Download McCULLOCH V. MARYLAND (1819) Facts: Q of Law: 1. Does

McCULLOCH V. MARYLAND (1819) Facts: Q of Law: 1. Does Congress have power to incorporate a national bank? 2. Does the State of Maryland have the power to impose fees (tax) on an institution (the bank) created by Congress? Reasoning: 1. Yes. (a) broad interpretation of the elastic clause: what is “necessary”? (Maryland said it means “indispensable;” U.S. said it should be defined as “convenient and useful”). The Court took a broad view. (b) “If the ends are legitimate and within the scope of the Constitution, any non-­‐
prohibited means are constitutional” (c) A bank is convenient, useful and essential for handling national finances; therefore... (d) It is within Congress' power to incorporate a nat. bank. 2. No. (a) Art 6 says the Fed. Constitution (and laws made by Congress) is supreme. They control the laws of the state. (b) Maryland is wrong when they said the powers of the federal government are delegated by the states, who are truly sovereign. [“We the people”] (c) “The power to tax involves the power to destroy.” You can't have a state having power over a federal institution, therefore.... (d) The Maryland law is null and void and UNCONSTITUTIONAL Katzenbach v. McClung (1964) Facts: Issue: Does a restaurant's refusal to serve blacks affect interstate commerce such that Congress can legitimately prohibit such discrimination? Analysis: Yes. Overruling the District Court, the USSC said: 1. Lots of testimony that discrimination in restaurants “had a direct and highly restrictive effect upon interstate travel by Negroes…. This obviously discourages travel and obstructs ISC for one can hardly travel without eating.” 2. Ample basis for the conclusion that restaurants sold less interstate goods because of the discrimination that interstate travel was obstructed directly by it, that business in general suffered and that many new businesses refrained from establishing there as a result of it. 3. “This Court has held time and again that this power extends to activities of retail establishments, including restaurants, which directly or indirectly burden or obstruct interstate commerce.” 4. “Confronted as we are with the facts laid before Congress, we must conclude that it had a rational basis for finding that racial discrimination in restaurants had a direct and adverse effect on the free flow of interstate commerce.” “The power of Congress in this field is broad and sweeping.” The act is valid. U.S. v. Lopez (1995)Facts: Q of Law: Is the Federal Gun Free School Zones Act a valid law under the Commerce Clause? Reasoning: NO. (5-­‐4; maj: Rehnquist) 3 broad categories of activity which Congress may reg. • use of the channels of ISC; • regulate the instrumentalities of ISC; • activities that have a substantial relation to ISC or substantially affect ISC. This is a CRIMINAL statute, not an economic one. This is too broad a use of the ISC Clause. Concr. (Thomas): this is more faithful to orig. intent Dissent (Breyer et. al): Congress must have leeway to determine scope of its power in regulating ISC. Is there a rational basis for this law? Yes there is! Dissent (Souter): Today’s decision “tugs the Court off course,” against the trend of letting Congress properly determine the scope...they, not us, are politically accountable. Have we now abandoned 60 years of court precedent??? Notes: Suitum v. Tahoe Planning Agency Facts: Issue: Must property owners attempt to sell their developmental rights before claiming the regulatory taking of property without just compensation, in accordance with the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments? Analysis: Government held hearings to determine which land was to be designated “protected” property. The government interest was to protect the quality of water in Lake Tahoe which has become more polluted in recent years. 1. Fifth amendment guarantees that Eminent Domain actions will compensate property owners with market value compensation. Eminent Domain is when the government takes a person’s property for public use. In this case the government compensated Suitum with the rights that were taken from her. However, these rights would not have a monetary value until they were sold. 2. The due process clause of the 14th Amendment requires that the government give a person the opportunity to challenge government decisions. If the government doesn’t provide an opportunity to challenge its decisions, a lawsuit is permitted to force a non-­‐biased assessment. Lawsuits against the government have to be based on proof that damage (or a “taking”) was done by the government’s actions. If the value of the development rights were the same value as the decrease in Suitum’s property value then there would be no case against the government. Decision: In a 9-­‐0 decision, the court found for Suitum. Property owners do not need to know the market value of government compensation in order to sue the government. Knowing the exact value of the development rights did not prevent Suitum from suing. Stenburg v. Carhart (1990) Facts: Issue: Does the Nebraska statute, which makes the performance of a "partial birth abortions" a crime, violate the liberty protected by due process of the Fourteenth Amendment in the U.S. Constitution? Analysis: Roe v. Wade (1973) was the Supreme Court case establishing a woman’s right to an abortion. The 14th Amendment was interpreted to