Download with the benefit of hindsight

WITH THE BENEFIT OF
HINDSIGHT
Learning from problem cases: volume 4
June 2015
With the Benefit of Hindsight
Acknowledgements
This report was generously funded by London and Quadrant Housing Trust.
The Homes and Communities Agency made available on a confidential basis to Campbell Tickell
background information, without which the report could not have been written.
The authors were a team from Campbell Tickell, including Kay Vowles, James Tickell and Radojka
Miljevic.
Disclaimer
This report was written by Campbell Tickell, using a standard of reasonable care and diligence. We
have taken reasonable steps to protect the identities of the organisations concerned, and we urge
readers to concentrate on the issues described rather than on speculation about historical events.
The views expressed are those of Campbell Tickell alone, and are not necessarily shared or
endorsed either by the Homes and Communities Agency, nor by London and Quadrant Housing
Trust.
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With the Benefit of Hindsight
Contents
Acknowledgements .............................................................................................................................1
Contents...............................................................................................................................................2
Foreword..............................................................................................................................................3
A welcome from the sponsors of this report ......................................................................................4
Introduction .........................................................................................................................................5
Chapter 1: The learning .......................................................................................................................8
Chapter 2: Cosmopolitan’s defining impact ......................................................................................16
Chapter3: Boron Homes, Bismuth Living and Polonium Group - the global financial crisis and its
effects ................................................................................................................................................20
Chapter 4: Nitrogen Housing and the PFI ..........................................................................................29
Chapter 5: Argon Group and the perils of complexity ......................................................................34
Chapter 6: Thorium Housing - ambition & complexity......................................................................38
Chapter 7: Carbon Group - complexity and contentiousness ...........................................................42
Chapter 8: Ujima Housing and the bridge too far .............................................................................45
Chapter 9: Neon Group: problems with property .............................................................................50
Chapter 10: Osmium Community Housing and the ‘soap opera of shenanigans’: ...........................54
Chapter 11: Zirconium Housing - risk and subsidiaries: ....................................................................58
Chapter 12: Strontium Housing Company and its long troubled history ..........................................61
Chapter 13: Erbium Housing, Nickel Group & Antimony Homes - Chief Executive pay and
severance packages ...........................................................................................................................65
Chapter 14: Caesium Support - the contract culture & its risks: .......................................................69
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Foreword
Foreword
For board members, senior executives of housing associations and regulators, this is a riveting
read. The seventeen case studies unpick how problems arise and form the basis for the lessons
summarised in the excellent ‘Learning’ chapter.
But the great thing about these case studies is that they show real problems in the raw. They
illustrate how they can arise and how they can be made worse (as well as how they are ultimately
resolved). They prompt fundamental questions:



Could that happen in our organisation?
Would we have spotted the problems earlier – before they became so serious?
What would I have handled differently?
Thinking about these and related questions should be a salutary experience. It is an opportunity
to learn from other people’s mistakes rather than your own – and this is generally a less painful
way to learn.
These cases are drawn from the last eight years. But they are only a small selection of the serious
cases that have arisen in this period. As the operating environment gets tougher we all need to
raise our game. Absorbing the lessons in this publication is a great way to avoid appearing in
subsequent volumes of this series.
Julian Ashby
Chair of the HCA Regulatory Committee
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With the Benefit of Hindsight
A welcome from the
sponsors of this report
Dear reader,
With the Benefit of Hindsight
London and Quadrant is pleased to have sponsored this volume. None of us is so perfect
that we have nothing to learn – and as a sector, we have certainly had to upskill over the
past few years.
Indeed, social housing providers have undergone massive change since the regulator
published the last volume of Learning From Problem Cases, back in 2010. The Tenant
Services Authority itself has gone, and austerity and welfare reform have become
household words.
All of us have done our best to weather the economic crisis in recent years. Indeed, many
housing associations have used it as an opportunity to reinvent ourselves. We recognised
that we needed to change.
For some of us, the experience has been liberating.
Taking responsibility for our own futures has involved finding ways to support ourselves
while remaining loyal to our core social mission: providing homes for people in need.
As this report show us, some of us have got it wrong. The good thing, however, is that a
report like this helps us all to understand what happened, so that we can do our utmost to
avoid ever finding ourselves in a similar position.
Hindsight, as we know, has great benefits.
Yours
____________________________________
Turlogh O'Brien CBE, Hon FCIBSE, FRSA
Chairman of the L&Q Group Board
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With the Benefit of Hindsight
Introduction
This volume
We live in a volatile world. Banks, major companies, even sovereign nations, can crash and burn.
The seismic aftershocks of the 2008 global financial crash rumble on, and a more dramatic reprise
of those problems can’t be ruled out.
The smaller circle of housing associations is not isolated from the outside world. Over past
decades, each year has seen a number of failures, usually financial but sometimes with wider
implications. So far, all that needed rescuing have been saved by larger and well-run
organisations, with the human and financial capacity to act. One of the intentions of this report is
to help maintain that important track record for the sector.
This book is the fourth in a series, chronicling the affairs of selected failures and near-misses. The
first two were produced by the then regulator, the Housing Corporation. The third was funded
and published by the Tenant Services Authority during its tenure as housing regulator. This latest
volume was generously funded by London and Quadrant Housing Trust, which has played a major
part in several prominent rescues. It was published and enabled by the new regulator, the Homes
and Communities Agency.
The book is aimed primarily at the boards and executives of housing associations and other similar
organisations, in the hope that it will enable them to learn from the mistakes and setbacks of
others, and avoid encountering similar fates.
After this introduction and its summary points, we start with a more reflective chapter, looking at
how such inherently stable organisations as housing associations can occasionally go so badly off
track. The first case study chapter is an examination of Cosmopolitan – although covered in other
reports, the book would not be complete without an assessment of its significance and impact.
The main body of the case studies then follow, these all but one anonymised, and grouped under
themes where appropriate.
We have aimed to tell each story in a neutral way, not casting unnecessary blame on individuals,
nor imputing any untoward motives to those involved. The narratives are the responsibility of the
authors, and we have not told them from the regulator’s point of view, nor indeed from any set
perspective. We should note that over the period we cover, the regulator changed from Housing
Corporation to TSA to HCA – we refer throughout simply to ‘the regulator’ and the investment
agency changed from Housing Corporation to HCA and, in London, to the Greater London
Authority – we refer throughout to ‘the investment agency’.
Campbell Tickell
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In a nutshell …
For readers in a hurry to cut to the chase, we offer ten precepts to Boards, not necessarily in order
of importance, which may be a useful checklist in considering how best to apply the lessons of our
problem cases to their own situations:
(1) Drive out unnecessary complexity: The more complicated things become, the greater their
chances of going wrong. Complex funding packages, activities, group structures, staffing
arrangements, all carry and compound their own risks. Life is unavoidably complicated, but
the virtue of deep simplicity, at least as an organising principle, lies behind most successful
organisations.
(2) Understand the risks that could be fatal: sample engineering components are routinely
tested to destruction before they can be used; every drug on the market has a lethal dose
established. And so it should be with business plans and financial assumptions. Just how
much strain would it take to spell the end for this organisation? How would we spot it
coming, and what could we do to fend off disaster in a hurry? Stress testing is here to stay,
and Boards may as well have some fun with gloom and doom scenario planning.
(3) Always have a Plan B: Most things will go wrong sooner or later, given half a chance.
Following on from the ‘what ifs?’ of stress testing, it’s important to have credible and ovenready plans for the day the bond market collapses just ahead of an issue, a main contractor
goes under, a new computer system just doesn’t work, the property market takes a sudden
nosedive, or a covenant is carelessly breached in the run-up to Christmas.
This thinking also applies, incidentally, to the organisations which may be involved in the
rescue of their failing brethren, the question here usually being some variation on “How can
we lay our hands on £5m of unencumbered liquid funds by Friday afternoon?”
(4) Be ambitious, but keep perspective: Low aspirations are disappointing – in the face of a
housing crisis, of course every organisation should deploy its assets for maximum social
result. But the ‘bridge too far’ scenario is all too common – the time when ego outstrips
competence and capacity by a substantial margin. Without party-pooping, Boards need to be
the inbuilt reality check for the vision and drive of the executive.
(5) Focus on the skills and competence of Board members: Because without a high-performing
Board, no organisation can get by for very long. Good governance demands creativity and
strategic vision, not to mention a robust ‘grip’ of the core business areas. With smaller
boards, getting the right team in place is now mission critical, and demands a rigorous
approach so to do.
(6) Create the conditions for effective challenge: A highly skilled Board is a good start, but not
always enough. The right behaviours and a well-designed governance cycle also need to be in
place. And behind that a Board culture which allows and enables dissent, challenge and
debate. In many of our cases, a Board which had been readier to challenge may have been
able to head off the crises long before they became catastrophes.
Arguably, if some of the Boards concerned had been prepared for the ultimate challenge and
duty – dispensing with the services of executives who had become a liability at some earlier
stage – the organisations would not have featured in this volume at all.
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(7) Engage positively with the regulators: They may not always be 100% right, but they have the
valuable perspective of experience, not to mention a range of statutory powers and
responsibilities. Organisations that are open with regulators, seek to understand their
concerns, and are prepared to regard them as partners for getting out of a pickle, are more
likely to bounce back quickly from any setback.
(8) Keep an iron grip on performance and compliance: The strategy and vision may be fine, but
without the firm hand of the Board on the key business drivers, they count for little. Of
course Boards should not allow themselves to become operationally embroiled. But they do
need to know that, in their name, the cash is there to pay the bills, rents are being collected,
tenants are being well served, gas boilers are being serviced, and that all conditions of loans
and grants are being met. And when things do go off track – as they must from time to time –
that issues can be identified and dealt with swiftly and robustly.
In a complex modern business, there is a myriad of important compliance areas, and each
one needs regular attention and oversight, within an overall integrated framework of
business assurance.
(9) Empower and value the Audit Committee: There is a lot more to business assurance than
the work of the Audit Committee. In terms of governance though, that committee is the
immune system of the organisation, and should generally be the point of first alert for a
possible failure of control. In some organisations, the audit work is seen as the unglamorous
province of box-tickers and procedure enthusiasts, and such preconceptions must be
dispelled. Like the Board, an Audit Committee needs a strategic view, the right skills among
its members, and the autonomy and ‘clout’ to be taken seriously.
(10) Never forget the tenants: Last but far from least, tenants and other customers are not
prominent in these volumes, and yet they of all stakeholders have the greatest interest. Their
homes, their services and the identity of their landlord may be at stake; by the time things go
wrong, there is often little opportunity for their voices to be heard. The core tenet of
upholding the tenant interest often falls thus upon board members, regulators and advisors,
whose duty is to the current and future generations of tenants, as well as to taxpayers and
the wider sector.
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Chapter 1: The learning
The roots of all evil
Across all the volumes of the series, it is striking (if only mildly reassuring) that corruption,
criminality and malfeasance are rare occurrences in the case studies. The roots of problem cases
among housing associations are more simply stated as an unholy trinity of:
 Weak governance leading to failures of non-executive oversight;
 Powerful ambition, from Board and executive, unmatched by ability, capacity or
understanding of risks; and
 Incompetence and lack of attention to detail and compliance, the issues often compounded by
excessive complexity.
And the greatest of these three is weak governance. By definition, and given that ‘the buck stops
with the Board’, any problem case necessarily is a failure of governance. In today’s tough business
environment, Boards need skill, grip and effective team work if they are to exercise proper
oversight of the executive and the operations of the organisation.
Critically, they also need robust systems of business assurance, so they can reasonably believe the
information they receive to be true and well-founded. In all too many of our cases, Boards have
been assured that all was well, when in fact it was not. Or they have simply not been given key
pieces of information, nor indeed even asked for them.
Brutally unfair as this may sometimes seem, Boards can only blame themselves when this occurs –
the ‘rogue executive’ explanation carries little weight in mitigation. Nonetheless, executives out of
control do play some leading roles in this volume. There is a fine line between a charismatic and
successful risk-taking leader, and someone who has become a dangerous liability. The personal
myth of a leader’s infallibility, reinforced by the sycophancy and optimism bias of others, can
create the very conditions that lead to a crisis. Boards need always to remember that, very
occasionally, it is their sad duty to consider initiating a change of executive leadership.
As well as personalities, money – the original root of all evil - is behind many of our problems. For
instance, the issues at Cosmopolitan were unveiled by a straightforward liquidity crisis, as forward
funding was simply not in place. In other cases, there were significant financial losses as a result of
over-trading, or loss-making activities that had been intended to return a surplus. Actual or
threatened breach of lenders’ covenants is another recurring theme.
And finally, it does seem an iron rule of problem cases that once one thing goes wrong, others will
follow. In some cases they are linked – a covenant breach for one lender can trigger cross-defaults
across the whole loan portfolio. Once an organisation is subject to regulatory action, its loans may
be repriced, creating a spiral of financial issues. These are often results of the spider’s web
complexity of financial and constitutional arrangements.
But in other cases, new issues will also emerge, apparently unconnected to the original presenting
symptom. A Board which has lost its grip in one key area may well have been weak in its oversight
of others as well, such as service delivery. The theme of ‘grip’ runs through this introductory
chapter. Successful Boards need absolute clarity on their responsibilities as company directors,
employers and landlords. And to sleep easy they need the robust audit and business assurance
systems that give them the grip they need.
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Know the risks …
The grip of each Board on risk is key. Again, and by very definition, each of our problem cases fell
victim to risks that had not necessarily been envisaged, and for which effective mitigations were
not in place.
The events of 2008 were a powerful reminder that the complexity of the modern world makes it
impossible to isolate risk, whether because of the global nature of markets, institutions and
investors, or the sheer speed with which events can unfold. It is surprising to remember that a
chain of events starting with the far away insolvency of Lehman Brothers in 2008 eventually acted
as catalysts for the solvency problems of Boron Homes, Bismuth Living and Polonium Group in this
volume.
Organisations are often fallible in their responses to risk because they make assumptions about
certain ‘givens’. Before 2008 for example, the possibility that banks in Britain might run out of
money featured low on most risk maps. For the known financial risks, such as a rise in interest
rates, traditional processes and arrangements remain adequate tools. Internal audit programmes,
or the oversight of an Audit Committee able to signal issues to the Board, or the sensitivity
analysis of business plans, are still valid and important.
But even these conventional risk management frameworks were neglected in some of the cases in
this volume (such as Thorium or Caesium), instead of being reviewed even more rigorously during
times of rapid change. It is not so much that the processes were entirely absent as that the weight
attached to them was insufficient and the context too narrow.
The global financial crisis also highlighted the limitations of the conventional risk tools. In the
wake of that crisis, a review1 of corporate governance (among banks and other financial
institutions) was commissioned by the government, led by Sir David Walker. Walker draws out
that the failures of the banking sector did not arise from ‘backward-looking’, conventional
compliance and audit processes, ‘but to defective information flow, defective analytical tools and
inability to bring insightful judgement in the interpretation of information and the impact of
market events on the business model’.2
Past experience was a poor navigation tool when what was required was oversight of risk in ‘realtime’. Traditional assurance processes needed to be accompanied by a Board dedicating its
attention to ‘current and forward-looking aspects of risk exposure, which may require a complex
assessment of the entity’s vulnerability to hitherto unknown or unidentified risks’.3
A particular theme of the case studies is that of complexity compounding risk. Complicated
finance deals and lease-backs, the labyrinthine documentation of the Private Finance Initiative,
cross-default provisions and group structures with too many dotted lines – all have played a part
in compounding problems, and hampering the ability of an organisation to respond swiftly to
problems that have arisen.
1
Review of corporate governance in UK banks and other financial industry entities, Sir David Walker, 2009 (hereafter
Walker).
2
Walker, Chapter 6, p. 93.
3
Ibid., p. 94.
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Keep that iron ‘grip’ …
In a more complex operating environment, Boards need to exhibit a stronger understanding of
dependencies and contingencies. If property sales don’t materialise or funding is suddenly not
available to finance a development pipeline, there needs to be a credible Plan B capable of swift
implementation. A Plan C may be useful too, just in case.
Among the perfect storms in this volume are those that combine ambitious development
programmes with unusual or complex or unsecured funding arrangements (such as Cosmopolitan
and Boron’s Project Thallium). Cosmopolitan was depending on arrangement of a complex finance
leaseback and on regulatory approval to charge assets to fund an ambitious development
programme. Costs were incurred on the development programme before the funding or the
consents had been secured. Thorium Housing had a large regeneration programme but was
dependent on huge efficiency savings and asset sales to achieve covenant compliance.
These interdependencies create a momentum; one risk crystallising potentially quickly
precipitates others. The speed with which organisations such as Cosmopolitan Housing Group or
Boron Homes find it almost impossible to regain ‘grip’ can seem breathless, as events run beyond
control.
It is at moments of crisis that some of the real work seems to get done: the more frequent
monitoring of cash-flow; the modelling of scenarios (such as re-pricing); the acquisition of
specialist advice; the recovery and Plan B action plans. One way of exercising grip and prudence,
therefore, may be for a Board - before it embarks on major new initiatives -to import as routine
some of the practices that organisations suddenly undertake when things go seriously wrong.
There are case studies in this volume in which Boards have approved complex agreements, under
which perceived matters of detail assume real substance at a later date, with negative
consequences. These are nearly always related to ways of raising new debt or generating new
income, whether leaseback schemes, mark-to-market swaps, exposures on PFI contracts or
special purpose vehicles.
This underlines the need for all of the Board to understand – really understand - the short and
longer term risks associated with new funding strategies or business ventures, a point underlined
in the regulator’s regular Sector Risk papers. While contracts are full of tiresome small print, this
does not excuse Boards from understanding their obligations. Recognising the limits of their
knowledge may be an important step in securing independent advice and support.
