Download Luther`s Doctrine of Imputation: Nominalism vs. Aristotelian Realism

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Luther’s Doctrine of Imputation:
Nominalism vs. Aristotelian
Realism
Joshua Price
History & Bible Major
The theology of German reformer Martin Luther has had a profound impact on Christian history. His doctrine of the imputation of Christ’s
righteousness to the believer is no different. This study examines the philosophic underpinnings that support and inform Luther’s doctrine
and describes the extent to which Luther is influenced by medieval Nominalism. This study then proposes two methods by which Luther’s
doctrine of imputation might be reconciled with a philosophic commitment to metaphysical Realism.
Since the Reformation, scholars of Martin Luther have debated the extent to which his philosophy was influenced by Nominalism. Certain of his doctrines seem inherently nominalist—such as
consubstantiation and the hidden God—and others are opposed to Nominalism, such as Luther’s
doctrine of human will. With some doctrines, it is more difficult to ascertain the extent to which
Luther’s beliefs reflect a Nominalist influence. One such example is Luther’s doctrine of the imputation of Christ’s righteousness to the believer. In this paper, I will explore the extent to which
Luther’s doctrine of imputation was influenced by Nominalism. Next, I will explore the methods
by which an Aristotelian Realist might reconcile the doctrine of imputation with Realism. I argue
that Luther’s doctrine of imputation represents a break from the traditional Nominalist doctrine. I
further argue that the best way to reconcile the doctrine of imputation with Aristotelian Realism is
by understanding it as a forensic act that provides the grounds for the justification of the believer
before God.
Before delving into the argument, it will be useful to define Nominalism and Aristotelian
Realism and explain the significance of these positions for the doctrine of imputation. Aristotelian
Realism refers to the metaphysical position that everything that exists is a composite of form and
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matter. Aristotle argued in Book VII Chapter 17 of his
Metaphysics that the form or substance of a thing guides and
forms the matter.1 Thus, universals such as redness exist in
nature in individual red things, and these individual things are
red because they possess the form of redness. This is significant for the debate concerning imputed righteousness because Realism holds that righteousness is a universal that can
be recognized by the accidents that inhere in righteousness.
Nominalism is the philosophic position opposed to Realism.
William of Ockham, a proponent of Nominalism, asserted in
Epistemological Problems that universals do not actually exist
in nature, but are merely concepts that the mind invents to
describe individual objects.2 To give an example, the Nominalist sees a dog as a dog not because it has the characteristics of
“dog-ness;” instead, he thinks a dog is merely an individual
thing to which the human mind ascribes a name. This is significant for imputed righteousness because it means that, for the
Nominalist, one could conceivably possess the accidents of
sinfulness and yet, at the same time, be considered righteous.
So, a philosophic commitment to Realism or Nominalism has
an important effect on one’s doctrine of imputation.
Luther was clearly influenced by Nominalism in some significant ways, and it affected his understanding of imputation.
One manifestation of this influence is found in his belief
concerning the nature of the divine will. In Bondage of the
Will, Luther defended a voluntaristic conception of God’s
will, arguing that no cause or ground determines His will,
but that His will is the self-determining rule for all things.3
Thomas Aquinas, an Aristotelian Realist, believed that God’s
will proceeds directly from God’s nature, which is used to
explain why God cannot sin. Luther, contra Aquinas, argued
that the goodness of God’s actions is not determined by the
inherent goodness of His nature, but out of His declaration
that His actions are good.4 For Luther, goodness proceeds
out of God’s will rather than His nature, so that the divine
will is separated from the divine nature. In other words, God’s
will determines what the term “goodness” means rather than
his nature being consistent with a particular conception of
goodness. In Bondage of the Will, Luther wrote that because
power is part of God’s nature, His will cannot be impeded.5
In this sense, God can do whatever he wants—even if it appears to be evil to humans—because His will is supreme.
This voluntaristic conception of the divine will is seen
clearly in the tradition of Nominalism, which is associated
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with William of Ockham. According to Heiko Oberman, an
historian who specialized in the Reformation, Luther’s voluntaristic conception of God stems directly from this Nominalist tradition.6 In The Two Reformations, Oberman points out
the medieval distinction between the potentia absoluta and
the potentia ordinata as evidence of Luther’s connection to
Nominalism.7 The potentia absoluta defines God’s ultimate
nature, while the potentia ordinata describes God’s nature as it
is revealed in Scripture. In Bondage of the Will, Luther wrote
of the importance of distinguishing between the revealed
God and the hidden God, as though the two have different
characteristics.8 Luther’s distinction between the potentia absoluta and the potentia ordinata is essential for understanding
the influence medieval Nominalism had on his conception of
God.
