSDAP,
Franz Eher Nachfolger, München, 1943. Available online at Community Books Open
Source Internet Archive:
ia600400.us.archive.org/12/items/DasEherneHerz/GoebbelsJosephDasEherneHerz1942224S..pdf (April 2011).
364
Universität Hamburg: Lexikon verfolgter Musiker und Musikerinnen der NS-Zeit
(“Dictionary of Persecuted Musicians of the Nazi Period”),
www.lexm.uni-hamburg.de (March 2011).
On the history of French television:
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Histoire_de_la_t%C3%A9l%C3%A9vision_fran%C3%A7aise
Wikipedia (April 2009).
Biography of Vlasta Burian:
www.csfd.cz/herec/1445-burian-vlasta/ (September 2007).
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www.vlastaburian.webz.cz/DVB.html (August 2007)
On the Lend-Lease Acts of 1941:
en.wikisource.org/wiki/Lend_Lease_Act,_11_March_1941 (March 2011)
On Emil Artur Longen:
www.volny.cz/czfilm/Osobnosti/Longen.htm (August 2007)
On Harry Osten:
GÖSSEL, Gabriel: “Fonogram” Týdeník rozhlasu, Jahrgang 2005, Nummer 12, (14.
III. 2005), www.radioservis-as.cz/archiv05/1205/12pub3.htm (September 2007).
On Přemysl Pitter:
VAUGHAN, David: Přemysl Pitter the Good Fundamentalist.
www.radio.cz/en/section/books/premysl-pitter-the-good-fundamentalist
2011).
(March
On Arwed Georg Smichowski:
STÁTNÍK, Dalibor: Agenti nacistických bezpečnostních složek Gestapa a
Sicherheitsdienstu ve službách StB (Kurt Wilfer a ti druzí.) (“Agents of the Nazi
Security Services Gestapo and Sicherheitsdienst in the Service of the StB (Kurt
Wilfer
and
the
Others)”):
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(April 2011).
Homepage of MUDr. Martin Jan Stránský, the grandson of Jaroslav Stránský.
www.narodni.cz/cz/index.html (September 2007).
On Otto Albert Tichý:
cs.wikipedia.org/wiki/Otto_Albert_Tichý (April 2011).
Biography of Čeněk Schlögel/Šlégl:
www.csfd.cz/herec/3301-slegl-cenek/ (September 2007).
Vývoj televizního vysílání v datech, archivní záběry, kuriozity. (“Development of TV
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in
Data,
Archive
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www.ceskatelevize.cz/ct/historie/index.php (February 2010)
365
Periodicals
Mainly at the Knihovna Národního Muzea – Časopisy (Library of the Czech
National Museum – Periodicals Department), Praha-Bubeneč, but also at the Czech
Radio Archive and in my own private library.
Arijský boj, Organ Protižidovské Ligy, (“The Aryan Struggle”, weekly central
newspaper of the Czech Anti-Jewish League), editorial offices and administration at,
Prague I, Graben 31.
Bohemia, Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Kultur der böhmischen Länder (“Bohemia, A
Journal of History and Civilisation in East Central Europe”), BRENNER, Christiana
(Ed.) Collegium Carolinum, Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, München, (Volume
51/1, 2011).
Das Schwarze Korps die Zeitung der Schutzstaffeln der NSDAP, Organ der
Reichsführung SS, (“The Black Corps, Newspaper of the Schutzstaffeln of the
NSDAP, Organ of the Reichs Directorate of the SS”), Verlag Franz Eher Nachfolger,
Berlin, undated special edition of the Reichs Propaganda Aktion 1939 dedicated to
the Petschek family villas, presumably from May 1939.
Der Neue Tag, Tageszeitung für Böhmen und Mähren, (“The New Day. Daily
Newspaper for Bohemia and Moravia”), publishing house and editorial offices at
Prague II., Herrengasse 8, volumes 1 through 7 (1939—1945).
Funk-Woche, (“Broadcast-Week”, weekly German radio program guide), Verlag
“Funk-Woche” Szalok & Co. K.-G, Berlin, volumes 14-16, 1939—1941.
