Download Team 8 - Federal Bar Association

TEAM 8
_______________________________________________________________________
In The
Supreme Court of the United States
__________________________
JOE PUBLIC and JANE PRIVATE,
Petitioners,
v.
ETI and RADTV,
Respondents.
__________________________
On Writ of Certiorari
to the Supreme Court for the State of Radnor
__________________________
B R I E F F O R P E T I T I O N E RS, J O E PU B L I C A N D J A N E PR I V A T E
_______________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for Petitioners,
Team 8
P E T I T I O N E RS R ESP E C T F U L L Y R E Q U EST O R A L A R G U M E N T
_____________________________________________________________________________
T A B L E O F C O N T E N TS
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT .............................................................................................
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................................. i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................................................... iii
STATEMENT OF QUESTIONS PRESENTED .............................................................................1
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION................................................................................................2
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ..............................................................................................3
STATEMENT OF FACTS ..............................................................................................................4
ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................................8
I.
T H E R ESP O N D E N TS A R E N O T E N T I T L E D T O A JU R Y T R I A L , A N D T H E I R
D U E PR O C ESS R I G H TS W E R E N O T V I O L A T E D W H E N T H E R A D N O R
C O U R T D E N I E D T H A T R I G H T , B E C A USE T H E R I G H T T O JU R Y T R I A L I N
C I V I L C ASES, AS D ESC R I B E D I N T H E SE V E N T H A M E N D M E N T , IS N O T A
F U N D A M E N T A L R I G H T A N D H AS N O T B E E N I N C O RPO R A T E D T O T H E
ST A T ES U N D E R T H E F O U R T E E N T H A M E N D M E N T , D E N Y I N G T H E R I G H T
'2(61272))(1'$&,7,=(1¶635,9,/(*(625,0081,7,(625
V I O L A T E D U E PR O C ESS, A N D JU D I C I A L PR O C E D U R A L M E C H A N ISMS,
SU C H AS T H E C I V I L JU R Y T R I A L , A R E ST A T E ISSU ES T H A T C A N B E
A B O L ISH E D F O R F I N A N C I A L R E ASO NS .................................................................9
A . T he Respondents A re Not E ntitled to a C ivil Jury T rial Because the Seventh
A mendment Right to C ivil Jury T rials is Not a F undamental Right Incorporated
to the States ...................................................................................................................9
B. 7KH5DGQRU&LUFXLW&RXUW'LG1RW9LRODWH5HVSRQGHQW¶V3ULYLOHJHVRU
Immunities or Due Process Rights By Denying T heir Request for C ivil Jury
T rial .............................................................................................................................12
C. T he Respondents A re Not E ntitled to a Jury T rial Because W hether or Not a
Right to C ivil Jury T rials E xists is up to E ach Individual State and the State of
Radnor H as Repealed the Right Due to L egitimate Budgetary Concerns ...........14
I I.
7+(5$'125&,5&8,7&28579,2/$7('7+(3(7,7,21(56¶
F I RST A M E N D M E N T R I G H T T O P E T I T I O N T H E G O V E R N M E N T F O R
5('5(662)*5,(9$1&(6:+(1,76758&.7+(3(7,7,21(56¶
C A USE O F A C T I O N R E Q U EST I N G D E C L A R A T O R Y JU D G M E N T T O
SH I F T T H E B U R D E N O F PR O O F T O T H E R ESPO N D E N TS A N D
i
O R D E R E D PE T I T I O N E RS T O F I L E A N A M E N D E D C O M PL A I N T
W I T H O U T T H A T C A USE O F A C T I O N B E C A USE T H E PE T I T I O N E RS
H A V E A F U N D A M E N T A L R I G H T , U N D E R T H E F I RST A M E N D M E N T
R I G H T T O P E T I T I O N T H E G O V E R N M E N T F O R R E D R ESS O F
G R I E V A N C ES, T O B E H E A R D A N D T O A C C ESS T H E C O U R TS, A N D
T H IS C O U R T M UST A PP L Y PR O C E D U R A L G U A R A N T E ES O F D U E
PR O C ESS, SPE C I F I C A L L Y T H E R A D N O R R U L ES O F C I V I L
PR O C E D U R E , T O PR O T E C T T H IS R I G H T A N D E NSU R E T H A T
C L A I MS A R E A DJU D I C A T E D I N A N O N-A R B I T R A R Y M A N N E R ...................17
A.
Under the F irst A mendment Right to Petition the Government for Redress of
G rievances, the Petitioners H ave the Right to be H eard and to Access the
Courts ....................................................................................................................18
B.
T he Radnor C ircuit Court W as Required to A pply the Radnor Rules O f
&LYLO3URFHGXUHWR3URWHFW3HWLWLRQHUV¶5LJKWWR3HWLWLRQWKH*RYHUQPHQWDQG
to E nsure T hat C laims A re A djudicated In A Non-A rbitrary M anner. ........23
CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................................27
ii
T A B L E O F A U T H O R I T I ES
C ases
Ad Hoc Comm. on Judicial Admin. v. Massachusetts,
488 F.2d 1241 (1st Cir. 1973) ...........................................................................................16
Armster v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Cent. Dist. of Cal.,
792 F.2d 1423 (9th Cir. 1986) ..........................................................................................16
Barron v. City of Baltimore,
32 U.S. 243 (1833) ............................................................................................................10
Bd. of Regents v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564 (1972) ..........................................................................................................23
Boddie v. Connecticut,
401 U.S. 371 (1971) ...................................................................................................21, 24
Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri,
131 S.Ct. 2488 (2011) .................................................................................................19, 20
Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited,
404 U.S. 508 (1972) ..........................................................................................................20
Chambers v. Balt. & Ohio R.R.,
207 U.S. 142 (1907) ..........................................................................................................22
Colgrove v. Battin,
413 U.S. 149 (1973) ..........................................................................................................14
Dent v. West Virginia,
129 U.S. 114 (1889) ..........................................................................................................25
E. R. R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor F reight, Inc.,
365 U.S. 127 (1961) ..............................................................................................20, 21, 22
Edwards v. South Carolina ,
372 U.S. 229 (1963) ......................................................................................................9, 18
Hooker v. Los Angeles,
188 U.S. 314 (1903) ..........................................................................................................13
Hovey v. Elliott,
167 U.S. 409 (1897) ..........................................................................................................24
iii
Iowa Cent. Ry. Co. v. Iowa ,
160 U.S. 389 (1896) ..........................................................................................................12
Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cnty., N. C.,
452 U.S. 18 (1981) ............................................................................................................23
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.,
455 U.S. 422 (1982) ..............................................................................................21, 22, 25
Martinez v. California,
444 U.S. 277 (1980) ..........................................................................................................25
Maxwell v. Dow,
176 U.S. 581 (1900) ..........................................................................................................11
McDonald v. City of Chicago,
130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) ......................................................................................................11
McDonald v. Smith,
472 U.S. 479 (1985) ..........................................................................................................19
0LQH:RUNHUVY,OO%DU$VV¶Q
389 U.S. 217 (1967) ..........................................................................................................21
Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Bombolis,
241 U.S. 211 (1916) ..........................................................................................................10
Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,
339 U.S. 306 (1950) ..........................................................................................................24
N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. White,
243 U.S. 188 (1917) ..........................................................................................................11
2¶&RQQRUY1HYDGD,
507 F. Supp. 546 (D. Nev. 1981) ......................................................................................13
2GGHQY2¶.HHIH,
450 N.W.2d 707 (N.D. 1990) ...........................................................................................16
Olsen v. Trust Co. of Chi.,
245 F.2d 522 (7th Cir. 1957) ............................................................................................13
Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319 (1937) ....................................................................................................11, 12
iv
Rudolph v. Mass. Bay Ins. Co.,
472 So. 2d 901 (La. 1985) ..........................................................................................15, 16
Snyder v. Massachusetts,
291 U.S. 97 (1934) ......................................................................................................10, 11
Societe Internationale v. Rogers,
357 U.S. 197 (1958) ..........................................................................................................24
Thomas v. Collins,
323 U.S. 516 (1945) ....................................................................................................19, 20
United States v. Cruikshank,
92 U.S. 542 (1876) ............................................................................................................20
Vermont Sup. Ct. Admin. Directive No. 17 v. Ver mont Sup. Ct.,
579 A.2d 1036 (1990) ..................................................................................................15, 16
Wagner Elec. Co. v. Lyndon,
262 U.S. 226 (1923) ..........................................................................................................11
Walker v. Sauvinet,
92 U.S. 90 (1875) ..............................................................................................................11
Wayte v. United States,
470 U.S. 598 (1985) ..........................................................................................................19
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624 (1943) ..........................................................................................................19
Windsor v. McVeigh,
93 U.S. 274 (1876) ......................................................................................................21, 24
Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp.,
591 F.2d 1164 (5th Cir. 1979) ..........................................................................................13
Statutes
Crime Victims Rights Act, 18 USC § 3771 (2012) ......................................................................22
Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 ............................................................................................................................26
U.S. Const. amend. VII ....................................................................................................................9
U.S. Const. amend. XIV ................................................................................................................12
v
O ther A uthorities
William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765) ..........................................18
English Bill of Rights para. 5 (Eng. 1689) ....................................................................................18
Risa E. Kaufman, Access to the Courts as a Privilege or Immunity of National Citizenship, 40
Conn. L. Rev. 1477 (2008) ............................................................................................................13
Magna Carta, para. 61 (Eng. 1215) ...............................................................................................18
Jeffrey Oakes, The Right to Strike the Jury Trial Demand in Complex Litigation, 34 U. Miami L.