However, Luther employed the terms differently than did medieval Nominalists. Gordon Rupp, a Luther scholar, points out
that Nominalists like Ockham appealed to potentia absoluta
to speculate on and explain supernatural occurrences, whereas
Luther used the distinction to cut off speculation and focus
on God as He has revealed himself in Scripture.9 Rupp argues
that Luther rejected the Aristotelian tendency to explain God’s
nature with reference to a hierarchy of being.10 Luther viewed
the Aristotelian view as a Pelagian fallacy, because he thought
it gave too much credit to human reason.11 Instead, as Rupp
aptly states, Luther understood God as an entirely unpredictable being.12 Rupp interprets Luther’s attempt to place God
beyond human understanding as a reflection of his theocentric approach to theology.13 Despite the semantic distinction,
both Luther and the medieval Nominalists used the potentia
absoluta and potentia ordinata distinction to support their
voluntaristic understanding of God’s will, namely, that His
will is distinct from His nature. So, Nominalism’s influence
on Luther is apparent in his attempt to insulate God from any
rational attempt to comprehend His being. As with Ockham,
this resulted in a voluntaristic understanding of God.
Despite the influence Nominalism had on Luther’s
doctrine of the divine will, he rejected Ockham’s view of the
human will in favor of an Augustinian view. As Oberman
points out, Ockham—and the Nominalist tradition in the via
moderna—asserted the priority of the will over the priority
of the intellect.14 In contrast, Augustine argued in Confessions that men are corrupt from birth, and this corruption
taints their ability to make decisions.15 In Bondage of the Will,
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Luther argued that human will is limited by God’s sovereignty
and by original sin. Regarding God’s sovereignty, Luther wrote
that God not only foreknows all things, but He wills them
necessarily and immutably rather than merely contingently.16
Thus, for Luther, humanity’s free will of man cannot limit or
impede God’s sovereign will that ordains all things. Regarding
original sin, the Book of Concord echoed Luther’s position
by stating that original sin refers not to willful acts of sin, but
to corrupt human nature, and asserting that sin inheres in the
nature, substance, and essence of man.17
The Book of Concord summarizes Luther’s assertion
in Bondage of the Will that the human will is so affected by
original sin that there is no goodness in humanity whatsoever.
Gordon Rupp observes that the scholastic Nominalist theologians of Luther’s day opposed this doctrine.18 The Nominalists appealed to the doctrine of synteresis to oppose original
sin, claiming that a small amount of goodness inclined the
will slightly towards the good.19 Luther specifically rejected
this Nominalist claim in the tenth thesis of his Disputation
Against Scholastic Theology, contending that the will is wholly
unable to pursue any good thing.20 In Bondage of the Will,
Luther further argued that free will without God’s grace is not
free at all, since it is a prisoner to evil.21 Luther rejected the
Nominalist assertion of the primacy of the will—at least with
reference to humanity—because he subjected human will to
the doctrines of God’s sovereignty and original sin.
With these two instances in mind, it becomes apparent that Nominalism did not have a comprehensive effect on
Luther’s theology. As discussed, Nominalism’s influence can
be seen in Luther’s voluntaristic conception of God’s will.
However, he rejected the Nominalist conception of human
will, favoring an Augustinian view. This inconsistency is vital
for understanding how Luther’s doctrine of imputation relates
to his Nominalist influences. The Nominalists held a negative
view of imputation; according to Rupp, both Ockham and
Scotus appeal to the doctrine of potentia absoluta to explain
how God can impute original sin to humans and to defend
why God can withhold imputing sin if He so wills.22 As we
will see, however, Luther adopted a positive view of imputation, in which God imputes Christ’s righteousness to the
sinner in order to justify him, disagreeing with the Nominalist
doctrine of a purely negative imputation.
