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MOTIVATION MATTERS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS AND REFUTATION OF
EVOLUTIONARY ARGUMENTS FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL ALTRUISM
Fred Curry
A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate College of Bowling Green
State University in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
May 2007
Committee:
Michael Bradie, Advisor
Thomas Wymer
Graduate Faculty Representative
David Sobel
Sarah Worley
© 2007
Fredrick Curry
All Rights Reserved
iii
ABSTRACT
Dr. Michael Bradie, Advisor
The origin of altruistic behavior has long been a puzzle for evolutionary biologists,
beginning with Darwin. Although group selection was first favored to explain cooperative and
altruistic behaviors, the forces of individual selection came to be seen as far more prevalent,
powerful, and responsive to change. The theory of group selection was replaced by other
explanations for altruistic behavior such as kin selection (inclusive fitness theory) and game
theory. Recently, however, group selection has been regaining credibility in evolutionary
biology. This resurgence is largely due to the work of two of the most prominent proponents of
group selection David Sloan Wilson, a biologist, and Eliot Sober, a philosopher of science, who
believe evolutionary arguments not only explain the origin of altruistic behaviors but also help
resolve the psychological egoism versus altruism debate by providing evidence that natural
selection favors altruistic motivations (psychological altruism).
While there is no necessary link between the existence of group selection and altruistic
motivation, if Sober and Wilson are right that group selection pressures are nearly ubiquitous for
social organisms, this additional selection pressure would mean that cooperative strategies,
including true altruism, would be beneficial more often than under a scenario that only includes
selection at the individual level. Their argument rests on two evolutionary principles: the
direct/indirect asymmetry principle, which posits a mechanism that triggers a fitness-enhancing
response by directly detecting a fitness-relevant situation, and the two are better than one
argument, which posits that an organism that has multiple mechanisms that serve the same
function has a fitness advantage over an organism that has only one of these mechanisms.
iv
While both of these principles are valid, the evolutionary arguments that incorporate
them are flawed and the evolutionary arguments arising from them should instead lead to the
conclusion that psychological altruism is improbable. Psychological hedonism is a more likely
trigger for the most fitness-enhancing degree of behavioral altruism had the chance to become
firmly entrenched before psychological altruism could have ever even made an appearance.
v
To my late mother who would have been proud.
vi
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to give a special thanks to the following people: Dr. Michael Bradie, Dr.
David Sobel, and Dr. Sara Worley who were always willing to share their valuable time and
opinions with me. I am especially grateful to Dr. Bradie who petitioned the school for extra
funding when my eye disease set my work back a year. My father Fred Curry senior, my brother
Daniel Curry, and my grandmother Alberta Curry also very much deserve my gratitude for their
emotional and, on occasion, financial support. I would also like to thank Jill Olthouse, who was a
bottomless fount of emotional support and encouragement when times got tough.
Finally I would be remiss if I didn‘t also thank that fine drug caffeine and all the late
night pizza delivery persons of Bowling Green Ohio.
vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................................ ii
LIST OF FIGURES ..................................................................................................................... xiii
MOTIVATION MATTERS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS AND REFUTATION OF
EVOLUTIONARY ARGUMENTS FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL ALTRUISM................... 1
Overview ..................................................................................................................................... 1
CHAPTER I: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EGOISM VS. ALTRUISM DEBATE AND
HISTORICAL ATTEMPTS TO RESOLVE IT ................................................................. 4
1_1 The Philosophical Arguments Concerning Psychological Egoism/Altruism ...................... 7
1_1.1 The Butler‘s Stone Argument against Hedonism ............................................................. 8
1_1.2 The Paradox of Hedonism .......................................................................................... 18
1_1.3 Nozick‘s Experience Machine .................................................................................... 21
1_1.3.1 The real reason why the experience machine argument fails. ............................. 29
1_2 The State of the Egoism/Altruism Debate in Light of
Empirical Psychological Studies .................................................................................. 35
1_2.1 Problems Concerning Introspection ............................................................................ 36
1_2.2 Why the Law of Effect Fails as a Solution ................................................................. 38
1_2.3 Batson‘s Experiments ................................................................................................. 42
1_2.3.1 The Aversive-Arousal Reduction Hypothesis ..................................................... 44
1_2.3.2 The Empathy Specific Punishment Hypothesis ................................................... 48
1_2.3.3 The Empathy Specific Reward Hypothesis ......................................................... 50
1_2.3.4 ESR2: The Negative-State Relief Hypothesis ..................................................... 53
1_2.3.4 Batson Tests the Negative-State Relief Hypothesis (ESR2)................................ 57
viii
1_2.3. 5 Batson and the Empathetic Joy Hypothesis ........................................................ 61
1_2.3.6 Some Conclusions Regarding Batson‘s Work ..................................................... 68
1_3 Summary ............................................................................................................................ 72
CHAPTER II: EVOLUTIONARY ALTRUISM AND GROUP SELECTION:
HOW NATURAL SELECTION CAN FAVOR INDIVIDUAL SACRIFICE ................ 75
2_1 Two Different Concepts of Fitness .................................................................................... 81
2_2 Sober and Wilson‘s Definition of Evolutionary Altruism ................................................. 84
2_3 Group Selection and the Haystack Model ......................................................................... 87
2_4 Why Have Modern Biologists Been so Unreceptive to Group Selection? ........................ 94
2_5 Trait Groups and the Haystack Model without Haystacks ................................................ 99
2_5.1 More Ways in Which Trait Groups Improve the
Case for Group Selection ........................................................................................ 108
2_6 Real World Examples of Group Level Selection: ........................................................... 109
2_6.2 Artificial Group Selection for Egg Production ......................................................... 110
2_6.2 Examples of Group Selection Outside of the Lab..................................................... 111
2_7 How Have Biologists Explained Away Apparently Obvious Instances of
Altruism and Cooperation in the Natural World? ....................................................... 115
2_7.1 Kin Selection ............................................................................................................. 115
2_7.2 Evolutionary Game Theory and Reciprocal Altruism .............................................. 119
2_8 Applying Sober and Wilson‘s Multi Level Selection Theory to
Real Populations ......................................................................................................... 129
2_9 Summary .......................................................................................................................... 134
CHAPTER III: ADAPTATIONS THAT ENHANCE GROUP SELECTION .......................... 136
ix
3_1 Assortative Behavior........................................................................................................ 137
3_1.1 Wilson and Dugatkin‘s Simulations and the
Power of Assortative Behavior ............................................................................... 143
3_1.1.1 The problem of origination. ............................................................................... 147
3_1.1.2 What do guppies have to do with human beings?.............................................. 150
3_1.2 Recap......................................................................................................................... 153
3_2 Carrots, Sticks, and Altruism ........................................................................................... 154
3_2.1 Another Look at the Guppies .................................................................................... 158
3_2.2 How Punishment Amplifies Altruism ....................................................................... 160
3_2.2.1 Does Punishment Reduce Instances of True Altruism? ..................................... 163
3_2.3 Another Kind of Freeloader ...................................................................................... 168
3_3 Norm Enforcement in Human Societies: Sober and
Wilson‘s Survey of Human Cultures .......................................................................... 173
3_3.1 The Enforcement Costs of Social Norms .................................................................. 175
3_3.2 Cultural Norms that Help Maintain a Cooperation Friendly Environment .............. 179
3_4 Summary .......................................................................................................................... 183
CHAPTER IV: PROXIMATE MECHANISMS AND MOTIVATION .................................... 186
4_1 Adaptive Behaviors and the Mechanisms that Cause Them............................................ 187
4_2 Proximate and Ultimate Mechanisms .............................................................................. 189
4_3 Motives ............................................................................................................................ 192
4_4 Summary .......................................................................................................................... 195
x
CHAPTER V: STRONG AND WEAK THEORIES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL ALTRUISM,
AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EVOLUTIONARY AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL ALTRUISM .................................................................................. 197
5_1 More on Psychological Altruism and Psychological Egoism .......................................... 198
5_2 Strong and Weak Theories of Psychological Altruism .................................................... 201
5_3 Separating the Psychological and Evolutionary Concepts of
Altruism and Egoism .................................................................................................. 203
5_4 Partially Reconnecting the Psychological and Evolutionary
Concepts of Egoism and Altruism .............................................................................. 208
5_4.1 Fitness Benefits and Other Benefits: How They Relate to the Relevance of
Evolutionary Altruism in the Psychological Egoism/Altruism Debate .................. 211
5_4.1.1 What about Evolutionary Accidents? ................................................................ 215
5_5 The Relationship between Egoism, Hedonism, and Sober and Wilson‘s Evolutionary
Arguments for Psychological Altruism ...................................................................... 218
5_6 Summary .......................................................................................................................... 221
CHAPTER VI: EXPLANATION AND CRITICISM FOR SOBER AND WILSON‘S
ASYMMETRY BETWEEN DIRECT AND INDIRECT STRATEGIES
ARGUMENT FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL ALTRUISM ................................................ 223
6_1 The Evolutionary Framework for the Psychological Altruism/Egoism Debate .............. 224
6_2 Two Analogous Examples and Five Evolutionary Considerations ................................. 226
6_3 Two Evolutionary Principles ........................................................................................... 232
6_3.1 Direct/Indirect Asymmetry ....................................................................................... 232
6_4 Pluralism .......................................................................................................................... 235
xi
6_5 The Principle of Pre-Established Hedonism .................................................................... 236
6_6 Direct/Indirect Asymmetry as an Evolutionary Argument for
Psychological Altruism ............................................................................................... 255
6_7 Problems with the Direct/Indirect Asymmetry argument for
Psychological Altruism ............................................................................................... 258
6_7.1 Criticism 1: Hedonistic Motivation Can Correlate to optimal Parental Care Just as
well as Altruistic Motivation .................................................................................. 258
6_7.2 Criticism 2: The Parental Care Example is Not a True Instance of
Direct/Indirect Asymmetry ..................................................................................... 264
6_8 Potential Objections to these Criticisms .......................................................................... 268
6_8.1 Rebutting the Time Efficiency Argument................................................................. 269
6_8.1.1 The Brain is a Parallel Processor ....................................................................... 270
6_8.1.2 Sober and Wilson‘s Diagram Oversimplifies Altruistic Reactions. .................. 272
6_9 Summary .......................................................................................................................... 274
CHAPTER VII: THE ―TWO ARE BETTER THAN ONE‖ PRINCIPLE, AND WHERE IT
GOES WRONG AS AN ARGUMENT FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL ALTRUISM ......... 278
7_1 The Two are Better than One Principle ........................................................................... 280
7_2 The Two are Better than One Principle as an
Argument for Psychological Altruism ........................................................................ 282
7_3 Why the Two are Better than One Argument for
Psychological Altruism Fails ...................................................................................... 286
7_3.1 It is Doubtful that Psychologically Altruistic Mechanisms would Provide a
Fitness Benefit when Combined with Psychologically Hedonistic Mechanisms ... 287
xii
7_3.1.1 Computer simulation. ......................................................................................... 296
7_3.2 The Backup Mechanism Argument .......................................................................... 299
7_3.2.1 Why the thesis of free psychological software fails. ......................................... 305
7_3.2.2 Energetic efficiency ........................................................................................... 306
7_3.3 Why Should the Two are Better than One Principle
Favor Psychological Altruism? ............................................................................... 311
7_3.4 Multiply Connected Control Devices ....................................................................... 316
7_4 Summary .......................................................................................................................... 320
CHAPTER VIII: INDEPENDENT ARGUMENTS AGAINST PSYCHOLOGICAL
ALTRUISM AND CONCLUSION ................................................................................ 323
8_1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 323
8_1 Can Desires Exist without Associated Pleasures and Pains? ........................................... 323
8_1.1 More Implications of Having only Non-Conscious Altruistic Desires ..................... 333
8_2 Summary .......................................................................................................................... 337
BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................................................................................... 340
APPENDIX A ............................................................................................................................. 345
xiii
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1.1 .......................................................................................................................................26
Figure 1.2 .......................................................................................................................................46
Figure 1.3 .......................................................................................................................................49
Figure 1.4 .......................................................................................................................................52
Figure 2.1 .......................................................................................................................................92
Figure 2.2 .......................................................................................................................................93
Figure 2.3 .....................................................................................................................................105
Figure 2.4 .....................................................................................................................................106
Figure 2.5 .....................................................................................................................................107
Figure 2.6 .....................................................................................................................................107
Figure 2.7 .....................................................................................................................................120
Figure 4.1 .....................................................................................................................................191
Figure 5.1 .....................................................................................................................................205
Figure 5.2 .....................................................................................................................................215
Figure 6.1 .....................................................................................................................................233
Figure 6.2 .....................................................................................................................................257
Figure 6.3 .....................................................................................................................................271
Figure 6.4 .....................................................................................................................................272
Figure 7.1 .....................................................................................................................................288
Figure 7.2 .....................................................................................................................................289
Figure 7.3 .....................................................................................................................................291
Figure 7.4 .....................................................................................................................................293
xiv
Figure 7.5 .....................................................................................................................................293
Figure 7.6 .....................................................................................................................................294
Figure 7.7 .....................................................................................................................................296
Figure 7.8 .....................................................................................................................................296
Figure 7.9 .....................................................................................................................................319
Figure 8.1 .....................................................................................................................................335
1
MOTIVATION MATTERS:
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS AND REFUTATION OF EVOLUTIONARY ARGUMENTS
FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL ALTRUISM
Overview
The origin of altruistic behavior has long been a puzzle for evolutionary biologists,
beginning with Darwin. Although group selection was, at first, the favored way to explain
cooperative and altruistic behaviors, the forces of individual selection came to be seen as far
more prevalent, powerful, and responsive to change. The theory of group selection was replaced
by other explanations for altruistic behavior such as kin selection (inclusive fitness theory) and
game theory. Recently, however, group selection has been regaining credibility in evolutionary
biology.
This resurgence is largely due to the work of two of the most prominent proponents of
group selection David Sloan Wilson, a biologist, and Eliot Sober, a philosopher of science. More
interesting than their revival of group selection (now known as multi-level selection theory),
however, is the fact that Sober and Wilson believe that evolutionary arguments can not only
explain the origin of altruistic behaviors but can also help resolve the psychological
egoism/altruism debate by providing evidence that natural selection favors altruistic motivations
(psychological altruism). While there is no necessary link between the existence of group
selection and altruistic motivation, if Sober and Wilson are right that group selection pressures
are nearly ubiquitous for social organisms, this additional selection pressure would mean that
cooperative strategies, including true altruism, would be beneficial more often than under a
scenario that only includes selection at the individual level.
2
Chapters 1-5 include investigation of the previous scientific and philosophical approaches
to the psychological egoism/altruism debate, Sober and Wilson‘s arguments for group selection,
special instances of group selection that apply more strongly to intelligent and social species
(especially humans), motivations as proximate mechanisms for adaptive behavior, and a more indepth exploration of the relationship between psychological and behavioral altruism.
Sober and Wilson‘s book, Unto Others, serves as the primary focal point from which to
examine and critique some of the strongest evolutionary arguments in favor of psychological
altruism to date. These evolutionary arguments are largely built upon two evolutionary
principles, which Sober and Wilson outline. The first of these principles is the direct/indirect
asymmetry principle, which states that, all other things being equal, a mechanism that triggers a
fitness-enhancing response by directly detecting a fitness-relevant situation is superior to a
mechanism that responds in the same way to cues that are imperfectly correlated to that same
fitness-relevant situation. The second principle is the two are better than one argument, which
states that, all other things being equal, an organism that has multiple mechanisms that serve the
same function has a fitness advantage over an organism that has only one of these mechanisms,
so long as neither of these mechanisms interfere with each other and it is possible for one to fail
without the other also failing.
Chapters 6 and 7 argue that while both of these principles are valid the evolutionary
arguments that incorporate them are flawed and that the evolutionary arguments based on these
principles should instead lead to the conclusion that psychological altruism is quite improbable.
In the process it is shown, among other things, that psychological hedonism could more easily
trigger the most fitness-enhancing degree of behavioral altruism, and that psychological
hedonism had the chance to become firmly entrenched before psychological altruism could have
3
ever even made an appearance. Chapter 8 includes an independent conceptual argument against
psychological altruism.
4
CHAPTER I:
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EGOISM VS. ALTRUISM DEBATE AND HISTORICAL
ATTEMPTS TO RESOLVE IT
This chapter will examine various non-evolutionary attempts to resolve the
psychological egoism vs. altruism debate and show that all of the arguments so presented fail to
adequately resolve the debate. Of course, no claim can be made as to having covered every
argument ever produced in an attempt to resolve the long-lived and lively psychological
egoism/altruism debate, but the arguments that will be presented and refuted here are among the
strongest and most well known. If the arguments presented here fail to settle the psychological
egoism vs. altruism issue, then the claim that Sober and Wilson are tackling a live and still
relevant philosophical and psychological problem is at least probable. Pursuing these earlier
arguments also has the advantageous function of serving as a useful introduction to the
psychological egoism/altruism debate. Though this chapter will consider the same attempts to
resolve the psychological egoism/altruism debate that Sober and Wilson criticize in their book,
Unto Others, it will also employ supplemental arguments to buttress Sober and Wilson‘s
rebuttals where they could have been made stronger.
The psychological egoism/altruism debate is focused on a philosophically important
question about human nature.1 Are human beings motivated only by their own self-interests as
the 17th century philosopher Thomas Hobbes believed, or can people act out of a genuine
1
The psychological egoism/altruism debate should not be confused with the debate between ethical egoists and
altruists. The ethical version claims to describe how people should behave, while the psychological version claims to
describe how people actually do behave. Very seldom will one find an ethical egoist who is also a psychological
egoist, because it makes little sense to claim that people should behave in an egoistic way when they are incapable
of doing otherwise. In contrast, an ethical altruist is almost always a psychological altruist, because psychological
altruists do not claim that people only behave in altruistic ways. The psychological altruist position is that people are
merely capable of acting altruistically, and it would make little sense to advocate an ethical standard that nobody is
ever capable of following.
5
interest in the wellbeing of others? Sober and Wilson side with the altruists, but not for any of
the reasons used in previous attempts to resolve the debate. Instead, they believe that an
evolutionary approach to the psychological egoism vs. altruism debate can show that it is
probable that psychological altruism evolved.
While more will be said on this in later chapters, it is important to understand that when
Sober and Wilson talk about psychological altruism, they do not merely mean that some people
have psychological motivations that cause them to help others. After all, psychological egoists
acknowledge that people help each other, and surely people in these cases have motivations for
their actions. The difference between psychological altruism and psychological egoism, as Sober
and Wilson see it, is that psychological altruism claims that people sometimes act on ultimate
desires for the wellbeing of others, while egoists claim that, ultimately, people only act out of
desires for their own wellbeing.
Ultimate desires are desires that are not spawned by other desires. Suppose a person
expresses her desire to win the lottery. A philosopher might then ask of her, ―Why do you want
to win the lottery?‖ to which she may respond by expressing the desire to possess a lot of money.
If the philosopher then questions her about why she would like to have so much money, the
woman may then respond that there are many things she would like to purchase, that it would be
nice to know that she will never be kicked out of her home for lack of rent money, or that she
will never suffer from a lack of health insurance. The philosopher may continue questioning her
by asking why the woman wants to purchase the particular objects she does and why she would
like to rid herself of worries about rent and healthcare. Each time the woman answers, she does
so by referencing an antecedent desire. The theory behind this repeated questioning is that the
woman will eventually be unable to answer the philosopher‘s questions because she will come to
6
a point where she desires something full stop, without any reference to fulfilling other desires (or
at least without the need for such references).
Desires that are derived from other desires are called instrumental desires. For example,
one typically desires painkillers to relieve oneself of pain. The desire to fill a prescription for
painkillers in such a case is therefore the result of having a desire to avoid pain. The desire to
avoid pain, however, does not seem to rest upon any deeper desire. People want to avoid pain
because they value being pain free, not just because being pain free will get them gain something
else. A desire that is not dependent upon other desires is called an ultimate desire.
By Sober and Wilson‘s definition of psychological altruism, a person acting to help
another because she feels vicarious discomfort at another person‘s suffering or because she feels
vicarious joy at seeing another person happy does not so act out of psychologically altruistic
motives, even though she may very well end up behaving altruistically. For an act to be
altruistically motivated, it must be the result of a benevolent other-regarding ultimate desire.2
The first section of this chapter introduces philosophical approaches to resolving the
psychological egoism vs. altruism debate and refutes them one at a time. Three basic
philosophical arguments will be covered: the Butler‘s stone argument, the paradox of hedonism,
and Nozick‘s experience machine thought experiment. Each of these arguments will be
explained in detail before any objections to them are raised. The second section will examine
psychological and experimental approaches to resolving the debate. Again, three approaches will
be covered: introspection, the law of effect, and Daniel Batson‘s experiments on the empathy
altruism hypothesis vs. egoistic alternatives. The third section of this chapter will contain a
summary and concluding remarks.
2
Psychological altruism can be true, however, if a person is motivated by both an ultimate desire to help others and
an ultimate desire to avoid pain or gain pleasure. What is important for psychological altruism is that at least one
desire to help can not be reduced to other desires.
7
1_1 The Philosophical Arguments Concerning Psychological Egoism/Altruism
Sober and Wilson‘s evolutionary arguments for psychological altruism are of greater
importance if the psychological egoism/altruism debate has not yet been resolved. While it might
be of scholarly interest to find alternate solutions where solutions already exist, it is usually more
important to find a working solution when none was present before. This is what Sober and
Wilson set out to do for the psychological egoism vs. altruism debate in their book Unto Others.
It is their position that previous attempts to resolve this debate have been unsuccessful. To
establish this position, they examine some of what they believe are the strongest arguments
available for both psychological altruism and psychological egoism and attempt to show that
ultimately, they do not work. For the same reason that it is important for Sober and Wilson to
show that the psychological egoism vs. altruism debate has not yet been settled, it is important to
make the same case in this dissertation.
During the course of this chapter, arguments for and against psychological hedonism will
be examined. If one judges with Sober and Wilson, that the previous resolutions to the
psychological egoism vs. altruism debate are either weak or do not work all together, then the
importance of Sober and Wilson‘s project becomes clear. On the other hand, if the reader decides
that one or more of the historical arguments regarding the debate solves the issue, there still may
be some value in developing an evolutionary explanation, because such an explanation will also
go a long way towards explaining why psychological altruism either exists or does not exist.
This section will examine three philosophical arguments against psychological egoism.
The first argument to be considered is an argument originally formulated by Joseph Butler
8
(1692-1752) designed to disprove hedonism (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 276).3 Several
incarnations of this argument will be examined, including C. D. Broad‘s and Thomas Nagel‘s
versions of the argument. Next, the ―paradox of hedonism‖ will be considered. This paradox
suggests that hedonism is self defeating because those who focus only on achieving happiness
are less likely to achieve happiness than those who do not. Finally, Robert Nozick‘s ―Experience
Machine‖ thought experiment, which he presented in his 1974 book entitled Anarchy, State, and
Utopia, will be confronted. This argument is an attempt to prove that people care about more
than just their own experiences.
1_1.1 The Butler‘s Stone Argument against Hedonism
Sober and Wilson begin their discussion of Butler‘s argument with a quote from Butler
himself. Since this quote summarizes his position nicely, it is worth reproducing here as well:
That all particular appetites and passions are towards external things themselves,
distinct from the pleasure arising from them, is manifested from hence; that there
could not be this pleasure, were it not for that prior suitableness between the
object and the passion: there could be no enjoyment or delight from one thing
more than another, from eating food more than from swallowing a stone, if there
were not an affection of appetite to one thing more than another. (Butler, 1726, p.
227)
3
It should be noted that disproving hedonism is not the same thing as disproving egoism. Nevertheless, egoistic
theories usually rely upon at least some hedonistic motivations to work. If hedonism is impossible, other egoistic
theories are going to be in jeopardy. Alternatively, if hedonism only turns out to be, by itself, an insufficient
explanation, then an egoistic theory might bolster hedonism enough so that the combined theory will work. The
arguments that Sober and Wilson give for evolutionary altruism, the discussion of which will begin in Chapter 6,
focus mainly on showing that psychological altruism is a superior theory than psychological hedonism. Sober and
Wilson say that they choose to focus on psychological hedonism specifically because, ―…defenders of egoism
inevitably invoke the ultimate desire to attain pleasure and avoid pain to save egoism from refutations‖ (Sober &
Wilson, 1998, p. 297). More will be said on this subject in Chapter 6.
9
This is usually taken to be an argument against hedonistic psychological egoism (Zellner,
1999, p.193). What Butler seems to be saying here is that hedonism, the theory that people are
only motivated by their own desires for pleasure4 (and as a corollary their desire to avoid pain),
must be false because people seek out specific objects or end states. Butler sees this as
problematic because he believes that it would be impossible to receive pleasure without first
satisfying a specific external appetite, which is separate and distinct from pleasure and pain. If all
people wanted was pleasure, Butler agues, the particular object they acquire would not matter
because it itself is not a pleasure. But if that is so, he continues, there is no reason why
swallowing a stone should not be as pleasant and satisfying as eating a delectable meal. From
this Butler concludes that his philosophical opponents who claim that all that people ever desire
is pleasure are manifestly wrong. This argument, and arguments similar to this one, have come to
be known as Butler’s Stone arguments (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 276). Zellner offers a
breakdown of the general argument which should be useful here:5
1. ―All particular appetites and passions are toward external things themselves,
distinct from the pleasures arising from them‖ (Zellner, 1999, p. 193).
4
Psychological hedonism is the theory that people are only motivated by their desire for happiness, but most
hedonists equate the term ―happiness‖ with pleasure while taking ―pleasure‖ to include a broad range of sensations.
5
Zellner points out that Butler ―…does not clearly explain just what he is arguing against‖ (Zellner, 1999, p. 193).
He believes that it is unlikely Butler was merely arguing against the claim that ―…some particular appetites are
toward pleasure, rather than external things‖ (Zellner, 1999, p. 194) He refers to Butler‘s preface which says, ―There
is a strange affection in many people of explaining away all particular affections, and representing the whole of life
as nothing but one continuous exercise of self-love.‖ Zellner also refers to the a paragraph of Butler‘s shortly before
the Stone argument is presented, in which Butler says, ―Every man hath a general desire of his own happiness, and
likewise a variety of particular affections…The former proceeds from or is ‗self-love‘…. The object the former
pursues is somewhat internal--our own happiness, enjoyment, satisfaction… The principle we call ‗self-love‘ never
seeks anything external for the sake of the thing, but only as a means of happiness or good.‖ Zellner therefore
concludes that Butler does agree that we have a desire for pleasure, and that therefore the original Stone argument is
directed at refuting the more restricted theory which claims that people only desire pleasure. Zellner argues that this
later view ―…may never have been consistently and explicitly held by anyone, but which [Butler] had reason to
think was a natural extrapolation from the writings of some of his opponents.‖ (Zellner, 1999, p.193)
10
2. ―There could not be this pleasure were it not for that prior suitableness
between the object and the passion‖ (Zellner, 1999, p.193).
3. There could be no enjoyment or delight from one thing more than another,
from eating food more than from swallowing a stone, if there were not an
affection or appetite to one thing more than another‖ (Zellner, 1999, p.193).
4. But, of course, we do enjoy some things more than others. This is a
suppressed premise, added here as a supplement to Zellner‘s description.
5. Therefore Butler‘s philosophical opponents must be wrong. This is a
suppressed conclusion, added here as a supplement to Zellner‘s description.
Sober and Wilson point out that the Butler Stone argument has been very influential,
saying, ―Butler‘s reasoning echoes through much of the philosophy that came after him, and his
influence on recent philosophy has been strong. For example, Broad claims that misers and
politicians are living refutations of hedonism, since they desire money and power even when
these items conflict with the attainment of happiness‖ (1998, p. 276).6 Sober and Wilson present
a quote by Broad to this effect:
It is no answer to say that a person who desires power or property enjoys the
experiences of getting and exercising power or of amassing and owning property,
and then to argue that therefore his ultimate desire is to give himself those
pleasant experiences. The premise here is true, but the argument is self-stultifying.
The experiences in question are pleasant to a person only in so far as he desires
power or property. This kind of pleasant experience presupposes desires for
6
It is important to note that Broad pointed out exceptions to the claim that all desires are for external things, which
is a fundamental premise for Butler‘s argument (Broad, 1930, p. 66-68). Some things are intrinsically pleasurable to
most of us, even if one never actually forms the desire to attain them--for example, suddenly feeling a cool breeze
on a hot day. For this reason, if Butler‘s argument is to be employed against hedonistic psychological egoism, then it
must be employed against a version that is battling the claim that that all people ever desire is pleasure.
11
something other than pleasant experiences, and therefore the later desires cannot
be derived from desire for that kind of pleasant experience.‖ (Broad, 1952, p. 92)
This argument is another version of Butler‘s Stone, which claims that, for certain
individuals, pleasure can only accompany the accumulation of power or property because it is
the power or property itself that is desired by those individuals. If this is true, then it follows that
people desire more than pleasure alone. But the problem with this line of reasoning is that both
Butler‘s original argument and Broad‘s later formulation of it seem to ignore the distinction
between ultimate and instrumental desires. Psychological hedonism holds that the only kind of
ultimate desire people have is for pleasure.7 So, on the one hand we have the hedonists claiming
that ultimately, at the root of it all, all we really desire is pleasure. We then have Butler and
Broad responding that this must be false because people receive pleasure from acquiring some
fitting object or obtaining some end state that is itself desired, and that since these external
objects or states of affairs are not pleasures themselves, the psychological hedonists must be
wrong when they assert that pleasure is all that a person can desire.
Placed side by side like this, the flaw in the Stone argument becomes clearer. Butler‘s
Stone assumes that hedonists claim that people never desire anything but pleasure. But this is
quite simply a misunderstanding of what psychological hedonists actually claim. Hedonists
believe that the only ultimate desire people have, that is to say the only desire they have that is
intrinsically valuable to them for its own sake, is pleasure. This leaves open the possibility that
there are non-ultimate desires, that is to say instrumental desires, which people pursue as a
means to gaining the ultimate desire of pleasure. Just as stacking a pile of books on the floor to
use as a step-stool may only be a means to the end of changing a light bulb, eating a double
7
The conception of pleasure here is broad and should be taken to include the absence or reduction of pain.
12
bacon cheeseburger instead of a stone may only be a means to the end of gaining pleasure (from
taste) or avoiding pain (in the form of hunger).
Indeed, psychological hedonists not only do not deny the existence of instrumental
desires, but their very theory is often used to explain why people do the things they do.
According to their theory, people do all the various things they do, whether it is eating a meal or
running away from a wild animal, to obtain pleasure and avoid pain. As Zellner points out,
Butler might be trying to debunk a theory that ―may never have been consistently and explicitly
held by anyone‖ (Zellner, 1999, p. 193).
The Butler‘s Stone argument, therefore, doesn‘t seem to undermine the hedonist‘s claim
at all. The mere fact that eating a specific food results in pleasure does not mean that the
acquisition of food was anything more than an instrumental desire spawned in order to alleviate
the pains of hunger or to gain access to the pleasure of food. Hedonists have never claimed that
human beings only act in ways that cause immediate pleasure. They all recognize that people can
do unpleasant things in order to achieve something pleasing further down the road. Psychological
hedonists only claim that pleasure is the ultimate desire for human beings, not that it is the only
desire human beings may have. For these reasons, the mere fact that a person gains pleasure from
eating food and not a stone in no way undermines psychological hedonism.
Yet, before we move on, Sober and Wilson do point out a more interesting version of the
Stone argument held by Thomas Nagel. They quote him:
There is one common account which can perhaps be disposed of here; the view
that other-regarding behavior is motivated by a desire to avoid the guilt feelings
which would result from selfish behavior. Guilt cannot provide the basic reason,
because guilt is precisely the pained recognition that one is acting or has acted
13
contrary to a reason which the claims, rights, or interests of others provide---a
reason which must therefore be antecedently acknowledged‖ (Nagel, 1970, p. 80).
However, while talking about guilt specifically adds an interesting spin to the argument,
the basic flaw in the reasoning remains the same. Nagel assumes that if guilt is caused by
recognizing that one has acted against the ―claims, rights, or interests‖ of others then that
necessarily means that recognizing those claims, rights, and interests of others are ultimate and
not instrumental desires. But, as Sober and Wilson point out, Nagel is confusing the cause of the
sensation with the reason for acting. It is certainly a logical possibility that Nagel is correct, but
the argument doesn‘t make any headway towards proving anything more than that. Hedonism is
a theory regarding why people act. Specifically, it is the theory that people act to gain pleasure
and avoid pain. If people try to avoid those things which they know will cause pain for the
ultimate reason of avoiding that pain, then it doesn‘t matter whether or not the pain would have
been caused by a ―recognition that one violated the rights of others,‖ a socialized reaction to
violating cultural norms, or something much less psychological in nature, such as eating a hot
chili pepper.
According to hedonists, it is the pain itself, and not the cause of it, which people
ultimately want to avoid. In cases of pleasure, it is the pleasure itself that people seek, and they
only perform deliberate actions as a means of obtaining it. Therefore the hedonistic theory is not
undermined by Nagel‘s version of the Stone argument, so long as the hedonists are only making
a claim about ultimate desires. If Nagel were to make the same move he makes in the quote
above about touching a hot stove instead of guilt feelings, the argument‘s utter failure to address
the hedonistic thesis would be much clearer. For the psychological hedonist, people don‘t avoid
14
touching hot stoves because of an antecedent desire to avoid touching hot stoves, rather they
avoid touching hot stoves because they know that doing so will cause pain.
Sober and Wilson do not attack the Butler‘s Stone argument on evolutionary grounds,
but they make the other arguments succinctly by first formalizing the Butler‘s Stone argument
and then making much the same argument that Zellner did. Since their approach is a little bit
different, I will consider it briefly here. Sober and Wilson summarize the Stone argument,
saying:
1. People sometimes experience pleasure.
2. When people experience pleasure, this is because they had a desire for some
external thing, and that desire was satisfied
------------------------------------------------------------------Hedonism is false (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 278).
No one would disagree with premise 1, say Sober and Wilson but, ―we will argue that
the conclusion does not follow from the premises and that the second premise is false‖ (1998, p.
278). To show this they consider a series of causes which they sketch out thus:
Desire for food  Eating  Pleasure (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 278).
They admit that if the pleasure can be traced back to a previous desire then the pleasure
did not cause the desire, but point out that the causal chain need not be structured in this way.
Rather they suggest it could look like this:
Desire for pleasure  Desire for food  Eating  Pleasure8
(Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 278).
Sober and Wilson sum up this argument by saying:
Butler‘s stone concludes that this causal claim is false, but for no good reason.
The crucial mistake in Butler‘s argument comes from confusing two quite
Sober and Wilson‘s alternative structure simply stopped at ―Desire for pleasure  Desire for food‖, but the eating
and the resulting pleasure are, of course, implied—otherwise the pleasure would never be attained.
8
15
different items---the pleasure that results from a desire being satisfied, and the
desire for pleasure. Even if the occurrence of pleasure presupposes that the agent
desired something besides pleasure, nothing follows about the relationship
between the desire for pleasure and the desire for something else (Sober &
Wilson, 1998, p. 278).
Finally they say, ―The crucial error, woven into the very fabric of the [Butler‘s Stone]
argument, is Butler‘s idea that hedonism is somehow opposed to the idea that people do want
external things. This is a mistake. Hedonism attempts to explain why people want external
things‖ (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 279). Zellner makes a similar point saying, ―HPE [hedonistic
psychological egoism] need not claim that we always want the pleasure of things, and not the
things. It may admit that we have desires for non-pleasures, but say that we have these only
because we have desires for the pleasures to be obtained from these non-pleasures‖ (Zellner,
1999, p.195).
There is another interpretation of the Butler‘s Stone argument which differs significantly
from the previous one. In this version, Butler‘s argument is not that hedonists can‘t desire
particular things, but that, if hedonism were true, there could be no explanation of why one
desires one thing over another in a large number of cases.
Consider two different desires, A and B. Assign them the values of the Butler‘s stone
argument so that A is a desire to consume food, and B is a desire to consume a stone. Now
suppose that psychological hedonism is correct so that we grant that a person who desires either
A or B does so because of a more basic desire for pleasure. Butler‘s challenge consists of a
demand for an explanation of why a person should desire A (consuming food) over B
(consuming a stone). It does no good to simply say that the agent obtains pleasure from A and
16
not from B because, on this view, Butler‘s very objection is that, if psychological hedonism is
true, one cannot give an explanation of why A is preferable to B. If, however, hedonism were not
true, then Butler‘s argument suggests that there would be ―an affection of appetite to one thing
more than another‖ (call it an ―ultimate desire‖) which would explain the agent‘s choice.
Butler‘s example refers to consuming a stone rather than consuming food. Under the
present interpretation of the argument, this might not have been the best example for him to use.
There are physiological reasons why an organism prefers to eat food over stones. Filling a belly
with stones would only alleviate hunger to a small degree for the body would still be starving,
stones do not stimulate the taste buds the same way that food does, and a belly full of stones is
likely to cause pain. So, with this particular example, a hedonist could in fact give an explanation
as to why one would prefer A over B, which is to say consuming food over consuming a stone.
But an unfortunate example shouldn‘t derail an argument, especially if better examples
are readily available. So let‘s assign new values to A and B. Where A once represented the desire
to consume food, let it now represent the desire to listen to Vivaldi‘s Four Seasons. Let B now
represent the desire to listen to Paint it Black by The Rolling Stones. If psychological hedonism
were true, it would mean that whichever piece of music an agent chooses she chooses because it
would give her pleasure. But Butler‘s Stone argument challenges hedonism to then give an
explanation as to why one would get more pleasure from listening to Vivaldi over The Rolling
Stones, or vice-versa.
Let us suppose that a particular person has the desire to listen to Vivaldi (A). Unlike the
case in which B represented consuming a stone and one could give clear physiological reasons
why an agent would get more pleasure from consuming food, there are no clear cut physiological
reasons why Vivaldi should produce more pleasure in a listener than The Rolling Stones. Indeed,
17
there are plenty of individuals who have heard both and yet would prefer B to A. And, of course,
there are many who would prefer B on some occasions and A on others. If hedonism were false,
then one could explain the desire for A, B, or A and B at different times by appealing to ultimate
desires (which may or may not change over time). The Butler‘s stone argument would then
conclude that psychological hedonism is probably false because it doesn‘t seem to leave room
for an explanation.
The defender of psychological hedonism has two effective ways to respond to this
criticism however. The first of these responses is simply an appeal to a more complex
physiological story. In the case of eating a stone, the story is rather simple. But, the hedonist may
argue, the case of listening to Vivaldi isn‘t of a different kind but is simply of a different
complexity. People start off physically constituted to receive more pleasure for food than from
eating a stone. People, however, have widely different tastes in music because of their individual
history, including different memories, different associations with particular types of music,
different cultural standards as to what good music is, different temperaments that result from
both genetic and environmental conditions, and an extremely large list of other reasons. But just
because a story explaining why Sally likes Vivaldi and Susie likes The Rolling Stones would be
a complex and difficult one to piece together doesn‘t mean that psychological hedonism presents
any sort of theoretical barrier to answering these sorts of questions.
A less likely but still workable response would be for a defender of psychological
hedonism to claim that particular objects have different levels of pleasure associated with them
in a basic way. In other words, if a defender of the Butler‘s Stone argument claims that the desire
to listen to Vivaldi can only be explained if a person ultimately desires to listen to Vivaldi, a
defender of psychological hedonism could say, ―No, the desire to listen to Vivaldi can be
18
explained because the properties of Vivaldi gives a person pleasure.‖ The person then chooses to
listen to Vivaldi because of a desire for that pleasure, not because of an ultimate desire to listen
to Vivaldi. If the defender of psychological hedonism is then challenged to give an explanation
of why Vivaldi gives a particular person more pleasure than The Rolling Stones, she could point
out that her position is as strong as that endorsed by the Butler‘s Stone argument by turning the
question around. She could ask, ―By Butler‘s account, why does a person ultimate desire
Vivaldi?‖ If the response is simply that the desire is ultimate and without an explanation, she
could reply that the pleasure she is talking about also does not have an explanation. If the
response is instead an evolutionary, cultural, historical, psychological or in some other way
causal story as to why a particular person would prefer Vivaldi, then she could provide the same
kind of story to explain why a particular person would gain more pleasure from Vivaldi than The
Rolling Stones. Either way, her explanation of an agent‘s choice of A over B through an appeal
to pleasure does not seem to be any worse off from a theoretical perspective than a reference to a
large and complex set of ultimate desires.
1_1.2 The Paradox of Hedonism
The ―paradox of hedonism‖ was first clearly expressed by the philosopher Henry
Sidgwick in The Methods of Ethics (1963, p. 135-136). Sidgwick introduces the ―paradox of
hedonism‖ as a possible and generalized interpretation of one of Thomas Hill Green‘s objections
to egoistic hedonism, and he skillfully does the argument in as soon as it is on the page.
The paradox of hedonism states that people who consciously aim at obtaining pleasure
are less likely to find life as pleasurable as people who have other goals as their ultimate ends.
The idea is that the very pursuit of pleasure would interfere with the attainment of pleasure. Here
is how Sidgwick introduces the paradox:
19
It may be replied that if these permanent sources of pleasure are consciously
sought merely as a means to the hedonistic end, they will not afford the happiness
for which they are sought. (Sidgwick, 1963, p. 136)9
The idea here is that focusing only on maximizing pleasure is self-defeating. The agent
knows that what she wants is happiness, but if happiness is all that she focuses on, then she will
either never put the necessary prior steps into motion to achieve that pleasure, or that she will not
be able to lose herself enough in the process enough to ever fully experience it. One might go out
to a club with a group of friends for the expressed purpose of having a good time, but if one
constantly asks herself ―Am I having fun yet?‖ she is certain to miss out on the enjoyment.
Pleasure, after all, is not usually obtained directly (although this could perhaps be accomplished
by directly stimulating the pleasure centers of the brain), but rather through some other activity
that generates feelings of pleasure in the mind of the individual.
After Sidgwick introduces the ―paradox of hedonism‖, indeed in the very next sentence,
he begins his criticism:
With this I to some extent agree; but I think that if the normal complexity of our
impulses be duly taken into account, this statement will be found not to militate
against the adoption of Hedonism, but merely to signalize a danger against which
the hedonist has to guard. (Sidgwick, 1963, p. 136)
And:
In his autobiography, John Stuart Mill also expresses this idea. He says, ―But I now thought that this end
[one's own happiness] was only to be attained by not making it the direct end. Those only are happy (I
thought) who have their minds fixed on some object other than their own happiness.... Aiming thus at
something else, they find happiness along the way.... Ask yourself whether you are happy, and you cease to
be so.‖ (Mill, 1909 #23, p. 94)
9
20
I have before spoken of this conclusion as the ‗Fundamental Paradox of Egoistic
Hedonism‘; but though it presents itself as a paradox, there does not seem to be
any difficulty in its practical realization, when once the danger indicated is clearly
seen. For it is an experience only too common among men, in whatever pursuit
they may be engaged, that they let the original object and goal of their efforts pass
out of view, and come to regard the means to this end as ends in themselves…
And if it be thus easy and common to forget the end in the means overmuch, there
seems no reason why it should be difficult to do it to the extent that Rational
Egoism prescribes: and, in fact, it seems to be continually done by ordinary
persons in the case of amusements and pastimes of all kinds. (Sidgwick, 1963, p.
137)
The paradox itself sounds reasonable as far as it goes. Quite often in life one finds that
fixating only on a distant goal can interfere with achieving that goal. This can happen because
worrying about an end result can cause one to neglect thinking through (or thinking properly
through) the means to achieve that end. Or it can interfere with mental states as well, since
asking oneself whether one is happy, or in love, or content, can interfere with feelings of
happiness, love, and contentment. However, this turns out to be irrelevant because egoistic
hedonism makes the claim that our ultimate desire is to obtain pleasure (and avoid pain), and it
does not further claim that the best way to obtain pleasure is to pursue pleasure directly. This is
very similar to the flaw identified in the Butler‘s Stone arguments. If one wants to have the
pleasure of a gourmet meal, the best way to achieve that end is to first focus on the instrumental
desire of obtaining food, with perhaps the aid of many other instrumental desires along the way.
But this is just what hedonism argues is true in the first place—that instrumental desires work to
21
support the ultimate desire of attaining pleasure. As Sober and Wilson point out, ―Means-end
deliberation is not only compatible with hedonism; it is part of the theory‘s basic logic‖ (1998, p.
280).
Trying to use the paradox against the theory of psychological egoism has an even greater
flaw. This is because psychological hedonism isn‘t a suggestion concerning how one should
make decisions. The theory of psychological hedonism purports to tell us how people actually do
make decisions. Sober and Wilson make this same criticism, saying, ―Even if this point [the
paradox of hedonism argument] entailed that people should not be hedonists, it would not follow
that people are not hedonists in fact.‖ (1998, p. 280).
Thus, at best, the paradox of hedonism can only be used to show that one is better off
acting as if the theory of psychological hedonism were not true. The truth of psychological
hedonism, however, is never even challenged by the paradox of hedonism. In the same way that
Pascal‘s Wager isn‘t an argument against atheism, but rather an argument that the payoff-to-odds
ratio of believing in God is more favorable than the contrary, the paradox of hedonism is not an
argument that psychological hedonism is false, but rather that self-conscious hedonists are less
likely to live pleasurable lives than those people who are not.
1_1.3 Nozick’s Experience Machine
In his 1974 book Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Robert Nozick introduces a powerful
thought experiment in order to undercut the idea that ultimately human beings only care about
their own experiences. Because pleasure and pain are experiences, this thought experiment could
be redirected to arguing against hedonism specifically.
The thought experiment itself is fairly simple. Nozick asks us to imagine that neurology
has progressed to the point to where ―experience machines‖ are available. A person who decides
22
to ―plug in‖ to one of these machines would have her neurons stimulated very precisely and
under the guidance of a very sophisticated computer program. Some forms of stimulation would
cause visual experiences, others auditory, still others tactile, and so on for smell, taste, touch, and
every other kind of conscious experience (qualia). We are to further imagine that this machine is
so good at doing what it does that no person hooked up to the machine could distinguish normal
experiences from those produced by the experience machine. Finally, we are to suppose that
when a person is first plugged into this machine her memories are altered by the machine so that
she does not know that she was ever plugged into the experience machine to begin with. An
entirely false set of memories could be presented to her in this way, and she would have no
empirical reason to doubt them. For example, an 80 year old woman under the influence of the
experience machine may have all and only those (false) memories and beliefs that are consistent
with a particular 13-year-old boy.
The experience machine would be a perfect ―anything-simulator‖ and nobody who
elected to be plugged into the machine could have any hint that what they are experiencing is
coming from a machine and not the world at large. The simulated lives that the experience
machine creates for its users would have perfect verisimilitude.10
Unlike Descartes‘ with his evil genius thought experiment, Nozick does not try to use his
thought experiment to ground epistemology. He is instead interested the question, ―What else
can matter to us, other than how our lives feel from the inside?‖ (1974, p. 43). The experience
machine that Nozick introduces is a wedge that is supposed to separate experiences from
anything else that might be meaningful to us. Nozick‘s move to accomplish this is to prompt one
10
Some contemporary movies and novels, such as The Matrix, Vanilla Sky, and others, have made use of
versions of the ―experience machine‖ idea, and the experience machine itself is just a more science-friendly
version of Descartes‘ evil genius. Of course, in the movies there is always something wrong with the
simulation that contributes to the plot. For Nozick‘s thought experiment, however, one is to assume that the
simulation is absolutely perfect. There are no hiccups or glitches in the system.
23
to ask herself what she would do if she were given the opportunity to plug into an experience
machine. One is to assume that the machine has been specifically programmed in such a way as
to give us the most pleasant and satisfying experiences possible for the rest of our lives.11 If the
person plugged into the machine always wanted to be a famous Hollywood movie star, she
would find herself to be a famous actress in a world without any hint of illusion--in spite of the
fact that it is all illusionary. A person who would be happiest as a scientist would routinely
experience the thrill of making new discoveries, although nothing would ever really be newly
discovered. And if any of these lives ever begin to become boring to the user of the machine, the
program automatically adjusts itself to deliver new experiences—the most pleasant ones
possible.
Given this thought experiment, if the psychological egoists are correct, then people
should be excited by the experience machine, and every reasonable person capable of truly
understanding her options would choose to be plugged into one. If they are wrong, then it would
be possible for people to rationally choose not to be plugged in. Sober and Wilson are interested
in the answer to the question Nozick asks of us because, if the answer is ―no,‖ the experience
machine thought experiment might work to undermine psychological hedonism.12
Now that the nature of the experience machine has been explained, one can try to imagine
what people would do if they were given the opportunity to be plugged into an experience
machine for life. Would people typically accept the offer or reject it? How many of us would
strap on the happy helmet and forsake reality for a more pleasurable fantasy? Nozick suspected
Nozick‘s actual example allowed people to choose their life experiences from a ―library‖ instead of sophisticated
computer software. The point remains the same however; the individual plugged into the machine would experience
the type of life that he or she would find most pleasurable.
12
Nozick was interested in the aforementioned question for a different reason. He wanted to establish that, ―…one
cannot reasonably claim that only the felt experiences of animals limit what we may do to them.‖ (Nozick, 1974
#14, pg 45)
11
24
that most people would reject the offer. He says, ―We learn that something matters to us in
addition to experience by imagining an experience machine and then realizing that we would not
use it‖ (1974, p. 44). However, if Nozick‘s is correct, it seems to follow that the theory of
psychological hedonism must be incorrect, since people would apparently be behaving as if they
had ultimate desires beyond attaining pleasurable experiences.
Of course, one way for Sober and Wilson, or anyone else for that matter, to object to
Nozick‘s claim would to be to question whether or not Nozick is right in suggesting that people
would really reject the opportunity to ―plug in‖ to the experience machine once they fully
understood what it would mean. Nozick certainly does not give any hard data or surveys to show
that people would generally make the choice he claims they would. He simply takes it for
granted that we would all have the same aversion to the experience machine that he does.
In support of this rejection, it is well known that many people choose to indulge in
escapist fantasies through media such as novels, immersive videogames, television, and movies.
Sometimes people go to sleep for no other reason than to escape reality in the hopes of pleasant
dreams, and many mind altering substances are used for the same reason.13 Nevertheless, let us
give Nozick the benefit of the doubt concerning how people would react when faced with this
decision, at least for the moment. Let us agree that some, or even most, people would reject the
opportunity to be plugged into an experience machine.14 Nozick gives three reasons why a
person might choose not to plug into the machine, though he makes no claim that this is a
comprehensive list of possibilities. The three reasons he lists are:
13
Nozick claims that people take psychoactive drugs to get closer to reality and in order to gain some sort of special
insight. (Nozick, 1974 #14, p. 43-44) But there is no reason given to presume that all people who use such drugs are
experimenters searching for a deeper understanding of themselves and/or the world they live in. There are plenty of
circumstantial reasons to believe that many drug users engage in this activity purely for pleasure and/or for escapist
reasons.
14
After all, if Nozick is wrong about this, then Sober and Wilson do not need to go any further to show that his
argument fails.
25
1.
―we want to do certain things, and not just have the experience of doing
them‖ (Nozick, 1974, p. 43).
2. ―we want to be a certain way, to be a certain sort of person. Someone floating
in a tank [i.e. hooked up to the machine] is an indeterminate blob. This is no
answer to the question of what a person is like who has long been in the tank.
Is he courageous, kind, intelligent, witty, loving? It‘s not merely that it is
difficult to tell; there‘s no way he is. Plugging into the machine is a kind of
suicide. [Emphasis mine]‖ (Nozick, 1974 #14, p. 43).
3. ―Thirdly, plugging into an experience machine limits us to a man-made
reality, to a world no deeper or more important than that which people can
construct. There is no actual contact with any deeper reality, though the
experience of it can be simulated‖ (Nozick, 1974, p. 43).
If people really would refuse to plug into the experience machine, it seems to show that
many people prefer a real (but less pleasurable) life to an illusionary (but perfectly pleasurable)
one; this, in turn, would seem to mean that people have at least one ultimate desire other than
pleasure, which would mean that psychological hedonism is false (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p.
292).15 Indeed, since hedonism makes a claim covering all human motivation, if just one rational
and healthy person fully understood and rejected the experience machine offer, it would seem to
prove that psychological hedonism is false.
As for Sober and Wilson, they find Nozick‘s argument fascinating but not convincing.
They do not reject the contention that people would refuse to be plugged into the machine
(although this would seem to be a legitimate area to attack). Instead, they delve into a discussion
15
Though egoism could, of course, still be true because there is logical room for there to be other egoistic ultimate
desires besides pleasure.
26
of human psychology to explain how, if the theory of psychological hedonism is true, a person
might refuse an offer to be plugged into the experience machine anyway.
They begin this discussion by drawing two different time lines which have been
replicated below (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 282). The following diagrams represent the order of
events of the two possible decisions that those who are confronted with the experience machine
offer might make. The span of time before reaching a decision (to plug in or not) is labeled as
―Deliberation‖. Once a decision is reached, the variables a or n1 and b or n2 represent the
aggregate hedonistic value that would be experienced between the point in time a decision is
made and the time of being plugged in or not (a) and the aggregate hedonistic value of a lifetime
connected to the experience machine (b).
Decision Plug
Reached In
▼▼
Choose To
Plug In
Time
│Deliberation a b
├─────────────┼─────┼────────►
Decision Do Not
Reached Plug In
Choose Not
To Plug In
Time
▼▼
│Deliberation n1 n2
├─────────────┼─────┼────────►
Fig. 1.1
Sober and Wilson present a first argument against the experience machine only to reject
it. The argument they reject is that the time between reaching the decision to plug in and actually
plugging in (a) is so painful that it overrides what would otherwise be a decision to plug in
27
because of the pleasure value of b. Nevertheless, though rejected (and flawed for the reasons we
will soon uncover), this argument is worth noting here because Nozick seems to take this as the
primary argument open to the hedonist when he says, ―Nor should you refrain [from plugging in]
because of the few moments of distress between the moment you‘ve decided [to plug into the
experience machine] and the moment you are plugged‖ (Nozick, 1974, p. 43). Sober and Wilson
make the same point, but in more detail. They say:
If you choose to plug into the machine, you‘ll have an immense level of bliss (b)
after you plug in. This will dwarf the amount of pleasure you‘ll experience in the
same period of time if you decide not to plug in and to lead a normal life instead;
b>n2. If this were the only consideration involved, the hedonist would have to
predict that people will choose to plug into the machine.
