Download Back to Westphalia? The International System of States and the

Back to Westphalia?
The International System of States and the Backlash on
International Cooperation in the Field of Migration
Mgr. Clarissa do Nascimento Tabosa
Institute of European Studies and International Relations, Comenius University
Fakulta sociálnych a ekonomických vied UK
Mlynské luhy 4
821 05 Bratislava
[email protected]
Back to Westphalia? The International System of States and the
Backlash on International Cooperation in the Field of Migration
Mgr. Clarissa do Nascimento Tabosa1
Abstract
Discussion upon international cooperation in the field of migration has been gaining space not only in the
academic sphere but also among policy-makers and different stakeholders. Yet, as argued by Newland
(2010), global governance of international migration although necessary is often portrayed as an
impossibility. In the article I raise key questions and introduce main discussions in the field of international
cooperation on migration whose content require further analysis. Does global governance, especially
regarding migration, undermine sovereignty? Is global governance in the field of Migration attainable? Has
migration been changing the meaning of politics – beyond the limits of national boundaries, or migration
issues have rather brought backlash on international cooperation turning states back to the Westphalian
idea of state sovereignty? The article looks at key approaches taken by world leaders regarding migration
to search for answers to these questions. My main argument is that although global governance may not
pose direct challenge to the meaning of state sovereignty, and although the meaning of sovereignty itself has
been changing, securitization of migration, the lack of common norms, principle and values, jointly with the
limited scope of global governance in this field show that the Westphalian concept of state sovereignty is
back in fashion in world leaders discourse.
Key words: cooperation, migration, sovereignty, global governance
Clarissa do Nascimento Tabosa, 25, from Caruaru, Pernambuco (Brazil) received her Bachelor’s and
Master’s degrees in “European Studies” at the Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences, Comenius
University in Bratislava in 2014 and 2016, respectively. She is currently a PhD. Student at the Institute of
European Studies and International Relations, FSES, Comenius University. Her dissertation is focused on
systemic and internal factors that underline and determine immigration policy (towards openness or towards
policy of control) in different European Union member states.
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Introduction
The Westphalian principle of state sovereignty is grounded on the idea that states’ parties
have the monopoly over decisions regarding territory (and its borders). The discourse on
migration is inevitably linked to this principle and has been, for a long time but more
intensely nowadays, closely linked to national security. While decision-making regarding
migration is still seen as a matter that belong exclusively to the national realm, the current
stage of world affairs seems to be calling for a different approach based on cooperation
and development of common approaches towards migration. This may be posing direct
challenges to the concept of state sovereignty itself. Discussion upon global governance in
the field of migration has been gaining space not only in academic sphere but also among
policy-makers and different stakeholders. Yet, as argued by Newland (2010), global
governance of international migration, although necessary, is often portrayed as an
impossibility.
In the article I raise key questions and introduce main discussions in the field of
international cooperation on migration whose content require further analysis. Does global
governance, especially regarding migration, undermine sovereignty? Is global governance
in the field of Migration attainable? Has migration been changing the meaning of politics –
beyond the limits of national boundaries, or migration issues have rather brought backlash
on international cooperation turning states back to the Westphalian idea of state
sovereignty? The article looks briefly at approaches taken by world leaders regarding
migration. My main argument is that although global governance may not pose direct
challenge to the meaning of state sovereignty, and although the meaning of sovereignty
itself has been changing, the securitization discourse, the lack of common norms, principle
and values, jointly with the limited scope of global governance in this field show that the
Westphalian concept of state sovereignty is back in fashion in world leaders discourse.