Boards need to make sure that they are considering information in the round – this may mean
more ‘hands-on’ involvement in directing and checking the briefs given to legal, HR or governance
advisors. Appropriate advice needs to be available before a decision is being made – the tale of
Nickel (in which legal advice is sought only after the Board has made its decisions) seems to
suggest that advice may sometimes be sought retrospectively to ‘cover’ the Board rather than to
inform and guide it.
Some risks are internally generated within organisations. The parent of a group must have
effective control over the subsidiaries – see the Carbon case study for a cautionary tale. Groups
also create a two-way relationship in which subsidiaries must see it as part of their obligation to
raise emerging issues to Group Board level. This is particularly important given the potentially
contagious nature of risk for an entire Group (whether reputationally, financially or in terms of
regulation). In any case, the ultimate authority of the Group Board needs to be real, and
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With the Benefit of Hindsight
respected. In the case of Argon, a subsidiary appeared able to over-ride the decisions of the rest
of the Group, and this situation must be avoided.
Stress test the plan …
Central to understanding risk is a real appreciation of exactly how things could go wrong, under
changed scenarios. The focus on stress testing now being promoted by the housing regulator, but
also more widely used in the banking sector, recognises that ability to withstand ‘pessimistic but
plausible’4 events – such as the collapse in property sales that hit the organisations above so
dramatically – must involve a deeper understanding of how adverse events could happen and how
this should affect thinking about risk appetite and exposure.
Given that housing growth strategies rely strongly on two markets that are vulnerable to global
influences, namely finance and property, the case for asking ‘but what if..?’ becomes stronger. In
2012 a panel established by the Financial Reporting Council to review lessons from the financial
crisis in relation to such issues as liquidity saw in stress testing ‘a powerful tool to lean against the
natural optimism of management in thinking about the future success of the business’.5
Unchallenged, the enthusiasm that is often desirable to foster among executive teams can spill
over into poorly reasoned and evidenced ambitions. A number of case studies in this volume
exemplify such intoxicated growth aspirations, with plans sometimes predicated on the perfect
convergence of events rather than consideration of the adverse. As mentioned above, optimism
bias can be a powerful driver of unwelcome events.
As the uncertainties of the operating environment have increased, the need for Boards to engage
proactively in this forward focus has strengthened. Horizon scanning, staying informed about the
wider world, scenario planning, financial modelling, stress testing and reverse testing need to be
part of the governance package.
Keep up the challenge …
The quality of challenge a Board can offer is fundamental to the value it can bring. How well this
works depends hugely on the nature of the relationship between the Board and executive and of
course on the competence of both. In this volume are examples of: poor functional relationships
between Boards and executive staff (see Argon Group); and a lack of understanding of the
difference in roles between each (see Thorium).
There are also good examples of effective collaboration between Boards and executive teams,
often after some Board and/or executive renewal has taken place. This highlights the dangers of
complacency, acceptance of the way things have always been done, cosy relationships or poor
ones, and longevity in a role. Walker’s review of banks and other financial institutions is alive to
how these dangers affect the quality of conversations in the board room environment:
4
The Sharman Inquiry. Going Concern and Liquidity Risks: Lessons for Companies and Auditors. Final Report and
Recommendations of the Panel of Inquiry, June 2012 – this report has a useful definition of stress testing as enabling
‘the directors to assess the effect of a combination of pessimistic but plausible estimates or assumptions on the
company’s solvency and liquidity’ and reverse stress-tests as seeking ‘to identify and consider scenarios that would
lead to a firm’s business model failing’, p.4.
5
Stress testing emerged as a key recommendation from the various reflections on the financial crisis, in particular the
work of the UK Sharman Panel of Inquiry which looked at lessons from the crisis and from a recessionary environment
in relation to liquidity and going concern risks. Ibid.
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‘Even a strong and established CEO may have a degree of concern, if not resentment, that
challenge from the NEDs is unproductively time-consuming, adding little or no value, and
might intrude on or constrain the ability of the executive team to implement the agreed
strategy. Equally, however, the greater the entrenchment of the CEO, perhaps partly on the
basis of excellent past performance and longevity in the role, the greater is likely to be the
risk of CEO hubris or arrogance and, in consequence, the greater the importance (and,
quite likely, difficulty) of NED challenge.’6
This volume contains evidence of key individuals (executives and non-executives) sometimes
needing to leave to allow real cultural change to take place. There was significant senior change at
Boron, Polonium, Nitrogen, Argon, Thorium and others, which then created the conditions for
resolution. Although the ‘nine year rule’ adopted by many housing association board members in
their code of governance has proved controversial, and is admittedly a blunt instrument, the
evidence of this volume supports its use.
The inability of Board members to provide effective challenge in failing or struggling organisations
is a persistent theme across sectors,7 and it appears – for instance in relation to the troubles of
the Co-operative Group. Lord Myners, tasked with reporting on the episode, sees Board
composition hampered by a process which elects ‘representatives’:
‘without the necessary qualifications and experience to provide effective board leadership
and to monitor, challenge and provide direction to management. This has massively raised
the cost of decision-making and diminished genuine accountability throughout the Group’s
governance hierarchy. – The result has been an inability to hold the Executive to account or
to provide the guidance, motivation and counsel that any management team competing in
this demanding competitive environment might reasonably deserve and expect.’8
Increasingly across sectors, we are seeing a higher bar for the standard of skills and competencies
required of non-executives. This may suggest a number of things: that our understanding of the
relationship between governance and organisational performance is evolving; that the operating
environment is changing and with it the nature of governance; that the nature of the modern
world – the plethora of data and information,9 the speed with which opinions can be sought and
conveyed in real time – makes different demands of those reflecting on all of these inputs to
create strategy.
It is clear that a shift is happening in the social housing sector. Being a benign and supportive
presence on a Board was once seen as enough for an effective contribution for its members. We
are now seeing – if not universally - a more ruthless focus on skills, capabilities and the depth of
knowledge in much Board member selection.
Walker also draws out the particular roles of the Chief Executive Officer and of the Chair in
creating a climate and culture in which challenge ‘as distinct from a conventional relatively boxticking focus on process’, is part of how proposals are discussed, that it is to be expected and
6
Walker, p. 53.
E.g. The inability or insufficient strength of character to participate’, and engage proactively in Board deliberation
undermines in Walker’s eyes someone’s suitability as a continuing Board member (Walker, p. 54).
8
Myners, p. 17.
9
Hospital trusts have at their disposal large and rich data sets; however, the Keogh review ‘found a deficit in the high
level skills and sophisticated capabilities necessary at board level to draw insight from the available data and then use
it to drive continuous improvement’ (Keogh, p.8).
7
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encouraged and conducted in such a way that it proves beneficial. Challenge should not be
received as provocation, disruption or disloyalty.
‘[…] clear responsibility should be laid, and be understood to be laid, on the chairman to
promote an atmosphere in which different views, within the ambit of convergent views on
core long-run objectives, are seen as constructive and encouraged. This will be particularly
relevant in relation to new strategic initiatives…’
Focus on governance …
Effective challenge is desirable, but Boards cannot act if senior staff do not make them aware of
emerging issues, as was the case at Bismuth Living. It is probably also the case that Boards are
more vulnerable to being misled (see Boron or Ujima) or ignored (Bismuth) when they are
insufficiently proactive. Boards need to be more than passive respondents to executive agendas,
however well-intentioned. To make this happen will require Boards to make time for reflection,
informal discussion, early engagement with their executive teams and active connection with
other organisations, networks or sources of good practice.
The culture of governance is fundamental to providing a Board environment in which there is
challenge, learning, and a willingness by staff to escalate problems at the earliest opportunity. The
inability to offer effective challenge, the tendency to just take at face value what one is told, is a
thread running throughout the volume.
Unsurprisingly, it is also an issue that reaches across to governance problems in other sectors, for
example in the hospital and banking reviews aforementioned, Keogh found that some of the
issues highlighted in the reviews were not on the Board’s agendas at all10 because they were not
probing in the right areas or gathering independent assurance. Walker found that an essential
step in Board discussion – ‘a disciplined process of challenge’11 – had in effect been missing in
many Board situations.
Never forget the housekeeping …
Excellent governance is not all about being strategic. Of course Boards need to avoid operational
entanglement, but they need too a real ‘grip’ on a wide range of compliance issues. Gas servicing,
data protection, value for money, employment matters and rent setting are just five areas where
various organisations have – some even since the cases in this volume – experienced fairly public
setbacks. Compliance with lenders’ covenants is mission critical for any organisation that has
borrowed money. The need for an energised Audit Committee as part of a wider business
assurance trail is very apparent.
Good housekeeping around governance documentation is important – it provides an audit trail
and helps to retain corporate memory. Effective housekeeping can help, for example, for a proper
piece of due diligence to take place. Chester and District Housing Trust might have had second
thoughts about joining the Cosmopolitan Group had the exact nature of the student leaseback
arrangements been properly understood; or for a quick process of Plan B to be executed – again
Cosmopolitan’s rescue was hampered by poor record-keeping.
10
11
Keogh, p. 27.
Walker, p. 12.
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There needs to be basic discipline and formality to how a Board conducts its business. The findings
of the Myners report into the Co-operative Group highlights how Board time can be wasted and
diverted in matters of secondary concern, with little in terms of decisions and next steps, and
overly long meetings. Some kind of ethics also need to underpin a Board’s competence – respect
for confidentiality, cabinet responsibility, courtesy and so on. Again, the report into the Cooperative Group provides many examples of the converse, such as a culture of leaks, a failure to
raise potential conflicts of interest, and personal rebukes to Board members or executive staff.
The housekeeping of employment matters has been highlighted by recent episodes, three
covered in this volume. Some Boards need to take their role as an employer more seriously than
they have to date. Although large sums and much reputational risk are involved, we give three
examples of Boards not applying this formal mind-set to executive retirements – Erbium, Nickel
and Antimony. In this and other areas, sub-committees should not have the power to commit the
organisation to significant future expenditure without the Board’s full involvement and approval.
For instance, a sub-committee at Nickel had agreed general severance terms for the CE’s contract
without reference to the Board.
There is evidence of Boards not asking the right questions, for example in relation to seeing the
entirety of remuneration for any pay and bonus packages for executive staff. In the three cited
cases, Boards considered information at short notice or with missing documentation or with
insufficiently comprehensive advice. Merger situations appear particularly vulnerable to this
disregard for responsible stewardship – for example, Erbium’s Chief Executive was to leave as the
consequence of a merger, and a proposed merger for Antimony led indirectly to the Chief
Executive choosing to retire.
When it does go wrong … jump the right way …
A common feature of problem cases is the propensity of some Boards to jump the wrong way
when things do go wrong. Spending time arguing or resisting regulatory perceptions and
judgements is more than likely to make things worse. In the case of Neon, for example, there was
a history of challenging the agencies with which it was dealing, and in the case of Thorium the
Board would not at first accept the various shortcomings highlighted by the regulator and by
consultants. We do not suggest that the regulator is always right about everything, but the cases
in this book suggest that more often than not, their concerns are valid.
The Board or organisation in denial tends to be a classic symptom of a deeper malaise, whether
poor attention to performance, or simple lack of awareness of what ‘good’ looks like. By way of
example, the Keogh Mortality Review of 14 failing NHS Trusts (a small volume on problem cases
from another sector)12 judged that the trusts which benefited most from the review process were
those that chose to engage with it positively, while a small number ‘spent disproportionate time
challenging the findings of the review team’ and some even briefed their staff on what to say.13
Furthermore, failing to appreciate the regulator’s role or respond to regulatory instructions (for
whatever reasons) is likely to exacerbate matters further: Antimony seemed unaware of its need
12
On 6 February 2013, the Prime Minister announced that Professor Sir Bruce Keogh, NHS Medical Director for
England, was to review the quality of care and treatment provided by the 14 NHS trusts and NHS foundation trusts
that were persistent outliers on mortality indicators.
13
Review into the quality and care of treatment provided by 14 hospital trusts in England: overview report, Professor
Sir Bruce Keogh KBE, 16 July 2013 (hereafter Keogh), p. 31.
Page 14
With the Benefit of Hindsight
to inform the regulator of the CE’s departure; Ujima supplied Board papers sporadically or not at
all at the regulator’s request; Polonium Housing Group was slow to respond to regulatory
requests and to address governance issues; Nitrogen was unresponsive to regulatory requests.
This kind of foot-dragging or lack of transparency starts to create a new strategic risk in terms of
further action by the regulator. The inability to get things done, act transparently or show due
regard for the need to act promptly, compounds the regulator’s concern.
Concomitantly, positive and proactive engagement with the regulator – in effect assuring the
regulator about the route and intent to get to the desired outcomes – is an important step in
managing down risks through a material event and not triggering a loan covenant breach.
And jump fast …
Agility to act when things go wrong is impeded by the manner in which growth has been planned
and managed. There is evidence in this volume of organisational capacity – skills and tools – failing
to keep step with ever more dramatic spurts of growth, as was the case at Thorium Housing.
Failing to resource and support growth in a managed way can only be a failure of governance: it is
the Board’s role to ensure a prudent path to fulfilling its ambitions.
The velocity with which events move accentuates the need to respond quickly at the first signs of
trouble – Bismuth had three emergency meetings in the space of two weeks when it was affected
by volatility in long-term swap rates owing to the credit crunch, with two banks calling for up to
nearly £30m of collateral.
Regulators are also likely to look for signs of a Board appreciating the depth of the water that it is
in – moving quickly, getting appropriate advice, ring-fencing the risk, and so on. These are read as
signs of a Board in control, and again Bismuth provides a good example of a Board keeping the bit
between its teeth and not simply delegating the work elsewhere.
In conclusion
As with the three previous volumes, it all comes down to governance. The world of housing
associations has changed substantially even since Volume 3, almost beyond recognition since
Volume 1. The risks are greater, the safety nets less comprehensive. The more recent problems
described are different from the past in many ways, but the underlying logic of good governance
remains the same. We can be certain that today’s well-governed housing association will not
feature in Volume 5.
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With the Benefit of Hindsight
Chapter 2: Cosmopolitan’s defining impact
The 2012/2013 episode of Cosmopolitan Housing will be familiar to many readers, and a recently
published review of events14 by consultancy Altair gives a full account of what happened. Most
importantly, it came within a whisker of insolvency, which would have been potentially
catastrophic for its tenants, and would have affected the credit rating of the entire housing
association sector. Ultimately, Cosmopolitan was rescued by Sanctuary Group, but the episode
was an alarming ‘near miss’ for all concerned.
As ‘problem cases’ go, it was thus the most important of recent years, and has had a major effect
of the thinking of both the regulator and lenders to the sector. In addition, it acted as a wake-up
call to many Boards as they planned new ventures, sought to re-energise governance, and
manage their risks sensibly.
The basic facts
The basic facts are simply stated. Cosmopolitan Housing Association was a developing association
operating in the Merseyside area, with some 3,400 homes. Within its group, there was an
unregistered subsidiary, Cosmopolitan Student Homes, with 3,500 bed-spaces. In 2011, as the
long-standing Chief Executive retired, the Group was joined by Chester and District Housing Trust
(‘CDHT’). The Chief Executive of CDHT assumed responsibility for the whole expanded group at
that time. CDHT was a transfer association with 7,000 homes. It had experienced early regulatory
problems after transfer in 2000, but at time of merger was well-regarded and high-performing.
The thinking behind the merger was to achieve economies of scale, and for CDHT to benefit from
Cosmopolitan’s expertise in more complex development and financing activities. The business
case for merger made a strong offer to create substantial efficiency savings, and also highlighted
that Cosmopolitan would be able to learn from CDHT’s work with tenants and communities. Due
diligence was conducted by both sides, but there was no detailed review of the contractual
documentation around certain of Cosmopolitan’s leaseback deals signed in 2003 for development
of student housing.
The new combined Group was given a substantial allocation for new development from the HCA,
and was in discussion with the insurance company Aviva about its forward funding needs. The
regulator was (rightly) concerned about the complexity of the Aviva deal, and raised various issues
with Cosmopolitan, including those relating to the need for forward funding to be in place. But
before these could be resolved, Cosmopolitan began to experience cash flow and liquidity issues
from March 2012.
In effect, it became clear that there had been no ‘Plan B’ for funding the development
programme, were the Aviva deal not to go ahead. At the same time, there were substantial
quarterly payments to be made on the student leaseback schemes.
14
http://www.altairltd.co.uk/cosmopolitanreport.pdf
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With the Benefit of Hindsight
Remedial actions get under way
An interim finance director was appointed, and three experienced housing professionals joined
the Board of Cosmopolitan Housing Group. Various actions were initiated:
 Cash flow was monitored daily;
 Operational savings and efficiencies were implemented;
 Various intragroup property transfers from Cosmopolitan to CDHT were made, with muchneeded cash passing in the other direction;
 Riverside Housing Group, a large locally based organisation, was approached and agreed to act
as funder of last resort with up to £2m as a line of credit;
 Existing lenders were approached to extend existing facilities and overdrafts; and
 The leaseback documentation was located and thoroughly reviewed.
Further concerns emerge
Over time, the review of documentation revealed more matters of serious concern, including:
 The business plan and assumptions for the student housing were not realistic, and the
portfolio would generate increasing losses into the future, not least because of the onerous
terms of the student leases;
 Maintenance, asset management and service delivery to tenants within Cosmopolitan
(although not CDHT) were weak, potentially undermining asset values;
 Record keeping and document retention generally was poor;
 The accounting treatment of the leaseback schemes was wrong, and the leases should have
been classed as being on balance sheet, rather than off; this meant that the organisation
would breach covenants, and would not be able to sign off its accounts;
 There were various other risks to Cosmopolitan’s covenant compliance going forward;
 The business partners on the student schemes were identified as being highly commercial in
their approach, and (as was their right) reluctant to renegotiate the terms of the leases;
 The evidence trail of Board scrutiny and oversight of decisions made revealed a lack of
challenge, and skill sets that did not match the association’s risk profile;
 Cash flow would continue to be an issue for the foreseeable future, despite the actions taken;
and
 The student leases had been guaranteed by Cosmopolitan Housing Association, which owned
the social housing assets within the group, thus placing social housing assets directly at risk.