protect a woman’s “liberty” to obtain an abortion. Once the case was decided a number of questions arose when states, who disagreed with the ruling, began to pass laws putting specific restrictions on abortions. For example, in the case of Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the court created a rule governing when a state could pass a law restricting abortion. The new standard asks whether a state abortion regulation has the purpose or effect of imposing an "undue burden," which is defined as a "substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability." Under this standard, a provision to fail the undue-­‐burden test would be one that required the husband to be notified whenever a woman wanted an abortion. In this case before the court, a Nebraska law defined "partial birth abortion" as a procedure in which the doctor "partially delivers vaginally a living unborn child before killing the... child," and defined the latter phrase to mean "intentionally delivering into the vagina a living unborn child, or a substantial portion thereof, for the purpose of performing a procedure that the [abortionist] knows will kill the... child and does kill the... child." Decision: Majority: The sharply divided Court struck down the statute because it placed an undue burden on a woman's right to have an abortion and did not allow for exception in cases of threatened health. "All those who perform abortion procedures using that method must fear prosecution, conviction, and imprisonment," that results in "an undue burden upon a woman's right to make an abortion decision," wrote Justice Breyer for the Court. Decent: Justice Antonin Scalia's dissent concluded that "[t]he notion that the Constitution of the United States... prohibits the States from simply banning this visibly brutal means of eliminating our half-­‐born posterity is quite simply absurd." DeShaney v. Winnebago County (1989) Facts: Issue: Does Gov’t failure to act deprived kid of liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause of 14th Amendment? Analysis: Gov’t’s failure to provide kid with adequate protection against his father's violence did not violate his rights under the substantive component of the Due Process Clause. 1. The Due Process Clause imposes no duty on the State to provide the general public with adequate protective services. The Clause is a limitation on the State's power to act, not a guarantee of certain levels of safety and security; while it forbids the State to deprive individuals of life, liberty, and property without due process of law, there is no affirmative obligation on the State to ensure that those interests do not come to harm through other means. 2. The State's knowledge of his danger and expressions of willingness to protect him against that danger DOES NOT establish a “special relationship” giving rise to an affirmative constitutional duty to protect. The harms petitioner suffered occurred not while the State was holding him in custody, but while he was in custody of his natural father, who was in no sense a state actor. While the State may be aware of the dangers that he faced, it played no part in their creation, nor did it do anything to render him more vulnerable to them. Under these circumstances, the Due Process Clause did not impose upon the State an affirmative duty to provide petitioner with adequate protection. The State may have acquired a duty under state tort law, but the Due Process Clause does not transform every tort committed by a state actor into a constitutional violation. Brentwood v. Tennessee Sec. Schools Assn.
Facts: Issues: a) Is a voluntary organization made of primarily government employees considered a government agency? b) Does a voluntary association composed primarily of public schools violate the First Amendment's protection of free speech when the association punishes a member school for violating athletic recruiting rules that the school agreed to follow? Analysis: 1) Freedom of speech, association and press are protected under the 1st Amendment. However, when the government can show a compelling state interests (a really good reason) and can show that there is no less restrictive way to achieve that interest, then they can limit speech. A Strict Scrutiny test is generally used. 2) Private organizations can punish their members for speech under many situations. 3) Government agencies are groups that are made up of government employees that exercise “police power.” Decision: a) yes, if the voting members of a voluntary organization are paid by the government and their work with the organization is tied to their government jobs then the voluntary organization exercises governmental “police power.” b) no, the speech of Brentwood Academy was not protected by the 1st Amendment as the interests of the government were enough to justify its restriction. Printz v. U.S. (1997) Facts: Issue: Using the “Elastic” Clause of Article I as justification, can Congress temporarily require state CLEOs (Chief Law Enforcement Officers) to regulate handgun purchases by performing those duties called for by the Brady Bill's handgun applicant background-­‐checks? Analysis: No. 1. Commanding CLEOs to conduct background checks is unconstitutional, and so is the duty to accept applicant statements from dealers. 