Rev. 243 (1980) .............................................................................................................................13
John B. Oakley, A F resh Look at the Federal Rules in State Courts, 3 Nev. L.J. 354 (2003) .....26
Procedural Reform in the States, 24 F.R.D. 85 (1960) .................................................................26
Timothy P. Terrell, Causes of Action as Property: Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co. and the
³*RYHUQPHQW-as-0RQRSROLVW´7KHRU\RIWKH Due Process Clause, 31 Emory L.J. 491 (1982) ...25
Timothy P. Terrell, Property, Due Process, and the Distinction Between Definition and Theory
in Legal Analysis, 70 GEO. L.J. 861 (1982) .................................................................................25
United States Declaration of Independence, para. 21 (U.S. 1776) ...............................................19
vi
ST A T E M E N T O F Q U EST I O NS PR ESE N T E D
I.
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their libel case against the Petitioners when doing so would not violate any fundamental right or
privilege or immunity, as the Seventh Amendment right to civil jury trials has not been
incorporated to the States by way of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the right to civil jury trial is
a state issue?
II.
Did the 5DGQRU&LUFXLW&RXUWYLRODWHWKH3HWLWLRQHUV¶)LUVW$PHQGPHQWULJKWWR
petition tKHJRYHUQPHQWIRUUHGUHVVRIJULHYDQFHVZKHQLWVWUXFNWKH3HWLWLRQHUV¶FDXVHRIDFWLRQ
seeking declaratory judgment to shift the burden of proof to the Respondents and ordered
petitioners to file an amended complaint without that cause of action, because doing so denied
the Petitioners their fundamental rights to be heard and to access the courts, and it denied them
the protections of procedural due process guarantees that would have ensured their claims were
adjudicated in a non-arbitrary manner?
1
ST A T E M E N T O F JU R ISD I C T I O N
7KH6XSUHPH&RXUWRI5DGQRUHQWHUHGDILQDOGHFLVLRQRQWKH3HWLWLRQHUV¶FODLPVZKHQLW
denied their request for discretionary review and affirmed the decision of the Radnor Circuit
Court. (R. at 7). Petitioner timely filed for a writ of certiorari. (R. at 7). This Court subsequently
granted certiorari . (R. at 7). This Court possesses proper jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a)
(2006).
2
SU M M A R Y O F T H E A R G U M E N T
The Radnor Circuit Court correctly affirmed the section of the Radnor Fiscal Emergency
Plan that abolished jury trials in civil cases. It has been affirmed by the United States Supreme
Court that the Seventh Amendment right to civil jury trials is not incorporated to the states via
the Incorporation Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Still, the United States government is
DEOHWRVWHSLQDQGUHTXLUHDVWDWHWRDFWLIWKHUHLVDQLPSLQJHPHQWRIDFLWL]HQ¶VIXQGDPHQWDO
right that violates one of their privileges or immunities thus violating due process. However, this
Court has consistently held that the right to civil jury trials is not a fundamental right as it is not
³VRURRWHGLQWKHWUDGLWLRQVDQGFRQVFLHQFH´RIRXUQDWLRQQRULVLW³IXQGDPHQWDOWRDQ$PHULFDQ
VFKHPHRIRUGHUHGOLEHUWLHV´)Xrther, this Court has held that denying a citizen a civil jury trial
in no way violates their privileges or immunities so long as they are allowed other procedural
avenues that meet the mandates of the Due Process Clause. In Radnor, the parties in the instant
case are still allowed their day in court before Radnor Circuit Court Judges therefore due process
has been met.
That being said, it is for the states to decide if they are to provide civil jury trials. States
are also allowed to abolish civil jury trials due to budgetary reasons as several states (including
Vermont and Louisiana) have done so without the United States Federal Government interfering.
Further, Radnor only enacted that RFEP after it was voted in by an electorate majority of 62%.
Additionally, Petitioners have enforceable rights for their claims to be heard under the
First Amendment; specifically, the Petitioners have a right for the court to either grant or deny
their motion for declaratory judgment to shift the burden of proof to the Respondents in this case.
7KHULJKWWRSHWLWLRQWKHJRYHUQPHQWLVDIXQGDPHQWDOULJKWWKDWLVGHHSO\URRWHGLQRXUQDWLRQ¶V
3
history. The fundamental right to petition the government for redress of grievances extends
beyond the right to petition the legislature, and in fact applies to all branches of the government.
Further, "redress of grievances" is construed broadly and requires that private citizens have
access to the courts and have an opportunity be heard; therefore, the right to petition the
government also includes the right to sue and defend. 3HWLWLRQHUV¶ULJKWWREHKHDUGXQGHUWKH
First Amendment Petition Clause is part of a comprehensive legislative scheme, under which
victims of any wrong, civil or criminal, have enforceable rights to be heard in court
,QWKLVFDVHWKH5DGQRU&RXUWVYLRODWHGWKH3HWLWLRQHUV¶)LUVW$PHQGPHQWULJKWWRSHWLWLRQ
WKHJRYHUQPHQWIRUUHGUHVVRIJULHYDQFHVZKHQLWVWUXFN3HWLWLRQHUV¶FDXVHRIDFWLRQDVNLQJIRU
declaratory judgment to shift the burden of proof to the Respondents, and ordered Petitioners to
refile an Amended Complaint without that cause of action. Litigants and causes of action are
HQWLWOHGWRSURFHGXUDOSURWHFWLRQ7KH&RXUW¶VDFWLRQLQVWULNLQJWKLVFDXVHRIDFWLRQZDV
fundamentally unfair because the court did not apply procedural guarantees of due process,
specifically the Radnor Rules of Civil Procedure, which were specifically designed to guard
3HWLWLRQHUV¶ULJKWVDQGHQVXUHWKDW3HWLWLRQHUVFODLPVZHUHDGMXGLFDWHGLQDQRQ-arbitrary manner.
ThereforeWKLV&RXUWVKRXOGUHYHUVHWKH5DGQRU6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQDQGUHPDQGWKLVFDVH
so that Petitioners can be heard on their request for declaratory judgment.
ST A T E M E N T O F F A C TS
Radnor is a state within the United States with a judiciary that consists of circuit courts,
appellate courts, and the Supreme Court of Radnor all serving as courts of general jurisdiction
that hear all cases, civil and criminal. (R. at 1). The state is governed by both the Constitution of
Radnor and statutes enacted by the Radnor Legislature. Id. The Constitution of Radnor does not
contain any provisions regarding the right to trial by jury in civil cases and the right was only
4
established later by statute for most civil cases. Id.
Decades of governmental overspending left the State of Radnor at risk of defaulting on its
financial obligations and as a result, the Radnor Legislature was forced to take cost-preventative
measures. Id. In doing so, the Radnor government presented the citizens of Radnor with a
package of reforms and buGJHWDU\FXWVNQRZQDVWKH5DGQRU)LVFDO(PHUJHQF\3ODQ³5)(3´
and the citizens passed the plan with 62% of the electorate in favor. Id.
One of the measures approved under the RFEP was the abolishment of civil jury trials.
(R. at 1-2). The Radnor Legislature, aided by the Judicial Committee that administers the
Judicial Branch, estimated that the money saved from eliminating the trials has been
³LQGLVSHQVDEOHIRUWKHMXGLFLDU\WREHDEOHWRRSHUDWHHIILFLHQWO\DQGZLWKLQLWVQHZ\HDUO\appointed budget.´5DW)XUWKHUVLQFHWKHHQDFWPHQWRIWKH5)(3WKHULJKWWREULQJFLYLO
suits before Radnor courts, for adjudication by Radnor judges, still exists. (R. at 2).