The decision to seek merger
In September 2012, Cosmopolitan accepted that it no longer had an independent future, and after
a summary selection process decided to join the Riverside Group. The organisation was now
clearly in a crisis, and there were regular meetings with the regulator and advisors. Board
members became concerned about their personal positions, and the advice of an insolvency
practitioner was obtained. A key concern for the Board was whether it would be able to sign off
the annual accounts as a going concern, and the extent to which the existence of a potential
rescuer could be taken into account.
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With the Benefit of Hindsight
The regulator began detailed contingency planning for insolvency, and looked at the use of its
statutory moratorium powers. Riverside began its due diligence process, and meanwhile,
Sanctuary Group was being kept informed, so that they could – if necessary – step in as ‘Plan B’.
Darkening skies
Riverside’s work revealed that the liabilities could – in a worst case scenario – add up to tens of
millions, if crystallised by buying out the onerous student lease terms and the guarantees. At the
same time, the regulator’s planning revealed that its statutory moratorium powers had some
limitations. There was thus at least the possibility of tenanted social housing being taken into the
possession of lenders after an insolvency event. It was also considered probable that, in the event
of such developments, all housing associations across the UK could face more expensive future
borrowing, and even a re-price of their existing loans.
The ongoing negotiations with the leaseholders and their lenders were proving protracted and
complex, and there was a considerable number of interested parties. Late in 2012, Riverside
decided that it would not be prudent for it to proceed, and in January 2013, there was an orderly
handover whereby Sanctuary became Cosmopolitan’s rescuer of choice.
Saved by the bell
Sanctuary was prepared to move quickly, and to manage out the longer term issues with the
student leases, and the rescue was able to move ahead at some pace.
As a part of the rescue, the Chester local authority was required to give up its ‘golden share’ in
CDHT, and was persuaded so to do. This was key to the rescue, as the economics of the
transaction from Sanctuary’s side depended on the ability for it to utilise the value within all parts
of the Cosmopolitan Group as necessary going forward. It is fair to say that without the value
inherent in CDHT, the rescue would have been much less feasible for Sanctuary to consider. The
rescue took place at the end of March 2013, to the considerable relief of all concerned.
The particular lessons of Cosmopolitan
The key factors in creating this episode can be summarised as:
 Poor governance and risk management; in particular, weak board skills and oversight of risky
non-social housing activity; this was compounded by the existence of a relatively complex
group structure for a small organisation;
 An over ambitious development and growth programme relative to the human and financial
capacity of the association;
 Onerous and over-complex leasing and finance deals for the non-social (student) housing,
compounded by weak underlying business planning and cashflows;
 The existence of financial guarantees directly putting at risk social housing assets;
 The lack of considered planning for liquidity and cash-flow, and in particular the reliance on
one potential funding deal, without any Plan B; and
 Weak record keeping and document retention, which slowed down potential remedial and
rescue activity.
The role of the HCA and previous regulators for Cosmopolitan is examined in some detail in the
report referred to above. The HCA emerges from the episode with reasonable credit, recognising
Page 18
With the Benefit of Hindsight
that the rescue did happen, and that the potential ‘train crash’ was avoided. The report makes
certain recommendations to the HCA and to housing associations.
The HCA has accepted the relevant recommendations, and they have been influential in the 2014
consultation on changes to the Regulatory Standards, now implemented. These are summarised
as the need for:
 Boards (and also the regulator) to have the skills and access to advice they need to discharge
their responsibilities;
 The regulator to update its plans for dealing with future insolvency and moratorium situations;
 Changes to the relevant legislation and regulations to update the regulator’s powers, both in
respect of insolvency and to allow the more flexible use of other powers;
 Housing associations to have accurate registers of their assets and liabilities;
 Enhanced and intelligent approaches to risk management, again by both regulator and
associations;
 A more rigorous approach to compliance and business assurance by the Boards of
associations;
 A more rigorous approach to mergers and due diligence by both Boards and regulator; and
 Better planning for potential crises and cash flow difficulties by the Boards of associations.
In conclusion
The Cosmopolitan episode was a close call for the association, its tenants, the regulator and the
wider sector. In the event, the difficulties were resolved with a rescue, as other similar cases have
been before. Lessons have been learned, and are being applied. But another time, events may
unfold in a less positive manner. Each Board needs to consider the lessons of this and other
problem cases, and avoid ever becoming ‘the next Cosmopolitan’.
Page 19
With the Benefit of Hindsight
Chapter3: Boron Homes, Bismuth Living and Polonium
Group - the global financial crisis and its effects
The global financial crisis started in autumn 2008. As will be remembered, the credit crunch
caused various difficulties for housing associations. The problems potentially affected both cash
flows and balance sheets, and these rightly gave rise to concerns for the regulator. Key problems
include: The collapse of the market for homes for sale, outright and intermediate, leading to cash flow
and solvency concerns;
 Collapse in the value and saleability of sites held for development;
 Significantly reduced values leading to the need for impairment in accounts;
 An unprecedented reduction in long term interest rates, leading to substantial cash or
collateral calls in relation to financial derivatives;
 Constraints on the availability and cost of new lending; and
 Potential for breach of loan covenants.
Three cases demonstrate this range of problems and how rapidly a situation can escalate. In two
examples, events moved so fast that the associations concerned cannot be seen as having any real
control of the situation. It is more the case that events were controlling them. In none of our
cases are the events, or the combination of events, foreseen. None of the associations concerned
had risk management systems which had identified the particular combination of risks which
materialised as potential ‘black swan’ events even to threaten the very existence of the
organisation. None had suitable contingency plans.
In one case, the credit crunch is just an additional factor precipitating issues which already exist.
In another, two more minor credit crunch problems combine with an unrelated governance issue
to give the regulator a more general concern. In the third, a very specific credit crunch problem
quickly becomes potentially life threatening and is almost as quickly resolved – but the aftermath,
not least the damaged relationship with the regulator, leaves the association in a weaker position
for some time.
Boron Homes
Boron Homes is a group with an extensive development programme including a number of joint
ventures.
Timeline
Year 1
Month 1
Boron submits a capacity model to the regulator, which considers that the cash flow
position is unstable. The regulator’s initial investigation identifies
 A solvency risk due to delaying payments to creditors
 Inadequate planning for loan security requirements
 The risk of breaches of loan covenants
 A weak viability rating going forward
 Unreliable reporting and financial management
Page 20
With the Benefit of Hindsight
 Several joint ventures have net outgoings in the short to medium term
 Reliance on property sales to meet interest payments and part fund the
development programme
Boron has substantial commitments which require additional funding, and it is
apparent that raising the funding is problematic. In addition there are concerns
regarding a very large development project (Project Thallium), with the likelihood of
substantial impairment.
The regulator requests weekly cash flow information. The position from week to week
is volatile, with several large draw-downs required. All drawings are dependent on
security being in place, and there is a risk this will not be done in time. External
consultants are asked to review the robustness of the cash flows.
The regulator facilitates arrangements with two other housing associations to provide
stand-by loan facilities on commercial terms which alleviates the short term liquidity
issues.
Month 3
The cash flow position is improving because of better forecasting and management,
better development forecasting and improved processes for arranging security.
However
 Additional lending is not yet in place
 Cash is tied up in Project Thallium, and additional government grant funding is
critical
 Forecasts in relation to the joint ventures indicate significant and mounting losses
 Property sales are very weak; some sites look like realising far less than their
projected returns, with receipts at c. 10% of the predicted sums
Phase 1 of the review of the cash flows does not highlight any significant new issues.
An audit of Project Thallium is in progress, and a governance review is also in progress.
Month 4
Additional grant funding is agreed to ease the position, although funding for Project
Thallium remains under negotiation.
Phase 2 of the cash flow review is critical of cash flow management and financial
management information. It highlights a lack of direction in the finance team and a
weak control environment. A development review highlights similar concerns about
controls and forecasting, but also notes an improving situation and no fundamental
weaknesses.
Month 6
New facilities have been arranged and are ready to draw. This ensures that at the year
end, there is a stable cash position with adequate headroom. However because of the
other financial uncertainties the overall viability position will not be clear until the
accounts are finalised.
The governance review confirms a number of failings at board and executive levels.
Boron agrees to some changes but the regulator is not content with Boron’s response
and asks for a more robust action plan. The regulator is holding fortnightly high level
meetings with Boron.
Month 7
The investment agency agrees further grant allocations for other schemes.
Page 21
With the Benefit of Hindsight
Month 9
Additional funding for Project Thallium is still not agreed and this is material to the
potential impairment in the accounts. The level of impairment is such that covenants
might be breached.
The retirement of the Chief Executive is announced.
The internal audit report on Project Thallium is completed and raises concerns about
procurement, and a further investigation is begun.
Month
11
Year 2
Month 1
The position for the year end accounts is acceptable.
A new Chief Executive is appointed. Steps are taken to strengthen the Board.
It becomes apparent that Boron is in breach of its constitution, having exceeded its
borrowing limit by some 30%. A rule change is agreed as a matter of urgency by the
financial services regulator. Lenders are supportive and do not seek to call a default.
The regulator asks Boron for an explanation as to how it arose.
The investigation into Project Thallium indicates that procurement may have been in
breach of EU legislation. Boron agrees to adopt procurement arrangements for
completion of the project that are OJEU compliant.
Month 3
It is established that there was a breach of EU procurement rules, and this is corrected
by going out to tender in compliance with the regulations. Boron also discovers it has
breached its borrowing limit in one of its subsidiaries. A further rule change is
required.
The audit management letter is issued and highlights internal control weaknesses.
The regulator takes the view that these further issues point to continuing governance
failures. Boron’s governance and finance ratings are both downgraded. Despite this,
the regulator considers the strengthened board and executive has the capacity and
willingness to address the issues.
Month 5
A new business strategy is agreed which includes simplifying its group structure, and it
receives in-principle agreement from its funders. Boron revises its asset management
strategy and addresses service delivery improvements. The financial position remains
stable and satisfactory, and Boron makes good progress on addressing the issues in
the management letter.
A review of projects similar to Project Thallium reveals no further irregularities.
The regulator concludes Boron has made sufficient progress to enable them to reduce
the level of regulatory intervention and remove Boron from the ‘intensive’ category.
Analysis
A large and aggressive development programme, together with a complacent approach to
financial management and risk management, combined here to create a situation where Boron
came close to insolvency. The regulator picked it up quickly and was strenuous in its efforts to
ensure a satisfactory resolution.
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With the Benefit of Hindsight
Boron’s development programme had complex arrangements for its delivery, including through a
number of joint ventures. The various reviews highlighted that its systems for financial
forecasting, management and reporting were not sufficiently robust to manage a programme of
such size and complexity. The credit crunch exacerbated the situation for Boron; difficulties selling
homes, impairment, and difficulties raising funding contributed to serious short term cash
problems and medium term balance sheet concerns.
After the initial problems had been identified, events snowballed very quickly. In the early stages,
there is a sense of things being almost out of control. Boron’s management team was fire-fighting
for some months and was under huge pressure to keep the organisation’s head above water.
The regulator was key to saving the situation. It acted swiftly and decisively to facilitate credit
arrangements with other associations. In the event these were not needed, but the regulator
should take credit for having arranged a fall-back position vital to limiting the immediate solvency
concerns. Indeed under a slightly different scenario, these measures could have prevented an
insolvency with potentially huge ramifications for the whole sector.
The further grant allocations were also important in recovering the wider financial position. The
lenders themselves also contributed positively by their forbearance in not calling default (when
they appeared to have the opportunity to do so) as a response to the constitutional issues.
By the end of Year 1 the regulator’s primary focus shifted from the financial position to the
control over the development programme and need for a governance improvement strategy. The
regulator rightly concluded that the operational and financial failures were symptomatic of
governance failures. The governance review indicated that board was misled about loans, security
and IT problems. Despite this, the Board is held accountable for its failure to manage the risk of
the development programme, and to failure to exercise financial stewardship. The organisation
was development led, the approach was over-optimistic and the Board did not maintain adequate
control. The strengthening of the Board and executive team was key to the regulator regaining its
confidence in Boron.
Polonium Housing Group
Polonium is a group of associations, with one small stock transfer subsidiary. The Group also
provides special needs housing.
Timeline
Year 1
Month 1
During an annual process of considering the organisation’s financial viability, the
regulator is alerted to financial issues which cause regulatory concern. The group is
heavily dependent on sales of low cost home ownership schemes from its
development programme. It is exposed to margin calls on stand-alone swap deals,
and has recently had to meet a substantial cash call. The regulator begins a period of
intensive regulatory engagement, requesting regular weekly cash flow information,
monthly management accounts, updates on sales performance and board reporting.
A number of independent reviews are commissioned, including asset management
and the Decent Homes Standard position, and treasury management.
Month 2
The sales position remains problematic but the financial implications are manageable
in the short to medium term. Polonium begins negotiations with the investment
Page 23
With the Benefit of Hindsight
agency to change tenure on some of its sales programme, to reduce risk.
Month 3
Some additional grant funding and tenure changes to some sales schemes are
agreed. Despite this, the regulator downgrades Polonium’s viability, whilst noting
there are no immediate liquidity concerns. Its records show the downgrading is in
part due to difficulties in obtaining information promptly from Polonium.
The asset management review criticises lack of information about stock condition
and some concerns about oversight of the DHS programme. The other reviews are
yet to be completed.
The regulator meets with the new Chair at Polonium and expresses concerns that
matters are not being resolved quickly enough.
Month 4
Polonium revises its projections to take account of the decisions on grant funding
and tenure changes.
Polonium submits a business case for taking transfer of two special needs schemes
from other providers. Despite its other concerns, the regulator recognises Polonium’s
strengths in this area and agrees to the transfer.
Month 8
Polonium submits an updated business plan and capacity model. The regulator
upgrades Polonium’s viability.
Progress is made on the asset management review outcomes. The treasury review is
complete, and an action plan is developed and is in implementation.
The regulator concludes that there is sufficient all round progress to remove
Polonium from intensive regulatory engagement.
Analysis
Once again the credit crunch and resultant property market collapse threw up financial challenges
which had not been foreseen. In this case the potential implications were not so serious as at
Boron, but they nevertheless reflected a similar lack of effectiveness of the organisation’s systems
for risk assessment and management.
Although the total case study covers only just under a year, there is a sense – articulated by the
regulator - that Polonium did not act swiftly.
The regulator rightly took the view that Polonium had an appropriate range of skills and
experience on the Board and did not need statutory appointees. Following the appointment of a
new Chair and progress on all the issues, the regulator reduced its level of regulatory activity and
removed Polonium from the intensive category.
The case was resolved quickly once Polonium got a grip on the issues, and it was helped by the
investment agency’s decisions about allocations and change of tenure. Despite the increased
regulatory scrutiny on these specific issues, the regulator retained its confidence in Polonium in
other respects, and allowed transfers of special needs schemes from other organisations to
proceed during this period.
While the focus in this case was on financial viability there were also governance issues emerging
in the small stock transfer subsidiary. It seems quite possible that neither problem on its own
would have resulted in the increased regulatory activity. This is an interesting point for both the
Page 24
With the Benefit of Hindsight
regulator and the regulated to ponder – for the former, when is it appropriate to consider
together two completely disparate problems and then increase regulatory activity, and for the
latter, be aware that the sum of smaller problems may add up to a whole which is of much greater
significance in the eyes of the regulator.
Bismuth Living
Bismuth is a large group of associations. The association is financially highly sophisticated and its
staff and board are knowledgeable, with strong finance and treasury skills. At the start of the case
study Bismuth is committed to complex financial instruments (‘swaps’ or ‘hedging instruments’)
relating to £450m of borrowings, by which Bismuth agrees to pay a fixed rate in return for
receiving an adjustable or floating rate from another party.
These financial instruments have only two counterparties, both banks. Bank A has a weekly mark
to market, Bank B’s is monthly. Mark to market (MTM) is the point specified in the swap
agreement when the price of re-establishing the fix at prevailing market rates is calculated, and
can be either positive or negative. In the case of a stand alone swap the bank is able to call for
collateral to cover its exposure should its position be negative.
In the first couple of months of the credit crunch long term swap rates were unusually volatile,
with a generally falling trend. Initially Bismuth considers the situation manageable, as negative
calls are matched by positive. However negative calls increase, the finance team starts to get
concerned and begins daily monitoring of rates. It also opens up discussions with Bank B to
attempt to mitigate its potential liability.
Timeline
Day 1
Before being able to conclude these discussions, rates take a significant downturn.
Bismuth is called upon to place £16.6m of collateral with Bank B. The call is due on
day 5. The Treasury Director advises the Group CE who in turn advises the Chair. The
regulator is notified the next day by telephone in the first instance.
Day 5
Bismuth satisfies the call from Bank B.
Bank A makes a call of £13.2m, payable the following day. Bismuth is not able to
raise this in the time available; it is working on ensuring that it can provide the
necessary security but this is not going to be in place sufficiently quickly. Bismuth
tells Bank A’s team that it needs to hold urgent discussions with them. The bank
considers that in its opinion Bismuth is in default. The regulator, understandably
concerned, demands an urgent meeting with Bismuth.
Day 8
A temporary waiver is agreed with Bank A, until day 13.