If the hedonists are to explain why people choose not to plug into the experience
machine, and if they are to do this by considering just the pleasure and pain that subjects expect
to come their way after they decide what to do, the claim must be that a + b < n1 + n2. Since b is
far greater than n2, this inequality will be true only if a is far smaller than n1. That is, hedonists
seem compelled to argue that people reject the option of plugging in because the amount of pain
they would experience between deciding to plug in and actually being connected to the machine
is gigantic--so large that it dwarfs the pleasure they‘d experience after they are connected. This is
an implausible suggestion. (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 284)
Thus Sober and Wilson reject this argument as does Nozick himself. The time between
choosing to be plugged in and actually being plugged into the machine is just too short compared
to all the proceeding years of bliss that one would receive by being attached to the machine
(Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 284). To illustrate this point, one might imagine that Nozick‘s
28
machine has been improved so that now those people who are plugged into the machine actually
live three times longer than they would have if they had to navigate through life in the real
world. Even given this change, if one‘s instinct were to reject being plugged into the machine in
the first place, a longer period of attachment to the machine would be unlikely to change that
decision. Indeed, an increased life span (which would thereby increase the hedonistic value of a
+ b compared to n1+ n2) hardly seems to touch the issue, and to really drive the point home, one
could increase the life expectancy multiplier of three to increasingly larger integers without
affecting this intuition. So the claim isn‘t just that a is so unpleasant that it will outweigh b, but
that a is so unpleasant that it will outweigh b no matter how large b is. This seems to change the
argument‘s truth value from the status of highly doubtful to completely ridiculous. If the
hedonists want to provide an answer to this challenge that does not deny that people would
behave in the way Nozick predicts, then they are going to have to do better than this.
Sober and Wilson also rebut the objection by modifying the experience machine thought
experiment slightly. In the new version, everything is the same as in the original except for the
following:
1. Instead of being plugged into the machine forever, people will only be
plugged into the machine for 10 seconds (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 284-285).
2. People will be given $5,000 for their trouble (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 284285).
3. The experience that people will receive from the machine isn‘t ultimate
pleasure, but rather the experience of, ―believing that you had just decided to
spend the rest of your life plugged into an experience machine‖ (Sober &
Wilson, 1998, p. 284-285).
29
After ten seconds of a completely convincing experience that one has decided to be
plugged into the machine forever, persons who chose to be plugged in will once again find
themselves back in the world of normally generated experiences.
Sober and Wilson suspect that this version of the thought experiment would yield very
different results. It is their position that most people would choose to be plugged in for 10
seconds to gain $5,000 (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 285).16 But since the individual who chooses
to plug in would still be experiencing a, any argument that the pain of a is so great that it
outweighs all the pleasures of b fails for the reason that b ($5000) would be chosen over a, even
though $5000 is much less valuable than a lifetime of perfect happiness.17 Sober and Wilson say
that, ―This shows that the hedonist should not claim that the experience of believing you will be
plugged into an experience machine for the rest of your life is so horrible that no one would ever
choose a life that included it‖ (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 285). If Nozick‘s argument fails, it must
fail for a reason other than this. Sober and Wilson give an argument they believe will do the job.
1_1.3.1 The real reason why the experience machine argument fails.
Though Sober and Wilson believe that the previous rebuttal fails, they also believe that
hedonists have another way out of Nozick‘s trap (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 285). Their argument
succeeds in that it shows that the rejection of psychological hedonism is not necessary even if
16
It should also be supposed that there are no lingering side effects from exiting the machine. Persons will not, for
example, be continuously plagued with the worry that they might have never actually exited the machine, nor would
they somehow become ―hooked‖ on the machine like a drug. Those deciding whether or not to plug in must be
supposed to be absolutely convinced of the machine‘s safety.
17
This response is open to the same objection that had been set aside against Nozick‘s argument. There is
simply have no evidence to support Sober and Wilson‘s claim that, if people were given the opportunity
they describe, most would behave in the way they predict. It should be admitted however, that Sober and
Wilson‘s conclusion seems at least as plausible as Nozick‘s predictions on how people would act under the
conditions of his thought experiment. This plausibility could be further increased by raising the amount of
reward money. How many people would refuse to be connected to the experience machine for 10 seconds
in exchange for a million dollars? How about a billion? Yet no matter how high the reward is, it could
never purchase a lifetime of perfect happiness.
30
Nozick is correct in thinking that most people would reject the opportunity to be plugged into an
experience machine.
Sober and Wilson hold that, ―The hedonist can maintain that deciding to plug into the
machine, [rather than the time lag between the decision and being plugged in] is so aversive that
people almost always make the other choice‖ (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 285). They offer several
observations that support this theory. Here are a few:
1. Deciding to plug into the machine would mean leaving behind friends and
other relationships, and losing all the plans that one has already formed in the
real world (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 285).
2. Sober and Wilson note that choosing to be plugged in forever, ―resembles
suicide in terms of utter separation it effects with the real world. The
difference is that suicide means an end to consciousness, whereas the
experience machined delivers…escapist pleasures (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p.
285). This is really just a restatement of what Nozick himself says in Anarchy
State and Utopia, ―Plugging into the machine is a kind of suicide‖ (Nozick,
1974, p. 43).18
3. Sober and Wilson point out that there is a difference between the experience
one would have while plugged into the machine, and the painful idea
envisioning oneself being plugged into the machine (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p.
285).
18
It is strange that Sober and Wilson would offer this argument since they are interested in defending the possibility
of psychological hedonism against Nozick‘s argument. If the resemblance to suicide were the reason why people
would reject plugging into the machine, then they have defended the less specific claim of psychological egoism, but
not the more specific claim of psychological hedonism. As I will argue, psychological egoism is all they need. This
may show that they understood that fact, but the point is not made clear by them given their almost exclusive focus
on psychological hedonism, the more specific claim.
31
Given these three premises, Sober and Wilson make the argument that it is the
deliberation about being plugged into the experience machine that is so painful. They claim that
when one knows that the time plugged into the machine would only be temporary, the
deliberation is no longer so painful, and many people would choose to be plugged into the
machine briefly, especially if they were rewarded in some way—say by a $5,000 check for
participating in the experiment.
Sober and Wilson claim that the beauty of this explanation is that it explains both thought
experiments (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 285). They say:
It explains why people often decline to plug into the experience machine for the
rest of their lives; it also explains why people offered $5,000 often agree to have
10 seconds of the experience of believing that they have just decided to plug into
the machine for the rest of their lives. In both cases, deliberation is guided not so
much by beliefs about which actions will bring future pleasure, but by the
pleasure and pain that accompany certain thoughts during the deliberation process
itself. (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 286)
This last point is especially important. Immediate pleasure and pain is often magnified in
the mind when compared with pleasure or pain further down the road. A person might be
miserable all day, for example, if she knew for a certainty that she would break her leg
tomorrow, and yet, if she were told simply that she would break her leg some time during the
next 10 years, she might put it out of her mind quickly, even if she were certain that it were
true.19
19
According to George Ainslie, in experiments where a person is offered 100 dollars immediately or 200 dollars
three years from now, the majority prefer the immediate 100 dollars. However, when people are asked whether they
would prefer 100 dollars three years from now or 200 dollars six years from now ―virtually everyone‖ picks the 200
dollars. But, as he points out, ―…this is the same choice seen at six year‘s greater distance‖ (Ainslie, 2001 #48, p.
32
But how is this possible within a hedonistic framework? Is this an argument against
hedonism as well? To explain, Sober and Wilson talk about what they call ―discount rates‖, by
which they mean how much a future pleasure or pain is diminished in so far as temporal distance
affects the decision making process. The further into the future the pleasure or pain is, the greater
the discount rate should generally be. They then say, ―Hedonism is consistent with the possibility
that different people have different discount rates for different types of experience; and it is
compatible with people‘s changing their discount rates on a particular type of experience as they
get older‖ (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 286).
Finally, Sober and Wilson point out that the experience machine scenario resembles
another supposed problem for hedonism--the tired example of a soldier in a foxhole who throws
himself on a live grenade to save the lives of his comrades. They say, ―How can hedonism
explain this act of suicidal self-sacrifice, if the soldier believes that he will not experience
anything after he dies? The hedonist suggests that a self-directed benefit accrues before the act of
self-sacrifice is performed. It is no violation of hedonism to maintain that the soldier decides to
sacrifice his life because that decision is less painful than the decision to let his friend die‖
(Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 286). No version of hedonism worth defeating maintains that people
always do what will produce the most pleasure for themselves in the long run as a matter of fact.
The act of smoking cigarettes is another example, but it serves its purpose. While there might be
33). This is consistent with the theory that there is sometimes a ―high spike of value at short delays‖ (Ainslie, 2001
#48, p. 34). Though experiments would have to be conducted to confirm this, it is possible that if the valuation of
utility ―spikes‖ at short delays, the same may be true of disutility. This would mean that a choice which is painful to
even consider might be valuated as even more painful because the pain is immediate.
Though this is a small deviation from the larger topic, I conjecture that one possible evolutionary reason
why immediate pleasures are evaluated more highly when they will occur soon than when they appear at a greater
temporal distance is because opportunities for successful mating decline when one gets older, and also because
sufficient nutrition and protection is especially vital during childhood where developmental defects can set in for
life. Also, one must keep in mind that the typical pleasures of our hominid and early human ancestors were not
typically the types of benefits that could be invested, and so there would have been little selection pressure directly
for the ability to optimize one‘s preferences for long term investments. Without techniques for preservation, even
consumption of food could only be delayed for a matter of days.
33
significant denial on the part of many smokers, it is reasonable to think that at least some
smokers know that they will cause themselves greater pain in the future by continuing to smoke
than they would suffer by trying to quit, and yet continuing to smoke. Though the likelihood is
that future pain reduces the hedonistic value of smoking more than the immediate pleasure, the
effects of diminished health are distant, while the pleasures (or relief from the pain of withdraw
symptoms) that result from smoking a cigarette are immediate.20
Though Sober and Wilson do not take up this point, another argument is that the sort of
perfect happiness that the experience machine is suppose to give is so far beyond our normal
realm of experience that we cannot reason properly in regard to it. It is difficult to imagine what
a lifetime of perfect pleasure is like, and, even if one believes that that b is greater than a in the
long run, the human mind may simply be incapable of rationally weighing pleasures and pains at
such extreme levels. This would not be outrageous. After all, our evolutionary ancestors did not
encounter choices even remotely resembling this one in magnitude and abstraction. Therefore,
even if hedonism is the correct theory of motivation, the hedonistic mechanisms for weighing
potential pleasures and pains may simply malfunction when one can only grasp the nature of
pleasures and pains in a very vague and abstract way.
It could also be the case that a severe enough pain is simply too difficult to endure for
most people, regardless of the pleasure enduring it will bring. Providing that there are no
permanent physical or psychological harms, it might well be rational for a person with no other
earning potential to accept an offer to be tortured for a week in exchange for all the money she
could ever spend. The memory of physical pain tends to recede quickly after it is over, but the
20
Another example of the same principle seems to be well known to advertisers. Dealers of expensive items such as
cars often have advertisements that declare ―No payments for 6 months!‖ Of course, even given inflation, the
difference in the value of the dollars spent isn‘t significant for most purchases over six months---yet, nevertheless,
deferring the pain of payment to a later date can cause a potential consumer to be more willing to buy.
34
benefits of the money would last for the rest of her life and the lives of all those people she cares
about. Nevertheless, if one could opt out of the deal at any time, it seems unlikely that most
people would be able to continue even after a couple of hours of torture.21 But this fact doesn‘t
defeat hedonism; it only shows that people find it difficult or impossible to act on the principle of
utility in some extremely adverse conditions.
By now it may seem like flagellating an expired equine, but there is a final and more
important objection to using Nozick‘s argument against hedonism. Though the argument is
simple, Sober and Wilson seem to miss the fact that even if Nozick‘s experience machine
argument does precisely what it was intended to do, that is to say that it shows that people care
about more than just their experiences, this does not imply anything about the truth of
psychological egoism, nor does it settle the psychological egoism/altruism debate.22 This is
because Nozick‘s argument can only show that people care about more than only their own
pleasurable experiences. Hedonistic desires, however, are not the only logically possible egoistic
desires. There may be, to name just one other possible example, an ultimate desire for survival
that goes beyond a mere aversion to pain. If such an ultimate desire existed, it would clearly be
egoistic so long as one was not living primarily for others. Yet this desire to survive would
satisfy Nozick‘s claims without taking a single step towards resolving the psychological
egoism/altruism debate.
Furthermore, this should not be taken as a failing on Nozick‘s part, since he didn‘t design
the experience machine as an attack on psychological egoism. He designed it as an attempt to
21
Like Nozick, I have no evidence of how people would end up behaving if this offer was really made. On this
matter I am simply asking the reader to consult her own intuitions. Although it might be some evidence that
apparently true believers of various religions often sin (by their own religious standards) even though the promised
reward is eternal happiness, and following the rules of a religion is not nearly as painful as being tortured.
22
Sober and Wilson might have focused exclusively on hedonism because the arguments they later give in defense
of the psychological altruism thesis primarily criticize psychological hedonism as the competing view. There will be
more on this in Chapter 6.
35
show that people care about more than just their own experiences. The failing lies in the
reasoning of any who would use Nozick‘s argument for a purpose to which it is ill-suited.
Indeed, Nozick himself suggests that people may value being a certain way, or actually
doing things over just experiencing doing them. These possibilities are not altruistic in nature,
although altruistic considerations are not ruled out. If one grants that people would choose not to
plug into the machine, their reasons for doing so could all be selfish, or, at the very least, need
not involve altruistic ultimate desires. Therefore, even if Nozick‘s argument were to successfully
disprove psychological hedonism, it could not, by itself, resolve the psychological
egoism/altruism debate.23
The examination of Nozick‘s argument concludes this chapter‘s review of philosophical
arguments that have been often been used in an attempt to settle the psychological
egoism/altruism debate. The following section will consider whether psychology has resolved
the issue.
1_2 The State of the Egoism/Altruism Debate in Light of Empirical Psychological Studies
In this section I will consider current psychological evidence directed at resolving the
psychological egoism/altruism debate. More specifically I will be discussing the experiments of
Dr. Daniel Batson. Sober and Wilson say that Batson‘s work ―does the best job of coming to
grips with the problem of testing egoism and altruism‖ (1998, p. 260). As a result, they dedicate
most of the time they use to explore the psychological evidence relating psychological egoism
23
The odd part about this is that Sober and Wilson seem to understand that psychological egoism represents a more
inclusive set of motivation types than psychological hedonism, as they say, ―Although hedonists must be egoists, the
reverse isn‘t true. For example, if people desire their own survival as an end in itself, they may be egoists, but they
are not hedonists.‖ Why Sober and Wilson focus almost exclusively on arguments that a widely defined view of
psychological hedonism has not been proven is something of a mystery. It may simply be the case that because
psychological hedonism is the dominant theory for many economists and psychologists they wanted to deal with it
directly.
36
and altruism (in Unto Others) to Batson‘s work. Each of Batson‘s experiments is designed to test
a different egoistic hypothesis against the psychologically altruistic empathy-altruism
hypothesis.24
But before turning to Batson, two other psychological approaches to the debate will be
criticized. The first approach is more of a method than an argument and simply suggests that we
could resolve the egoism/altruism debate through introspection. The second is the proposed law
of effect first formulated by E. L. Thorndike (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 256) coupled with the
argument that this law proves that egoism must be true.
1_2.1 Problems Concerning Introspection
If introspection were a reliable source of data, then it seems the psychological
egoism/altruism debate would be easy to resolve. We would just ask people what they want, and
if their answers are ever altruistic in nature we could dismiss egoism. That is how it seems
anyway, but even if we put aside the possibility that people may report their introspections
falsely, or that culture may make people prone to answer in a particular way or alter their
answers either consciously or subconsciously, introspection alone is not up to the task of
resolving the debate.
This is because the psychological egoism/altruism debate does not merely concern
desires people have, but on what ultimate desires they have. If people are simply asked, for
example, why they work as volunteers at a homeless shelter, they may say that they do so
because they want to help others. But the egoist doesn‘t deny that people want to help other
people, she only denies that this desire to help others is an ultimate desire. If helping others, for
Daniel Batson and Laura Shaw define the empathy-altruism hypothesis by saying that it, ―…claims that empathic
emotion evokes truly altruistic motivation, motivation with an ultimate goal of benefiting not the self but the person
for whom empathy is felt‖ (Batson, 1991 #13, p. 107). This is consistent with Sober and Wilson‘s definition of
psychological altruism.
24
37
example, gives the volunteers a feeling of pleasure or satisfaction, and if these positive feelings
were themselves the ultimate motive for the action, psychological egoism has not been disputed
no matter how many hours one dedicates to charity work. Further, Sober and Wilson claim that,
―even the direct question ‗What are the ultimate motives behind your helping?‘ may fail to
produce the information we are looking for, if people lack introspective access to their ultimate
motives‖ (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 252).
While Sober and Wilson agree that introspection might be able to provide valuable
information, they say that whether or not it can do so is a ―contingent matter‖ (Sober & Wilson,
1998, p. 253). Introspection may work very well to determine if one is in pain, or whether one
finds a particular piece of music soothing, and yet it may not work well as a tool to completely
uncover all of one‘s innermost motivations. To decide whether introspection is reliable in a
particular type of case, one has to test whether or not introspective reports of one‘s own ultimate
desires correlate to the actual ultimate desires that one has. For this to work, we need an
independent method of evaluating a person‘s ultimate desires (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 253).
For this reason Sober and Wilson say, ―Quite obviously, the reliability of introspective reports
about ultimate motives cannot be decided directly, if we don‘t already know how to resolve the
debate between egoism and altruism‖ (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 253). This suggests that
empirical research is needed to resolve the issue.
Before moving on to the next argument, Sober and Wilson give further evidence that
introspection is at least sometimes unreliable (it lacks the necessary ―introspective access to
ultimate motives‖ it would need to do the job) by referencing Nisbett and Wilson‘s 1977 article,
―Telling More Than We Can Know---Verbal Reports on Mental Processes‖. In particular they
refer to the bystander effect.
38
The bystander effect itself is a startling discovery about human nature. It has been
observed that the more bystanders there are to a situation in which a person needs assistance, the
less likely it is that the person in need will be aided. This interesting fact is made relevant when
Sober and Wilson cite the 1970 work of Latane and Darley where subjects were asked, ―whether
their inclination to help was influenced by how many bystanders were present‖ and the subjects
―consistently denied that this was so, and also denied that other people are influenced by this
consideration‖ (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 255).
These two studies, taken together, makes it clear that introspective reports made by the
experimental subjects were not accurate since they behaved differently in situations where the
only variable of note was greater or fewer bystanders in a situation where a person was
ostensibly in need. In spite of their behavior, they claimed their thought processes were
unaffected by this factor. This does not show that all types of introspection are inaccurate, but it
does show that sometimes our introspective access to our own motivations is muddled.
Perhaps another psychological approach to resolving the psychological egoism/altruism
debate will be more fruitful.
1_2.2 Why the Law of Effect Fails as a Solution
The Law of Effect is the theory that ―learning requires organisms to experience positive
and negative sensations; experiencing the former and avoiding the later must constitute its
ultimate goals in behavior‖ (Sober& Wilson, 1998, p. 256). The idea is that a behavior which is
followed by pleasurable feedback is more likely to be repeated, while behavior that is followed
by painful feedback is more likely to be avoided in the future. When E. L. Thorndike proposed
this law, the idea was that ―Without this feedback loop through the experiential consequences of
39
behavior, there is no way for the organism to change the way it acts‖ (Sober& Wilson, 1998, p.
256).
Sober and Wilson make three key observations and objections to this theory as an
argument for psychological hedonism. First they say that, ―The law of effect does not say that
every behavior occurs because the organism was conditioned earlier; that would mean that no
behavior ever occurs for the first time‖ (1998, p. 257). They point out that such a suggestion
would be not only ludicrous but that for conditioning to occur in the first place, a behavior must
happen the first time, else wise no conditioning response could ever be applied to it (1998, p.
257). Further, the idea that all behaviors are conditioned would also conflict with the ―innate or
instinctual behaviors that we observe in many animals‖ (1998, p. 277).
Second, Sober and Wilson point out that even some environmentally dependent behavior
does not require this kind of conditioning. The example they use concerns greylag geese. The
goslings will imprint and follow a goose or a human that makes the correct calls in response to
the cries of the baby geese, but will not imprint on ―a model chicken that emits prerecorded calls,
if the calls are not produced in response to the goslings‘ calls‖ (Sober& Wilson, 1998, p. 257).
Third, while Sober and Wilson do not deny that conditioning occurs, they point out that,
―the law of effect is a general principle; the question is whether it is true of all behavior, not just
some‖ (Sober& Wilson, 1998, p. 258). They continue by saying that, ―being rewarded does not
always raise the probability of a behavior‘s being repeated, and probabilistic dependencies
between behavior and environment do not always stem from this type of conditioning process‖
(Sober& Wilson, 1998, p. 258-259). Most importantly, they point out that even in the cases
where the law of effect predicts behaviors it ―does not show that people care only about pleasure
and pain‖ (Sober& Wilson, 1998, p. 259). It only shows that pleasure and pain are motivators,
40
but this is not in doubt. To show that psychological hedonism is true, it must be shown both that
pleasure and pain are ultimate motivating desires, and that they are the only ultimate motivating
desires. Such conclusions are well beyond the scope of the argument (Sober& Wilson, 1998, p.
259).
A supplemental argument which could be given to undercut the law of effect itself (and
thus any arguments derived from it), comes from fact that there have been many quite successful
experiments that have resulted in instances of learning behavior that did involve pleasure or pain.
Many of these experiments use robots or computers equipped with sensing hardware coupled
with learning software of various kinds. MIT‘s ongoing experimental robot called COG, for
example, can learn to grab an object held in 3D space using two video cameras for eyes that
allow it to perceive depth. As far as practical applications in common use go, voice recognition
software learns how to adapt to the unique vocal patterns of particular speakers. Both COG and
voice recognition software show the ability to change behavior based on environmental feedback
and internal calculations.
The egoist might object that, in both of these cases, the software can detect (or is told)
when it fails in its task and therefore modifies itself so that it is less likely to repeat the same
behavior. Furthermore, they might object that this is exactly the same function that pain serves in
regards to learning for the law of effect theory. Of course the appropriate response to this is that
while it is true that these pieces of software have functions that are similar in many ways to
hypotheses about how pleasure and pain affect learning, the fact remains that they do not create
actual instances of pleasure or pain.25
25
I suppose a desperate egoist might further object that perhaps these pieces of software do in fact feel pleasure and
pain, but, though one can not claim to experience the world from the point of view of a computer, the suggestion
seems highly unlikely. This is made more unlikely by the fact that neuroscientists have identified parts of the brain
associated with pleasure and pain, and these structures are not used by the developers to create these programs.
41
Don‘t both COG and the voice recognition software learn by modifying their own
behavior when a task, or part of a task, is successful or fails? Of course they do. However, this
does not necessitate anything like the qualitative feelings of pleasure and pain. After all, the
indicators of success, failure, or both are the only relevant pieces of data by which to modify
behavior if successful task completion is the goal. Seen in this light, failure results in a reduced
chance of repeating unsuccessful strategies, and success increases the likelihood of repeating
successful ones. What else could it mean to learn through experience? In what sense could an
organism or machine be said to learn how to do a task through experience if success or failure at
that task did not affect how it behaves? However, behavior modification based on indicators of
success and/or failure remains separate from hedonistic motivators (such as pain).
Therefore, unless we are to suppose that programs, even those simple enough to be run
on low end PCs, (such as Dragon Naturally Speaking26) actually feel pain when the user corrects
the software‘s interpretation of a spoken word into a microphone, the existence of software that
can learn is proof that pleasure and pain are in fact not necessary conditions for learning at all.
Another line of objection that an egoist defending the law of effect might use is that, in
the cases of learning software, the software isn‘t really learning at all. An egoist may follow with
some argument that only conscious or biological beings can really learn. One who defends the
law of effect would have a hard time pulling this argument off, since, by her very own theory,
learning is just a matter of conditioning, and it is quite clear that these pieces of software are
capable of being conditioned. The software is subject to a form of conditioning that does not
involve pleasure or pain, but it is being conditioned nonetheless. The defender of the law of
26
Dragon Naturally Speaking is a popular and inexpensive piece of voice recognition software that allows a user to
input information, as if typing, by dictating into a microphone connected to her PC. The software, however, does not
work very well at first. It has to learn how to interpret the way that the operator speaks.
42
effect cannot avoid this conclusion by claiming that the ability to feel pleasure and pain are
definitional requirements of learning, since this would simply be begging the question.
Before moving on to Batson‘s empirical experiments, there is a coup de grace rebuttal
against egoist arguments based upon the supposed law of effect. The argument is this: Even if
the law of effect were true and the only way that an organism can learn is through pleasure
and/or pain conditioning, then that is merely a fact about how organisms learn. It is not a fact that
can be said to reveal their only ultimate desires. It is perfectly consistent with the law of effect
that an organism could act upon ultimate desires which, for one reason or another, play no role in
learning. This leaves plenty of elbow room for co-existence with psychological altruism. If any
action that involves ultimate desires (other than pleasure seeking/pain avoidance) also involves
learning behavior (either sometimes or always), then one could simply argue that the pleasure
and pain desires merely accompany these other ultimate desires either on some occasions or
always.27
The situation is even worse for the law of effect as an argument against psychological
altruism. This is because even if the desire for pleasure and the avoidance of pain turn out to be
the only ways in which an organism can learn, it does not follow that desire for pleasure (and to
avoid pain) are ultimate desires. They might just be instrumental desires that have the unique
property of playing a particular role in learning activity. Thus an argument from the law of effect
does not harm to the theory of psychological altruism.
1_2.3 Batson’s Experiments
Daniel Batson ran a series of experiments to prove his empathy-altruism hypothesis. His
experiments were designed with the hope of ruling out specific egoist hypotheses while showing
It should be emphasized here that this is an ―even if it were so‖ argument. I believe that the law of effect has been
adequately debunked by the previous arguments against it.
27
43
that the results are consistent with the empathy-altruism hypothesis. The empathy-altruism
hypothesis is the theory that experiencing empathy can cause persons to have altruistic ultimate
desires, and that these desires can cause persons to behave in altruistic ways (Batson, 1991, p.
107). This is different from any theory which might argue that empathy itself, or a desire to
increase or relieve empathetic states causes people to act in apparently altruistic ways. It is also
different from any theory that only makes a claim that people act in behaviorally altruistic ways.
The empathy-altruism hypothesis claims that empathy triggers altruistic ultimate desires
which concern only the wellbeing of others. Since desires are part of psychological motivations,
this makes the empathy-altruism hypothesis a hypothesis in favor of psychological altruism.
More will be said about the nature of psychological motives in Chapter Five, and evolutionary
(or behavioral) altruism will be discussed at a much greater length in Chapter Two.
Competing egoistic theories claim that empathy is related to helping behavior in other
ways, such as causing in the subject a desire to avoid guilt feelings that would result from
ignoring ones empathetically triggered emotions. Such theories are egoistic because they
hypothesize that people are only pursuing their own pleasures (or avoiding pains) by behaving in
apparently self-sacrificing ways. Another type of competing egoistic theory states that people act
on their empathy for the sake of personal payoffs that are likely to result from such behavior.
Again, such a theory hypothesizes that when people behave in apparently altruistic ways, they
are only concerned with their own benefit, and thus are egoistically driven.
These types of egoistic theories parallel the two that Batson notes when he says,
―One class [of egoistic theory] involves gaining rewards and avoiding punishments; the other,
reducing aversive arousal‖ (Batson, 1991, p. 110). His experiments are designed to test various
44
proposed egoistic theories in both of these classes against the psychologically altruistic empathyaltruism hypothesis. These theories, experiments, and results are described below.
1_2.3.1 The Aversive-Arousal Reduction Hypothesis
Batson pits the empathy-altruism hypothesis (EA) against numerous alternative egoistic
explanations. The first to be examined here will be the aversive-arousal reduction hypothesis
(AAR), which Batson says is, ―The most frequently proposed egoistic explanation of the
empathy-helping relationship‖ (Batson, 1991, p. 114). The AAR hypothesis states that when
people see other people whom they believe are having unpleasant experiences, they help because
the experience of witnessing suffering is painful. As an example, imagine a babysitter tenderly
rocking a baby to sleep, not because of any concern for the baby‘s own wellbeing, but because
the child‘s crying is disturbing her. The AAR hypothesis says that, ―[acting to help others one
sees in distress] is merely a means of achieving a better level of personal comfort‖ (Sober&
Wilson, 1998, p. 261). Batson explains the theory this way: ―According to this explanation
[AAR], empathically aroused individuals help in order to benefit themselves by reducing their
empathic arousal; benefiting the victim is simply a means to this self-serving end‖ (Batson, 1991,
p. 115). The contrast between AAR and Batson‘s empathy-altruism hypothesis (EA) is obvious.
Batson designed several experiments to test the AAR hypothesis against the EA
hypothesis. In the first study, subjects were told that they would watch Elaine, a fellow college
student, receive 10 electric shocks though a video feed leading to a different room.28 On the
television set, before any shocks were administered, the subjects got chance to see and hear one
of the experimenters tell Elaine how he is worried about her discomfort and that she can stop
taking shocks if the subject viewing her agrees to substitute for her. Elaine is happy to agree to
28
In reality, of course, there were no real shocks administered to the ―student‖. Elaine was an actress playing a role.
45
this. After a number of shocks have been administered, the experimenter enters the subject‘s
room and asks if the subject would be willing to swap positions with Elaine (Sober & Wilson,
1998, p. 262). Batson ran two versions of this experiment that deserve consideration.
Batson and his colleague‘s theory was that, if the AAR hypothesis were correct, then
people should feel relieved if they could escape from the painful empathy arousing situation and
would choose this escape over helping. This test can be called the easy-escape vs. difficultescape experiment. In this study the ―easy escape subjects‖ watched Elaine get shocked two out
of the ten times and were then given the opportunity to either swap places with her or leave the
room and do something else. The ―difficult escape students‖ had to watch up to ten shocks
administered, unless, of course, they would swap places with Elaine when given the opportunity
(Batson, 1991, p. 114).
This set up was then further divided between subjects who had high empathy for the
Elaine and those who had low empathy. These two conditions were controlled by having the
experimenters in the high-empathy groups describe Elaine in a way that closely matched the
subjects‘ own reports about themselves. In the low-empathy groups, the experimenters described
Elaine in a way that was opposed to the subjects own reports about themselves. This created four
possible result cells (high/low-empathy • easy/difficult-escape).29
The results showed that the helping responses of the subjects varied between the four
combinations of high/low empathy • easy/difficult escape. Sober and Wilson diagramed the
pattern of these results using the variables W, X, Y, and Z to stand in for the frequency of
subjects offering to help. The basic diagram looks like this:
29
It should be noted that the empathy manipulation was done to insure that subjects in the high-empathy group had
higher empathy on average than those in the lower empathy group. Batson does not pretend that each and every
individual in the high-empathy groups were appropriately empathetic, and the same thing goes for the low-empathy
groups (Batson, 1991 #19, p. 262).
46
Easy Difficult
Escape Escape
W
X
Low
Empathy
Y
Z
High
Empathy
Fig 1.2
The most direct way of understanding the significance of differing results for each of
these variables is to first understand what results the competing hypotheses would have
predicted. The empathy-altruism hypothesis predicts that high empathy groups would help more
often than low empathy groups. Thus, the results should be such that Y > W and Z > X.
Sober and Wilson point out that the aversive-arousal reduction hypothesis could be taken
in two ways. If it is taken just to mean that people sometimes help others because it is difficult
for them to escape the situation, AAR does not necessarily conflict with the EA hypothesis
(Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 263). After all, under AAR, one should expect that high empathy
individuals would experience more pain at seeing the person they empathize with suffer, and
therefore offer to help more often. So, if the data from the experiment showed that Y > W and Z
> X, this would not disconfirm this version of the egoist thesis at all. If that is as far as the AAR
hypothesis goes, then it merely predicts that X > W and/or Z > Y. This is just to say that it
predicts that those who find it difficult to escape will help others more often than those who find
it easy to escape (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 263).
However, if the aversive-arousal reduction hypothesis is to be taken as a reason for
rejecting the empathy-altruism hypothesis, then either one or both of the theories needs to predict
47
more than just X > W and Z > Y. Therefore, Batson takes the empathy-altruism hypothesis to
predict that the high empathy group of individuals will help more often than the low empathy
group even when escape is easy. This seems pretty straightforward since the EA hypothesis says
that empathy helps trigger or create altruistic ultimate desires. According to the EA hypothesis,
once empathetic feelings have initiated an altruistic ultimate desire, simply escaping the area will
not satisfy that desire. This is because the ultimate desire that is initiated, according to the EA
hypothesis, concerns the welfare of the needy other as an ultimate end. Any subject would know
that removing oneself from the presence of a suffering person does nothing to actually help the
person in need, and therefore their desire that to improve the other‘s wellbeing would not be
satisfied. Under this interpretation then, if EA is true then Y should be approximately equal to Z.
On the other hand, if the aversive-arousal reduction hypothesis were true, then easy
escape should be the preferable choice for both empathy levels since the AAR theory states that
personal discomfort at seeing another in distress is what motivates helping behavior. So, while
AAR predicts that X > W and Z > Y, it also predicts that W ≈ Y and X ≈ Z (Sober & Wilson
1998, p. 263-264). Now that it is clear what each theory predicts, the results of the experiment
can be adequately interpreted.
The results support the predictions of the empathy altruism hypothesis and provide hard
evidence against the aversive-arousal response hypothesis, at least when AAR is taken as a
monistic egoistic claim. Indeed, according to Batson in a 1991 paper entitled Evidence for
Altruism, there have been more than half a dozen experiments completed using this basic
structure and:
Results of these experiments have consistently conformed to the pattern predicted
by the empathy-altruism hypothesis, not to the pattern predicted by the aversive
48
arousal reduction explanation. Only among individuals experiencing a
predominance of personal distress rather than empathy (i.e., feeling relatively
anxious, upset, distressed, and the like) does the chance for easy escape reduce
helping. (Batson, 1991, p. 115)
1_2.3.2 The Empathy Specific Punishment Hypothesis
Of course, the aversive arousal reduction hypothesis isn‘t the only possible egoistic, or
even hedonistic, theory. Indeed, there are many others. The next one to be examined is called the
empathy-specific punishment hypothesis (ESP). According to Batson and Shaw ESP claims that
―we have learned through socialization that additional obligation to help, and so additional guilt
and shame for failure to help, are attendant on feeling empathy for someone in need. As a result,
when we feel empathy, we are faced with impending social or self censure above and beyond
any general punishment associated with not helping‖ (Batson, 1991, p. 115).
Applying this theory to the previous experiment, ESP would predict along with Baton‘s
EA hypothesis that Y > W, Z > X, and Y ≈ Z. In other words, in the previous experiment ESP
would predict exactly the same things that the EA hypothesis predicted, and therefore a new
experiment must be designed to test EA against ESP. Batson therefore designed a modified
experiment reasoning that ESP should predict that, in cases where the chances of censure by
others were reduced along with the reasons for self-censure, altruistic acts should be less
common.
To test for this, Batson constructed an experiment similar to the first, except that subjects
were given either high justification or low justification for not helping before the experiment
began instead of easy or difficult opportunities for escape. The subjects who were in the high
justification (for not helping) group were told that few other subjects had helped, and the low
49
justification group members were told that few other subjects had refused to help (Sober, 1998
#1, p. 265). The data cells for this experiment (again using W, X, Y and Z as variables) look like
this:
Justification for not Helping
Low High
Low
W
X
Y
Z
Empathy
High
Empathy
Fig 1.3
The empathy-altruism hypothesis should still predict that Y > W and that Z > X, since
higher levels of altruism should create more or stronger, or more and stronger altruistic ultimate
desires. Additionally, Batson believes that EA should predict that W < X on the grounds that
those with low empathy are even more unlikely to help if they are given a justification not to do
so. The ESP hypothesis makes these three predictions as well, however, and so a point of
disagreement between the predictions of the two hypotheses must be found. Batson takes it that
the two theories disagree as to whether or not Z will be greater than Y. For Batson‘s EA
hypothesis, the level of justification for not helping should matter very little because altruistic
ultimate desires should have been triggered, and justification for not helping at that point should
no longer matter (at least not as much). Therefore EA predicts that the high empathy groups
under both levels of justification for not helping will offer to help roughly the same percentage of
the time Y ≈ Z. However, if ESP is true, then Z should be greater than Y. This is because the
desire to help, under the ESP theory, is just a way to avoid self censure or the censure of others
50
and therefore, if the likelihood of these types of censure is reduced, then even the high empathy
subjects should be less motivated to help (Batson, 1991, p. 116).
The data resulting from the experiment showed that the percentage of high-empathy
members who offered to help was not affected by the level of justification they were given for
not helping. This is in contrast to what the egoistic ESP theory predicted, and in agreement with
the predictions of the EA hypothesis. But, Sober and Wilson do not find this victory conclusive.
They say, ―a central interpretive questions remains: Does empathy promote helping by causing
subjects to have an altruistic ultimate motive? …this question remains open‖ (Sober & Wilson,
1998, p. 266).30
1_2.3.3 The Empathy Specific Reward Hypothesis
There is yet another egoistic hypothesis that Batson wanted to test. This one is much like
the last, except that while ESP dealt with empathy-specific punishments, this new egoistic theory
involves empathy-specific rewards. The empathy-specific reward hypothesis (ESR) comes in
two forms, both of which will be examined here. According to Batson:
The empathy-specific reward hypothesis claims that we learn through
socialization that we are eligible for special praise from others or special selfrewards when we help a person for whom we feel empathy. Thereafter, when we
feel empathy, we of think these social or self-rewards and help out of an egoistic
desire to gain them. (Batson, 1991, p. 149)
It might also be worth adding that the use of a blatant logical fallacy such as the ―bandwagon argument‖ to
―justify‖ not helping might simply be too absurd on the surface to provide a good variable for the experiment, if the
participants recognize on some level that what other people did isn‘t truly a justification for behavior. Perhaps if the
subjects were told that the person they were choosing to help or not help was himself/herself in the position of
helping or not helping a previous subject in the experiment and then chose not to help, then that would provide a
better justification for not helping. This sort of retributivist justification for not helping may also, in fact, be flawed,
but at least it is not logically fallacious upon a surface level examination.
30
51
The first version of this theory claims that, ―we gain additional social and self-rewards
when we help someone for whom we feel empathy‖ (Batson, 1991, p. 149). The second version
claims that, ―feeling empathy for a person who is suffering involves a state of temporary sadness
or depression, and empathic individuals are motivated to relieve this negative affective state. The
negative state can be relieved by any mood-enhancing experience‖ (Batson, 1991, p. 163). These
two versions of the theory will be called ESR1 and ESR2 respectively.
Batson designed two experiments to test ESR1. The theory behind the first of these
experiments is that, because according to ESR1 the subject must be the helper to receive the
mood enhancing effect, the subjects‘ moods should not be elevated if they find out that their aid
was no longer needed or that another had already helped. The EA hypotheses, in contrast,
predicts that, since empathy generates an ultimate desire for the other‘s welfare, mood
enhancement should occur (as an effect) so long as the focus of their empathy is no longer in
need.31
The subjects of the first experiment were told that they could help a fellow schoolmate,
Elaine, by performing a simple task which would reduce the number of shocks she had to take.
Of these subjects, half of them were later informed that they would not be allowed to perform the
task which would help Elaine. This split the subjects into two possible cells, those who would be
allowed to perform the helping task and those who would not be. Each of these cells was then
divided again when half the students in each cell were told that the help was no longer necessary
because their schoolmate would not be subject to the shock taking experiment after all. This
further division produced four possible cells. This number was then doubled again to eight
because, as with all the experiments that will be discussed in this section, the subjects were
31
The EA hypothesis does not deny that pleasure and/or pain may sometimes, or even always, accompany how one
acts when empathically aroused. It only denies that pleasure and pain must always be the cause of behaviors that
result from strong feelings of empathy.
52
divided into high and low empathy groups. The subjects‘ moods were tested, both after the time
they were first told that they would have an opportunity to help, and at the end of the experiment
(Batson, 1991, p. 150). Assigning letters to the cells produces a chart like this:
Perform
Not perform
Low Empathy
Perform
High Empathy
Not Perform
Shocks Occur: A B C D
No Shock Threat: E F G H
Fig. 1.4
If ESR1 were correct, then mood should be elevated only when the threat was believed to
be real and when the subjects were given an opportunity to help. This is to say that ESR1
predicts that C > D, C > G, and C > H. The EA hypothesis predicts that mood should be low only
in the cell where the other is still in danger and the subject cannot help, and so it predicts that C,
G, and H are all greater than D.
The resulting data lent no support to the predictions of ESR1, while the evidence
―provided clear support for… [the EA hypothesis] prediction‖ (Batson, 1991, p. 151).
Interestingly however, when the results for the low empathy group were tested, the analysis
actually showed that low empathy individuals performed the assigned task better (circled more
correct answers)32 when told their classmate was not going to receive any shocks (cell E)
(Batson, 1991, p. 150-151).
The second experiment that Batson ran was similar to the first, except that it used the
―Stroop procedure‖ to test whether the subjects were thinking more about rewards or the welfare
of their classmate. The Stroop procedure measures the latency of naming the colors that words
32
The task that subjects had to perform was to circle as many combinations of numbers that would add up to a
specific other number as they could on a sheet of paper filled with pre-generated numbers.
53
shown on slides are written in. When the words shown are relevant to what the subject is
thinking about, the latency for naming the color of the word is supposed to be longer than the
latency for neutral words. The prediction of ESR1 was that the latency of naming the colors of
reward words should be larger that of neutral words, a prediction which was not supported by the
experimental data. (Batson, 1991, p. 153)
1_2.3.4 ESR2: The Negative-State Relief Hypothesis
The second version of the empathy specific reduction hypothesis was introduced by
Cialdini et al. in 1987 and is sometimes called the negative-state relief hypothesis. This
hypothesis is similar to the first version except that the discomfort felt by the empathetically
aroused individual ―can be relieved by any mood-enhancing experience, including but not
limited to obtaining the social and self-rewards of helping‖ (Batson, 1991, p. 163-164). This
theory too can explain why a person with high empathy might help, even when escape is easy. It
can also explain the results that contradicted ESR1 in the previous experiment, since under this
theory, C, G, and H should all be greater than D. Therefore, this version of the theory was not
falsified by Batson‘s previous experiment.
Cialdini and his colleagues ran an experiment in which some subjects were given a
mood-enhancing experience before they were given the opportunity to help a needy other
(Batson, 1991, p. 164). This experiment again used ―Elaine,‖ who would take shocks to which
she would react to as if experiencing elevating levels of discomfort.33 The subjects were then
asked if they would like to help Elaine, an opportunity which they did not expect. Some of the
subjects were allowed to escape even if they chose not to help, while others would have to watch
the full regiment of shocks (Batson, 1991, p. 164).
33
Again, ―Elaine‖ was an actress and did not actually receive any shocks.
54
Some of the high empathy subjects were given a mood enhancing experience just
prior to being asked if they would be willing to help. Of those who received a mood-enhancing
experience, some were told that they would receive a dollar for participating, and others were
praised by being told that ―their performance on a previously completed questionnaire indicated
that they had ‗fine social abilities‘‖ (Batson, 1991, p. 165). The prediction made by Cialdini was
that those who received the mood enhancing experiences would have their negative state relieved
which would prevent an increased motivation to help for the high empathy subjects (Batson,
1991, p. 165). That is to say that those who received either mood-enhancing experience should
help less than those who received none.
Batson reports that the mood-enhanced subjects in the easy escape cell indeed
helped less than those who were not as Cialdini predicted but that, ―This difference did not,
however, approach statistical significance‖ (Batson, 1991, p. 165). The results were further
complicated by the fact that only those subjects who received the monetary reward showed this
decrease. This fact was made even more bizarre because payment seemed to reduce helping in
the difficult escape cell just as much as in the easy escape cell. Batson says that this suggests
―the presence of processes other than negative-state relief, such as reactance‖ and that the
experiment by Cialdini et al. ―raised more questions than it answered‖ (Batson, 1991, p. 166).
The second experiment that Cialdini performed was similar to the first except that the
subjects were given a placebo before the experiment and some of these subjects were told (right
before they were given an opportunity to help) that the pill they had taken would fix their mood
so that it would not change. The logic of this procedure was that, according to ESR2, the subjects
who were told their mood was fixed in place should not expect to receive a mood enhancing
experience from helping and therefore should help less often. This experiment was also different
55
in that it did not revolve around a student being shocked, but instead one who needed some help
going over her class notes (Batson, 1991, p. 166).
The results of the experiment were mixed. While the amount of time that the students
agreed to spend helping the student go over her class notes fit the ESR2 hypothesis, the number
of participants who volunteered to help did not fit the pattern predicted by ESR2. The results
therefore fell somewhere between the predictions of the negative state relief hypothesis and the
empathy-altruism hypothesis (Batson, 1991, p. 166). Cialdini interpreted this data as support for
his hypothesis, but did point out that the results could have been due to distraction as a result of
timing because the subjects were told about the supposed effects of the ―drug‖ they had taken
immediately before they were offered the opportunity to help.34
Schroeder, Dovido, Sibicky, Matthews, and Allen performed a different experiment in
1988 which was designed to test the same hypothesis. They used the same mood-fixing placebo
method as Cialdini and ―a very similar need situation and helping response‖ (Batson, 1991 #19,
pg 167). Their results differed from Cialdini‘s, and they found no drop in the amount of helping
in the high empathy cell in which the subjects were told about the supposed effects of the ―drug‖
they took. As the empathy-altruism hypothesis would have predicted, they found more helping in
the high empathy condition than in the low. There were some traces of the ambiguous pattern in
the Cialdini experiment, which Batson says were based largely on an ―internal analyses
comparing the helping of participants reporting a relative predominance of empathy with the
One might further object here that the very idea of a placebo that supposedly fixed one‘s mood is not a very good
way to manipulate the key variable here. After all, the subjects of the experiments should know if they are feeling
anything for the other in need, and further, by imagining helping or not, they may very well have been able to test
how they would feel by acting to help or not. I do not deny that sometimes a placebo can have a powerful effect, but
it seems to me that in most such cases the subjects of the experiments do not have such direct access to the effects
that the supposed drug has. Consider, for example, giving somebody a sugar pill and telling them that it is a drug
that will make them temporarily blind for an hour, starting in 5 minutes. Though a test would have to be done to
confirm this, it seems terribly unlikely that any of these subjects would find themselves suddenly bereft of sight. In
much the same way, it seems unlikely the placebo Cialdini used would prevent the subjects from accessing their
internal emotional states.
34
56
helping of those reporting a relative predominance of distress‖ (Batson, 1991, p. 168). Further,
―Schroeder et al. concluded that their results were more supportive of the empathy-altruism
hypothesis than the negative-state relief explanation‖ (Batson, 1991, p. 168). The primary
difference between the two experiments, which Batson suggests might be the reason for the
differing results, is that in Schroeder‘s experiment the subjects were informed about the effects
of the placebo well before they were asked to help. Indeed, they were told even before they were
presented with the needy other. According to Batson, this supports the possibility that the results
of the Cialdini experiment might have been due to distraction, and not the forces predicted in his
hypothesis.
Because of this possibility of distraction, Schaller and Cialdini conducted another
experiment in 1988 using the same procedure except that, instead of telling the subjects that they
had been given a mood-fixing drug, some of the subjects were told that whether they decided to
help or not, their mood would be enhanced by listening to a comedy routine. In order to reduce
possible distraction, the subjects were told this at the beginning of the study and only reminded
of it before given the opportunity to help.
Again, the results did not ―provide unambiguous support for either the negative-state
relief explanation or the empathy-altruism hypothesis…. On neither dependent measure was the
pattern predicted by either hypothesis statistically reliable‖ (Batson, 1991, p. 169). Schaller and
Cialdini claimed support for the ESR2 hypothesis but:
[They] also counseled caution, for two reasons: First, they noted that effects were
weak due to a great amount of error variance on their helping measure. In an
attempt to reduce this error variance, they introduced a post hoc time-of-semester
variable, which created 30 cells of small and unequal Ns…that were subject to
57
unequal weighting in the least-squares analysis that Schaller and Cialdini
performed:
Second…the lack of difference in helping between the low-and highempathy conditions for participants anticipating mood-enhancement seemed due
more to an unpredicted increase in helping in the low-empathy condition than to
the predicted decrease in the high-empathy condition. This unpredicted increase
in the low-empathy condition would easily account for the observed lack of
association between empathy and helping in the mood-enhancement condition.
(Batson, 1991, p. 169-170)
So far, the value of the negative state relief hypothesis (ESR2) is still unresolved. For this
reason, Batson performed his own experiment.
1_2.3.4 Batson Tests the Negative-State Relief Hypothesis (ESR2)
Due to conflicting results, Batson decided to perform his own tests of the negative-state
relief hypothesis (ESR2). He conducted three studies. In order to avoid possible distraction,
―they used an anticipated mood-enhancement manipulation much like the one used by Shaller
and Cialdini [In the previously mentioned experiment]‖ (Batson, 1991, p. 170). Batson says:
Participants were led to expect that if they chose not to help they would
immediately watch a 5-minute video that either would not enhance their mood or
would cause ―strong feelings of happiness and pleasure.‖ (Batson, 1991, p. 170)
The first of the three studies was designed to test the effectiveness of the manipulation for
mood-enhancement. The second and third studies tested the predictions of the two contradictory
theories, ESR2 vs. EA.
58
The second study once again used ―Elaine,‖ who was to be shocked as before. A portion
of the subjects were informed that if they decided not to help, they would watch a video that
would enhance their mood and others were told that they would watch a ―neutral video‖ (Batson,
1991, p. 170). Students were also evaluated for feelings of personal distress or empathy through
the use of self-reporting techniques.
The EA hypothesis predicted that helping should drop for those who were distressed, but
be high for those who were experiencing stronger feelings of empathy. The negative state relief
hypothesis, on the other hand, predicted both that the empathic rather than distressed individuals
should help more (just as the EA hypothesis predicted) and that helping should be lower for
those subjects who were told that they would be allowed to watch the mood-enhancing video.
The results of the experiment, according to Batson, were ―consistent with the prediction
of the empathy-altruism hypothesis‖ and, ―contrary to the predictions of the negative-state relief
version of the empathy-specific reward hypothesis, there was no evidence that anticipated mood
enhancement reduced the rate of helping by individuals reporting a predominance of empathy‖
(Batson, 1991, p. 171-172).
Experiment three used a fictional predicament of ―Katie Banks‖ whose parents had
allegedly died and who was having great difficulty supporting her two siblings, fearing that she
might even have to put one or both of them up for adoption. Mood enhancement ―was
manipulated as in the previous study‖ (Batson, 1991, p. 172).
According to Batson, the results were, ―consistent with the predictions of the empathyaltruism hypothesis…there was only one reliable effect, the main effect for empathy…the
proportion helping was high in the high-empathy condition‖ (Batson, 1991, p. 172). The
negative-state relief hypothesis, on the other hand, was not borne out by the evidence. According
59
to Batson there was, ―no evidence that anticipated mood enhancement reduced the rate of
helping in the high-empathy condition‖ (Batson, 1991, p. 172).
Given these experiments, why do Sober and Wilson argue that the empathy
altruism hypothesis has not been confirmed? The answer is not hard to see. It is because they
point out that an egoistic explanation is readily available that can fit with the results of the
experiment. They say:
If empathizing with a needy other makes a subject sad, why expect the subject to
think that… [a mood enhancing experience] will be a completely satisfactory
mood corrective? When we are sad, we usually are sad about something in
particular. It is not surprising that the pain we experience in empathizing with the
suffering of others is not completely assuaged by any old pleasant experience;
however, this presents no difficulty for the egoism hypothesis.35 (Sober, 1998, p.
271)
Lise Wallach and Michael A. Wallach make a similar objection, saying:
If I am empathically aroused by another‘s troubles, some symbolic representation
of their suffering is likely to continue, especially if I have every reason to believe,
as subjects do in these experiments, that the suffering will continue. Given such
symbolic representation, aversive arousal should still be anticipated as well. To
offer escape from witnessing the suffering of the victim, therefore, does not offer
removal of the aversive arousal produced by that suffering. For high empathizers,
to continue helping even though escape is made possible thus could still be due to
35
In this quote Sober and Wilson were talking about music as a mood enhancing experience, which I replaced with a
more general term in brackets to avoid confusion. The point they make, however, remains the same.
60
their desire to reduce their own aversive arousal. (Wallach & Wallach, 1991, p.
153)
Another way to try to save the ESR2 theory would be to object that the reward offered
was simply not comparable in intensity to empathetic response that resulted from learning about
the needy other. Further, the type of pleasure that results from the helping of the needy other is
harder to come by than the pleasure offered by the experimenters in the studies above.36 One can
rent their own mood enhancing videotape or comedy routine. What is more, the subject is more
likely to know what kind of video or comedian is likely to please her than are the experimenters.
Indeed, the subjects in this case may have very little desire to sit through what somebody else
claims is entertaining. After all, unless they knew the experimenters well, they would have no
reason to trust them in matters of taste.
Because of the mixed results of experiments dealing with the negative state relief
hypothesis (ESR2), even Batson cautioned a certain amount of restraint in the interpretation of
his own studies. He says:
Evidence to date suggests that this third egoistic alternative to the empathyaltruism hypothesis is probably wrong, but the evidence is not as overwhelming
or clear as evidence against the aversive-arousal reduction and empathy-specific
punishment hypotheses. Further tests of the empathy-specific reward hypothesis,
especially Version 2 of this hypothesis, are warranted. (Batson, 1991, p. 174)
Though Batson believes he can claim significant support for the empathy-altruism
hypothesis, he is aware that more work needs to be done to obtain a clear result that favors the
36
It is further possible that being empathically aroused is more easily satisfied by a pleasure that derives from
helping than from a humorous comedy routine in just the same way that somebody who has had her appetite for
food aroused is more likely to be satisfied by the pleasure of eating than from the pleasure of a hot bath. If this is the
case, then one should expect the same results (in these experiments) from both the ESR2 theory and the EA
hypothesis.