Joe Public is a well-known soap opera actor and resident of Radnor. (R. at 2). He recently
married Jane Private who maintains a private personal life working as a nurse. (R. at 2). She is
18 years old, the legal age to be married without parental consent in Radnor. (R. at 3).
(QWHUWDLQPHQW7DEORLG,QF³(7,´DQG5$'79DUHERWKFRUSRUDWLRQs incorporated in the state
of Radnor. (R. at 2). ETI owns Gossip Show, a daily tabloid entertainment television news
program. (R. at 2). RADTV owns Channel 5, the most viewed channel in Radnor, which
broadcasts Gossip Show in its primetime slot. (R. at 2).
Gossip Show aired a segment about Joe Public and Jane Private during its May 23
EURDGFDVWWKDWUHIHUUHGWRWKHHYHQWDVD³PDILDZHGGLQJ´DQGDOOHJHGWKDWWKHFRXSOHEHJDQWKHLU
sexual relationship when Jane was a minor (a felony in Radnor) and that they were only getting
married because Jane was two months pregnant. (R. at 2-3). An expert survey conducted among
5
3,000 Radnor residents showed that 80% of those interviewed in fact believed the allegations
made by Gossip Show during the broadcast. (R. at 4).
As a result of the broadcast, Jane Private became very distressed from the negative
attention she was receiving and became afraid to leave her home. (R. at 3). In fact, Jane and Joe
were unable to leave their home for several days because reporters, photographers, and paparazzi
surrounded it 24 hours a day. (R. at 3).
After Joe appeared on rival television show, Tabloid ZoneWRUHIXWH*RVVLS6KRZ¶VFODLPV
the couple filed a lawsuit against ETI and RADTV in the Radnor Circuit Court alleging that
(7,¶VMay 23 broadcast was defamatory and slanderous under Radnor Law; that the defamatory
and slanderous comments made during the broadcast of Gossip Show causeded and continue to
FDXVHWKHPJUHDWPHQWDOSDLQDQGDQJXLVKDQGWKDW-RH¶VFDUHHUKDGVXIIHUHGDVD result of the
slanderous and defamatory remarks, including the termination of two major endorsement deals,
costing him in excess of $5 million dollars. (R. at 3-4). Jane and Joe further alleged that RADTV
was responsible for the content of the shows it aired and for inadequately supervising the
productions under contract, specifically the May 23 Gossip Show broadcast. (R. at 4).
Jane and Joe also claimed that they were entitled to heightened protection of their privacy
rights as protected by Sections 1 and 5 of Article III of the Constitution of Radnor. (R. at 4).
Thus, Jane and Joe filed a declaratory judgment in which they requested that the burden of proof
be shifted so that Respondents have the burden of proving that the remarks made during the May
23 Gossip Show broadcast were true or were reasonably investigated before broadcasting. (R. at
4).
Respondents, ETI and RADTV, answered the Complaint by denying most of the
allegations, filed a counter-request for declaratory judgment on shifting the burden of proof, and
6
requested declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of the RFEP that eliminated civil jury
trials. (R. at 4).
Eight months after Joe appeared on the May 27 edition of Tabloid Zone, and one month
after Joe and Jane filed their ComplainW*RVVLS6KRZDLUHGDQ³LQYHVWLJDWLYHUHSRUW´DERXW-RH
airing over the course of three days that featured an interview with a young woman who claimed
that Joe had had an affair with her. (R. at 5).
After the investigative report aired, Jane became extremely emotionally distraught and had
a miscarriage. Id. This incident, coupled with the media frenzy generated by the second
investigative report, caused Jane to fall into a deep depression, resulting in a weeklong
hospitalization; she is still receiving outpatient treatment. Id. Jane and Joe requested and were
granted leave to file an Amended Complaint that included new causes of action for the
defamatory broadcast of the investigative report and their subsequent emotional damages. Id.
Petitioners filed D0RWLRQWR'LVPLVV5HVSRQGHQWV¶UHTXHVWIRUGHFODUDWRU\MXGJPHQW
UHJDUGLQJWKH5HVSRQGHQWV¶ULJKWVWRDFLYLOMXU\WULDOZKLOHWKH5HVSRQGHQWVDQVZHUHGDVVHUWLQJ
that their right to civil jury trials is a fundamental right. Id. After this briefing, the matter was
submitted to the Circuit Court. Id.
The presiding Judge in the Radnor Circuit Court ordered that the Amended Complaint be
stricken from the record, returned the filed document to Petitioners, and ordered Petitioners to
refile their Amended Complaint without the Declaratory Judgment request for the shifting of the
EXUGHQRISURRI5DW,QVWULNLQJ-DQHDQG-RH¶VUHTXHVWIRUGHFODUDWRU\MXGJPHQWWKH
presiding judge acted without being moved by any party. (R. at 6). The judge also affirmed the
section of the RFEP that abolished jury trials in civil cases. Id.
3HWLWLRQHUVVRXJKWWLPHO\UHFRQVLGHUDWLRQIURPWKH&LUFXLW&RXUWDUJXLQJWKDWWKH&RXUW¶V
7
actions violated their First Amendment right to petition the government for redress of grievances
as to the shifting of the burden of proof. Id. Petitioners further averred that the Radnor Rules of
Civil Procedure did not grant jurisdiction to the Court to choose which causes of action to hear
and that they do not contemplate striking from the record a proper cause of action. Id. Petitioners
requested that the Circuit Court either grant or deny their request for declaratory judgment, while
Respondents also sought timely reconsideration and argued that the Circuit Court was bound by
the Fourteenth Amendment to recognize their Seventh Amendment civil jury trial right. Id.
However, the Circuit Court denied both requests for reconsideration without opinion. Id.
Both parties sought discretionary review from the Radnor Supreme Court. Id. Petitioners
made clear that the only thing they were seeking was for the Circuit Court to hear their
DUJXPHQWVDQGHQWHUDGHFLVLRQDFFRUGLQJO\DVWKH&RXUW¶VRQO\FKRLFHZDVWRJUDQWRUGHQ\
3HWLWLRQHUV¶UHTXHVWIRU'HFODUDWRU\-XGJPHQWZKLOH5HVSRQGHQWVDUJXHGWKDWWKe Circuit Court
erred in affirming the section of the Radnor Fiscal Emergency Plan that eliminated civil jury
trials because constitutional rights cannot be abridged due to financial concerns. (R. at 6-7).
The Supreme Court denied both requests for discretionary review and affirmed the
&LUFXLW&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQ5DW3HWLWLRQHUVDQG5HVSRQGHQWVILOHGVHSDUDWH certiorari petitions
before the Supreme Court of the United States. Id. The Supreme Court consolidated and granted
both petitions, agreeing to heDU3HWLWLRQHUV¶DUJXPHQWWKDWWKH&LUFXLW&RXUWYLRODWHGWKHLUILUVW
amendment right to petition the government for redress of grievances, while also agreeing to
KHDU5HVSRQGHQWV¶DUJXPHQWWKDW5DGQRUYLRODWHGWKH6HYHQWKDQG)RXUWHHQWK$PHQGPHQWVE\
eliminating civil jury trials under the RFEP. Id.
ARGUMENT
This Court must review de novo WKH5DGQRU6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQDIILUPLQJWKH
8
5DGQRU&LUFXLW&RXUWZKLFKVWUXFN3HWLWLRQHUV¶FDXVHRIDFWLRQUHTXHVWLQJWRVKLIWWKHEXUGHQRI
proof to Respondents and denied Respondents the right to a civil jury trial, because both issues
are questions of law. This Court reviews all questions of law de novo. See Edwards v. South
Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963) (requiring de novo review for questions of constitutional
law).
I.