Day 9
Bismuth holds an emergency board meeting to discuss the crisis and to agree a
strategy for dealing with the banks and with the regulator. Bank A agrees to allow
an undrawn facility to be used as collateral provided it is repaid within 7 days. The
Board concludes that the priority is for the team of the executive to meet the two
banks concerned as quickly as possible with a view to restructuring Bismuth’s
hedging portfolio.
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With the Benefit of Hindsight
Day 13
A further emergency board meeting is held. Bank B has agreed that although calls
will continue to be made monthly, Bismuth will be given 3 months to satisfy the
calls. This gives Bismuth time to complete its work in relation to securities, and
breathing space to negotiate a long term solution.
Bank A is considering embedding Bismuth’s swaps within existing loan facilities even
though the value of the swaps exceeded Bismuth’s current loan book with Bank A.
This will require Credit Committee approval and the Committee is meeting at this
moment to consider this. The bank’s proposal, which would involve rolling up the
existing unsecured facility and which could involve the crystallisation of a significant
loss, might create accounting and financial covenant issues for Bismuth. In addition,
Bismuth’s cost of funds could rise significantly. Bank A has, however, agreed not to
make further calls pending resolution of the negotiations.
The Board is pleased to have a breathing space, and agrees that it will continue to
meet in emergency session as and when required rather than delegating to a
committee. Meanwhile another financial issue, signing off a complex financial deal,
has become urgent, and must be concluded by day 24. There are reputational risks
and abortive costs if the deal is not signed off, but the Board takes the view that
there is greater risk to the organisation and to them individually as board members
if they proceed whilst Bismuth’s position remains uncertain. The Board agrees that
until the outcome of current events is known, it cannot agree to the financial close
of the contract.
Page 26
With the Benefit of Hindsight
Day 21
A third emergency board meeting is held. More discussions have been made with
Bank A, which has written outlining its terms. These are more onerous than those
previously discussed, but it is apparent this is a ‘take it or leave it’ offer. Bismuth’s
negotiating position is weak. The Board notes that the risk of not accepting the offer
is to return to the ‘mark to market’ situation, which all agree is untenable. These
terms effectively extinguish the risk on MTM. The Board gives authority to accept
the terms.
Negotiations with Bank B are continuing. Providing security is proving challenging
because of the other funding under negotiation – more assets are coming on line
but additional external resource is needed to work on charging. Agreement with
Bank B is close, but heads of terms are not yet issued.
The Board looks again at the financial deal which is now urgent. The Board agrees to
close the deal subject to:
 The arrangements with Bank A being signed
 Heads of terms being issued by Bank B which are not unduly onerous
 Specialist advice is taken on cash flow
The Board agrees that the Executive should revisit the Group’s disaster scenario
planning and strategic risk map, and conduct a form of stress testing, thinking the
unthinkable.
Day 23
The deal with Bank A is completed. It will cost Bismuth an additional £2.6m each
year. Bank B is proposing to increase Bismuth’s unsecured facility which means that
future calls can be met without recourse to Bismuth’s own funds.
The cash flow advisors give assurance about the model and the inputs.
Bismuth advises the regulator of the updated position.
Day 24
Bank B confirms the agreement and expresses its willingness to review the structure
of the long term swap arrangements.
The crisis is at an end.
Analysis
The scale of the downturn in long term swap rates presented a major threat to Bismuth’s short
term cash position. Bismuth’s exposure was exacerbated by the size of its stand alone swaps and
the fact it was spread across just two counterparties, with one of those able to call for weekly
MTMs.
The crisis faced by the Board when it held its first emergency meeting was made worse because
neither the Group Chief Executive nor the Board had been alerted to the deteriorating position
earlier. Various opportunities for this had arisen, but had not been taken. While earlier awareness
of the looming crisis is unlikely to have avoided the remedial action Bismuth was forced to take, it
could have allowed a more balanced and measured set of negotiations with the two banks, for the
security charging work to be accelerated earlier and for the regulator to be properly briefed.
There was no time in this scenario for regulatory action to be taken, but this reputational damage
could have been avoided.
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With the Benefit of Hindsight
Once apprised of the seriousness of its position the Group Board acted with determination and
decisiveness. In the space of two weeks, which included three emergency meetings, the Board
developed and agreed a revised deal with both banks which mitigated Bismuth’s exposure to
future collateral calls. The deal with Bank A came at some cost which, in the weak position
Bismuth found itself, was the price to be paid for sustaining it as an independent organisation.
The Board showed a good understanding of the best interests of the organisation, and of
members’ own individual positions in relation to potential trading whilst insolvent. Despite the
regulator’s obvious concerns, it is clear there was some recognition of how the Board handled the
situation.
What has the global financial crisis taught us?
Each of the case studies has its own lessons, but one key lesson underpins them all. None of the
associations foresaw what would happen. A second important lesson is that Boards need to have
a thorough understanding of the complex risks that they are taking on, with some members at
least who have direct experience of similar matters elsewhere.
Of course it could be said that no-one foresaw the global financial crisis, or had dealt with
anything similar. But whilst the exact nature of the risk may not be foreseen, nevertheless risk
management systems must identify worst case scenarios, attempt to ensure that whatever
happens there is no fundamental threat to the continued existence of the organisation, and that
contingency plans are in place.
Once things start to go wrong they can unravel very quickly indeed. Good risk management
requires both management teams and boards to think the unthinkable, and equally to know how
to respond when something unexpected occurs.
Page 28
With the Benefit of Hindsight
Chapter 4: Nitrogen Housing and the PFI
Background
Nitrogen is a large association, which at the start of this case study has the strongest governance
rating available and a slightly downgraded viability rating, because of the unprofitability of one of
its key business streams and weakness in controls.
Nitrogen had a large Private Finance Initiative (‘PFI’) scheme for refurbishment of council owned
housing stock. The project inception was more than 6 years prior to the events recounted here.
The council concerned had entered a 30 year contract with a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) which
was an unregistered subsidiary of Nitrogen. The refurbishment works were carried out by one
main contractor which employed a number of sub contractors, and the council made substantial
monthly payments to Nitrogen.
After the works were completed, it was discovered that they had not been done to the specified
contractual standard. The capital cost of rectification was well over £10m. The contractor was by
then in severe financial difficulties. A dispute arose between Nitrogen and the council, and the
council made substantial contractual deductions from the monthly payments, and sought to
compel the SPV to make good the sub-standard work at its own expense.
Timeline
Year 1
Month 1
The regulator holds an internal assessment meeting and notes the following points:
 The council could terminate Nitrogen’s contract, leaving them without monthly
income to offset the capital costs
 Nitrogen’s exposure is established through the contract, and any shortfall in the
SPV will ultimately come back to Nitrogen and be dealt with via Nitrogen’s I&E
account
 it is unclear if the capital cost liability will affect covenants, year end accounts or
cash flow
The regulator thinks that Nitrogen has been slow to notify it, although it recognises
Nitrogen has already put in place a number of reviews and investigations. The two
key questions are how Nitrogen has found itself in this position and what financial
capacity it has to meet the costs of rectification and absorb the reduced monthly
unitary payments. It asks Nitrogen for more information.
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With the Benefit of Hindsight
Month 2
Although cash facilities appear adequate there is some uncertainty as to the
robustness of this analysis. Cash flows are being reviewed. Nitrogen embarks on a
programme of property sales to minimise the risk of covenant breach.
A private placement planned for later in the year cannot go ahead because of the
PFI position, and Nitrogen starts negotiations to extend an existing facility.
Nitrogen takes legal advice, and also financial advice to model the impact of the
costs of default on the PFI funding model. Nitrogen believes there may be a legal
case against other parties involved in the PFI, and actions against them are pending.
Nitrogen also investigates whether any performance bonds in place would mitigate
their losses but this proves unsuccessful.
Month 3
The council notes the “direction of travel (being) towards a solution for tenants
which will not result in contract termination”.
The regulator considers the covenant position to be unclear, and asks Nitrogen for
external confirmation of the covenant compliance position and the degree of
tolerance.
Month 4
The regulator writes to Nitrogen again asking for urgent clarification on the
outstanding points. Nitrogen appoints consultants to review what went wrong.
Month 5
The sales programme continues and looks on track to raise enough for the
estimated capital cost of rectifications works, but will not improve the covenant
position. Despite this, Nitrogen’s external auditors are able to confirm Nitrogen will
not breach interest cover covenants. Progress on alternative loan facilities is limited.
The regulator is concerned that agreement with the council has still not been
reached, and considers Nitrogen has been slow in setting out its plans and managing
the associated risks. It advises Nitrogen it is considering downgrading the RJ.
Month 6
Nitrogen considers the various options available to it if it is unable to reach
agreement with the council at a meeting due imminently. However, if agreement is
not reached by the time Nitrogen’s accounts are due to be filed, then Nitrogen will
be forced to choose between either filing its accounts on time but possibly with a
going concern qualification in the audit report, or filing its accounts late. Either
option would almost certainly amount to a breach of funders’ covenants which
could result in re-pricing of existing lending agreements. If the council terminated
the contract, that would have a similar outcome.
The regulator stresses to the Chair and members of the Executive the seriousness of
the concerns it would have if Nitrogen’s problems led to the loss of social housing
from the sector.
Month 7
Discussions with the council continue. Liquidity is not an immediate concern but
discussions with lenders on additional funding remain on hold pending agreement
with the council.
Nitrogen considers there is no risk of impairment, since the return still exceeds its
cost of capital. The consultant’s report is delayed because of the volume and
complexity of the documentation needing review.
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With the Benefit of Hindsight
Month 8
Nitrogen believes a resolution is now looking more likely but uncertainty remains as
agreement still needs to be reached on the works programme. The risk remains that
agreement will not be reached and the contract will be terminated. Negotiations
continue.
The cost to Nitrogen of termination of the contract is estimated at £52m. Nitrogen
continues to develop contingency and mitigation plans:
 Funders are aware of the situation and are to date supportive
 Liquidity is assured for at least another 12 months
 It has modelled the potential impact of debt re-pricing and has the financial
capacity to absorb this to a significant extent
 Its auditors are comfortable with its accounting treatment of the PFI
 It will not be progressing with its development programme until matters are
resolved
 In the event of a default of its loans, Nitrogen would be sufficiently financially
weakened to necessitate partnership discussions
Month 9
Negotiations with the council continue. Agreement regarding the works is reached,
but two other areas remain unresolved. Both parties are working towards a Deed of
Variation, but there is still no guarantee that this will be completed, or that it will be
completed quickly enough for Nitrogen’s accounting requirements. The consultants’
report into ‘what went wrong’ concludes:
 Nitrogen made misjudgements in tactics in responding to the disputes and
adjudications with the council. From the start right up until the breakdown of
relations, the relationship with the council was not effectively managed
 There was a blurring of the separation of the governance of Nitrogen and the
SPV. From inception all the non-executive board members of the SPV were also
on Nitrogen’s Board
 There was no separation of risks between Nitrogen and the SPV
 There were weaknesses by the executive in terms of management of the project
risks
 Reporting lines within Nitrogen were fragmented from the start. There was no
overall project director until after things broke down
 The terms of the PFI output specification and deduction mechanisms were vague
and onerous to Nitrogen
 Too much reliance was placed on consultants and advisers in the stages up until
formal entry into the contract
The report notes that the current Board and Chair were not responsible for the
majority of the origins of the problems with the project. A number of senior
executive appointments have also changed in that time.
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With the Benefit of Hindsight
Month 10
Nitrogen now has a letter of intent from the council, and it looks as if the final
approvals for the contract variation will go smoothly. The biggest risk to Nitrogen
now is that it will be unable to deliver under the revised contract, which has tight
financial and performance parameters. Failure might result in calling in of loans. The
regulator requires Nitrogen to prepare what has subsequently become known as a
‘living will’ against this worst case scenario.
Month 11
The regulator considers a revised regulatory judgement. It concludes that, by
current standards, Nitrogen does not have effective mechanisms in place, but that
by the standards of the time when the project was entered into, it did. Nitrogen did
take professional advice on the structure of the deal taking into account the
relevant expectation of the regulatory Good Practice Notes of that era.
Nitrogen’s recent steps to manage and mitigate the risks of failure provide
assurance that its ability to meet standards in the future is not sufficiently
prejudiced by the unregulated activities. The regulator concludes that without this
risk mitigation the technical non-compliance would have been more serious. In the
event a new judgement is issued which puts both governance and finance a notch
below full health.
Year 2
Month 1
The Deed of Variation is signed, removing the threat of contract termination at least
for the present. A new revolving credit facility is signed off. The accounts are signed
off, unqualified. The accounts show a loss on the PFI contract of £12.3m and an
overall loss for the year of £3.3m.
The Chief Executive of Nitrogen leaves by mutual agreement. An interim is
appointed. The risk profile of Nitrogen is such that it remains under enhanced
regulation.
Analysis
After 12 months of intensive negotiations and financial fire fighting, a variation to the contract
was agreed. The crisis was averted for the time being but Nitrogen remained under threat.
Nitrogen lost its Chief Executive, and also lost the confidence of the regulator.
What went wrong was investigated by consultants and is described in Month 9 above. Underlying
those causes is the sheer complexity of the project – not just the works, the legal and financial
aspects and the governance arrangements, but also the risk management and control, and the
project and relationship management needed to keep it on track. PFI was a novel arrangement
and not one which Nitrogen had experience in managing. The consultants’ report suggests that
the Board and executive were not fully on top of it right from the start, and changes in personnel
at both executive and non-executive level and resultant loss of knowledge would have made it
harder to manage it effectively further down the line.
Events and Nitrogen’s responses to them make evident that it had not appreciated and planned
for the risks inherent in the contract and the governance arrangements which accompanied it.
Both the regulator and the consultants note that at an early stage the risks were viewed by
Nitrogen as being no greater than its core business. This was such an under-assessment that it
suggests the association’s entire approach to risk appraisal and risk management was flawed.
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With the Benefit of Hindsight
It took Nitrogen a while to realise the gravity of the situation. However once it had done so, it was
very active trying to resolve the situation with the council and to put in place financial contingency
plans. During the months it took to negotiate the revised contract terms, Nitrogen’s future and
independence were at considerable risk. If the agreement had not been concluded and the
contract terminated, then Nitrogen would almost certainly have ended up seeking a merger
partner. There was also risk to publicly funded assets within Nitrogen, because of the magnitude
of the cost of failing to secure the contract variation.
Conclusions
Events here demonstrate why the regulator places such importance on the need to protect social
housing from any threat that may come from unregistered subsidiaries and/or diversified activity.
Page 33
With the Benefit of Hindsight
Chapter 5: Argon Group and the perils of complexity
Argon is a group structure formed by the merger of two existing groups. One of the former parent
companies Radon, and its main subsidiary Xenon, are in intensive regulatory engagement even
before the merger, because of poor service delivery.
Timeline
Year 1
Month 1
An Audit Commission inspection gives Xenon Housing “poor service, uncertain
prospects for improving”. The then parent, Radon commissions consultants to
review the exercise of control and what has led to the problems. The review
concludes that the subsidiaries are running the group rather than the group
controlling the subsidiaries. Radon and Xenon are placed in intensive regulatory
engagement. The group develops two action plans, one to address performance and
one to address governance issues.
Month 9
A review by the regulator indicates that the governance actions are in hand, and
some progress is being made on the performance issues. The regulator decides to
lift Radon’s intensive regulatory engagement status so as to allow a merger with
another Group to take place. Part of the regulator’s strategy in so doing is to enable
a newly created merger group, Argon, to address the known performance issues
within Xenon.
Month 11
A new non-stock holding group parent Argon comes into existence. Both former
parent companies and all former subsidiaries retain their legal identities.
Year 2
Month 4
Argon’s management team is concerned about service improvements which are not
bedding in. A decision is taken to postpone the imminent mock inspection to give
more time to address the performance concerns. Argon asks the regulator to defer
its planned review until after the mock inspection and the regulator agrees.
Month 9
A mock inspection of Xenon indicates another poor outcome is likely. Argon notifies
the regulator. Argon uses its ‘step-in’ powers to appoint two group board members
to Xenon’s board, one of whom takes on the role of Chair. It also employs an
external company to facilitate operational change. Xenon’s Chief Executive resigns.
Month 11
The regulator holds an internal case review. It does not consider Argon’s actions go
far enough. It has serious concerns about the failure of the group parent to manage
and control the subsidiary effectively, to implement change post-merger, and to
deliver on the service delivery expectations that were envisaged when the regulator
approved the merger. The regulator debates internally on the proportionality of
applying intensive regulatory engagement status to all members of the group, and
whether funding restrictions should be placed across the group. It eventually
concludes that the parent Argon should be held accountable for the failure of the
subsidiary, and that funding restrictions should be placed across the group. As a
result:
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With the Benefit of Hindsight




Argon is placed in intensive regulatory engagement
Three statutory appointments are made to Argon’s Board
Argon loses its ‘lead partner’ status
All existing schemes of all subsidiaries which are not yet on site are
transferred to other providers
The forthcoming Audit Commission inspection is postponed.
Month 12
Year 3
Month 3
The statutory appointments are made and take up their roles.
Everything appears to be going well; the appointees are making a positive
contribution, and feedback from and about them is good. A detailed action plan is in
place for the operational issues and working groups are set up.
Month 5
Tensions are developing between the Chair and the appointees, and the Chair and
the Chief Executive. Following a very difficult and challenging board meeting, the
Board agrees to accept the Chief Executive’s resignation. A sub-committee is set up
to consider interim arrangements.
Month 7
Argon is encountering difficulties in sourcing a suitable interim.
The appointees go over the Chair’s head to prepare an initial paper on strategic
review.
Month 8
An interim Chief Executive is appointed, who in turn appoints consultants to
undertake the strategic review. The brief is agreed with the regulator.