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1. Global Governance and State Sovereignty
Thomas Weiss places global governance as “a half-way house between the international
anarchy underlying Realist analysis and a world state” (2013, 25). He claims that the Realist
current of thought in International Relations tend to portray a dichotomy between anarchy
on one side and world government in another side, disregarding there can be something in
the between - a world order without world government: global governance (Ibid). Global
governance appears, therefore, as one mechanism that may be able to constraint states’
behavior. Governance acquires different meaning depending on whether we look at it
from a national or global perspective. In the national level there has governance plus
government while in the global level there is governance but no government in order to
ensure compliance with decisions taken (Ibid). Cooperation through global governance is,
therefore, relevant in creating these mechanisms to coordinate and constraint states’ (but
also non-state) behavior.
According to liberal institutionalists, international cooperation and creation of
regimes help to decrease transaction costs and to overcome some obstacles posed by the
anarchical structure of the international system. This explains why states are willing to
engage in international cooperation – because it provides states with an environment in
which some level of organization, and consequentially trust, can be attained. With the
absence of a world-hegemon (Gilpin 1986), Keohane (1984) argues, for instance, that in
order to coordinate world economy, the focus must be shifted to multilateralism and the
creation of institutions and regimes that create an environment for cooperation and
collective actions.
It seems, indeed, impressive that daily a huge number of transnational activities
(not only in the economic field) occur in different areas – political, economic, technical,
cultural – and all in the absence of a central international political authority. These
transnational activities in place have been putting in question, or maybe even changing the
meaning of what we know as state sovereignty. Stephen D. Krasner (1999) sustains that
sovereignty can be understood in four ways: international legal sovereignty - related to mutual
recognition and jurisdiction; Westphalia sovereignty - relating to non-interference in internal
affairs; domestic sovereignty - monopoly of the use of force, in the Weberian sense; and
interdependence sovereignty – which “refers to the ability of public authorities to regulate the
flow of information, ideas, goods, people, pollutants, or capital across the borders of their
state” (Krasner 1999, 4). The author poses a critic towards the commonly accepted
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understanding of the international system as being a Westphalian System of states, and to
the centrality put in the principle of sovereignty. A leading voice among the critics,
Krasner sought to demonstrate the Westphalian model is not a scientifically accurate
description of the international system of States. He proposes adjustments to the use of
the Westphalian sovereignty concept, and considers the terms of the 1648 peace as an
“organized hypocrisy” (Ibid). For him, the principle of sovereignty of states has always
been breached: states have long intervened in each other affairs for a long time with great
intensity.
Hardt and Negri (2004) argue a new form of sovereignty is emerging along with
global market and global production of goods. They call this new form of sovereignty
Empire and define it as “the sovereign power that governs the world” (Ibid., xi). Empires
act in changing the meaning of political sovereignty, beyond national boundaries. State
sovereignty has progressively assumed new forms, Hardt and Negri claim, “composed of a
series of national and supranational organisms united under a single logic of rule” (2010,
xii).
These views that state sovereignty is an “organized hypocrisy” or at least the
consideration that an erosion of states sovereignty is occurring has increased its force
especially after 1990’s: with the strengthening of the process of globalization (which is not
new [Weiss 2013]) - states have been losing the capacity to exercise control over their
territories. Transnational trade, globalization, and human rights issues can also be said to
have been challenging state sovereignty, as a concept, and changing the role sovereignty
has played in world politics in practice.
Arguing in a different direction, Neumann and Jacob (2010) show how the
creation of new categories of statehood, such as fragile or failed states, by IOs – therefore,
an indicator of global governability – actually strengthens state sovereignty. Neumann and
Jacob build a sophisticate argument that points out that global governance discourse, at
least in the cases they present, instead of challenging the meaning of politics and the
authority of sovereignty states actually strengthens it. They specifically claim
Global governance discourse increasingly conceptualizes states as entities that are “licensed” to
survey, regulate, and discipline their territories and populations in such way as to avoid
instability and risks (2010, 155)
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Although the World Bank sets standards that many times can be seen as authoritative, it
strengthens state sovereignty also by justifying actions being taken by state actors as well as
by providing measurement tools. Functioning robust states are essential for reaching the
main objectives of the Bank (Ibid.). For the purpose of this paper, this is relevant to the
extent that we need to overcome the tendency to see global governance as something that
poses challenges to state sovereignty. When it comes to migration, however, the tendency
seems to be for policy-makers and leaders alike to argue this is a matter of national security
and that cooperation in this field could indeed undermine state’s sovereignty.