T H E R ESP O N D E N TS A R E N O T E N T I T L E D T O A JU R Y T R I A L , A N D T H E I R
D U E PR O C ESS R I G H TS W E R E N O T V I O L A T E D W H E N T H E R A D N O R
C O U R T D E N I E D T H A T R I G H T , B E C A USE T H E R I G H T T O JU R Y T R I A L I N
C I V I L C ASES, AS D ESC R I B E D I N T H E SE V E N T H A M E N D M E N T , IS N O T A
F U N D A M E N T A L R I G H T A N D H AS N O T B E E N I N C O RPO R A T E D T O T H E
ST A T ES U N D E R T H E F O U R T E E N T H A M E N D M E N T , D E N Y I N G T H E R I G H T
'2(61272))(1'$&,7,=(1¶635,9,/(*(625,0081,7,(625
V I O L A T E D U E PR O C ESS, A N D JU D I C I A L PR O C E D U R A L M E C H A N ISMS,
SU C H AS T H E C I V I L JU R Y T R I A L , A R E ST A T E ISSU ES T H A T C A N B E
A B O L ISH E D F O R F I N A N C I A L R E ASO NS.
A.
T he Respondents A re Not E ntitled to a C ivil Jury T rial Because the Seventh
A mendment Right to C ivil Jury T rials is Not a F undamental Right
Incorporated to the States.
The Respondents, ETI and RADTV, argue that they are guaranteed a civil jury trial
because the Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees them this right by
way of the Fourteenth Amendment, which incorporates the right to the States. (R. at 4).
However, the Respondents are not entitled to a civil jury trial because the right is not
fundamental to an American scheme of ordered liberties, nor is it required because it is so deeply
URRWHGLQRXU1DWLRQ¶VKLVWRU\6LQFHWKHULJKWWRFLYLOMXU\WULDOVLVQRWDIXQGDPHQWDOULJKt, the
Respondents privileges or immunities have not been violated, and, therefore, the RFEP,
approved by a majority of the electorate, is constitutional.
7KH6HYHQWK$PHQGPHQWSDUWRIWKH%LOORI5LJKWVVWDWHVWKDW³,QVXLWVDWFRPPRQODZ
where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise examined in any other Court of the
9
8QLWHG6WDWHVWKDQDFFRUGLQJWRWKHUXOHVRIWKHFRPPRQODZ´86&RQVWDPend. VII.
This Court has time and again held that not all of the amendments within the Bill of
Rights need apply to the legislation of the States. Barron v. City of Balti more, 32 U.S. 243, 247
(1833). For example, in analyzing a provision of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause with
UHJDUGVWRDVWDWHWDNLQJDFLWL]HQ¶VODQGWKLV&RXUWXOWLPDWHO\KHOGWKDWLWGLGQRWKDYH
MXULVGLFWLRQRYHUWKHFODLPEHFDXVHWKHSURYLVLRQZDV³LQWHQGHGVROHO\DVDOLPLWDWLRQRQWKH
exercise of power by the government of the United States and [was] not applicable to the
OHJLVODWLRQRIWKHVWDWHV´86DW-1. The Court further reasoned:
The constitution was ordained and established by the people of the United States for
themselves, for their own government, and not for the government of the individual
states. Each state established a constitution for itself, and in that constitution, provided
such limitations and restrictions on the powers of its particular government, as its
judgment dictated.
32 U.S. at 247.
Throughout and into the next decade, while most of the Bill of Rights was in fact
incorporated to the states, the Seventh Amendment right to civil jury trials was not. Indeed, in
Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Bombolis, this Court held that the Seventh Amendment only
DSSOLHVWRWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVFRXUWVDQGWKDWLW³GRHVQRWLQDQ\PDQQHUZKDWHYHUJRYHUQRU
UHJXODWHWULDOVE\MXU\LQVWDWHFRXUWV´86
Moreover, the right to a civil jury trial is a non-fundamental right and has not been
incorporated to the States, so the Respondents are not entitled to a civil jury trial in Radnor. In
Snyder v. Massachusetts, the Court considered which rights from the Bill of Rights must be
incorporated to the States. 291 U.S. 97 (1934). In Snyder , the Court held that the states could
JRYHUQWKHSURFHGXUHRIWKHLURZQFRXUWVYLDWKHLURZQEHOLHIVRIIDLUQHVV³XQOHVVLQVRGRLQJLW
offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
10
UDQNHGDVIXQGDPHQWDO´86. at 105. Thus, the term fundamental right was coined and the
8QLWHG6WDWHVZDVJLYHQDXWKRULW\WRVWHSLQLIDVWDWHLPSLQJHGRQDFLWL]HQ¶VIXQGDPHQWDOULJKWV
In Palko v. Connecticut, this Court determined that the right to civil jury trials was not a
fundamental right. 302 U.S. 319 (1937). While the Court stated that the right to a jury trial can
KDYHYDOXHDQGLPSRUWDQFHLWFODULILHGWKDWFLYLOMXULHV³DUHQRWRIWKHYHU\HVVHQFHRIDVFKHPH
RIRUGHUHGOLEHUW\´DQGWKDWDQDEROLVKPHQWRIWKHULJKWZRXOGQRWYLRODWHD³SULQFLSOHRIMXVWLFH
VRGHHSO\URRWHGLQWKHWUDGLWLRQVDQGFRQVFLHQFHRIRXUSHRSOHDVWREHUDQNHGDVIXQGDPHQWDO´
302 U.S. at 325. Further, Justice Cardozo reasoned that the Court has consistently held that trial
by jury may be modified by a state or abolished altogether. See, e.g., Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S.
90 (1875); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900); N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188
(1917); Wagner Elec. Co. v. Lyndon, 262 U.S. 226 (1923).
Moreover, most recently, in holding that the Second Amendment Right to Bear Arms was
DIXQGDPHQWDOULJKWWKLV&RXUWUHLWHUDWHGWKDWD³WRWDOLQFRUSRUDWLRQ´WKHRU\RIWKH)RXUWHHQWK
$PHQGPHQWKDVQHYHUEHHQDFFHSWHGDQGWKH&RXUWKDV³GHFOLQHGWRDSSO\VHYHUDOSURYLVLRQVWR
the States LQDQ\PHDVXUH´LPSRUWDQWO\WKH&RXUWQRWHGWKH6HYHQWK$PHQGPHQWKDVQHYHU
been incorporated. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3094 (2010).
5HVSRQGHQWVPD\HUURQHRXVO\DSSO\WKH&RXUW¶VKROGLQJLQSnyder WRPHDQWKDW³WKH
Seventh AmendmenWULJKWWRFLYLOMXU\WULDOVLVERWKGHHSO\URRWHGLQRXU1DWLRQ¶VKLVWRU\DQG
IXQGDPHQWDOWRDQ$PHULFDQVFKHPHRIRUGHUHGOLEHUWLHV´DQGWKXVFDQQRWEHGHQLHG5DW
However, Snyder did not, in any way, stand for establishing the kind of nationwide right to a
civil jury trial that the Respondents falsely claim exists and are asking this Court to establish.
Snyder86DW,QIDFWWKLV&RXUWKDVIXUWKHUDVVHUWHGWKDWD³IDLUDQGHQOLJKWHQHG
V\VWHPRIMXVWLFH´FRXOGH[LVWZLWKRXWWKHULJKWDnd they have consistently held that the right to
11
FLYLOMXU\WULDO³PD\EHPRGLILHGE\DVWDWHor abolished altogether ´See Palko, 302 U.S. at 32425 (emphasis added).
In summary, it has long been established that the right to a civil jury trial is not so deeply
URRWHGLQRXUQDWLRQ¶VKLVWRU\WKDWLWFDQEHFRQVLGHUHGDIXQGDPHQWDOULJKWWKDWLVJXDUDQWHHGWR
U.S. citizens in their individual states. Therefore, the Respondents are not entitled to a civil jury
trial in Radnor, where the right was abolished by the RFEP. (R. at 1-2).
B.
7KH5DGQRU&LUFXLW&RXUW'LG1RW9LRODWH5HVSRQGHQW¶V3ULYLOHJHVRU
Immunities or Due Process Rights By Denying T heir Request for C ivil Jury
T rial.