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empathy-altruism hypothesis over some egoistic alternatives. Sober and Wilson, and Lise and
Michael Wallach are even less sanguine about his results than that.
1_2.3. 5 Batson and the Empathetic Joy Hypothesis
The empathetic joy hypothesis is a 1989 attempt by Smith, Keating, and Scotland to save
ESR1 from the experimental evidence against it. This version of the empathy specific reward
hypothesis states that, ―empathetically aroused individuals help to gain the good feelings of
sharing vicariously in the needy person‘s joy at improvement‖ (Batson, 1991, p. 153). Batson
notes that this is contrary to the EA hypothesis which claims that empathetic joy is merely a
consequence and ―not the goal‖ of helping behavior.
Smith et al. designed an experiment to test their hypothesis. In this experiment subjects
were divided into different groups based upon whether or not they believed they would receive
future feedback about the needy other if they helped. The reasoning behind this experiment is
that, if people are motivated by empathetic joy, they should be motivated to help more often
when they believe they will receive feedback and be able to share in the joy of the other more
easily than when they do not.
The setup for this experiment was simple. Subjects were divided into high/low empathy
groups, which were then divided into feedback/no-feedback cells. If the empathy altruism
hypothesis were true, then feedback should not affect the likelihood of helping behavior;
whereas, if the empathetic joy hypothesis were true, then the high-empathy/no-feedback cell
should show a significant reduction in helping behavior compared to the high-empathy/feedback
cell. Empathy was manipulated through perspective taking instructions, and the helping
opportunity that the subjects received was the opportunity to write a letter to a (fictitious) student
allegedly having problems adjusting to college. Some subjects were told that if they chose to
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write a letter giving advice to this person, they would get to see another video of how she has
adjusted. If they chose not to help in this way, then they could simply watch a video of another
student. The no-feedback subjects were treated in the same way as the feedback subjects except
that they were not told that they would get any further information about the needy student
(Batson, 1991, p. 154-156).
The results of the study were mixed. Batson says, ―when empathy condition (low vs.
high) was based on the experimental manipulation…helping results conformed to the predictions
of the empathy-altruism hypothesis, not the empathetic-joy hypothesis‖ (Batson, 1991, p. 157).
However, when the results were based on a median split the helping in the no-feedback/highempathy cell was lower than the other high-empathy cell though this ―did not, however,
approach statistical significance‖ (Batson, 1991, p. 157). When the median split was done not
just on self-reported empathy but on empathy minus levels of distress, ―helping was higher in the
feedback/high-relative-empathy cell than in each of the other three cells‖ but there were no
statistically significant differences between the other three cells (Batson, 1991, p. 157). That is to
say that in the high-relative-empathy/no-feedback cell, the results were approximately the same
as in the low-relative-empathy/no-feedback cell. Smith et al. claimed support for the empatheticjoy hypothesis by using the resulting data in the third way.
Batson argues that the experiment was subject to error because the subjects, being
students themselves, were likely to share some of the fictitious student‘s worries. He says, ―It is
easy to imagine that reports of empathy would be high for participants who were themselves
having similar problems, and that, moreover these individuals would be especially interested to
learn whether their advice produced beneficial effects. After all, this information might be useful
in their own coping efforts‖ (Batson, 1991, p. 158). Batson also hypothesized that because the
63
situation of the needy other in this case was ―rather stereotypic and not physically disturbing‖ it
was more likely that the data would be corrupted by students who merely wanted to appear
empathic (Batson, 1991, p. 158).
For these reasons, Batson et. al. performed their tests for the empathetic-joy hypothesis.
They used perspective taking instructions to produce high and low empathy subjects. However,
instead of using a fictional student having problems adjusting to college as their needy other,
they used the fictitious Katie Banks who needed assistance in order to take care of her younger
brother and sister because her parents had recently died in an accident. Participants were asked if
they would like to help by working to stuff envelopes to raise funds for Katie and her siblings.
Those in the no-feedback cells were told that they would not be able to learn of the effects of
their work on her behalf. Those in the feedback group were told that anybody who decided to
help would receive follow-up information on Katie and their own efforts to aid her. There was
also an additional feedback condition in Batson‘s experiment. The high and low empathy
subjects in this third condition were given no information at all about whether they would
receive further news about their efforts or not. This was included because Smith et al. ―used this
assumption [that subject‘s would presume that they would receive feedback in the absence of
contrary information] to explain why in previous research an empathy-helping relationship had
been found when no explicit information about feedback was provided‖ (Batson, 1991, p. 159).
The analysis of the resulting data, ―revealed evidence of the empathy-helping relationship
predicted by the empathy-altruism hypothesis in both the no-information (replication)
conditions…and the no-feedback condition…. The significant difference in the no-feedback
condition was contrary to the prediction of the empathic-joy hypothesis‖ (Batson, 1991, p. 160).
The experiment led to unexpected results, however, since the feedback condition showed no
64
evidence of an empathy-helping relationship. This effect was the result of the fact that both the
high and low empathy feedback conditions produced similar results. Batson et al. claims that
this, ―seemed to be due primarily to the relatively high helping among the low-empathy
individuals led to anticipate feedback‖ but also stated that, ―In retrospect, this unpredicted
increase seemed entirely reasonable. Low-empathy individuals less concerned about Katie‘s
welfare and more concerned about their own, may have been especially sensitive to the potential
for vicarious pleasure in knowing that Katie was better‖ (Batson, 1991, p. 160).
Also, contrary to Smith‘s claim that subjects who are given no information about
receiving feedback one way or another assume that they will be receive feedback, the noinformation subjects behaved in the same way as those who were told specifically that they
would receive no feedback.
Batson claims that his results indicate a victory for the empathy-altruism theory once the
increased helping of the low-empathy feedback cell is taken into account and that, regardless of
this, the experiment produced no support for the empathic-joy hypothesis. Nevertheless, Batson
et al. ran two other experiments pitting the empathic-joy hypothesis against the empathy-altruism
hypothesis.
In these other two experiments, the subjects were given no opportunity to help the needy
other at all, but were instead given the choice between hearing updated information about this
individual and learning about the situation of a new person. The subjects in these experiments
were split into cells based on high and low empathy and whether they were told that the needy
other had a 20% chance of improving, a 50% chance of improving, or an 80% chance of
improving. The two experiments differed in respect to the needy other. In the first experiment,
the subjects were exposed to a woman who was supposedly having trouble adjusting to college,
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and in the second the subjects were exposed to the situation of the fictional Katie Banks again
who was having trouble taking care of her siblings after her parents suddenly died.
The empathic-joy hypothesis predicted that the desire to receive follow up information on
the case should increase with the probability of this follow up information being positive. Desire
to receive follow up information in the 20% cells should be the lowest while the 80% cells
should be the highest and the 50% cells should lay somewhere in between. The empathy-altruism
hypothesis made a different prediction. It predicted that either there would be no relationship at
all between the likelihood of positive news and the desire to receive follow-up information, or
that the desire to receive follow-up information should be highest when the odds of improvement
were at 50% because this is ―where there would be maximum uncertainty about improvement‖
(Batson, 1991, p. 162).
The data from these two experiments revealed the response pattern predicted by the
empathy-altruism hypothesis. High-empathy subjects were more likely to want to hear follow up
information. There was no evidence of an increasing desire to hear follow up information as the
odds of good news increased for high-empathy individuals. For low empathy individuals there
was evidence of this, but the empathy altruism hypothesis only applies to individuals who are
feelings levels of empathy that are strong enough to generate ultimate desires for the well being
of another. EA does not deny that low-empathy individuals may be affected by any number of
variables or even that other theories may describe these effects (Batson, 1991, p. 163). For the
high-empathy individuals, the desire for new information increased slightly when the likelihood
of good news was 50%.
Batson claims that this is yet another victory for the empathy-altruism hypothesis, but
Sober and Wilson are not so sure. They say:
66
…it is not difficult to invent an egoistic explanation of this outcome. Uncertainty
can be a torment; this is a familiar experience when the question mark concerns
our own welfare, and also when the uncertainty involves the well-being of those
we care about. Of course, we‘d rather receive good news than bad, but people also
prefer receiving information over remaining in the dark. We may apply this idea
to Batson‘s experiment by hypothesizing that high-empathy subjects choose to
receive news because they want to reduce the disagreeable feelings that
accompany uncertainty. In addition, declining the offer of information might
make high-empathy subjects feel guilty. Apparently, the results of this experiment
can be accommodated within the framework of egoism. (Sober & Wilson, 1998,
p. 268)
In addition to Sober and Wilson‘s objection, one may want to consider the fact that, in
Batson‘s last two experiments, helping behavior was never tested for. Subjects were never given
an opportunity to help. Yet the claim of the empathy-altruism hypothesis is that strong feelings
of empathy for a needy other trigger ultimate desires to help that person. No part of this theory
predicts that empathically aroused individuals are more likely to want to hear new information
about a person whom they have no chance of helping. Had the results been different, the
defender of EA could have easily claimed that high-empathy subjects were less likely to want
new information in this experiment only because it is painful and pointless to continue to
experience empathy for a needy other when one can do nothing to aid this individual. Thus even
if the experiment‘s results were consistent with the predictions of the empathic-joy hypothesis,
the empathy-altruism hypothesis would suffer no harm. A defender of the empathetic-joy
hypothesis could also explain this result in the same way Batson did. The defender of the
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empathic-joy hypothesis could simply say that uncertainty is highest at 50%, and that this is the
result of a separate force affecting the subjects other than empathic-joy.
Further, the results of these two experiments do not necessarily work to undermine the
empathic-joy hypothesis. The defender of the empathic-joy hypothesis could maintain that the
reason people engage in helping behavior is to share vicariously in the joy at the other‘s relief,
and still cope with the results of Batson‘s experiments. She may do this by replying that
regardless of how likely the other was to improve, the follow up information is the subject‘s only
option for experiencing empathic-joy, and the reason why the individuals in the high-empathy
cells desire follow up information more often and that all the high empathy cells produced
similar results, is because the lower the likelihood of improvement is for the needy other is the
stronger the desire for empathic-joy becomes. High-empathy individuals in the 20% cell ask for
updated information approximately as often as those in the 80% cell because those in the 20%
cell have a greater desire for empathic joy because they have been given more disturbing
information. Even though the chances of receiving good news is slimmer for the 20% cells,
gaining new information remains the only possibility for acquiring empathic-joy from this
situation.
The point here is that defenders of the empathic-joy hypothesis still have some fairly
obvious options left open to them, and there seems to be no readily apparent way to fix the
situation. It at least seems like, no matter what the experiment, either theory could be tweaked to
fit the resulting data. Batson‘s experiments may undermine a simplistic or naive version of the
empathic-joy hypothesis, but not one that takes into account a more realistic, and/or more
complex human psychology.
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1_2.3.6 Some Conclusions Regarding Batson’s Work
By now a pattern should be beginning to take form concerning psychological
experimentation. In Sober and Wilson‘s words, ―The strategy behind Batson‘s research program
is to show that each of the versions of egoism he has formulated encounters observations that it
is unable to explain‖ (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 271). Largely, Batson has been successful in
doing just that. Even given this, Sober and Wilson ask the important question, ―How do these
findings bear on the question of whether there is a set of observations that no version of egoism
will be able to explain?‖ (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 271). Every time an egoistic hypothesis is
shot down, another one can (at least seemingly) pop up to replace it, and often times this requires
very little actual modification of the original theory. Sober and Wilson note that it could be
suggested that Batson‘s experiments ―raise the probability‖ that no version of egoism will work,
though the issue is by no means settled.
I am not sure I would even state Batson‘s case that strongly. There were hundreds of
attempts to make a flying machine before Wilbur and Orville Wright succeeded. Yet it does not
seem at all clear that each failed attempt significantly increased the likelihood that the
construction of a flying vehicle was impossible. By saying this, I do not simply mean that it is
obvious now because the Wright brothers were successful. Rather I mean that, because there had
not been a serious and extended scientific effort to develop such a device, rendering a conclusion
that an invention or discovery is impossible based on induction is weak. If induction shows us
anything, it is that when attempting a new and difficult task one should expect many failures
before a success. Batson has tested the empathy-altruism hypothesis against only a handful of
very simple egoistic possibilities.
I do not deny that induction is legitimate (even in these cases), or that the continued
failure of a type of theory could very well indicate that a theory of that class is less likely to be
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true. As an example, it seems clear to me that induction alone can give us a good reason to doubt
supernatural explanations. This is because we have very long history supernatural explanations
for events all of which have failed. My objection here is merely that there has not been enough
experimentation yet to produce any significant inductive evidence showing that an egoistic
theory will not work. It should also be pointed out that, though Sober and Wilson are open to the
idea that Batson‘s experiments have increased the probability that pure egoistic theories of
motivation are incorrect, they still say:
Nonetheless, when we survey the ingenious experiments that social psychologists
have constructed, we feel compelled to conclude that this experimental work has
not resolved the question of what our ultimate motives are. The psychological
literature has performed the valuable service of organizing the problem and
demonstrating that certain simple egoistic explanations are inadequate. However,
there is more to egoism than the hypotheses tested so far. What we find here is a
standoff. (Sober& Wilson, 1998, p. 271)
As a result, Sober and Wilson claim that the egoism vs. altruism debate is still alive and
well. Their own evolutionary approach to the problem is therefore still relevant. If the fact that
the experimental evidence against the second version of the negative state relief hypothesis is
weak is taken into consideration, then the experimental footing for the empathy-altruism
hypothesis becomes very slippery indeed. Add to this the arguments I presented that claim that
some of the experiments testing the empathy-joy hypothesis were malformed and slippery turns
to slipping.
Wallach and Wallach go even further (1991). They claim that altruism cannot be
demonstrated through social psychological experiments at all. They give an example of a young
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woman, Suzie, who decides to go out with Frank when he happens to come across a pair of
concert tickets to a show he believes she wants to see. Frank naturally wonders if Suzie is really
interested in going out with him or if she is only interested in going to the concert. This is an
example, they say, in which Suzie‘s motivations can be tested. If she happens to come upon
some tickets herself and decides that she will go with somebody other than Frank to the concert,
then one can reasonably conclude that she was never really interested in Frank in the first place.
But Wallach and Wallach say that experiments such as those Batson uses against the aversivearousal reduction explanation are fundamentally different. They say:
One cannot show that the ultimate goal of an empathizer‘s helping is alleviation
of the victim‘s suffering and not reduction of the empathizer‘s aversive arousal in
the same way as one can show that the ultimate goal of Suzie‘s attentions to Frank
was the concert and not Frank. Suzie can obtain the purported ultimate goal
without the other; the empathizer cannot. If empathy has anything like the
meaning Batson and Shaw intend, then alleviating the victim‘s suffering will
inevitably in some degree reduce the empathizer‘s aversive arousal. Thus,
although Suzie can get to the concert without Frank once the tickets arrive, there
is no way the victim‘s suffering can be alleviated without the empathizer‘s
aversive arousal being reduced as well. Trying to determine which of the two
goals is ultimate may not even make sense in cases like this, where one goal
(reduction of the empathizer‘s aversive arousal) is a necessary consequence of the
other (alleviation of the victim‘s suffering.) (Wallach & Wallach, 1991, p. 154)
The impossibility Wallach and Wallach are talking about does not reside in the fact that
altruism cannot theoretically be proven by any method, but rather that the tools of social
71
psychological experimentation may never be able to get the job done. Indeed, it is Wallach and
Wallach‘s opinion that psychological altruism is in fact real, but they, like Sober and Wilson,
claim that much of the evidence resides in evolutionary considerations (Wallach & Wallach,
1991, p. 155).
Though the point of this dissertation is ultimately to analyze evolutionary arguments for
psychological altruism, there may be types of non-evolutionary experimentation which could in
fact lead to progress in the egoism/altruism debate. These experiments would not simply be
socially psychological in nature, but neurological as well. Imagine an experiment, for example,
in which subjects are placed into empathy arousing situations such as those Batson designed
except that, while the subjects are making their decisions on how to act, their brains are being
monitored for activity in particular regions. Suppose also that neurological experiments have
already identified the regions of the brain associated with empathy, decision making, and the
anticipation of pleasure. If subjects who decided to help always showed an order of response
such as this:
Empathy  Anticipation of Reward Decision  Helping Behavior
Or Fear of Punishment
Then this would be strong evidence that egoism, as Batson defines it, is the correct theory. On
the other hand, if some subjects showed this pattern:
Empathy  Decision  Anticipation of Reward Helping Behavior
Or Fear of Punishment
(Or neither)
Or
Empathy  Decision  Helping Behavior  Anticipation of Reward
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Or Fear of Punishment
(Or neither)
Then this would be evidence that hedonism is incorrect and genuine altruism may be at
work. I make no claims that such evidence would be incontrovertible, but it seems to me that one
of these results would provide at least strong support for one theory over the other. Of course it
could be the case that it is impossible for such an experiment to yield results if the brain‘s reward
anticipation and decision making processes are active at exactly the same time. Even then
however, if technology progressed to the point where one could trace the individual causal neural
pathways of a living subject as she deliberates, neuroscience might reveal an answer as to
whether feelings of empathy are trigging helping behavior though hedonistic desires or if this
behavior is the result of an ultimate desire for the well being of another.
But though such experiments may be in principle possible sometime down the road, this
does not change that fact that currently there seems to be no hard experimental evidence
supporting either psychological egoism or psychological altruism. Finding no answers elsewhere,
therefore, evolutionary arguments, such as those that Sober and Wilson champion, are that much
more important to the debate.
1_3 Summary
The purpose of this chapter has been to provide an overview of the psychological egoism
vs. altruism debate. Within, it was revealed that there have been two primary approaches to
resolving this debate: philosophical arguments and scientific theory and experimentation. The
philosophical attempts to prove that altruism exists through the use of the Butler‘s stone
argument, the paradox of hedonism and Nozick‘s experience machine thought experiment all fail
to be compelling. Likewise, arguments from personal introspection are doubtful scientifically,
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and the argument for psychological hedonism based on the law of effect argument seems to be
contrary to empirical evidence. Dr. Batson‘s intriguing experiments designed to support the
empathy-altruism hypothesis, while providing some compelling evidence that some versions of
psychological hedonism are false, fall short of showing that psychological hedonism is false in
general, and makes even less headway towards disproving psychological egoism.
The attempts to solve the psychological egoism/altruism debate analyzed in this chapter
are representative of other attempts. The very nature of attempting to prove that an organism
possesses one particular motive for behavior over another, especially when both motives are
expected to lead to identical (or nearly identical) behaviors, provides problems both for both
philosophical arguments and scientific research.
In spite of this, however, an evolutionary approach to the debate might prove to be
fruitful. A successful evolutionary investigation would not require the delivery experimental
evidence of altruistic motivations (or repeated failure to disconfirm them), but would instead
would attempt to provide theoretical evidence that either psychologically altruistic motives are
likely to evolve or not evolve. Such an investigation would be both philosophical and scientific
in nature, as both evolutionary theory, and philosophical interpretation and investigation
(including thought experiments) would contribute to the investigation‘s methodology.
This chapter has been the first step along a road that will ultimately lead to a careful
examination and criticism of evolutionary arguments for psychological altruism. The road is not
short, however, and there are further facts about evolution and motivation that must be
understood to fully appreciate these forthcoming evolutionary arguments. Indeed, the next four
chapters are dedicated to providing the scientific and philosophical background that is required
to place these arguments into a meaningful context. Chapter two will bring us through the first
74
legs of this journey by explaining evolutionary altruism and how it can be generated, among
other ways, through group selection.
75
CHAPTER II:
EVOLUTIONARY ALTRUISM AND GROUP SELECTION:
HOW NATURAL SELECTION CAN FAVOR INDIVIDUAL SACRIFICE
The previous chapter outlined several non-evolutionary attempts to resolve the
psychological egoism/altruism debate, and showed why Sober and Wilson believe these
approaches have made little progress to date. They believe that one of the most important reasons
these previous attempts fail is because proponents of psychological egoism seem to be able to
tell a story that explains away any apparent evidence of psychological altruism using an egoist
model instead (Sober & Wilson, 1998, pgs. 271-272). Further, with all the logical space available
to put different psychological spins on the same pieces of evidence, Sober and Wilson believe
that it is improbable that any new psychological discoveries capable of finally vindicating one
theory over the other are likely to appear in the near future.37 Psychological studies reveal
empirical information, but the psychological egoism/altruism debate concerns private
psychological states that are currently difficult, if not impossible, to measure accurately.
Philosophical attempts to resolve this issue stretch far back into history, but while many
interesting arguments have arisen, Sober and Wilson find fault with the major contenders.
Since both philosophical arguments and psychological experiments have failed to resolve
the debate, Sober and Wilson suggest that there may be a better way to approach the problem.
Instead of asking whether there is solid evidence or unflawed reasoning that proves that either
Sober and Wilson do not deny that it is possible to make such a discovery. They say, ―Of course, even if one type
of experiment is incapable of disentangling psychological egoism and motivational pluralism, another design might
be able to do the job. Nonetheless, it is tempting to claim that any behavior elicited in a psychological experiment
will be explicable by both the egoism hypothesis and by the pluralism in which the altruism hypothesis is embedded
(Wallach and Wallach 1991). We take no stand on this stronger thesis; what experimental psychology has been
unable to do so far, new methods may yet be able to achieve. For now, however, the conclusion we draw is a
discouraging one. Observation and experiment to date have not decided the question, nor is it easy to see how new
experiments of the type already deployed will be able to break through the impasse‖ (Sober & Wilson, 1998, pg.
272)
37
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psychological egoism or psychological altruism is true, they advise that we apply our knowledge
of evolutionary theory to determine whether psychological egoism or psychological altruism is
more probable given what is known about natural selection, the apparently cooperative behavior
of many different organisms, and the unique evolutionary history of human beings.
This purpose of this chapter is to discuss Sober and Wilson‘s arguments for multilevel
selection, including group selection. Of particular importance to Sober and Wilson‘s position is
group selection for altruistic traits. Before presenting these arguments, however, it is important to
note that there is some disagreement as to what Sober and Wilson have in mind when they
discuss multi-level selection and group level selection specifically. At some points Sober and
Wilson‘s write as if group level selection was a separate force, not reducible to the properties of
individual organisms in that group. At other times Sober and Wilson speak of group selection as
either a heuristic device or a method of interpreting data in such a way as to reveal more of the
mechanisms at work on an organism, such as when they discuss kin selection saying that
―multilevel selection theory is like shutting off the spotlight and illuminating the entire stage.
Genealogical relatedness is suddenly seen as only one of many factors that can influence the
fundamental ingredients of natural selection‖ (Sober & Wilson, 1998, pg. 332). In an article
replying to commentaries, Godfrey-Smith and Benjamin Kerr make a similar point. They say,
…there are many references to group selection as a ―forces (pp. 102-104). This is
the strong version of Sober and Wilson‘s defense of MLS theory. But at other
times Sober and Wilson handle the issue differently. They also say that
individualist descriptions that do not engage in inappropriate averaging of fitness
are fine. They distance themselves from any ―vague‖ claim about the superior
causal or explanatory resources of MLS theory. They emphasize their
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endorsement, in Unto Others, of ―Pluralism of perspectives.‖ This is the more
moderate form of their defense. The more moderate view is not far from our
own38 (Godfrey-Smith, 2002, p. 543)
Since the only issue surrounding group selection that is truly important for the
psychological egoism/altruism debate is whether or not the mechanisms that Sober and Wilson
appeal to can account for the development of behaviorally (evolutionarily) altruistic traits, this
chapter concerns itself more with describing the mechanisms Sober and Wilson discuss rather
than what they should be called. Since the thesis of this dissertation is that evolutionary
arguments psychological altruism, such as those being championed by Sober and Wilson, do not
succeed, this chapter will use Sober and Wilson‘s group selection and multilevel selection
terminology. Further, so long as behaviorally altruistic traits can evolve in the kinds of cases that
they describe, it is unimportant whether or not the strong or weak thesis is true.39
For these reasons, this will assume the weaker thesis. When a term such as ―group selective
forces‖ is used, this should not be taken to imply that group selective forces cannot be reduced to
the behavior and traits of organisms within the group.
In spite of the fact that the ultimate purpose of this dissertation is to evaluate evolutionary
arguments for psychological altruism, the form of altruism that will be examined in this chapter
is much broader. This chapter will limit itself to discussion of evolutionary altruism only. The
38
Godfrey-Smith and Kerr believe that Sober and Wilson hold the stronger version of the multilevel selection thesis,
but this issue is not of primary importance for this dissertation (Godfrey-Smith, 2002 #53, pg. 543).
39
Though I do not necessary agree will all points of his criticism of group selection (specifically of Sober and
Wilson‘s defense of it) Amotz Zahavi makes a similar point to the one I am making here, when at the end of his
article he says:
The fact that altruism has been selected for by individual selection does not mean that altruists are cynical.
It only means that the deep personal motivation for moral behavior, as well as that of love, and of the
readiness to invest and sacrifice for the sake of one‘s offspring, have evolved for the individual‘s ultimate
advantage. But that takes us to the level of the psychological—that is, proximate, rather than ultimate—
causation. (Zahavi, 2000 #54, pg. 256)
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term ―evolutionary altruism‖ will be defined more sharply later in this chapter, but for the sake
of this introduction, it should simply be noted that evolutionary altruism implies no internal
psychological states or motivations on the part of the altruist. Evolutionary altruism is a theory
about behavior only, and, in fact, organisms need not even possess a neurological system in order
to exhibit evolutionary altruistic (sometimes called behaviorally altruistic) traits. This type of
altruism can be present in bacteria or elephants, mollusks or human beings.40
A reader might reasonably ask, ―If we are ultimately concerned with psychological
altruism, most notably the possibility of human psychological altruism, then why waste time on a
chapter about evolutionary altruism? Doesn‘t this just sidetrack us?‖ This is a reasonable
question, but there are several reasons why evolutionary altruism is relevant to a discussion of
the psychological egoism/altruism debate, especially when that discussion will contain
evolutionary arguments for psychological altruism such as those Sober and Wilson have
developed.
It is not difficult to see a number of ways in which an explanation of how evolutionary
altruism evolved would serve as an aid to understanding how/if psychological altruism might
have evolved. The same selective forces that promote an altruistic behavior could also provide
positive selection in favor of psychologically altruistic traits if those traits have a tendency to
cause (beneficial) altruistic behaviors. Additionally, if it turns out to be the case that ―self
sacrificial‖ behavior can evolve even in organisms without a psychology, then discovering that
similar behavior is present in human beings who have highly complex psychologies, form large
social groups, and live in highly complex and intricate societies, should not be so surprising. In
―Evolutionary altruism‖ is perhaps a misleading phrase since Sober and Wilson are going to argue that
psychological altruism evolved as well. It is perhaps better to think of ―evolutionary altruism‖ as ―behavioral
altruism‖. Either way it is important to understand that ―evolutionary altruism‖ describes behavior while
psychological altruism describes the psychological motives (which help to behavior) (Sober & Wilson, 1998, pg.
99).
40
79
addition, any voluntary human behavior that is behaviorally altruistic must be governed by
human psychology, and so the two theories are related in this way also. There is certainly no
necessity that psychological altruism be responsible for altruistic behavior; indeed, this
dissertation will ultimately argue against psychological altruism as Sober and Wilson define it.
But prior to an investigation, the existence of evolutionary altruistic behavior makes altruistic
motivations appear more likely than they would if altruistic behaviors did not exist at all. After
all, if human beings could not even behave altruistically there would be little reason to posit
altruistic motives, though these two conditions are not logically contradictory.41
The first section of this chapter will examine two different concepts of fitness. The first
concept will be that of ―absolute fitness‖ and the second ―relative fitness‖. This section will
describe these definitions of fitness show how they can be used to analyze different evolutionary
scenarios and work to measure the degree to which a population is growing or shrinking in
absolute number or in relative representation within a group.
The second section of this chapter will continue to explain key definitions and concepts
in more detail than this introduction allows. This same section will also begin an analysis of how
altruistic (self sacrificing) traits can evolve under the unforgiving culling process of natural
selection.
Section three is dedicated to explaining one particularly important group-level process
that can theoretically allow for evolutionary altruism, Maynard Smith‘s haystack model. First
this model will be explained descriptively, and then mathematics will be used to show how
evolutionary altruism is possible under this model. However, even though this section will
demonstrate that group level selection can theoretically outweigh individual selection, section
41
The importance of evolutionary altruism to the psychological egoism/altruism debate will be discussed in greater
detail in Chapter 5.
80
four will show that even Smith himself felt his model should be taken as evidence against group
selection rather than as evidence for it. This same section will analyze why modern biologists
have been unreceptive to group selection, even though Smith provided a working model. This
section will conclude that many of the objections to group selection that biologists make appear
to have some merit if the concept of a ―group‖ is understood in too narrow a fashion.
Section five will reveal the Rosetta stone of group selection which will allow for group
selection to play a major role in evolutionary theory by expanding the notion of what counts as a
group. In the process, many of the concerns discussed in section four will be undermined. All
this will be done through an understanding of ―trait groups‖; section five will detail this theory
and follow it up with a mathematical example.
Section six will move the discussion from the theoretical level to actual biology with the
discussion of cases in which group selection produces dramatic results. From virulence levels of
infectious diseases to the egg production in chickens, we will see how group selection can
account for key behaviors that individual or gene-level selection theories find easily to overlook.
Section seven will consider how it is that so many biologists have ignored group
selection for so long. In doing so, theories that have sprung up to partially fill the void left by the
rejection of group selection will be discussed. These are the theories of kin selection, selfish
genes, and evolutionary game theory. Sober and Wilson argue that each of these theories add to
our understanding of the evolutionary process, but have also been used improperly to imply that
group selection is superfluous.
After the ―replacement theories‖ in section seven have been dealt with, section eight will
explain how Sober and Wilson‘s multi-level selection theory can be employed by scientists to
determine to what degree natural selection has influenced the development of a particular trait at
81
each level of selection. Sober and Wilson propose a three step process, and this section will
describe each of these steps in detail. Finally, this chapter will conclude with a summary of the
material.42
2_1 Two Different Concepts of Fitness
In order to understand Sober and Wilson‘s account of group selection, one must first
understand the difference between two definitions of fitness that are commonly employed by
biologists. The first of these is known as absolute fitness and the second as relative fitness,
though relative fitness is often simply referred to as just ―fitness‖ (Strickberger, 2000, p. 640).
The term ―absolute fitness‖ simply refers to the fecundity of a particular genotype at a particular
time and in a particular environment, measured without factoring in the fecundity of competing
genotypes.43 The absolute fitness value of a particular genotype describes whether or not a
particular genotype is increasing or decreasing in number from one generation to the next. To
measure the absolute fitness of a genotype, one only needs to compare the number of surviving
offspring in one generation to the number of surviving offspring the next. Thus absolute fitness
can be calculated with a simple algebraic formula:
Wabs = (Surviving progeny of G1 in n)/ (Surviving progeny of G1 in n-1)
In the formula above ―G1‖ represents individuals of a particular genotype (indexed by
subscript one), while ―n‖ represents the number of a particular generation. ―Wabs‖ denotes the
absolute fitness value being solved for. Thus, if a generation of 50 individuals of type G1 were to
This is confusing since there are many cases in which absolute fitness is referred to simply as ―fitness‖ as well.
The concept of absolute fitness is similar to the concept of fecundity. Sober and Wilson use the term primarily to
help the reader understand the distinction between how many viable offspring an organism manages to leave behind
and how many viable offspring an organism leaves behind relative to its competitors (Sober & Wilson, 1998, pgs.
23, 203, 58-60). The notion of absolute fitness is also linked to the way Sober and Wilson use terms such as
―benefit‖, such as when say that if an organism is evolutionarily altruistic then it must produce a benefit to others at
a cost to itself. Here the term ―benefit‖ is referring to an increase of absolute fitness or relative fitness (within a
group), and the term ―cost‖ is referring to a decrease in relative fitness (within a group) for the altruist.
42
43
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leave behind 70 surviving progeny, the absolute fitness of genotype G1 would be 1.4. That is to
say that, on average, G1-types will leave behind 1.4 offspring a piece. An absolute fitness value
that is larger than 1 indicates that the G1 genotypes are increasing in absolute number from one
generation to the next.44 Once absolute fitness is understood, relative fitness comes fairly easily.
Relative fitness is the absolute fitness of one particular genotype compared to another, different
(and usually competing) genotype.45 To calculate the relative fitness of G1 to G2, one first needs
to calculate the absolute fitness of each genotype independently (but limited to within the
relevant group) and then determine how these values compare to one another. One can calculate
relative fitness with the following formula:
Wrel (for G1) = Wabs(G1)/Wabs(G2)
Putting numbers to the variables will provide an example of the formula at work. If G1
types have an absolute fitness value of .9 and G2 types have an absolute fitness value of .8, then
G1 types have a relative fitness of 1.125 compared to the G2 types. 46 The fact that the G1s have a
relative fitness value that is larger than one indicates that the percentage of G1s in the group is
growing in proportion to the percentage of G2s. A value of exactly 1 would have indicated that
the two genotypes are maintaining a stable ratio relative to each other, and a value of less than
one would indicate that the proportion of G1 genotypes is shrinking compared to that of the G2
44
There is, of course, a difference between fitness compared locally and over a short period of time and long-term
fitness, or non-local fitness. For example, an organism that has a currently very effective strategy and a high level of
fitness might in fact be changing its own in environment in such a way that the species will be devastated in the long
run, or its fitness might greatly be decreased or increased if it were to settle into a different environment. Some
definitions of fitness try to take long-term effects into account (Strickberger, 2000, pg. 640) but this is difficult in
practice because it is often very nearly impossible to calculate how an organism will fair in the long run if one is
trying to peer far into the future.
45
There have been sundry definitions of ―fitness‖, but ―relative fitness‖ is what population geneticists generally
mean when they use the term ―fitness‖ (Strickberger, 2000, pg. 640).
46
Of course absolute fitness values are not absolute in all senses of the word. The fitness values we are discussing
are only ―absolute‖ in the sense that they give an absolute measure of fecundity at a particular time and place
without consideration of how well one genotype is doing compared to another, nor how that same genotype would
fair under different circumstances or in a different environment.
83
types. Unlike with the calculation of absolute fitness, a value that is greater than one does not
indicate that a particular genotype is growing in absolute number. In the above example, both
genotypes have an absolute fitness value of less than one and so the total number of both G1 and
G2 types are shrinking in absolute terms. Nevertheless, relative to the percentage of G2 types, G1
types are increasing.
The absolute fitness values of these two genotypes need not be less than one for relative
fitness to be significant. The absolute fitness values of both genotypes could be greater than one
and yet one genotype could be at risk of extinction because of a disadvantage in terms of relative
fitness. Consider, for example, a calculation where G1 types have an absolute fitness value of 1.2
and the G2 types have an absolute fitness value of 1.5. Even though the total number of G1 types
is growing in absolute number, the relative fitness of the G1 genotype is .8 (1.2/1.5) meaning that
the G1 genotype is shrinking in proportion to the G2 genotypes. This is not good news for the G1s
because ultimately it is relative fitness that determines the outcome of a war of selection. If
realistic world conditions were set aside and organisms had unlimited resources and room in
which to grow this would not be the case and both genotypes could continue to survive
indefinitely even though one type would do so as an ever decreasing percentage. In the real
world, however, resources and niche space for a genotype is limited. Non-competitive expansion
cannot continue forever, and once the population of G1s and G2s becomes large enough to reach
their population limit, the genotype with the lower relative fitness value will disappear from the
population unless something changes.47 Sober and Wilson refer to Williams saying, ―In general,
evolutionary success depends on relative fitness (Williams 1966). It doesn‘t matter how many
Relative fitness values, of course, don‘t always remain constant. Often times a population is stable with a
particular ratio of different phenotypes, and one genotype need not drive another to extinction in every case. This is
fact is readily apparent in nature and has also been shown to work with game theoretic models such as the
Hawk/Dove game which Dawkin‘s describes in his book The Selfish Gene. (Dawkins, 1989, pg. 70).
47
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offspring you have; it only matters that you have more than anyone else‖ (Sober & Wilson, 1998,
p. 23).
2_2 Sober and Wilson‘s Definition of Evolutionary Altruism
Getting a handle on these two different definitions of fitness puts us in a more strategic
position to understand Sober and Wilson‘s definition of evolutionary altruism. Sober and Wilson
say, ―A behavior is altruistic when it increases the fitness of others and decreases the fitness of
the actor‖ (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 17). This is simply to say that an altruistic organism
expresses a trait that causes it to increase the absolute fitness of others in the group at the cost of
its own relative fitness (within the same group).48 Thus a trait can be altruistic in nature even if it
benefits the altruist so long as other members in the group benefit more than the altruist does.
Consider, for example, an organism with a phenotypic characteristic that increases the
rate of reproduction of every member of the group it is in by two offspring a generation. Further
suppose that this organism increases its own offspring production by only one because
expressing the reproduction increasing trait consumes precious energy or has some other sort of
individual drawback. Even though the altruistic trait benefits its possessor in terms of absolute
fitness (the altruist will produce one more offspring than it did previously), the altruistic
organism will suffer a decrease in fitness relative to its competitors within the group. This is
because the non-altruistic, or ―selfish,‖ members of the group benefit more than the altruist does
Dr. Sara Worley of BGSU Ohio pointed out that, interestingly, an organism doesn‘t actively have to do anything
to directly help other organisms to count as altruistic. For example, if one considers an organism with a new
mutation that decreases its own fitness by limiting its ability to reproduce, or by causing it to die before it has a
chance to reproduce, other organisms within the group gain a relative fitness advantage because there is now less
competition within the group. Therefore, in some cases there may be example of ―altruistic‖ behavior that that we
normally would not think of as altruistic. These forms of altruism are unlikely to spread because, as will be
explained later on within this chapter, an altruistic organism needs to provide a group advantage and also increase its
own relative representation in other groups via between group selections to spread its genotype. If an altruistic
organism is hurt so badly that it will barely be represented in the next generation, or if the benefits the altruist
provides for the group itself are too tiny to give the altruists an advantage after group level selection is factored in,
such traits will not be selected for.
48
85
from its own behavior. Indeed, even if the altruist increased offspring production for itself by
two as well, this trait could still be altruistic so long as the altruist‘s actions require at least a little
bit more energy or risk than the behavior of free-riding organisms which only have to reap the
benefits of the altruist‘s trait. Thus, from the very definition of evolutionary altruism, one can see
that the percentage of altruists within a group that contains free riders will always shrink relative
to the percentage of selfish organisms, so long as all other factors remain stable.
Since populations cannot grow forever unchecked, shrinking in relative percentage will
eventually result in the elimination of genotypes which possess lower relative fitness values than
their competitors within a group. This is of course the crux of the problem that biologists face
when attempting to explain the evolution of altruistic traits to begin with. Given the disadvantage
altruists suffer in terms of relative fitness, it is difficult to see how it is that altruists could stave
off extinction under the pressures of natural selection. Paradoxically however, examples of
evolutionary altruism seem to appear in nature all the time, from the probing behavior that
guppies exhibit to test for potential predators, to the food sharing habits that many organisms.
The warning cries of many animals are yet another example, and the intervention of female
chimps who try to placate and reunite two hostile males yet another. Indeed, there are too many
examples to list.
Before moving on to possible solutions to this conundrum, it is worth noting here that
the type of altruism Sober and Wilson are talking about when they use the term ―evolutionary
altruism‖ only concerns traits and behaviors, it does not reflect motivations (Sober & Wilson,
1998, p. 17 & 199). The term ―evolutionary altruism‖ can be applied to single celled organisms
or plants just as easily as it can be to chimpanzees or human beings. For this reason any
anthropomorphizing terms such as ―sacrifice fitness‖ or ―selfish trait‖ used in this chapter should
86
be taken as colorful uses of language that are meant to convey a particular type of behavior, and
not as indicators of any psychological attitudes such as those we would normally assume exist
when invoking the word ―altruism‖ to describe the actions of fellow human beings.
Here the reader may object that this seems to be a strange understanding of the word
―altruism‖. After all, when we use the word ―altruism‖ in day-to-day speech, we are normally
talking about the character of another human being and not simply his or her behavior. Certainly,
in normal speech, we would never refer to a bacterium or a slime mould as behaving
altruistically. The term ―altruism‖, in its most common usage, implies a knowing sacrifice on the
part of one individual with the conscious intent of helping others. However, this point should not
distract us from what Sober and Wilson are trying to do here. The term ―evolutionary altruism‖
is coined specifically to distinguish a biological sacrifice of relative fitness in a way that
enhances the relative fitness of others from ―psychological altruism‖ which concerns the
motivations behind a behavior, and which is much more in line with the common usage of the
word ―altruism‖. In fact, it is psychological altruism that is ultimately the focus of Sober and
Wilson‘s book Unto Others and which will likewise be the focus of this dissertation.
Nevertheless, the puzzle of how evolutionary altruistic behavior could have evolved requires an
explanation which will prove to be a useful starting point for an analysis of psychological
altruism.
Understanding how evolutionary altruism could have evolved in spite of its costs in terms
of relative fitness may lead to the beginnings of an explanation of how (or if) psychological
altruism evolved. If sacrificing relative fitness to help others in a group can be beneficial (e.g.
evolve as an adaptation) in primitive organisms, then that is all the more reason to believe that
there would be selective pressures favoring altruism in more social and more neurologically
87
complex species such as human beings, because humans have moral convictions, the ability to
empathize with others, and societal structures, and often act consciously as the result of
psychological motivations. The connection between the psychological and evolutionary concepts
of altruism will be explored more fully in Chapter Five.
2_3 Group Selection and the Haystack Model
Both relative and absolute fitness can be seen at work in a type of evolutionary model
originally introduced by Maynard Smith in a 1964 paper entitled ―Group Selection and Kin
Selection‖. This model (and models like it in relevant ways) have come to be called ―haystack
models.‖ They demonstrate how an evolutionarily altruistic behavior can evolve through natural
selection. To understand how this may work, on is asked to imagine a type of organism that lives
most of its life in small groups within an array of haystacks that are scattered about a field. For
the convenience of having a label less cumbersome than ―organism,‖ these creatures will be
referred to as s.49 Further, when discussing our population of s, we will be using the term
―community‖ to refer to all the s that ever interact with each other in respect to group making.
The term ―group,‖ on the other hand, will refer to smaller, temporarily isolated, sub-communities
of s.
The community of s has two interesting traits. The first, but more mundane, trait is
genetic variation among the s. For the purposes of this thought experiment, we are only
concerned with one set of phenotypic differences in particular; some portion of s, let‘s say a
very low percentage at first, exhibit an evolutionarily altruistic phenotype and the others only
behave selfishly. This is to say that some s in the community sacrifice time and energy in such a
49
Maynard Smith‘s original example used a fictional type of mouse.
88
way as to benefit not only themselves but also the other s in their group, even if those other s
may simply be ―free riders‖ who reap fitness benefits from their altruistic neighbors but give
nothing back in return.
The second and more unusual aspect of -dom is that the s interact with each other in a
rather unusual way. For most of their lives each
lives within a small group of other s in an
isolated haystack. Once every few years, however, all the s in all the haystacks will leave their
groups and briefly form a larger community. Once this community of s is formed, the creatures
intermingle and split up randomly into new groups which then repopulate the haystacks.
Shortly, actual numbers will be put into the example. Before this, let us first test our
intuitions regarding what might happen to this community under the right conditions. We already
know that natural selection works on an organism‘s fitness. We also know that any altruists
isolated in a haystack with non-altruists will be at a relative fitness disadvantage because, in such
a situation, the free-riders always have an advantage over the altruists. As we have discussed,
this is true even if the behavior of the altruist benefits the organism that expresses the altruistic
trait as well as the other s in the group, so long as the expression of this trait has some cost in
relative fitness associated with it. Given the nature of natural selection, we can predict that the
number of altruists within any isolated haystack50 is always shrinking in proportion to the total
number of selfish-types that are in that haystack group (if any). This just follows from the fact
that the altruists have a lower relative fitness value than the free riders within a haystack, which
should be no surprise since, by definition, a sacrifice of relative fitness is required for a behavior
to count as altruistic in the first place. Therefore, one can see right away that within each
50
The haystacks of course are merely standing in for isolated groups.
89
individual haystack, the altruistic s will eventually disappear if the forces described so far are
the only ones at work.
But before we conclude that evolutionary altruism is impossible, let us not forget that we
know another important thing about the s. We know that every several years they reform into a
full community, intermix randomly, and then split back up into new groups which run back to
colonize the previously abandoned haystacks. This fact gives us an answer to any argument that
suggests that the necessary loss of relative fitness of altruists within a group means that altruism
can never evolve by natural selection. This is because, with the reforming and disbanding groups
that are part of the haystack model, altruists do not only compete against non-altruists within
their own groups, but there is also competition between groups that contain different proportions
of altruists51 competing against each other within a larger community. Without the need for any
long calculations, one should be able to see that if the altruists produce a strong enough benefit
for the groups which they are a part of, then they can overcome the loss of relative fitness that
they invariably suffer within a group by increasing their representation within the community at
large. Altruistic organisms have an advantage when there is between-group competition because
an altruist will, on average, find itself grouped with one more altruist than non-altruists --and that
is assuming that there are no assortative mechanisms at work.52
To summarize, if the benefit altruists provide is powerful enough relative to their loss of
fitness within a group, then the groups that contain the most altruists could very well have a
greater fitness within the community relative to other groups which contain fewer altruists. Since
the groups continually dissolve and reform with a different collection of individual s, the
51
Noting that the proportions of altruists in each group differ is important because natural selection cannot occur
where there is no variation for it to work on. This will be discussed in more detail later in sections four and six of
this chapter.
52
Assortative behavior will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Three.
90
altruists are able to move from group to group and gain a group-level advantage because they, on
average, are grouped with one more altruist than the selfish types upon regrouping. If this
advantage is strong enough, the number of altruists in the community will increase relative to the
number of selfish or free riding organisms.
Thus the haystack model allows us to see that there are really two different selective
forces at work on the s, each pushing the organism‘s evolutionary course in a different
direction. Natural selection, in terms of relative fitness within groups, works against organisms
that possess altruistic traits and always reduces their relative presence within a group. However,
natural selection, in terms of the relative fitness between competing groups, favors altruism since
it favors groups with more altruists within them. Not surprisingly, if the variables for this
scenario are favorable to altruism, then the selective forces at work between competing groups
can outweigh the forces of selection at the individual level and favor an increase in the overall
percentage of altruistic s within the community.
Now that the intuition behind the haystack model has been explained, it is time to plug in
some numbers for a more concrete demonstration. To simplify matters, the following
assumptions are made:
1. It will be assumed that there are always five haystacks (and hence the
community of s will always split up into five groups).
2. The community will at first consist of 100 s, five of which are altruists. The
percentage of altruists for generation number one is therefore 5%.
3. The distribution of altruists in groups when the community splits is supposed
to be random in our model, but natural selection needs variation upon which
to act. A random factor would lay an extra layer of complexity to the
91
mathematics of this experiment. For these reasons, it will be assumed that the
altruists are not evenly split between the groups (one each). This is reasonable
since the grouping and regrouping of the s will occur an indefinite number of
times. Indeed, since this scenario is meant to be an illustration of group
selection at work, let‘s artificially distribute the altruistic s in a way that
magnifies the group selection effect to illustrate how the model works. To this
end, assume that four altruists are in group number one, and the remaining
altruist begins in group number two. These are numbers that will make the
group selection effect more apparent. It is important to realize that so long as
the altruists are not distributed exactly evenly, the same forces are at work
with different distributions, although the process of change may occur more
slowly and over a larger number of generations.
4. Assume that the normal rate of reproduction for s is five offspring each.
5. Assume that for each altruist in a group every
in that group will produce five
additional offspring except for the altruistic organism itself which will
produce only four additional offspring because of the costs of generating this
effect. Altruists will, however, gain the full benefit of five additional offspring
from any other altruists in their group.
6.
As a final simplifier, we will assume that each generation completely dies out
after producing the next, and that the carrying capacity for each haystack is
over 500 s.
Given these assumptions, our groups start off looking like this:
92
# Selfish
Group 1
16
# Altruists
4
Total s
20
% Altruists Pop
Growth
20
---
%%
Group 2
19
1
20
5
---
Group 3
20
0
20
0
---
Group 4
20
0
20
0
---
Group 5
20
0
20
0
---
Total number of s in the community: 100
Total percentage of altruists in the community: 5a/100(a+s) = 5%
Fig 2.1
Since the calculations for groups three, four, and five are the easiest, let‘s resolve them
first. Each
produces five offspring, and the previous generation of s dies off. This means that
all three groups without any altruist s grow to a population size of 100, zero percent of which
are altruists.
Next is the calculation for group number two. Since there is only one altruist in the
group, that altruist produces its normal five offspring plus four (five minus one) more as a result
of the effects of its own altruism minus the costs of being an altruist. Thus the single altruist
leaves behind a total of nine offspring. The selfish members of group two do even better,
producing ten offspring each. The selfish s in group two therefore leave behind 190 offspring
total, resulting in a grand total of 199 s, nine of which are altruists.
Group number one is only slightly more difficult to calculate than group number two. As
for the selfish members of the group, each produces its normal five offspring plus an additional
five for each altruist in the group, which is, in this case, four. This means that each selfish
produces 25 offspring total (20 of which are the result of the number of altruists within the
93
group). The 16 selfish s therefore become 400 in number. The altruistic s, on the other hand,
produce their normal five offspring, an additional four offspring as a result of their own altruistic
actions, and five more offspring each for every other altruist in the group (three in this case).
Since there are four altruists, this means that each altruistic
produces 5+(5*a)-1 offspring
where ―a‖ is the number of altruists in the group. In this case the altruistic s produce 24
offspring each. The result is that the four altruists in the first generation become 96 (24*4) in the
next. The total number of s in generation two for group number one is therefore 496 (400+96).
Now suppose that after just a single generation the s once again temporarily merge
themselves into a single community. Before splitting into separate groups again and running
back to colonize the abandoned haystacks, this is what the groups look like:
# Selfish
Group 1
400
# Altruists
96
Total s
496
% Altruists Pop
Growth
19.3
24.8x
%%
Group 2
190
9
199
4.5
9.95x
Group 3
100
0
100
0
5x
Group 4
100
0
100
0
5x
Group 5
100
0
100
0
5x
Total number of s in the community: 995
Total percentage of altruists in the community: 105a/995(a+s) = 10.5%
Fig. 2.2
Even looking only one generation into the future, we can see that, though the percentage
of altruistic s decreased within every group they were a part of, the total percentage of altruists
in the
community more than doubled. The altruistic s lost relative fitness within each group
94
but gained relative fitness between groups and thereby gained an advantage over the selfish s in
the community. Thus this example confirms the intuition arrived at earlier: If the group benefits
of an altruistic trait are powerful enough, altruists can grow in proportion to the selfish types in a
community as a result of the between-group advantage they confer, even though without this
inter-group dynamic the altruistic s would have eventually died out within each group.
2_4 Why Have Modern Biologists Been so Unreceptive to Group Selection?
Though our previous example proves that under the right circumstances group level
selection can overcome the power of individual selection, most modern biologists still believe
that, if group selection occurs at all, then it has only been a negligible force for evolutionary
change (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 5-8). Indeed, Maynard Smith, the creator of the haystack
model just examined, argued that group selection, while theoretically possible, is not a
significant evolutionary force. Why did he think this when his example seems to show that group
selection can be effective? He judged the conditions for group selection to be ―severe‖ (Smith,
1964, p. 1146). He says:
The model is too artificial to be worth pursuing further. It is concluded that if the
admittedly severe conditions listed here are satisfied, then it is possible that
behavior patterns should evolve leading individuals not to reproduce at times and
in circumstances in which other members of the species are reproducing
successfully. Whether this is regarded as an argument for or against the evolution
of altruistic behavior by group selection will depend upon a judgment of how
often the necessary conditions are likely to be satisfied (Smith, 1964, p. 11461147).
95
The majority of modern biologists have agreed that the conditions required for the group
selection of altruism are much too ―severe‖ to represent a significant evolutionary force. Let‘s
briefly consider some of these reasons in more detail.
For one thing, consider the number of requirements piled on in the
example. First, the
s must breed in isolated sub communities. Then, for no apparently adaptive reason, they must
shuffle themselves back into the larger community, form back up into subgroups again, and
continue to repeat that process. If any of these three behaviors were missing for the s, group
selection would not occur. If the s did not breed in sub groups, then group selection would be
impossible because there would be no groups for natural selection to work on in the first place. If
the s did not form back into a larger community, then group selection would be impossible
because the groups would never compete against each other, and the altruists would eventually
die out within each group because they will always suffer a loss of relative fitness if there are any
non-altruists in the group at all. Finally, if the s didn‘t divide back into different groups, it
would be just as if they never dissolved back into larger community at all, and again the altruists
would continue as if isolated in one group and disappear just as if they had stayed in their
individual haystacks. As Sober and Wilson note, ―Altruism is [always] maladaptive with respect
to individual selection but adaptive with respect to group selection‖ (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p.
27).
There are also other reasons why biologists believe that haystack model is not paralleled
very often in nature. One of these reasons is that it seems as if each group must stay in place long
enough to reproduce. Indeed, Maynard Smith himself lists this as the very first condition
necessary for group selection of this kind saying, ―Groups must, for a time be reproductively
96
isolated, because
is eliminated from mixed groups‖53 (Smith, 1964, p. 1146). Of course these
groups must not stay together for too many generations either, for if they do the altruists will die
off because of their lower relative fitness within their groups. These two factors, taken together,
seem to imply that a very carefully tuned balance needs to be struck between isolation and
intermixing if group selection is to be a significant force in nature.
Additionally the maintenance of grouping behavior over a period of time (including the
behavior of splitting up and regrouping) is seemingly an uncommon behavior for the s to have.