Luther agreed with the Nominalist idea of the non-imputation
of sin. In Commentary on Galatians, Luther wrote that our
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sins are not imputed to us for Christ’s sake.23 However, Luther
did not allow—unlike Ockham and Scotus—that this nonimputation of sins was arbitrary. Instead, Luther argued that
faith in Christ must be present for the remission of sins.24 In
fact, Luther specifically opposed the Nominalist appeal to the
potentia absoluta to explain imputation in theses 55-56 of
Disputation Against Scholastic Theology. Luther wrote against
Ockham that even through the absolute power of God,
God could not declare a man righteous unless His grace was
justifying him.25 Thus, Luther disagreed with the Nominalist tradition regarding the doctrine of imputation by insisting
that non-imputation of sin only occurs where faith in Christ is
present.
This distinction between Luther and Ockham does
not by itself necessarily lead to the conclusion that Luther
disagreed with the Nominalist understanding of imputation;
however, he also had a positive understanding of imputation, namely the imputation of Christ’s righteousness to the
believer. This aspect of his doctrine demonstrates that Luther
disagreed with the Nominalist doctrine of imputation, namely,
imputation in the purely negative sense. Indeed, Bruce defines
Luther’s doctrine of imputation as God making the sinner
righteous by forgiving all of his/her sins for Christ’s sake and
imputing the righteousness of Christ to him/her.26 Another
distinction between Luther and Ockham’s understandings
of imputation is found in Luther’s separation of righteousness into passive and alien righteousness. In Two Kinds of
Righteousness, Luther distinguished between proper or active
righteousness and alien or passive righteousness. According
to Luther, proper righteousness consists in good works and
actual moral obedience. Luther defined alien righteousness as
the righteousness of someone else, instilled from without.27
This righteousness of Christ justifies believers through faith.28
Luther also argued in the same passage that this righteousness
forms the basis of sanctification. Thus, Luther disagreed with
the Nominalist belief that the basis of justification is merely
God’s declaration that a person is righteous, instead asserting
that the imputation of Christ’s righteousness forms the basis
for justification as well as the basis for sanctification.
It can be concluded that Luther’s doctrine of imputation was not Nominalist. As stated above, he tended to use
voluntaristic language when discussing the divine will. This
reveals the influence that Nominalist philosophy (especially
the via moderna) had on Luther’s beliefs. However, his beliefs
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Nominalist. On the contrary, Luther agreed with Augustine
that human will is bound by sin. Augustine was not Nominalist, but was a proponent of Realist philosophy.29 Thus, Luther’s beliefs about God’s will were influenced by Nominalism
while his beliefs about human will were influenced by Realism.
His theology reflected two diametrically opposed philosophic
perspectives. This is what makes his doctrine of imputation
difficult to label; it integrates a Nominalist perspective of
God’s will with a Realist perspective of human will.
Given the conflicting philosophic influences on Luther’s
doctrine of imputation, it seems that it would be difficult to
integrate his doctrine with Aristotelian Realism. The apparent
problem for an Aristotelian Realist is that the doctrine seems
to bifurcate a person’s essence from their perceived qualities.
In other words, it would seem that a person cannot be essentially righteous and have the accident of sinfulness. Luther’s
doctrine of imputation asserts that Christ’s righteousness is
imputed to the believer, yet it is obvious that Christians continue to sin. Thus, to an Aristotelian Realist, imputation seems
to be an untenable doctrine.
However, some Christian Aristotelian Realists may want to
affirm Luther’s doctrine of imputation. An Aristotelian Realist
can reconcile the doctrine of imputation with Realism by two
methods. The first method is an insistence on the metaphysical independence of the substance of righteousness from
the accidents of righteous behavior via a supernatural work
of God. The second method is to appeal to imputation as a
forensic rather than a substantial act (i.e. an act that affects a
person’s standing before God as opposed to an act that affects
a person’s essence).
The first method of reconciliation is to posit that a person
can be essentially righteous even while they sin. At first, this
seems contrary to Realism, but it has a precedent among
Realist philosophers. Thomas Aquinas used such a method to
defend transubstantiation. In Summa Theologica, III, q. 75,
art. 4, Aquinas argued that in the sacrament of the Eucharist
God converts the substance of the bread and wine into the
substance of the body and blood of Christ. The accidental
properties of the bread and wine remain, but the essence is
the body and blood of Christ. Similarly, an Aristotelian Realist
could presumably assert that when God imputes Christ’s righteousness to the believer he changes his substance from sinful
to righteous—without changing the accidents of the person.
In other words, a person could be essentially righteous while
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actually sinning.