Since the Radnor Circuit Court did not violate Respondents¶ fundamental rights when it
denied them a civil jury trial5HVSRQGHQWV¶SULYLOHJHVRULPPXQLWLHVDV86FLWL]HQVhave also
not EHHQYLRODWHGE\WKHFRXUW¶VDFWLRQV7KH3ULYLOHJHVRU,PPXQLWLHV&ODXVHRIWKH8QLWHG
6WDWHV&RQVWLWXWLRQVWDWHV³1R6WDWHVKDOOPDNHRUHQIRUFHany law which shall abridge the
SULYLOHJHVRULPPXQLWLHVRIWKHFLWL]HQVRIWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV´86&RQVWDPHQG;,9†FO
+RZHYHUWKLV&RXUWKDVORQJKHOGWKDWGHQ\LQJDFLWL]HQ¶VULJKWWRDFLYLOMXU\WULDOLQQR
way violates the Privileges or Immunities Clause. In Iowa Cent. Ry. Co. v. Iowa , the Court held
that procedural due process was provided when a litigant went through a summary proceeding as
opposed to a civil jury trial. 160 U.S. 389, 392 (1896). The Court reasoned that:
I]t is clear that the Fourteenth Amendment in no way undertakes to control the power of a
State to determine by what process legal rights may be asserted or legal obligations be
enforced, provided the method of procedure adopted for these purposes gives reasonable
notice and affords fair opportunity to be heard before the issues are decided. This being
the case, it was obviously not a right, privilege, or immunity of a citizen of the United
States to have a controversy in the state court prosecuted or determined by one form of
action instead of by another.
160 U.S. at 393.
Following the decision in Iowa Cent. Ry. Co., this Court has consistently affirmed that
12
States are in no way constrained by the Privileges or Immunities Clause in determining which
procedural mechanisms may be adopted, so long as the mandates of the Due Process Clause are
met. See Hooker v. Los Angeles, 188 U.S. 314, 318 (1903) (requiring reasonable notice and
opportunity to be heard); see also, Risa E. Kaufman, Access to the Courts as a Privilege or
Immunity of National Citizenship, 40 Conn. L. Rev. 1477, 1498 (2008).
)XUWKHU³LWLVDEDVLFWHQHWRIFRQVWLWXWLRQDOODZWKDWWKH6HYHQWK$PHQGPHQWJXDUDQW\RI
a jury trial in a civil case is not an element of due process applicable to the state courts through
WKH)RXUWHHQWK$PHQGPHQW´2¶&RQQRUY1HYDGD, 507 F. Supp. 546, 548 (D. Nev. 1981), see,
e.g., Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164, 1171 (5th Cir. 1979) (finding that the right to a
civil jury trial is not fundamental as it is not explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the
Constitution); Olsen v. Trust Co. of Chi., 245 F.2d 522, 524 (7th Cir. 1957) (finding that denial
of civil jury trial is not a denial of due process that the Constitution guarantees because it is a
particular form or method of state procedure).
Respondent has erroneously suggested that the Circuit Court erred in denying their right
WRDMXU\WULDOEHFDXVH³&RQVWLWXWLRQDOULJKWVDUHQRWVXEMHFWWRYRWHEHFDXVHRQFHWKHULJKWLV
constitutionally granted it takes off the table ceUWDLQSROLF\FKRLFHV´5DW7KLVDUJXPHQWLV
plainly inapplicable as the Radnor Constitution was silent with regards to the right to trial by
jury, instead only establishing the right to civil jury trials via statute. (R at 1).
Further, the case before the Court today is a libel and defamation action that requires
extensive rules and damage calculations that could be difficult for a jury to comprehend. It
FRPSOH[OLWLJDWLRQ³WKHMXU\¶VLQDELOLW\WRFRPSUHKHQGWKHLVVXHVPD\>DORQH@FDXVHWKH6HYHQWK
Amendment right to civil jury trial to conflict with due process rights and authorize the judge to
VWULNHWKHMXU\´-HIIUH\2DNHV The Right to Strike the Jury Trial Demand in Complex Litigation,
13
34 U. Miami L. Rev. 243, 300 (1980). Hence, it would be prudent to leave the issues presented in
this case to Radnor Circuit Court Judges because they are more likely to fully understand the
complexities of the law.
The State of Radnor has not violated the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment as the Respondents still have an opportunity to be heard. Rather than
being heard in front of a jury of their peers, the Respondents will be heard in front of a judge
who will better understand the rule of law and measuring of any damages. In turn, the
elimination of civil jury trials will save the State of Radnor time and money; the citizens of
Radnor approved the RFEP with conservation of government resources in mind. (R. at 1).
Each individual state must be left to decide upon specific judicial procedural
PHFKDQLVPV$VORQJDVDFLWL]HQ¶VSULYLOHJHVRULPPXQLWLHVDUHQRWYLRODWHGDQGGXHSURFHVVLV
followed, regulation of state judiciaries should remain a state issue. For these reasons, the ruling
of the Radnor Circuit Court, denying the Respondents a civil jury trial, should be affirmed.
C.
T he Respondents A re Not E ntitled to a Jury T rial Because W hether or Not a
Right to C ivil Jury T rials E xists is up to E ach Individual State and the State
of Radnor H as Repealed the Right Due to L egitimate Budgetary Concerns.
The Respondents erroneously suggest that the United States Constitution guarantees them
a civil jury trial in the State of Radnor. (R. at 4). This argument fails, because whether a right to a
civil jury trial exists is a state issue. Indeed, there was even a proposal to create a Constitutional
provision that would guarantee the right to trial by jury in civil cases, but this proposal failed
³EHFDXVHWKH6WDWHVYDULHGZLGHO\DVWRWKHFDVHVLQZKLFKFLYLOMXU\WULDOZDVSURYLGHGDQGWKH
proponents of a civil jury guarantee found too difficult the task of fashioning words appropriate
WRFRYHUWKHGLIIHUHQWVWDWHSUDFWLFHV´ Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 153 (1973).
If a state has established the right to trial by jury through statute, as was the case in
14
Radnor, that state may later repeal it in light of financial concerns. The RFEP included the repeal
of the right to civil jury trials, and a 62% majority of the Radnor electorate voted in favor of the
SODQDVD³ODVWDWWHPSWWRSUHYHQW>WKHVWDWH@ IURPGHIDXOWLQJRQLWVILQDQFLDOREOLJDWLRQV´ Id. The
Judiciary Committee that administers the Judicial Branch in Radnor established that the money
VDYHGIURPHOLPLQDWLQJFLYLOMXU\WULDOVKDVEHHQ³LQGLVSHQVDEOHIRUWKHMXGLFLDU\WREHDEOHWR
operate eIILFLHQWO\DQGZLWKLQLWVQHZ\HDUO\DSSURSULDWHGEXGJHW´5DW
Other states have acted in the same manner as Radnor and have suspended civil jury trials
in light of financial considerations. In Rudolph v. Mass. Bay Ins. Co., the Supreme Court of
Louisiana held that Louisiana had a legitimate interest in saving money by eliminating jury trials.
6RG/D7KHFRXUWUHDVRQHGWKDW³WKHUHFDQEHOLWWOHDUJXPHQWWKDWWKHVWDWHKDV
a legitimate interest in preserving its financial resourcHV«DQGLQPLQLPL]LQJWKHGHOD\VDQG
JUHDWHUFRXUWFRVWVZKLFKJHQHUDOO\DWWHQGMXU\WULDOV´6RGDW7KHFRXUWFRQFOXGHG
³WKH/HJLVODWXUHFRXOGKDYHUDWLRQDOO\EHOLHYHGWKDWWKLVFODVVLILFDWLRQRIWRUWYLFWLPVZKRFDQQRW
require a jury trial, is related to achieving the legitimate state objectives of the protection of the
VWDWHWUHDVXU\DQGWKHIDFLOLWDWLRQRIWKHMXGLFLDOSURFHVV´ Id.
More recently, the Supreme Court of Vermont held that a state administrative directive
ordering a delay of civil jury trials for budgetary reasons was constitutional. Vermont Sup. Ct.
Admin. Directive No. 17 v. Vermont Sup. Ct., 579 A.2d 1036, 1037 (Vt. 1990). While the Court
included a provision that gave administrative judges the power to permit civil jury trials in
extraordinary circumstances, the provision was never used and the court allowed a near 6-month
suspension of all civil jury trials. Id.
The instant case is analogous to both Rudolph and Vermont. Those cases dealt with states
suspending the right to civil jury trials in light of budgetary considerations, and in both instances,
15
the courts upheld these acts as constitutional. We ask this Court to do the same for the case at
bar. Also, just as the Rudolph court found a legitimate state interest in wanting to save money by
abolishing civil jury trials, Radnor had a legitimate state interest in passing the RFEP to avoid
defaulting on their financial obligations.