However, it is relevant to stress that although following different lines of
argumentation and different position towards state sovereignty and global governance,
Neumann and Jacob (Ibid) or Hardt and Negri (2004) focus is, both, on economic and
cultural exchange – and this is relevant to understand the main argument of this paper.
Global governance may be developing successfully in certain fields, yet, the current state of
world affairs regarding migration seems to indicate that global governance in the field of
migration may be slowing down and that we may be experiencing backlash regarding
supra-nationalization, or globalization, of sovereignty – we may be seeing a return to a
Westphalian model of sovereignty in which states are to be seen as the sole actors entitled
to shape and determine migration policies based mainly on internal affairs and national
interest.
Hardt and Negri (Ibid) idea of Empire, for instance, is not built upon a territorial
center of power and boundaries – the fact itself that for them a global means of
sovereignty is detached from any territorial center of power, directly clashes with the
concept of migration that usually cannot be understood without the idea of a territorial
center of power . The authors claim the “concept of Empire is characterized fundamentally
by a lack of boundaries: Empire’s rule has no limits.” (2004, xiv), yet, there are limits to
Empire’s rule, and the authors themselves recognize later in their book: Empire is unable
to restrain flows of economic migrants – what they propose, therefore, is papier pour tous
(Ibid, 400) or full rights of citizenship. They put forward an idealistic ideal of the
development of a cosmopolitan world. When I argue that international cooperation in the
field of migration has been slowing down and supranational forms of sovereignty may be
facing backlash, it is clear that I see Hardt and Negri’s idea of residency papers for all with
skepticism.
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2. Global Governance in the Field of Migration
Global governance in certain fields has been particularly successful. Neumann and Jacob,
for instance, have looked at the role that international organizations (IOs) play in
economic global governance and claim IOs have become more powerful as they function
as “sites for negotiation and formalization of universal categories of practices of rule”
(2010, 136). They draw their argument upon the Country Policy and Institutional
Assessment (CPIA), an instrument of the World Bank used to evaluate countries that
receive development aid from different aspects, and argue this instrument not only set
guides to eligibility for international development aid, but it also shapes the way these
economies and societies are governed.
Although there are strong arguments to support the effectiveness of global
governance in promoting cooperation, in assisting to establish world order, and to restrain
the behavior of states, there is also a recognition that such effectiveness may be
compromised or simply do not apply when the matter into discussion is migration. Weiss,
for instance, argue that globalization has not changed the fact that the movement of
people is still restricted (and has been since the creation of passports in the 19 th century)
and “is likely to remain highly controlled or perhaps become more restricted” (2013, 12).
Practitioners such as Sergio Marchi (2010) argue global governance in the field of
migration can be attainable by finding ways to look at migration more with analytical tools
that reflect the reality and trying to find common migration principles that would guide
global governance measures (instead of locating migration in a securitizing discourse based
on fear, I argue). Neumann and Jacob stresses the role played by international
organizations exactly “in producing and disseminating universal grids (…) for the
evaluation, rating, and discussion about how societies should be governed” (2010, 133). In
this way, international regimes can contribute by being a sphere in which some level of
governability in the field of migration can emanate based on development of common
principles, based on human rights and on international law. Another way to booster global
governance in the field of migration found out by Marchi (Ibid) based on discussion
among people involved in the field may be the use of a more neutral expression instead of
global governance. The author found out that the term itself tend to be misinterpreted and
could be viewed as “intimidating by some government and agencies” (2010, 326). His
focus, therefore, is on top-down initiatives of global governance. The main issue, however,
is to define “universal categories and practices of rules” (Neumann and Jacob 2010, 136)
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in relation to migration policies in a scenario comprised by different actors in times when
migration issues are many times framed within a discourse based on securitization of
migration and by portraying migrants and refugees as threats to national security.