However, not all Aristotelian Realists accept Aquinas’s defense of transubstantiation. For example, seventeenth century
theologian Francis Turretin objected to the separation of
substance and accidents in Institutes of Elenctic Theology.
Turretin argued that the separation of essence and accidents
necessary for transubstantiation is impossible for two reasons.
First, it goes against the testimony of the senses. Turretin
observed that the senses are used to perceive accidents, and
a substance is perceived by the accidents.30 Therefore, if the
senses indicate that accidents are present, it necessarily follows
that the substance is present. According to Turretin, transubstantiation violates the clear testimony of the senses that the
elements in the Eucharist possess the accidents (and therefore
essence) of bread and wine. Turretin’s second argument is that
transubstantiation is contrary to reason. Turretin noted that
the nature of an accident requires that it inhere in a substance.
He observed that the formal reason of an accident is to inhere
in a substance, so that accidents cannot exist at all, even for
a moment, without a substance in which to inhere.31 If, as in
transubstantiation, the accidents are supposed to exist without
inhering in a substance, they cease to be accidents. Thus, it
appears that transubstantiation results in a contradiction. The
argument might also be framed in this manner:
1.It is the nature of accidents to inhere in a substance.
2.An accident cannot exist without a substance in which to inhere.
3.In transubstantiation, the accidents of the bread and
wine are supposed to exist without a substance in which to
inhere; therefore,
4.Transubstantiation is impossible.
The two preceding arguments posed by Turretin seem to
argue forcefully against the separability of substance and accidents in transubstantiation. The substance of his arguments
would apply to our concern with imputed righteousness as
well. It seems that if a person is essentially righteous and they
continue to sin, the accidents of sinful behavior are bifurcated
from the essence of sinfulness and cease to be accidents.
Furthermore, if the senses perceive a person sinning then
they also perceive the essence of sinfulness in those accidents.
Thus, the two arguments seem to prove that Aristotelians cannot reconcile imputed righteousness in this way.
In spite of Turretin’s strong argument, modern Aristotelian Essentialist David Oderberg argues for the possibility
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of transubstantiation. Turretin claimed that accidents cannot
be separated from substance or subsist separately from the
substance in which they inhere.32 Oderberg counters this argument in his book, Real Essentialism, appealing to the fact that
the metaphysical independence of accidents and substance are
required for essentialism.33 Oderberg agrees with Turretin that
accidents can never exist without a substance in which to inhere in the order of nature. Oderberg appeals to the possibility of transubstantiation by observing that if God suspended
the laws of nature in a particular location, an accident could
exist while inhering in a substance other than the one in which
it normally inheres. Oderberg defends this suspension of the
laws of nature by asserting that God can suspend the laws
without actually breaking them.34 So, Oderberg would respond
to Turretin’s arguments by appealing to a possible circumstance in which God suspends the laws of nature to separate
the substance and accidents.
Oderberg’s argument seems convincing. However, I think he is
mistaken for two reasons. The first reason is that his conclusion seems to destroy the reliability of the senses. If Oderberg
is correct, then it is impossible to perceive—at least with
certainty—the substance of a thing by perceiving its accidents.
If Oderberg is correct, there is no certainty in knowledge of
forms and the very concept of substance seems to lose its
meaning. The senses become unreliable because there is no
necessary connection between accidents and substance. To
give a brief example, if the accidents that I perceive to be a
book were under God’s suspension of the laws of nature, they
could actually inhere to the substance of a cow. Oderberg’s
theory undermines the possibility of certainty with respect to
knowing the substance of a thing through the perception of
its accidents.
Second, Oderberg’s argument is invalid because it results
in a contradiction. Oderberg defends transubstantiation by
appealing to the possibility of God’s miraculous suspension
of the laws of nature. Oderberg asserts that a suspension
of the laws of nature is distinct from breaking those laws. I
think this assertion is false. Oderberg gives the example of
a state that has suspended traffic laws for a month (meaning those who “break” the law are unpunished because the
law did not apply when the laws were “broken”). However, I
think this is an inaccurate analogy. There is nothing in human
nature that constrains us to obey human decrees. However,
the nature of substance and accidents do constrain them to
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behave in ways consistent with their nature. In other words,
an accident can only be an accident insofar as it behaves as an
accident—inhering in a substance. Thus, a suspension of the
laws of nature is very different than a suspension of human
traffic laws. A suspension of the laws that constrain accidents
and substance would necessarily involve a contradiction. The
nature of an accident is to inhere in a substance. If, as Oderberg argues, an accident can be present in the order of nature
without a substance in which to inhere, it is no longer an accident, since accidents are defined as such by their inherence in
a substance. Due to the law of noncontradiction, we see that it
is impossible for an accident ever to exist without a substance
in which to inhere. Thus, Oderberg’s argument for transubstantiation is invalid.