The Respondent may erroneously suggest the instant case is distinguishable from
Vermont because that case dealt with a definite timed suspension, while the state of Radnor has
not established any sort of time frame for its abolishment of the right to civil jury trial. However,
just because the citizens of Radnor have chosen to abolish civil jury trials through the RFEP does
not mean that they could not reinstate the right at a later time when such serious financial
burdens do not exist. Further, states need not set a definite time on the length of the suspension;
such was the case in Ad Hoc Comm. on Judicial Admin. v. Massachusetts:
Delay per se is not unconstitutional; it may become such only when an injured plaintiff,
ready and eager for trial, or a Respondent, seeking vindication and himself ready for trial,
are denied for too long his day in court. If a five year delay in a civil action reflects
VLPSO\WKHSDUWLHV¶XWLOL]DWLRQRISUH-trial discovery or settlement negotiations there is no
constitutional violation. To codify the myriad relevant elements into timetables of general
application having constitutional force may well be impossible.
488 F.2d 1241, 1244 (1st Cir. 1973).
The Respondents may cite several cases that have held that citizens have a right to civil
jury trials. See, e.g., Armster v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Cent. Dist. of Cal. , 792 F.2d 1423, 1425
(9th Cir. 1986) (finding that a judicial decision, rather than referendum, to suspend a jury system
GXHWRDODFNRIVWDWHIXQGVYLRODWHGDSHWLWLRQHU¶VULJKWWRDFLYLOMXU\WULDOXQGHUWKH6HYHQWK
Amendment and was therefore unconstitutional); 2GGHQY2¶.HHIH, 450 N.W.2d 707 (N.D.
1990) (holding that the suspension of civil jury trials, established as a right under the North
Dakota Constitution, due to financial reasons was unconstitutional because the right was
protected by the State &RQVWLWXWLRQEXWQRWLQJWKDW³WKH6HYHQWK$PHQGPHQWLVQRWDSSOLFDEOHWR
16
VWDWHFRXUWSURFHHGLQJVXQGHUWKH)RXUWHHQWK$PHQGPHQW´+RZHYHUWKHVHFDVHVDUH
distinguishable from the instant case for very important reasons: first, the people of Radnor
approved the abolishment of the right to civil jury trial with an overwhelming majority; second,
the right to civil jury trial was only established by statute and never enjoyed Constitutional
protection, as did the right in other states.
Since denying a citizen the right to a civil jury trial does not offend the Privileges or
,PPXQLWLHV&ODXVHDQGWKXVGRHVQRWYLRODWHDFLWL]HQ¶V'XH3URFHVVULJKWVWKHULJKWLVQRW
fundamental. Therefore, the right to civil jury trials is not guaranteed to the States by the
Constitution of the United States. Thus, a majority of the Radnor electorate validly voted to
remove the right to civil jury trials by referendum and this Court should not override their will.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182 (1976) (relying on the opinion of the majority to find that
the death penalty does not violate the Eight Amendment).
The choice to attain or abolish the right civil jury trials remains an issue for the states. In
the instant case, Radnor made a decision to abolish civil jury trials to conserve financial
resources. Radnor even put the decision up to a vote, and the majority of the state electorate
voted in favor of the RFEP. The Supreme Court of the United States has repeatedly affirmed the
ULJKW6WDWH¶VWRDEROLVKFLYLOMXU\WULDOVAccordingly, today we ask that this Court do the same.
I I.
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17
C L A I MS A R E A DJU D I C A T E D I N A N O N-A R B I T R A R Y M A N N E R.
A.
Under the F irst A mendment Right to Petition the Government for Redress of
G rievances, Petitioners H ave the Right to be H eard and to Access the Courts.
7KH5DGQRUFRXUW¶VDFWLQVWULNLQJWKH3HWLWLRQHUV¶FDXVHRIDFWLRQDQGRUGHULQJWKH
Petitioners to file an Amended Complaint without that cause of action violated the First
Amendment Right To Petition the Government for Redress of Grievances because the Petitioners
had a right for the Radnor court to hear and adjudicate that claim. The First Amendment has been
incorporated to the states, so the Petitioners have enforceable rights for their claims to be heard.
See Edwards v. South Carolina , 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (finding that the First Amendment right to
petition the government for redress of grievances is a constitutionally protected right into which
the states cannot intrude under the Fourteenth Amendment).
The right to petition the government, and to have claims heard by courts, is deeply rooted
in history, particularly in English law. The first mention of this right to petition occurred in the
0DJQD&DUWDZKLFKVWDWHV³LIZHWUDQVJUHVVDQ\RIWKHDUWLFOHVRIWKHSHDFHRUWKHVHFXULW\DQG
the offence be notified to four of the aforesaid twenty-five barons, those four barons shall come
to us, ... and, laying the transgression before us, shall petition us to have that transgression
corrected´0DJQD&DUWDSDUD(QJHPSKDVLVDGGHG$ULJKWWRSHWLWLRQDJDLQ
HPHUJHGLQWKH(QJOLVK%LOORI5LJKWVZKLFKVWDWHG³>,@WLVWKH right of the subjects to petition the
kingDQGDOOFRPPLWPHQWVDQGSURVHFXWLRQVIRUVXFKSHWLWLRQLQJDUHLOOHJDO´(QJOLVK%LOORI
Rights para. 5 (Eng. 1689) (emphasis added). The English right to petition the king became an
American right with the founding of the original thirteen colonies. Indeed, renowned English
MXULVW:LOOLDP%ODFNVWRQHQRWHGWKDW³WKHULJKWRISHWLWLRQLQJWKHNLQJRUHLWKHUKRXVHRI
SDUOLDPHQWIRUWKHUHGUHVVRIJULHYDQFHV´ZDVD³ULJKWDSSHUWDLQLQJWRHYHU\LQGLYLGXDO´:LOOLDP
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, *143 (1765).
18
7KHLPSRUWDQFHRIWKHULJKWWRSHWLWLRQDQGIRUWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VREOLJDWLRQWRUHGUHVV
JULHYDQFHVLVHYLGHQWLQWKHWH[WRIWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV'HFODUDWLRQRI,QGHSHQGHQFHWKHNLQJ¶V
perceived failure to redress grievances was listed as one of the reasons for declaring
independence from England. See United States Declaration of Independence, para. 21 (U.S.
³,QHYHU\VWDJHRIWKHVH2SSUHVVLRQV:HKDYH3HWLWLRQHGIRU5HGUHVVLQWKHPRVWKXPEOH
terms: Our repeated Petitions have been answered only by repeated injury. A Prince, whose
character is thus marked by every act which may define a Tyrant, is unfit to be the ruler of a free
SHRSOH´
The importance of the right to petition is further evident from its placement in the First
Amendment alongside other fundamental rights, such as the freedoms of speech and religion. See
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette86³2QH
VULJKWWROLIHOLEHUW\DQG
property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental
ULJKWVPD\QRWEHVXEPLWWHGWRYRWH´,QGHHG³>t]he right to petition is cut from the same cloth
as the other guarantees of that Amendment, and is an assurance of a particular freedom of
H[SUHVVLRQ´McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 482 (1985). This Court further explained in
Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri that while the right to petition the government for redress of
JULHYDQFHVLVHTXDOO\LPSRUWDQWWRRWKHU)LUVW$PHQGPHQWULJKWV³>L@WLVQRWQHFHVVDU\Wo say that
the two Clauses are identical in their mandate or their purpose and effect to acknowledge that the
rights of speech and petition share substantial common ground. This Court has said that the right
WRVSHDNDQGWKHULJKWWRSHWLWLRQDUHµFRJQDWHULJKWV¶´131 S.Ct. 2488, 2494 (2011) (emphasis
added) (citing Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)); see also Wayte v. United States,
470 U.S. 598, 610, n. 11 (1985).
This Court has acknowledged the fact that the drafters of the First Amendment
19
purposefully included the right to petition alongside the other freedoms of the First Amendment,
VD\LQJ³>L@WZDVQRWE\DFFLGHQWRUFRLQFLGHQFHWKDWWKHULJKWVWRIUHHGRPLQVSHHFKDQGSUHVV
were coupled in a single guaranty with the rights of the people peaceably to assemble and to
SHWLWLRQIRUUHGUHVVRIJULHYDQFHV´ Thomas, 323 U.S. at 530. Indeed,
³>E@RWKVSHHFKDQGSHWLWLRQDUHLQWHJUDOWRWKHGHPRFUDWLFSURFHVVDOWKRXJKQRW
necessarily in the same way. The right to petition allows citizens to express their ideas,
hopes, and concerns to their government and their elected representatives, whereas the
right to speak fosters the public exchange of ideas that is integral to deliberative
democracy as well as to the whole realm of ideas and human affairs. Beyond the political
sphere, both speech and petition advance personal expression, although the right to
petition is generally concerned with expression directed to the government seeking
UHGUHVVRIDJULHYDQFH´
Borough of Duryea, 131 S.Ct. at 2495.