Month 10
The consultant’s report back, with four possible strategic options. The option which
is agreed involves:
 Collapse of most of the group into one company
 A new streamlined governance structure and executive leadership structure
 Revised accountability arrangements
While this is agreed in principle there are potential obstacles, not least the need for
agreement of all the subsidiary boards and shareholding members.
The Chair and Vice Chair agree they will resign as part of the change process.
Feedback from a review by external consultants indicates that service
improvements are going well.
Year 4
Month 1
The subsidiary boards accept the strategy for collapse of the group.
A new Chair is appointed and takes up the post.
Month 5
The deferred Audit Commission inspection takes place and gives Xenon one star
with promising prospects.
Four new board members are appointed to Argon.
A new Group Chief Executive is appointed.
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With the Benefit of Hindsight
Months
6&7
The shareholder meetings take place to vote on the rule changes; after considerable
resistance and persuasion, all changes are approved.
The appointees stand down.
Month 7
Argon is removed from intensive regulatory engagement, and consent is given to
the constitutional changes.
Analysis
The Board of Xenon gave insufficient attention to service delivery and performance, leading to a
poor inspection outcome. Once service delivery problems were identified, neither the boards nor
the executive gave enough focus to ensuring these were addressed. This was the case both before
and after the merger.
The original consultants’ pre-merger report on governance – that the subsidiaries were controlling
the group rather than the parent - proved to be correct. Although Radon and Xenon seemed to be
implementing the resultant action plan, with hindsight they failed to give it sufficient weight and
to act sufficiently robustly on its findings. After the merger and creation of Argon, the original
analysis was if anything even more pertinent, but by this time the group’s attention was turned
elsewhere. The review was side-lined, and then forgotten altogether. No-one was accountable for
seeing through the recommendations.
Radon’s original structure was unwieldy and dysfunctional. Unfortunately, the governance issues
identified in Radon were actually magnified as a result of the creation of an even larger group. The
new Argon group was so labyrinthine that it affected the ability of both executives and nonexecutives to manage or govern effectively.
Immediately following the merger, regulation and contact with Argon was light, despite the fact
that Xenon remained in intensive regulatory engagement. The regulator wanted to give Argon and
Xenon time for the improvements to bed in and be reflected in the performance statistics. Its
rationale was that it had no reason to think things were going wrong. However it had no clear
evidence that things were going right either, and the unexpected postponement of the mock
inspection was perhaps an indicator that things were not what they should be.
The role of appointees was very important in getting the case resolved. In the middle of the third
year their actions, both inside and outside board meetings, were a catalyst to move things on to
the next stage.
The interim Chief Executive was also critical to the resolution of the problems. He worked
effectively with the consultants and the regulator, and was successful in selling the concept of the
group collapse to the shareholders. Because the appointment was interim, it allowed him to focus
on these particular issues. Had a permanent replacement been made at an earlier stage, the
person appointed would have had the full Chief Executive remit with all its distractions, and
potentially had less focus on the essential actions needed to bring the governance issues and
supervision situation to a conclusion.
Conclusions
Xenon was in intensive regulatory engagement for approaching four years as a result of
performance failings. This cannot be an acceptable way to deliver services to tenants, and the
failings should have been addressed much more quickly. However it was a classic case of the
Page 36
With the Benefit of Hindsight
problem (poor performance) being a symptom rather than the cause. The underlying issue was
one of poor governance oversight and attention, and by adding further layers of governance
complexity and distance, the merger exacerbated instead of addressed the problem.
Mergers, particularly those as large and complex and this, do present challenges for executives
and non-executives alike. In these circumstances where one of the component parts of the
merger already had known about serious problems, it might have been of benefit to have
considered more carefully exactly how and by whom the issues would be progressed post-merger.
Experience suggests that immediately post-merger attention is drawn away to all sorts of new and
unexpected challenges, and that pre-existing problems can easily get overlooked.
The regulator was perhaps too easily persuaded that improvements were in hand, and should
have followed up more robustly. Once the continuing problems were inescapably obvious, the
regulator gave considerable thought to the proportionality of its response. Although the
withdrawal of funding may have seemed harsh given that the other subsidiaries were not
exhibiting any of the same problems, it was necessary to ensure that the parent did take rapid and
appropriate action to deal with the underlying and longstanding problem.
This case reached a successful and logical conclusion. The regulator should probably have acted
more firmly to follow up performance issues during the period immediately following the merger,
which might have prevented the need for intensive regulatory engagement. However,
investigating the performance issues served to highlight the underlying governance and structural
problems which would have had to be addressed in any event.
Page 37
With the Benefit of Hindsight
Chapter 6: Thorium Housing - ambition & complexity
Background
Thorium is a group which has a number of subsidiaries, both registered and unregistered. At the
start of this case study the group was facing significant cash generation challenges, and had
embarked on a large scale and fast paced programme of re-structuring and re-organisation to
deliver it. This included an asset rationalisation strategy which would mean relocation of its head
offices, withdrawal from almost half of the local authority areas in which it worked, and a
governance rationalisation including merger of two subsidiaries into the main association.
Timeline
Year 1
Month 1
The regulator initially picks up the issues from a rents review – Thorium is planning
to seek a rent waiver on one of the subsidiaries, Cerium. Cerium is a stock transfer
with a substantial regeneration programme, which in the current economic
environment is not viable, and the regeneration is unlikely to go ahead without the
rent waiver. The local authority is not happy with Thorium’s performance.
The regulator is concerned that Thorium’s programme of reform is over-ambitious
and that there is too little contingency available in the business plan. The plan has
already built in very large efficiency savings and relies on asset sales to achieve
covenant compliance. The regulator is also concerned that Thorium has brought in
an interim finance director a few weeks previously, without notifying the regulator.
Thorium’s new auditors have issued an Audit Management Letter (AML) raising
controls issues, and lenders are expressing concern to the regulator about this and
the way which Thorium have communicated with them about it. All in all, the
regulator is concerned at the group’s ability to cope with this period of rapid change
and the needs of the various stakeholders involved, whilst having no immediate
viability concerns.
The regulator considers it needs much more assurance, and makes Thorium an
intensive regulatory engagement case. A letter is sent to the Chair expressing its
concerns.
Month 2
Thorium’s board discusses its strategy. It wants to maintain an independent future
but recognises the challenges facing it. It also confirms it wishes to continue with
the regeneration project at Cerium but that in supporting Cerium it must protect the
interests of Thorium. Discussions are in hand with the local authority and Thorium
decides not to proceed with the rent waiver application.
The Board asks the executive to draw up plans for a further £10m of cost savings.
Thorium agrees to the regulator’s request for a governance review.
Thorium announces the departure of both the Chief Executive and Finance Director.
An interim Chief Executive joins the existing interim FD.
Month 3
The regulator reviews viability and the grading remains as it was previously.
Page 38
With the Benefit of Hindsight
Thorium’s discussions with the local authority continue, the master plan is revised
and agreement is reached in principle on a new way forward, but the detail remains
to be sorted out.
The regulator agrees to the merger of the two subsidiaries into the main
association.
Month 4
Thorium revises its business plan which is now based on more realistic assumptions
and is clear about what each business stream needs to achieve. Thorium’s board
sets up a series of away-days to take place during Month 5 at which it will consider
the governance review, and options for the long-term strategic direction of the
business. The regulator is reassured that the Board is now properly addressing the
difficult decisions it faces.
Month 5
The governance review concluded that Thorium’s governance arrangements were
complex and unwieldy. Specific concerns include:
 Confusion over the roles of executives and non-executives
 Non-compliance with the parent’s code of governance
 Some key issues are not given proper consideration by the Board because of
poor reporting or crowded agendas
 Poor control of subsidiaries
 The Board’s consideration of reports on risk was poor
The Board takes the view that the review looked at a snapshot in time, and that it
does not accept all the findings. Nevertheless it agrees to some of the
recommendations, including:




Month 6
Reductions in the size of the Board
Changes to the committee structure
A programme for board renewal
Maximum terms of office
The Board agrees that six members will stand down at the next AGM and starts to
recruit replacements. This does not include the Chair despite them having reached
the time limit.
Recruitment for a permanent Chief Executive begins.
Month 7
Work continues on asset sales and cost savings. Further office rationalisation and
reductions in staff numbers are required.
Thorium agrees a level of support to Cerium to help kick start the regeneration
scheme, and is also exploring the potential of alternative sources of funding for the
regeneration including the possibility of additional investment by other registered
providers.
Month 8
The regulator remains concerned at the Thorium Board’s lack of acceptance of all
aspects of the governance review. Thorium’s action plan in relation to internal
controls is considered to be too little, too slowly. The regulator sends a strongly
worded letter to Thorium, again urging reconsideration of the Chair’s position.
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With the Benefit of Hindsight
Month 9
Thorium completes revised business plans for the whole group and submits them to
the regulator.
Month 10
A new Chief Executive is appointed and will start shortly.
A problem comes to light with a recent major procurement with a potential cost of
£13m to Thorium. This highlights further internal control issues. The regulator notes
that procurement and contract management have been identified as problematic in
several previous risk reviews and internal audits. It takes the view that this
demonstrates systemic failure to deal with known risks and exposures quickly and
effectively, and seek additional assurance from Thorium’s board. Thorium instigates
an inquiry into what happened.
The Chair announces their intention to step down and recruitment for a
replacement begins.
Month 11
The new Chief Executive takes up their post.
Year 2
Month 2
The regulator downgrades Thorium’s governance on the basis of:




Poor risk management
Serious weaknesses in financial planning
Lack of control & support of Cerium
Inadequate internal controls
Month 3
Thorium settles its claim against its supplier involved in the procurement issue. The
terms remove a potentially significant financial loss, and restore Thorium’s control
over the contract.
Month 4
Thorium is implementing the revised business plan for the group, and also the new
master plan for the Cerium regeneration project. Thorium agrees to on-lend to
Cerium to sustain the project, and finalises further funding from lenders.
Month 6
The report into the procurement shows there had been significant historical control
failures. The management response to the report demonstrates that Thorium has
already put some better control mechanisms in place and has developed a robust
action plan to resolve those issues that remain outstanding. The regulator is content
with this as an initial response.
Months
The procurement function is reviewed and restructured, and a number of key
contracts are re-negotiated. Internal audit is outsourced. The risk management
process is overhauled.
7-9
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With the Benefit of Hindsight
Month 9
The last remaining board members stand down, so with the exception of Cerium’s
chair, there has been complete turnover of board members. A new post of Head of
Governance is created. The committee structure is further revised and with it, new
terms of reference developed.
The new FD and team have thoroughly revised the budgeting process, and new
financial policies and controls are being rolled out. The financial position and
performance are much improved. There is headroom on covenants, and the
business plan is no longer dependent on achieving efficiencies.
Month 10
The regulator holds an internal case review. It considers that Thorium has addressed
the presenting issues, and that other problems which have arisen since have been
effectively dealt with. Enough has been done to upgrade governance. Time is now
needed to bed down the new executive, board and governance arrangements to
ensure the structures and processes are effective in process as well as design.
Analysis
Thorium’s plans were too ambitious - it tried to do too much, too quickly. It got so involved in its
plans that the basics of management and control got lost in the ‘noise’, and both the Board and
the executive failed to engage in appropriate risk management. Then when things started to go
wrong, Thorium’s recovery plans were similarly complex and over ambitious.
The Board had not heeded warning signs over a number of years. When its governance
shortcomings were pointed out, both by consultants and by the regulator, the Board did not
accept it. It was a classic ‘board in denial’. It took a crisis of confidence by the regulator and
resultant regulatory action to jolt the Board into acceptance of the need for change.
The problems at Thorium were not insoluble, and a more measured approach might have saved
the situation without any of the ensuing drama. In the event, it took virtually a complete change
of executives and non-executives to turn Thorium around. The much more sober approach by the
new team demonstrated in the second half of the timeline enabled Thorium to work
systematically through the issues and reach appropriate solutions. This was assisted by the
measured approach taken by the regulator.
Conclusions
Once again the key lesson for associations is the importance of proper systems for the
identification, control and management of risk, and the exercise of proper controls. These
underpin everything else that the Board does. There is no evidence here of a strong audit
committee’s influence and control either, which might have provided a brake – or at least a
salient reminder – to the Board when things were spiralling out of hand.
The procurement problem illustrates how seemingly unrelated things can go awry when there is
not an appropriate culture of control and overview. Although many organisations would attempt
to explain this sort of issue as a one-off, perhaps down to a rogue employee, time after time the
evidence points to it being the organisational culture which creates an environment that allows or
even encourages such incidents to happen.
Page 41
With the Benefit of Hindsight
Chapter 7: Carbon Group - complexity and
contentiousness
Background
A group structure with a non-stock holding parent Carbon, and a number of subsidiaries, one of
which (Silicon) is very much larger than the others. The Group is without a permanent Chief
Executive, and there is an interim in post.
The group considers its future strategic direction following a consultant’s report setting out
structural options. Differences arise between Carbon and Silicon regarding the future of the
group, with Silicon wanting to de-couple from the group and the remainder wanting to collapse
the group. The governance structure is so arranged that the members from Silicon can block the
group board from taking action, and an impasse is reached.
Timeline
Year 1
Month 1
A short notice inspection of Silicon by the Audit Commission identifies 4 out of 5
areas where weaknesses outweigh strengths, and comments adversely on
governance and executive leadership difficulties which impact on service delivery.
The regulator holds an internal case review to consider this and also notes:
 A recent review of governance which identifies a number of weaknesses and
recommends a collapsed group structure
 The difference of opinion over the structure and strategic direction of the group
and the impasse reached at board level
 The constituency composition of the Carbon board which has the potential to
allow any subsidiary to block any vote requiring a 75% majority – as is currently
the case with Silicon and the revised group structure
 The continuing absence of a permanent Chief Executive and the destabilising
effect this is having on the staff team and on services
 A number of breaches of the NHF Code of Governance, to which Carbon
subscribes.
Month 3
The regulator accepts a joint voluntary undertaking from Carbon and Silicon. The
key actions agreed are:
 Carbon will commission a detailed governance review, and the group will accept
and implement its findings
 Carbon will appoint four new independent members to its Board
 A steering group comprising mainly the new members will oversee the
governance review process.
Month 6
The governance review is underway. Three independent members are co-opted to
the Carbon Board.
Month 7
The Chair of Silicon resigns from the Carbon Board and indicates their intention to
step down from Silicon as well.
Page 42
With the Benefit of Hindsight
Month 8
The Group Chair announces their intention to stand down. Recruitment gets
underway for the permanent Chief Executive.
Consultants present their draft report, recommending collapse of the group. Early
indications are that it is well received.
Month 9
Year 2
Month 1
The final governance review is presented and all the boards agree the proposals to
collapse the group. An implementation plan is developed, which the steering group
continues to oversee.
A new Chief Executive starts work, and a new Chair of Carbon is appointed.
A problem is identified with the group structure proposal in that the need for
lenders’ consent is likely to trigger re-pricing of the loan book. In the current
economic climate this is not an acceptable proposition. With its legal advisers,
Carbon develops an alternative plan to create an administrative/operating structure
which mirrors collapse without implementing the legal structure that would need
lenders’ consent. This is Phase 1; Phase 2 remains the long term intention to
formally collapse the structure, when market conditions allow.
Month 6
The administrative structure is in place, and the new combined board has been
established and is about to start to meet. It comprises ten common members, with
one additional separate member for each of Silicon and the other subsidiary boards.
Month 8
Re-structuring the senior management team is complete. This reduces the team
from five operational directors to three strategic directors.
Month 10
The regulator confirms that the voluntary undertaking has been discharged and
Carbon returns to routine regulation. Carbon is to be upgraded for governance
shortly.
Analysis
As at Argon, it was the problems with governance which led to the failures of service delivery. In
this case it was not the complexity of the structure so much as the conflict in the relationships
which caused the problems:

The various boards were at odds with each other, and relationships were strained;

The board membership structure gave too much weight to the subsidiaries, leading to a
position where an individual subsidiary could over-ride the wishes of the remainder of the
group;

The group had been without effective executive leadership for some time. The permanent
Chief Executive had left, and temporary internal arrangements had been made prior to the
appointment of an externally sourced interim Chief Executive some considerable months
later. Strife was evident within the management team.
This case was resolved relatively quickly, particularly in the light of the somewhat dysfunctional
state of affairs at both executive and non-executive levels at the beginning of the case study. It is
notable as an effective example of the concept of the ‘virtual collapse’ of a group.
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With the Benefit of Hindsight
The regulator considered using its regulatory and enforcement powers to make statutory
appointments to the Board, but instead decided to accept a voluntary undertaking from Carbon.
The undertaking required Carbon to make voluntary co-options to the Board so as to restore the
balance of power to the parent organisation, and also to commission a detailed governance
review. Extensive changes were then made to the structure and membership of the common
group board, including reducing representation of the subsidiaries down to one per subsidiary.
It is clear from the regulator’s internal documents that it was very conscious of the need to get
the voluntary undertaking right. It took legal advice to ensure that the undertaking complied with
its statutory powers and with the published guidance. It also wanted to ensure that its hands were
not tied, if things went wrong. It was a step in the dark for Carbon, too. In the event, all parties
worked well together and the choice of a voluntary undertaking was successful in achieving
everyone’s objectives. In particular, it precluded the need for formal regulatory action, with its
concomitant repercussions for Carbon.
The concept of a virtual collapse of a group structure is now quite widespread. There are a
number of reasons why actual collapse may not be possible, but at the time of this case study
there were particular problems with lenders threatening to re-price loan books as the quid pro
quo for giving consent to constitutional change. The creation of a combined board with a majority
common membership and minority subsidiary membership worked well for Carbon. It was a
creative and effective solution to an otherwise messy problem. Since the end of the case study,
Carbon has been able to revise its legal structure, as well.