This leads inevitably to the question of how the grouping and regrouping behavior of s evolved
in the first place. Since this behavior provides some of the conditions necessary for group
selection to occur, it could not have evolved by group selection itself and so must be an
individual level, or gene level, adaptation. Perhaps one might think of some story that justifies
this behavior through individual selection. Maybe the survivability of an individual‘s offspring
would be increased by gaining access to different gene pools for example. Self isolation through
behavior, though, if it were an adaptation, would need an evolutionary explanation. If the
conditions for this development are too rare, or if these conditions were not met by species that
actually exhibit evolutionary altruistic behavior, then that too would be powerful evidence that
group selection is not a strong evolutionary force.
Perhaps, then, groups are isolated by geographic circumstance instead of behavior?
However, it is unlikely that groups of organisms in nature often find themselves physically
isolated from one another for only short periods of time, only to then find themselves
― ‖ here represents the trait of an organism potentially self sterilizing which has the beneficial result for the group
in this example in that food supplies will not be exhausted. This is, of course, an example of an evolutionary
altruistic trait.
53
97
geographically mixed and re-isolated into separate groups again. It is even less likely that this
would happen to the same community repeatedly.54
Another readily apparent objection is that in most haystack examples55 individual
organisms reproduce for a several generations under competition within their groups before
between group competition occurs during the remixing phase. This is a blow to group selection
because it means that group selection occurs at a slower pace than individual selection, and
therefore group selective advantages must be even more powerful to outweigh the force of
individual selection. This is why the mathematical example I provided carried the assumption of
a very significant payoff for altruistic behavior in order to show a positive effect so quickly. In
the mathematical model I used, the presence of each altruist increased the birthrate of each
by
five (with a –1 penalty for being the altruist responsible for that single boost in fecundity). Given
the fact that the normal fecundity for each
was only five to begin with, that is an extremely
large benefit provided to the group for each altruistic . But, in nature, it seems absurdly unlikely
that the first signs of altruism that appear would provide group benefits even close to this
magnitude, and this in turn makes it difficult to imagine the conditions under which altruistic
traits could have ever gained a foothold in the first place. Of course I deliberately chose
favorable numbers in my example to amplify the group selection effect so that the reader might
see the process at work in the haystack model and also so that a significant result might be seen
after a single generation rather than running through the hundreds, thousands, and tens of
thousands of generations that is often required to see significant changes in organisms via natural
selection working at its normal pace. Nevertheless, the objection remains insofar as the benefits
provided by the altruist would have to be great enough to outweigh the altruist‘s loss of relative
54
This is unlikely but not impossible. For example, lakes may largely evaporate during the summer leaving only
smaller isolated ponds until, later in the year, rains refill the entire lake, linking all the ponds together again.
55
Though this is not true for the particular example I gave.
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fitness. Further, the more generations in which a group is isolated the more powerful the
advantage that the altruist presents to the group must be in order to outweigh individual
selection.
Therefore, while one might be able to construct mathematical models or hypothetical
examples in which group selection overpowers individual selection, without any independent
justifications for thinking that the correct conditions appear with some regularity in nature, these
mathematical models and thought experiments would simply be interesting theoretical
diversions. There would be no reason to believe that the proper conditions appear in nature, and
even if the proper conditions were discovered in some isolated case one might reasonably
assume that such a case is freakishly rare and does not represent any significant impact of group
selection on the evolution of life on Earth.
So in sum, modern biologists have argued that the haystack model, while suitable for
group selection, does not accurately model conditions in the natural world. The very starting
conditions for a functional haystack model require the regular formation and remixing of groups
and this is a behavior would have had to evolve itself for some individually adaptive reason.
Without the proper starting conditions, the model does not even get off the ground. Further, the
mixing and remixing of groups must occur at intervals friendly to group selection, otherwise any
altruistic-types would regularly die out within their groups before communal remixing. Finally,
the benefits provided by the altruist must be suitably large to overcome the quicker pace of
individual selection.
Sober and Wilson do find an example of a parasitic organism in nature which fits the
haystack model‘s criteria very well. This organism is called Dicrocoelium dendriticum (or
―Brain Worm‖), and its life-cycle fits very nicely into the haystack model framework. But if
99
Sober and Wilson‘s argument were to stop there, this bizarre organism would seem merely to be
the exception that proves the rule.56 Fortunately, Sober and Wilson introduce a way of
understanding the interactions of organisms that, when fully understood and appreciated, largely
takes the sting out of all the above objections against group selection. What does all of this work
for them is the theory of trait groups, which will be discussed in the following section.
2_5 Trait Groups and the Haystack Model without Haystacks
The way out of many objections raised against group selection becomes apparent as soon
as one understands trait groups and their significance. Trait groups, according to Sober and
Wilson, describe the ways that organisms can group together in nature without the need for any
physical isolation. After all, what was significant about the s in the previous example was that
they interacted with only a certain subset of other s in the community for a period of time, not
that they isolated themselves in haystacks. The trick to understanding the significance of trait
groups is to realize that the exact same effect would have been achieved had the s lived in one
large community in which each altruistic
would only interact with and benefit from the traits of
a particular subset of other s.
The life cycle of a Brain Worm are so strange that one might be tempted to think that such a creature couldn‘t
exist anywhere outside of the worlds dreamed up by science fiction authors. The Dicrocoelium dendriticum live
their adult lives in the livers of certain farm animals, such as cows and sheep, where they produce their eggs. These
eggs then exit with the feces of the farm animal and are inadvertently eaten by snails that feed off the dung of
grazing animals. Inside the snail the eggs hatch and spend two generations before exiting in groups in the mucus
produced by the snails. At this point the parasites are eaten by ants which feed off of snail mucus, and thereby enter
the ant in groups of about fifty. At this point all the parasites move through the stomach wall, but only one of them
continues to travel up into the ant‘s brain where it forms a cyst that changes the behavior of the ant. Once the cyst is
formed, the inflicted ant will spend more of its time on top of blades of grass (where it is, of course, more likely to
be eaten by the grazing animals, beginning the cycle anew). This is related to altruism and group selection because
the parasite that actually causes the change in ant behavior dies by creating the cist while the other parasites are able
to produce more generations if they are ingested by a grazing animal. Thus the parasite that causes the cist in the
ant‘s brain is acting altruistically since it dies and can no longer reproduce, while any selfish parasites, along with
any altruistic types that didn‘t act, benefit from this ―sacrifice‖ (Sober & Wilson, 1998, pg. 18). Of course, the point
here is not simply that a very haystack-compatible type of organism exists in nature, but that this organism stands
out because this type of life cycle is so rare.
56
100
As the name of the term might suggest, trait groups are defined by the interactions among
individual organisms in regard to a specific trait. In this way, though trait groups of organisms
are not literally isolated into separate populations, they maintain the same sort of population
structure that is produced by the physical isolation of a group, at least insofar as this structure is
relevant to the haystack model.
Consider, for example, organisms that have the ability to discern allies within the rest of
the population and give them aid, say by food sharing. Furthermore, that food sharing is
something they would not do for non-allies in the community. Even if the network of allies is
thoroughly mixed throughout the community, their ability to discern each other within the
community and adjust their behavior accordingly separates them from the rest of the community
in regard to expressing a particular trait (food sharing in this case). The ability to recognize other
organisms, in fact, is not even necessary, though it might be helpful to the process of forming
trait groups. A population can mimic traditional haystack-type groups whenever a community
contains individuals that for periods of time interact with only a portion of the other individuals
in the community in relation to a specific trait and yet continue to be members of the community
as far as many other behaviors are concerned. Trait groups form whenever organisms interact
based on a particular trait, and this is true whether or not these groups are formed by mutual
recognition, pure happenstance, or anything in between.
Understanding this enables one to see that conditions friendly to the type of group
selection that the haystack model describes are likely much more common in nature than
previously appreciated. One no longer needs to presume the existence of a community of strange
organisms that split up, reform, and then split up again, nor try to calculate the strange set of
evolutionary forces and turns of fate that would have led to such behavior to begin with. Instead,
101
any population of organisms in which individuals interact with each other in subsets of the
community has the potential to function in the same way as a haystack model, making the
physical isolation of groups unnecessary (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 94-95).
Further, groups based upon brief interactions of a small number of organisms can often
result in the ―founding‖ of groups with genotypes that differ greatly in proportion from other
groups and the community as a whole. This solves one of the problems that Smith recognizes in
his paper ―Group Selection and Kin Selection.‖ In that paper, he lists several ―severe‖ conditions
that must be met for group selection to work with his model and one of these is that, ―Groups
must be started by one or a few founders‖ (Smith, 1964, p. 1146). This is because variation
between groups is important. For trait groups, there is no reason to suspect that this condition
would be rare at all since pairs of organisms interact on the basis of particular traits all the time,
and this is as small as a founding group can be. In short, trait groups allow for the possibility of
haystack models without haystacks.
Furthermore, trait groups not only allow one to predict that conditions friendly to group
selection are more ubiquitous in nature than one would expect from Smith‘s original model, but
they aid the case for group selection in another way. The existence of trait groups shows that
group selection need not be a process that occurs over many generations. In fact, a trait group
need not even last for an entire generation. Since trait groups form whenever organisms interact
with each other in regard to a particular trait, they can form and reform rapidly. Indeed, this can
happen as rapidly as organisms can interact with each other. Further, an individual might even be
part of more than one trait group at any given time, since each individual organism has many
traits. Thus trait groups get around the reproductive isolation problem and the extended
102
generation problem both of which Smith lists as ―severe‖ conditions required for group selection
to occur57 (Smith, 1964, p. 1146).
To further understand trait groups and see more precisely how they work and relate to
altruism, we can put numbers to another thought experiment in which altruists share a
community with free-riding organisms. The primary difference between these organisms, call
them s, and the ones in the previous example, is that the s will not literally split up into
geographically isolated groups as the s did. Instead, all the s will live in a single large
community and form trait groups. Before any calculations are made, there needs to be a set of
rules that the s will obey, as well as some simplifying conditions for the scenario:
1. The community consists of 6 s.
2. These organisms all live together and regularly encounter one another.
3. During these encounters, the s are able to swap resources with each other. It
doesn‘t matter what these resources are so long as they can confer some sort
of selective benefit. To simplify the case, further suppose that there are only
two resources that the s can trade. These will be called resource ―A‖ and
resource ―B‖.
4. For each A+B set of resources an organism possesses, it gains an absolute
fitness advantage. Thus a can benefit its own absolute fitness by ―trading
away‖ a resource that it has a surplus of in order to gain a resource that it
needs to create an AB set.
Smith only listed three conditions in ―Group Selection and Kin Selection,‖ and the third one was specifically
forbids encroaching on food supplies which was relevant not to altruism in general but to his example in which the
altruistic trait was self sterilization when food supplies became very limited. (Smith, 1964, pg. 1146)
57
103
5. I will stipulate that there are just two expressed phenotypes within this
community that relate to trading encounters. The selfish s will always act to
increase their relative fitness within the trait group, and so therefore will only
make an exchange if it benefits themselves more than their trade partners.
6. The altruistic s will exchange with any other so long as the trade benefits
itself at least half as much as it benefits its exchange partner. Since this
strategy will always result in the loss of relative fitness within any trait group
that contains a selfish , this fits Sober and Wilson‘s definition of an altruistic
strategy in the evolutionary sense.
7. Each pair of resources that an organism has is worth a single ―fitness point,‖
which ultimately represents an increase in fecundity. It is worth noting here
that each fitness point need not represent an entire offspring. Perhaps it takes
five or ten fitness points to produce a single descendant. Exactly how much
each point increases reproduction is unimportant for the example so long as it
is understood that any increase in fitness points represents an increase in
fecundity.
8. It will be assumed that both selfish and altruistic type s have an equal number
of base fitness points that result from behaviors other than resource
exchanges. Because this base fitness value will be the same for both the
selfish and the altruistic types, they factor out of the model, and do not need to
be considered any further.
9.
To present the worst possible case for the altruists in the group, presume that
selfish s will always take maximal advantage of the altruists they interact
104
with. This is to say that selfish s will always ―offer‖ a deal that benefits
themselves twice as much as the altruist they trading with, or the closest thing
to that percentage that the altruist can manage.
10. Each will start off with five units of a single primary resource and zero of its
secondary resource. Which resource is primary and which is secondary will
vary between s. To make resource equally important to the community all
odd number s have resource type ―A‖ as their primary resource and all
evenly numbered s have resource type ―B‖ as their primary resource.
11. So that the s do not run out of resources during the experiment, after each
trade the s will each produce one additional unit of their primary resource but
will produce no secondary resources.
12. The starting ratio of altruists to selfish-types is 1/6.
13. In each trading round number n will pair with number n + (trading round),
so long as that is not already paired to trade with another .
a. If the value of the ―trading round‖ ever exceeds five, it is reset to one for the
purposes of this calculation.
b. If ―n + (trading round)‖ is a number greater than six then six is subtracted
from that number. This is to cause a ―wrap around‖ effect so that all s will
eventually trade with each other. E.g. if it is the second trading round, #6
will trade with #2, not a non-existent #8.
This seems like a complex series of rules, but most of them are there simply to explain
the matching process and the starting conditions of the experiment. Rules three, four, and five are
doing most of the conceptual work here, and the experiment should be much easier to follow
105
when the numbers are structured graphically. From the rules just laid out, the community starts
off looking like this:
Type
Resource Resource
Fitness
A
Points
B
#1
Altruist
5
0
0
#2
Selfish
0
5
0
#3
Selfish
5
0
0
#4
Selfish
0
5
0
#5
Selfish
5
0
0
#6
Selfish
0
5
0
Fig 2.3
Where the symbol ―<>‖ represents a trading group, the pairings in the first trading round
are as follows: 1<>2, 3<>4, and 5<>6. The second two exchanges are trivial to calculate since
both pairs consist of organisms using the selfish strategy. Because it is impossible for both
traders to benefit more than their trading partner, no exchange will take place and no organism in
either group will lose or gain any relative fitness compared to the other. The exchange between
organisms one and two is a different story however. The selfish individual, #2, will always take
maximal advantage of the altruist #1. As a result, #2 will gain 2 A-type resources and give
away only one B-type resource. The selfish therefore gains relative fitness compared to the
altruistic by earning two fitness points as compared to the altruist‘s one. This is only to be
expected since evolutionary altruists, by definition, always suffer a loss of relative fitness when
there are any non-altruists in the group, and, of course, each time two individuals pair they are
forming a trait group since they interact with each other based on their trading strategy. After the
trading round is complete, the community looks like this:
106
Type
Resource Resource
Fitness
A
Points
B
#1
Altruist
4
1
1
#2
Selfish
2
5
2
#3
Selfish
6
0
0
#4
Selfish
0
6
0
#5
Selfish
6
0
0
#6
Selfish
0
6
0
Fig 2.4
So far #2 leads the pack by utilizing the selfish strategy. Now let us iterate through a
few more trading rounds and see what happens. In trading round two, there are no trades since
each pair of organisms has a surplus of the same resource. Each still gains another unit of its
primary resource however.
In trading round three, the s will group together like so: 1<>4, 2<>5, 3<>6. Again, the
groups containing only selfish individuals are able to make no exchanges, and so do not increase
or decrease in relative fitness. Also, as before, the selfish lucky enough to be grouped with the
altruistic will always take maximal possible advantage of its trade partner, and so the exchange
between s #1 and #4 is unbalanced. #1 gives up two units of resource ―A‖ to gain one unit of
resource ―B‖, and gains only one fitness point. #4 on the other hand gains two fitness points
from the exchange.
Trading is once again impossible in round four because each pair of s has a surplus of
the same resource. The community now looks like this:
107
Type
Resource Resource
Fitness
A
Points
B
#1
Altruist
5
2
2
#2
Selfish
2
8
2
#3
Selfish
9
0
0
#4
Selfish
2
8
2
#5
Selfish
9
0
0
#6
Selfish
0
9
0
Fig 2.5
The altruist is now tied with the two leading selfish organisms and ahead of the other
three. In trading round five the organisms pair up like so: 1<>6, 3<>2, 4<>5. The purely selfish
groups are once again unable to make any trades, and neither gain or lose any fitness relative to
one another. Selfish #6, on the other hand, takes two ―A‖ resources off of (altruistic) #1 in
exchange for only one ―B‖ resource which again results in a 2 to 1 fitness point gain favoring the
selfish-type. Once again this is followed by another round of pairings that do not result in trades.
The community now looks like this:
Type
Fig 2.6
Resource Resource
Fitness
A
Points
B
#1
Altruist
5
3
3
#2
Selfish
2
10
2
#3
Selfish
11
0
0
#4
Selfish
2
10
2
#5
Selfish
11
0
0
#6
Selfish
0
10
2
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At this point, the little altruist that could pulls ahead. If this process were to continue,
then in the next round #2 (selfish) will once again be tied with the altruist at four points each.
After that, the altruist will again take the lead, which will continue to grow. An analysis of what
happened here shows that though the altruist lost every trading ―battle‖ with its opponent (in
terms of relative fitness), it still managed to win the ―fitness war‖ because it was a member of
numerous trait groups and gained an advantage for itself from each one, though never as great of
an advantage as its opponent. This is because the altruist provided a group benefit, though at the
cost of losing relative fitness each time a trade was made. Since each time a trade took place the
trading groups disbanded and each organism took a new partner, there was a between group
selection force at work, and the altruist turns out to be more fit than the selfish types after all
levels of selection are considered.58 Had the altruist in our example been forced to trade with
only a single selfish partner (i.e. be part of only a single trait group for its entire lifetime) it
would have failed miserably compared to its only competitor. However, because the groups
themselves were ephemeral and the members of these groups varied, the altruist managed to
succeed over its selfish counterparts. This is the power of between-group selection at work.
2_5.1 More Ways in Which Trait Groups Improve the Case for Group Selection
The previous section showed how effective trait groups can be, but there are still other
ways in which understanding trait groups helps strengthen the case for group selection. Once
trait groups are understood, they undermine three of the objections used against the haystack
model.
58
This does not mean that the altruists in this example will eventually drive out selfish types completely. This case
would result in and evolutionarily stable strategy of altruistic and selfish behavior because a larger percentage of
altruists results in bigger payoffs for the remaining selfish organisms. Evolutionary altruism need not always result
in mixed evolutionarily stable strategies however.
109
First, the trait groups in the previous example were tiny (indeed a group of two is a tiny
as a group can be), and so trading groups easily varied phenotypically from one another. This
shows that founding groups with significant variation is not as problematic as it first seemed.
Second, the trading groups were very short lived. It is now clear that groups do not need
to cohere for generations in order for altruists to confer a group selective benefit. Each trait
group may endure for only the tiniest fraction of a generation and still have a large cumulative
effect over all because an organism can play out its strategy a large number of times in many
different groups. This fact both reduces the cost altruists must ―pay‖ in terms of relative fitness
(because the loss of relative fitness is spread out more thinly over more competitors), and allows
for many more group-level interactions to occur during the same amount of time. Thus, it speeds
up the selection process. This in turn allows for altruistic benefits to be much more modest than
was assumed in the haystack thought experiment when there were far fewer groupings.
Third, if the formation of isolated groups were a requirement for group selection, as
seemed to be the case upon first examination of the haystack model, then meeting the proper
conditions for group selection would be rare. Further, the groupings in such a case would require
either the strange behavior of the s (splitting up into groups and then mixing up again
repeatedly) or regular and repeated geographical isolation. Groups ―isolated‖ by trait-based
interactions, on the other hand, require no unusual geographical scenarios or strange behavior on
the part of the organisms being affected by group selection. Group selection can again play the
role of a significant evolutionary force.
2_6 Real World Examples of Group Level Selection:
So far, the examples of group selection presented have been abstract and considered at
the theoretical level only. This has been necessary to illustrate the mechanics at work. However,
110
now that the basics have been covered, it is a good time to pause for a moment and look at some
examples of group selection at work in the real world. This section (and subsections) will cover
two such cases, the first a case of artificial selection under controlled conditions and the second a
case of raw natural selection in nature.
2_6.2 Artificial Group Selection for Egg Production
Artificial selection for group level traits has been highly effective both in the laboratory
and when applied to real world tasks. Perhaps one area of industry where group selection has had
its most dramatic effect is the poultry industry. Chickens had been artificially selected for many
years in order to produce larger eggs in greater quantity. By allowing the chickens who produce
the largest quantity and best quality of eggs to reproduce, and culling out those who produced
least well, farmers managed to increase both egg size and egg production. As a result, eggs are
now much larger than they were when people first began to keep chickens in captivity for the
purpose of egg production (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 121-122). This is a simple case of artificial
selection for individual traits.
Craig and Muir conducted an experiment in which caged groups of hens were selected
for (based on the quantity and quality of their eggs) instead of individual hens and quickly
achieved very significant results (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 121). After just six generations of
group selection, egg production rose 160%. As an additional bonus, the mortality rate of the egg
laying hens was so drastically reduced that beak trimming was no longer necessary. In this case,
group selection proved to be a powerful enough force to take over when individual selection
alone could no longer improve hens qua egg laying machines.59
Muir‘s experiment with the chickens built off of the work of Wade‘s experiments with flour beetles in 1976 and
1977.
59
111
This last point should be emphasized. Individual selection cannot account for the
progress made in this case, because the hens were artificially selected for only as groups and
only as a result of a group level trait (total quantity and quality of eggs for the group).60 While it
is true that total egg production is merely the aggregate of individual egg production, the same
principle holds true of most group-level traits. A particular flocking formation is only the result
of the positions of individual members of the flock. The food sharing behavior of a pack of
wolves is only the combined result of the activities of the individuals of wolves. Group selection
does not require that there be some group-level property that cannot be explained reductively.
Nor could an opponent of group selection effectively object that in fact the behavior is
selfish at a gene level because, in the end, only genes, not individuals or groups, replicate. While
it is true that group features only multiply when the genes that promote such behavior multiply,
this is only a fact regarding the true replicators. The debate about group selection is a debate over
whether significant selection pressure can occur at the group level in addition to the individual
and gene levels.
2_6.2 Examples of Group Selection Outside of the Lab
Of course, group selection wouldn‘t be particularly interesting for biologists if it only
occurred under artificial conditions. As a result, Sober and Wilson argue that group selection
plays a major role regarding the evolution of the virulence of disease organisms. Diseases work
especially well for group selection models because disease causing viruses or bacteria form a
group within an individual host which compete at the individual level within the host, but which
are nevertheless under group selective pressure to spread to as many other hosts as possible.
60
It should again be emphasized that this chapter is assuming that Sober and Wilson are arguing for a moderate
position concerning multi-level selection, as discussed in the introduction to this chapter.
112
Indeed, diseases operate in a way that looks to be very similar to Smith‘s haystack model, even
without an appeal to trait groups.61
Once a disease organism infects a host, it begins to multiply. This rapid multiplication is
often the source of unpleasant and even deadly symptoms in the host. As a general rule, the
severity of symptoms increases with the virulence (reproduction rate) of the disease. The result is
that an organism infected with a less virulent strain of a disease is likely to live longer, suffer
fewer symptoms, or both than a host infected by the more virulent strain of the same disease
causing bacteria or virus.
Now that the mechanics of group selection have been explained both abstractly and as
part of a controlled experiment, let‘s engage in a thought experiment involving disease causing
organisms. Suppose that a person is infected with two strains of the same disease, one of which
is more virulent than the other. From the perspective of an individual disease organism, faster
reproduction is always beneficial because the strain that is most highly represented in the host
organism is the one that is most likely to be passed on in greater numbers to any other host
infected. Therefore, if individual selection were the only selective force in play concerning the
evolution of virulence, increased virulence should always be selected for.
Given this, we are quite lucky that individual selection is not the only force at work in
the evolution of virulence.62 This is because, while individual selection works to increase the
degree of virulence, group selection can work to decrease it. The more virulent a disease is
within a host, the less mobile that host will become (as a rule) due to the increased severity of the
disease symptoms. However, this decrease in mobility is no good thing for the disease organisms
61
Even if group selection was found to work only in cases involving the evolution of disease organisms, this would
still mean that group selection has played a significant evolutionary role. Of course Sober and Wilson believe its role
is much larger than this.
62
That was, perhaps, too quick. It might be more accurate to say that we are unlucky because diseases which
became increasingly virulent would become extinct and no longer cause any suffering at all.
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in the host‘s body because diseases are often transferred to other hosts in proportion to how
active the host is and how social it remains.
Consider an everyday example for the sake of illustration. Suppose a person is infected
with a flu bug. If the flu hits the host so hard that she calls in sick from work and stays home in
bed all day, she is much less likely to spread that disease to others than a person who is infected
with a less virulent strain of the same flu, which only makes the host feel a little bit under the
weather, but not so much so that she curbs her daily activities. Therefore, while we can see that
maximal virulence is always selected for within a host, less than maximum virulence is selected
for between hosts. Maximally virulent diseases would increase rapidly within a host but spread
from the host less often than they would from a host infected with a less virulent strain (or a mix
of more and less virulent strains) of the disease.
Further, given that selection within the host is always directed towards a state of
maximum virulence, a strain of the disease causing organism which reduces its own reproductive
behavior (decreases its own virulence) is acting in an evolutionarily altruistic way. It is
―sacrificing‖ some of its own relative fitness (within the host) in such a way as to increase the
overall fitness of others in group. Since hosts that contain the altruist strain in addition to the
more virulent strain do better than those that which contain the more virulent strain alone, the
altruistic strain provides a group selective advantage that can work to at least partially offset the
power of individual selection for ever increasing virulence (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 45).
Another way to look at it is that for every disease there is a level of optimal virulence
which is that level of virulence that best perpetuates the disease organism to new hosts (Sober &
Wilson, 1998, p. 44). So, while individual selection will always work towards maximum
virulence within a host, group selection will always work towards optimal virulence between
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hosts. As Sober and Wilson put it, ―To assume that diseases evolve an optimal degree of
virulence is to assume that they have evolved entirely by group selection‖ (Sober & Wilson,
1998, p. 45). Of course, in reality, both individual and group selective forces are at work, and so
what one ends up seeing in actual disease organisms is a degree of virulence that is greater than
the optimal degree of virulence, but less than maximum virulence.
Multi-level selection for levels of virulence leads to the prediction that some types of
diseases should be more virulent than others. Diseases which are airborne or transmitted by
touch require social intermingling to spread to other hosts and therefore should be less virulent
than diseases that are spread by fecal matter, which require only that the fecal matter is in some
way carried away from the sick individual. For human beings, this will usually happen so long as
the victim is alive, even if he or she remains cloistered. This prediction turns out to be accurate,
as intestinal diseases tend to be more virulent than airborne ones63 (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p.
44).
It was Richard Lewontin who first understood that the evolution of virulence provides a
good test case for group level selection, and to this end he investigated the Myxoma virus. This
disease was deliberately introduced into the Australian rabbit population because rabbits are not
native to Australia and wreaked havoc with the ecosystem once they were introduced. They have
been breeding out of control ever since (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 45-46). The virus worked very
well after it was first introduced, but eventually the disease appeared to become less and less
effective. Lewontin noticed that the decreasing mortality rate of the rabbits was not merely due
to the rabbits becoming more resistant to the virus, as one would of course expect from
individual selection. The virus itself had become less virulent, and this, of course, runs contrary
63
Sober and Wilson are referencing to Ewald‘s 1993 work ―Evolution of Infectious Disease‖ here.
115
to individual selection theory64 (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 46). As noted before, decreasing
virulence cannot be explained by individual selection, since relative fitness within the host
always favors the more virulent strains. It is only through selective pressure at the group level
that a general decrease in virulence for Myxoma begins to make any kind of sense.
2_7 How Have Biologists Explained Away Apparently Obvious Instances of Altruism and
Cooperation in the Natural World?
So how did modern evolutionists manage to ignore group selection for such a long time?
Apart from the doubts about the applicability of the haystack model to the natural world,
biologists believed that they had developed evolutionary tools that could explain the evolution of
cooperation, and even a certain type of altruism, without the need to resort to group selection.
One of these tools is the theory of inclusive fitness, which now more often goes by the name ―kin
selection,‖ and the other is evolutionary game theory, especially in so far as game theory deals
with evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS).
2_7.1 Kin Selection
W.D. Hamilton developed inclusive fitness theory in 1963, and Maynard Smith later
relabeled this theory as kin selection in 1964.65 According to Sober and Wilson, this theory was
developed specifically to explain altruism without invoking group selection theories (Sober &
Wilson, 1998, p. 55). Kin selection takes the insight that what individuals pass on are collections
of genes, rather than copies of themselves (selfish gene theory), and combines that with the
understanding that what matters as far as the evolutionary fitness of an organism is concerned is
64
This information was gathered from Sober and Wilson‘s quote of Lewonton.
Sober and Wilson note that G. C. Williams and D. C. Williams published an earlier paper that outlined a similar
theory specifically for social insects.
65
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how many viable copies of a particular individual‘s genes are reproduced. Which individual
organism these copies come from is irrelevant, evolutionarily speaking. From these two insights,
one can glean an understanding of kin selection, which theorizes that an organism can increase
the fitness of its own genes by being willing to sacrifice fitness on an individual level if doing so
increases the fecundity of enough relatives, which together share a large enough portion of its
genes.
An organism will, on average, share half of its genes with a brother or sister, and
necessarily share half its genes with its father or mother.66 Mother/father and brother/sister
relationships share the closest genetic ties, if maternal twins are excluded. Cousins, nephews, and
half-siblings will, on average, share a quarter of their genes with their relation, and this
proportion continues to decrease geometrically67 as the familial relationships become more and
more remote. The insight of kin selection is that an organism that sacrifices some of its own
fitness, or even its own life, to aid enough close relatives is increasing the fitness of its own
genes. And the individual genes, of course, influence the individual‘s behavior (especially for
simple organisms). The greater the degree of sacrifice, the more closely related the aided
individuals (and/or the larger the number of relatives aided) should be under this theory, at least
as a general rule.
Consider, for example, a mother bird that acts to distract a predator approaching its nest,
luring it away from her offspring by feigning an injury far away from the nest. Let‘s suppose that
66
This is true, barring mutations and errors in reproduction such as triple X or double Y chromosomes, and the fact
that technically males have more of their mother‘s DNA than their father‘s because Y chromosomes are shorter than
X chromosomes.
67
Barring inbreeding, the familial relationship will shrink geometrically, although there is obviously a limit to this,
since, as a species, even non relatives share most genes with the rest of their species.
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in this way the mother bird saves the lives of three of her offspring. 68 Assume for this example
that the offspring are close enough to adulthood to survive on their own. Even if the mother bird
dies as a result of her action, she has still increased her fitness in terms of passing on genes to the
next generation. The mother bird carries 100% of her own genes, but her three offspring together
carry 150% of her genes.69 Therefore, under normal kin selection interpretation, the sacrifice of
the mother bird is usually not seen as genuine altruism, as it would be if it had evolved by group
selection. Instead, it is seen as a type of selfishness that is the result of selection at a selfish-gene
level (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 56).
Though kin selection is generally seen as an alternative to group selection, Sober and
Wilson argue this is a mistake made by biologists who think that kin selection is describing a
different process involving natural selection instead of just a different perspective of the same
process (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 57). The mother bird and its offspring are linked because they
are kin, it is true, but they also form a trait group where the mother bird exhibits a behavior when
a predator approaches its offspring based on the trait of its offspring being genetically related70 to
her. This sacrifice provides a group benefit and lowers the relative fitness of the mother bird as
an individual (in the group which consists of herself and her nestlings), which is all that is
required to accurately label the mother bird‘s behavior as evolutionarily altruistic.
Sober and Wilson argue that kin selection, as it turns out, is simply a special case of
group selection (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 94 and 332).71 Kin selection is a form of group
68
The Western Snowy Plover does something much like this. The adult bird will fake a wing injury to lure a
predator away from its nest. This behavior is risky but not usually fatal, as the bird will attempt to escape before the
predator actually attacks.
69
Although some particular genes might not get passed along as a matter of chance. For example, all three offspring
might have received a common chromosome from their mother.
70
Of course, the trait need not be that specific. The mother bird could just be acting off of the fact that there are baby
birds in her nest without being able to judge relatedness for example.
71
Sober and Wilson say, ―Replacing kin selection theory with multilevel selection theory is like shutting off the
spotlight and illuminating the entire stage. Genealogical relatedness is suddenly seen as only one of many factors
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selection that might be especially noteworthy because cases of kin selection may create stronger
selective forces at the group level which could aid the evolution of evolutionary altruistic
behavior. Further, cases of group selection that involve closely related individuals could give rise
to greater variation between groups, which, as was noted earlier, is important because natural
selection needs variation to work upon. Nests, clutches, and colonies of kin magnify variation
because if an organism carries a rare gene and then forms a group by producing offspring, those
offspring have a greater chance of carrying that rare gene themselves than the general
population. If the gene coded for an altruistic behavior, this would increase the concentration of
altruists in some groups but not others, thus increasing a higher degree of variation between
groups. Williams and Williams modeled this particular advantage for group level adaptations in
1957 (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 62).
However, there is reason to doubt that kin selection can sufficiently explain the amount
of altruism (or apparent altruism so as not to beg the question) found in nature all by itself.72
First of all, kin selection does not succeed in explaining altruistic behavior while avoiding group
selective mechanisms. When organisms treat each other in an altruistic way because they can
sense their kinship relation or in some way act on their kinship (perhaps because many animals,
in the early stages of their lives, are in situations where they can only interact with kin anyway),
they are really acting as a trait group. For example, if kin share food with each other because this
increases the chances of their own genes being passed on, this is an altruistic trait that aids the
group--specifically the trait group based relatedness.
that can influence the fundamental ingredients of natural selection—phenotypic variation, heritability, and fitness
consequences. The random assortment of genes into individuals provides all the raw material that is needed to
evolve individual-level adaptations; the random assortment of individuals into groups provides similar raw materials
for group-level adaptations‖ (Sober & Wilson, 1998, pg. 332).
72
This is true even in conjunction with game theory, which we will discuss later.
119
Also, if mere relatedness without group-level competition were alone enough to explain
altruism, then one should expect to observe more altruism the more closely related competing
individuals are to each other. This prediction doesn‘t prove true. Plants with low dispersal rates,
for example, produce patches of siblings that are closely related to one another. This magnifies
the genetic variation between themselves and more distantly related patches of the same species,
and this variation is admittedly helpful for the development of altruism. Nevertheless, it turns out
to be the case that low dispersal rates limit the extent to which more varied groups can interact
and compete with one another. This, in turn, hinders the evolution of altruism and other group
level adaptations by reducing between-group competition. Sober and Wilson reference Queller,
Wilson, Pollock, and Dugatkin saying, ―These opposing forces exactly cancel, so that limited
dispersal has no effect on the evolution of altruism‖ (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 95). This
indicates that between-group competition, the natural selection of groups, can often be the
important impetus behind the evolution of altruistic traits even in groups of kin.
2_7.2 Evolutionary Game Theory and Reciprocal Altruism
Another way that evolutionary biologists attempt to explain away altruistic behavior is
through evolutionary game theory and the discovery of evolutionary stable strategies. Perhaps
the best way to understand game theory is through a brief introduction to one of the earliest
examples, the famous ―Prisoner‘s Dilemma‖ scenario. The Prisoner‘s Dilemma was originally
formulated by the Rand Corporation in order to model global nuclear strategy (Shermer, 2004, p.
58). Traditionally the dilemma is explained with the aid of a diagram, such as this one:
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Opponent
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate
2,2
0,3
3,0
1,1
Player
Defect
Fig. 2.7
To understand the dilemma, one is asked to put herself into the position of a player in this
―game.‖ Instead of using criminal suspects trying to achieve the fewest number of years in prison
(from whence comes the name ―Prisoner‘s Dilemma‖), I will instead make this Prisoner‘s
Dilemma have a different goal. In this game the ―players,‖ which are stand-ins for competing
organisms, are persons competing to gain as much money as possible. The numbers in the boxes
represent the amount of money, in dollars, that the player will gain from particular outcomes
followed by the amount of money the opponent would receive from the same outcome.
At the start of the game, both players are placed into different rooms where they are each
told by a third party that, ―If you choose to cooperate with your partner and your partner chooses
to cooperate with you, then you will both gain two dollars. If one of you chooses to cooperate
and one of you chooses to defect, however, then the one who defected will walk away with three
dollars while the lone cooperator will gain no money at all. In the case that you both defect, you
will gain only a single dollar each.‖ The players are then both kept in separate rooms and are
unable to communicate with each other. The game ends when each player makes her choice.73
73
The original game involved not money but years spent in prison. In that setting, the goal was to get the lesser
value, while in the version of the game I am presenting the object is to get the higher value. The payoffs of the
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This is an example of a Prisoner‘s Dilemma scenario because if the players could both
communicate and trust one another, it would be better for players to cooperate. This is also the
strategy that is best for the two players considered as a group. Nevertheless, from an individual
perspective the rationally self interested strategy always seems to be to defect. Cooperation is
best for the players as a group because they will gain four dollars instead of either two or three.
Nevertheless, the rationally self-interested choice is to defect instead of to cooperate. This
becomes clear when one considers the following: No matter what a player chooses to do, there
are only two options her opponent can choose. If the opponent chooses to cooperate, then the
best thing for the player to do is to defect and gain three dollars instead of two. If, on the other
hand, the opponent decides to defect, then the player should also defect and at least gain one
dollar instead of nothing.
The opponent is in exactly the same position of course, and will, if she is rationally selfinterested herself, determine that it is also best for her to defect no matter what her opponent
does by the same reasoning. Further, if both players know that their opponent is rationally selfinterested as well, then they also know that by defecting they will each only receive a single
dollar and not three. This is the source of the dilemma. Even though both players know that they
would be better off cooperating, the rational thing to do is to defect because defection will
always have the better payoff, regardless of what ones opponent does.
If somehow both players could be assured that their opponent would cooperate then,
instead of gaining only one dollar each, they could gain two each by cooperating. It should be
noted that communication alone isn‘t enough to accomplish this, since one‘s opponent may
always be lying and there is no enforcement mechanism built into the game. When applied to the
original game were, of course, different. If the numbers in the boxes were exchanged diagonally, then this example
would work to create a PD where the object was to get the lowest ―score‖ possible.
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evolution of biological organisms, this game does not seem to bode well from the evolution of
cooperation or altruism in nature because, from the point of view of individual selection, the
defector will never suffer a loss of relative fitness while a cooperator can.74
Yet to conclude that the prisoner‘s dilemma game shows that evolutionary altruism
cannot evolve is going too far too quickly. There is a relevant variation of this scenario left to
consider. What if, instead of playing a game that only lasts one round, the players were to play a
game that is reiterated a number of times? In such circumstances, each player would be able to
develop a long-term strategy. One player might try to communicate a willingness to cooperate
with the other by cooperating for the first iteration of the game. If they both do this, then this
successful cooperation may lead them to cooperate in the next round as well, because they both
know that a war of defection would hurt them both. Even though a player might be tempted to
defect against an opponent who has been cooperating for the immediate bonus dollar that
defection grants, a player who thinks ahead will realize that when the number of iterations is
indefinite, cooperating with her opponent is the best long term strategy so long as she believes
her opponent is rational and self interested as well.75
The prisoner‘s dilemma played for money is an example of a non-zero-sum game. That is to say that in the
example there is not a winner or a loser among the players. More than a single player can come out ahead, unlike
games such as chess, basketball, or any number of other games that allow for only one winner or winning team. In a
non-zero-sum game, the goal for each player is to do as well for herself as she can. Of course in nature if there were
only two ―players‖, and fitness was the payoff, then the prisoner‘s dilemma would become a zero-sum game
because, as we now know, the price paid for a continuous loss of relative fitness is eventual extinction. However, as
we will see, the PD will become a non-zero-sum game when an organism‘s cooperate/defect strategies is tested
against large enough number of other players.
75
It is important that the number of iterations in the game is unknown, because if the number of iterations is made
known to the players then one runs across the same problem that appeared in the non reiterated prisoner‘s dilemma
game. In such a situation, the best option is to defect on the very last iteration, since there can be no repercussions as
a result. This makes the very last iteration of an iterated PD game with a definite and known number of rounds just
like the non-iterated game. Of course, if both parties know that the other will defect on the last round, then that
makes the second to last round just like the non-iterated game and so the rational strategy would again be to defect,
and so on all the way back to the very first round of the iterated game which would lead to a defect strategy for
every iteration of the game.
In practice, when the reiterated game is played with people, there are in fact more defectors during the last
few repetitions of the game. Yet those defections do not back all the way up to the early stages of the game. If the
participants in the game are given a chance to communicate, the number of defectors goes down even further. In the
74
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The relevant point concerning iterated PDs verses non-iterated PDs is relevant to
evolutionary biology because animals often live in relatively small communities. Thus, they
travel and interact with others within a fairly limited radius. The chance of interacting with the
same individual on more than one occasion is therefore often quite high, and so natural
prisoner‘s dilemmas are often of the iterated variety. This means that the way an organism
―plays‖ one particular interaction can have effects reaching far into the future that would make a
cooperative strategy more beneficial, even if the immediate payoff for defection is higher.
Human beings, of course, can rationally plan ahead and predict that mutual cooperation is the
best long term strategy, but this point is not limited to rational beings, or even organisms with
central nervous systems. Organisms can have more mechanical and predictable strategies
regarding cooperation, and if the long term strategies are more effective then they will be
selected for via natural selection.
Robert Axelrod used a series of computer simulations as part of a contest in which he
invited faculty members to provide cooperation and defection strategies for a scientific
experiment consisting of a series of reiterated prisoner‘s dilemmas (Axelrod, 1984). These
strategies were converted into computer code and played against opposing strategies where each
―player‖ would match up against every other ―player‖ many times over. Axelrod teamed up with
Hamilton and together they proved that, given the right conditions, tit-for-tat was an optimal
strategy (and, indeed, this was the strategy that won Axelrod‘s contest). The tit-for-tat strategy is
one in which a ―player‖ (in this case a piece of computer code that will be called ―player-a‖)
natural world, of course, an organism is unlikely to know the exact number of iterations in any analogous game.
Still, if game theory is meant to be a full account of cooperation in humans and animals alike, then reiteration fails to
explain why people tend to cooperate even with strangers they are likely never to see again--for example, tipping a
waitress at a restaurant one encounters while driving across the country. Likewise, there seem to be too many
instances of cooperation in the natural world for all of them to be based on evolutionary either game theory or kin
selection or even both together.
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starts off by cooperating when matched with another piece of code (player-b) which it has never
―met‖. On all subsequent interactions between player-a and player-b, player-a will duplicate
player-b‘s last action. In other words, if player-b defects on the first round, then player-a will
defect on the second, and so on. If a tit-for-tat (TFT) player were in a pool composed entirely of
cooperators (the only-cooperate strategy), it too would always cooperate. If it were in a pool that
contained some cooperators, some defectors, and some fellow tit-for-tatters, it would always
cooperate with the cooperators, always cooperate with the other TFTs, and get suckered by the
defectors only their first pairing after which it will always defect. TFT, it turns out, is a very
successful strategy. Indeed, Rosenberg says:
―If, among a number of players using different strategies, the ones with the lowest
payoffs are eliminated, say, after every five turns, then in the end, after enough
turns, all remaining players will be using tit-for-tat. In the long run no strategy
generates a higher pay-off than tit-for-tat.‖ (Ruse, 1998, p. 455)
And,
If playing tit-for-tat in an iterated prisoner‘s dilemma is a significant individually
adaptive strategy, and can be transmitted from generation to generation…then, in
the long run, reciprocal altruism can be established even among animals that have
neither kinship ties nor even common membership in the same biological species.
Tit-for-tat is altruism in the expectation of reciprocation with the threat of
retaliation just in case co-operation is not forthcoming. (Ruse, 1998, p. 455-456)
What is more, once the tit-for-tat strategy is established, it is impossible for an ―always
defect‖ strategy to invade and take over, as any always-defect strategist that tried would sucker
all the TFT players in the group one time only and then never again, while the tit-for-tatters
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receive the benefits of cooperation with all the other tit-for tatters in the group every single time
they are paired together. It is possible for an ―always cooperate‖ strategy to infiltrate a tit-for-tat
community because, though the TFTers and the cooperators have different strategies, they will
always behave in an identical way so long as those are the only two strategies in play. If a
strategy that always defects moves in to a mixed group of cooperators and TFTers however, the
―always cooperate‖ strategy will quickly be replaced by the TFT strategy because the
cooperators will continue to cooperate with a known defector every single time. Maynard Smith
termed this type of strategy, that is to say a strategy such as TFT which is resistant to invasion,
an ―evolutionarily stable strategy‖ or ESS.76
Of course it is important to understand that the tit for tat strategy isn‘t the best strategy in
all circumstances, since it can only come to dominance under particular conditions. Dugatkin and
Reeve say:
The success or failure of cooperation in the Iterated Prisoner‘s Dilemma
is…clearly dependent on the probability of future play with the same player….
When the chances of future play with a given partner are high, but probabilistic,
TFT can resist invasion from ALLD [all defect] and ALTDC [Alternate defect
and cooperate]. (Dugatkin & Reeve, 1998)
The evolution of a successful TFT strategy requires a number of conditions. First, for the
reasons mentioned in footnote 34, the exact number of interactions that will take place over the
course of the ―game‖ cannot be known to the players or in any way sensed and acted upon by the
organisms involved. Second, the probability for long-term benefits of cooperation must be
Of course it is important to note here that tit-for-tat isn‘t the only ESS possible given the strategies discussed. A
population composed entirely of defectors cannot be invaded by tit-for-tatters or any other strategy mentioned so far.
Such a population does not do nearly as well on the whole as a tit-for-tat community, but, nevertheless, once
established it cannot be invaded.
76
126
greater than the immediate benefit that can be gained by defecting. Third, the player organisms
must be able to ―remember‖ one another in the sense that they can respond uniquely to different
individuals (Ruse, 1998, p. 457). Some of these conditions may seem more difficult to come by
in nature than others, but none of them are too dubious on the surface.
Given the success of tit-for-tat in prisoner‘s dilemma models and the success of other
evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) in which cooperation pays, many biologists believed (and
still believe) that evolutionary game theory has the potential to sufficiently explain cooperation
among organisms either completely in terms of game theory, or in conjunction with inclusive
fitness theory. These theories, they believe, can eliminate any need to appeal to group selection
as an explanation of what they would call only apparently altruistic traits. The reciprocal altruism
demonstrated in the examples above, which appears to function purely on the level of individual
selection, is an attempt to show that group selection theories are superfluous.
It seems unlikely, however, that evolutionary game theory and kin selection, even taken
together, could explain all the cases of cooperation between organisms in nature. Still, let us
assume for just a moment that game theory alone could handle the massive explanatory workload
expected of it. Even if this were the case, Sober and Wilson argue that group selection is still
alive and well. To understand why, just look at the process that takes place within a computer
simulation such as Axelrod‘s, which tries various strategies for cooperation and defection against
one other. As was noted, TFT did especially well in these simulations. Surprisingly however,
TFT did not do better because the TFT algorithm confers the most individual fitness.
To see this, consider the fact that if a tit-for-tat strategist and a selfish strategist were
grouped together and continued to play the game only with one another, the TFT strategist would
always lose, as TFT has a lower relative fitness value when grouped with an opponent playing
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the always defect strategy. The reason for this is clear; the selfish strategist will always
successfully defect one time before the tit-for-tatter retaliates. In the same way, the tit-for-tat
strategy is not in any absolute sense superior to the always cooperate strategy. As was mentioned
previously, a tit-for-tatter grouped only with cooperators expresses exactly the same behavior as
the cooperators, and neither strategy in this case would have an advantage over the other
provided that there were no invaders or mutations.
The reason why the tit-for-tat strategy did so well in Axelrod‘s experiments and emerged
as dominant in most cases is because TFT benefits more easily from group selection than do the
other two strategies. Under Sober and Wilson‘s multilevel selection theory, each time two
algorithms are matched up in the experiment they form a trait group--which is to say that they
interact with each other based upon the trait that governs their cooperation strategy.
As admitted, the always defect strategists come out slightly ahead over the tit-for-tatters
if only paired together. However, when the trait groups constantly change and every strategy is
matched up against every other strategy repeatedly, this advantage is diminished over time. If the
always defect strategy is matched with a cooperator, and if this match is reiterated, the
cooperator does far worse than the tit-for-tatter would, since the cooperator will be ―fooled‖ time
and time again by the selfish strategists while the tit-for-tatter will suffer from a non-mutual
defect only one time. This will cause the cooperator strategy to suffer a greater loss than the
TFTers when always defect strategists are in the group. On the other hand, when a selfish
strategist meets another selfish strategist, each individual receives a non-optimal benefit, both
individually and when taken as a group. This is in contrast to the tit-for-tatters who produce a
maximal benefit for the group (itself and its partner) whenever two tit-for-tatters meet, just as
they do when meeting pure cooperators. The tit for tatters cannot exploit the cooperators as the
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always defect strategists can. Under these circumstances, the cooperators would not be around
too long to exploit if there are selfish strategists mixed into the group. On average, organisms
with the tit-for-tat strategy will benefit more and be hurt less in a wider variety of possible
pairings (trait groups).77 The tit-for-tatters benefit the trait groups they are part of more often
than they do not, and, further, they share in that benefit over repeated groupings.
The discovery of various stable cooperation strategies in evolutionary game theory is in
no way a replacement for multi-level selection theory. Instead, game theoretic models are just
special cases of group selection, or, as Sober and Wilson would say, the two competing theories
are merely different perspectives that describe the same process (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 57).
The group selection perspective is worthy of notice, however, because by merely focusing on
individual algorithms or organisms, one can easily overlook the significant force of betweengroup competition. Both theories provide descriptions of the same process, but multi-level
selection theory makes all the forces at play more obvious.
Just as Darwin‘s theory of natural selection blurred the line between what were
previously thought of as distinct species, Sober and Wilson‘s understanding of multi-level
selection blurs the line between group level adaptations and individual level adaptations, since
any adaptation that has been affected by both group selective and individual selective forces is
no longer purely one or the other and therefore admits to no simple label of ―group level
adaptation‖ or ―individual level adaptation.‖ When gene level selection is also at work, it also
has a partial claim on the final form of the adaptation.78 Therefore, Sober and Wilson developed
a process by which one can determine the relative strength of selective forces at different levels
77
Of course, for this to happen, the tit-for-tatters must be introduced into a sufficiently diverse system, or, at least,
one that is not entirely made up of algorithms that always defect. There needs to be a critical level of cooperation in
the starting group for the tit-for-tatters to prevail.
78
There could also be cases where group selection and individual selection are working in the same direction,
speeding up the evolutionary process and again both receive credit.
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of competition. This would allow biologists to say, instead of ―This is a group level adaptation.‖
or ―This is an individual level adaptation,‖ that ―This adaptation was shaped roughly 60 percent
by group selection and 40 percent by individual selection.‖ This is the subject of the next section.
2_8 Applying Sober and Wilson‘s Multi Level Selection Theory to Real Populations
Now that I have discussed the fundamentals of group selection as Sober and Wilson
present it, one might wonder how their multi-level selection theory could be applied in a
practical way by biologists. Sober and Wilson designed a three-step process through which one
can determine the relative strengths of individual and group level selection. In fact, their process
is more flexible than that since their multi-level selection theory is scalable. They claim the same
three-step process can be used to determine the relative forces of any legitimate levels of
selection, from selfish gene selection verses individual selection, to group level selection verses
species level selection or other levels (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 102-103).79 Though it is true
that this chapter has focused primarily on group level selection, this is only because it is group
level selection that is so important for the evolution of altruism. Multi-level selection theory, as
Sober and Wilson envision it, can be applied to all legitimate levels of selection.
Sober and Wilson point out that their three-step process may seem more complex than
theories which only describe a single level of selection, but maintain that these opposing theories
do not win out over multi-level selection merely because they are simpler. If the process being
described really complex in fact, then theories that over simplify are not more virtuous merely
because they are less complicated because parsimony is only a good principle for choosing
between opposing theories that are roughly equal in their descriptive and predictive powers
(Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 131).
79
It is not my intention to argue for the plausibility of species level selection in this dissertation.
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Though multi-level selection theory can be scaled to any legitimate level of selection,
Sober and Wilson‘s three-step process will be explained by applying it to a group versus
individual selection question. Regardless, the same three step process for analysis at all levels of
selection.
Step 1: Determine what one should expect if group level selection were the only force at
work.
What should one expect? Sober and Wilson argue that if group selection were the only
force at work, then one should expect an optimum level of cooperation. The optimal level of
cooperation is that level of cooperation that maximally benefits groups (Sober & Wilson, 1998,
p. 103). As an example, suppose again that one wants to analyze the evolution of virulence in a
disease organism. From the earlier discussion of virulence, it became clear that both withingroup and between-group selective forces shape the degree of virulence of diseases. However, if
group selection were the only force at work one should expect the disease in question to evolve
to the point of optimal virulence, where optimal virulence is that degree of virulence that
maximizes the spread of the disease to other hosts. If one were considering food sharing instead
of virulence then one should expect that pure group selection would select for that level of food
sharing which maximizes the fitness of the group.
Step 2: Step 2 is the counterpart of step 1. For step 2, Sober and Wilson ask us to
determine what behaviors should be expected of organisms that evolved a particular feature
through individual selection only.
Sober and Wilson point that in such cases one will often find a large number of ―short
sighted‖ strategies (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 104). For example, if individual selection were the
only factor involved in the evolution of virulence, one should expect maximum virulence to
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evolve instead of optimal virulence. This is because the relative fitness of a disease organism is
always enhanced by passing on more copies of its genes. Of course, maximum virulence would
have a tendency to kill off host organisms before the disease could transfer to new hosts, and it is
in this way that the strategy is ―short sighted‖.
Step 3: In this third and final step of the process, one is supposed to use the results
gathered from steps 1 and 2 to create a spectrum that runs from the expected results of complete
individual selection, at one extreme, to the expected results for complete group selection at the
other. Empirical information should then be gathered in order to pinpoint exactly where the
organisms fits along that spectrum (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 117). If the trait of the organism in
question falls midway in the spectrum, one can determine that the forces of individual selection
and group selection are roughly equal in strength. If the actual phenotype of the organism fell
3/4th of the way towards ―complete group selection,‖ then the forces of group selection are
roughly three times as strong as those of individual selection.