Hör Zu!, Die Rundfunkzeitung, Hammerlich und Lesser Verlag, Hamburg 4, Volume
1, Number 1, 15 to 21 December 1946.
Náš rozhlas, (“Our Radio” – weekly radio program guide), published by “Orbis” a.s. v
Praze XII, Fochova 62, volumes XVII – XIX, 1939–1941.
Ozvěny domova i světa, (“Echoes from Home and the World” – illustrated Czech
weekly), published by “Politika”, Praha, 1938.
Pestrý týden (“Colorful Week”), ústřední obrazový list “Radosti ze života”, V.
Neubert, Praha-Smíchov, volumes XV-XVIII, 1940—1943
Radiojournal, (“Radiojournal” – weekly radio program guide) published by “Orbis”
a.s. v Praze XII, Fochova 62, volumes X-XVI, 1932—1938.
Rozhlasová korespondence (“Broadcasting-Correspondence”), Dr. Jan Wenig (Ed.),
Český Rozhlas, společnost s.r.o., Praha 1941, 1942 (Knihovna národního musea,
sign. Z3H28)
Rundfunkarchiv, Rundfunk und Fernsehen in Wissenschaft und Praxis,
(“Broadcasting Archive, Broadcasting and Television in Science and Practice”,
366
German monthly), R.V. Decker’s Verlag G. Schenck, Berlin. Particularly volume 14,
(1941).
Svět v obrazech (“The World in Pictures”), týdeník Ministerstva Informací (“Weekly of
the Ministry of Information”), V. Neubert a synové, Praha-Smíchov. Particularly
volume 1, (1945).
Týden rozhlasu, (“Broadcast-Week”, weekly Czech radio program guide), published
by “Orbis” a.s. v Praze XII, Schwerinova 46, volumes VIII – XII, 1941—1945.
Tygodnik Radio dla Wszystkich, (“Radio for Everyone”, Polish radio program
weekly), published by printers of the same name, Warszawa, calendar week 31,
July-August 1939.
Welt-Rundfunk, Internationale Zeitschrift für Rundfunk und Fernsehen, (“WorldBroadcasting, International Periodical for Broadcasting and Television”, German
monthly), Dr. Kurt Wagenführ (Ed.), Berlin, volume VIII, 1944.
Vlajka, Organ hnutí ČNST-Vlajka (“Banner”, central newspaper of the Czech Fascist
movement ČNST-Vlajka, published at varying intervals), Prag II, Myslík-Gasse 15,
volumes IX-XII, 1939—1942.
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18. Resumé
Co nám řekne rozhlasová politika v Protektorátu o nacistických plánech s českým
národem? Jaké možnosti české kolaborace nebo naopak odporu existovaly v
Českém rozhlasu, hlavní rozhlasové společnosti tzv. Protektorátu, a jaký vliv měla
tato situace na vzájemné vztahy mezi Čechy a Němci v rámci této instituce? Kdo byli
hlavní aktéři na obou stranách a jak se ovlivňovali navzájem?
Založena převážně na archivních pramenech snaží se tato studie odpovědět na tyto
otázky. Autor zjistil, že okupační orgány zřídily úřad k ovládání českých médií pod
názvem Oddělení IV - Kulturní politika v rámci Úřadu Říšského protektora v Čechách
a na Moravě, do kterého však neinvestovaly dostatek prostředků. Na počátku roku
1940 pověřil Goebbels relativně nezkušeného byrokrata Lothara Scurlu, jenž měl
malou nebo žádnou představu o české historii a kultuře, vedením rozhlasové
skupiny v Oddělení IV ve spolupráci se sudetskými Němci již dlouhodobě pracujícími
v Českém rozhlasu.