Conclusions
In creating a group structure, it is essential to ensure that the parent organisation does actually
have effective control over the subsidiaries. This should of course be written in to the various
bodies’ constitutions and the intra-group agreement, and reflected in governance policies and
practices. However the Carbon case study demonstrates the need to check carefully to ensure
that this is the case and that there is no accidentally built-in ability for the ‘tail to wag the dog’.
The regulator was evidently aware of a number of issues by the time the Audit Commission
inspection outcome precipitated an internal case review. With hindsight, particularly being aware
that Carbon had been without a Chief Executive for a considerable period, perhaps it should have
been keeping a closer eye on events. However, once the regulator did pick it up, it was dealt with
speedily and with marked success. The case provided an excellent example for both regulator and
regulated as to how effective a voluntary undertaking process can prove to be.
Page 44
With the Benefit of Hindsight
Chapter 8: Ujima Housing and the bridge too far
Background
Ujima is a long established association with a history of occasional regulatory engagement, but
also of significant achievement as a community based organisation, and a flag carrier for
associations with a Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) focus. It is a development partner and has an
unusually large development programme relative to its size.
It is named in this volume, as all the events described are in the public domain, and were the
subject of an independent inquiry, the report of which was published.15
In the past few months, a new Chief Executive (who comes from outside the sector) has recently
taken up post. This is Ujima’s fourth Chief Executive in as many years. The entire executive team
of eight has been replaced, and only three have housing sector experience. The new team
develops a innovative and ambitious business plan which aspires to expand the range of business
streams to include a number of arm’s length commercial subsidiaries, and to develop many more
new homes. This is approved by the Board.
Ujima’s board is small. Three experienced members have left and not been replaced. While it has
strong community links and some members have relevant skills, overall it does not have the full
range of skills required to oversee the implementation of such a business plan.
The regulator has already placed Ujima on its ‘watch list’ because of potential weaknesses
highlighted in an external review and some poor relationships with development partners. Ujima
currently has the top regulatory status, although the most recent viability assessment highlights
some concerns, while noting that Ujima’s financial position could, if necessary, be improved
relatively quickly by scaling back on development.
Timeline
Year 1
Month 1
Various allegations are sent to the regulator regarding a range of matters at Ujima.
The regulator asks Ujima to investigate. Ujima does not respond positively and
complains to the regulator about the way in which it has handled the allegations.
Ujima’s development programme appears to be slipping. Ujima gives the regulator
assurances that targets will be met.
The regulator classifies Ujima as medium risk and embarks on a strategy of
enhanced regulation, including requesting sight of all Ujima’s board papers.
However these are not supplied, or only sporadically.
Month 3
A new capacity model is submitted to the regulator but does not incorporate the
new business plan, the detail of which is still being worked up. There are errors in
the model and Ujima is asked to review it.
15
Now available at: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20080912120601/http://www.housingcorp.gov.uk/
upload/pdf/Ujima_report_FINAL.pdf
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With the Benefit of Hindsight
Month 5
A further updated model is submitted but still does not incorporate the financial
detail of the new business plan. The regulator holds a meeting with Ujima’s auditors
to discuss the late sign-off of Ujima’s accounts. An extension is agreed.
The regulator considers downgrading the association’s management because of
failure to achieve a post-Audit Commission inspection improvement plan. Ujima
challenges this, including the regulator’s motives, and the regulator agrees to allow
them a further three months.
Month 6
The development programme is slipping significantly. The regulator asks Ujima to
update forecasts for completions and expenditure. The regulator considers
downgrading development but instead asks Ujima for an action plan for delivery.
Month 9
The accounts are signed off. The Audit Management Letter raises serious concerns
about Ujima’s development capabilities and expertise, about accounting practices
and a possible covenant breach. The regulator requests a formal response from
Ujima, which is not received until year 2 month 1.
Revised development forecasts have proved to be inaccurate and do not relate back
to the capacity model. The regulator asks Ujima to review them yet again.
Month 10
The regulator completes its viability review and gives Ujima a green light. However it
notes concerns about the aspirational business plan and growth projections.
The reports on the earlier allegations conclude either that there is no substance to
them or that evidence is insufficient to take matters further. Nevertheless the
reports highlight a number of procedural, policy and internal control weaknesses.
The regulator asks Ujima to put together an action plan to address them.
Month 12
Year 2
Months
1-3
The development programme performance has slipped still further. The regulator
downgrades Ujima’s development traffic light to red and withdraws Ujima’s
development partner status.
Further allegations are received by the regulator regarding staffing issues and
possible Schedule 1 breaches. The regulator asks Ujima to investigate but this is
never completed.
Month 2
In the light of the downgraded red light for development the regulator issues a new
assessment, with all the other traffic lights remaining green.
Months
Following the poor development performance, the regulator decides to undertake a
review into governance. The conclusion of the review is that the Board of Ujima is
not maintaining adequate oversight of the organisation's development function, and
that the Board is not providing effective leadership.
3-5
Month 5
Ujima tells the regulator that it will not be able to sign off its accounts on time. A
one month extension is agreed. Questions arise as to whether Ujima is working to
the most recently approved version of its Rules. It is doubtful if existing and
proposed new board members are properly appointed. Next month’s AGM is
cancelled.
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With the Benefit of Hindsight
Month 6
The regulator holds a formal case conference and considers all of the above, and
Ujima’s failure to cooperate. It decides to place Ujima in supervision. Three
statutory appointments are made to the Board. The AGM goes ahead after all, at
very short notice.
Month 7
The regulator meets with Ujima’s auditors again. The auditors and Ujima are in
dispute over the accounts. The auditors are concerned that transactions in the
accounts will place Ujima in breach of loan covenants and lenders have not been
advised. It is also concerned about impairment.
Week 1
Ujima submits a Section 9 consent request for a substantial loan. The regulator is
unable to process it because the documentation is inadequate and because the
previous year’s accounts are still not filed. The regulator now has serious concerns
about Ujima’s short term cash position.
Month 7
Week 2
Legal advice confirms that apart from the appointees and the tenant members, all
other board members have been invalidly appointed over the last 4 years. The
appointees and the tenant members act together to constitute a new Board with a
substantially different membership. This new Board suspends the Chief Executive
and the Finance Director, and commissions an urgent independent inquiry into
Ujima’s financial position.
Month 7
Week 4
The review reveals unexpected operating loss for the previous year and significant
further deterioration of Ujima's financial position during the current year, including
the likelihood that Ujima will run out of cash in Month 8. It appears that some part
of that deterioration in Ujima's financial position may relate to the purchase of land
and continuing unsubsidised development activity following the withdrawal of
development partner status, and the investment of significant sums in the
renovation of Ujima's headquarters offices.
The Board concludes that its financial position means that the association is in
breach of its loan covenants and is not in a position to raise further funds. The Board
agrees that Ujima cannot sustain an independent future. Following consideration of
a number of proposals, it agrees that the best option is to transfer the stock of
Ujima to another housing group.
Board members work behind the scenes with the regulator and legal advisers to
consider options in more detail.
Month 8
Week 3
A stock transfer proposal is put to shareholders at a special general meeting, and
the motion is lost.
Month 8
Week 4
Ujima presents a winding up petition to the court on the basis that it is no longer
able to meet its debts as they fall due. The following day, secured creditors serve
Notices to the regulator and then take the steps necessary to appoint a receiver.
This triggers a 28 day moratorium under Part I of Housing Act 1996, which means
the regulator may put proposals to Ujima's secured creditors to ensure tenants
homes are not put at risk, protect public investment in Ujima's housing stock and
safeguard the interests of Ujima's creditors.
Page 47
With the Benefit of Hindsight
Month 9
Week 3
The regulator considers the options including possibility of transfer to one of several
associations who have expressed an interest. It selects one as being the best
possible option to deliver the regulator’s statutory obligations to tenants, creditors
and the taxpayer. The regulator puts the proposal to Ujima’s secured creditors and
it is agreed. An insolvency manager is appointed, and two days later the transfer is
completed.
Analysis
Following the collapse and receivership of Ujima the regulator sets up an independent inquiry.
This analysis draws on the conclusions reached by the Inquiry.
How the problems went undetected
At the heart of this case study is a management team which was collectively out of its depth, and
a board which was weak and inexperienced and not able to recognise, let alone control, what was
happening. Ujima pursued an aspirational growth plan without the resources or experience to
manage existing services, let alone deliver an ambitious development programme.
Neither Ujima’s board nor the regulator was provided with sufficient and reliable information to
understand the scale of the financial problems. The Board was uninformed, under-informed or
misinformed on key issues. Both the Board and the regulator took assurances from management
too readily. Despite the lack of adequate information, subsequent examination of board agendas
and papers does reveal:

An identified £7m overspend on the development programme

The Chair of development committee had resigned and no development committee
meetings were held after Year 1 Month 3

The response to pressure from the funding agency regarding delivery was to land bank;

No management accounts were presented for a period of about nine months
 For a period in excess of 12 months, Ujima had not considered risk at board level.
But the Board itself did not pick up on these issues as raising alarm bells – interestingly three of
these points relate to events or reports which should have been routine, but which didn’t actually
happen. The Board did not spot the gaps. The Board had insufficient expertise, and the loss of
three experienced members seriously undermined its subsequent effectiveness. Only one
member really made any challenge but as a lone voice, this was not sufficient. The regulator did
not follow through on its request for sight of board papers, and so it too missed out on this vital
information. Awareness of these issues would have ratcheted up the regulator’s concerns.
The Inquiry concluded that in the latter part of Year 1 it was unwise for the regulator to discount
financial viability as a potential concern. However, even after downgrading development to red in
Year 2, the regulator did not amend the other traffic lights. This gave a confused message to Ujima
and to the outside world. It encouraged Ujima to think it could develop its way out of problems.
Conclusions
Ujima’s collapse was caused by its own bad management and an ineffective board. However, the
outcome may have been different if the regulator had taken more decisive and earlier action.
Page 48
With the Benefit of Hindsight
The regulator did have serious concerns, but was unwilling to take action without what it
considered sufficient evidence. It considered all the issues individually but did not conflate them.
On individual issues the regulator felt they were not serious enough, or there was not enough
evidence, or that it was a business rather than a regulatory matter (the ambitious business plan)
or there was scope for improvement without supervision. The constant obstruction, challenges
and threats of legal action from Ujima did not help the regulatory process, either. With the benefit
of hindsight, the regulator adopted an over-cautious approach and should have intervened earlier
as a series of signals indicated mounting problems.
Once the regulator did intervene, its role was successful inasmuch as none of the funders and
creditors lost money, and the tenants kept their homes. However the Inquiry concludes that this
success was dependent on two factors – that the defect in the appointment of board members
meant that effectively a new board could be appointed who were willing and able to work
together to find a solution, and secondly, that there was another association able and willing to
take Ujima on. As the Inquiry concludes, these were two fortuitous circumstances which cannot
be relied on to recur in any similar situation.
The Inquiry also considered the extent to which the law and practice regarding insolvency was
effective and appropriate for housing associations. It identified a number of problems with the
insolvency process which it considered unsuited to an organisation that has public services to
deliver, but which could not be delivered if its assets were to be sold off by a receiver acting for a
lender. The Inquiry made a number of other recommendations for change, which go beyond the
scope of this review.
Page 49
With the Benefit of Hindsight
Chapter 9: Neon Group: problems with property
Background
Neon is a provider with an expressed commitment to investing in communities.
There is a history of regulatory concerns, including a challenge to the Audit Commission and
subsequent poor response to its findings, and a finding of severe maladministration by the
Ombudsman. The regulator has been keeping a close watch on Neon over an extended period of
time but has not taken any enhanced regulatory action.
These events take place at a time of economic crisis, with credit very tight and property values
falling sharply. Neon has a substantial programme of sales of homes, and also holds considerable
development land which either has no planning permission or no allocation or both.
Timeline
Year 1
Month 1
The regulator downgrades viability as a result of:
 An on-going inability to service interest payments from operating cash flows
 Inaccurate forecasting
 A very poor Audit Management Letter
Neon’s investment partner status is withdrawn. Neon is asked to put together a
brief for a governance review, focusing on financial management, audit and
controls.
The regulator meets with Neon’s Board to explain its expectations and to advise of a
forthcoming internal case review. The Board is asked to recruit new members with
relevant skills, in advance of the review’s findings.
Month 2
Week 1
One of Neon’s lenders contacts the regulator explaining that no further drawdowns
will be permitted because of the viability downgrade, and until Neon complies with
various information requests including management accounts. The regulator
contacts Neon’s Chair to discuss, and it becomes apparent that the Chair is not
aware of the situation. This causes the regulator to question the relationship
between the executive and the Board.
Neon is due to meet another lender this same week to finalise another drawdown.
It appears that unless this facility is agreed and drawn, Neon will run out of cash in
less than two months.
Page 50
With the Benefit of Hindsight
Month 2
Week 2
Neon advises the regulator that two new board members have been appointed.
However the regulator remains concerned about the strength of the board and
notes that the governance review has not yet been commissioned. The regulator
holds a case conference. It has concerns about governance:
 Lack of skills & experience on the Board
 The Chair’s ability to control the association
 The relationship between the executive and non executive teams.
And about finance and development, in particular:
 Liquidity
 Loan covenants and relationships with lenders
 The budget position
 Land banking and impairment;
 Unsold homes and cash flow implications
 Mixed messages about future development
The regulator notes that whatever actions it takes may cause difficulties because of
the economic climate, and notes that putting Neon into intensive regulatory
engagement may precipitate a loan default and lead to insolvency. However its
deep concern about how Neon has handled the last few days is such that it
nevertheless decides to place Neon in intensive regulatory engagement and to make
statutory appointments to the Board. The regulator writes to Neon to inform it, and
requires Neon to put together an action plan addressing the points above.
Month 3
The communications with the regulator cause Neon’s board to question the
association’s management. Following a board meeting it is agreed that the Chief
Executive will leave the organisation. Three appointees join Neon’s board.
A review of Neon’s development programme highlights significant exposures in the
pipeline, relating particularly to the value of its land bank and to potential abortive
development costs. This has a major impact on its accounts. Neon is in discussion
with its auditors about finalising those accounts on a going concern basis. This is
complicated by the fact that the draft accounts lead to breaches of covenants with
lenders which need to be remedied by letters of waiver from the lenders. The
lenders are being robust, both in respect of their information requirements and the
pricing of their loans.
If Neon is not able to continue to draw down cash from the lenders it could continue
to pay bills for around one month, but the Board would clearly be in a difficult
position regarding trading. The regulator undertakes a confidential piece of internal
work to identify possible rescuing partners and is confident it can achieve this if
necessary.
Month 4
Neon’s board decides to seek a merger partner. The Chair, disagreeing with this
course of action, resigns.
The accounts – now late – have still not been signed off, because the ‘going concern’
issues are not yet resolved.
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With the Benefit of Hindsight
Month 5
An experienced interim Chief Executive starts in post.
Neon, with the help of consultants, continues its search for a merger partner.
Month 7
The accounts are finalised and signed off by the Board and the auditors without
qualification. The business plan is accepted by funders and the principal lender is
prepared to back the cash flow requirements, at least for the short term.
Month 8
The interim Chief Executive is successful in stabilising operations.
Neon holds a beauty contest and chooses its preferred partner. A very quick merger
timetable is agreed, with the intention being to complete the merger by the end of
month 11.
Month 9
The partner’s board approves proposals to bring Neon within its group.
Month 10
Neon’s AGM approves the rule changes necessary to bring about the merger.
Month 11
The regulator considers the business case for the merger and gives consent to the
rule changes.
Year 2
Month 1
Neon becomes a subsidiary of the partner association. The statutory appointees
stand down and Neon is removed from intensive regulatory engagement.
Analysis
Neon had a history of challenging the agencies with which it had dealings, and of not accepting
their findings and criticisms. The Board lacked the skills needed to manage the association, and
this was exacerbated by the fact that it was not fully informed about some key issues. This was an
extremely dangerous combination, and meant that there was inadequate control over the
executive. Neon got itself into a position which was not tenable in either a financial or regulatory
sense.
There was a particular lack of financial skills and expertise on the Board, and a consequent failure
to appreciate the wholesale lack of financial performance and management. The Board did not
control the financial risks that it was taking. The Board was not challenging the executive. There
are strong similarities to Ujima here.
The appointments to the Board were crucial to steering this along the tracks, since the lack of
skills on the Board beforehand was one of the key causes of Neon’s situation. The departures of
the Chief Executive and Chair were also critical.
An interesting move made by Neon early on was to appoint two new board members, and this
seems to have been an attempt to head off the regulator’s possible regulatory action. However it
was an ill-conceived, rather knee-jerk reaction which had the opposite effect, causing the
regulator to have additional concerns. It seemed to characterise the rather peremptory way in
which Neon went about things, without giving enough thought to its actions.
The period spanned by this case study is incredibly short, and shows what can be done when
needs must. From entering into intensive regulatory engagement to completion of the merger
took less than a year, and from choice of preferred partner to completion of merger took less than
Page 52
With the Benefit of Hindsight
four-and-a-half months, including all necessary consents. Once it was clear that rapid and drastic
action was needed, all the stakeholders involved, including lenders, moved quickly and
cooperatively to achieve it.
The situation in this case study, like many of the others, was made much worse by the global
economic crisis. Had the situation arisen a few years earlier, Neon might have been able to
manage its way out of it by means of higher land values and readier asset sales. However the
economic crisis was not the cause of the problem, but just one of the circumstances surrounding
it.