Of course, in reality, step three isn‘t quite as simple as it sounds because experimenters
have to consider at least three important details (which Sober and Wilson cover), each of which
correlates to one of the three necessary (and together sufficient) conditions for natural selection.
These are (a) phenotypic variation between the units of selection, (b) the heritability of those
phenotypic differences, and (c) fitness differences caused by those particular phenotypic traits.
To fully apply the theory, one must consider each of these elements at the level of selection
being investigating.
Consider condition (a): If one were investigating selection at the group level, then it must
be confirmed that the group level trait in question varies between competing groups. This could
be a trait such as, ―the percentage of disease bacteria in the group that reproduce more slowly
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than the others‖ or ―the average number of eggs lain by this group of chickens‖ etc. In theory,
variation is measurable, but in practice, sometimes, there are complications involved in making
these measurements accurately.
Condition (b) might seem like a ―give me‖ so long at the phenotypic traits are genetically
influenced, but this isn‘t necessarily the case. For example, in a simple case where a trait varies
based on a single allele, a beneficial trait is not inheritable if it is the heterozygous genotype that
has the selective advantage while the homozygotes are equally fit. Sober and Wilson give an
example of this for the (individual level) phenotypic trait of height in the case where being taller
procures a fitness advantage. To clarify: If Aa (or aA) codes for the taller height while AA and
aa codes for the shorter height, heritability quickly becomes a problem (Sober & Wilson, 1998,
p. 108). The reason why heritability falters in this example is because the genotypes that are
favored by natural selection are Aa and aA, and yet, even if the population started off containing
only tall phenotypes, one would quickly find that instead tall phenotypes replacing the shorter
ones, the population would ―devolve‖ to a proportion of roughly 50% tall and 50% short
phenotypes. If the population started with mostly short phenotypes, then the percentage of tall
would only increase to 50% and no higher percentage of the tall phenotype would be inheritable.
Why is this? Because if heterozygotes (the tall and selectively favored organisms) mate with
each other they statistically produce all four genotypic combinations, AA, aa, Aa, and aA, in
equal proportions.80 Thus, no matter how strong selection for the heterozygous trait of tallness is,
80
Actually, to claim that heritability is impossible in a situation like this one probably goes too far. Some natural
selection is possible, since a population which a larger than 50% population of either AAs or aas or both would
quickly evolve to a 50/50 split due to the selective advantage of the heterozygous type. This is evolution, but the
trait has a sub-optimal cap. The heterozygous genotype could never take over no matter how strong natural selection
favors it. Sadly, this is what happens in the case of resistance to malaria and sickle cell anemia. The heterozygous
phenotype is highly resistance to malaria, but one of the homozyogotic genotypes results in sickle cell anemia, a
disease which is usually fatal. If things were otherwise and one of the homozyogotic traits caused immunity to
malaria however, that allele would quickly come to dominate and cases of sickle cell anemia would dwindle and
perhaps even disappear.
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the next generation will not be able to inherit that that trait in proportions statistically greater
than 50%, and therefore the tall-coding genotypes will never replace the short-coding genotypes
(Sober & Wilson, 1998, pgs. 108-109). While it may be harder to think of example of cases like
this that could exist at the group level, it is still important that heritability be confirmed.
Finally, the third condition (c) must be analyzed. Does natural selection favor one
phenotype over another, and if so to what degree? Again, the only way to discover this is through
empirical observation and investigation. Thus, while Sober and Wilson do indeed provide
biologists with a working strategy to determine the forces of selection at work for any given level
of selection, empirical research remains vital. Careful measurements and solid empirical data are
needed to apply Sober and Wilson‘s rubric. When the data is gathered accurately, evolutionary
biologists can then use this three step process to gain an understanding of the relative strengths of
all levels of selective forces at play.81
Sober and Wilson‘s method measures the evolutionary pressures on an organism in such
a way that none of the selective forces are ―averaged out‖ by looking at only absolute fitness.
Sober and Wilson call this the ―averaging fallacy,‖ and single level selection theories, however,
are vulnerable to it.82 Just as a falling object is influenced by forces impacting it from numerous
vectors--forces such as gravity, air resistance, and wind speed, so too is the evolution of
organisms influenced by the forces of gene-level selection, individual selection, and group level
selection, each of which can nudge the evolutionary course of a species along a different vector.
And, just as the strength of the forces affecting a falling object can vary as the result of an
object‘s structure (Is it aerodynamic? Does it act like a parachute?), so too can the evolution of
81
This is true provided that the trait in question evolved as a result of natural selection, not genetic drift or any other
force that may cause changes in gene frequency what are not the result of natural selection.
82
Sober and Wilson call this the ―averaging fallacy‖ (Sober & Wilson, 1998, pgs. 31-35) and name it as the source
of many erroneous arguments against group selection.
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organisms be influenced by the structure of both the organism itself, and the ―social‖ structure of
the group it is a part of.
Averaging all levels of fitness together isn‘t technically incorrect, however average
fitness disguises the fact that there is selection pressure at the gene, individual, and group levels.
Thus, if the genes coding for a particular trait increase on average, there is temptation to look at
this result and conclude that the only force at work was individual or gene selection. This is
because if the frequency of a particular gene increases, and all other variables are held constant,
it must be because that gene is favored by natural selection. Group selectionists like Sober and
Wilson do not deny this fact. If a trait, be it a group level trait or otherwise, increases, it must be
because the genes coding for that trait have increased in the gene pool.83 Nevertheless, until the
details are analyzed, the question remains as to whether or not one of the factors influencing the
gene‘s success was the natural selection of group level traits.
2_9 Summary
This chapter discussed two different ways of measuring fitness and defined evolutionary
altruism as the expression of any trait that benefits others in terms of absolute fitness while at the
same time causes a loss of relative fitness for the actor. The presence of evolutionary altruism
and cooperation in nature has been a longstanding puzzle for evolutionary biologists.
This chapter also explored the haystack model that Maynard Smith developed which
showed that group selection could theoretically overpower individual selection. Though Smith
believed that his ―haystack model‖ was actually proof that group selection was an insignificant
evolutionary, this was because he believed that the conditions required for a natural population to
83
This statement only regards genetically determined traits, or genetically influenced traits if all environmental
factors are held constant. It is not meant to rule out the possibility of cultural evolution.
135
fit the general framework of the haystack modeled would be exceedingly rare and short-lived.
Many other biologists have shared this belief. As group selection fell out of favor, evolutionary
biologists developed new theoretical tools to explain apparent altruism that were specifically
designed to avoid the need to appeal to group selection which was by then seen as a debunked
theory.
Two of the favored approaches used to do this are W.D. Hamilton‘s theory of inclusive
fitness (better known as ―kin selection‖), and evolutionary game theory, which has been used to
model cooperative behavior for both selfish individual organisms and selfish genes. These
theories have lead to progress in evolutionary biology, but do not seem up to the task of
explaining the degree to which many organisms are altruistic.
It wasn‘t until the discovery of trait groups that group selection once again became a
viable option, and this chapter has shown how trait groups do not require the highly restrictive
conditions Smith predicted were necessary for the haystack model to appear in nature. Sober and
Wilson developed a multi-level selection theory that utilizes the concept of trait groups and
further developed a three-step process that allows biologists to determine the relative degree of
selective pressure present at all levels of selection. This process provides an advantage in that it
paints a more accurate picture of all the selective forces at work shaping a particular adaptation
as opposed to simply considering whether a phenotypic trait is fitness enhancing or not.
The next chapter will continue to focus on group selection, especially of altruistic traits.
This chapter will attempt to show how group selection can become an even more powerful
evolutionary force favoring evolutionarily altruistic behavior through systems of rewards,
punishments, and cultural norms.
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CHAPTER III:
ADAPTATIONS THAT ENHANCE GROUP SELECTION
Chapter two discussed the mechanisms driving group selection in order to show how it is
that altruistic behavior can evolve when the conditions for group selection are favorable. Further,
it showed that, because of trait groups, the conditions are favorable much more often than
previously appreciated. Upon further examination, it turned out to be that case that some,
supposedly individualistic, selection mechanisms which have been used to explain the
development of altruistic behavior in the past (such as kin selection and evolutionary game
theory) are not, in fact, individualistic mechanisms at all, but are instead specific forms of group
selection.
Understanding the evolutionary forces that can promote altruistic behavior is important
because the more that selective pressure favors a behavior, the more it will favor mutations that
affect psychology or physiology in a way that favors that behavior. Since between-group
selection always favors altruism, the purpose of this chapter is to explore other mechanisms that
can increase the power of between-group selection.
Specifically, this chapter will focus on mechanisms that can amplify selection for
altruistic behavior. The reason that these mechanisms have been singled out for a chapter of their
own is because they have something in common. They all require a certain level of neurological
complexity before they are possible. The mechanisms are:
1. Assortative behavior
2. Within-group systems of rewards and punishments
3. Specifically human systems of rewards and punishments
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Just as multi-level selection theory has shown that evolutionary environments favorable
to group selection extend far beyond simple kinship relations, the forthcoming discussion of
these mechanisms will illustrate how altruistic behaviors need not be as costly as one might
originally expect from an analysis of the group-beneficial behavior alone. This will show that
altruistic behaviors should not only appear fairly frequently in the right types of organisms, but,
also, that groups of organisms which share particular cognitive features can create an
environment that is even more favorable for the development and maintenance of behavioral
altruism. The bulk of this chapter will consist of explanations and demonstrations intended to
show how these adaptive mechanisms can magnify the selective pressure for evolutionary
altruism to such an extent that many altruistic behaviors that would otherwise seem to require too
much self-sacrifice to ever gain a foothold, spread, and flourish, become relatively easy for
natural selection develop and maintain.
3_1 Assortative Behavior
From chapter two, we know that whether we are considering evolution at the gene level,
the individual level, or the group level, there are three ―ingredients‖ that are independently
necessary and collectively sufficient for evolution via natural selection to (Sober & Wilson,
1998, p. 104-105). These three ingredients are:
1. Variation of phenotypic traits between the units of selection.
2. The heritability of these phenotypic variations.
3. Differential fitness consequences between the varying phenotypes.
Take away any one of these conditions and evolution by natural selection is no longer
possible. The presence of all three over multiple generations guarantees that natural selection
will occur. A fourth condition, the presence of mutation or some other source of variation, is
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required for selection to continue without running out of variation to act upon and to produce
new and complex adaptations. Without this fourth condition, natural selection occurs but will
grow more and more stagnant whenever genetic variation is lost due to either chance or the
selection process itself.84
The first ingredient for evolution, the presence of variation, was a particularly sticky
point for group selectionists to deal with. The less variation there is between groups, the weaker
the force of between-group selection becomes. Large, randomly assorted groups have fairly
small amounts of variation between them. This statistical fact becomes more and more
significant as groups become larger and larger. In chapter two, it was revealed that trait groups
can provide a source of variation because there is a good deal of variation between small trait
groups within a larger population, even when generated by random groupings. Nevertheless,
larger amounts of variation between groups leads to more selection pressure at the group level. If
there is a scarcity of variation, then the problem of origination arises. This problem will be
discussed further into this chapter.
Since evolutionary altruistic behavior always carries a selective disadvantage within
groups, it can only evolve via between-group selection (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 44-45). As a
result, traits of organisms which can cause an increase in variation between groups increases the
strength of group selection overall, and are important for calculations involving the development
of evolutionary altruistic adaptations.
One property of particular importance is the ability of some sufficiently complex
organisms to choose which members of the population they interact with and in what
84
Without mutation, natural selection would suffer from entropy of information since whenever a gene disappeared
from the population it would be gone forever without any new variation to compensate for the loss.
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capacities.85 This is called assortative behavior and occurs whenever organisms associate with
others based upon a trait or traits they exhibit. In the case of altruism, behavioral traits are of
primary concern. If assortative behavior is common, then high levels of variation can be
expected for sufficiently complex organisms. High levels of variation, in turn, make group level
traits more visible to natural selection thereby generating greater evolutionary pressure for
favorable group traits, which, in turn, provide greater evolutionary pressure for adaptations that
will help maintain favorable group level traits.
Let‘s consider a population of guppies who swim together in small schools. Schooling
and flocking-type behavior is common for many types of animals. Such formations provide a
powerful defensive strategy against predators and are highly beneficial to both individuals within
a group and to the group as a whole.
The reason for this is not difficult to see. If the guppies under consideration are schooled
together, then each individual fish need not actually see a predator approach to flee from it.
Rather, the individual fish flee as soon as they see neighboring fish flee. This provides a type of
early warning system for most of the members of the group most of the time. This behavior, by
its very nature, requires a certain level of cooperation because it is better for a fish to be in the
middle of a school than on the edge. Those along the outside edges of the school are in a more
dangerous place because being in such a position increases the likelihood that a predator will
attack them directly and they will not receive the benefit of an early warning, while the fish in
the middle of the school always receive warning. While voluntarily taking a position along the
outside edge of a school might be considered an altruistic behavior, there is an even more
The word ―choose‖ here is a bit anthropomorphic. I do not mean to imply the necessity of any level of
consciousness.
85
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extreme case of altruism among guppies. This case is only made possible by the schooling
behavior described above.
Suppose that the aforementioned guppies, in addition to schooling, also display the
following trait. The guppies exhibit the behavior of occasionally breaking away from the rest of
the school in order to swim closer to a nearby predator to test its reaction. The guppies exhibit
this behavior with varying frequencies and approach the predator at varying distances. One of the
group benefits of this behavior is that, if the predator tries to attack the approaching guppy, then
the school of fish gains an even earlier warning of attack than roughly equidistant schooling
provides. If, on the other hand, the predator is not hungry or turns out not to be a guppy-predator
at all, the school of fish can continue foraging for food and thus gain fitness both by conserving
the energy that they would have otherwise used to flee (perhaps even fleeing into danger), and
also because the school can continue feeding without looking for a new source of food.
The predator-approaching behavior in this example is clearly evolutionarily altruistic
since it not only increases the fitness of the school as a whole but also decreases fitness of the
predator approaching guppy in relation to the other guppies in the school. Scouting out predators
is a dangerous job after all. Chapter two discussed how altruistic behaviors such as these can
evolve when the benefit of being in a group with evolutionary altruists outweighs the cost of
being an altruist, so the presence of altruism in guppies should not be terribly surprising.
However, not only is predator approaching a very costly behavior, it is a behavior that gives no
benefit to a lone altruist.86 Even though it was originally stipulated that predator approaching
86
Dugatkin and Alfieri actually seem to say that there is some benefit for the inspector (even if paired with a
defector) when they say, ―If one fish approaches the predator and the other remains distant, both obtain the benefit
while only one obtains the cost…‖ (Dugatkin & Alfieri, 1991, p. 301) It is hard to see, however, what this benefit is
supposed to be. The inspecting fish uses energy and risks its life. Presuming that approaching the predator only
increases its chance of being eaten, the inspecting fish would have been better off if it stayed at a distance if all other
members of its group were non-cooperators, not just in relative terms but in absolute terms as well.
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behavior varies between the guppies, the most altruistic guppies are always in the position of a
lone altruist in the sense that, in a mixed population, they always accrue a cost that is not
associated with an additional benefit. So how could an altruistic behavior such as this increase
instead of deteriorate over time?
A supplemental answer above and beyond those given in chapter two would be helpful
because that chapter primarily dealt with cases in which an altruist exhibits a behavior that helps
non-altruists more than itself at the within group (individual) level of selection. The predator
inspection of the guppies described above, however, involves altruistic guppies that benefit nonaltruists and do not benefit themselves at a within group (individual) level at all. This does not
mean that the arguments in chapter two do not help to answer this question, but the presence of
an additional force favoring such extreme sacrificial behavior would make the evolution of this
type of behavior more likely. Such an additional force exists, and it arises out of assortative
behavior.
Assortative behavior occurs when organisms favor associations with organisms that have
a particular trait. When this occurs, groups become self-sorting and no longer suffer from the low
levels of between-group variation that is the bane of random group formation. To see why,
suppose a population of guppies were to split into two groups based upon altruistic predatorapproaching behavior. The variation between groups would then become very high since all of
the most altruistic members would be in one group and all of the more selfish members would be
in the other. With assortative behavior in place, highly altruistic guppies would no longer suffer
the same reduction of individual fitness within the group, because they would now be grouped
with other highly altruistic individuals which would suffer the same risks they do. Further, the
high-altruism group would all share in the benefits of being grouped with a high concentration of
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other altruists. More selfish guppies, on the other hand, would no longer benefit from the
presence of highly altruistic guppies in their group, and, as a result, their group would suffer in
terms of fitness because of the reduced predator approaching behavior. The result over time
would be an increase in group-selected altruistic behavior (predator approaching behavior) over
the individually selected selfish (non-approaching) behavior.
There is a catch. In order for the guppies to accomplish this kind of assortment, they need
to reach a certain level of neurological complexity. More specifically, there are three specific
sub-tasks they need to be able to accomplish before they could engage in assortative behavior.
The first two are fairly obvious:
1. The guppies need to be able to distinguish individual guppies in their group.
2. The guppies need to be able to notice and remember the levels of displayed
altruism of the other guppies in their group.
The problem with assortative behavior at this point is that selfish guppies would also
prefer to associate with altruistic guppies. After all, they gain a fitness advantage from being
grouped with predator inspectors. There is therefore no incentive for selfish guppies to stay in a
group with other selfish guppies instead of joining the group of altruistic guppies. In order for
assortative behavior to work, the guppies need one more capability.
3. They need to have some control over which guppies they school with.
Given these three traits, assortative behavior is possible. Since every guppy prefers to be
around altruists, which reduces its own risk of being eaten by a predator, each guppy will try to
swim with those guppies that have the strongest altruistic tendencies. Altruistic guppies,
however, could work to enforce their separation in any number of ways. As just one example, if
two altruistic guppies prefer to swim together and a more selfish guppy tries to nose its way in
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between them, they could work to nudge it out. Simply by preferring to swim together, the more
altruistic guppies of the group would naturally cooperate to include more altruistic guppies over
more selfish ones.87
If the guppies possess these three abilities, they will be able to assort based upon the
frequency and danger of predator approaching behavior. This will create a spectrum effect when
a larger group of fish split into smaller schools. This is just to say that whenever a population p
of guppies splits into a number n of schools, there will be n instances of guppy schools which
range from most altruistic to least.
This kind of assortative behavior increases the variation between the schools far more
than random school formation would. This, in turn, increases the ―visibility‖ of trait being
assorted for to the forces of group selection. Even understanding all this, however, the degree to
which assortative behavior can generate variation is surprising.
3_1.1 Wilson and Dugatkin’s Simulations and the Power of Assortative Behavior
Wilson and Dugatkin modeled assortative behavior and compared its capacity for
producing variation to that of kin selection and cloning colonial behavior. One of the historical
―selling points‖ of the kin selection has been that kin selection provides an obvious reason to
believe that there will be a great deal of variation between groups when a novel behavior is
generated through mutation. An individual bird, for example, that had an evolutionary altruistic
mutation could easily mate with another bird and nest, eventually forming a group containing the
two parental birds and their offspring. If only one of the parental birds has the mutation, half of
their offspring (statistically) will also carry the mutant gene. If the parental birds produced 4
offspring, then 3 of the 6 birds in the group (including the parents) will carry that gene.
This ―nudging out‖ behavior would simply fall out all guppies preferring to swim with altruistic guppies. Other
enforcement mechanisms are possible however and could go so far as to include aggression.
87
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Statistically, 50% of the birds in a parent/sibling kin-group will be carriers of a mutant gene that
only one of the parents carries. Compare this to randomly formed groups of six members from a
population that contains only a single mutant. Whatever group the mutant is placed in it would
be randomly grouped together with five non-mutants. In such a group, the mutant gene would be
present in only 16.6% of the population. This is a significant reduction in variation between
groups when compared to the kin group of which half would be mutants. Further, the difference
in variation between the randomly generated group and the parent/sibling group only increases
with the size of the group. If the number of offspring for the kin group was 98, for example, then
the amount of variation between mutant parent/sibling kin-group and a randomly selected group
of 100 organisms from a population carrying only one mutant would be 50 times greater in favor
of the kin group.
If random group formation is compared to colonial groups or organisms that reproduce
by cloning (for example, a colony of bacteria), the difference in variation between founded
groups and randomly formed groups is greater still. If a colony is founded by a mutant clone then
all of the members the new colony would carry the mutant genes, while all colonies founded by a
non-mutant will only contain non-mutant genes.88 If the mutation were to cause altruistic
behavior, then individuals in the mutant‘s colony would never suffer from free-riders in the
group and all would benefit from the altruistic behavior of the other members in the colony. All
other things being equal, this would give a survival advantage to the altruistic mutant colony
over colonies of non-mutants.
In chapter two, for the sake of simplicity, behavioral traits were discussed as behaviors
that were caused by only a single gene. Though in this chapter it has already been specified that
the guppies vary in their predator approaching, up until now altruistic traits have been discussed
88
This does not consider the possibility of new mutants appearing within the colony or invaders from other colonies.
145
as if they were digital in nature---either on or off. Sometimes, for some simple traits, this
assumption may be true, but, much more often, complex behaviors are influenced by many genes
(Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 136). This is true for the predator-approaching behavior in the guppy
example which Sober and Wilson also make use of (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 136).
When examining a trait influenced by multiple genes, the result is usually a continuouslooking variation around a mean. For example, some guppies may approach a potential predator
by moving three meters away while others may approach closer than a meter, with the behaviors
of many fish falling in between the two ends of the spectrum.89 Within-group selection obviously
favors one extreme (staying the distance away from a predator that optimizes individual fitness)
and between-group selection favors approaching the predator as closely as is necessary to
optimize the fitness of the group (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 137). In a colony of clones, behavior
should approach or even reach the altruistic group optimum. The kin selection model for sexual
organisms should predict behavior somewhere in the middle, between the clones that contain no
within-group variation and groups that are randomly selected. Non-cloning kin groups would
therefore have greater internal variation and less between-group variation than colonial kin
groups. Randomly selected groups, especially if these groups are large, will usually approach the
little/no-variation extreme of the spectrum (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 137).
Wilson and Dugatkin designed computer simulations to model the variation of
continuous traits and tracked the differences between groups formed by assortative behavior, kin
selection, random groupings, and groups of clones. The term n in these models refers to the
number of individuals in each group, and the term p represents the total population out of which
89
Of course no genetic trait is truly continuous in the way that space might be, as there are a limited number of
genes that affect the trait. In the same way as motion across ones television set may appear continuous, even though
motion smoothness is limited to the number of pixels across, behaviors or other traits can appear to be continuous as
well.
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these groups are formed. The number of groups in any simulation therefore is p/n.90 Following is
a list describing the general structure of each simulation.
1. In the random model, n individuals were randomly picked from the population
p as many times as possible.
2. In the kin selection model, kin groups were formed by ―mating‖ two random
individuals from the population and having them produce enough offspring to
produce groups of size n.
3. In the clone colony simulation, single ―organisms‖ were selected from the
global population and multiplied to groups of size n.
4. Assorting behavior was simulated by splitting the global population into
groups of size n based upon how extreme a particular trait was. This was done
in a ―worst case scenario‖ situation where the trait began with a variation
around an individual/selfish mean (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 137).
The results were surprising. When p = n, there can only be one group, and thus there can
be no between-group variation. But When p = 2n, the variation produced by assortative behavior
was marginally greater than that produced by kin groups in sexual organisms. By the time p =
4n, the amount of variation between groups was nearly as great as that between colonies of
cloning organisms. Assortative behavior, it turns out, can be a more powerful source of variation
than kin selection. As p increases, the amount of variation produced by assortative behavior
approaches the asymptote set by between-group selection of groups of clones. Even the amount
of variation between ―super-organisms‖ such as bees, ants, and termites when founded by a
single queen can be surpassed when p is a relatively small multiple of n.
90
The experiments in this case were designed such that p was always a multiple of n.
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The variation so produced is extremely important because it increases the influence of
between-group selection, which itself increases selection pressure for evolutionary altruistic
traits. When assortative behavior is combined with the notion of continuous traits, it can also
help give an answer to another problem often raised against the possibility of ubiquitous
evolutionary altruistic traits in nature. This problem is called the problem of origination, and will
be considered next.
3_1.1.1 The problem of origination.
Altruistic traits that are not continuous would, under many evolutionary circumstances,
disappear or never be able to gain a foothold in the first place. This is because the level of
within-group selection against some altruistic traits is much more severe when there is a
relatively small percentage of other altruists in the group. The guppies provided an example of
this at the beginning of section one, but here, in this sub section, the problem will be discussed in
greater detail.
When both the within-group fitness cost of performing an altruistic behavior is relatively
high and the percentage of other altruists in the relevant group is low, the future of that behavior
is in jeopardy. As the percentage of evolutionary altruists in a group rises, the force of withingroup selection against that specific altruistic trait is decreased. Remember that altruistic
organisms, though they are at a selective disadvantage within a group, benefit from the altruistic
actions of other altruists in the same way that the selfish organisms do. Further, whenever the
percentage of altruistic individuals within a group increases, the percentage of selfish individuals
competing within the group against altruists decreases. A higher percentage of altruistic
organisms in a group benefits altruists, both in the sense that altruists gain a greater benefits from
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a greater number of altruists to associate with, and also because there are fewer free-riders to
take advantage of the altruist‘s helpful nature.
For these reasons, some degrees of altruism might be viable when there is a population
consisting of some particular percentage of altruists, say 15%, but not when the percentage is
smaller than this. Of course, the odds of 15 identical mutations (or mutations similar in effect)
appearing within a single group at approximately the same time are so low as not be worth
mentioning. Therefore, when one discovers apparently high degrees of altruistic behavior in
nature that require levels of sacrifice that shouldn‘t be sustainable unless there is a large
percentage other altruists who sacrifice at about the same level, it creates a puzzle for
evolutionary biologists. This puzzle is called the problem of origination.
Looking back to kin selection, we see that kin selection does not suffer as greatly from
the problem of origination as do randomly selected groups (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 136). This
is because a single mutation under the kin selection model will produce groups that are, on
average, 50% mutants. For cloning models, there is even less of a problem because, barring any
new mutations, 100% of the resulting offspring in a new colony will carry the gene. This
provides a perfect climate for any degree of altruistic sacrifice.
Luckily, as has been shown in section 3.1, assortative behavior, especially on continuous
traits, can be almost as great a source of variation between groups (and thus homogeneity within
groups), as colonies of cloning organisms.
Continuous traits are especially important for resolving the problem of origination.
Consider the predator approaching behavior of the guppies again. Approaching the predator to a
distance of ten meters away is certainly far less sacrificial on the part of the altruist than
approaching to a distance of one meter. Nevertheless, approaching the predator at all could
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provoke it into trying to attack if it is hungry, and thus both traits are altruistic but to different
degrees. Even the ten meter approach would benefit the entire school of guppies, by either
alerting them to a predator attack or by reducing the fear of attack so that they may continue their
activities—though, admittedly, it would not do so as effectively as the one meter approaching
behavior.91
If approaching a predator was caused by a single gene, however, and if it always caused
guppies to approach extremely close, assortative behavior could not help the altruistic trait to
take hold. In this case, the cost to the altruist would be too severe to maintain unless there were
enough other altruistic guppies in the group that are relatively equal in their level of altruism.
Again, the problem of origination rears its head, and one has to ask how the original altruistic
mutation ever gained a foothold in the first place.
When traits are continuous, however, and the levels of altruism deviate around a mean,
assortative behavior can provide a powerful force for variation between groups that will
continually drive the mean level of altruistic behavior upwards towards its optimum level for
groups of size n of p. As Sober and Wilson note, ―It may be hard for a mutant altruist to find
another altruist to interact with, but it is easy for an individual who is above average to find
another individual who is above average‖ (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 136-137).
Assortative
behavior of continuous traits is, therefore, a powerful mechanism that can make non-kin group
selection an even more powerful source of between-group variation than kin selection. This same
mechanism can also overcome the problem of origination for highly altruistic traits that
seemingly would have had to pop into existence at threshold levels without the aid of selection.
91
So, therefore, any predator approaching behavior of this kind counts as evolutionarily altruistic, assuming that
there is always an increased risk to the suspected altruist and that there is a benefit to other members of the school.
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3_1.1.2 What do guppies have to do with human beings?
The assortative model for guppies requires some assumptions about the cognitive
capacities of guppies. These assumptions were mentioned previously, but to recap, the guppies
must be able to individuate other members of their group, notice and associate levels of a
particular trait to particular individuals, and also have some control over which individuals they
associate with. Given that the brain of a guppy is only 1/100th of a gram (Moravec, 2003), one
might object that such abilities would be unrealistically demanding of such relatively simple
neurology.92 This argument might then be expanded to cover many other animals possessing
significantly less-than-human intelligence to push for the conclusion that assortative behavior is
not a sufficient explanation for the apparently altruistic behaviors simpler animals.
The example of predator approaching in guppies, however, is not merely a hypothetical
story told only for the sake of a thought experiment. As it happens, guppies (and other species of
fish) do display predatory approaching behavior of the kind described. Further, guppies group
together non-randomly with respect to the frequency and degree of altruistic tendencies just as
with the assortative model described previously (Dugatkin & Reeve, 1998, p. 300).93 This level
of sophistication in an animal with such a primitive neurology seems surprising at first. But this
surprise is tempered considerably when one realizes that no particular level of consciousness,
self awareness, or abstract decision making needs to be assumed on the part of the guppy. The
92
Putting the computing power of a guppy brain into perspective, it is worth mentioning that, according to Moravec,
the processing power of a guppy brain is roughly the equivalent of the PCs available to the general market in 2003
(Moravec, 2003).
93
―Results indicate that guppies are capable of recognizing and remembering their partner‘s behavior and seem to
imply TFT-like strategies over the course of many inspection visits. In addition, significant differences exist
between individuals in the degree to which they will inspect a predator, suggesting that ‗cooperator‘ and ‗defector‘
may be relative terms rather than discrete categories of behavior.‖ (Dugatkin & Reeve, 1991, p. 300) and, ―Milinski
et al.,…Dugatkin (1991b) and Dugatkin and Alfieri (1991) have followed up the original mirror experiments by
examining the behavioral dynamics of two and three live fish during predator inspection…and that in larger groups
individuals pair up with a particular co-inspector more often than expected by chance alone. Dugatkin and Alfieri
(1991) found that given a choice, guppies will choose to associate with the more cooperative of two co-inspectors.‖
(Dugatkin & Reeve, 1991, p. 302)
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guppy need not have a concept of ―I‖ (to distinguish itself from other guppies, recognizing them
as like itself but not itself) and then further remember behaviors that, upon reflection, seem
beneficial to itself in terms of a cost benefit analysis. Natural selection, after all, does all the
work of a cost-benefit analysis itself when it produces instinctive behaviors by propagating those
traits that are most beneficial to the gene, organism, or group overall. The guppy‘s neurology
merely needs to be able to record information and act upon it. A guppy does not need to
consciously decide to associate with other altruists any more than the roots of a tree need to
consciously decide to grow towards moist earth.
Assortative behavior can be a powerful force for the selection of group level properties
even in animals as neurologically simple as a guppy. As Sober and Wilson note, ―If guppies can
accomplish nonrandom groupings with their meager cognitive abilities, then imagine what might
be achieved by our own species!‖ (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 136-137)
There is a potential objection that could be made against assortative behaviors being
generators of great degrees of variation, especially in human beings. The objection would point
out that along with a greater capacity to observe and analyze the behaviors of others, intelligence
also brings with it the capacity for more complex and subtle methods of deception. Though
human beings can better analyze information that can lead to the discovery of cheating or freeriding, human cheaters and free-riders also become better at cheating and free-riding, and this
could corrupt the variation generated by assortative behaviors.
The observation is correct. After all, an increase in general intelligence can be applied to
both the general task of catching deceivers and to general task getting away with deception.
Nevertheless, there is little reason to believe that deception becomes easier overall as the
intelligence of a species increases. In fact, the reverse might very well be true. After all, it is far
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easier for one to covertly observe another than it is to notice oneself being covertly observed.
Quoting Sober and Wilson:
It is hard to fake inspecting a predator; a guppy either approaches or fails to
approach, and its behavior can be observed by all. Similarly, it is hard to fake
altruism or conceal selfishness in human social groups whose members have a
long history of interaction. The large anonymous societies of today are recent
inventions; human evolution took place in small groups whose members had
extensive opportunities to observe and talk about each other. (Sober, 1998, p. 136141)
In addition, it should be noted that greater memory accompanies the greater intelligence
of human beings, and that this can make deception more costly. Suppose, for example, that a
hunter feigns a bad back as an excuse for not participating in a particularly risky hunt and that he
is successful in convincing the members of his tribe that he suffers from this ailment. Presuming
that food is shared in the community, the hunter gains fitness though avoiding danger and
conserving energy. However, this gain can easily be offset by the fact that the hunter has to now
continue to feign this injury until a reasonable amount of time has passed for him to claim he has
healed. This means that if he would otherwise find it beneficial bend over and pick up an object,
he must be careful doing so in front of others and must continue a charade that is consistent with
his supposed injuries. If he decides not to pretend to have back pain forever, then the advantage
gained by feigning a back injury is likely a very short term benefit. After all, the members of his
tribe would find it increasingly suspicious if he claimed to have back pain before every
dangerous hunt, especially if he continued to heal quickly afterward. This same principle holds
true for lies of all kinds. If Mary tells a lie to Mark, then all her future communications with
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Mark need to be consistent with that lie, and for real security she would have to make sure that
everything she says to anybody who might communicate with Mark is consistent with the lie as
well. If one of Mary‘s friends becomes suspicious, then Mary might have to lie again to maintain
the verisimilitude of the first lie, thus doubling the complexity of maintaining her charade. As
memory increases, a simple one time deception can quickly become a lot of work for Mary,
while catching the lie can happen quite passively.
It seems that as intelligence increases, it becomes more and more difficult to be a
deceiver, even when the ploys of deceivers also become more subtle and complex. Further, as
Sober and Wilson pointed out, the difficulty of deception would be enormous within the small
closely knit groups in which human beings evolved. Today, the opportunities for deception are
greater. Even small towns offer more anonymity than would a life in a small band of early
humans, and no doubt deception increases as groups increase in size and group members have a
greater opportunity to live private lives and better keep secrets. Nevertheless, through most of
human development this was not an issue, and it should be noticed that even in large modern
societies a life of continuous deception remains difficult. In a small band of hunter-gatherers it is
almost impossible to imagine a successful confidence trickster. In larger societies, however, a
confidence trickster can thrive, although other members of that society become wary of dealing
with strangers.
3_1.2 Recap
Section one of this chapter has shown how assortative behavior can be a powerful source
of variation between groups, and in this way it can increase the strength of selection for group
level properties. Evolutionary altruistic traits, as Sober and Wilson define them, can only evolve
via group selection. Indeed, group selection always favors altruistic traits while individual
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selection always disfavors them. As variation with regard to a particular trait within a group
decreases, so does the between-individual selective force for or against that trait. In this way,
assortative behavior can deal a double blow in defense of altruism. Assortative behavior can
increase between-group variation and decrease within-group variation to a level approaching that
of colonies of cloning organisms. At the theoretical limit, this assortative behavior would always
favor altruistic traits over selfish ones. At very high levels, assortative behavior will almost
always favor altruistic traits over selfish ones; even when assortative behavior is low, (p = 2n) it
is a more powerful force for between group variation (and for within-group homogeneity) than
kin selection alone.
In addition, assortative behavior regarding traits of a continuous nature resolves the
problem of origination. Levels of altruism that would normally require a threshold percentage of
other altruists to be maintained can now be understood to have evolved through assortative
behavior acting on even a small amount of variation around a mean and beginning with a
population of very selfish organisms.
For these reasons, assortative behavior can enhance selection for altruistic behavior
dramatically. But assortative behavior is not the only adaptation which can help generate and
maintain high degrees of altruism in a species. Rewards and punishments can also have an
enormous impact on evolutionary altruistic behavior. This will be the subject of the following
discussion.
3_2 Carrots, Sticks, and Altruism
The word ―punishment‖, as it is used in day-to-day speech, generally indicates, among
other things, deliberation on the part of the punisher. Since this section is concerned with the
evolution of punishing behaviors (which can be demonstrated by even simple organisms), the
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psychological component of this term is excess baggage. In the same way that it has been useful
to talk about certain kinds of acts as being altruistic in an evolutionary/behavioral sense, it will
also be useful to develop an evolutionary/behavioral conception of punishment distinct from the
psychologically loaded version of the term.94
The definition of ―evolutionary altruism‖ neither excluded nor entailed the possibility
that an evolutionarily altruistic organism be psychologically altruistic. Likewise the term
―evolutionary punishment‖ does not entail or exclude the possibility that the punisher has any
psychological motivations that are implied in the everyday use of the term. Thus a member of a
species that has no brain, much less a psychology, could engage in evolutionary punishment.
Here are some examples of the two different senses of punishment at work. A plant which could
sense the presence of parasites might release a toxin when they are present and not waste the
energy creating this toxin otherwise when they are not. Such a plant would be engaging in
evolutionary punishment, even though it could not be said to be punishing the parasites
intentionally. A person might punish a dog in the everyday intentional/psychological sense, and
yet not punish the dog in any way that causes the dog to lose fitness—indeed, training a dog not
to run out into the street, for example, may actually improve the fitness of the animal. Finally, a
person might punish another both in an evolutionary sense and in a psychological/intentional
94
Sober and Wilson do not give an evolutionary definition of punishment, though they at times clearly use the term
in a purely behavioral sense in their book Unto Others (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 144-148). Since a search for a
purely evolutionary definition of punishment was not fruitful, I decided to take on the task of presenting provisional
definitions of my own.
In ―Evolutionary Wars‖, Charles Kingsley Levy did provide a good definition of ―aggression,‖ however
this definition included some behaviors that do not seem to fit under the heading ―punishment‖ and exclude others
which do. For example, aggression, under Levy‘s definition, must occur between members of the same species, yet
this seems an unnecessary restriction for punishment, although between-species punishment is likely to be rare
(Levy, 1999, p. 265). Further, the definition seemed to include any of ―…a spectrum of social behaviors with a
competitive dynamic between members of the same species.‖ which would include behaviors that are clearly not
punishments because they are not reactions to the behavior of the punished (Levy, 1999, 34, p. 265). This is no
failing on Levy‘s part, since he was defining ―aggression‖ and not ―punishment.‖ Nevertheless, this biological
definition of aggression was the closest thing I could find to a biological definition of punishment in the literature.
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sense at the same time. Chemically castrating a rapist might be an example of this. But examples
are no substitute for a definition:
Evolutionary Punishment: An organism A is punishing an organism B in the evolutionary
sense if and only if the following four conditions are met: 95
1. The behavior of organism A causes a loss of fitness for organism B.
2. The behavior of organism A is a direct or indirect reaction to a behavior or
property of organism B.
3. Organism A would have been better off in terms of fitness if B had never
triggered A‘s response.
The first condition is pretty straightforward. In order for a punishment to be evolutionary
in any selective sense, it must in some way negatively affect the fitness of the punished
organism.
Condition two stipulates that a punishing behavior must be in response to a triggering
behavior or property of the punished. If organism A is not responding to organism B when it acts
to cause B‘s loss of fitness, then, while A might be said to be harming B in an evolutionary way,
it cannot be said that A is punishing B. At least, this cannot be said if the definition of
―evolutionary punishment‖ is to retain any analogous connection to the everyday use of the term.
Condition three is required for reasons that are a little bit more complicated. This
condition insures that behaviors which would not normally be considered punishments, such as
an organism A hunting and killing organism B as a source of food, are not counted as
punishments. Even though A‘s hunting behavior hurts B‘s fitness and may even have been
While the term ―fitness‖ in this definition can refer to either within-group relative fitness or group level fitness,
the relevant factor is almost always going to be within group relative fitness. I have left the level of fitness effects
open, however, in order to preserve the possibility that some possible punishments may include punishment of an
entire group. While I cannot think of an example of group punishment in nature, human beings are certainly capable
of engaging in it.
95
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triggered by something B did (such as emanating a smell or making a sound), hunting does not
resemble typical punishment. Who would say that a bear that snatches a salmon from a stream
out of hunger is punishing the salmon? The bear, after all, is dependent, in part, on the salmon
for its nutrition. Condition three assures that actions such as this are not considered punishments
because, even though the salmon‘s fitness is decreased by being hunted, and even though the
bear may be reacting to a behavior of the salmon, the bear‘s fitness is increased by hunting
salmon. Even if the bear fails and only wounds the salmon before it gets away, the bear is made
better off from having had the chance to catch the fish.96
This can be contrasted with a situation in which a bear detects another bear in its territory
and drives the intruder off. This later example is rightly an instance of evolutionary punishment
and would not be excluded by condition three. The important difference between these two cases
is that the bear doing the punishing loses fitness through risk of bodily harm and through
expending energy. The punishing bear would be better off if it never had to deal with a rival
animal invading its territory to begin with, while the fishing bear would not be made better off if
there were no salmon around to fish for.
Still, the definition is not perfect because contingency can cause a loss of fitness in
unusual ways. Consider a situation in which bird A hears a call from bird B during mating season
and returns the call. Now suppose that when A responds to B‘s call it causes one predator to turn
its head and notice bird B and another predator to notice bird A. The results of A‘s response in
this situation has none of the intuitive markers of a punishment even though the cause of the loss
of fitness (attracting predators) was the result of an action A took in direct response to a behavior
of B. Therefore, condition three should be understood in terms of the average effect of A‘s
reactive behavior in response to triggers such as that caused by B. Since, in this example,
96
Condition four will helps specify and strengthen this last point.
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organisms such as A would not be better off ignoring mating calls, A‘s behavior does not count
as punishment.
Because this chapter will only concern itself with the evolutionary sense of punishment,
all references to the word ―punishment‖ should be taken to refer to evolutionary punishment
unless otherwise stated.
3_2.1 Another Look at the Guppies
In section one of this chapter, we looked at the assortative behavior of the common
guppy. It is worth noting that this assortative behavior also included subtle elements of punishing
behavior. For example, when more selfish guppies are shunned by a group of more altruistic
guppies, the selfish guppies are being punished in two ways. First, the selfish guppies are being
punished if they expend effort and time braving whatever dangers may be part of attempting to
associate with members of an altruistic group of guppies that take action to reject them. Second,
selfish guppies are punished by being deprived of the benefit of associating with altruistic
guppies, whether they attempt to join the altruistic group or not. Thus, the previous example of
the guppies already illustrates evolutionary punishment at work. Assortative behavior in the
guppy case not only provided an increase of between-school variation, but also served to punish
less altruistic guppies (and to reward more altruistic ones). The punishment in the case of the
guppies, however, is not very direct or obvious. Nevertheless, it is important to realize that
punishments can vary wildly in both type and severity. Some punishments are very costly both to
the punisher and the punished, others cost the punisher very little but severely harm the
punished, and yet others have a relatively low fitness cost for both the punisher and the
punished.97
97
Clear instances of rewards are less common in nature, and so this chapter will primarily focus on punishment.
159
The cost of performing a punishing action is important because the benefits gained
through punishing must usually outweigh the costs of the punishing behavior.98 When the victim
of a punishment is severely affected by a small effort on the part of the punisher, the punishing
behavior is more selectively advantageous than when the reverse is the case. In spite of this,
however, it is worth noting that increasing the severity of punishment is not always in the
punisher‘s (or the group‘s) best interests. A punishment which is too severe could result in
additional fitness costs (that are not worth paying) for the punishers. For example, consider a
wolf that picks a fight with the leader of its pack in an attempt to gain dominance. Assume that
the leader wins by seizing its competitor‘s neck firmly in its jaws. Ripping out the competitor‘s
throat would surely be a more severe punishment than letting the challenger survive, but the
death of a pack member would weaken the pack as a whole, especially the death of a member
that is strong enough to vie for dominance. The pack‘s hunting efficiency would suffer, and the
pack might even die off completely if within-group conflicts that result in maiming or death were
common. Mildness of punishment is commonly selected for and displayed in contests over
mating rights. For example, giraffes wrestle with their necks, and elk have antler fights. In
venomous snakes, where the stakes of combat are very high, many species engage in ritual
combat that involves no biting. Instead each snake tries to force the other‘s head down (Shine,
2006, p. 3).
The last two subsections covered what evolutionary punishment is and presented a couple
of illustrative examples of punishment. The next subsection will provide an abstract explanation
describing how it is possible for punishing behavior to increase selective pressure in favor of
altruism.
98
This is not necessarily the case when the costs of a punishment are shared by many members of the group.
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3_2.2 How Punishment Amplifies Altruism
Evolutionary altruistic behavior, by definition, is a behavior that benefits the group but
results in a loss of within-group fitness for the benefactor (so long as there are non-cooperators in
the group). This is because free-riding or selfish organisms gain the benefit of an altruist‘s
behavior but do not pay the cost.
Consider the case of a group with just two organisms. Call the organisms Oa and Os
respectively. Oa is an altruistic organism and Os is a selfish one. Let C be the cost in relative
fitness for performing a particular altruistic act, and let B represent the benefit provided to all
members of the group by the altruistic act. Given these variables one can see that Oa‘s relative
fitness is decreased by C compared to Os‘s. That is to say:
Oa‘s change in fitness as a result of its own altruistic act is: B-C
Os‘s change in fitness as a result of Oa‘s act the act is: B
Since the Bs cancel out, and since we are discussing relative fitness, Oa‘s loss of fitness
could be put into terms of Os‘s gain. This is to say that expressing the fitness change as Oa‘s loss
of fitness (-C) or Os‘s change in fitness is C both amount to the same thing. 99
Since B represents a fitness increase, it is always a positive number, and C always
represents a positive number100 because this number measures the cost in terms of fitness that
will be subtracted for performing the act. Therefore, no matter how large or small C is, the
selfish organism (Os) will gain a within-group benefit over any altruistic (Oa) organisms in the
group. Chapter two demonstrated how altruistic behaviors can increase in spite of this fact if C is
This is assuming that Oa and Os are the only two organisms in the group. In a larger group, Os‘s gain in relative
fitness would be C divided by the total number of other organisms in the group and multiplied by the total number of
altruistic organisms (N) in the group. (C/total number of organisms) * N. The total change in relative fitness for an
altruistic organism in a larger group would be (C/total number of organisms) * N – C. Since C is always positive, an
altruistic organism will always lose within-group relative fitness by performing an altruistic act.
100
C can not be zero because then the act wouldn‘t fit the definition of behavioral altruism.
99
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low enough relative to B while at the same time other factors, not worth rehashing again here,
are properly balanced. The point of assigning abstract variables to each of these quantities is to
set up a framework to demonstrate how it is that, when the proper kind of punishment is
introduced, evolutionary altruistic traits can become less costly within a group and therefore
more favorable in terms of natural selection (all other things remaining equal).
Within this framework, the previous example can be reworked to factor in the results of
evolutionary punishment. Let P represent the cost in relative fitness to the victim of a particular
punishment, and assume that this punishment, whatever it may be, will be only levied against
selfish organisms. Since the purpose of this demonstration is simply to present an abstract
representation of how punishment can affect relative fitness, the question of how an organism is
punished and by what/who will be set aside temporarily.
The punishment is a separate action from the altruistic act of the punisher. Nevertheless,
the variables can be grouped together to examine the total fitness results of both behaviors
combined. By introducing P (the cost of being punished) it becomes obvious that when noncooperators are punished across the board:
Oa‘s change in fitness as a result of its own act is: B-C
Os‘s change in fitness is: B-P
Since the Bs cancel out:
Oa‘s change in relative fitness is: -C
Os‘s change in relative fitness is: -P
Alternatively, since this is a comparison of relative fitness, Oa‘s loss can be put into terms
of Os‘s gain by adding C to the total relative fitness change of each organism:
Oa‘s change in relative fitness is: 0
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Os‘s change in relative fitness is: C-P
Given this, it should be clear that the greater the fitness cost of being punished (P), the
better the altruist‘s (Oa‘s) relative fitness. As P increases, Oa‘s loss of relative fitness is reduced
compared to the fitness of Os, and when P=C, the costs of the punishment and of the altruistic
behavior cancel each other out and the altruist suffers no within-group fitness disadvantage (C-P
= 0).
If P continues to increase, becoming even larger than C, then the behavior that was once
termed ―evolutionarily altruistic‖ actually becomes evolutionarily selfish!101 This is because,
though the formerly altruistic behavior is still beneficial to the group, it no longer costs the actor
anything to perform it. Indeed, the organism performing the group beneficial behavior actually
gains relative (individual-level) fitness for performing the behavior. The implications of this
point will be examined in more detail in the next subsection.
This is a very simple example. After all, if some organism inflicts a punishment on
another, there is bound to be some cost (Z) inherent to performing the punishing behavior. If Z >
P, then the punisher is harmed more than the punished. This later possibility is unlikely to evolve
unless the punishment cost is shared by many group members. In any case, a perfectly accurate
formula must include the cost of punishing and properly assign this cost. It would also have to
include the chances of the potential victim getting away unpunished, and sundry other
possibilities that serve to complicate matters. The purpose of the previous exercise, however, was
not to develop a precise formula for biologists to use in the laboratory or out in the field. The
purpose was to give a general picture of how the punishment of non-cooperators can serve to
reduce the within-group fitness costs altruists normally suffer from as the result of their altruistic
The reverse isn‘t true of course. The selfish behavior does not suddenly become evolutionarily altruistic just
because P > C.
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behavior. This, in turn, shows how the existence of evolutionary punishment can magnify natural
selection for altruism.102
3_2.2.1 Does Punishment Reduce Instances of True Altruism?
As has been noted, a severe enough punishment can make an otherwise altruistic
behavior (Φ) selfish according to the definition of evolutionary altruism previously adopted. This
is just to say that, when a punishment for not Φ-ing is harsh enough, certain enough, and costs
the punishers little enough, behavior Φ, which would have otherwise generated a within-group
loss of fitness for the acting organism, can instead grant a within-group relative fitness
advantage. This has been demonstrated abstractly in the previous section, but, to really drive the
point home, let us once again turn our attention to Dugatkin‘s guppies. Though it was noted
earlier that predator approaching behavior varies around a mean, for simplicity‘s sake let us
pretend once again that predator approaching is a digital on/off type behavior, and also that the
guppies show a mating preference in favor of altruists and against non-altruists.103 Because
successful mating is a very important fitness factor for sexually reproducing organisms, this
behavior would work as punishment against selfish guppies and as a reward for altruistic ones.
Given this, let us consider four possibilities. In each of these possible scenarios the
relative cost of predator approaching behavior will be a 15% loss of relative fitness. Each
scenario varies, however, in how strongly guppies prefer mating with altruists. The variations are
as follows:
1. Mating preferences causes a 10% loss in relative fitness for selfish guppies.
102
Since both selfish and altruistic organisms benefit from having altruists in their groups, punishment of altruistic
behavior would be an oddity, and short lived one at that, if there is any group competition at all.
103
This example has been simplified for the sake of this illustration, but Dugatkin and Godin did in fact find that
female guppies preferred males that approach closer to the predators. In their own words: ―By using small, custombuilt containers that allowed us to position males at different distances from a predator fish, we found that females
indeed preferred the most intrepid males.‖ (Dugatkin & Godin, 2005)
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2. Mating preferences causes a 15% loss in relative fitness for selfish guppies.
3. Mating preferences causes a 20% loss in relative fitness for selfish guppies.
4. There are no mating preferences for or against predator approaching behavior.
(No punishment.)
A quick analysis of these three situations tells us that in scenario one, altruists have a net
loss of 5% in terms of relative fitness. The altruistic behavior in scenario one is costly, but it is
much less costly than it is in scenario four where there is no punishment of free riders. This
means that it will be easier for the altruistic predator approaching behavior to continue to
develop under scenario one than under scenario four, though both scenarios would require a
threshold level of selection at the group level for the behavior to increase in frequency. Altruists
in scenario two, on the other hand, suffer no net loss in relative fitness. In such a circumstance
any degree of between-group competition would favor the propagation of predator approaching
behavior in the guppies. In scenario three, the presence of punishment actually causes a 5%
within-group relative fitness advantage for guppies that demonstrate predator approaching
behavior. In this scenario predator approaching behavior would increase even if there were no
between group selection at all. It is important to note that in scenarios two and three, the predator
approaching behavior no longer causes a loss of relative fitness for the benefactor, and therefore,
under these two sets of conditions, predator approaching could no longer be considered an
evolutionary altruistic behavior given the definitions adopted. Though predator approaching still
benefits the group, there would no longer a cost or sacrifice associated with the behavior, and it
would no longer meet the definition of evolutionary altruism.
Though it has been shown that punishments can reinforce group-beneficial behaviors,
scenarios like two and three might be seen to be arguments against the wide spread presence of
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evolutionary altruism. When punishments like those under scenario three occur, the apparently
altruistic behavior turns out to be generated not by group selection, but by individual selection.
Any mystery over how the altruistic behavior evolved is dissolved as soon as one discovers that
there is no true altruistic behavior to be reckoned with in the first place. The guppies (under
scenario three) approach predators because it is too costly on an individual level not to. So where
is the altruism?
Sober and Wilson examine this line of argument in a thought experiment about an
anthropologists observing meat sharing behavior in a small hunter-gatherer tribe of humans
(Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 142-143). The anthropologist in their story is at first confused by the
meat sharing behavior. Having studied individual selection, she104 expects that the hunters will
keep the greater portion of the meat for themselves, and that any meat sharing behavior would
occur only if this activity were reciprocated in a game theoretic way. This is not what she
observes however. Instead, she discovers that meat is divided evenly among all members of the
tribe, even those who could not be expected to reciprocate any favors in the future. Upon further
observation, however, she discovers that the hunters gain some special benefits as the result of
their efforts. Quoting Sober and Wilson:
It turns out that women think that good hunters are sexy and have more children
with them, both in and out of marriage. Good hunters also enjoy a high status
among men, which leads to additional reproductive benefits. Finally, individuals
do not share meat the way that Mr. Rogers or Barney the Dinosaur would, out of
the goodness of their hearts. Refusing to share is a serious breach of etiquette that
Sober and Wilson present this thought experiment in second person using ―you‖ instead of ―she‖, but second
person wording would have been awkward in this case.
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provokes punishment. In this way, sharing merges with taking (Sober & Wilson,
1998, p. 142).