Kathleen Newland recognizes the difficulties in finding common principles in this
area, or of setting supranational institutions to deal particularly with migration. She points
out that “global governance of international migration is portrayed simultaneously as a
necessity and an impossibility” (2010, 331). Accordingly, Newland divides global
governance in the field of migration into top-down and bottom-up approaches. While the
former is difficult to be attained the latter, argues the author, is not impossible to be
achieved. By top-down initiatives of global governance in the field of migration we can
place the creation of a supranational body to deal with international migration issues, the
creation of binding mechanisms to enforce migration international law, or the
development of common principles. Binding international mechanisms that address
migration have not been received with much support, especially by major immigration
countries – an example is the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Migrant
Workers and Their Family Members that took 13 years to enter into force due to the lack
of signatories. On the other hand, Newland argues bottom-up initiatives of global
governance can take form as platforms for different stakeholders to coordinate their work,
to develop best practices and guidelines, and to formulate non-binding instruments (Ibid),
for her these measures can be achieved in a global level. Bottom-up global governance in
the field of migration can be seen as being not only a necessity but also a possibility. What
makes it possible is the diversification of channels through which global governance in this
particular field can occur as well as the diversification of actors involved in this process.
Bearing all this in mind, if we go back to one of the questions raised in this article
“Is global governance in the field of Migration attainable?” we could most likely answer that yes. If
we look at global governance through Thomas G. Weiss lenses, that I myself find to be
one of the most accurate, as a process instead of a global entity, we will see that global
governance is not the opposite of state sovereignty and they do not need to be treated as
opposite approaches; as the author himself claims
(…) global governance does not constitute a new international relations ‘paradigm’ to replace
state sovereignty (…) global governance is less a worldview and more a half-way house that
provides additional and necessary insights as we attempt to understand the contemporary
world and identify new way of approaching ongoing and future threats (2013, 41)
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By half way house, we can imply that a bottom-up global governance in the field of
migration actually comprise cooperation in the field of migration, and not governance in
the strong sense of the word in which there is a institutionalization of practices that are
sets standards and limits the actions of different actors, but especially states, in the
international arena.
However, in migration issues sovereignty in Westphalian terms still plays a central
role. Migration is still seen as being a matter in which decision-making is to belong to the
national structures, hence the idea of the creation of international regimes or the
involvement of different actors in migration governance in order to facilitate agreement
among the parties is seen with skepticism. The question of sovereignty may be one
plausible explanation on why the development of international regime in the field of
migration has not evolved in the pace required in order to “facilitate the making of
substantive agreements by providing framework of rules, norms, principles and procedures
for negotiation” (Keohane 1982, 337). I place the revival of the focus on discourse of
national interest, securitization of migration, and the return to old Westphalian idea of
state sovereignty as key barriers for development of international regimes on migration.
When we take into consideration Keohane’s inverted Coase theorem that points out three
conditions, in which at least one must apply, in order for regimes to be seen as effective in
facilitating agreement among state parties, we can see that international regimes on
migration seems to be an appropriate measure to be taken:
(a) lack of clear legal framework establishing liability for actions;
(b) information imperfection (information is costly)
(c) positive transaction costs
(1982, 338)
The lack of clear legal framework for establishing international legal responsibility
for actions regarding migration processes is a reality – the majority of the legal instruments
available addresses questions of refugees and trafficked people but not of migrants per se.
Information imperfection is also a reality. It is costly, it is diffuse and due to irregular
movements the numbers are many times inaccurate or they simply do not exist. The
creation of a framework of rules, norms, principles and procedures for negotiation seems
appropriate, especially when we consider the important role of global governance also in
structuring “long-term processes of interactions that shape state preferences, and
ultimately identities” (Weiss 2013, 26). However, there is not much research in place to
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explain states’ approaches toward migration phenomena from within the scope of
international relations’ theories neither approaches that focus on determinants of
migration policies that originate in the systemic level.