Moreover, in United States v. Cruikshank, this Court reinforced the importance of the right
to petition as being a primary right by comparing it to the right to assembly, which it labeled as a
VHFRQGDU\ULJKW86³WKHULJKWRIWKHSHRSOH peaceably to assemble for the
purpose of petitioning Congress for a redress of grievances, or for anything else connected with
the powers or duties of the national government, is an attribute of national citizenship, and, as
such, under protection of, and JXDUDQWHHGE\WKH8QLWHG6WDWHV´$FFRUGLQJO\WKHIUHHGRPWR
petition the government for redress of grievances is regarded as a fundamental right that must be
maintained. See Eastern R. R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor F reight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127,
138 (1961) ("[Because] the right of petition is one of the freedoms protected by the Bill of
Rights, . . . we cannot, of course, lightly impute to Congress an intent to invade these freedoms");
see also Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Assn., 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967) (noting that the right to
SHWLWLRQLV³DPRQJWKHPRVWSUHFLRXVRIWKHOLEHUWLHVJXDUDQWHHGE\WKH%LOORI5LJKWV´
The fundamental right to petition the government for redress of grievances extends
beyond the right to petition the legislature, and in fact applies to all branches of the government.
20
In fact, in California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unli mited, this court held that, ³WKHULJKW
to petition extends to all departments of the Government [and] [t]he right of access to the courts
is LQGHHGEXWRQHDVSHFWRIWKHULJKWRISHWLWLRQ´ 404 U.S. 508 (1972). Further, the Court has
explained that, "redress of grievances" is to be construed broadly so as to not restrain people
from making their wishes known to the government; therefore, the right to petition includes not
solely appeals by the public to the government for the redressing of a grievance in the traditional
sense, but also petitions on behalf of private interests seeking personal gain. Noerr , 365 U.S. at
137-38 (1961).
In fact, due process requires that private citizens have access to the courts and have an
opportunity be heard under the First Amendment. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371
(1971) (finding that a state judicial mechanism that denied access to courts for individuals who
sought judicial dissolution of their marriages, solely because of inability to pay, violated due
process); Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 86ILQGLQJWKDW³WKH'XH
Process Clause grants the aggrieved party the opportunity to present his case and have its merits
IDLUO\MXGJHG´DQGWKDWWKHUHIRUH³some IRUPRIKHDULQJLVUHTXLUHG´HPSKDVLVLQRULJLQDO
The Court explained the extent of the right to be heard in Windsor v. McVeigh, ZKHUHDOLWLJDQW¶V
appearance was stricken and he was not allowed to participate in the proceedings, stating
³jurisdiction is the right to hear and determine; not to determine without hearing. And where, as
in that case, no appearance was allowed, there could be no hearing or opportunity of being heard,
DQGWKHUHIRUHFRXOGEHQRH[HUFLVHRIMXULVGLFWLRQ´86-84 (1876).
7KLV&RXUW¶VUXOLQJLQ Logan is particularly applicable to the case at hand, as it illustrates
WKHLPSRUWDQFHRIDQDJJULHYHGSDUW\¶VULJKWWREHKHDUG,Q Logan, the petitioner filed a cause of
action for unlawful termination before the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission, but
21
the agency failed to act on the case for more than 120 days. Logan, 455 U.S. at 426. As a result,
/RJDQ¶VFDXVHRIDFWLRQZDVWHUPLQDWHGfor lack of agency jurisdiction due to mandatory
language in Illinois rules that required such termination after 120 days of agency inaction. Id. at
427. As a result, the Commission never heard his cause of action, and Logan had no remedy. Id.
at 427-28. TKLV&RXUWKHOGXQDQLPRXVO\WKDW/RJDQ¶VGXHSURFHVVULJKWVZHUHYLRODWHGZKHQWKH
application of administrative rules deprived him of a cause of action and the right to be heard. Id.
at 437.
Petitioners, similar to the petitioner in Logan, have a right to be heard in this case because
they are the victims of wrongs committed by private parties, Respondents RADTV and ETI. See
Noerr, 365 U.S. at 139; see also Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907)
³7KHULJKWWRVXHDQGGHIHQGLQWKHFRXrts is the alternative of force.... It is one of the highest
and most essential privileges of citizenship, and must be allowed by each State to the citizens of
DOORWKHU6WDWHVWRWKHSUHFLVHH[WHQWWKDWLWLVDOORZHGWRLWVRZQFLWL]HQV´Congress has been
consistent in creating enforceable rights so that victims of any wrong, civil or criminal, can to be
heard in court. Specifically, victims of crimes have a right to be heard in criminal cases under
the Crime Victims Rights Act, 18 USC § 3771 (2012) (granting certain rights to crime victims,
including the right to attend proceedings, the right to speak at criminal justice proceedings, the
right to restitution, and the right to be treated with fairness, dignity, and respect). Victims of
crimes retain the right to be heard even though they are not parties to criminal proceedings. The
fact that Congress extended the right to access the courts and judicial proceedings to non-parties
emphasizes the importance and fundamental nature of the right of all Americans to petition the
government, and illustrates that the government intended for this right to extend to all who have
been wronged in violation of U.S. laws.
22
Petitioners have a right for the court to rule on its motion for declaratory judgment
shifting the burden of proof to the Respondents in a defamation case because the right to petition
the government includes the right to bring lawsuits against private parties for violations of
LQGLYLGXDOULJKWV7KH5HVSRQGHQWVYLRODWHGWKH3HWLWLRQHUV¶ULJKWVWRSULYDcy when it aired a
defamatory story on Gossip Show, and as such the Petitioners are entitled to be heard by the
5DGQRU&RXUWV%\VWULNLQJWKH3HWLWLRQHUV¶FDXVHRIDFWLRQUHTXHVWLQJWKHEXUGHQRISURRIWREH
shifted, and ordering the Petitioners to file an amended complaint without it, the Radnor Court
made it impossible for Petitioners to truly access the courts and be heard on the issue. As such,
WKLV&RXUWVKRXOGILQGWKDWWKH5DGQRU&RXUWYLRODWHGWKH3HWLWLRQHUV¶)LUVW$PHQGPHQWULJKWVWR
petition the government for redress of grievances.
B.
T he Radnor C ircuit Court W as Required to A pply the Radnor Rules O f
&LYLO3URFHGXUHWR3URWHFW3HWLWLRQHUV¶5LJKWWR3HWLWLRQWKH*RYHUQPHQWDQG
to E nsure T hat C laims A re A djudicated In A Non-A rbitrary M anner.
When freedoms or rights endowed to American citizens under the constitution are
jeopardized, they trigger procedural protections. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564
(1972). This Court has emphasized that the procedural mechanisms of courts must not be
fundamentally unfair in any judicial proceeding. See Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Services of Durham
County, N. C., 452 U.S. 18, 24-25 (1981) ³Applying the Due Process Clause is therefore an
XQFHUWDLQHQWHUSULVHZKLFKPXVWGLVFRYHUZKDW³IXQGDPHQWDOIDLUQHVV´Fonsists of in a particular
VLWXDWLRQ´ ,QWKLVFDVHWKH5DGQRU&RXUWVYLRODWHGWKH3HWLWLRQHUV¶)LUVW$PHQGPHQWULJKWWR
SHWLWLRQWKHJRYHUQPHQWIRUUHGUHVVRIJULHYDQFHVZKHQLWVWUXFN3HWLWLRQHUV¶FDXVHRIDFWLRQ
asking for declaratory judgment to shift the burden of proof to the Respondents, and ordered that
3HWLWLRQHUVUHILOHDQ$PHQGHG&RPSODLQWZLWKRXWWKDWFDXVHRIDFWLRQ7KH&RXUW¶VDFWLRQLQ
striking this cause of action was fundamentally unfair because the court did not apply procedural
23
guarantees of due process1 WKDWZHUHVSHFLILFDOO\GHVLJQHGWRJXDUGSHWLWLRQHUV¶ULJKWVDQGHQVXUH
that Petitioners claims were adjudicated in a non-arbitrary manner.