The anthropologist is relieved at these discoveries, ―because the apparently altruistic
behavior of sharing meat that would have been difficult to explain now seems to fit comfortably
within the framework of individual selection theory‖ (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 142-143).
Grounding their thought experiment in reality, Sober and Wilson also point out that, ―This
scenario informally describes the current conceptualization of meat sharing in hunter-gatherer
societies‖ (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 143).
So the question arises: Is the type of ―altruistic‖ behavior described above really
selfishness in disguise? The short answer is ―yes.‖ The longer and more correct answer is, ―Yes,
but this does not do serious harm to Sober and Wilson‘s argument that evolutionary altruism is
present in these scenarios.‖ The long answer seems to contradict the shorter answer on the
surface. How can it be that an altruistic behavior under consideration is individually selected for
avoid hurting the argument that altruism is present in the system?
To see how, grant that predator approaching and meat sharing are enforced by
punishments and rewards strong enough to make these behaviors selectively advantageous on an
individual level. With this stipulated as true, the behavior under consideration (predator
approaching/meat sharing) becomes selfish as a matter of definition, since meat sharing becomes
an individually advantageous act. Nevertheless, Sober and Wilson argue that altruism is still
present because the punishing behavior itself must be altruistic. After all, punishers in the group
are promoting a trait that benefits the group as a whole, and, while punishing might not be as
costly as the predator approaching or meat sharing itself, there is bound to be some fitness cost
for punishers. Therefore, discovering that an individual selective advantage exists for an
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apparently altruistic behavior (as the result of punishment) does not give one a reason to doubt
the presence of altruism, but instead requires that we look for altruism in the punishing behavior
that reinforces the group beneficial trait that at first seemed altruistic.
Sober and Wilson call the behaviors that would have been altruistic sans
punishments/rewards ―primary behaviors‖ (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 143). They call rewarding
and punishing behaviors ―secondary behaviors‖ (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 143). Any behavior
which encourages a primary behavior is therefore altruistic105 if there is any within-group fitness
cost for the performer.106 Sober and Wilson, therefore, do not believe that punishment poses a
Sober and Wilson note that this parallels the ―second-order public goods problem‖ described by economists
saying that, ―Any behavior that promotes a public good is itself a public good.‖ (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 144)
106
If the secondary behavior has an additional affect that grants it a within-group selective advantage that outweighs
its own costs, then the source of that individual advantage must itself be analyzed, again punishing back the
question. As a result, the ―true‖ altruistic behavior may lay several steps away from the primary group-beneficial
behavior. In some cases, however, the rewards and/or punishments might actually be the result of within-group
selection and not be or derive from an altruistic behavior at all. This later possibility is one that Sober and Wilson do
not seem to consider in their discussion of punishment (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 142-149).
For example, the mate selection observed in guppies that has been discussed in this section may, in fact, be
due to individual level selection---at least in part. Dugatkin and Godin say, ―We hypothesized that boldness
exhibited during predator inspection might be attractive to females because it should be a reliable indicator of
fitness.‖ and the tests for female mate preference were designed to help prove this hypothesis (Dugatkin & Godin,
2005). Nevertheless, it is important to note that not all rewards and punishments found in nature are the results of
mate selection, and not all mate selection is the result of individual fitness selection. Though some cases of apparent
evolutionary altruism could be the result of rewards and punishments developed entirely by means of individual
selection, this is no reason to believe that all, or even most cases are like this.
Further, even if there is an individual selective force for punishments or rewards in the case of the guppies,
this is not enough to show that the punishing or rewarding behavior of guppies is not altruistic. For example, if
individual selection only favors a 75% preference for predator inspectors and yet female guppies display an 85%
preference for predator inspectors, this would prove that the punishing/rewarding trait is altruistic at its existing
level. Since the 10% difference in this hypothetical case goes beyond the individual optimum, this behavior would
incur a within-group fitness cost and therefore should be viewed as evolutionarily altruistic. The mere presence of
some individual selection pressure for a punishing or rewarding behavior directed at a group beneficial trait is
therefore not enough for one to reasonably conclude that only individual selection is involved. Indeed, one should
expect to find cases in nature that are the result of mixed forces since individual selection within groups is always
present during group selection as well.
Finally, since a primary group-beneficial behavior grants a benefit to the group, it would be very odd if this
benefit did not increase selection for the punishing or rewarding behavior as well. It would be odd, but not
impossible. In order for this to happen the punishing/rewarding organisms must have developed their
punishing/rewarding behavior without the presence of any group selective advantage produced by that behavior.
This means that the primary behavior must only benefit individuals that do not display the secondary
rewarding/punishing behavior. Theoretically, this could happen either if the organisms performing the secondary
behavior were all of one sex and the beneficiaries were all of the other, or it could happen in cases of symbiotic
relationships between multiple species of organisms where the species producing the secondary behavior do not
receive the benefit of the primary behavior but another does. It is almost needless to say that the number of
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threat against the presence of evolutionary altruistic behavior. Furthermore, this seems to be a
reasonable conclusion.
3_2.3 Another Kind of Freeloader
A sufficiently powerful system of punishment can make practically any behavior
advantageous within a group (Boyd, 1992). All that is required for any behavior to be beneficial
within a group is that there be a punishment attached to non-performance of the behavior that is,
on average, more costly in terms of relative fitness than performing the action.107 Punishment is a
remarkably flexible method for encouraging altruistic and group beneficial behaviors, and is
especially powerful because the relative fitness costs of punishing are usually much less than the
behavior that the punishment promotes. What is more, the costs of punishing, in some cases, can
be shared by many members of a community. Thus, while it may be costly for the best hunter in
a group of hunter-gatherers to share meat equally, it costs very little individually to shun a hunter
who refuses to share.
Be this as it may, a low relative fitness cost is a cost nonetheless, regardless of how small
it is. So long as there is any cost at all to implement a punishment, there is an evolutionary
temptation to cheat by refusing to punish. A group member that doesn‘t punish would receive the
benefits of living in a society that punishes behaviors that are harmful to the group, without
losing any relative fitness themselves by punishing. The freeloading strategy is still a drag on the
evolutionary development of altruistic adaptations; although the weaker the benefits of cheating
are, the less powerful between-group selection has to be to overcome them. Because punishing
contingencies required for any such scenario to occur in nature would make any real cases of this very rare.
Nevertheless, some such cases may exists and therefore Sober and Wilson are not technically correct if they are
suggesting, as they seem to be doing, that a primary behavior that would have been altruistic without punishments or
rewards must always involve secondary behaviors somewhere down the causal line that are themselves
evolutionarily altruistic. However, while it would be dishonest to claim that this observation does nothing to weaken
Sober and Wilson‘s case for the ubiquity of altruism, this represents a very minor blow at worst.
107
This statement should be taken to factor in the chances of successful punishment and the costs of punishing.
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behavior can be less costly than the altruistic (or group beneficial) behavior that it helps to
enforce, the presence of punishing behavior can allow these beneficial behaviors to evolve more
easily.
Special kinds of punishment can make the environment even friendlier for the
development of evolutionary altruistic behaviors. R. Axelrod, in his 1986 paper entitled An
Evolutionary Approach to Norms, showed that freeloaders who do not punish can be deterred by
a system of punishment which also punishes non-punishers. In the same way that punishing a
cheating behavior can make cheating too costly to be advantageous to the cheater, punishing
non-punishers can help assure that almost every member of a group upholds the practice of
punishing. If the punishment for failing to punish is harsh enough and sure enough, then
freeloading by refusing to punish will no longer be an individually advantageous within-group
strategy. Axelrod called norms such as the punishment of non-punishers ―metanorms‖ (Axelrod,
1986, 1100-1103). This particular metanorm, punishment of non-punishers, seems to be
especially effective. Axelrod says:
By linking vengefulness against nonpunishers with vengefulness against
defectors, the metanorm provides a mechanism by which the norm against
defection becomes self-policing. (Axelrod, 1986, p. 1102)
Of course, along with a drastic reduction or elimination of freeloaders comes a more
favorable environment for between-group selection of altruistic behaviors. Axelrod, however,
started his experimental populations with the ―punish non-punishers‖ metanorm already coded
into some members of the population. It is questionable therefore that the metanorm of punishing
non-punishers has often evolved in natural populations. In Any Animal Whatever, Jessica C.
Flack and Frans B.M. de Waal say that such behavior still needs to be demonstrated even in the
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relatively complex societies of non-human primates they discuss that same paper (Flack & De
Waal, 2000, p. 15). In addition, several searches of my own have failed to turn up any nonhuman instances of the ―punish those who do not punish‖ metanorm in natural populations.
Nevertheless, the punishment of non-punishers metanorm clearly does exist within human
populations, and Axelrod is careful to provide numerous examples. To list just one of several, he
points out that, ―Metanorms are widely used in the systems of denunciation in communist
societies. When the authorities accuse someone of doing something wrong, others are called
upon to denounce the accused. Not to join in this form of punishment is itself taken as a
defection against the group‖ (Axelrod, 1986, p.1101). Additional studies might reveal that social
structures such as these exist in more primitive social animals, or it might turn out to be the case
that the level of social organization required for the punishment of non-punishers metanorm to
develop is so high that only human beings display this metanorm. This question can only be
answered by more empirical research.
Axelrod‘s 1986 paper An Evolutionary Approach to Norms identified 7 other
mechanisms that support norms (Axelrod, 1986, p. 1103-1108). These mechanisms were
dominance, internalization, deterrence, social proof, membership, law, and reputation. Most of
these mechanisms require the presence of sophisticated cognition and psychology.108 Without
going into each of these mechanisms in detail, it is worthwhile to give a brief description of each:
1. Dominance occurs when one group enforces a norm over another (Axelrod,
1986, p. 1103).
2. Internalization ―means that violating an established norm is psychologically
painful even if the direct material benefits are positive‖ (Axelrod, 1986, p.
This is neither a shortcoming nor surprise since Axelrod‘s paper was published in The American Political Science
Review and deliberately focused on human social groups.
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1104). In other words, this mechanism requires something like a conscience,
which itself is a relatively complex psychological feature.
3. Deterrence moves beyond immediate selection or trial and error. It can only
occur when a subject is able to look ahead and consider likely future outcomes
of its behavior with a workable degree of accuracy, and then use this
information to decide how to act.
4. Social proof ―applies especially to what people decide is correct behavior.‖
(Axelrod, 1986, p. 1105). Essentially, social proof influences the norms of
others when members of a social group look to the actions of those around
them for clues as to how to behave. This mechanism allows individuals to
adapt to new social surroundings, and requires cognitive abilities which are
sufficiently perceptive. For organisms to make use of this mechanism, they
must be able to produce a very plastic range of behaviors, as opposed to
organisms that are primarily driven by instinct.
5. Membership, and by this Axelrod is speaking of voluntary membership, in a
group that is ―working together for a common end‖ is yet another norm
enforcing behavior (Axelrod, 1986, p. 1105).
Axelrod points out that voluntary membership has three strong effects:
1. First, it [makes] defecting less attractive because to defect against a
voluntarily accepted commitment would tend to lower one‘s self-esteem.
Second, group membership allows like-minded people to interact with each
other… Finally, the very agreement to form a group helps to define what is
expected of the participants. (Axelrod, 1986, p. 1105)
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2. Law, of course, is a uniquely human invention that codifies norms. The law,
―supplements private enforcement mechanisms with the strength of the state.‖
Also ―The law…has a substantial power of its own, quite apart from whether
it is or can be enforced. Many people are likely to take seriously the idea that
a specific act is mandated by the law‖ and behave accordingly for this reason
alone (Axelrod, 1986, p. 1106).
3. Reputation provides another powerful norm enforcing mechanism. Axelrod
says that reputation is, ―An important, and often dominant, reason to respect a
norm‖ (Axelrod, 1986, p. 1107) Of course, reputation as an enforcement
mechanism also requires the presence of sophisticated cognitive abilities and
complex psychological features.
The point of listing these mechanisms, however briefly, is that one would not expect to
find that they have much effect on non-human animals. This does not mean that dominance, or
reputation, or some of the other norm-enforcing mechanisms listed will not be found to some
degree in other animals, but these mechanisms play a much larger role in human social groups.
Also, a number of these mechanisms, such a reputation, become much more important with the
presence of language. Gossip, for example, might be expected to magnify the effects of
reputation as a norm enforcing mechanism (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 168).
Social mechanisms such as those listed above can play a large role in determining human
behavior, and one of the most important types of behavior that these mechanisms promote is
altruistic and group beneficial behavior. The next section of this chapter will therefore focus on
human beings specifically. This will largely be done through a brief examination of Sober and
Wilson‘s survey of cultures and their general conclusions concerning human social groups.
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Examples that exemplify the power of punishments and how a punishment can cost the punisher
little but the punished a great deal will be given. Further, norm-enforcing behaviors such as those
discussed by Axelrod will be elaborated upon.
3_3 Norm Enforcement in Human Societies: Sober and Wilson‘s Survey of Human Cultures
Because of considerations such as those mentioned in subsection 2.3 of this chapter,
Sober and Wilson believe that altruism ―is especially relevant to the evolution of human
behavior‖ (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 158). In fact, Sober and Wilson go so far as to liken human
societies to superorganisms.109 They say,
Many evolutionary biologists have rejected this [superorganism] interpretation
because human groups do not have the same genetic structure as bee hives and
coral colonies. Multilevel selection theory casts doubt on this objection and
demands that human groups be evaluated in terms of the fundamental ingredients
of natural selection. By these criteria, it is plausible that group selection has been
a very strong force throughout human evolution. The mechanisms that substitute
for genealogical relatedness probably operate in many species, but they do so
especially in human populations because they require sophisticated cognitive
abilities and (in some cases) the cultural transmission of behavior. (Sober &
Wilson, 1998, p. 158)
While it is reasonable to doubt that human social groups are superorganisms in the strong
way that bee hives or colonies of asexually reproducing organisms are,110 the argument that
109
A superorganism is a group of many organisms which function together so tightly and cooperate so fully that
they behave much like a single organism. Social insects such as bees, ants, and termites provide classic examples of
superorganisms. Naked mole-rats show that mammals can behave as superorganisms as well (Corning, 1997).
110
I find myself doubting the true superorganism status of human beings because, in all the examples of
superorganisms in nature that I am aware of, reproduction can only be carried out by specialized members of the
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human beings evolved as group problem solvers (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 159) and that they
live in groups which divvy up the tasks necessary for survival and specialize at these tasks seems
beyond doubt. Even though this may not qualify human social groups as full-fledged
superorganisms, the behavior of human beings is still undoubtedly superorganism-like in many
ways.111
To examine the power of norms and norm enforcing behaviors in human groups, Sober
and Wilson surveyed 25 different cultures. To insure their impartiality, they selected the cultures
they would study randomly using the HRAF (Human Relations Area File) database. Particular
conditions for acceptance into the survey, such as the requirement that references must have at
least 5 pages of information on the social norms of a culture and that no more than 10 pages
would be read, were, decided upon before evaluating the selected cultures (Sober & Wilson,
1998, p. 160-165). While it would be wasteful to reiterate Sober and Wilson‘s entire survey in
this chapter, a summary of some of their findings will provide at least some evidence for the
position that altruistic behavior, cooperation, and group beneficial behavior, are especially
powerful evolutionary adaptations for human beings. Of primary interest are Sober and Wilson‘s
remarks on the enforcement costs of social norms in human societies, and the social norms that
maintain a balance of power between individuals that is conductive to cooperation.
hive or colony unless all members are genetically identical (such as in the case of coral colonies etc). I am not
entirely convinced that is a difference that makes a difference, especially when Sober and Wilson go on to consider
the evolution of culture, but I think that their point goes through just fine without needing to make the stronger
claim. It would be hard to deny that human beings are interdependent or that the ability to create sophisticated
cultures is an evolutionary adaptation key to the human survival. These two truths can be recognized without
delving into all the new complications that a heavy dependence on cultural evolution would bring to the argument,
and are sufficient to show how behavioral altruism is especially important for human beings to live as we do.
111
Though this dissertation is not poised to take on political issues, I would warn against using the superorganism
metaphor as an evolutionary argument for communitarianism. Human beings, unlike bees, or mole-rats, or
individual coral organisms, have complex psychologies, and their happiness depends not only upon the survival
advantage conferred by living in complex social groups, but upon satisfaction of personal desires as well. While
natural selection has never ceased its work on us, the personal and conscious goals of human beings, and even the
stated goals of groups of human beings, are never consciously designed for the soul purpose of being evolutionarily
successful.
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Earlier in this chapter it was noted that second order altruistic behaviors (punishing and
rewarding behavior) are altruistic themselves and are not cost-free to perform. It was also
emphasized that what makes punishing mechanisms so powerful is that the cost in fitness for
enforcing a behavior is often much cheaper or even ―trivial‖ compared to the relative costs of the
primary behavior (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 144). How does this theory hold up when
examining actual human behavior? Sober and Wilson cite some interesting examples in Unto
Others that suggests that it holds up very well indeed.
Before moving on to these examples, it is vital to note that the point of this section is
merely to reveal some of the common norms Sober and Wilson believe are important for the
adaptation of human social groups and supplement them with a small number of examples from
their survey. This dissertation will ultimately analyze particular evolutionary arguments
supporting psychological altruism in human beings, but none of the counterarguments to come
will attack these arguments on the grounds that human social norms do not function in the way
Sober and Wilson claim they do. For this reason, a mere revelation of Sober and Wilson‘s claims
about social norms will provide sufficient background information to move on.
3_3.1 The Enforcement Costs of Social Norms
Sober and Wilson provide numerous examples of the strength of social norms and their
enforcement mechanisms in human societies. While not all their examples will be repeated here,
enough information should be given to provide the reader with a sense of how effective social
norms and norm enforcing behavior can be.
Many social norms revolve around reproduction, and taboos against behavior that is
related to incest and rights to marry are frequent. For example, Sober and Wilson cite the
ethnographer Shternberg who investigated the Gilyaks and found only three instances where
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individuals of the Gilyak violated major norms (Shternberg, 1993, p.184). All three of these had
to do with reproduction (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 167). For the sake of brevity, I will quote
only Sober and Wilson‘s description of the first violation:
The first involved an old man who purchased a new wife the same age as his own
son. When the father died, his son lived for a time (and presumably had sexual
relations) with his stepmother. The son‘s attraction to a woman his own age may
appear natural to us, but it evidently shocked the entire community, who ―spoke
of him as some kind of monster.‖ (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 167)
Living in the 21st century, we know that the stepmother and her stepson are not
genetically related. Along with this knowledge comes the knowledge that none of the dangers of
incest, such as inbreeding and the expression of recessive genetic diseases, will result from a
sexual relationship between stepmother and stepson. Nevertheless, it is easy to see how this norm
could develop as part of a taboo that functions to reduce cases of actual incest in a society where
the reasons for birth defects that often result from incest are not known. What is amazing,
however, is the fact that violation of such norms seldom occur,112 and that when they do
punishment costs the group very little.113
For example, in the previous case Sober and Wilson quote Shternberg as saying, ―the
violator[s] had to go into voluntary exile, i.e. settle outside the settlement and lead a lonely
existence, with all the deprivations of clan blessings associated with ostracism‖(Shternberg,
1993, p.184)(Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 167). Sober and Wilson say that the ―marvelous phrase‖
According to Sober and Wilson ―two of the three offenders are described as ‗Russified Gilyaks‘ who took a
supercilious view of the customs of their own people‖ (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 167).
113
To refer back to Axelrod‘s mechanisms again for a moment, Sober and Wilson point out that, ―According to
Shternberg, Gilyaks normally react to the idea of marriage between forbidden categories with the same kind of
visceral disgust many people in our own society reserve for incest or homosexuality‖ This is evidence that the
marriage norms have become internalized, which, as Axelrod points out, is an important mechanism for the
maintenance of norms. See section 2.3.
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about having to go into ―voluntary exile‖ emphasizes the low cost of punishment (Sober &
Wilson, 1998, p. 167):
Enforcers of the social norm do not have to fight the deviant or otherwise spend much
time, energy, or risk. They merely have to decide that the deviant must go into exile and the deed
is done. The balance of power so obviously favors the group over a particular individual that an
actual contest does not take place (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 167).
This is just one example of low cost enforcement of norms through punishment in human
societies. There are many others. To choose just one more example, simple gossip can provide
both powerful rewards and punishments by either raising or lowering the reputation of an
individual. This is especially true in small societies where the choice of partners for cooperative
interaction is limited, and all or most will gain information through gossip.114 Sober and Wilson
refer to a tale about a Lesu man whose pig broke into another man‘s garden and ate some of his
crops. 115 Even though the injured party was not himself upset by the incident, the pig owner
grew increasingly concerned over all the gossip, and eventually offered to give the garden owner
a pig as compensation for the damage. The garden owner refused the payment of the pig and
―stopped the talk by declaring that the incident should be forgotten‖ (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p.
168). Gossip, being mere talk, is not at a very costly act to perform. In spite of this, the impact
that gossip can have on reputation was powerful enough to cause a member of Lesu society to
offer a pig to make it stop, which would have been much more costly than uttering a sentence.
As Sober and Wilson put it, ―The prestige that the transgressor was so anxious to recover is like
a magical substance that can be given and taken away at will‖ (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 168).
114
Gossip obviously works on reputation, which was one of the mechanisms of norm enforcement that Axelrod
mentioned in his paper An Evolutionary Approach to Norms (Axelrod, 1986, p. 1107).
115
The Lesu are a ―Melanesian island society‖ (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 168).
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Indeed, reputation and prestige can be powerful motivating factors for human behavior
anywhere. Even in ―virtual societies‖ maintained over the internet, reputation is an important
motivating force. For example, amateur anime translators and pirates of music and movies
dedicate large portions of their time to subtitling video and uploading audio and movie files onto
the net. Often such hobbies require high-end computer equipment and expensive high-bandwidth
internet services. In spite of these costs, and in spite of the fact that audio and video pirates risk
legal penalties, individuals compete online to be the most prolific, timely, and wide spread
distributors of this content on the World Wide Web. What is more, any boost in reputation is
usually limited to the online community since the credit for these acts most often go to a pirate‘s
online moniker, leaving most unable to identify the holder of the reputation in the ―outside‖
world. Less costly but similar behavior occurs when a person works to maintain a reputation as a
helpful troubleshooter on a web forum. It is far easier and less time consuming merely to read
advice or ask questions when in need than it is to think about a problem and produce a working
solution for another person‘s problem. Yet individuals all over the world dedicate significant
amounts of time to helping others with technical problems or questions in specialty subjects.
These people are not paid for their advice--often they are not even thanked by the person who
asked the question. If the pleasure of helping out a fellow human being is ruled out as being
benefit enough, the only obvious other benefit that the helpers receive is a boost in reputation
among the limited population of the regulars who frequent that forum.116
In conclusion, mere approval or disapproval of the other members of one‘s community
are powerful motivators that regulate behavior. Low cost punishments such as (but not limited
In fact, some web forums keep track of the number of posts that one writes and assigns ―ranks‖ to forum
members which get higher as posts accumulate. Presumably this was meant as an incentive to encourage even more
posting. This incentive is based upon reputation alone as no special benefits are usually given to users with higher
ranks. This form of incentive is often so powerful that administrators have to take action against cheaters who write
lots of useless or irrelevant posts for the sole reason of increasing their rankings.
116
179
to) gossip, shunning, and exile, work to encourage altruistic and group beneficial behavior in
others, even when such behaviors might be costly to perform.
3_3.2 Cultural Norms that Help Maintain a Cooperation Friendly Environment
Earlier in this dissertation, it was revealed that free-riders who benefit from the
cooperation of others without cooperating themselves have a negative effect on group level
fitness. Evolutionary punishment can help to eliminate a great deal of internal friction and
thereby increase the fitness of a group. But human beings have language and a large capacity for
forethought, and these additional cognitive capacities conjoined with selfish desires can
sometimes work from within to damage adaptive features of a social group.
Sober and Wilson discuss three particularly vulnerable areas for human groups and the
norms that are commonly in place that maintain group fitness against these concerns. These three
areas of concern are the management of privacy, the balance of power, and freeloading. In what
remains of this section, these three topics will be discussed and examples of norms that help
govern behavior in group beneficial ways relating to these three problem areas will be given.
Privacy can be an important issue within human social groups. After all, when a person is
unobserved, he or she could be doing selfish things that the rest of the tribe, clan, or other social
group is unaware of. This can be damaging to the group as a whole. Sober and Wilson give one
of many possible examples, ―If members of a group are free to go off by themselves, then
behaviors such as meat sharing can be difficult to enforce‖ (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 176-177).
Apart from meat sharing, the possible hoarding of goods and the building of coalitions also
become dangers when high degrees of privacy are possible. It is further not difficult to see how
restrictions on privacy might help to curb adultery.
180
To stick with the example of food sharing, Sober and Wilson say, ―Eating alone is the
ultimate in bad behavior in many hunter-gatherer societies, something that only an insane person
would do‖ (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 177). Sober and Wilson also quote Mead about the nature
of privacy in Samoa, saying:
…those things done alone are at least suspect, if not downright wrong. The
expecting mother, the young chief, the bride-to-be, must never be alone. Anyone
whose conduct is of importance to other people must be sheltered from solitude
because no one would conceivably wish to be alone unless on evil bent (Sober &
Wilson, 1998, p. 177)
It turns out that even active social behavior can be enforced by norms. The Mbuti expect
members of their group to be talkative, for example (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 177). This social
engagement is conducive to cooperative behavior. Indeed, Sober and Wilson say, ―If the social
norm of a group is to be physically present and socially engaged, then the deck is stacked in
favor of pro-social behaviors from the beginning‖ (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 177).
Of course, managing privacy is not the only major source of concern for human social
groups. An improper balance of power between individuals in a social group can also cause
resentment and friction. Sober and Wilson point out that ―especially in hunter and gatherer
societies that approximate the ancestral human condition‖ social norms frequently appear that
limit the amount of power than any individual may have (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 177).117 They
say,
The big men, chiefs, and others who seem to be powerful are usually not despots
who have totally escaped social control, but often behave in a capacity that in
117
This limitation of power, however, may work differently for different sexes, ages and classes (Sober & Wilson,
1998, p. 178).
181
some significant degree benefits the group. For many of the cultures in our
survey, leaders are controlled at least as much as they do the controlling. Among
the Kpelle, for example, older brothers usually serve as family head, but they
must consult with a council of elders to make important decisions. … Apache
leaders were expected to exemplify the value of sharing by precept and example.
Gifts received by leaders were largely redistributed or used to fulfill requirements
of hospitality. Leaders could advise, but not command. (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p.
179)
Indeed, Sober and Wilson say that, in their survey, they identified ―at least two specific
design features of social norms that constrain the power of leaders‖ (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p.
180). First, leaders are held to ―higher moral standards‖ than the rest of the group (Sober &
Wilson, 1998, p. 180). Second:
…powerful individuals are often not allowed to decide the fate of other members
of their group. A norm of personal autonomy, in which no one can be told what to
do, exists side-by-side with norms for mutual aid and cooperation (Boehm 1993;
Knauft 1991). It appears that decisions are seldom made by despotic individuals
and simply imposed on other members of the group, at least until a society
becomes very large. (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 180)
It is worth drawing attention to the last clause of the previous citation. Both the privacy
norms and the norms which maintain a balance of power so effectively in small groups might
seem to go against our intuitions about how people behave coming from the perspective of life in
a large modern country. However, most of human evolution occurred when people lived in
relatively small hunter-gatherer societies. In these groups, the anonymity that is possible to
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obtain in the modern world was impossible. Also, small populations allowed members of a social
group to keep tabs on one another and make their displeasure both known and felt by their words
or their actions, even concerning their leaders. A single member of society could communicate a
complaint to an entire populous in a small enough group. By contrast, in large nations, most
citizens never even meet their leaders, and it takes a great deal of coordination and a large
number of individuals to even gain the attention of extremely powerful figures; simple gossip
will not do as an enforcement mechanism in such modern cases.118
Social norms can also help to control freeloading. For example, Sober and Wilson point
out that Navajos are expected to cooperate when prevailed upon for a favor, but also that an
individual has a right to deny the request. As a consequence they say, ―individuals do not make
requests lightly, less they suffer the public humiliation of being refused‖ (Sober & Wilson, 1998,
p. 181). As another example, the Lasu are not allowed to give anything or do anything for free
for another with the exception of giving food to family and friends (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p.
180).
Though Sober and Wilson‘s study only included 25 randomly selected cultures, and
though this section gave only a very brief overview of that study, at least some of the ways in
which human social norms can influence human behavior should be clear. Sober and Wilson go
so far as to say:
In every case [of the 25 cultures they surveyed], many of the social norms appear
designed to forge groups of individuals into well-functioning units. This
118
Wide spread advertising and whispering campaigns can serve some of the same functions as simple gossip
however.
Also, Sober and Wilson claim that their study shows that ―large stratified societies are indeed vulnerable to
exploitation by powerful members‖ (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 179). They also theorize that, ―norms may become
increasingly difficult to enforce as societies become larger, shifting the balance in favor of within-group selection‖
(Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 180).
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conclusion emerges so strongly from the ethnographies and seems so embedded
in the minds of the people themselves that a functional interpretation appears
warranted. In culture after culture, individuals are expected to avoid conflict and
practice benevolence and generosity towards all members of a socially defined
group. (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 172)
3_4 Summary
In chapter, it was shown that evolutionary altruism is not only possible but that the
common nature of certain mechanisms and structures, such as trait-groups, indicate that it is not
rare. Three major mechanisms were discussed which have the power to greatly amplify natural
selection in favor of altruism once an organism has developed particular capacities.
Only organisms that can discriminate between group members and remember the past
behavior of individuals in their group can participate in assortative behavior. Nevertheless,
assortative behavior appears to be possible even for organisms as simple as guppies. This
mechanism magnifies selection for altruistic behavior by increasing variation between groups.
When assortative behavior is in effect, altruists can identify other altruists and ―choose‖ to
associate primarily with them. This has the additional benefits of reducing the number of noncooperators that parasite off of the behavior of altruists and, as a corollary, also increases an
altruist‘s exposure to the beneficial actions of other altruists.
Evolutionary punishment helps to support the development of altruistic adaptations.
When non-cooperative (or less-cooperative) organisms are punished for their lack of
cooperation, non-cooperators lose within-group fitness relative to altruists in the group. This in
turn makes the altruistic behavior in question less costly in terms of relative fitness for the
altruist. Indeed, it is possible for evolutionary punishment to be severe enough and sure enough
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that it outweighs the cost of performing the group beneficial behavior it encourages. When this
happens, it actually transforms the performance of what would otherwise be altruistic groupbeneficial behavior into selfish or individually selected (but still group beneficial) behavior. In
such a case true behavioral altruism likely exists in the secondary enforcement
(punishing/rewarding) behavior of the organisms.
Finally, related to evolutionary punishment, are social norms such as those present in
human societies. Such norms can only exist for organisms that have the cognitive capacities
great enough to support complex cultures, and thus appears to be limited to human beings. Social
norms can make almost any behavior selectively advantageous within a group, and often serve to
allow groups of human beings to function as adaptive units. Like evolutionary punishment,
social norms enforce rules that decrease within-group competition. Social norms, however, can
enforce more complex rules and are not determined in a strict way by genetics. Accompanying
punishments for violating these norms do not always correlate with evolutionary fitness, though
they often do. Social norms can manage freeloading, imbalances of power, and privacy issues in
such a way as to reduce within-group conflicts. Social norms, especially in small group of
humans, can be enforced at low costs by means such as, but not limited to, gossip and shunning.
Though psychological altruism is not a required part of any of these mechanisms, the
topics covered in this chapter are important to the subject because they make stronger the case
that natural selection favoring evolutionary altruism and group beneficial behaviors can be very
intense, especially for creatures such as ourselves. Why is altruistic behavior important for a
discussion of psychological altruism? The answer resides in the fact that psychological altruism
does not describe a type of action but a possible cause of some human actions. More specifically,
psychological altruists are motivated by an ultimate desire for the wellbeing of another. Since
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acts caused by such motivations are more likely to (though do not necessarily) involve sacrifices
on the part of the actor, the more selection pressure there is for group beneficial actions the more
selection pressure there will be for reliable internal mechanisms that can trigger them.
In short, psychological altruism and psychological egoism are competing theories over
which types of proximate mechanisms are involved in human behavior--especially apparently
self-sacrificial human behavior. The next chapter will therefore briefly explore the nature of
proximate mechanisms as well as lay out a couple of other details necessary to set the
groundwork for Sober and Wilson‘s evolutionary arguments in favor of psychological altruism.
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CHAPTER IV:
PROXIMATE MECHANISMS AND MOTIVATION
The previous chapters have shown how evolutionary altruistic behaviors can evolve, and
why such behaviors may constitute especially beneficial adaptations for a species such as our
own. Selection for such behaviors in human beings may even be stronger than the selection for
cooperative behaviors of other social species.
It has already been mentioned that psychological altruism and evolutionary altruism are
distinct. One difference is that evolutionary altruism does not require a neural system, much less
a sophisticated brain, to be present, while psychological altruism, if it exists, requires a relatively
sophisticated brain. Another is the fact that the presence of evolutionary altruism can be
determined by observation and experimentation, while psychological altruism is presently
undetectable using these methods. However, by far the most important difference119 between the
two theories is that evolutionary altruism is solely about behavior, while psychological altruism
is solely about motivation.
This much has been said in previous chapters. Psychological altruism requires that the
actor is motivated, at least in part, by a benevolent other-regarding ultimate desire, and
psychological egoism requires that an actor be entirely motivated by self-regarding desires. Just
what is the nature of these psychological mechanisms called ―motives‖? This purpose of this
chapter is to give a more detailed answer to this question.
The term ―most important difference‖ refers to what is most important in terms of the psychological
egoism/altruism debate, not most important by some other standard.
119
187
4_1 Adaptive Behaviors and the Mechanisms that Cause Them
Any behavior that evolves is always accompanied by a mechanism that causes
that behavior (Sober & Wilson, 1998 p. 199). Still, behaviors and the mechanisms that cause
them are worth distinguishing conceptually for at least two reasons.
The first reason is that natural selection only works on phenotypes.120 Phenotypes are the
expressed characteristics of an organism. Only phenotypes are ―visible‖ to natural selection.121
Thus behaviors are directly selected for, but the mechanisms which produce these behaviors are
only selected for based on the behaviors they cause and how appropriately and reliably they
cause them. A mechanism could have phenotypic traits of its own, and these could be directly
selected for or against, but in such a case phenotypes are still the subject of selection.
Now one might object and say that mechanisms are in fact selected for qua mechanisms
because one mechanism might produce a particular behavior more effectively, more assuredly, or
more efficiently than another. This is true as far as it goes, but insofar as there is a difference in
efficiency, reliability, or effectiveness, there is also a difference in exhibited behavior. It is only
this difference in behavior (a phenotypic trait) that selection favors or disfavors directly. If two
The term ―phenotype‖ is sometimes taken to mean an expression of a genotype; other times it is used more
broadly and includes characteristics that are partially dependent upon the environment. Genes, for example, may
give an organism certain capacities that are inheritable, but the capacities might only express themselves if certain
environmental conditions are met. For example, many species of poisonous dart frog no longer produce poison, or
produce much less of it, when they are fed diets by pet owners that are dissimilar to what they would eat in their
native environment. The same thing could apply to capacities for particular learned behaviors as well, such, for
example, tool use by some tribes of chimps.
121
For a characteristic to be visible to natural selection it must be a phenotype (in the broad sense of the term), but
not all phenotypes are visible to natural selection. There is likely no selection pressure being exerted for the color of
my spleen, for example. Coloring is, however, very important for the very poisonous coral snake, and perhaps even
more so for its relatively harmless look-alikes, such as the scarlet kingsnake.
120
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mechanisms were different but produced identical behaviors with equal efficiency, durability,
and reliability, then the mechanism themselves would be invisible to natural selection.122
When a particular mental effect can be produced by more than one mechanism in the
brain (or brain state), that effect is said to be multiply realizable. This doctrine of multiple
realizability originated in an article called Psychological Predicates by Hillary Putnam, and is
the second reason why it is important to distinguish between behaviors and the mechanisms that
produce them (Putnam, 1967, p. 37-48).123 The theory of multiple realizability is especially
important for the psychological egoism/altruism debate because both psychological altruists and
psychological egoists are in agreement over how humans and other animals behave. The
psychological egoist does not deny the fact that individuals have used and even lost their lives in
ways that help others. The point of disagreement between psychological egoists and
psychological altruists concerns what kinds of psychological mechanisms are available to cause
behaviors. The psychological altruist says that the mechanism can sometimes contain a
benevolent other-oriented ultimate desire, and the psychological egoist claims that it cannot.124
At least, this is how Sober and Wilson frame the debate (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 297).
122
This is again assuming that the mechanism in question does not have other selectable traits. It is possible that a
mechanism may be selected for or against directly, but this selection pressure would not be the result of the behavior
it produces.
Also, it is not necessary that the competing mechanisms be equally reliable, efficient, and effective under
all possible conditions to be indistinguishable under natural selection. The merely need to be equally reliable,
efficient, and effective under those conditions hat the organism will encounter.
123
In chapter one, multiple realizability provided a strong reason to doubt that Batson‘s experiments prove
conclusively that altruism is present in human beings, though the term ―multiple realizability‖ was not used at the
time. Reflecting back, however, every experiment Batson provided at first seemed to falsify an egoist mechanism
that could explain a particular behavior. But, even if there is no doubt that the experiments themselves were well
constructed, other egoistic mechanisms could seemingly always be generated to account for Batson‘s data.
124
Of course the term ―mechanism‖ can be taken very broadly. A mechanism produces an effect in a causal chain of
events. If the macro events in the universe are completely deterministic, then the mechanism that caused any effect
E could rightfully be said to be the Big Bang itself, or any set of causes in the causal chain that leads to E. The exact
lines demarcating the boundaries of a particular mechanism are blurry. For example, is air itself part of the
mechanism of an air pump? What about the electric socket that powers it? In spite of a certain amount of vagueness,
however, the following subsection should clarify the difference between ultimate and proximate mechanisms
sufficiently for the terms to be used.
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Recall that Sober and Wilson never deny the claim that it might be possible to give
experimental evidence for psychological altruism (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 272). Whether they
realize it or not, they have to be open to this possibility since they defend evolutionary arguments
in support of psychological altruism. This commits them to the position that natural selection
could favor, and therefore ―distinguish‖, psychologically altruistic behavior from
psychologically egoistic or hedonistic behavior. This commitment further commits them to the
view that it is at least theoretically possible for experimental evidence to distinguish the two.125
Further, if Sober and Wilson‘s evolutionary arguments are to be effective, then the relevant
behaviors caused by egoistic and altruistic motives cannot all be identical. If they were identical,
then natural selection would not favor one type of motivation over another, and Sober and
Wilson‘s evolutionary arguments rest on the claim that selection would favor the presence of
altruistic motives for at least some behaviors.
The fact that behaviors that seem multiply realizable could be subtly distinct underlines
the importance of examining the theoretical differences between egoistic and altruistic
mechanisms in the context of modern evolutionary biology. To aid in this task, it will be useful
to further examine the mechanisms are relevant to the psychological altruism/egoism debate in
more detail.
4_2 Proximate and Ultimate Mechanisms
According to Ernst Mary, if one were asked what the mechanism behind a particular
behavior (B) in an organism (O) is, there are two different types of answers that one might give
(Mary, 1961, p. 1501-1506). Suppose, for example, that a biologist is asked what causes the
125
This presumes that the physical differences between psychologically egoistic and psychologically altruistic acts
are not quantum. At the quantum level, testing itself interferes with the results.
190
roots of a radish plant to grow towards a water source. One type of answer she might give would
be that the roots grow in this way because natural selection favored hydrotropic roots in radishes.
If pressed for further information, she might explain how natural selection works and why
hydrotropic roots provide a selective advantage.
However, there is another way for her to answer the question. She could say that the roots
of a radish plant contain root caps which can detect moisture gradients in the soil and help direct
the growth of the plant‘s roots towards greater areas of moisture (Eaten, Barros, Ponce, Campos
& Casaba, 2005, p. 44). If this explanation were pressed further, she might explain the chemistry,
or even the physics, that allow the root cap to play this functional role.
Neither of these answers is wrong. Sober and Wilson call the first kind of cause
―relatively ultimate‖ and the second kind ―relatively proximal‖ (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 200).
Of the two kinds of causes, the psychological egoism/altruism debate is concerned with the latter
over the former. The debate over the possibility of psychological altruism is a debate over
whether certain types of behavior can spring from mechanisms that contain benevolent otherregarding ultimate desires. The psychological altruist claims that at least sometimes they can,
and the psychological egoist denies this claim. But both the psychological altruist and the
psychological egoist agree that the ―relatively ultimate‖ cause of behavior is natural selection
and other evolutionary forces.
It is important to note that the ultimate desires of an organism are not necessarily similar
to the ultimate causes of that desire. This is because psychological and evolutionary meanings of
the term ―ultimate‖ are not the same (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 201). An explanation of this fact
will be aided by the following diagram:126
126
Sober and Wilson presented a similar diagram, but I have modified the heuristic. The original can be found on
page 201 of Unto Others (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 201).
191
1. 2. 3. 4.
Natural selection for  Desire to avoid  Desire to avoid  Avoidance of a
avoiding injury pain
snakes snake
(Ultimate mechanism) (Proximate mechanism) (Instrumental desire) (Behavior) (Ultimate desire)
Fig. 4.1
Pain makes for a good example here because Sober and Wilson agree with hedonists in
that they acknowledge that the desire to avoid pain is an ultimate desire (Sober & Wilson, 1998,
p. 201). But, though the desire to avoid pain (2) is ultimate psychologically, it is not ultimate in
terms of causation. The ultimate causal mechanism that results in avoidance of injury is natural
selection (1), and the desire to avoid pain (2) is, in this sense, instrumental to that end (Sober &
Wilson, 1998, p. 201). Another way to say this is to say that the desire to avoid pain (2) is a
proximate mechanism supporting an adaptive behavior (4) that is favored by the relatively
ultimate cause of natural selection (1).
The desire to avoid pain (2), however, does not help an organism know which things to
avoid in life. In order for the ultimate desire (2) to be effective, an organism must develop
instrumental desires by discovering or learning what types of objects or conditions cause pain, or
else have the appropriate reactions instinctively. Thus a person who comes to believe that a
snake bite is painful develops an instrumental desire to stay out of a snake‘s striking distance (3).
Finally, causes 1-3 result in snake-avoiding behavior (4).
The psychological altruism/egoism debate does not involve only proximate mechanisms.
Nor does it even concern all proximate mechanisms that cause self-injurious behavior that
benefits others. Suppose, for example, that a captain in the FBI asks for someone to volunteer for
an extremely dangerous deep cover mission, and, as soon as the captain stops talking, a very
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small and extremely unlikely seizure causes an agent‘s arm to jerk upwards. Captain and
comrades see the raised arm and praise the agent for her bravery, resulting in an agent who is too
embarrassed to explain that she wasn‘t really volunteering for anything. Though such a behavior
is clearly sacrificial, and though this behavior may benefit others, this action is irrelevant to the
psychological egoism/altruism debate. This is because the freak seizure that was the proximate
mechanism behind the behavior is not the type of mechanism that psychological egoists or
psychological altruists are interested in. Indeed, the only proximate mechanisms relevant to the
debate are psychological motives. It will therefore be useful to briefly examine the nature of
psychological motivation.
4_3 Motives
Psychological motives are proximate mechanisms for behavior, but what exactly is a
motive? Sober and Wilson subscribe to the theory that motives consist of two basic components,
the first being a belief and the second a desire (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 208).
This theory entails that desires can never lead to a behavior without some sort of
directing belief. For example, a desire to keep a job will not result in a person setting her alarm
clock without the accompanying belief that being late for work would jeopardize her job, and the
belief that the alarm will help insure that she is not late for work. Likewise, beliefs alone will not
result in an action without an accompanying desire. The belief that being late for work will
jeopardize a person‘s job will not prompt her to set her alarm unless she also desires to keep her
job.
Motives can contain many different types of desires, but an altruistic motive must contain
a benevolent other-directed ultimate desire. A motive compatible with psychological egoism
must contain a self-directed ultimate desire.
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For Sober and Wilson, this belief/desire theory of action is very important. They say:
The egoism-altruism debate assumes that beliefs and desires are the items in the
mind that produce behavior. A debate about what our ultimate motives are
presupposes that we have motives and that they are causes of the way we act.
Although this assumption has not gone unchallenged, we (unsurprisingly) accept
it here as a reasonable working hypothesis. If science someday establishes that
beliefs and desires do not exist…then we expect the debate about psychological
egoism and altruism to be tossed in the rubbish heap of history. (Sober & Wilson,
1998, p. 208)
Sober and Wilson also emphasize the propositional nature of beliefs and desires saying:
Consider what it means to say that Jack believes that there is water in the glass. If
we take this statement at face value, we will say that it means that Jack bears a
particular relation—the relation of believing—to a proposition (the one expressed
by the phrase ―there is water in the glass‖). Desire also is a propositional attitude.
When we say that Jill wants there to be water in the glass, we are saying that Jill
bears a certain relation—the relation of wanting true—to a proposition (the one
expressed by the phrase ―There is water in the glass‖). (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p.
208-209)
The propositional nature of beliefs and desires is important to Sober and Wilson because
propositional attitudes require a particular level of cognitive sophistication. An organism is
capable of generating a belief or desire only if ―they have the capacity to represent its constituent
concepts‖ (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 209). In Sober and Wilson‘s above quote, for example,
194
Jack must have a concept ―water and the concept of a glass (as well as the concept of physical
containment and the concept of existence)‖ (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 209).
This does not mean that an organism must have a spoken language to have beliefs and
desires. Psychological altruism and psychological egoism are limited to organisms that have the
ability to ―use the concepts that figure in a representation of the proposition‖ (Sober & Wilson,
1998, p. 213). Beliefs and desires are not limited to organisms that have the ability to
intentionally express those representations however. In fact, Sober and Wilson defend the notion
that dogs have beliefs and desires. They say,
Although we talk about organisms wanting objects, without thereby pinpointing
what concepts the organisms are using, this should not lead us to think that there
is such a thing as a ―nonconceptual desire.‖ Desiring involves the formation of
representations that have propositional content. (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 213)
Sober and Wilson also assert that, even though motivation is a cognitive process, the
deliberation that takes place is not restricted to ―lengthy episodes of self-conscious reflection‖
(Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 211). They use as an example a case of a lifeguard jumping into the
water immediately to save a drowning child saying, ―Even though the action occurs quickly, it
still is plausible to think that beliefs and desires are consulted and processed in accordance with
some decision rule‖ (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 211).
In defense of this position, Sober and Wilson suggest that the fact that the lifeguard grabs
a life preserver and swims to the child‘s aid supports this claim (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 211).
This assertion seems at least open to question, however, as habit or mental preparation for
possible future events could possibly bypass reference to the original desire/belief pair. This is an
empirical question, and the evidence is not in yet. On the surface, at least, it seems just as
195
plausible to think that habits or events that one has psychologically prepared for involve shorter
reaction times precisely because they bypass much of the decision making process as it does to
think that all the same beliefs and desires are consulted when decisions are made quickly. Nor
should we let the fact that an action might be later justified or rationalized by appealing to all the
relevant beliefs and desires fool us into thinking that they were referenced immediately before an
intentional action.
Even though this particular position might be doubtful, Sober and Wilson‘s evolutionary
arguments can continue. They can continue both because habits that were derived from altruistic
motivations may still be called altruistic in an important sense, and because, even if habits did
not count as altruistic desires, deliberative action still would.
4_4 Summary
In this chapter, it was revealed that the psychological altruism/egoism debate is
ultimately a debate over what kinds of proximate mechanisms can cause behavior. Psychological
altruists hold that these proximate mechanisms can be motives which contain benevolent otherregarding ultimate desires. Psychological egoists claim that no such motives exist.
It was further revealed that motives consist of belief-desire pairs that work together to
cause intentional action. Since beliefs and desires are propositional in nature, it turns out that
only animals with fairly sophisticated brains are capable of motivation, though Sober and Wilson
argue that dogs and other animals likely possess psychological motives. This does not mean that
Sober and Wilson believe that they are capable of altruism, since altruism not only requires
psychological motivation but a particular type of motivation (e.g. one which is partially
composed of a benevolent other-oriented ultimate desire) which might itself require greater
cognitive capacities.
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The nature of proximate mechanisms is important to the psychological egoism/altruism
debate because Sober and Wilson‘s evolutionary arguments for psychological altruism concern
the indirect selection of motives which contain altruistic ultimate desires.
Before moving on to an examination of these arguments, it is useful to further clarify how
evolutionary definitions of altruism and egoism relate to psychological definitions of altruism
and egoism. This will be the task of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER V:
STRONG AND WEAK THEORIES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL ALTRUISM, AND THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EVOLUTIONARY AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ALTRUISM
Though psychological altruism is a theory about motives and evolutionary altruism is a
theory about behaviors, there is a sense in which psychological altruism is also evolutionary. It is
evolutionarily in the sense that, if the capacity for psychological altruistic motivations exists, it
must have evolved. Though it might be difficult to completely rule out that the capacity for
altruistic motivation developed as an evolutionary accident instead of by natural selection, this
possibility seems unlikely given the important role that theories of psychological altruism place
on altruistic motives. Regardless, evolutionary arguments for psychological altruism, such as
Sober and Wilson‘s, must argue that natural selection that favors psychological altruism in
beings like ourselves (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 296-327).
Though psychological altruism has this evolutionary component, the evolutionary
concept of altruism and the psychological concept of altruism are distinct. This chapter will show
how a psychologically altruistic motive can lead to an evolutionary selfish behavior. In addition,
the three other combinations of psychological egoism and altruism and evolutionary egoism and
altruism will be illustrated as well.
Though the evolutionary and psychological concepts of egoism and altruism are
separable, an argument can be made that links these two forms of altruism together in a way that
is important for any strong psychological altruism thesis based on natural selection.
By the end of this chapter, all the tools, concepts, and definitions necessary to understand
Sober and Wilson‘s evolutionary arguments for psychological altruism should be secured.
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5_1 More on Psychological Altruism and Psychological Egoism
Before moving on to begin an examination of evolutionary arguments for psychological
altruism in the next chapter, it will be helpful to first explore the relationship between
psychological altruism and psychological egoism. How do these two different types of
motivation relate to their counterparts?
Recall that psychological altruism is a theory about the types of motives that can serve as
proximate mechanisms of behavior. The psychological altruist believes that, at least sometimes,
people act on motives which contain an ultimate desire to help others. The psychological egoist
denies this.
Notice that when asking whether a behavior is psychologically altruistic or not, one is
asking a question about the motive of an action. According to Sober and Wilson, a motive for
behavior is not altruistic if does contain a benevolent other-directed ultimate desire as part of its
belief and desire pair (Sober & Wilson, 1998, pgs 228-229). If a motivation contains an
instrumental desire instead of an ultimate and irreducible one, then the chain of instrumental
desires must be followed backwards to an ultimate desire, and if that desire is altruistic, then so
is the motivation. Sober and Wilson note that, whereas the theory of psychological egoism says
that all ultimate desires are self-directed, the theory of psychological altruism only makes the
claim that some desires are benevolently other-directed (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 228).127 They
say:
We should construe altruism as part of a pluralistic theory of motivation that
maintains that people have ultimate desires about others as well as about
127
There is certainly conceptual space for a position which holds that all human desires are other-directed, but the
claim seems untenable on the surface. As far as I know, no defender of psychological altruism has ever held this
position. That said, the theory that people are only sometimes motivated by benevolent other-regarding desires is
clearly harder to defeat than a theory which says that people are always ultimately motivated by other-regarding
benevolence. The latter would be defeated by just one undeniable counterexample.
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themselves. Egoism and hedonism, on the other hand, are rightly understood as
(relatively) monistic doctrines. (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 228)
Sober and Wilson acknowledge the importance of other ultimate desires. They even
accept hedonistic desires, such as the desire to avoid pain, as ultimate desires (Sober & Wilson,
1998, p. 201). Their position on psychological altruism only commits them to the belief that
altruistic ultimate desires exist as well. They are pluralists about ultimate motivation, and,
therefore, they do not contradict themselves if they maintain that human beings have both
altruistic and egoistic ultimate desires.
As pluralists, Sober and Wilson identify two types of pluralism capable of incorporating
altruism. Under type-one pluralism, or what will be called uni-causal pluralism, when altruistic
motives cause a behavior, that behavior is only caused by altruistic motives, and when egoistic
motives cause a behavior only egoistic, motives are responsible (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 308).
Under uni-causal pluralism, both types of ultimate desires exist, but they never influence a
behavior jointly. Under type-two pluralism, or what will be called poly-causal pluralism,
organisms may perform behaviors based on mixed motives. This means that a single behavior
can be the result of both egoistic and altruistic ultimate motives working together (Sober &
Wilson, 1998, p. 308). If only poly-causal pluralistic actions exist, then the presence of altruistic
motives must, at least sometimes, contribute to a result that would have been different than had
only egoistic motives played a role. If this were not the case, then altruistic ultimate desires
would exist, but they would be incapable of causing behavior, and evolutionary arguments such
as the ones Sober and Wilson wish to make would no longer be applicable. 128
128
Technically, a psychological altruist could merely deny that altruistic ultimate desires are ever efficacious yet
claim they exist. This would be a hard position for an evolutionist to defend, however, since there would be no
selective force to maintain a proximate mechanism that never triggers a behavior.
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Psychological egoism, of course, denies both forms of pluralism. However, while
technically it only takes one instance of psychological altruism to disprove psychological
egoism, it seems mistaken to believe that psychological altruists in general, and Sober and
Wilson in particular, would be satisfied if it were ever proven that, historically, there has been
one and only one case of psychological altruism due to a short lived and extremely unlikely
mutation. Sober and Wilson believe that natural selection favors the presence of psychological
altruism in organisms like ourselves, and evidence that there were one and only one exception to
psychological egoism would be evidence of defeat rather than of victory for them. Likewise, if a
neurosurgeon in the near future decided to prove that altruism was true by tinkering with a
subject‘s neurons and creating an altruistic ultimate desire within her subject (where none existed
naturally), it seems unlikely that psychological egoists would wave a white flag. Even though the
neurologist would have created a genuine instance of psychological altruism, if this is the only
such example, it would be an exception which serves to prove the rule that people never
naturally have altruistic motives.