With these arguments in mind, it is apparent that the first option for accepting imputed righteousness fails. An Aristotelian
Realist cannot reconcile imputed righteousness by an appeal
to the separability of a substance and its accidents; the essence
of righteousness cannot be present in a person along with the
accidents of sinfulness. The second option available for an
Aristotelian Realist is to adopt an understanding of imputation
as a forensic act that serves as the foundation for justification.
In order to explain how imputation might be understood in this way, it will be necessary to prove two things.
First, that justification should be understood in a forensic
sense, and secondly, that imputation is the meritorious cause
for this justification. Scripture clearly teaches that justification
is a forensic act. In Romans 3:24-26 Paul explained, “they are
now justified by his grace as a gift, through the redemption
that is in Christ Jesus, whom God put forward as a sacrifice of
atonement by his blood, effective through faith. He did this
to show his righteousness, because in his divine forbearance
he had passed over the sins previously committed” (NRSV).
Here Paul specifically appealed to justification as a forensic
act in which God deals with sin as worthy of punishment. Perhaps even more persuasive is Paul’s statement to the Romans
in 8:3. Paul wrote, “For God has done what the law, weakened
by the flesh, could not do: by sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and to deal with sin, he condemned sin in
the flesh.” Paul observed that God punished sin in Christ in
order that sinful men might be justified because the law could
not justify men. Turretin further points out that if justification
is not a forensic act, but rather a moral and substantial act—as
the Roman Catholic Church claimed—it is indistinguishable
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from sanctification.35 Furthermore, Turretin argued, a person
cannot be justified on the basis of his inherent righteousness
for two reasons. First, inherent righteousness is imperfect, and
cannot satisfy God’s requirement for perfect obedience to the
law.36 Second, justification consists in the remission of sins
and the removal of guilt. Since inherent righteousness cannot
remove guilt or the offense to God, it cannot be the basis of
the remission of sins (and thus, justification).37 So, justification cannot be based on inherent righteousness, but must be a
forensic act.
Given this understanding of justification, it is apparent that sinners are in need of a perfect righteousness
by which they can be declared righteous before God. The
imputation of Christ’s righteousness serves this very purpose.
Luther argued for an understanding of imputation that was
substantive in nature. Turretin modified Luther’s doctrine,
asserting that imputation can be understood in two ways. He
stated that Christ’s righteousness serves a twofold purpose,
namely, as a forensic imputation that acts as the grounds for
justification and as a moral infusion that forms the basis of
sanctification.38 Second Corinthians 5:21 represents the understanding of imputation as a forensic act: “For our sake he
made him to be sin who knew no sin, so that in him we might
become the righteousness of God.” This understanding of
imputation is actually necessary for an Aristotelian Realist. An
Aristotelian conceives God’s nature as being perfectly unified.
This means that every act of God must be consistent with all
his attributes. So, in justification, God must be both merciful and just. Thus, God demands a perfect righteousness that
can only be fulfilled by Christ’s perfect obedience. Turretin
explained how this obedience is reckoned as the possession
of the Christian. He argued that no one could stand before
the rigor of God’s court by his/her own works. However,
the perfect obedience of Christ is reckoned as the believer’s,
and it is by his righteousness that believers are forgiven and
counted righteous.39 Thus, the conception of imputation that
is most faithful to Aristotelian Realism is that of imputation as
a forensic act that justifies the sinner before God rather than
a substantive act that changes a sinner’s essence. A person
justified by Christ’s imputed righteousness remains essentially
a sinful person, but his/her standing before God has changed.
To summarize, it is apparent that Martin Luther’s theology was influenced by Nominalism. This influence manifests
itself particularly in his voluntaristic conception of the divine
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will. However, Luther disagreed with the Nominalist tradition in his doctrine of human will and imputation of Christ’s
righteousness. Luther understood the imputation of Christ’s
righteousness in the positive sense, rather than in the negative
sense described by Nominalists. In this way, his doctrine is
rescued from the accusation of Nominalism. An Aristotelian
Realist can reconcile Luther’s doctrine of imputation in one
of two ways. The attempt to reconcile it by appealing to a
separation of substance and accidents is infeasible because it
is contradictory and undermines the testimony of the senses.