When we look at empirical evidence on how states have been shaping migration,
but especially immigration, policies it is not certain that further development of global
governance in this field will be achieved in the near future. Although key issues whose
effects can be felt in global scale moved state towards the need for international
cooperation and although global issues called upon global engagement in seeking for
solutions, migration and the securitization of it on the other hand seems to be reinforcing
the concept of state sovereignty that for some time seemed to be losing its strength.
Neumann and Jacob (2010) call for the inclusion of an account of how sovereignty
is reconstructed in the context of global politics is very valid. Migration, I argue, may be an
interesting issue through which we can try to analyze this process of transformation,
challenging, and renewing of the concept of sovereignty. It gives rise also to the question
on under which contexts sovereignty is not transformed in the context of global politics.
We are then required to question if migration has been changing the meaning of politics – beyond the
limits of national boundaries, or migration issues have rather brought a backlash on international
cooperation turning states back to the Westphalian idea of state sovereignty?
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3. Back to Westphalia?
For some time the meaning of state sovereignty in the Westphalian sense has been put into
question. As we saw in the first session, some authors argue new forms of sovereignty are
emerging and these include new poles from which sovereignty can be exercised – from
NGOs to supranational units. Other authors such as Krasner (1999) go even further to
claim the Westphalian idea of sovereignty as being the lack of external interference in
internal affairs was never a reality. The loosening of the Westphalian idea of state
sovereignty made possible for new actors to engage in the governing process in a way that
trespass national borders and in a broad range of issues – it is in this scenario that global
governance emerged. It is indeed impressive that nowadays there exists global governance
and that daily a huge number of transnational activities occur in different areas even in
absence of a central international political authority.
On the other hand, the ideas that have been gathered throughout this paper serve
to sustain the argument that although affective in some areas, global governance in the
field of migration does not seen to be a reality at any time soon, although there have been
attempts lately to address the issue more effectively (the incorporation of the International
Organization for Migration to the UN structure in 2016, for example). Global governance
in particular areas, especially in the economic field, seems to be effective when there is a
polarization of sources of sovereignty, and international regimes can be formed when
actors have shared long-term interests and objectives and seek to institutionalize their
relationship in a way to attain mutual benefits (Keohane, 1982).
Although migration itself is not a new phenomenon, portraying migration as a
threat to security has become increasingly common since 9/11. In the post-9/11 context
politics of control have prevailed and immigrants in general, but also refugees and asylumseekers have been central actors in the security debate (Edwards and Ferstman 2009).
Public opinion has been shaped towards fear of migrants and securitization of migration
has become common. Goodwin-Gill points out that
The already restrictive, hostile and generally repressive measure which States were already
taking towards refugees and asylum seekers (…) have been give spurious justification by
the terrorism agenda. For some States (or rather, for some governments), that has been
the opportunity to introduce yet more stringent laws and policies, often in the aftermath of
a terrorist incident, but also generally under a carefully constructed cloud of fear. (2008, 7).
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The election of Donald J. Trump for president of the United States accentuates the
discourse of border and the need for the creation of walls (physical or not) and the
necessity for turning attention to national security – downplaying international cooperation
in the field of migration. Donald Trump’s inaugural discourse continuously reiterating
“America first, America first” exemplifies the downturn of politics of cooperation and the
centrality national security and sovereignty in the Westphalian terms in the years to follow.
In the European context, Robert Cooper (2000) classified the European Union as
a post-modern institution. Among the characteristics of post-modern institutions is the
lack of emphasis on state sovereignty, as compared to modern states, the lack of division
between domestic and external affairs, mutual interference in internal affairs along with
mutual surveillance, rising irrelevance of borders, and security based on interdependence.