V počáteční fázi německé okupace (1939/1940) spočívala většina nacistické
manipulace programu v cenzuře obsahu vysílání. Občasné politické přednášky
českého nacisty Emanuela Moravce se v programu častěji začaly objevovat až na
jaře a v létě 1940. Po počátečních jen několika pořadech o německé hudbě, kurzech
německého jazyka a proněmecké kulturní propagandě začal aktivní nacistický vliv na
program rychle růst. Českojazyčná fašistická politická propaganda se vysílala nejdřív
pouze prostřednictvím místního německého vysílače Reichssender Böhmen (dříve
Praha II-Mělník). Záměrem bylo vzbudit v okolním světě dojem, že Němci se do
českého vysílání nevměšují. Pokud jde o vysílací společnosti samotné, původní
vedení Českého rozhlasu po invazi zpočátku zůstalo na svém místě a vůči Němcům
uplatňovalo politiku pasivní rezistence. Německá témata v programu se soustředila
na německou hudbu a pokud možno na neutrální, tj. nenacistické německé
historické postavy, jakými jsou Mozart, Virchow, Zeiss atd.
Avšak od jara roku 1941, nacistický vliv v Českém rozhlase dramaticky vzrostl.
Původní vedení bylo postupně odstraňováno. Koncem června 1941 Scurla založil
Oddělení politických přednášek vedené českým fašistou Aloisem Křížem z hnutí
ČNST-Vlajka. Po příchodu Reinharda Heydricha do Prahy na konci září 1941 Kříž
inicioval cyklus "Co víte o Židech?", který se vysílal v době deportací židovského
obyvatelstva protektorátu do ghett a vyhlazovacích táborů. Současně Scurla vypustil
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do českého éteru politickou satiru v podobě "politických skečů", série hrubých a
vulgárních komedií, kterou vytvořil tým kolem českého fašisty Josefa Opluštila. Po
zhruba šesti týdnech však Heydrich Scurlu pro neschopnost odvolal a Goebbels
poslal kvalifikovaný rozhlasový personál, nejprve Hannse-Otta Frickeho, kterého na
jaře 1942 nahradil esesák Ferdinand Thürmer. Za Frickeho začalo období
nespoutané manipulace a německého zasahování do programu. V té tobě
vyplňovaly téměř polovinu celého vysílacího času, 47,3%, buď německá hudba,
německojazyčné programy nebo proněmecké/pronacisticke českojazyčné politické
programy.
Příchod Ferdinanda Thürmera vedl k odstranění prakticky všech předních
sudetoněmeckých pracovníků, stejně jako ke zkrocení Kříže a Opluštila a
redukování politických témat v programu. Reichssender Böhmen vstoupil s českými
stanicemi do Vysílací skupiny Čechy-Morava, zatímco německý Reichsprogramm
vysílal dále. V Českém rozhlase se postupně politické obsahy programů soustředily
do cyklů připravovaných skupinou kolem Kříže. U většiny ostatních žánrů došlo k
návratu k faktickému obsahu. Současně znamenalo zavedení bilingválního
německo-českého uvádění programů i větší využití Českého rozhlasu pro specifické
německé účely. Strategie českojazyčné propagandy se posunula do určité míry od
negativ Československé republiky k zdánlivě pozitivním aspektům nacistického
režimu a soustředila se - v konečné fázi okupace - na negativní hlediska možné
budoucí sovětské okupace. Možnosti odporu mezi zaměstnanci Českého rozhlasu,
kteří našli modus vivendi s Thürmerem a jeho zástupcem Pabelem, postupně
klesaly. Programy pro dělníky v Protektorátu a v Říši samotné expandovaly, což
podtrhuje význam české výroby pro německé válečné úsilí. Po celou dobu okupace
se v českých zemích prodlužovala délka denního vysílání a dramatickým způsobem
rostl počet vlastníků a tedy i posluchačů rádia (vlastníků rádia o 48%!), což
naznačuje, že nacisté aplikovali v podstatě stejnou politiku propagace rozhlasu mezi
Čechy jako mezi německými obyvateli Říše. Je ironií, že právě úspěch tohoto
nacistické propagace rádia zajišťoval, že stále více českých posluchačů mohlo
naladit rozhlasové vysílání spojeneckých sil.
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