2. State legislatures are not subject to federal direction. While Congress may require the federal government to regulate commerce directly, in this case by performing background-­‐checks on applicants for handgun ownership, the Necessary and Proper Clause does not empower it to compel state CLEOs to fulfill its federal tasks for it -­‐ even temporarily. 3. The Brady Bill could not require CLEOs to perform the related tasks of disposing of handgun-­‐application forms or notifying certain applicants of the reasons for their refusal in writing, since the Brady Bill reserved such duties only for those CLEO's who voluntarily accepted them. Schechter Poultry Co. v. U.S. (1935) Facts: Q of Law: 1. Was the commerce engaged in by Schechter considered inter-­‐state? 2. Was the usage of the executive branch to write the codes an over-­‐stepping of Congressional authority? Reasoning: 1. No. The effect that the companies' transactions had on interstate commerce was indirect rather than direct. 2. Yes. The act “supplies no standards for any trade, industry or activity....Instead of prescribing rules of conduct, it authorized the making of codes to prescribe them....In view of the scope of that broad declaration, and of the nature of the few restrictions that are imposed, the discretion of the President in approving or prescribing codes, and thus enacting laws for the government of trade and industry throughout the country, is virtually unfettered. “WE THINK THAT THE CODE-­‐
MAKING AUTHORITY THUS CONFERRED IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.” The law was not “voluntary”. “Extraordinary conditions” does not “justify action which lies outside the sphere of constitutional authority. Extraordinary conditions do not create or enlarge constitutional power.” (Hughes) Notes: U.S. v. Curtiss-­‐Wright Export Co. (1936) Facts: Q of Law: Does the P. have the power to issue proclamation relating to international affairs? Reasoning: YES. (7-­‐1) 1. The federal government has supremacy in dealing with foreign affairs; 2. The P. alone, within the natn'l gov't, possesses the ability and power to deal with the information regarding foreign affairs; therefore... 3. The President acted within his powers to forbid the selling of weapons. Notes: UNANSWERED QUESTIONS: 1. What if the situation had been domestic, rather than international in nature? 2. What if Congress had not given the P. authority via its joint resolution? Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. U.S. (1952) Facts: Q of Law: May the President rely on the concept of “inherent powers”, as C-­‐in-­‐Chief, make an order which usurps lawmaking authority of Congress on the basis of a compelling need to protect the national security? Reasoning: NO. (6-­‐3) 1. Congress had voted down, during debate in 1947 on the Taft-­‐Hartley Act, attempts to give the Pres. this power; 2. There is no express Constitutional authority to take private property to avoid a strike; 3. Therefore, the President cannot legally authorize the action. Dissent: In international and foreign policy, the President should be granted wide authority Notes: 7 different opinions in this case! U..S. v. Nixon (1974) Facts: Q of Law: Can a federal court order the President to surrender court materials that the President wishes to withhold as a matter as “executive privilege”? Reasoning: Yes. 1. There is no explicit Constitutional “executive privilege.” It is OK to use, however, if used in a Constitutional manner 2. This case involves a criminal trial (though not Nixon's). The balance between a fair trial and confidentiality must be found in favor of the “fair trial.” 3. Separation of powers still exist, but there is no unqualified privilege of immunity for the President from the judicial process. UNANIMOUS (8-­‐0) (Rehnquist recused himself) Notes: Narrow application of law in this case. Repercussion: Nixon resigned a few days later—the first and only President to resign his office. President William Clinton v. Paula Jones (1997) Facts: Q of Law: May a citizen sue a sitting president or does the president have immunity while in office? Reasoning: 1. Precedents granting immunity from damages actions based on President’s official acts based on his ability to do his job provide no support for unofficial conduct. 2. Separation of power doctrine does not require courts to stay all private actions vs. the Pres. until he leaves office. Federal courts have the power to determine the legality of Presidential actions, thus they are not hindering the Presidential function to execute the laws. 3. The Court is not persuaded this will lead to a large volume of politically motivated harassing suits or that national security concerns will hinder the President’s ability to defend himself in court. Let Congress pass legislation if it thinks the President deserves stronger protection from suits. Dissent: None. It was unanimous I.N.S. v. Chadha (1983) Facts: Q of Law: Does the concept of “separation of powers” forbid Congress to use the legislative veto to block executive branch action? Reasoning: YES. (6-­‐2) The action by the House, in overriding the Attorney General's decision, is in effect “legislation” (requiring passage by both houses and subject to Pres. veto) Dissent: (White) The Legislative Veto is an essential part of the “modern administrative state” and has become a “central means by which Congress secures the accountability of the executive and independent agencies.” Notes: This overturned parts of over 200 laws that had a “legislative veto” aspect to them.