Hitherto, Cooper recognized that post-modern states would be dealing with a challenge
We need to get used to the idea of double standards. Among ourselves, we operate on the
basis of laws and open cooperative security. But when dealing with more old-fashioned
kinds of state, we need to revert to the rougher methods of an earlier era (...) among
ourselves, we keep the law but when we are operating in the jungle, we also must use the
laws of the jungle. (2000, 37-38)
The EU could, then, be seen as a post-modern entity. Nevertheless, this argument
seems to be losing its strength. The current migration and refugee crisis in Europe may
also have contributed the increase of support for right-wing parties in Europe which
inevitably leads to the promotion of politics of control. In the European context a series
of events in the years 2015 and 2016 seems to support this argument. In the midst of the
chaos generated by the great number of people arriving at once the European Union
common mechanisms in place to deal with migration, which were not many, collapsed.
The Dublin regulations proved to put a very strong weight on the countries that make the
European Union border and proved unfeasible. The idea that the Union is a post-modern
entity can now be contested: emphasis on state sovereignty revived, even when operating
among ourselves – many EU member states saw the quota system proposed by the
Commission as being beyond its area of competence and a breach of State’s sovereignty2.
Open cooperative security, another characteristic of post-modern world also failed
in the EU context. The lack of commitment to the principle of solidarity was promptly
2Many
EU countries say “no” to immigration quotas http://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-homeaffairs/news/many-eu-countries-say-no-to-immigration-quotas/
12
shown by the Visegrad countries that denied any attempt coming from the Union to apply
a temporary quota system. Not only the four countries reject the quota system, But
Hungary and Slovakia also went further and filled a lawsuit against the EU over the
mandatory quota system at the European Court of Justice3. Poland, after establishment of
a new government in November, expressed the continuity in aligning with the V4 and did
not change its position regarding the quota system (Strážay 2016, 61). The Schengen zone
was further put into question when, without coordination in the Union level, some states
opened its borders – disregarding the fact that the migrants would have to pass through
other states’ territories in order to reach their final destination – while other closed it
temporarily. Goodwin-Gill’s observation regarding the use of terrorist actions and
construction of fear in order to introduce more strict migration laws have never seen so
accurate when we look to the main discourse of key European (but not only) leaders –
especially in the Visegrad group.
In Slovakia the securitizing discourse and the association of migration with
terrorism was carried out by mainly, but not only, the Prime Minister, Robert Fico,
especially after the terrorist attack in Paris, 2015. In reaction to the attack, Fico spoke to a
main television channel, Markiza
I respect that there is a migration crisis. Before the rights of migrants, with the need to
take care of them in the first place must be a citizen of the Slovak Republic and the
security of the country4
Statements of this kind can be clearly associated to the Westphalian norms of sovereignty
over one’s territory, non-intervention on domestic affairs, and focus on national interest
above the principle of solidary (in the EU level) and of human rights protection in a
broader international scope. In the apex of the migration and refugee crisis in Europe one
of the few measures taken by Slovakia was to sign a memorandum and to agree to receive
temporarily in the city of Gabčikovo a limited number of people applying for asylum in
Austria. The memorandum was signed by the minister of interior, Robert Kaliňák – SMER
–SD, from the same party as Robert Fico, that during electoral campaign repeatedly stated
there is no place for Islam in Slovakia5. With the signature of the memorandum, the Slovak
3
Hungary and Slovakia file lawsuit against EU’s mandatory refugee quotas:
http://hungarytoday.hu/news/hungary-slovakia-file-lawsuit-eus-mandatory-refugee-quotas-75815
4
Fico: Útoky v Paríži potvrdili riziká spojené s migračnou vlnou:
http://spravy.pravda.sk/svet/clanok/373948-fico-utoky-v-parizi-potvrdili-rizika-spojene-s-migracnouvlnou/
5
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National Party’s (SNS) leader, Andrej Danko, during a press conference also spoke on the
subject stating the memorandum breaches the sovereignty of Slovak Republic. In the V4
context, it is also important to stress that these countries had little experience with high
flows of irregular migrants and, similarly to other EU countries, they were not prepared to
deal with the situation. However, this is not the main problem, the main issue here is that
in the European context peculiarly regarding relations among member states, the discourse
based on state sovereignty, in the Westphalian terms, have not been as apparent as it is
now. The coordinate actions of the V4 countries in opposing to the proposed quota
system and the revival of a strong discourse based on sovereignty by mainstream parties in
these countries put in question the idea that the EU is a post-modern institution, in
Cooper’s term. The Visegrad group now has (four) voices, in the plural, that speak the
same message. The group aligns against measures taken in the EU but the reasons for
doing it seems not to be done based on genuine cooperation towards a common goal, but
based on the interest of the mainstream political parties that seems to converge in these
countries.