The other option is to adopt a conception of imputation and
justification as forensic acts that alter the believer’s standing
before God rather than his/her essence. This is the view advocated by Francis Turretin and the Reformed tradition, and it
is the best way to reconcile Aristotelian Realism with Luther’s
doctrine of the imputation of Christ’s righteousness.
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EndNotes
1 Aristotle. “Metaphysics,” in The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon, (New York: The Modern Library,
2001), 810-811.
2 William of Ockham. “Epistemological Problems,”
in Readings in the History of Philosophy, ed. Michael Strantz
and Maureen Staudt, (Mason, Ohio: Cengage, 2009), 205-207.
3 Luther, Martin. “The Bondage of the Will,” in Martin Luther: Selections from his Writings, ed. John Dillenberger,
(New York: Anchor Books, 1961), 196.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid., 181.
6 Oberman, Heiko. The Two Reformations: The
Journey from the Last Days to the New World. Ed. Donald
Weinstein. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003, 24.
7 Ibid.
8 Bondage of the Will, 191.
9 Rupp, Gordon. The Righteousness of God. Cambridge: Hodder and Stoughton, 1953, 91.
10 Ibid., 30.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Rupp, 248-9.
14 Oberman, 29.
15 St. Augustine, Confessions, trans. Henry Chadwick
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 197.
16 Bondage of the Will, 184.
17 Bruce, Gustav Marius. Luther as an Educator.
Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1963, 117.
18 Rupp, 152.
19 Ibid.
20 Luther, Martin. “Disputation Against Scholastic
Theology,” in Martin Luther: Selections from his Writings, ed.
James Atkinson, (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1962),
267.
21 Bondage of the Will, 187.
22 Rupp, 90.
23 Luther, Martin. “Commentary on Galatians,” in Martin Luther: Selections from his Writings, ed. John Dillenberger, (New York: Anchor Books, 1961), 111.
24 Ibid.
25 Disputation Against Scholastic Theology, 270.
26 Bruce, 119.
27 Luther, Martin. “Two Kinds of Righteousness,” in
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Martin Luther: Selections from his Writings, ed. John Dillenberger, (New York: Anchor Books, 1961), 86-88.
28 Ibid.
29 Augustine was a proponent of Platonic Realism
rather than Aristotelian Realism, but the distinction between
the two systems of thought is not germane to the present
discussion. 30 Turretin, Francis. Institutes of Elenctic Theology. Ed. James T. Dennison, Jr. Vol. 3. Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R
Publishing, 1997, 490.
31 Ibid., 491.
32 Ibid.
33 Oderberg, David. Real Essentialism. New York:
Routledge, 2007, 155.
34 Ibid., 148.
35 Turretin, Francis. Institutes of Elenctic Theology. Ed. James T. Dennison, Jr. Vol. 2. Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R
Publishing, 1997, 635.
36 Ibid., 643.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid., 647.
39 Ibid., 648.
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55
Hebrew Exogesis: Hebrews
4:14-5:10: Jesus, The Great
High Priest
Patton Shinall
Theology Major
This paper attempts to answer what the author of Hebrews offered to teach in Hebrews 4:14-5:10. Through exegetical hermeneutics this
paper shows what the message of this passage is and how Christians are to live in light of this Scripture.
I n Hebrews chapter 4, verse 14 through chapter 5, verse 10, Jesus is exalted as the great high priest
of the Church. Within this text are some of the most important truths regarding Christ’s office as
the exalted priestly intercessor on behalf of Christians as well as his atoning work accomplished
through his ministry. As a result, this passage truly is a treasure within the Book of Hebrews and
the New Testament as a whole, and because of this persistent dedication should be implemented in
order to understand God’s holy and transcendent will and grace spoken within this text.
Historical Context.
One cannot begin to understand the interpretation of any biblical text without first under-
standing the historical context of the book in question. Donald A. Hagner, author of Encountering
the Book of Hebrews writes:
Given the central importance of grammatico-historical interpretation, the starting point for the interpretation of any book of the Bible is the determination of its situation in history: its author, approximate date, and place of origin, its addressees and their back
ground, its intended purpose, its dependence upon literary and oral sources, and so on (Hauger, 20).