The Court has found that litigants themselves are entitled to procedural protection. See
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380 (1971) (the Due Process Clause prevents states from
denying potential litigants use of established adjudicatory procedures, when such an action
ZRXOGEH³WKHHTXLYDOHQWRIGHQ\LQJWKHPDQRSSRUWXQLW\WREHKHDUGXSRQWKHLr claimed
ULJKW>V@´Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 209 (1958) (the Fifth Amendment's
'XH3URFHVV&ODXVHLPSRVHV³FRQVWLWXWLRQDOOLPLWDWLRQVXSRQWKHSRZHURIFRXUWVHYHQLQDLGRI
their own valid processes, to dismiss an action without affording a party the opportunity for a
KHDULQJRQWKHPHULWVRIKLVFDXVH´ Hovey v. Elliott86DFRXUW¶VDFWLRQLQ
punishing a litigant for contempt by striking an answer from the files and condemning, as by
default, was a denial of due process of law, and therefore repugnant to the 14th Amendment);
Windsor v. McVeigh86³7KRXJKWKHFRXUWPD\SRVVHVVMXULVGLFWLRQRIDFDXVH
of the subject-matter, and of the parties, it is still limited in its modes of procedure, and in the
extent and character of its judgments. It must act judicially in all things, and cannot then
WUDQVFHQGWKHSRZHUFRQIHUUHGE\WKHODZ´
In addition, this court has also consistently held that causes of action are entitled to
procedural protection. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950)
(finding that a cause of action was a species of property that is protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and lack of personal service amounted to a denial of due
While the Supreme Court only granted certiorari RQ3HWLWLRQHUV¶)LUVW$PHQGPHQWFODLPDQG
did not grant certiorari on the Fourteenth Amendment issue, procedural due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment is inherent in and necessary to protect access to courts and the right to be
heard under the First Amendment right to petition the government. See Logan, 455 U.S. at 42930.
1
24
process of law); Martinez v. California , 444 U.S. 277, 281-³>D@UJXDEO\´DVWDWHWRUW
FODLPLVD³VSHFLHVRIµSURSHUW\¶SURWHFWHGE\WKH'XH3URFHVV&ODXVH´see also Logan v.
Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982) (finding that an employee
VULJKWWRXVHDQDJHQF\¶V
adjudicatory procedures and institute causes of action was protected by the due process clause).
The right to petition the government, as described in the First Amendment, requires that
courts adhere to some non-arbitrary standards to ensure the fairness of judicial proceedings. See
Dent v. West Virginia86³7KHWRXFKVWRQHRIGXHSURFHVVLVSURWHFWLRQRI
WKHLQGLYLGXDODJDLQVWDUELWUDU\DFWLRQRIJRYHUQPHQW´7KHDSSOLFDWLRQRIQRQ-arbitrary
standards iVLPSRUWDQWFRQVLGHULQJWKDW³SHUVRQVZKRVHHNUHGUHVVRIZURQJVWKH\EHOLHYHWR
have been done to them have no place to turn except the state-created and state-operated court
V\VWHP´7LPRWK\37HUUHOO Causes of Action as Property: Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co. and
WKH³*RYHUQPHQW-as-0RQRSROLVW´7KHRU\RIWKH'XH3URFHVV&ODXVH, 31 Emory L.J. 491, 516
(1982). Application of non-arbitrary standards in civil case also helps to prevent the abuse of
government power. See Timothy P. Terrell, Property, Due Process, and the Distinction Between
Definition and Theory in Legal Analysis, 70 GEO. L.J. 861 (1982). In Radnor, the Radnor
Judiciary developed the RRCP to provide procedural protections of litigants in Radnor courts.
7KH)HGHUDO5XOHVRI&LYLO3URFHGXUH³)5&3´ZHUHGHVLJQHGDVZHUHWKH55&3WR
SURWHFWWKHSURFHGXUDOULJKWVRIOLWLJDQWVLQ)HGHUDOFRXUWVDQGWRHQVXUHWKDWOLWLJDQWV¶ULJKWVWR
access the courts and be heard under the First Amendment are not violated; the FRCP has served
as a model for the majority of state codes of civil procedure seeking to similarly provide
procedural guarantees.2 ,QGHHGPRVWVWDWHVDGRSWUXOHVEDVHGRQWKHIHGHUDOPRGHOEHFDXVH³WKH
2
The record is silent with regards to the actual provisions of the RRCP or whether the
RRCP is similar to the FRCP. However, the content and context of the FRCP are relevant and
instructive here, especially considering the underlying federal rights (specifically, the First
25
system of procedure embodied in the federal rules is seen to be clearly superior to the existing
VWDWHV\VWHPV´3URFHGXUDO5HIRUPLQWKH6WDWHV)5'3 The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure were drafted to serve as a safeguard to the fairness of judicial proceedings and to
ensure that Courts do not act arbitrarily in adjudicating claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (2007)
³7KH>UXOHV@VKRXOGEHFRQVWUXHGDQGDGPLQLVWHUHGWRVHFXUHWKHMXVWVSHHG\DQGLQH[SHQVLYH
GHWHUPLQDWLRQRIHYHU\DFWLRQDQGSURFHHGLQJ´,Q)HG5&LY3ZDVDPHQGHGWRDGG
WKHSKUDVH³DQGDGPLQLVWHUHG´WKHGUDIWLQJFRPPLWWHHQRWHGWKDWWKLVDPHQGPHQWZDVQHFHVVDU\
WRUHIOHFWWKH³DIILUPDWLYHGXW\RIWKHFRXUWWRH[HUFLVHWKHDXWKRULW\FRQIHUUHGE\WKHVHUXOHVWR
ensure that civil litigation is resolved not only fairly, but also without undue cRVWRUGHOD\´
The RRCP do not grant jurisdiction to the court to choose which causes of action to hear,
nor do the rules contemplate striking a proper cause of action from the record. (R. at 6). When
faced with a request for declaratory judgment, Radnor courts must either grant or deny the
request; these are the only actions allowed by the Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. at 6). Therefore,
WKH5DGQRUWULDOFRXUWDEXVHGLWVGLVFUHWLRQLQVWULNLQJWKH3HWLWLRQHUV¶FDXVHRIDFWLRQEHFDXVHLQ
doing so, it ignoreGWKH55&3WKHWULDOFRXUW¶VDFWLRQVZHUHWKHUHIRUHIXQGDPHQWDOO\XQIDLUWR
the Petitioners as they were denied the procedural protections and guarantees of fairness granted
by the RRCP.
When the Petitioners filed their complaint, including the cause of action that was
Amendment right to petition the government for redress of grievances, right of access to the
courts, and right to be heard) that are at issue in the instant case.
3
As of 2003, at least 33 states had rules of civil procedure that were true replicas of or
unquestionably modeled upon the federal rules; in addition, only 18 states had rules that were
substantially dissimilar to the federal rules. John B. Oakley, A F resh Look at the Federal Rules
in State Courts, 3 Nev. L.J. 354, 356-58 (2003). In DPDMRULW\RIVWDWHVWKHUHZDVLQGHHG³EXWRQH
SURFHGXUHIRUVWDWHDQGIHGHUDOFRXUWV´LQDOOEXWWKHPRVWWHFKQLFDORIVHQVHV2DNOH\VXSUDDW
357.
26
eventually stricken by the Radnor trial court, they were entitled to certain procedural protections
and guarantees of fairness to ensure that their rights were respected; specifically, they were
entitled to have their right to petition the government respected by the Radnor trial court. In
DUELWUDULO\VWULNLQJWKH3HWLWLRQHUV¶FDXVHRIDFWLRQDQGRUGHULQJWKHPWRUHILOHWKHLUFRPSODLQW
without it, the Radnor trial court ignored standards that were put in place to protect their right to
petiWLRQWKHJRYHUQPHQW,QVRDFWLQJWKH5DGQRUWULDOFRXUWYLRODWHGWKH3HWLWLRQHUV¶)LUVW
Amendment right to petition the government.
7KHUHIRUHWKLV&RXUWVKRXOGUHYHUVHWKH5DGQRU6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQDQGUHPDQG
this case so that Petitioners can be heard on their request for declaratory judgment.
C O N C L USI O N
For the reasons set forth above, Petitioners, Joe Public and Jane Private, by and through
their attorneys, respectfully request that this Court affirm the decision of the Supreme Court of
Radnor in part, and find that Respondents are not entitled to a civil jury trial, and reverse its
GHFLVLRQLQSDUWDQGILQGWKDWWKH5DGQRU&RXUWVYLRODWHG3HWLWLRQHUV¶ULJKWWRSHWLWLRQWKH
government for redress of grievances.
Dated: March 12, 2013
Respectfully submitted,
Joe Public and Jane Private, Petitioners-Petitioners
__________________________
Through their attorneys
Team 8
27