One may argue that sole fact that the Visegrad four align their policies as a
response to the quota system proposed by the EU is an indication that states continue
acting taking into consideration external forces. I assume a more neo-realist perspective in
which I believe these states act and form alliances regarding migration in the international
arena pushed not by an interest in genuine cooperation, but because cooperation itself
aligns with national interest. The Visegrad four aligned their position based on a common
interest: of securitizing migration in order to fulfill the political agenda of leaders such as
Viktor Orban in Hungary or Robert Fico in Slovakia.
Slovakia’s leader said Islam has ‘no place’ in his country. Now he’s taking a leadership role in the E.U.:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/06/21/the-next-e-u-president-saysislam-has-no-place-in-his-country/?utm_term=.8bb479cbd60a
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Conclusion
We may see the existence of Hedley Bull’s (1977) international society in a broad range of
issues in international relations. Global governance has indeed contributed to the creation
of a sense of shared interests and values and to the sense that actors in international
relations are bound by certain goals and institutions – required to the existence of Bull’s
international society. Nevertheless, when the matter in question is migration, although
there are modest attempts to create an international society, the current stage of world
affairs seems to indicate that the relations among states form not an international society,
but an international system in Bull’s terms. States are more and more acting based on their
own principles and interests and do not share this sense of being bound by a common set
of goals and institutions.
Furthermore, although the meaning of sovereignty have been changing from the
Westphalian idea to a more loose understanding in which sovereignty can emanate from
different actors, the discourse on migration has led to a revival of the use of the term in
the Westphalian sense – as states having the supreme sovereign power over its territory.
Donald J. Trump discourse, similarly, the discourse and actions taken by Visegrad leaders
in reaction to the Union’s attempt to regulate migration based on the principle of solidarity
may point towards this direction. Securitization of migration, instead of the existence of
shared norms and values and the sense we are bound by common rules and institutions,
seems to the bounding force behind collective actions regarding migrations in the cases
briefly presented in the paper.
In conclusion, very few academic have dedicated their efforts to scrutinize the
underlying systemic reasons behind decision-making processes of migration policies, even
fewer have dedicated their effort to look at these issues through the lenses of international
relations theories. Questions such as how to conciliate global governance in the field of
migration and state sovereignty, two seemingly opposite approaches or how to foster
cooperation in the field of migration while still keeping in place one of the key pillars in
which the United Nation system was built, sovereignty, still need to be answered. It is not
clear how international cooperation in the field of migration will develop within the next
years or decade. What is clear is that there is a lack of research on the legal and political
features that emanate from the systemic level that affects decision-making process towards
migration policies in the national level. It is important for academics to focus on these
issues and to understand the limits of international cooperation in this field as well as the
15
systemic mechanisms that can effectively influence in migration policies not only to fill
existing gaps in the literature of migration but mainly with the ultimate purpose of
alleviating human suffering resulting from uncoordinated and irregular migration
processes.
16
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