The reason some psychological altruists would not be satisfied by the mere existence of
altruistic motivations is because there is a spectrum of conditions one could require of the
psychological altruism thesis. These different versions of the theory would be able to do different
amounts, and perhaps different kinds, of explanatory work. The proof that one and only one
altruistic motive ever existed would support a thesis of psychological altruism that is capable of
explaining very little. Additional requirements, however, would allow the psychological altruism
theory to say something significant about the way human beings think and behave, and thus have
greater philosophical and psychological importance if true. Because of this, it is worthwhile to
more clearly distinguish between strong and weak versions of the psychological altruism thesis.
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5_2 Strong and Weak Theories of Psychological Altruism
As mentioned above, an indubitable discovery that one person at one time acted on an
altruistic motive, and that this never happened before or since, would be a terrible blow for most
defenders of the theory of psychological altruism, even though it technically proves that their
theory is true. In contrast, this same discovery would be warmly received by most defenders of
psychological egoism, even though it proves that their own theory is technically false. This
inconsistency is possible because psychological egoism and altruism are theories meant to
explain something important about the referent of the admittedly vague term ―human nature‖.
This concern is unlikely to be addressed by rare flukes, errors, or impotent altruistic desires. The
strict requirements of psychological altruism can be fulfilled without granting the theory the
explanatory power expected of it by its defenders. For this reason, it is prudent to distinguish
between what will be called strong and weak theories of psychological altruism. To accomplish
this, a definition of what would satisfy a minimal theory of psychological altruism would make a
useful starting point.
1. Minimal Theory of Psychological Altruism: The theory of psychological
altruism is minimally true if any altruistic motive has ever existed.
The minimal theory of psychological altruism has only one requirement. An altruistic
motive must have existed at some point in time. Notice that this motive might have been
ineffective at changing behavior. Thus, a minimal conception of psychological altruism could be
true even if altruistic motives have never brought about, or even contributed to bringing about, a
behavior.
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Sober and Wilson describe the psychological egoism/altruism debate as a debate over the
existence of altruistic motives (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 228).129 In spite of this, such a minimal
account of psychological altruism could not be entirely what they have in mind. Instead, it seems
like Sober and Wilson must accept criteria like the following:
2. Strong Theory of Psychological Altruism: A strong theory of psychological
altruism is true if the following conditions are met.
3.
Altruistic motives exist.
a. Altruistic motives produce behavior (though not necessarily
evolutionary altruistic behavior) that can affect fitness.
b. Altruistic motives can exist as part of a sustainable strategy (e.g. they
are not necessarily fleeting).
c. a and b are true in such a way that they might be considered part of the
―nature‖ of the acting organism, and are not merely flukes or the result
of rare processing errors in the brain of that organism. In other words,
the brain of the organism is functioning properly when a and b are
true.
As defenders of a theory of psychological altruism, Sober and Wilson clearly believe that
altruistic motives exist. This satisfies condition A. Sober and Wilson further argue that natural
selection has favored the evolution of altruistic motivations in human beings (Sober & Wilson,
1998, p. 296-327). Natural selection could only have favored altruistic motivations if those
motivations were capable of producing behavior that affected fitness (either group or individual)
in a significant way. This satisfies condition B. Further, if Sober and Wilson believe that natural
As an example of just one passage to this effect they say, ―The thesis of altruism, as we understand it, says that
some people at least some of the time have the welfare of others as ends in themselves‖ (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p.
228).
129
203
selection favors the presence of altruistic motives for beings like us, then this indicates that they
believe that altruistic motives are sustainable. This satisfies condition C. Finally, if the
possession of altruistic motives (or the capability of generating them) was favored by natural
selection, then condition D must be true as well.
The strong theory of psychological altruism requires much more than the minimal
conception. Though the definition provided does not follow any one philosopher or psychologist,
Sober and Wilson‘s position seems to require that at least this much be true.
Though this definition has been labeled ―the strong definition,‖ this is not meant to imply
that stronger definitions cannot be forged. Some theorist, for example, might stake out a stronger
position that is only satisfied if people generally act altruistically. The definition provided is only
meant to make explicit the suppressed aspects of a theory such as the one Sober and Wilson, as
two of the strongest modern proponents of psychological altruism, seem to hold.
Just as there is conceptual space for an even stronger version the psychological altruism
hypothesis, there is also conceptual space for versions of the theory with requirements that lay
between the strong and minimal conceptions of psychological altruism. These possibilities will
be labeled as weak versions of the theory.
4. Weak Theory of Psychological Altruism: The weak theory of psychological
altruism is true if at least the minimal definition of psychological altruism is
met and at least one of the requirements for the strong definition are not.
5_3 Separating the Psychological and Evolutionary Concepts of Altruism and Egoism
For the sake of understanding the evolutionary arguments for altruism that will be
presented later in this work, it is important to realize that evolutionary altruism and
psychological altruism do not logically imply one another. Evolutionary altruism occurs when an
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organism sacrifices relative within-group fitness in such a way as to benefit its entire group. The
proximate mechanisms behind an evolutionary altruistic behavior can be non-psychological
(such as a virus limiting the speed of its own reproduction), driven by altruistic psychological
motives, or driven by egoistic psychological motives.130
Considering only the last two options, one can explain an evolutionarily altruistic
behavior in two ways. Suppose that the behavior in question is donating money to a charity.
Let‘s decree that this behavior is evolutionarily altruistic because it decreases the within group
fitness of the person making the donation while providing a fitness advantage to other members
of the group. This behavior could be explained by a motive containing an ultimate desire to help
others. Even putting aside such blatantly egoistic motives such as the desire to look generous in
front of others, the proximate mechanism behind the donation could be egoistic in that the
donation behavior might have been the result of a desire to feel good about helping, or even a
desire to assuage anticipation of any guilt that would have resulted from not helping.131 Thus an
evolutionary altruistic behavior can be either altruistically or egoistically motivated. This same
duality applies to evolutionarily selfish behavior. Suppose, for example, that in fact a particular
piece of legislation would be harmful to a community if ratified, but would be popular with
voters nonetheless. A politician who champions this law successfully will gain political power
for herself at the expense of the community. However, while one can easily imagine a selfserving politician who cares only about her own wellbeing pushing such a law forward out of
selfish motivations, it is just as easy to imagine a politician who sincerely (but wrongly) believes
that the new law would be beneficial to the community and fights for it for that reason. This
130
It is also possible that some psychological proximate mechanisms for behavior are neither egoistic nor altruistic.
Whether such mechanisms exist and what they might be, however, has not been explored since any such
mechanisms would be irrelevant to the psychological egoism and altruism debate.
131
Remember, for Sober and Wilson, even a behavior triggered by a desire to obtain or avoid the pleasant or
unpleasant feelings that result from genuine empathy are egoistic (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 332).
205
same politician might also believe that supporting this bill will actually injure her political
position due to underestimating how popular the law would be. Thus it is clear that what would
be called an evolutionarily selfish behavior can be triggered by both psychologically altruistic
and psychologically egoistic proximate mechanisms.132
There are four possible combinations that can be formed by organisms that are either
psychologically egoistic or altruistic and, at the same time, either evolutionarily egoistic or
altruistic. These combinations are illustrated in the following figure:
Evolutionarily Selfish
Evolutionarily Altruistic
Egoistic
Psych. Egoistic
Evo: Selfish
Altruistic
Psych: Altruistic
Evo: Selfish
Passing the bill will:
*Increase the politician‘s
power
*Politician is motivated by
personal gain
Passing the bill will:
*Increase the politician‘s
power
*Politician ultimately
motivated by an ultimate
motive to do good for others
Psych: Egoistic
Evo: Altruistic
Psych: Altruistic
Evo: Altruistic
Passing the bill will:
*Benefit the Community
*Politician is motivated by
personal gain
Passing the bill will:
*Decrease the politician‘s
power
*Politician is ultimately
motivated by an ultimate desire
to do good for others
Fig. 5.1
Psychological egoists, of course, deny that item two or four could ever be true. If this
case is generalized to all human behaviors, psychological altruists must hold that sometimes
either two or four (or both) are true and are otherwise free to assert one, two, or both as
explanations as well.
132
It is to be supposed in this case that gaining political power increases ones evolutionary fitness.
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The psychological concepts of egoism and altruism can be separated from the
evolutionary concepts in yet another way. As human beings gain knowledge, the proximate
psychological mechanisms that served our evolutionary ancestors so well may no longer coincide
as often with biological fitness. For example, human beings desire to have sex. Yet, unlike all
other animals, humans are the only species that actually knows that sexual intercourse results in
procreation. Further, even for human beings, this was surely a discovery; after all, the effect only
becomes visible months after the cause. However, once the pregnancy and copulation connection
was made, people successfully sought ways to satisfy their desire for sexual release and yet avoid
procreation. Successful contraception, though, causes a reduction of evolutionary fitness, at least
in many circumstances. In cases such as this, the function of an adaptive desire is bypassed by a
new behavior in such as way that the desire is fulfilled but the primary adaptive feature of the
desire is not. I call this the end-run effect.133
The end-run effect is not limited to human beings, though it is probably more strongly
applicable to us than to any other species. There are only two conditions necessary for detecting
the influence of the end-run effect. These are:
1. An organism‘s environment or abilities are changed so that at least one of its
adaptive desires triggers a behavior that fails to serve the desire‘s adaptive
function or fails to serve it as well.
2. The desire in question is still satisfied by the triggered behavior.
133
This potential schism between desires and fitness has been noticed before. For example, Nevel Sesardic, in his
paper Recent Work on Human Altruism and Evolution, makes a point similar to my own. He says, ―the connection
between interests and fitness is not only probabilistic but…is also context dependent, and…can easily break with
changes in the environment‖ (Sesardic, 1995, p. 138 footnote). However, what I have labeled the end-run effect,
refers specifically to evolved desires, the evolved predilection for particular desires, or both that lose some or all of
their fitness value because the desire can be satisfied either by some other means, or in ways that are no longer
fitness enhancing.
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Suppose that a foreign species of bird were introduced into a new area. These birds have
a desire to use twigs of a particular length and thickness to build their nests. Using twigs of these
specifications was beneficial to the bird in its original habitat, but in its new habitat many
qualifying twigs come from a particular plant that produces chemicals which cause some harm to
the baby birds of this species.
Because of their innate desire, the birds continue to build nests in their usual way, and
this has the result that they use the dangerous twigs. This hypothetical situation would satisfy all
the conditions of the end-run effect. The birds use the harmful type of twig, doing so satisfies the
desire that helped produce the action, and the triggered behavior no longer fulfills its primary
adaptive function as well. The important concept that the end-run effect is designed to
encapsulate is the fact that desires which were adaptive once can bypass their adaptive functions
and be satisfied nonetheless. They may do so either some of the time or all of the time, and thus a
particular desire may still be adaptive even if, on occasion, it is not because of the end-run effect.
Though the end-run effect is not specific to humans, human beings are so good at
manipulating their environment and developing new ways to satisfy their desires, that it becomes
especially applicable and common for human beings. Through the application of intelligence to
problems of desire satisfaction, what was once an adaptive behavior can become maladaptive (in
an evolutionary sense) or non-adaptive very quickly when a new means of desire satisfaction is
developed.134 Take, for example, the common desires for sweet and salty foods.
The end-run effect is important to the discussion of how the psychological and
evolutionary terms altruism and egoism relate to one another because this effect can help explain
some disconnects between evolutionary and psychological egoism and altruism. For example,
134
I am not asserting here that we should care in any moral way about what benefits us most in an evolutionary
sense. I am merely pointing out that human intelligence coupled with the desires natural selection favored earlier in
our evolution can cause maladaptive behavior from an evolutionary point of view.
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voluntarily having a vasectomy might be an altruistic act evolutionarily speaking, yet it is very
easy to imagine that most men who have this operation do so to satisfy sexual desires while
avoiding the financial hardships that having a child would produce. Thus, the end-run effect can
result in evolutionarily altruistic but psychologically egoistic behavior. Or consider that, though
it was once evolutionarily adaptive for people to crave sweet foods, it is no longer healthy for
many people to satisfy a heavy desire for sweets in a parts of the world where sweets are
superabundant and there is no shortage of healthy high-energy foods for nourishment. Therefore,
if psychologically altruistic desires exist, a person might satisfy her desire to make another happy
by giving this other person a box of chocolates. If we presume that the altruistic desire to make
people happy is an adaptation (say because it provided group-level benefits), and if chocolate is
harmful enough, then the chocolate giver is satisfying a psychologically altruistic desire in a way
that no longer has the evolutionarily altruistic effect of increasing group-level fitness. Indeed, the
altruistically motivated behavior may even have a result that is detrimental to fitness. In ways
such as these the end-run effect can cause a disconnection between the evolutionary and
psychological concepts of altruism and egoism.
Now that it has been shown how easily, and in how many ways, the evolutionary and
psychological concepts of altruism and egoism may unravel, it is worth asking whether or not a
connection between them can reestablished.
5_4 Partially Reconnecting the Psychological and Evolutionary Concepts of Egoism and
Altruism
Despite all the ways that the evolutionary and psychological concepts of altruism and
egoism can unravel, an understanding of the evolutionary concept of altruism remains vital to
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fully understanding the psychological concept, at least if a strong version of psychological
altruism is to be defended.135
This is because if psychological altruism exists and has persisted as a complex
component of human psyches, then it must have developed as the result of evolutionary forces.
However, if psychological altruism is an adaptation, then it must have been part of what was (at
least at one time) a successful evolutionary strategy. To the extent that psychological altruism
promotes behavior that is harmful to the individual but beneficial to others, the puzzle of how
such a mechanism can survive the process of natural selection arises. Understanding how
evolutionarily altruistic behaviors can be selected for gives us a solution to that puzzle. If the
conditions are such that evolutionary altruistic behavior can evolve, then the proximate
mechanisms which cause these behaviors (including psychological altruism) are also evolvable
under those same conditions.
This is not an answer to the question ―Did psychological altruism evolve?‖ or even to the
question ―Is it likely that psychological altruism evolved?‖ Those questions are for later. But it is
an important part of any answer to a question that asks how psychological altruism could
develop or be maintained if it promotes self-sacrificial behavior.
Unfortunately, the situation becomes more complex when one realizes that psychological
altruism might not have been selected for because it leads to evolutionary altruistic behavior; it
might have been selected for because it produces evolutionarily selfish behavior. After all, the
previous section demonstrated at length how the evolutionary and psychological concepts of
altruism and egoism can be split apart and mixed together in four distinct ways. So, though
evolutionary altruism is clearly relevant if psychological altruism is an adaptation selected for at
135
These arguments will assume that if altruistic motives exist they are an adaptation resulting from natural
selection. The possibility that they are not will be considered in a subsection afterwards.
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the group level, the question can be raised as to whether or not evolutionary altruism is relevant
if psychologically altruistic motives are adaptations that developed only because they provide
fitness benefits on an individual level.
To further investigate this matter, we will evaluate the importance of evolutionary
altruism under a history in which psychological altruism evolved as an adaptation from
individual (selfish) selection processes. This means that psychological altruism evolved only
because of fitness advantages generated by being psychologically altruistic within a group, but
not because of advantages in either isolated groups or trait groups. Call this possible evolutionary
past History-S. This history can be contrasted with the more intuitive History-A, in which
psychological altruism evolved, at least in part, by group selection because it helps to produce
behaviors that are beneficial to either isolated groups or traits groups.
It has already been shown that the mechanisms behind evolutionary altruism are
important under History-A. However, suppose that History-S is correct, and psychological
altruism evolved as an adaptation to produce evolutionary selfish behavior. This might have
happened if, for example, it is individually beneficial to appear psychologically altruistic to
others, and the best way to accomplish this is to actually be psychologically altruistic. In such a
case, psychological altruism would be selected for on an individual level but would not tend to
lead to altruistic behaviors. Is a discussion of evolutionary altruism still relevant to the
psychological egoism and altruism debate under these conditions?
Even if the fact that most theorists who support psychological altruism do so in part
because they believe that altruistic motives provide an explanation for altruistic behavior were
put aside, evolutionary altruism remains important under History-S. It could be argued that if
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History-S were proven true, only a relatively weak theory of psychological altruism could be
defended.136 The reason this is so will be explained in the following section.
5_4.1 Fitness Benefits and Other Benefits: How They Relate to the Relevance of
Evolutionary Altruism in the Psychological Egoism/Altruism Debate
Persons are typically said to have engaged in altruistic behavior when they sacrifice some
good of their own for the good of another, where the term ―good‖ can stand in for just about any
conception of ―good‖ the speaker may have in mind. This conception of good may be a fitness
conception, but generally the word ―altruism‖ is not used in this way. Thus, most altruistic acts
do not necessarily grant a fitness benefit to the beneficiary. When these acts do not confer fitness
benefits, they can be said to be non-fitness-conferring altruistic behaviors.
As an example of non-fitness-conferring (NFC) altruistic behavior, consider a person
who provides care for a parent with Alzheimer‘s disease. The benefactor in this case may be both
136
For the record, Sober and Wilson do not seem to believe that a very weak theory of psychological altruism says
much of importance by itself. They say,
If the theory [of psychological altruism] claims merely that people sometimes have irreducibly
altruistic motives, but says nothing about how strong or pervasive those motives are, why is it
worth discussing? To be sure, there is more to the psychology of altruism than the altruism
hypothesis we have just identified. However, we believe that this hypothesis is fundamental
because more ambitious claims about the importance of altruism are committed to this modest
thesis. (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 229) [Emphasis mine].
Thus, proofs that only included especially weak forms of altruism and exclude stronger forms would win
the battle but lose the war for Sober and Wilson and other defenders of the psychological altruism thesis. While it is
reasonable to take on a more modest claim before pursuing a stronger one, as Sober and Wilson have done, it should
also be kept in mind that the stronger thesis can not be disproven or shown to be highly unlikely without a cost to
their greater project. This is relevant for the rest of this section because it will be shown in what follows that a
defender of a strong version of psychological altruism must make assumptions that commit the theorist to the
importance of evolutionary altruism. This is not a revelation that will affect Sober and Wilson negatively. In fact,
since they spend so much time explaining how group selection can work to produce evolutionary altruistic behaviors
in their book Unto Others, they would probably be pleased with this fact. However, Sober and Wilson tie the
evolutionary and psychological theories together in only the weakest of ways in their book. The following
arguments are given in hope of strengthening this connection. Further, considering that these arguments apply to any
theorist defending a strong version of psychological altruism, the evolutionary forces behind behavioral altruism
become important for a full explanation of psychological altruism even for a defender who does not hold that the
theory is true for evolutionary reasons.
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psychologically suffering and suffering in terms of evolutionary fitness. If the parent is no longer
able to produce offspring or help care for the offspring of others, no fitness benefit accrues for
the beneficiary of the NFC altruistic act. Nevertheless, such a behavior would generally be
regarded as altruistic. What‘s more, this seems appropriate.
Humans engage in NFC altruistic behavior too often for this type of behavior to be the
result of rare processing errors in the brain. If these behaviors are not flukes, but rather fall under
the category of the vague term ―human nature,‖ then the proximate mechanisms which cause
NFC altruistic behaviors are almost certainly evolutionary adaptations.137 As such, the forces
driving their evolution was either entirely individual selection (History-S) or at least partially
caused by group selection (History-A).138
If History-A is true, then the selection processes that select for and maintain evolutionary
altruistic behaviors are relevant.
If History-S is true, then one can ask whether the NFC altruistic behaviors cause a fitness
benefit to accrue for the actor in the present, or just in the evolutionary past. If the fitness benefit
conferred in the evolutionary past is not produced in the present, then the NFC altruistic behavior
and its proximate mechanisms are currently being selected against. To the extent that this is the
case, only a weak version of the psychological altruism thesis can be supported. In such a case,
psychologically altruistic motives exist, but are disappearing because the behaviors they cause
are currently mal-adaptive.139 If it is also the case that the altruistic desire driving the action is
satisfied, then it can also be concluded that the end-run effect is in play. If that is the case, then
137
The possibility that they are not will be dealt with more fully later.
There is the possibility of gene level selection, but, for the purposes of this argument, these can be looked at as
selfish processes.
139
If psychologically altruistic motives do not produce altruistic behaviors, then the theory of psychological altruism
becomes extremely weak. Psychological altruistic motives would exist, but they would be unable to cause altruistic
behavior. Further, it would do no good to object that psychologically altruistic motives could cause evolutionary
altruistic behaviors, because this would invoke History-A, and evolutionary altruism is relevant under History-A.
138
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not only would psychological altruism be selected against currently, but the altruistic motives
causing the behavior would no longer be performing their adaptive functions (at least in these
cases).
Of course the situation could be mixed, and sometimes the altruistically motivated NFC
behavior could cause a fitness advantage for the actor and sometimes not. Nevertheless, so long
as the NFC behavior would decrease the fitness of the actor averaged over time, that behavior
(and the proximate mechanism which causes it) would be selected against, all other things
remaining equal.
For the strong psychological altruism thesis to survive in such a way that evolutionary
altruism is irrelevant while History-S is true, NFC altruistic behaviors must grant fitness benefits
to the actor overall. This results in a mixed scenario in which the NFC altruistic behavior is
evolutionarily selfish. Such a result is not nearly as damaging to the psychological altruism thesis
as the case in which evolutionary altruism is selected against and disappearing, but the theory is
still weakened. Psychologically altruistic motives become a mechanism that grants the actor
evolutionary fitness by offering goods that do not improve the beneficiary‘s fitness in exchange.
In fact, it is likely that the NFC benefits granted would reduce the fitness of the beneficiary,
because enjoying these benefits would likely take at least some amount of time and energy. From
the perspective of valuing only non-evolutionary goods, the NFC behavior is altruistic. From an
evolutionary perspective, the motto to live by would be ―Beware of altruists bearing gifts.‖
However, such a scenario is unlikely. While granting NFC benefits in exchange for
evolutionary benefits is evolutionarily beneficial for the actor, it is evolutionarily harmful (on an
individual level) to other members of the group. Members of the group which refuse to grant any
fitness conferring benefits to another member in the group that grants NFC benefits would have a
214
selective advantage over those who do not refuse. As a result, the selection pressure favoring
conferring NFC benefits must be stronger than the selection pressure against conferring fitness
benefits in exchange for NFC benefits. This is not an impossible situation. As was shown in the
previous chapter, culture can result in virtually any behavior becoming selectively advantageous
at an individual level. Nevertheless, it is no minor hurdle to overcome.
Evolutionary altruism is therefore only irrelevant to the strong psychological altruism
thesis if, out of all the possible scenarios, only the one lastly mentioned is the one that usually
holds true. Even then, the defender of psychological altruism has to swallow the fact that
altruistically motivated NFC altruism is only possible under a strong theory of psychological
altruism if the actor is behaving an evolutionarily selfish way.
A flowchart has been provided below which sketches out the general form of the
arguments just given:
215
Fig. 5.2
5_4.1.1 What about Evolutionary Accidents?
The preceding arguments work under the assumption that the presence of altruistic
motives, if such motives exist, is the result of natural selection. There is another possibility,
however. These motivations might be the result of non-selective evolution. That is, they could be
the result of evolutionary accidents, chance, natural constraints upon the organism, or a
216
combination of these factors. Altruistic motives might even be the result of genetic drift, the
founder effect, exaptation, or may even be evolutionary spandrels.140 It might be claimed that
these possibilities show that evolutionary altruism is not relevant to psychological altruism after
all, even when a strong version of the theory is being pursued. There are three responses to this
line of criticism.
First, if Sober and Wilson are correct in thinking that neither psychological
experimentation nor philosophical arguments alone are likely to settle the psychological
egoism/altruism debate any time in the near future, it seems as if an argument for a strong
version of the theory of psychological altruism must rely on evolutionary arguments such those
Sober and Wilson try to provide. It is possible that there other alternative ways of arguing as
well, but there are no such arguments at present to examine. Sober and Wilson argue that it is
likely that psychological altruistic motives would evolve for creatures like us. Arguments such as
this must rely on what one should suspect would happen via natural selection and not
evolutionary accidents.
Second, exaptations, and even spandrels, are still subject to the forces of natural
selection. A feature that is a side effect of selection for other traits can itself be evolutionarily
beneficial or harmful. If altruistic motives influence behavior fairly regularly and in important
ways, then the expression of these motives would probably be subject to fairly strong selection
pressure. This pressure would then act on the traits that produce the altruistic motives or other
traits that can encourage or suppress those motives. If, on the other hand, altruistic motives rarely
change behavior, or if this change in behavior is of little importance, then the theory of
The term ―spandrel‖ is used in biology to refer to phenotypic traits of an organism that are not the result of direct
selection but are merely a byproduct of features that were selected for. This term of coined by Gould and Lewontin.
Just one example they give of a spandrel is the coloring of certain mollusks that is never visible because they live
covered in such a way that the color patterns can not be seen (Gould Lewontin, 1979 , p. 595)
140
217
psychological altruism is capable of explaining very little of importance about how human
beings behave.
It might be objected that it is at least possible that altruistic motives could be spandrels or
exaptations that affect behavior often and yet are negligibly selected for, because whatever traits
give rise to them are much more important. This possibility seems very unlikely because it
implies that altruistically motivated actions would not have a major effect on fitness. But, even if
this possibility were as likely as anything else, it would is just one possibility out many, and,
unless it is confirmed, evolutionary altruism remains important in case one of the many other
possibilities is true.
Finally, Stephen Jay Gould, a major critic of the ―Adaptationist programme,‖ which
assumes that natural selection explains almost all traits that organisms possess, still favors
natural selection over other evolutionary causes. He simply argues that non-selective
evolutionary processes are often very important as well. In a paper he co-authored with Richard
Lewontin entitled ―The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm: A Critique of the
Adaptationist Programme,‖ he says this:
Although Darwin regarded selection as the most important of evolutionary
mechanisms (as do we), no argument from opponents angered him more than the
common attempt to caricature and trivialize his theory by stating that it relied
exclusively upon natural selection. (Gould & Lewontin, 1979, p. 589) [Emphasis
mine]
This indicates that even Gould believed that natural selection was the primary impetus
behind evolution. Thus natural selection is a reasonable first guess when considering the
evolutionary source of an organism‘s traits, unless there is a reason to suspect that the trait in
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question is the product of non-selective evolutionary forces. Since it has not yet been concluded
whether or not altruistic motives even exist, much less that they are the type of traits one should
suspect to be the result of non-selective evolutionary forces, it is reasonable to proceed under the
assumption that, if altruistic motives exist at all, they are the product of natural selection.
5_5 The Relationship between Egoism, Hedonism, and Sober and Wilson‘s Evolutionary
Arguments for Psychological Altruism
The egoistic theory of motivation, according to Sober and Wilson, entails that ―Egoists
ultimately desire only what they think will be good for themselves‖ while altruists ―have ultimate
desires concerning what they think will be good for others‖ (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 230).
What this ―good‖ may be is left open, since it will vary with different people in different places
at different times. To act psychologically altruistically or egoistically, it is not necessary that the
actor have an objectively correct belief about what is good, but only that she has a sincere belief
about it.
Psychological hedonism, on the other hand, entails a definite conception of good,
although the actor might not be aware of it consciously. Under the theory of psychological
hedonism, the only things people ultimately care about are their own pleasures and pains. It bears
mentioning that the concepts of pleasure and pain hedonists employ are very broadly construed,
so as to include all sensations that are enjoyable or aversive (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 224). For
example, a feeling of guilt would be included under the hedonistic conception of pain, and a
feeling of satisfaction would be included as a pleasure. Psychological altruism is, of course,
incompatible with psychological hedonism as a theory which is taken to exclude all other
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psychological motivations.141 Thus an apparently altruistic behavior that is motivated by pleasure
or the anticipation of pleasure (or pain) alone, such as religious person giving to charity solely
because she thinks it will help her get into heaven, is not, in fact, altruistically motivated.
The distinctive property of psychological hedonism that Sober and Wilson identify is
that, ―it [hedonism] says that ultimate desires are always solipsistic. What we ultimately care
about is limited to the states of our own consciousness; what goes on outside of the mind is of
instrumental value only‖ (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 224). This kind of solipsism is compatible
with egoism, but not necessary for it. Reflecting back to the discussion of Nozick‘s experience
machine in chapter one, it became evident that a desire to survive would not be hedonistic, yet
would be egoistic nevertheless.
Yet, in spite of the distinction between psychological egoism and psychological
hedonism, Sober and Wilson focus their evolutionary arguments in a way which considers
―hedonism as the main competitor that the altruism hypothesis must confront‖ (Sober & Wilson,
1998, p. 297). They attempt to justify this claim by saying:
Defenders of egoism inevitably invoke the ultimate desire to attain pleasure and
avoid pain to save egoism from refutation. For example, if they maintain that
people are motivated exclusively by external rewards (such as money), it is easy
enough to describe behaviors that cannot be explained within that framework. In
order to avoid defeat, egoists then appeal to internal rewards to do the explanatory
work. (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 297)
Since defenders of psychological egoism must always incorporate psychological
hedonism as part of their theory, Sober and Wilson maintain that by going after psychological
141
Psychological altruism is not, however, incompatible with the very existence of psychologically hedonistic
motivations, which is why pluralism is possible.
220
hedonism they are confronting ―the version of egoism that is most difficult to refute‖ (Sober &
Wilson, 1998, p. 297). In a footnote on this point, Sober and Wilson acknowledge that, since
egoism has a wider scope than hedonism, egoism is harder to defeat than hedonism, but they then
say, ―our point is that hedonistic egoism is harder to refute than non-hedonistic egoism‖ (Sober
& Wilson, 1998, p. 359).
If what they say in their footnote is really what they mean, then going after hedonism
may not be enough. True, if hedonism were shown to be impossible, then no egoistic theory that
depends on hedonism can be true. However, it will not topple a theory of egoism that relies upon
hedonism if it is merely shown that hedonism cannot account for some behaviors. After all, the
behaviors that the hedonistic part of the egoistic theory cannot account for may very well be
explained by other non-hedonistic but still egoistic motives. So, for example, a theorist
supporting psychological egoism might hold that most actions people take are motivated by the
ultimate desire of gaining pleasure and avoiding pain, but some actions are motivated by an
ultimate desire to live, or an ultimate desire for true information, or any number of other
logically possible non-altruistic ultimate desires.142
Sober and Wilson claim that their ―argument against hedonism has more general
implications‖ and that, ―Hedonism exemplifies the kinds of evolutionary implausibility into
which egoism inevitably must fall‖ (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 297). However, this will only be
the case if their arguments can show that no egoistic ultimate desire can account for whatever
behavior or data that hedonism is incapable of handling. Developing an argument that disproves
pure psychological hedonism might be a significant accomplishment, but it does not by itself
Dake Jamieson also makes this point saying, ―Pluralistic Egoism, the view that ‗a wide variety of internal and
external cues …are relevantly connected to our fitness‘ would appear to be even more difficult to refute than HE.
Given the existence of such competitors, it is clear that the defeat of HE does not imply the true of PA‖ (Jamieson,
2002).
142
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entail a reason to dismiss all theories of psychological egoism that merely incorporate elements
of psychological hedonism.
5_6 Summary
A lot of ground has been covered in order to get to this point, and a brief review of the
conclusions made so far will help provide secure footing for the trek into the next chapter. In
chapter one, the psychological egoism and altruism debate was explained and examined. Though
there have been many different efforts to resolve this debate, some philosophical and some
empirical, the results have been inconclusive. For this reason, Sober and Wilson suggest a new
approach which utilizes evolutionary arguments to show that psychological altruism is more
likely to evolve than not.
Before moving on to arguments for psychologically altruistic motives, it seemed wise to
first understand how altruistic behaviors are possible. Chapter two described how, in spite of the
fact that it at first seems that natural selection would eliminate any evolutionarily altruistic
behaviors, one should expect that natural selection favors behavioral (evolutionary) altruism in
many circumstances. Chapter three continued this line of argument by pointing out that for
particular types of organisms, especially human beings, selection for evolutionarily altruistic
behavior is apt to be very strong indeed.
In chapter four, several more items of importance were revealed. Psychological
proximate mechanisms in the form of motives proved to be the key issue in the psychological
altruism and egoism debate. Chapter four also analyzed the nature of proximate mechanisms in
general and of motives in particular.
In this chapter, it was shown that the psychological and evolutionary concepts of altruism
and egoism are separable. In spite of this, very weak forms of psychological altruism are unlikely
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to satisfy defenders of the psychological altruism hypothesis. Using this fact, arguments can be
formed which loosely link the psychological and evolutionary concepts of altruism together
again for anyone who intends to argue in favor of a strong form of psychological altruism.
In the process of developing these arguments, evolutionary altruistic benefits and
altruistic benefits based on other conceptions of good turn out to be loosely related. Sometimes
this can be the result of the end-run effect. Finally, this chapter revealed that the evolutionary
arguments Sober and Wilson defend are largely aimed at hedonistic alternatives to psychological
altruism, although the authors seem to be mistakenly take themselves to be undermining egoistic
theories in general.
It is now time to scrutinize and evaluate the evolutionary arguments for psychological
altruism. This work will begin in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER VI:
EXPLANATION AND CRITICISM FOR SOBER AND WILSON‘S ASYMMETRY
BETWEEN DIRECT AND INDIRECT STRATEGIES ARGUMENT FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL
ALTRUISM
Chapters one through five have all been leading up to the presentation of Sober and
Wilson‘s evolutionary arguments for psychological altruism. Sober and Wilson develop two
primary arguments to support their claim that psychological altruism more likely evolved than
not. The first of these arguments is an argument from the principle of Asymmetry between Direct
and Indirect strategies (to be explained later in this chapter), and the second is an argument from
the Two are Better than One principle. This chapter will focus exclusively on explaining and
criticizing Sober and Wilson‘s argument from Asymmetry between Direct and Indirect
strategies. The next chapter will attempt to do the same thing for their argument from the Two
Are Better than One principle.
This chapter has three primary goals. The first is to explain Sober and Wilson‘s argument
from the Asymmetry between Direct and Indirect strategies principle and put it into the
framework of motivational pluralism. The second is to show that the argument is flawed, and
defend this view from possible counterarguments. The third is to show that there is reason to
suspect that psychological egoism is more likely to evolve than psychological altruism as Sober
and Wilson define it. The hope is that this third goal will be accomplished during the rebuttal
phase. Of course, all three of these goals are constrained to the argument from Asymmetry
between Direct and Indirect Strategies, and do not take into account the Two are Better than One
argument.
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6_1 The Evolutionary Framework for the Psychological Altruism/Egoism Debate
As was shown in chapter one, psychological experimentation and philosophical
arguments, as they stand now, have failed to resolve the psychological altruism vs. egoism
debate. An examination of the debate in chapter four revealed that the source of disagreement
between the theory of psychological altruism and that of psychological egoism concerns motives.
The theory of psychological altruism holds that motives (belief-desire pairs) that partially consist
of other-regarding ultimate desires exist. Psychological egoistic theories deny this claim. Sober
and Wilson believe that, by viewing motives in an evolutionary context, a type of argument
becomes available that can gain traction on the psychological egoism/altruism debate where
previous types of arguments have failed.
This new hope of finding a solution arises from the notion that our motivations are an
evolutionary adaptation molded by natural selection. As such, motivations are like any other
adaptation and it may be possible to explain them using the theory of natural selection combined
with the relevant information about the organism to which the adaptation belongs. Sober and
Wilson say ―[their] strategy is to shift the focus from behavioral effects to evolutionary causes‖
(Sober &Wilson, 1998, p. 298). Providing a simple visual guide for their model, they produce the
diagram that has been replicated below (Sober, 1998, p. 298):
Evolution  Motives  Behavior
This structure simply represents the idea that evolutionary forces lead to the evolution of
motives as psychological proximate mechanisms for a particular type of adaptive behavior. How
can this framework help solve the egoism vs. altruism debate? When trying to explain a feature
of an organism, especially one that would seem to have a significant fitness effect, evolutionary
biologists use information available about the way the organism in question lives, its historical
225
environmental conditions, as well as other tools to produce an evolutionary scenario that is often
capable of explaining why a particular feature evolved. The plausibility of such stories can vary
greatly depending on how many reasonable evolutionary explanations are available, how
plausible non-adaptive explanations for the given feature are, and how much information
evolutionary scientists have about the history of an organism, its ancestors, its historical
environment, its way of life, and the apparent function of the adaptation in question.143 Placing
altruistic and egoistic motives into this kind of evolutionary framework allows one to ask the
same kinds of questions about these apparently adaptive mechanisms for behavior that one
would ask when studying other adaptive features of an organism.
If a trait, or the proximate mechanism that leads to a trait, is a structure which we can
currently understand, it can be understood through physical examination. Given an up to date
understanding of the biological, chemical, and physical sciences, many biological mechanisms,
once discovered, can be dissected and the mechanism that gives rise to its functional properties
can be understood. However, in cases where the trait is a psychological mechanism things
become a little bit more difficult. Neurology has taken great strides forward in the last decade,
but the science is still young. It is difficult to understand psychological motivations through
biological examination when brain science has not yet progressed to the point where one even
knows how to narrow down a limited set of neurons that are responsible for a particular desire or
belief, much less explain the functional role of each neuron in the network. This makes the task
143
Sometimes these evolutionary stories are criticized on the grounds that they assume that a feature is an adaptation
when it could be a spandrel or the result of genetic drift or other historical or structural accidents. Gould and
Lewontin make such criticisms in their paper ―The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian paradigm‖ (592596). Nevertheless even Gould and Lewontin‘s criticisms do not condemn adaptationist explanations, but only the
fact that other possibilities are often ignored or downplayed by adaptationists for no good reason (Gould, 1979 #40
p. 523-524). However, if Sober and Wilson have made their case that cooperative behavior can be evolutionarily
advantageous even at the group level and even when they involve a within-group loss of fitness, and if they have
adequately shown that cooperation is especially important for creatures like us, the notion that these behaviors are in
fact adaptations becomes at least reasonably strong.
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of developing an accurate evolutionary story about how a particular type of motive came to be
more difficult than a similar evolutionary story about how an eye or a kidney might have
developed.
In spite of this, it is possible that evolutionary arguments can make progress where
progress seemed impossible before. If one accepts the arguments Sober and Wilson gave when
they claimed that evolutionary altruistic behaviors are likely to be especially beneficial for
creatures like us (see chapter three), then, given the principles of evolution, there may be grounds
for supposing that one type of psychological proximate mechanism is more likely to be favored
by natural selection than another (or even that there is selection for both types). Sober and
Wilson are pluralists, and so argue that human beings have both altruistic and egoistic motives.
They further argue that selection pressure is such that we should expect altruistic motives to have
developed on top of already existing egoistic motivations. Physical confirmation of this fact
would be at present difficult or impossible for the reasons mentioned in the previous paragraph,
but Sober and Wilson believe that they can provide evolutionary arguments that show that it is
more probable that altruistic motivations evolved than not.
6_2 Two Analogous Examples and Five Evolutionary Considerations
In chapter ten of their book Unto Others, Sober and Wilson draw an analogy between two
types of behavior, each of which could be caused by two different types of proximate
mechanisms. The first example is that of an anaerobic marine bacterium. It is vital to the fitness
of this creature that it behave in such a way as to avoid oxygen. But what sort of proximate
mechanism might best do the job? Sober and Wilson discuss two possibilities. One possible
proximate mechanism is an oxygen detector that causes the bacterium to flee when oxygen is
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present. They label this type of mechanism a direct mechanism because it responds to the fitness
relevant environmental feature (oxygen) directly (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 207 & 304-306).
An alternative evolutionary strategy is that the organism might develop a more indirect
method of avoiding oxygen, whereby it senses something that is highly correlated with the
presence of oxygen and uses this information to avoid oxygen without directly detecting
oxygen.144 The example mechanism Sober and Wilson describe for the bacterium is that of a
magnetosome which is capable of sensing the magnetic field of the earth. The bacterium could
then use this information to determine its depth, and if it is too close to the surface (where
oxygen content is high), it will swim to deeper waters.
Sober and Wilson then point out that, for psychological mechanisms, too, there may be
both direct and indirect methods of attaining a fitness-enhancing end. The example they use is
that of human parental care for their offspring. Sober and Wilson suggest that understanding why
natural selection may favor a particular physical proximate mechanism for a marine bacterium
(oxygen detectors, magnetosomes, or both) may give us some of the insight required to
understand which psychological proximate mechanism is more likely to evolve for the case of
parental care (altruistic motives, egoistic motives, or both) (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 305).145
Sober and Wilson say:
How might the desires that parents have be arranged so as to produce caring
behavior? A relatively direct solution to the design problem would be for parents
to be psychological altruists—let them care about the well-being of their children
as an end in itself. A more indirect solution would be for parents to be
144
There is, of course, the possibility that both mechanisms may be present and active within a single organism. This
possibility will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.
145
Sober and Wilson do not specifically say that they are using an analogy, but they use the principles they derive
from the bacterium example for their arguments about human parental care and altruism (Sober, 1998 #1, p. 304327).
228
psychological hedonists—let them care only about attaining pleasure and
avoiding pain, but let them be so constituted that they feel good when their
children do well and feel bad when their children do ill. And of course, there is a
pluralistic solution to consider as well—let parents have altruistic and hedonistic
ultimate motives, both of which motivate them to take care of their children.
(Sober, 1998, p. 305)
The analogy between the oxygen-avoiding behavior of the anaerobic bacteria and the
caring behavior of a human parent is useful. If the analogy holds, then one can examine the
nature of magnetosomes and oxygen detectors in relation to their function in anaerobic marine
bacteria, and from what is learned about these physical mechanisms then try to extract
evolutionary principles that will hold true for psychological mechanisms as well.146 This process
may help to determine what type of psychological proximate mechanism is most likely to have
developed to insure particular behaviors of human beings.
One might suspect that direct proximate mechanisms are always better because they
detect conditions more directly correlated with fitness than indirect ones. To use the bacterium as
an example, the detection of oxygen always means that oxygen is present, but detection of
deeper water depth is only imperfectly correlated with the absence of oxygen. Therefore, it
would appear as though oxygen detectors would be the better evolutionary solution to the
problem of avoiding oxygen. The situation isn‘t that simple, however. Though it may seem at
first glance that direct mechanisms are always superior to indirect ones, this is not necessarily the
146
This is not to deny that neurology is a physical science and can potentially explain all of human behavior
physically. But the fact is that, given the current state of neurology, it is not yet possible to talk about the functional
neural networks behind the psychological concepts of beliefs, desires, ultimate desires, benevolent desires, and selfregarding vs. other-regarding ultimate desires, in a very meaningful way. For this reason, it is easier to talk about
―psychological mechanisms‖ rather than ―neural mechanisms.‖ But the hope is, of course, that as neurology
progresses, the knowledge required for a lower level discussion will become available.
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case for the simple reason that other evolutionary considerations can get in the way. Sober and
Wilson list three important considerations that influence what type of proximate mechanism will
most likely evolve via natural selection.
The first of these considerations is that of availability. Though adaptations can be viewed
as solutions to fitness problems, natural selection, being teleology free, does not actively or
intelligently seek out or design any such solutions. Natural selection is simply the tendency for
organisms that are most fit to survive and reproduce over those that are less fit. Therefore,
evolution through natural selection can occur only when there is variation for it to work upon,
and, of course, that variation must be inheritable. If all members of a group were phenotypically
identical, natural selection could not influence the evolution of members of that group. This is
why it was so important to show how particular processes can increase the amount of variation
between groups when arguing for group selection in chapter two and chapter three. Without
variation between groups, group selection cannot occur. Without variation between individuals,
individual selection cannot occur.
What all this means is that natural selection cannot favor oxygen detectors over
magnetosomes if oxygen detectors are not present in the population (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p.
305). Of course an oxygen detector need not appear in its entirety if the necessary elements to
produce one were gradually introduced and individually fitness enhancing enough to be selected
for because of other benefits. That is to say that an oxygen detector could (and almost certainly
would) develop in a slow step-by-step process with each step enhancing fitness. If few of the
elements required to generate an oxygen detector are present but many of those required for a
magnetosome are already incorporated in the organism, then a magnetosome might be an easier
and more likely adaptation than an oxygen detector. Another way that availability can affect the
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likelihood of one mechanism evolving over another, is if an organism‘s environment changes, or
if an organism changes in some way internally, that result in a particular trait becoming adaptive
in a new way. Perhaps a bacterium had a magnetosome for other reasons and then evolved in
such a way as to become less tolerant of oxygen. In such a case a primitive magnetosome might
become exapted and fine tuned for a different use. Examples of exaptation are not rare in
evolutionary biology. As just one example, the first stage in the evolution of scales to feathers is
thought to be the result of selection for particular thermoregulatory properties of scales, even
though scales did not originally evolve to serve a thermoregulatory function (Ahouse, 1998).
A second condition that needs to be considered that can affect the probability of one
adaptive mechanism evolving over another is the reliability of that mechanism. Suppose some
anaerobic bacteria have magnetosomes that always work and some have oxygen detectors that
work only half the time. Further suppose that everything else about these bacteria remain equal
and that they are competing with each other in the same environment. In such circumstances, the
bacteria with the magnetosomes would have a fitness advantage over those with the oxygen
detectors so long as the correlation between water depth and lethal amounts of oxygen is greater
than 50%.147
The third consideration Sober and Wilson consider is that of energetic efficiency (Sober
& Wilson, 1998, p. 308). Proximate mechanisms require energy both to develop and to operate.
If magnetosomes are cheaper in terms of energy to develop or function then magnetosomes
might have a selective advantage over oxygen detectors even if an oxygen detector would
marginally improve a bacterium‘s chances of avoiding oxygen.
Note that ―reliability‖ in this case refers to the reliability of the mechanism, not the correlation between what the
mechanism detects or predicts and its correlation (whether direct or indirect) to fitness.
147
231
To Sober and Wilson‘s three considerations, a fourth and fifth can be added. The fourth
condition is that of time efficiency. One mechanism is more time efficient than another if it
executes more quickly. In the same way that a match is a more time efficient way to light a fire
than flint and steel, one biological mechanism may be more time efficient than another. To help
understand the fourth condition, consider that magnetosomes do not need to wait for oxygen to
be present to prod the anaerobic bacterium to swim downwards. The organism instead swims
downwards whenever it gets too close to the surface. An oxygen detector, however, actually
needs to come into contact with oxygen before it can entice the organism to retreat. In this case,
time efficiency may favor the magnetosome even further if the organism can use it to keep itself
at a buffered distance between itself and oxygen-rich waters. In such a case, the marine organism
can begin swimming downwards before reaching oxygen rich territory. If the fitness advantage
resulting from greater time efficiency is strong enough, natural selection may favor a less reliable
mechanism over a more reliable one.
Finally pleiotropic fitness effects of mechanisms may advantage or disadvantage an
adaptive mechanism that is otherwise equal in relation to its potential competitors. In all fairness,
Sober and Wilson do refer to ―other fitness effects‖ when talking about energetic efficiency, but
then they proceed to only discuss energy efficiency and not the numerous types of other fitness
effects that a proximate mechanism may have on a particular organism (Sober, 1998, p. 307). For
example, suppose that a magnetosome doesn‘t work quite as well as an oxygen detector, but that
the genes that cause the magnetosome to develop also have another fitness enhancing effect,
such as the production of a protein that is disagreeable to predators. In such a case, the oxygen
detector may be more readily available and more reliable and even more efficient but still
provide a smaller fitness advantage total than the magnetosome.
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Thus there are at least five major considerations that need to be taken into account when
trying to determine which of a number of possible proximate mechanisms is more fitness
enhancing and therefore more likely to evolve: availability, reliability, energetic efficiency, time
efficiency, and accidental fitness effects.148
6_3 Two Evolutionary Principles
In spite of the considerations previously mentioned, Sober and Wilson believe that there
are two situations in which direct proximate mechanisms have a selective advantage over
indirect ones. Each situation represents an evolutionary principle that is relevant to determining
whether evolutionary altruism or egoism (or both) are likely to evolve for beings such as
ourselves. The first of these principles, which is to be covered in this chapter, is the principle of
Asymmetry between Direct and Indirect Strategies. The second principle, which is to be covered
in the next chapter, is the Two are Better than One principle.
6_3.1 Direct/Indirect Asymmetry
As a lead-in to their first principle, Sober and Wilson make use of the anaerobic
bacterium and consider whether oxygen detectors or magnetosomes are more likely to evolve. To
help the reader visualize the two possibilities, they create the diagram duplicated below (Sober &
Wilson, 1998, p. 306):
148
There are almost certainly more considerations than thus, but these should be sufficient for the task at hand.
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In this chart the single arrows represent causation and the double arrows correlation. Thus
oxygen level is correlated with fitness, and elevation is correlated with oxygen level. The ―D‖
and ―I‖ represent more direct and more indirect proximate mechanisms. In this example, the
direct proximate mechanism would be an oxygen detector and the indirect proximate mechanism
would be a magnetosome used to detect elevation. Sober and Wilson argue (Sober & Wilson,
1998, p. 306) that if we assume that availability, reliability, and energetic efficiency are
equivalent for both oxygen detectors and magnetosomes then:149
D will be a more reliable guide than I concerning which behaviors are fitnessenhancing, if D detects oxygen at least as well as I detects elevation and oxygen
and elevation are less than perfectly correlated. (Sober, 1998 #1, p. 306)
To generalize this argument so that it is not restricted to magnetosomes and oxygen
detectors, label whatever fitness factor the more direct mechanism responds to FF (fitness
factor). This would be oxygen in the case of the anaerobic bacterium. Also label whatever
indirect factor the more-indirect mechanism responds to IF (indirect factor). Assume that factor
IF is only relevant to fitness indirectly as a result of its correlation with FF. IF would be water
depth in the case of the anaerobic bacterium and FF would be presence of oxygen. By replacing
149
Only the first three conditions are listed here because these are the only three that Sober and Wilson make note
of, but time efficiency and accidental fitness effects are, of course, relevant here as well.
234
the specifics of the anaerobic bacterium case with variables, it becomes evident that the D/I
asymmetry principle is applicable whenever a more direct mechanism works at least as well at
responding to FF as a more-indirect mechanism works at responding to IF so long as the
correlation between IF and FF is less than perfect.
As long as all the proper premises are acknowledged, the D/I asymmetry principle
follows as a straight forward deduction. We can see this in the form of an equation. Let C
represent the percentage of correlation with whatever it is that the indirect mechanism is
detecting and whatever fitness relevant factor the direct mechanism is detecting. In addition let F
represent the amount of average fitness gained by performing a functional action when whatever
it is that the direct mechanism detects is present. Given these variables, the average fitness
accumulated each time the direct mechanism is (appropriately) activated is F while the average
fitness provided when the indirect mechanism activates appropriately is C * F. The D/I principle
simply states that F > C * F, which must be true so long as C and F are positive numbers and C is
a number between 0 and 1.
Since F represents a fitness benefit, F must be positive. Since C is a non-perfect
correlation of the fitness relevant factor that the direct mechanism detects to the factor that the
indirect mechanism detects this number must be between -1 and 1. Since responding to the direct
mechanisms is stipulated to enhance fitness, C must be a non-zero number less than 1. Thus F
must be greater than C * F.
It remains important to remember, however, that the five considerations mentioned in the
previous section can nullify the principle of D/I asymmetry if they do not apply equally to both
mechanisms. Nevertheless, all other things being equal, the principle of D/I asymmetry is indeed
sound.
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6_4 Pluralism
Sober and Wilson are pluralists when it comes to ultimate desires. They believe that
hedonistic ultimate desires exist and that altruistic ultimate desires exist. They point out that
there are two forms of pluralism consistent with this belief. The first form, which shall be called
uni-causal pluralism,150 is the case when, in Sober and Wilson‘s own words, ―some of the
actions the organism performs are caused solely by altruistic ultimate motives, while others are
caused just by egoistic ultimate motives‖ (Sober, 1998, p. 308). As an example, Sober and
Wilson describe an organism that avoids snakes solely because of egoistic ultimate desires but
helps its children only because of altruistic ultimate desires.
The second form pluralism, which shall be called poly-causal pluralism, occurs if some
of an organism‘s actions are caused by both altruistic and egoistic ultimate motives (Sober &
Wilson, 1998, p. 308). Sober and Wilson illustrate this possibility with an example of an
organism that takes care of its children both because doing so causes it pleasure and because it
has an altruistic ultimate desire to do so (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 308).
Sober and Wilson believe that it is important to distinguish between these two types of
pluralism because:
With respect to [uni-causal pluralism], we need to ask if an organism might
evolve that has some of its behaviors regulated, not by pleasure and pain, but just
by an altruistic ultimate motive. With respect to [poly-causal pluralism], we need
to ask if an organism might evolve that regulates some types of behavior by
having two ultimate motives, rather than just one. [uni-causal pluralism] restricts
the scope of hedonistic ultimate desires and substitutes an altruistic ultimate
Sober and Wilson refer to these two different types of pluralism as ―the first type‖ and type-two (Sober &
Wilson, 1998, p. 319). I preferred to give them names for the same of clearer references.
150
236
desire as the sole control device for a certain kind of behavior; [poly-causal
pluralism] supplements the hedonistic desires that are universally present with an
altruistic ultimate motive. (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 308-309)
Sober and Wilson give arguments that selection would favor the development of
psychological altruism, as opposed to egoism alone, for each type of pluralism.
6_5 The Principle of Pre-Established Hedonism
Before moving on to Sober and Wilson‘s arguments for psychological altruism from the
Asymmetry between Direct and Indirect Strategies principle, a short digression into the question
of whether or not psychologically hedonistic mechanisms had a chance to evolve long before
psychologically altruistic mechanisms became possible will prove valuable. If psychologically
hedonism had a chance to become deeply rooted before psychologically altruistic mechanisms
were ever a possibility, then it would be that much harder for psychologically altruistic
mechanisms to develop. This is because new psychologically altruistic mechanisms would have
to be introduced at a level in which they can compete with psychologically hedonistic
mechanisms which have had millions of years to be honed through natural selection. Further, if
psychologically hedonistic mechanisms were present long before psychologically altruistic ones,
psychologically hedonistic mechanisms would become more and more deeply rooted and other
brain systems would develop which may interact with and even become dependent upon them.