Conclusions
Whilst this is a prime example of just how quickly things can be done, the question remains as to
whether the regulator should have acted earlier. Neon was clearly on the radar much earlier, and
with hindsight there were perhaps enough warning signs which meant it should have been
escalated through the internal case management system before it became an outright crisis.
Nevertheless once the crisis did materialise, the regulator was very proactive in addressing it and
achieved a very satisfactory outcome.
The regulator also took steps behind the scenes to put in place a rescue merger, should it have
been needed. In the event Neon managed the process of selecting a partner itself. Nevertheless
the regulator did a good job in developing a Plan B, not just for the benefit of Neon but for the
sector as a whole.
For associations, the lessons are once again about having the skills and expertise on the Board
that enable the Board to make constructive challenge, ask the right questions and ensure that
actions are seen through once begun.
Page 53
With the Benefit of Hindsight
Chapter 10: Osmium Community Housing and the
‘soap opera of shenanigans’
Background
Osmium is a small locally based association.
Timeline
Year 1
Month 1
There has been a history of problems within Osmium, including whistle-blowing
allegations about maintenance and lettings. Osmium is in regular contact with the
regulator. The Board responds by initiating various reviews and audits, which
although generally finding the allegations not to be true, do highlight poor controls
and poor practice, particularly in maintenance. The regulator holds an internal case
review which notes that:
 Osmium has been without a Chief Executive for around eight months, since the
Board dismissed the previous Chief Executive
 There have been complaints about the Chair
 There has been a series of internal and special audits with limited assurance and
showing lack of internal controls
The regulator decides to put Osmium in intensive regulatory engagement, and
repeats previous advice to the Board that it needs to be strengthened. The Board
approaches various consultants for assistance.
Month 4
A new Chief Executive takes up post. Two former board members are brought back
onto the Board. Another potential member is invited as an observer for six months.
A governance review is in progress which includes recruitment of further
independent members.
Month 6
An action plan is to be developed which brings together the actions from the various
audits and investigations, and a consultant is brought in to manage this process.
Month 11
Following the governance review, the Board agrees to adopt the NHF Code of
Governance, and adopt a retirement plan which would make it compliant with the
‘nine-year rule’ within two years. Three new members are recruited to join
Osmium’s board, but are required to join as observers for six months. The
consultant’s report is due on the action plan, but has been delayed due to the
absence of the Chair.
Month 12
There is evidence that the Board is wasting time on trivial issues and not prioritising
key concerns. A paper by the Chief Executive due to go to the Board as a preliminary
to restructuring is ‘pulled’ by the Chair without good reason.
A consultant’s report is also scheduled for this meeting but is also not discussed,
apparently because a former board member has made a complaint about the
consultant.
The board meeting does not finish all the business on the agenda and a further ad
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With the Benefit of Hindsight
hoc meeting is called for three weeks later. This second meeting lasts nearly threeand-a-half hours but still does not complete all the business. It is suggested at the
meeting that the Chair should stand down in the best interests of the association,
but this is rejected.
It becomes apparent that the relationship between the Chair and Chief Executive
has broken down. The Chief Executive indicates he may not be able to carry on for
much longer. There is a risk he will leave the organisation, leaving it again leaderless
Year 2
Month 1
Month 2
The consultant’s report highlights governance weaknesses as well as personnel and
procedural problems. One of the observers drops out because of concerns about
how the Board operates, one observer is not accepted into full membership for
reasons which are unclear, and an existing board member resigns. The core of the
Board is now six members all with between 12-23 years on the Board (although two
have a break in service), two other independent members and two observers.
Osmium responds neither to the membership situation nor to the consultant’s
report. The regulator writes to Osmium setting out deadlines for actions and setting
out expectations. In relation to board membership, the regulator points out that
after 20 months of trying to recruit new members, only two genuinely new
members have actually joined, and that the six-month observer status is hindering
the process. Meeting the retirement plan looks unlikely. Other issues raised include:
 Osmium is still without a settled senior management team, and that this is
impacting on service delivery
 The audit committee has only met twice in the last year and is not making a
valuable contribution to assurance or risk control
 Management accounts are not being regularly monitored
 There has been no individual or collective board assessment in the prior year
The letter makes clear that regulatory enforcement action will follow if Osmium’s
responses are not deemed appropriate.
Month 3
Another three members are recruited and are expected to join the Board
straightaway. The Chair agrees to stand down at the next AGM. Osmium commits to
dealing with all the outstanding actions over the next couple of months.
Month 6
Osmium completes a new business plan which provides the focus for a programme
of reform to address the remaining weaknesses. A restructuring of the organisation
is also under way, an essential element of which is reorganisation of the
maintenance function.
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With the Benefit of Hindsight
Month 8
Externally facilitated recruitment of a replacement Chair is in hand, ahead of the
AGM.
The regulator and Osmium’s Chief Executive meet and agree that progress is being
made. The key governance issues are moving forward and the board papers indicate
that the Board is getting the necessary information to exercise proper oversight of
the business.
The regulator confirms that Osmium is now meeting the regulator’s standards in
relation to viability and governance.
Month 9
Progress continues to be made, and the regulator removes Osmium’s intensive
regulatory engagement status .
Analysis
Osmium ended up in intensive regulatory engagement as a result of what the regulator’s
documentation describes as a “soap opera of board shenanigans”, and a complete breakdown of
relations between the Board and the Chief Executive. The regulator’s eventual threat of
enforcement action did force through changes at board level, and other problem areas improved
rapidly as a result.
At the heart of this case study is a board which has been in place for too long, without a clear idea
of what good governance looks like, and without fresh ideas and thinking being brought in from
outside. The regulator’s description of this as a “soap opera” seems particularly appropriate.
There were long standing failures of governance and management which had not been tackled.
The Board is insular and lacks understanding of its governance role to the extent that it failed to
monitor services provided to tenants and to assure itself about controls and risk.
The lack of board turnover and renewal was a key factor in the poor governance at Osmium. The
core board membership – those with the very long service – effectively impeded progress, even
though this did not appear to be a deliberate strategy. The lack of turnover meant that the Board
could comfortably keep repeating mistakes it had made previously – board recruitment,
relationship with the executive, unresolved personnel issues, unmonitored services – in a form of
collective group think. Often where there are very longstanding boards, the problem is that a cosy
relationship builds up between executives and non-executives, with a lack of challenge. Here the
opposite happened – not so much lack of challenge as simply creating bad feeling and preventing
executives from getting on with their jobs.
Osmium adopted the NHF Code of Governance part way through this case study. But although it
adopted it in theory, there was little evidence of any changes in practices to achieve compliance.
The Board had not made effective arrangements to review governance and to appraise its own
performance, nor to review recruitment practice. Its requirement for a six-month observation
period not only hindered recruitment of new members in the sense of causing delay, it also
created a situation where observers who did not like what they observed could decide not to go
ahead, without feeling the commitment to stay and resolve problems which might have
influenced them had they been full members.
The regulator finally lost patience with Osmium. It was not until the threat of formal action that
Osmium did take steps to bring new members in straight away, and for the Chair to agree to step
down; from then on things did improve.
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Conclusions
This case is another where the lack of board renewal is the underlying cause of the problems
which arose. Effective governance policies and practices are essential underpinning, and were
absent. The absence of policies on membership, terms of office, succession and recruitment, and
the lack of an effective system of board and individual member appraisal allowed a highly
unsatisfactory situation to simply roll on, unchecked. The regulator’s eventual loss of patience
should probably have happened earlier. While this is understandable, the prompt response to the
threat demonstrated that taking earlier action would probably have resulted in earlier resolution.
It was not necessary to go all the way to formal action, a sharper reminder proved to be enough.
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With the Benefit of Hindsight
Chapter 11: Zirconium Housing - risk and subsidiaries
Zirconium is a small association, which has set up a number of subsidiaries carrying out
community based activities. Serious concerns arise about financial viability which are in some
considerable part due to the losses made by the subsidiaries. There is an evident lack of financial
control and risk management. The Board accepts the need for change and sets about it with some
vigour. Changes in board and management team accelerate this still further, but investigations
also bring to light other problems.
Timeline
Year 1
Month 1
Concerns about governance arise when it becomes clear that Zirconium is not
operating an effective risk management framework, particularly in relation to its
business expansion. In addition Zirconium is not offering tenants sufficient
opportunity to influence group strategy and direction.
Further concerns arise about financial viability. Deficits incurred by subsidiaries lead
to a cash flow crisis and a consequent loan covenant breach. There is evidence that
financial management and internal controls are not operating effectively. The
regulator downgrades viability and governance, and asks for weekly cash flow
statements.
The Board accepts the need for change, and takes rapid action to alleviate cash flow
exposure and renegotiate loan facilities. Zirconium begins a strategic review and
develops a governance improvement plan. The regulator considers the actions taken
give it comfort and that there is no need to take further formal regulatory action,
although Zirconium is under intensive regulatory engagement.
Month 4
The investigations by the Board are highlighting previously unidentified
performance concerns, and these are creating further pressure on resources.
Month 5
The Chair and four other longstanding members stand down. New members are
recruited. A new Chair of Audit is appointed.
Month 6
A new business plan is developed. The strategy is to reduce in size and focus on
housing. Zirconium decides to close down a commercial subsidiary immediately, and
starts to take steps to divest itself of two other subsidiaries. A group cost
improvement plan is agreed, including overhead reduction.
Month 9
The cost improvement plan is in progress. The two subsidiaries leave the group. The
Chief Executive leaves Zirconium.
Month 10
A new Chief Executive and new Finance Director start in post.
Zirconium adopts the NHF code of governance starts works to implement this,
prioritising frameworks for risk management and controls. A tenant engagement
strategy is developed and a tenant member is co-opted onto the Board.
Year 2
Month 2
Work on the accounts indicates that the loss for the previous year is likely to be
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With the Benefit of Hindsight
significantly higher than expected. It becomes apparent that Zirconium has not
achieved target rents and has not applied for an extension or exemption.
Month 3-4 Work continues to complete the governance improvement programme and restore
financial stability.
Month 5
Various positive steps forward are taken:
 A commercial tenant is found for an office surplus to requirements, thus
reducing risk
 A longstanding employment dispute is settled in relation to one of the former
subsidiaries
 Treasury advice is taken in relation to loans due to be re-financed shortly
 Application is made for an extension to rent convergence
Month 7
Zirconium successfully concludes funding negotiations, and loans are available that
will provide certainty of funding for at least the next five years.
The regulator upgrades viability. Zirconium is removed from intensive regulatory
engagement.
Month 9
The regulator comments in its published judgement returning the provider to a
compliant rating that throughout a difficult period, the Board has shown
commitment and leadership.
Analysis
At the beginning of the case study, the Board seems to have lost its way. Subsequent events
demonstrate that the Board had not been exercising its risk management functions effectively,
and was not sufficiently focused on internal controls and assurance. The business had expanded
into a number of areas peripheral to housing which proved to be loss making, but the Board’s
financial management was not effective either in foreseeing this or taking appropriate action
when it occurred.
Zirconium’s organisational structure was complex and this placed too much strain on the
association’s relatively small resources. Reducing the number of subsidiaries was important to
ease both the financial and administrative burden, and allowed Zirconium to improve its cash
position. Zirconium has continued to slim down the structure even further.
Zirconium’s board had a number of longstanding members which was a contributory factor. The
situation at the beginning, and the problems which subsequently became apparent, are all
indicative of a board which did not sufficiently question or challenge the information put to it by
the executive. This is a typical feature of boards and executive teams which have worked together
for too long without sufficient changes in the personnel involved to shift the dynamics of the
relationship.
Although the Board reacted promptly to the initial contact from the regulator, momentum really
built up after the changes to the Board. The updated board consisted of 12 members, of whom
five (including the Chair) were new. There was a significant reduction in the average length of
time which board members had served, and at the same time the introduction of new skills and
experience. Members were able to challenge some of the thinking and practices which had
prevailed for a very long time.
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With the Benefit of Hindsight
On a positive note, Zirconium demonstrates that things can deteriorate to a really quite poor
position, but yet be turned around quite quickly without the need for statutory appointments and
enforcement action. Once the regulator gave Zirconium a sharp spur, it set off with a will and was
able to make the necessary changes themselves with only minimal intervention. The key to this
was the new Chair and executive team, who demonstrated an open and constructive approach to
Zirconium’s relationship with the regulator. As a result the regulator was content to allow
Zirconium the time and space it needed to make the changes. Both Zirconium and the regulator
deserve credit for this.
Conclusions
Once again we see the importance of having effective governance practices which allow the Board
to exercise proper oversight and control. Here there were deficiencies in risk management and in
internal controls and assurance, which frequently go hand in hand. It took a third party to point
the deficiencies out to Zirconium – it should have been able to find it out for themselves if it had
the Board had appropriate models for risk and assurance, and system for assessing whether it was
adhering to the models.
Allied to this is the importance of board renewal. The NHF Code of Governance provides the basis
for developing an appropriate policy using the nine-year rule as a starting point. This did not
happen here because Zirconium only adopted the Code as part of its response to the problems. As
with the risk and assurance, a more proactive approach to governance might have prevented the
problems.
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With the Benefit of Hindsight
Chapter 12: Strontium Housing Company and its long
troubled history
Background
Strontium is an organisation which since its foundation has had difficulties in meeting its business
plan. It has struggled with viability issues and has been subject to regulatory action in the past. It
is placed in intensive regulatory engagement again with a range of issues across the whole
spectrum of finance, governance and management of the association.
Timeline
Year 1
Month 1
Month 10
Year 3
Month 7
Strontium is placed in intensive regulatory engagement because of its failures to
meet its business plan and viability concerns.
An Audit Commission inspection awards zero stars, with uncertain prospects for
improvement.
A further Audit Commission inspection awards 1 star, with excellent prospects for
improvement.
Month 8
The regulator raises concerns about financial viability, the main issues being
continuing failure to achieve business plan targets, particularly in two key areas of
asset sales and costs of estate renewals. The Decent Homes position is
unsatisfactory.
Month 10
A new CEO starts.
Year 4
Month 5
Problems come to light in relation to procurement. Strontium’s Chair resigns
because of loss of confidence from the Board. A governance review commissioned,
and the brief is agreed with the regulator. Two new directors start.
Month 6
A new chair starts – a former appointee of the regulator, recently co-opted back
again.
Month 7
A new Company Secretary starts, and leaves again within 5 weeks.
Months 8 Five board members resign in period of two months, two apparently because of
&9
concerns about internal controls and loss of confidence in the association.
Strontium is having difficulty in holding quorate meetings.
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With the Benefit of Hindsight
Month 9
The regulator has continuing concerns about viability, which are essentially
unchanged since the previous year. The regulator notes past financial performance
against previous business plans has been poor, and that Strontium has key
challenges over the short to medium term to ensure its viability:
 Maintaining financial performance within the agreed business plan parameters,
with the potential to breach covenants if not achieved
 Delivering the accelerated DHS programme within the resources identified
 An apparent absence of contingency plans which can be readily realised
Month 10
Following recruitment, the Board is back up to adequate numbers. The regulator
holds an internal case review. It has concerns relating to viability, and to governance
and management:
 The Board does not have the skills or structure required to govern the
association
 A number of allegations have been made, from a variety of sources
 Relationships with unions are deteriorating and staff morale is low
 Relationships with the local authority are deteriorating
 There are service delivery failures
 The AC action plan is not completed; among the key actions still outstanding is
the customer care strategy
The regulator concludes that Strontium’s board does not have sufficient strength to
give proper consideration to the organisation’s strategic future. However it decides
to defer a decision about making statutory appointees until after the Board’s
imminent away day, which is to consider the governance review.
On the day of the board away day, further allegations are received by Strontium’s
Chair. Strontium takes urgent legal advice. The away day proceeds and the Board
decides it does not have an independent future and that it will look for a merger,
preferably with a locally based partner.
Month 11
Further allegations are made. An independent external investigation into all the
allegations is commissioned. The regulator considers that in order to execute its
intention to find a merger partner, it will need additional strength on its board.
Accordingly, Strontium is put into intensive regulatory engagement and
appointments are made to the Board. The regulator’s expectations of Strontium are
to:
 Develop an action plan for delivery of the partnership decision
 Implement a strategy for satisfactory governance and management of the
company, including control over financial affairs
 Complete the investigation into the various allegations
 Complete the inspection action plan
Month 12
The regulator attends a board meeting to outline its expectations and introduce the
appointees. Two executives leave the organisation. Strontium appoints experienced
interim staff to cover.
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With the Benefit of Hindsight
Year 5
Month 1
Consultants are appointed to assist Strontium with the process of finding a partner.
Month 3
Strontium receives a substantial number of expressions of interest from other
providers. The Board agrees its selection criteria and after preliminary submissions,
agrees a shortlist of three.
Month 6
Strontium selects its preferred partner, and due diligence begins. A key issue
emerges as to whether the partnership arrangements will be a ‘material event’
triggering a loan book re-pricing. Lenders appear to be taking a tough line.
Month 9
Negotiations with lenders continue.
Month 12
An in-principle deal is agreed with lenders, and preparation of final loan documents
commences.
Year 6
Month 3
Lenders belatedly seek to widen the loan agreement to include terms relating to
possible future mergers and transfer relating to the parent as well as Strontium;
Strontium and the preferred partner resist. The preferred partner is increasingly
uncomfortable about the lenders situation and wants a strong focus on a date for
resolution.
In operational terms the two providers are now working together very closely.
Central services are being supported by the parent designate and progress on
integration is moving ahead.
Month 5
Negotiations with the lender reach a satisfactory conclusion.
Month 6
Progress is made on the service improvement action as a result of the joint
operational working. The regulator:
 Gives consent to the rule changes necessary for the merger
 Stands down the statutory appointees
 Removes Strontium from intensive regulatory engagement
Analysis
The history of problems and the wide range of issues currently facing the associations meant that
the only realistic way forward was merger with another association.
The rapid turnover of senior staff was destabilising for the organisation. This was combined with
what appeared to be an unhealthy organisational culture from the top, and would have made it
difficult for staff especially at middle management level to operate in an effective way.
There was also a very rapid turnover of board members, and there were no contingency plans for
dealing with a sudden exodus of members. The Board needed to recruit quickly, and the new
membership did not have the skills and expertise required to operate effectively.
For both executive and non-executive teams, the rapid turnover meant a loss of knowledge about
the organisation as well as a lack of continuity.
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The number of changes to key personnel and sheer range of issues needing to be addressed gives
the impression of an organisation in almost perpetual turmoil. The situation was just too multifaceted for Strontium to resolve on its own. The appointees were crucial to the resolution of this
case. Not only did they bring some stability, they brought skills and experience which were
essential to decision making in relation to taking the merger forward.
An interesting situation arose near the end of this case study, when operational integration got
rather ahead of the legal formalities. This was a potentially dangerous situation. If the loan
negotiations had not reached a successful conclusion – and they had been dragging on for months
– it might have proved quite difficult for both merger partners to unpick.
Conclusions
Strontium existed for less than 10 years, with two extended periods of intensive regulatory
engagement. Throughout most of this time tenants got a sub-standard service. Once an
association has been removed from intensive regulatory engagement, there is understandable
reluctance to put it back. On this occasion, perhaps with hindsight it should not have been taken
out of intensive regulatory engagement in the first place.
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With the Benefit of Hindsight
Chapter 13: Erbium Housing, Nickel Group & Antimony
Homes - Chief Executive pay and severance packages
From the early 2000s increasing media attention has been given to public sector pay, both the size
of salaries, and also pay offs to departing executives. A brief search of Inside Housing reveals
regular negative articles regarding the size of pay offs for housing association executives and the
so-called ‘reward for failure’. The MP expenses scandals and the ongoing rows over bankers’
bonuses have ensured a continuing climate of hostility towards bonuses and pay offs, even in
circumstances where pay-offs may objectively seem justifiable.
The press’s inclination to manipulate the figures to make the facts appear much worse than the
reality has meant that even more attention needs to be paid to public relations aspects of how
payments may appear to the public – and, for housing associations, how they may appear to
tenants.
We set out here three case studies, all illustrating how associations got it wrong in determining a
pay-off to a departing Chief Executive. Each had significant consequences for the association
concerned, and all were avoidable.
Erbium Housing Association
Erbium had a history of strong organic growth. Looking to raise significant finance for a
regeneration project, it sought and found a larger association as a merger partner. One of the
consequences of this merger was that Erbium’s Chief Executive would leave post-merger. The
Board delegated dealing with a severance package to a sub-committee.
The sub-committee considered a paper regarding the package, at short notice. A paper was
circulated the day before the meeting, and then substantive changes made on the day itself. Both
versions contained significant inaccuracies. Initial legal advice, obtained on the day of the
meeting, was not circulated to members nor was it discussed at the meeting. The sub-committee
agreed the package in principle. The minutes were submitted to the next full board meeting but
rejected, so the substantive matter was not discussed. The legal advice urged Erbium to discuss
the package with the regulator. This was not followed up.
The matter was discussed again at the next board meeting, on the basis of the sub-committee
minutes. The Board agreed a substantial payment. The settlement agreement was drawn up using
different solicitors, who were not asked to give advice, just to draw up the agreement.
Some weeks later Erbium asked the first solicitors to give advice as to whether the payments
already made were contractual. Despite the narrow brief, the solicitors’ advice contained a
number of wider warnings. It drew attention to several matters of concern, and made reference
to the regulatory and reputational position. This advice was circulated by email to all board
members but elicited no further discussion or response.
When the regulator became aware of it, they were indeed interested in the settlement. Erbium
engaged consultants to carry out an investigatory review. The review concluded that:
 A substantial part of the settlement was not contractual;
 The Board gave so much weight to expediency and the commercial aspects of its decisions
that it failed to properly consider its wider role as a housing association and charity, including
regulatory and reputational considerations;
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With the Benefit of Hindsight
 Use of advisers was not appropriate. Advice was not taken at the appropriate times and the
brief given was too narrow; the Board then ignored key warnings flagged up in the advice;
 the Board placed too much trust in the limited information it was given;
 The Board was not on top of its key role in determining executive pay and conditions;
 The administration of governance fell short – notice of meetings, supporting papers, minutes,
board approval of committee actions.
The regulator concluded that the Board had not exercised adequate control or fully assessed the
risks associated with the level of the payments it agreed. It downgraded Erbium’s governance to a
non-compliant grade. Erbium entered into a voluntary undertaking, under which it would:




Review board membership and succession planning;
Take legal advice on whether board members had acted in breach of charitable law;
Review governance administration; and
Take further specialist and legal advice on executive remuneration and other HR related
matters.
The entire board of Erbium resigned. Once the various actions were complete and a new Board
and Chair in place, the regulator gave consent to the merger. The regulatory judgement lapsed as
it was no longer relevant after the merger had taken place.
Nickel Group
The longstanding Chief Executive of the Nickel Group of associations decided to retire and gave in
his notice. A couple of weeks later, the Board held a confidential meeting immediately prior to the
start of the scheduled board meeting to approve the payments to be made to him. No supporting
papers were presented, and members were unaware that the item was for discussion until just
before the meeting. The Chair set out verbally what the terms of the contract were and what the
CE’s entitlement would be.
The contractual terms included 12 months’ notice or pay in lieu and an additional 12 months’
termination payment. These terms had in fact been agreed by a sub-committee some years
previously, though this had not been referred to the Board. The Chair also proposed a significant
salary bonus.
The Chair advised that they had no choice regarding the first two items, so the Board moved on to
discuss the proposed bonus. One member raised whether it was appropriate as a not-for-profit
organisation and there was some discussion about potential adverse publicity. But the members
agreed to pay the bonus. The minute of the discussion was brief and records little of the debate.
Neither legal nor HR advice was sought before the board meeting which agreed the payments.
Extensive legal advice was sought by the Chair in the following two months, but no change was
made to the settlement terms despite warnings from the solicitors regarding the totality of the
package, and the likely regulatory and reputational impact. The Board only became aware of a
potential problem when the auditors queried the accounting treatment, and the regulator got to
know about it shortly thereafter.
The regulator asked Nickel to undertake an investigatory review, and Nickel gave a voluntary
undertaking to do so. The review’s findings regarding the payments were that:
 The notice period and the severance payments were contractual. However a contract with 12
months’ severance payment on top of 12 months’ notice was out of line even at the time it
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With the Benefit of Hindsight
was agreed. In effect it amounted to 24 months’ notice. If not unique, this was certainly rare.
The Board was remiss in agreeing to it at the time;
 The introduction of the 12 month payment triggered when the employee (rather than the
employer) gave notice when over 60 years of age was anomalous;
 Once the contractual terms became clear after the CE gave in his notice, the Board should
have taken issue over them;
 A bonus payment was a contractual term but the exercise of it was discretionary. The Board
was remiss in deciding to award a generous bonus on top of an already generous notice period
and severance.
The review also made the following general points which cover remarkably similar ground to
those in the case of Erbium:
 The Board had not discharged its key role of determining executive pay and conditions;
 There was a culture of complacency and lack of challenge. This was compounded by close
working relationships formed as a result of the long service of a number of board members;
 The Board had not kept itself up to date with either regulatory guidance or best practice;
 Use of advisers was not appropriate. Advice was not taken at the appropriate times, and not
actually considered by the Board
 The Board did not make an adequate assessment of the risk it was taking in agreeing the
payments;
 The administration of governance fell short – supporting papers, minutes, evidence trails,
terms of reference, board approval of committee actions.
Nickel accepted the findings of the review. The regulator downgraded Nickel’s governance rating,
albeit to a compliant grade. The Chair and several other board members resigned, including all bar
one of the sub-committee who agreed the original contractual terms. Six new members were
recruited, under new service agreements and with a new suite of governance policies and
procedures. The regulator monitored the new Board’s progress for a couple of months and then
upgraded Nickel’s to full compliance.
Antimony Homes
Antimony’s relationship with its Chief Executive of many years broke down, primarily over a
particular major project. The Board decided that the relationship had broken down irretrievably
and authorised a sub-committee to deal with negotiations for the CE’s departure. It was agreed
between Antimony and the CE that the departure would be publicly described as early retirement.
Antimony notified the regulator by telephone that the CE was taking early retirement. A few days
later the regulator received an email repeating that message, sent the same day as a press release
to the same effect. The departure and the package were discussed a few weeks later in a
telephone conversation between the Chair and the regulator. The precise content of the call was
not followed up in writing by either party. Whatever was said or was not said, the regulator
continued under the impression that the departure was properly speaking a retirement matter for
some months, and did not know the extent of the package until the draft annual accounts were
available.
At that stage the regulator took the view that Antimony had not been open, neither with the
detail of the CE’s departure, nor the financial settlement which Antimony had agreed. The
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With the Benefit of Hindsight
regulator asked Antimony to undertake an investigatory review, and Antimony gave a voluntary
undertaking to do so. The review cleared Antimony of deliberately trying to mislead the regulator
but was critical of its lack of transparency in the dealings with the regulator. The review concluded
that:
 The Board was unaware of the custom and practice within the housing sector, and the use of
informal channels of communication during such sensitive episodes to keep the regulator
openly informed and “on side”
 The negotiations with the departing CE in respect of the package were conducted responsibly,
although not faultlessly. The sum paid complied with Schedule 1, and although high, was
considered by legal advisers to be less that the possible cost of defending and settling a claim.
As a result of the review’s findings:
 The regulator issued a regulatory judgement downgrading Antimony for governance
 Three board members resigned, including two of the sub-committee involved and
 The Chair indicated an intention to stand down at the next following AGM.
Lessons
Although the three cases are about pay-offs, there are common themes which emerge about
governance which are evident in other scenarios throughout our case studies:








The exercise of proper control
Adequate assessment of the risk involved in a course of action
Boards making appropriate inquiry and challenge to officers
The importance of board renewal to avoid complacency
Proper use of external advisers
Good governance administration and particularly keeping clear records
Transparency in relations with the regulator
Ensuring that terms of reference, policy, regulatory guidance etc. are in line with one another
and that practice reflects principle
 Once the regulator looks closely at one issue, it is often the trigger for looking at others.
The lessons specific to pay offs are:
 Ensure that executive contracts are regularly reviewed and terms re-negotiated if necessary
 Be mindful that contract terms which may appear to protect the organisation in some respects
– for example, long notice periods - can also operate to ratchet up payments to departing
executives
 When considering settlements, take legal advice early, from suitably experienced advisers and
with an appropriately wide brief
 Consult with the regulator as soon as possible, certainly before agreeing settlement terms
 Be open with the regulator about the reasons for the departure
 Consider the totality of the payment as well as the constituent parts
 Consider the regulatory and reputational impact of the Board’s decision
 Ensure that even if a sub-committee handles the preliminaries and the detail, the whole board
makes the final decision with full knowledge of the situation.
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With the Benefit of Hindsight
Chapter 14: Caesium Support - the contract culture &
its risks
Background
Caesium operates nationally and provides supported housing. Caesium is small; its turnover is
only around £15m pa, with the bulk of its income coming from support contracts. In the year
before this study begins it had made an overall deficit of £1.8m due to restructuring and a surge in
repair costs, and in the year before that it also made an operating deficit of £0.7m. This is in
contrast to previous years when it produced operating and overall surpluses. At the start of this
case study Caesium had a compliant viability rating. Its last two Audit Management Letters have
raised controls issues, which have not been addressed.
Timeline
Year 1
Month 1
Caesium advises the regulator that the management accounts are projecting a deficit
for the year of approaching £1m, in variance to a projected surplus of a similar
amount. Given its small size, this is potentially serious. It will reduce revenue reserves
to only £2.6m. Caesium puts together an action plan which includes an external
investigation into the shortfall, measures to strengthen internal controls and a review
of the budget for the year just started. At the present time Caesium believes the
variance is due to shortfalls in Supporting People (SP) income.
The regulator asks for the external investigation brief to be widened. It is concerned
that the management accounts did show significant variances some six months
previously and this was not picked up by the Board.
Month 3
The external investigation outcome is presented to Caesium’s board. Key findings are:
 Budgeting and internal control failures – a 'systemic failure'
 Governance – weaknesses are found arising from its structure, reporting
practices and missed opportunities to question financial performance
 A failure of leadership and management, particularly within the finance
function
 Weaknesses are highlighted both within the finance team and in its
relationship with Caesium’s operational teams
The review notes that the AMLs for the last two years have referred to the need to
centralise SP contracts, but this action is still outstanding. This is not just a matter of
document housekeeping but an important tool for the proper management and
review of the contracts and of income.
Caesium puts together a recovery plan. The Finance Director leaves the organisation.
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With the Benefit of Hindsight
Month 4
Caesium starts to send weekly cash flows to the regulator. The regulator is concerned
that solvency issues threaten the medium and long term viability of Caesium. The
Board approves a revised budget for the year in progress but asks the executive to
seek a further £0.5m of savings.
Month 5
The projected deficit for the year recently ended has increased to nearer £2m, and
one lender’s covenant has been breached. Caesium and its consultants meet with the
lender. Although the lender is broadly supportive, the breach is waived only on
agreement to revised commercial terms.
The current AML is in draft. It notes that considerable information is still awaited by
the auditors and that the lack of, and inaccuracy of, information and record keeping is
such that the auditors are considering giving a qualified audit opinion. The auditor is
not yet able to provide a view on ‘going concern’ as the levels of expenditure
reported are not sustainable going forward. The auditors consider that management
accounts presented to the Board were not prepared on a ‘reasonable basis'. The draft
statement of internal controls refers to a ‘severe breakdown’ in the effectiveness of
internal controls in a number of areas.
The consultants who helped Caesium to put together the current year’s budget are
still of the view that Caesium can achieve it, albeit with very firm cost control. At the
end of the first quarter Caesium has a small positive variance. Nevertheless the
Board, consultants and the auditors remain concerned because of the long history of
poor control and poor record keeping.
The regulator holds an internal case review. It decides against intensive regulatory
engagement for the moment, primarily because the Board has been proactive in
dealing with the issues and is working in a very co-operative way with the regulator.
Five Board members step down and Caesium decides not to replace them, so as to
keep numbers down as recommended by consultants. Caesium does however
appoint one new independent member with experience of change management and
turnaround.
Month 6
Following the provision of further information, the auditors feel able to sign off the
accounts on a going concern basis and without qualification.
The Board considers an options paper by its consultants. Its options are constrained
by its heavy reliance on SP income and lack of opportunity for diversification. Future
success as an independent organisation will depend on very tight financial controls,
and first class skills in contract negotiation, management and monitoring, not areas in
which Caesium has excelled in the past. The Board decides that the best way forward
is to seek a merger partner. It starts the process of partner selection.
Month
11
Following an initial long list selection and then short listing with detailed proposals,
presentations and interviews, the Board decides on its preferred partner, a national
association with a strong focus on special needs.
Month
12
Due diligence begins, and the process of obtaining consents.
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With the Benefit of Hindsight
Year 2
Month 3
The merger becomes effective.
Analysis
Caesium was in a specialist sector undergoing rapid political change, with a number of specific
risks including serious threats to future income streams. Caesium did not have an approach to risk
which allowed it to identify or foresee the risks, and to develop appropriate strategies for
addressing them.
Problems had been evident for at least a couple of years prior to the events outlined above. It was
clear that Caesium’s executive management and leadership were weak, particularly in relation to
finance, and there was no culture of control. The Board had not challenged the executive and had
not been proactive in ensuring that once problems were identified, the resultant remedial actions
were followed through.
The Board was large, indeed overly large, and needed to be slimmed down to become a more
effective decision making body. It did include a number of people who appeared to have relevant
skills and experience which should have enabled appropriate challenge. We would speculate that as has been our experience with other specialist associations – the Board was very much focused
on the client groups and the quality of the services provided to them, to the detriment of the
practical aspects of running a business.
Although the Board was slow to pick up and deal with the problems, so was the regulator.
Problems were known but Caesium rather slipped below the regulatory radar for more than a
year. Once the regulator did engage with Caesium, its approach was both effective and
proportionate. But by then the outcome was almost a foregone conclusion.
Caesium lost its independence as a result of cumulative failings which lead to a situation from
which there was no realistic comeback. Had firmer action been taken earlier, independence might
have been maintained, but by the time the severity of the situation was realised it was already
really too late. Even then, Caesium might have been able to struggle on alone, but it would have
been a hand to mouth existence and unlikely to have been in the best interests of its customers.
The Board was right to make the decision that it did.
Conclusions
For associations the lessons are once again about the Board focusing on the business, ensuring
that control is maintained and that the organisational culture supports an environment of controls
assurance and risk management. Over time, a lack of appropriate challenge at board level is likely
to foster a similar environment amongst the staff group, with potentially very serious outcomes.
A positive message for associations, also in common with other case studies, is that positive and
proactive engagement with the regulator often means that the regulator decides not take
regulatory action to the next formal level. This is important for a number of reasons, not least that
it may avoid a situation where a ‘material event’ clause in its loan agreements automatically
triggers a default.
Turning to the regulator, there were undoubtedly other larger and more immediately serious
regulatory problems which needed to be managed but the regulator needs to be proactive in
keeping a closer watching brief on the smaller associations with known problems, particularly
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With the Benefit of Hindsight
where the type of problem combined with the size of the organisation leaves so little margin for
error.
Page 72
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Publication date: June 2015