It is worth recapping that Sober and Wilson define psychologically altruistic motivations
as motivations that contain a benevolent other-regarding ultimate desire. Since Sober and Wilson
see motivations as desire/belief pairs, psychologically altruistic motivations must contain beliefs
of the relevant sort. Sober and Wilson characterize psychological altruism as follows:
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The altruism hypothesis says that we have other-directed ultimate desires,
whereas psychological egoism says that all of our ultimate desires are selfdirected. But egoism and altruism are usually understood to involve more than
this. For example, if Iago views the destruction of Othello as an end in itself, then
one of Iago‘s ultimate aims is other-directed. Nonetheless, it would be odd to call
Iago an altruist, since his other-directed desire is malevolent. … This is why our
definitions of egoism and altruism go beyond the distinction between self-directed
and other-directed ultimate desires … altruist have ultimate desires concerning
what they think will be good for others. (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 229-230)
[Emphasis mine]
In other words, not all other-regarding desires are altruistic. Such desires are only
altruistic if they are benevolent as well. The term ―benevolent‖ here refers to intentions since this
is what characterizes psychological altruism over behavioral and evolutionary altruism. Given
this, it is rather odd that Sober and Wilson say the following on the very same page:
But consider people who care irreducibly about ―the environment,‖ meaning the
well-being of the entire earth (both living and nonliving). Is this altruism? And
what about people who care about a nation, a religion, an ethnic group, or a
cultural tradition, not just as a means but as ends in themselves? True, such
concerns sometimes count as ―selfless.‖ But are they altruistic? Although we will
concentrate on the altruistic regard that human beings may have for other human
beings, there is no reason to rule out these other candidates. (Sober, 1998 #1, p.
229)
238
Sober and Wilson include in their above list people who care irreducibly about non-living
things in the environment.151 However, this seems to go against the definition presented when
Sober and Wilson say ―altruist have ultimate desires concerning what they think will be good for
others.‖ Suppose, for example, that a person cared irreducibly about a rock. What is good for a
rock? Is it better for it to be polished than rough? Better to be clean than dirty? Better to be
turned into a work of art than to remain unchanged? Better to exist than not to exist? Since the
rock has no interests of its own, all of these suggestions are equally futile. An ultimate desire to
take care of a rock, even though it is non-egoistic, could only count as altruistic if the person who
had the desire also had the mistaken belief that rocks have some sort of ―wellbeing‖ of their
own.152
Even if one argues that the person in this case values the existence of rocks ultimately, it
is still hard to see how this attitude is altruistic any more than a person who values the existence
of sorrow ultimately. If such a person spends her life trying to make people miserable because
she cares irreducibly about sorrow, one would hardly call her altruistic. Further this is not merely
a result of the fact that her ultimate desire for increased sorrow harms others, for in that case one
would want to say that she is altruistic towards sorrow, but not towards the beings she makes
sorrowful. Or instead suppose she had an ultimate desire for yellowness and was dedicated to
going around town and painting things yellow. If the existence of yellow things is an ultimate
On the same page Sober and Wilson say, ―We are prepared to be quite liberal concerning what might count as an
‗individual.‘ This decision won‘t affect the main arguments we will advance in what follows; readers are invited to
construe altruism more narrowly if they so wish.‖ For the reasons to be given, I will take Sober and Wilson up on
their offer to construe the individuals that one can be benevolent towards (without a mistaken belief) as entities that
have individual interests.
152
One might suggest that it is somehow better for a rock to exist than not to exist, because, if it didn‘t exist, there
would be no rock. But, this preference for existence can only be a preference of the agent and not the rock itself.
What is more, in concerning the welfare of other beings one does not always believe that continued existence is in
their best interests. An irreversibly wounded animal might be shot or euthanized as an act of mercy, for example. A
human being may wish to die rather than live on in incurable pain, and view death as being in her best interests.
There is no reason to assume a priori that unaltered existence is ―wellbeing‖ for the rock. Indeed, unless one
mistakenly attributes independent interests to the rock, the question ―What is in a rock‘s best interest?‖ is absurd.
151
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desire, then her desire isn‘t self directed. Nevertheless, the color yellow (or yellow objects) are
not ―others‖ in any sense relevant psychological altruism. Yellow objects may be other things
separate from the desirer, but they are not the sort of things one can have a benevolent attitude
towards except through a mistaken belief that yellow objects have interests.
The fact that an organism must attribute interests to a thing in order to have an altruistic
attitude towards it implies that there are several requirements that must be fulfilled in order for
an organism to have psychologically altruistic motivations. At minimum these requirements are:
1. The organism must be capable of forming beliefs.
2. The organism must have a conception of itself as separate from its
environment (or else ―other directed‖ would be meaningless in terms of
benevolence).
3. The organism must be capable of conceiving that at least some other
organisms (either of their own species or others) are beings separate from
themselves.153
4. The organism must be capable of realizing that at least some of the beings it
recognizes have interests independent of its own. This implies that the agent is
aware of its own interests as well.
5. To effectively act to benefit a separate organism, the psychologically altruistic
organism must also be capable of perspective taking, meaning that it must be
capable of reasoning as if through another‘s perspective. 154
153
An organism could mistakenly believe that this is true for some objects instead of some organisms. In it unlikely
that such a mistake would be actively selected for, however. Either way, the organism must be capable of conceiving
of others as others.
154
It is important to understand that, while perspective taking can be extremely useful for a psychological hedonist
and may even be necessary for a psychological hedonism to accomplish some things, it is required for
psychologically altruistic mechanisms to be effective.
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6. Finally, an organism must have altruistic desires in order to have altruistic
motivations. It will be assumed arguendo that if conditions 1-5 are met then
altruistic desires become available.
All this is to say that an organism must have a theory of mind in order to be motivated by
psychologically altruistic mechanisms. The term ―theory of mind‖ is not meant to be understood
as abstract theorizing on the part of an organism about other organisms. An animal has a theory
of mind just in case it can represent the mental states of others. This seems to be consistent with
Sober and Wilson‘s view when they say, ―The act of helping others does not count as
(psychologically) altruistic unless the actor thinks of the welfare of others as an ultimate goal‖
[emphasis mine] (Sober & Wilson, 1998).
Though there is no current method available for detecting subjective experiences in
others directly, one can attempt to determine whether or not some animals can represent the
mental states of others by observing how they behave in both natural and experimental settings.
Richard Byrne, in his book The Thinking Ape, says the following:
Certainly as humans we can never hope to know much about the private minds of
other species; we will never know what it would be like to be an ape or a lizard.
However, we can ask whether animals, like us, treat other individuals as if
they have mental states, because if they do so, it would make an observable
difference to their behaviour. Any animal that did act as if other individuals have
mental states would then be said to have a theory of mind. (Byrne, 1995, p. 100)
Given that a theory of mind requirement is necessary for psychologically altruistic
mechanisms, it is perhaps possible to determine whether psychologically hedonistic mechanisms
had a chance to evolve before psychologically altruistic ones based upon whether or not ancestral
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organisms likely had a theory of other minds significantly before or after all the requirements for
psychologically hedonistic mechanisms were met. This same analysis might also help to
determine whether or not there would have been a considerable time lag (in evolutionary terms)
between the availability of psychologically hedonistic and psychologically altruistic
mechanisms.
To attempt to answer this question, it will also be necessary to consider what
prerequisites are necessary for psychologically hedonistic mechanisms to evolve as well. If it
turned out to be the case that psychologically hedonistic mechanisms require cognitive abilities
that psychologically altruistic mechanisms do not, then it would be possible that psychologically
altruistic mechanisms had the opportunity to evolve first, depending upon when those abilities
became available historically. As it turns out, however, it seems that all the elements required for
psychologically hedonistic mechanisms to evolve are required for psychologically altruistic
mechanisms as well. I propose that psychologically hedonistic mechanisms require that an
organism be able to:
1. Have beliefs.
2. Have subjective experiences as independent from other environmental factors.
3. Have hedonistic ultimate desires regarding those experiences.
It should be noted here that the second requirement need not include a robust sense of
self, such as a theoretical concept of ―I‖ as distinct from other minds. The organism merely has
to have some sort of unified conscious awareness for the propositional contents of its beliefs and
desires to reference. If an organism consciously feels hunger and desires to eat, or feels pain and
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desires to avoid that pain, these desires are self-directed so long as the organism can distinguish
its own desires from other environmental conditions.155
Thus, a psychologically hedonistic organism can get by with a less than robust concept of
self. The mere fact that a hedonistic organism can consciously form (and decide to act on)
instrumental desires (based on an ultimate hedonistic desire) indicates it realizes on some level
that there is possible state of affairs which, if made true, will satisfy its desire—and this entails
that the organism has some sense of its own conscious desires which is, at the very least,
independent of the conditions required to satisfy them.
These same abilities are not sufficient for a psychologically altruistic organism however.
A benevolent other-regarding desire requires that an organism be capable of recognizing that
other organisms have interests, and this requires a theory of mind concerning other organisms.
In fact, there are three such requirements. First, a psychologically altruistic organism
must be capable of understanding that (at least some) other organisms are beings separate from
itself (as opposed to mere objects). Second, such an organism must be capable of realizing that at
least some of the beings it can discern in the environment have interests other than its own.156
Third, a psychologically altruistic organism must be able to ―perspective take‖ in order to be
effective at intentionally performing actions that benefit others. Though it is conditional upon
effectiveness, this additional requirement is necessary since it is assumed that being effective at
As for a more robust sense of ―I‖, Richard Byrne says the following in his book The Thinking Ape:
A concept of self might be acquired by learning first that mental states are useful concepts in
predicting the behavior of others; then, by taking the other‘s point of view, the self, too, is viewed
as having similar mental attributes. Or, an intuitive understanding of self may come first, and later
the individual finds it is useful to attribute similar mental states to others—the better to understand
their mind and behavior… (Byrne, 1995 #45, p. 117)
156
Even otherwise identical organisms do not always share the same desires at any given moment.
155
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performing altruistic actions (based on altruistic desires) is what would have to drive selection in
favor of altruistic motives in the first place.157
Of course, the mere fact that psychologically altruistic mechanisms have availability
requirements in addition to the requirements for psychologically hedonistic mechanisms (while
the reverse isn‘t true) is not sufficient to show psychologically hedonistic mechanisms must have
become available first. If the additional requirements necessary for psychologically altruistic
mechanisms evolved earlier or at the same time as the requirements for psychologically
hedonistic mechanisms, then both psychologically altruistic and hedonistic mechanisms might
have become available at the same time. Additionally, if the requirements for psychologically
altruistic mechanisms become available soon after he mechanisms for psychologically hedonistic
mechanisms became available, the order of appearance might not be evolutionarily significant.
At good way to determine which of these possibilities is the case is to look for any
empirical evidence that may show that the requirements necessary for psychologically altruistic
mechanisms have a phylogeny (relative to human beings) that does not go as deep as the
phylogeny (relative to human beings) for the jointly held requirements for both psychologically
altruistic and psychologically hedonistic mechanisms.
One place to look for this evidence is in an organism‘s ability to perspective take. The
ability of an organism to perspective take is an important sign that the organism realizes that
other organisms have interests different from its own, and this itself entails that the organism also
recognizes the existence of others. Since the ability to perspective take entails all of the nonshared requirements for psychologically altruistic mechanisms, gaining a rough idea of when this
157
It is theoretically possible that an organism could evolve that recognizes other organisms, understands that they
have interests, and instinctively knows what will benefit them. However, given the level of brain development
required for the first two capabilities combined with the fact that a theory of mind would likely only evolve for
organisms that lived in a dynamic social environments, this seems an unlikely possibility.
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capability evolved could provide a useful estimation of when all the prerequisites for
psychologically altruistic mechanisms could have been met historically.
Doug Jones, in his article Evolutionary Psychology, says:
Representations of the perceptions of others probably have a deep phylogeny.
Many accounts of monkeys in the wild suggest that in some cases, A can take into
account that what B sees is different from what she sees and can use this
knowledge in tactical deception, which must involve reckoning about lines of
sight… (Jones, 1999 #44, p. 563-564)
Of course the phrase ―deep phylogeny‖ expresses a relation that is relative to some point
of comparison. Compared to chimpanzees, monkeys have a deeper phylogeny with respect to
human beings. But compared to early mammals, or marsupials, or reptiles, the phylogeny of
monkeys compared to humans is relatively shallow. Thus, if one could find evidence that
suggests that the requirements of psychological hedonism were met for organisms with a
significantly deeper phylogeny (compared to humans) than monkeys, this would strongly suggest
that psychologically hedonistic mechanisms had a chance to evolve and optimize through natural
selection before psychologically altruistic motives ever became a possibility.
Further, the claim that certain monkeys, such as Barbary Macaques, have the ability to
perspective take in such a way that implies a theory of other minds is probably too generous.
Several studies seem to indicate that only chimpanzees can engage in this type of behavior with
any reliability at all, and that some of the great apes are sporadically capable of perspective
taking.
For example, an experiment conducted by Daniel Povinelli placed one chimpanzee in an
environment such that it could see which of two levers released food awards, but could not reach
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the handle itself. In order to receive the food rewards this chimpanzee had to communicate which
handle to pull to a second chimpanzee which could reach the handles but could not see which
handle would release the food reward. According to Byrne:
Chimpanzees succeeded in learning either role. More importantly, they were ablewithout further training—to assume the other‘s role when they were reversed.
Monkeys, by contrast, showed no such immediate comprehension of their new
role (Povinelli et al. 1992b). The chimpanzees‘ performance implies that they
understand the logical organization of the (joint) task, including co-ordination of
the two roles—a similar sort of insight into behavioral organization to that
involved in program-level imitation. What is more, it strongly suggests that they
understand what the other needs to know in order to succeed—hinting that
chimpanzees can represent the knowledge of other individuals. (Byrne, 1995, p.
106-107)
Byrne also points out that this role-switching ability might also indicate that chimpanzees
can understand intentions (Byrne, 1995, p. 109). Understanding that others have separate
intentions from oneself is not the same as, but is closely related to, understanding that others
have (separate) desires of their own, and this, of course, is necessary for the development of
psychological altruism.
In another experiment conducted by Povinelli, a caged chimpanzee was able to make
drink requests of two persons. The chimpanzee was denied access to the drink in two engineered
circumstances. In one of these circumstances, the chimpanzee did not get its drink because the
assistant ―accidentally‖ tripped and spilled it. On a different occasion, a different assistant
deliberately poured the drink onto the ground where the chimpanzee could see. According to
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Byrne, ―Afterward, the animal consistently chose the ‗clumsy‘ person for its drink requests
(Povinelli 1991)‖ (Byrne, 1995, p. 111).
Byrne points out that this experiment was not perfect since there was only one subject. In
spite of this however, he says that, ―the balance of evidence at present would credit the
chimpanzee with an ability to judge intentions and needs—at least in human experiments, and so
presumably of other chimpanzees in nature‖ (Byrne, 1995, p. 111).
On a generous reading of this data, it would seem that the requirements for
psychologically altruistic mechanisms to develop, assuming that they are both possible and that
they became available at all, could have appeared for animals with brains approximately as
sophisticated as a chimpanzee‘s.158
More evidence that the prerequisites for psychologically altruistic mechanisms are recent
evolutionary adaptations comes from studies of child development. Usually a child is unable to
distinguish between the knowledge that she possesses and that which another person possesses
until the age of four (Brune, 2006, p. 445).159
An extremely generous interpretation of all this data might allow that the common
ancestor of humans and chimpanzees possessed a theory of mind. DNA evidence suggests that
such an ancestor existed less than 6 million years ago (―News Release,‖ 2006 ). Though this is
probably the more accurate marker of when the prerequisites for psychologically altruistic
158
It should be noted that it could be the case that the requirements for psychologically altruistic mechanisms to be
available are still not satisfied. The requirements being investigated in this section represents generous bare
minimum requirements for the availability of psychologically altruistic mechanisms. There is no guarantee that
psychologically altruistic mechanisms would have become available even if these conditions are met.
159
The following describes the test used:
The classic ‗Sally-and-Anne-Test (Wimmer and Perner, 1983) creates a situation in which a test
person has to distinguish his or her own knowledge that an object has been hidden by one
character (Anne) in the absence of another person (Sally) from the knowledge of the other
characters involved. The crucial question is where Sally would look for the object when she
returned: The location it was before she left the scene, or the place where Anne had moved it.
Children under the age of four usually perform quite poorly on this test. The cognitive capacity to
pass the test requires the ability to ‗metarepresent‘ Sally‘s mental state… (Brune, 2006, p. 445)
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mechanisms were met, let‘s give objectors the benefit of the doubt and say that monkeys possess
all the necessary prerequisites. Though the earliest monkeys were much more primitive than
those used in the noted experiments, the most primitive old-world monkeys first appeared on the
planet roughly 30 million years ago. If this is the point in time that the prerequisites for
psychological altruism were met, the next question to ask is whether the requirements for
psychologically hedonistic mechanisms were present before this, and, if so, how long before.
Dr. Donald R. Griffin notes that rats that have learned that an electric shock follows a
warning light show signs of expecting a painful experience even when the shock does not occur.
He says, ―It seems reasonable to conclude that the animal knows it will be hurt a few seconds
after the warning signal if it does not do what will prevent this from happening. It expects a
painful shock following the warning light and anticipates that it will not be hurt if it does what it
has learned will be effective‖ (Griffin, 1984, p. 135).160
Other evidence gathered with EEG machines that monitored information from the scalps
of human subjects has linked particular event related potentialities (ERPs) to thoughts and quite
possibly conscious thought. When a subject is subjected to sensory information such as a flash of
light or a click, the brain usually produces waves within 1-50 milliseconds. According to Griffin:
[these waves] do not vary greatly according to the subject‘s mental or neural
activity and are not greatly diminished after light anesthesia. These early
potentials quite clearly reflect sensory input to the brain, for very similar
potentials can be recorded with electrodes deep inside the brain tissue at locations
known to be concerned with early stages in the processing of sensory excitation.
For this reason the early potentials are of much less interest to us than those that
160
On the same page, Griffin does acknowledge that psychologists in general prefer a behavioristic account over a
mental one for such cases.
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occur 100-500 milliseconds after the stimulation. The potentials having relatively
longer latencies are often called ‗event related potentials,‘ or ERPs. (Griffin,
1984, p. 146-147)
One particular potentiality, a positive wave that occurs approximately 300 milliseconds
after a stimulus (termed P300) has a possible correlation with thinking.161 Subjects of an
experiment experience a long series of clicks at regular intervals, except that occasionally a click
was skipped. According to Griffin, ―The P300 wave that occurred about 300 milliseconds after
an expected click was omitted often had a larger amplitude than after other clicks in the series,
indicating that the immediately preceding stimulus is not necessary for brain activity leading to
the P300 wave‖ (Griffin, 1984, p. 147). Similar experiments were run in which human subjects
had to pick out ―oddball‖ stimuli. For example, in one experiment subjects were presented with
words, approximately 20 percent of which rhymed with ―cake‖ and had to pick out the correct
ones. In another, the subjects had to pick out words that were synonymous with the word ―prod.‖
Other similar experiments required subjects to identify one of two names, and another required
the subjects to make the additional determination of whether the name was masculine or
feminine. Griffin says, ―Under the conditions of these experiments all stimuli produced P300
waves, but the oddball stimulus usually produced a larger one (Galambos and Hillyard, 1981)‖
(Griffin, 1984, p. 148). On the same page, he notes that ―The latency difference between the
P300 waves in response to frequent and rare stimuli was greater when the problem was to decide
whether the stimulus was synonymous with prod, rhymed with cake, or was a feminine rather
than a masculine first name‖ which is strong evidence that the spikes in P300 waves involve
thinking.
Griffin points out that the term ―ERP‖ is used to refer to shorter latency periods, but that he will use is
exclusively to refer to those latency periods ―associated with more complex brain activities‖ (Griffin, 1984 #47, p.
147).
161
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While not conclusive, all these experiments strongly tie the P300 wave to cognition, and
probably conscious cognition. Though only a few similar experiments have been performed on
animals, the experiments performed on cats and on monkeys suggest that both of these animals
have ERPs analogous to the human P300 wave (Griffin, 1984, p. 150-151). The brain of a cat is
very simple compared to that of a human or chimpanzee, indicating that animals likely evolved
the ability to consciously experience stimuli long before the common ancestor of humans and
chimpanzees ever arrived on the scene.
The ability to consciously experience pain may even extend back to animals far more
primitive than this. A study conducted by Lynne U. Sneddon, provides evidence that rainbow
trout can feel pain. In her study, 25 rainbow trout were separated into five different test groups.
Each group received a different treatment. One group received an injection of acetic acid in the
lips, another a saline injection, another a morphine injection, another a morphine and acid mix,
and the final group was handled but received no injection at all (Sneddon, 2003, p. 155). The fish
injected with both acid and the morphine-acid mix exhibited behaviors that appear to go beyond
a simple ―programmed‖ reaction to pain. These fish exhibited a rocking behavior ―where the fish
moved from side to side on either pectoral fin whilst resting on the gravel‖ and also rubbed their
lips in the gravel and up against the walls of the tank (Sneddon, 2003, p. 156). Such behaviors
were significantly less frequent in the acid-morphine mix group. Sneddon conclude that, ―it is
likely that fish are capable of pain perception‖ (Sneddon, 2003 #49, p. 155). Further, Sneddon
uses the word pain in such a way as to include pain as an experience. She says:
The commonly used definition of pain has been proposed by Zimmerman (1986) and
states that pain in animals is an adverse sensory experience that is caused by a stimulus that can
or potentially could cause tissue damage; this experience should elicit protective motor (move
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away from stimulus) and vegetative reactions (e.g. inflammation and cardiovascular responses)
and should also have an adverse effect on the animal‘s general behaviour (e.g. cessation of
normal behaviours). So being more than a sensory experience, pain has to be associated with a
―feeling‖ or negative perception (Broom, 2000). These guidelines have been adopted by many
researchers (Broom, 1991; Bateson, 1992; Gentle, 1992, 2001; Molony et al., 2002). (Sneddon,
2003, p. 154)
The behavior of the trout seems to indicate a more complex reaction to the injections than
one would expect from an unconscious or reflexive response. Additional support for the
hypothesis that rainbow trout are capable of feeling pain comes from the fact that they possess
nociceptors which ―preferentially detect noxious, damaging stimuli‖ and ―had identical
properties to those found in mammals‖162 (Sneddon, 2003, p. 154).
James D. Rose however argues that fish can not feel pain, even though they have
nociceptors. In his article, The Neurobehavioral Nature of Fishes
and the Question of Awareness and Pain. He argues that consciousness ―is known to depend on
functions of the neocortex,‖ a brain structure that is not found in fish (Rose, 2002, p. 31).
Thus, while there is some evidence that at least some type fish can experience pain, it is
not yet clear that the evidence strongly favors this possibility. Luckily the principle of preestablished hedonism does not require that animals as primitive as fish experience pain, but only
that the evidence indicates that animals with significantly simpler brains that chimpanzees (or to
be generous, monkeys) likely experience pain consciously.
Of course, it is a difficult philosophical problem even to establish conscious awareness
even in other human beings. One cannot measure it directly, but instead must rely upon
162
Sneddon references: Lynn, B., 1994. The fibre composition of cutaneous nerves and the classification and
response properties of cutaneous afferents, with particular reference to nociception. Pain Rev. 1, 172–183.
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behavioral evidence and structural similarities between oneself and others. Nevertheless there are
good scientific reasons for believing that non-human animals have qualitative experience. Jaak
Panksepp points to three such reasons in his article Affective consciousness: Core emotional
responses in animals and humans (Panksepp, 2005).
Panksepp cites the reactions of animals to certain drugs as particularly strong evidence.
He says:
Many humans find drugs that activate opiate receptors in the brain, and those that
facilitate dopamine activity, to be pleasurable or euphoria-producing. The types of
brain changes that correlate with these effects have been documented (Drevets et
al., 2001; Volkow, Fowler, & Wang, 2002). The fact that animals exhibit strong
desires for similar agents, and since those attractions are mediated by similar
brain systems, is impressive, there should be little doubt that affective states do
exist in other animals (Panksepp, Burgdorf, Beinfeld, Kroes, & Moskal, 2004a,
2004b). (Panksepp, 2005, p. 14)
He further points out that rats make different anticipatory sounds for drugs expected to
elicit pleasurable than those expected to produce noxious experiences. Additionally, studies of
drug addiction in animals allow scientists to predict how addictive new drugs will be for human
beings (Panksepp, 2005, p. 14-15).
A second reason for believing that animals have ―internal affective states‖ is that there is
neurological evidence that affective states are produced in subcortical areas of the brain that are
similar across species. He says:
Even though there is a reticence to accept that a primitive affective form of
consciousness could be elaborated far below the cerebral mantle, the evidence is
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quite robust for such a subcortical locus of control in humans (Liotti & Panksepp,
2004). Even though MRI human brain-mapping studies of various emotions have
yielded only modest differentiation of the various basic emotional systems
(Murphy, Nimmo-Smith, & Lawrence, 2003; Phan, Wager, Taylor, & Liberzon,
2002), the most extensive PET study has yielded striking differences between
sadness, anger, fear, and happiness (Damasio et al., 2000), yielding patterns that
often match animal maps based on localized brain stimulation (Panksepp, 1982,
1998a, 2003a). In sum, although higher cognitive functions add an enormous
richness to human emotional life and surely that of animals as well, the
‗‗energetic‘‘ engines for affect are sub-neocortically concentrated. (Panksepp,
2005, p. 15)
Panksepp says that his third support for the belief that animals have affective states is
perhaps the strongest scientifically. This evidence comes from brain stimulation experiments that
seem to show that subcortcal structures in mammals are homologous to those of human beings
and seem to produce emotional responses when stimulated. He says:
The fact that electrical ‗‗garbage‘‘ applied to specific sites in the brain can yield
psycho-behavioral coherence (distinct emotional expressions) indicates that
various affect-generating emotional operating systems do exist in deep subcortical
regions of the brain. The areas that generate behavioral indicators of positive and
negative affective states in humans and animals are remarkably similar, and the
most powerful affects are obtained from subcortical brain areas where homologies
are striking (Heath, 1996; Panksepp, 1985). A most reasonable conclusion
follows: not only are many affective states related to such deep brain system
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arousals, but the resemblances between basic animal and human emotions are
truly remarkable. Indeed, localized brain stimulation of specific brain areas,
whether electrical or neurochemical, is a compelling scientific way to specify the
types of emotional systems animals have inherited as ancestral gifts (Panksepp,
1982, 1998a, 1998b, 1998c). (Panksepp, 2005 #51, p. 15)
Bernard J. Baars from the Neuroscience Institute in San Diego, in an article entitled
―Subjective experience is probably not limited to humans: The evidence from neurobiology and
behavior‖, explains that sleep studies have provided additional reasons to believe that animals
have conscious experiences. EEG recordings of brain activity during unconscious (non-REM)
sleep in humans show very similar patterns for both human and non-human mammals (Baars,
2005, p. 9). Baars says:
These EEG phenomena apply to humans and other mammals alike, so much so
that mammalian EEG studies are often applied to humans. In all mammalian
species studied waking shows fast, irregular, and low-voltage field activity
throughout the thalamocortical core. In contrast, deep sleep reveals slow, regular,
and high-voltage field activity. Thus the electrical activity of the thalamocortical
core in waking appears to support reports of conscious experiences in humans.
But the underlying brain activity is so similar in humans, monkeys, and cats, that
these species are routinely studied interchangeably to obtain a deeper
understanding of states of consciousness. (Baars, 2005, p. 10) [Emphasis mine.]
Baars, like Panksepp, emphasizes the importance of the thalamus-cortical region of the
brain for consciousness. He notes that damage to the intralaminar nuclei of the thalamus causes
loss of consciousness, but damage to the cerebellum, basal ganglia, and spinal cord do not
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interfere with consciousness. This evidence in conjunction with stimulation experiments and
brain imaging lead him to say that, ―The evidence is therefore very strong that the T-C system
supports consciousness. That is why many neuroscientists consider the T-C system to be the
‗‗seat‘‘ of conscious experience, and have done so for at least a century‖ (Baars, 2005, p. 10).
But if this is true for humans, what, if anything, does this imply about conscious
experience in other animals, especially those animals with significantly less sophisticated brains
than those of chimpanzees or even monkeys. Bar has this to say:
All mammals have a highly developed T-C system, suggesting that they must be
conscious. Mammals are 100–200 million years old. Although we cannot directly
observe ancestral forms of mammals, by studying skulls and gene conservation
across species, it certainly seems that the fundamental T-C system has not
changed much in 100–200 million years… Notice that brainstem mechanisms like
the reticular formation are also extremely ancient phylogenetically, going back at
least to early vertebrates. Thalamic structures like the intralaminar nuclei also
exist in mammals generally. Both these facts suggest that the brain anatomy of
conscious wakefulness is very ancient indeed. (Baars, 2005, p. 10)
Given this evidence, what can be concluded about the availability of psychologically
hedonistic mechanisms versus psychologically altruistic ones? New world monkeys evolved
roughly 30 million years ago. Thus even on an extremely generous interpretation of the evidence
in which the earliest monkeys are credited with a theory of mind while fish and ancestral reptiles
are assumed to have no subjective qualitative experience, psychologically hedonistic
mechanisms had at least 70 million years to be honed and fine tuned by natural selection before
psychologically altruistic mechanisms could have arrived on the scene. That is at least 70 million
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years for psychologically hedonistic mechanisms to become deeply entrenched before
psychologically altruistic mechanisms could have even become a possibility. Since the earliest
mammals appeared on earth roughly 220 million years ago a more realistic estimate of the time
between the possibility of psychologically hedonistic and psychologically altruistic mechanisms
to 190 million years. Under a more liberal scenario in which a theory of mind is limited to a
relatively narrow range of great apes and in which some ancestral reptiles (but not fish) are
capable of subjective experiences, psychologically hedonistic mechanisms would have had even
longer to become deeply established.
On balance, the evidence suggests that subjective consciousness was an early adaptation,
while a true awareness of other minds came much later. From this one can reasonably draw the
conclusion that psychologically hedonistic mechanisms evolved long before psychologically
altruistic mechanisms would have been possible. I call this the principle of pre-established
hedonism. This principle will strengthen (though will not be essential to) several arguments
against the psychological altruism hypothesis in the remainder of this dissertation.
6_6 Direct/Indirect Asymmetry as an Evolutionary Argument for Psychological Altruism
Sober and Wilson evaluate hedonistic and altruistic motives to see which will more
reliably lead to parental care. They represent these two different motives as two different sets of
instructions (Sober &Wilson, 1998, p. 312). The hedonist follows the instruction ―Perform [the
caring action] if and only if you believe that it will maximize pleasure and minimize pain‖
(Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 312). The altruist follows the instruction ―Perform ―the caring action‖
if and only if you believe that it will do the best job of improving the welfare of your children‖
(Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 312).
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Sober and Wilson note that out of all the possible actions a hedonistic or altruistic
organism might take, one of them will be the best possible for its children.163 They call this
action A*. They then ask ―whether a hedonistic or altruistic parent is more likely to select this
action‖ (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 312). Following altruistic instructions, the organism will
perform A* whenever it believes that A* is best for its offspring. Following hedonistic
instructions, the organism will perform A* whenever it believes that doing so will give it the
greatest amount of pleasure and least amount of pain.
Though Sober and Wilson note that there is ―no a priori reason…why HED [the
hedonistic mechanism] must do worse (or better) than ALT [the altruistic mechanism] in
producing adaptive behavior,‖ they believe that real world cases where hedonism will do better
than altruism are unlikely (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 313). They say that hedonism might be
better if an organism has ―outrageously false beliefs about the welfare of its children‖ (Sober &
Wilson, 1998, p. 313). That is to say that hedonistic desires might lead to actions closer to A*
than altruistic desires regarding parental care if parents find it difficult to judge what is in the
best welfare of their children. But they believe that a scenario such as this is unrealistic, saying,
―human parents are fairly reliable judges of what will help and harm their children‖ (Sober &
Wilson, 1998, p. 313).
Sober and Wilson also argue that a hedonistic correlation between the welfare of one‘s
child and one‘s own pleasure can fail in many ways. They say:
What would happen if the organism provides parental care, but then discovers that
this action fails to deliver maximal pleasure and minimal pain? If the organism is
able to learn from experience, it will probably be less inclined to take care of its
children on subsequent occasions. Instrumental desires tend to diminish and
163
It is possible that there will be several best actions which all do equally well.
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disappear in the face of negative evidence of this sort. This can make hedonistic
motivation a rather poor control device. (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 314)
Indeed, Sober and Wilson go so far as to claim that in order to get around this problem
―hedonism must ensure not just that the organism performs a calculation to decide whether to
help its children, and not just that the organism believes on a single occasion that taking care of
its children is the best act for it to perform. In addition this belief must actually be true;‖ (Sober
& Wilson, 1998, p. 314).
What Sober and Wilson are presenting here is an argument from the principle of D/I
asymmetry. They are arguing that an altruistic mechanism is a more reliable guide to actions of
parental care than a hedonistic one because altruistic motivation ―tries‖ to pick out action A*
directly when hedonistic motivations will only lead to action A* if the parent believes that A* is
also Ah, where Ah maximizes hedonistic pleasures and/or minimizes pains. If Ah is less perfectly
correlated with A* than altruistic motivation, then, according to the principle of D/I asymmetry,
altruistic motivations work more reliably than hedonistic ones at producing behavior A*.
Sober and Wilson illustrate this idea with the diagram reproduced below (Sober &
Wilson, 1998, p. 318).
In this diagram, the hedonistic mechanism is presented as a less direct method for
producing parental caring behavior than the altruistic mechanism. For the altruistic mechanism to
activate the subject S need only believe that her children need help. In order for the hedonistic
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mechanism to activate the subject must further feel bad enough about the fact that her children
need help to perform action A* over engaging in some other more appealing hedonistic activity.
6_7 Problems with the Direct/Indirect Asymmetry argument for Psychological Altruism
Sober and Wilson‘s argument from D/I Asymmetry has a number of problems however.
In what follows it is important to remember that the criticisms presented are directed only at the
argument from D/I Asymmetry which tries to show that psychological altruism would more
reliably trigger the fitness enhancing behavior of parental care than psychological egoism (and
more specifically psychological hedonism). Arguments that rely upon a premise that an organism
which has both mechanisms would be more fit than an organism with only one fall under the
scope of Sober and Wilson‘s Two are Better than One principle. This principle and the
arguments derived from it will be the subject of the next chapter.
6_7.1 Criticism 1: Hedonistic Motivation Can Correlate to optimal Parental Care Just as
well as Altruistic Motivation
The force of the D/I asymmetry argument stems from an imperfect correlation between
the fitness relevant factor that the indirect mechanism detects and the one which the direct
mechanism detects.164 This means that if hedonistic motivations can correlate to the fitness
enhancing factor just as well as altruistic motivations then the evolutionary argument from D/I
asymmetry fails.165
As Chapter two noted, there are a number of different ways in which biologists use the term ―fitness.‖ It should
be taken here to mean an average fitness after all levels of selection are taken into account, measured by the number
of offspring left to the next generation adjusted by the likelihood of those offspring reproducing themselves.
165
Or, at least the argument fails so long as there are no additional reasons to believe that the hedonistic correlation
would be less likely to develop than an altruistic one.
164
259
One of the reasons that Sober and Wilson believe that hedonistic motivations cannot
correlate perfectly to parental care might be tied to the fact that they often describe psychological
hedonism as pleasure-maximizing behavior.166 They reason that if action A* (that action which
produces the greatest level of parental care) is pleasurable but action Ah is even more
pleasurable, then a hedonistically motivated organism that comes to know of Ah would choose
Ah over A*. An organism that had an altruistic ultimate desire to take care of its children,
however, would always choose action A* so long as it could determine what A* is.
However, it need not be the case that psychological hedonists always act to maximize
pleasure. One can trivially show that maximization is conceptually unnecessary for
psychological hedonism by simply pointing out that if there existed an organism that was always
motivated to perform the action that it believed would produce the second greatest amount of
pleasure, that organism would still be ultimately motivated by pleasure and therefore would still
be psychologically hedonistic.
Of course it is unlikely that any such organism could exist, as it is hard to see why
evolution would ever favor consistently choosing the second greatest pleasure. But, though
unrealistic, this hypothetical organism does show that maximization is not a necessary part of
psychological hedonism, and this opens up the door to other non-maximizing psychologically
hedonistic strategies that could allow a hedonistic organism to choose A* over Ah, even if it is
aware that Ah produces greater pleasure.
To bring one of these alternatives to light, let‘s suppose that A* is not just the action of
greatest parental care, but also the most fitness enhancing action. There are problems with this
assumption, but these will be set aside for the next subsection. Accepting this premise means that
As just one example Sober and Wilson say, ―Suppose a hedonistic organism believes on a given occasion that
providing parental care is the way for it to attain its ultimate goal of maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain
[emphasis mine]‖ (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 314)
166
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there is selective pressure for a process that will consistently result in producing action A* over
Ah or any other behavior. Indeed, this selection pressure is the reason why Sober and Wilson
believe that D/I asymmetry provides an argument that psychological altruism is more likely to
evolve than not.
But if action A* is more fitness enhancing than Ah, then there would be selection pressure
favoring organisms that have a system of hedonistic motivations that cause them to pick out
actions closer to A* than the rest of their species. By the principle of pre-established hedonism,
the natural selection process would have had plenty of time to act upon systems of hedonistic
motivation before altruistic mechanisms appear. Indeed, one should expect that the mechanisms
involved with hedonistically motivated parental care evolved right alongside of evolutionary
changes in the amount and kinds of care that an organism needs to provide for its offspring. So
long as adjustments to existing hedonistic mechanisms were possible, and there seems to be no
more reason to object to hedonistic mechanisms optimizing than there is to object to new
mechanisms being formed and optimizing, then there is reason to believe that a psychologically
hedonistic organism could track A* just as well as an altruistic one. But if a psychologically
hedonistic organism already tracks A* as well as a psychologically altruistic organism can, there
would be no selection pressure favoring the development of psychological altruism in the first
place.
There are two basic ways in which a hedonistic motivational structure might be altered so
as to reliably track action A* over Ah. The first way would be for hedonistic motivations to
ignore pleasure maximization, or do so in particular situations. The second way would be for the
values of hedonistic rewards and punishments to alter in such a way that the most pleasure
maximizing action is also the action that is most beneficial to ones offspring. That is to say that
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the levels of pleasures and pains associated with different states could be such that Ah always
represents the same action as A*.
Considering the first possibility, a hedonistic organism under enough selection pressure
to choose action A* might develop particular ―discount rates‖ that would allow the organism
perform an action that it knows does not maximize pleasure in the long run. In fact, Sober and
Wilson use the notion of hedonistic discount rates to explain why Nozick‘s experience machine
thought experiment does not show that hedonism is false. They say:
Hedonism is a theory that comes in many forms; it may claim that people want to
maximize pleasure and minimize pain over their entire lifetimes or over some
shorter period of time. There are many different alternatives here; each may be
viewed as specifying a ―discount rate‖ that describes the relative import of
experiences in different time periods. Hedonism is consistent with the possibility
that different people have different discount rates; it is also consistent with a
single person‘s having different discount rates for different types of experience;
and it is compatible with people‘s changing their discount rates on a particular
type of experience as they get older. (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 286)
Sober and Wilson explicitly say that discount rates may vary by type of experience as
well as in relation to particular stretches of time. One might also suspect that discount rates differ
by the context of decision making as well. Given this, an organism that is entirely hedonistically
motivated might develop so as to completely discount all other pleasures and pains when it
believes that parental care is needed. Such an organism would remain psychologically
hedonistic, but it could track action A* just as well as psychologically altruistic organism that is
identical in all other ways.
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Another possibility along the same lines would be for a psychologically hedonistic
organism to evolve in such a way that it simply becomes ―blind‖ to other pleasures and plains
whenever it perceives its offspring to be in danger. In this case the organism would still be
hedonistically motivated, but when it came time to act the organism would forget or become
unaware of any more pleasurable act than providing parental care. In effect action Ah would
again be action A*. This same effect could also be accomplished if the level of pleasure (or relief
of aversive feelings such as fear) associated with parental care were so great that in practice they
are never outweighed by other hedonistic considerations.
As a heuristic for the last case, consider that strong negative emotions such as fear count
as pains under the broad hedonistic definition of pain as aversive feelings. But even in cases
where an individual knows that the amount of fear she is feeling is disproportionate to any actual
danger this fear may significantly affect how a she behaves. One reason that this is so might be
because immediate hedonistic payoffs sometimes have more influence over decision making
than future ones (which may be discounted). Another reason may be that strong fears can simply
bypass or remain effective in spite or rationality.
Phobias are interesting cases to consider because they are belief resistant and thus have a
degree of isolation from reason. A person with a fear of spiders might, for example, agree that a
particular tarantula is not poisonous. This same person might also agree that that same spider is
incapable of biting through thick leather gloves. Indeed, the phobic might even agree that there
would be absolutely no danger in handling the spider while wearing a pair of such gloves.
Nevertheless, a strongly arachnophobic person would likely turn down an invitation to put on
protective gloves and play with the harmless tarantula. What is more, she is likely to do so even
if promised something she would find pleasurable as a reward for doing so. Nevertheless,
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nothing about the phobic‘s actions indicate that she is not hedonistically motivated. Avoiding the
aversive feeling of fear is a hedonistic desire, even if the subject knows that the fear is
irrational.167
How do fears and phobias relate to hedonism, altruism, and parental care? The link is
easy enough to see if it turns out to be true that many parents naturally feel a very direct fear
associated with the knowledge that one of their children is in danger. If this is true, then it would
not be so easy for a parent to simply ignore acting on that fear, even if she intellectually believed
that not aiding her offspring would result in a greater amount of pleasure. What is more, a
resulting choice to maximize parental care would not violate any psychologically hedonistic
principles.
Thus, there are many possible ways in which a psychologically hedonistic organism
could develop so as to insure that it takes action A* as reliably as an organism that has genuinely
altruistic motivations. Given this, it is difficult to see why Sober and Wilson believe that
altruistic motivations would give an organism an evolutionary edge as a result of D/I asymmetry.
Psychologically hedonistic mechanisms can not only do just as well as altruistic ones, but would
have had more time to optimize than any altruistic motivations which newly arrive on the scene.
Yet, by the principle of pre-established hedonism, one should expect that newly evolved (not yet
optimized) altruistic motivations would be competing against hedonistic motivations that have
already been finely honed through millions of years of natural selection. As an additional
complication, not only would hedonistic desires have to be highly reliable when introduced, they
167
One might try to resolve this seeming conflict between belief and action by suggesting that the phobic
intellectually believes that she would be in no danger handling the spider, but that she does not truly believe it on
some deeper level. Alternatively, one might suggest that the phobic has two competing beliefs, one which has had its
justification undermined yet somehow still remains deeply influential (perhaps due to a habitual way of thinking)
and another which is justified but unable to completely override what has long be a predominant way of thinking.
Regardless of the story told, one thing is clear. People can be hedonistically motivated in to act in one way even if
they rationally believe they should act in another.
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would also have to be arrive in such as way as to not interfere with or badly react to already
established hedonistic motivations.
None of this shows that the development of altruistic motivations is logically impossible.
Nevertheless, considering only the argument from D/I asymmetry, it seems much more plausible
that an already existing system of psychologically hedonistic motivations would be tweaked and
refined by evolution to track A* than it would be for an entirely new system of ultimate motives
to develop and be highly reliable upon introduction without being thrown off by, or conflicting
with, the already existing hedonistic decision making process in a way that reduces fitness. The
principles of evolution, in this case, should lead one to suspect that psychological hedonism is
more likely to evolve than psychological altruism.
Because this section has focused extensively on action A* (that action which most greatly
enhances the fitness of one‘s offspring), it may be worthwhile to ask an important question. Is it
the case that A* is the most fitness enhancing target action far a parent whose child is in danger?
If not, the D/I asymmetry argument collapses entirely, as it rests upon the notion that only an
altruistic mechanism can directly pick out A* and that picking out A* is optimal for fitness. The
next section will use evolutionary principles in an attempt to answer this question. As it turns
out, doing so provides a powerful counter to Sober and Wilson‘s argument for psychological
altruism from D/I asymmetry.
6_7.2 Criticism 2: The Parental Care Example is Not a True Instance of Direct/Indirect
Asymmetry
The most serious problem for Sober and Wilson‘s use of the D/I asymmetry principle as
an evolutionary argument for psychological altruism is the fact that the case of parental care is
disanalogous to the case of the anaerobic bacterium which they present as a paradigmatic of D/I
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asymmetry. In the bacterium case Sober and Wilson argue that, all other things being equal, an
oxygen detector is preferable to a magnetosome because it is oxygen that is deadly to the
organism and the correlation between depth (which the magnetosome detects) and an absence of
oxygen is less than perfect. Therefore, if all the other evolutionary considerations involved in the
selection of mechanisms for oxygen avoidance are equal, and if oxygen detectors function at
least as well at detecting oxygen as magnetosomes functions at detecting depth, then oxygen
detectors will help the bacterium avoid oxygen a greater percentage of the time. While it is less
than certain that magnetosomes and oxygen detectors really are equal for the purposes of other
evolutionary considerations, it is true that if they are an oxygen detector will work better than a
magnetosome at keeping an aerobic bacterium alive. In the case of the marine bacterium, the D/I
asymmetry argument works just fine.
But the case of parental care is different from the case of the marine bacterium in a very
important way. This difference is born of the fact that, while avoiding oxygen is always (or so
close to always as to make no difference), optimal for the fitness of the bacterium, the same
relationship does not hold between fitness and performing action A*. Acknowledging this
problem does not require denying the fact that protecting ones offspring is of tremendous
evolutionary importance. Because humans tend to have so few offspring compared to other
animals, and because human offspring require a great amount of attention and care to survive,
exhibiting parental care is extremely important for the fitness of creatures such as ourselves.
However, as important as parental care is, maximizing parental care (e.g. taking action A*) does
not always maximize fitness, while avoiding oxygen always seems beneficial for the marine
bacterium.
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It is not difficult to see why this is true. Suppose that in a prehistoric hunter gatherer
society a human woman who makes it through puberty would produce, on average, five offspring
during her lifetime. Now suppose that a mother of one is put into a situation where her child is
endangered by a beast and that if she interferes she may be maimed or killed by the animal
herself. While it would clearly improve the child‘s fitness if its mother attempts a rescue, doing
so will not necessarily increase the fitness of the mother, her genes, or the group she is a part of.
This is because, on average, the mother would bear four more children if she is not killed. Faced
with such a difficult situation then, the best action for the mother to perform would not be A* but
A**, where A** represents the action which best balances the potential fitness benefits of the
mother‘s ability to raise more children with the potential fitness benefits and likelihood of
successfully rescuing her child. Perhaps the best action is to yell and throw stones at the animal
to try to scare it away. Perhaps the best action is to approach the animal in a threatening way, but
flee if the animal tries to attack. Perhaps the best action is to call for help to drive the animal
away and risk the delay while others come to the rescue. But if the animal poses enough danger
to the young mother, the best action in terms of the mother‘s fitness would not be to risk almost
certain death for a very slim chance of saving her child.
The most direct mechanism for optimizing parental care therefore is not the one which
motivates a parent towards action A* as Sober and Wilson suppose, but rather one which
motivates a parent towards action A**, where A** is the most fitness enhancing action once all
levels of selection are considered.168 Further, by Sober and Wilson‘s own reasoning, altruistic
motivations would be ill-suited for directing a parent towards action A**. The reason for this is
simple; an ultimate desire to protect ones children can only motivate towards A* directly and can
168
It should be noted that A* and A** could sometimes both represent the same action. This could be the case if
there is little risk to the parent as the result helping coupled with a good chance of enhancing the fitness of the child.
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never aim directly at action A** unless by chance A* and A** represent the same action. This is
the very fact that does the work for Sober and Wilson‘s argument from D/I asymmetry. But,
since choosing maximum parental care is not always the fitness maximizing action, a system of
motivations that could directly target A** would be superior by the very same D/I asymmetry
reasoning.
So, of the two options being considered, what type of motivational system seems best
able to pick out action A**? The answer is psychological hedonism. The pleasures associated
with having healthy and happy children can help to insure parental care, while fear for one‘s own
life and fear of pain can work to counterbalance these pleasures when a situation is especially
dire.169 All that is needed to help insure that hedonistic motives usually result in action A** (or
one very close to it) is inheritable variation of pleasure preferences or discount rates for natural
selection to act upon. The altruistic motives being considered, on the other hand, are by their
very nature limited to selecting action A*.
One might try to argue that while altruistic motivations alone would be a poor guide to
insuring action A**, if poly-causal pluralism is true then altruistic motives can work in
conjunction with egoistic ones to produce a balance that tends to trigger A**.170 This is certainly
a logical possibility, but at this point altruistic motivations do not seem to be doing any work that
hedonism cannot do alone. Further, given the principle of pre-established hedonism, the sudden
introduction of altruistic motivations might actually interfere with the existing system of
hedonistic motives and result in decisions that have a lower fitness value.
169
It is also worth noting that when ones child is in immediate danger, considerations about ones other children are
likely to temporarily drop from one‘s mind. If one has four children who could not survive on their own and risks a
50% chance of death to save one child, this strategy reduces the fitness of the not only the parent but of her other
offspring as well.
170
This objection that altruistic motivations will not work to motivation a person towards A** over A* provides
another argument against uni-causal pluralism. If poly-causal pluralism is true, a mixture of hedonistic and altruistic
motives could at least theoretically interact to motivate a parent towards action A**.
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This rebuttal does not strictly prove that altruism is false, but, as with the previous
rebuttal, it appears to be less complicated for selection pressure to tweak associated levels of
pleasurable and aversive feelings associated with parental care and particular dangers so that an
organism will perform action A** than it is to introduce an entirely new ultimate desire, integrate
it with already present hedonistic desires, and then still tweak pleasurable and aversive feelings
so that the more complicated blend of two types of motivation will tend to produce the most
fitness enhancing behavior.
Thus, though Sober and Wilson are correct in thinking that the principle of D/I
asymmetry is important for determining whether psychological altruism or psychological egoism
is more likely to have evolved, it turns out that the principle of D/I asymmetry actually favors
hedonistic motivations because they can track action A** directly while altruistic motivations
cannot.
6_8 Potential Objections to these Criticisms
Though Sober and Wilson do not clearly present this argument and may not support it
themselves, a person who wishes to defend their position may suggest that hedonistic
mechanisms are less time efficient than altruistic ones.171 Strictly speaking, this line of criticism
171
There is one particular section in which Sober and Wilson seem as if they may be making a an implicit argument
about time efficiency and not just reliability (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 316-317). In this section they say that
sometimes people respond directly to pain, and draw a causal diagram that goes from a person burning her fingers
 suffering pain  withdrawing her fingers from the fire. They then say that it would be less efficient to have an
extra step such as this: Burn fingers  pain  form belief that fingers are injured  Withdraw fingers. They speak
of this inefficiency as a reduction in reliability—perhaps because if there is an extra step then there is an extra place
for the process to fail, or perhaps because they take time considerations to be a factor of reliability without directly
saying so.
Regardless, an objection can be made here in addition to the rebuttal of the time efficiency argument in this
section. The objection is this. It is not at all clear that their first model, which bypasses belief formation, is possible
for anything except a reflex (and pain wouldn‘t be required for a reflex to function). After all, their three-part chain
of events, which excludes belief formation, still concludes with the withdrawing of fingers from the fire. But, one
might wonder why the subject would pull her fingers out unless she already had the belief that her fingers which are
being injured? Without this belief it would seem just as rational for the person to jerk back a foot or stick her hand in
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would not be an argument from D/I asymmetry as Sober and Wilson try to use the principle. As
they use the principle, D/I asymmetry is present when the more direct mechanism is more
perfectly correlated to the fitness enhancing behavior than indirect mechanism. Nevertheless, an
argument similar to this one can be made by suggesting that the more indirect mechanism is less
time efficient in the case of parental care because the indirect mechanism does not only require
that the parent form a belief that her children are doing badly to act on but also requires that this
belief must further trigger a bad feeling (see fig 6.2). Looking at Sober and Wilson‘s
representation in fig. 6.2 the altruistic mechanism seems to avoid this step and thus appears to be
more time efficient.
6_8.1 Rebutting the Time Efficiency Argument
The first problem with this criticism is to note that, even if it were true, it would not
significantly affect the most serious criticism of Sober and Wilson‘s argument from D/I
asymmetry which was presented in the previous section. As a reminder, this criticism is the fact
that even if altruism is better able to trigger action A* (which criticism two put into doubt),
action A* does not track fitness as well as action A** (which represents the most fitness
balancing combination of parental and self care) and egoism (even hedonism more narrowly) is
more suited to track action A**. There would therefore have to be a very significant difference in
deeper. Now it is possible that a general belief about touching hot things may be been formed before and only
referenced when the hot object is touched, but this can be the case for any learned behavior and this still requires the
process of accessing the belief. Further, Sober and Wilson admit far earlier in their book that beliefs can be accessed
very quickly saying, ―we do not restrict these terms [‗deliberation‘ and ‗means-end reasoning‘] to lengthy episodes
of self-conscious reflection. … Suppose a lifeguard sees a drowning child and jumps in the water to help. Even
though the action occurs quickly, it is still plausible to think that beliefs and desires are consulted and processed in
accordance with some decision rule‖ (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 211). In just the same way it seems reasonable to
suppose that a person who accidentally touches something hot and removes her hand has ―consulted‖ a belief that
touching hot things with her fingers causes the type of sensation she is feeling. It seems unlikely that the process of
belief formation is bypassed in the case Sober and Wilson give about directly responding to pain, and at the very
least it isn‘t obviously true. There is no knockdown argument here that they are wrong, but at the very least their
causal outline needs some sort of justification.
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time efficiency favoring the altruistic mechanism over the hedonistic one to offset the fitness
advantage of choosing A**. The argument from time efficiency does not seem poised to show
such a significant time difference however as Sober and Wilson themselves admit that even
means-end deliberation does not require ―lengthy episodes of self-conscious reflection‖ but say
instead that, ―a reasoned decision about what to do can be experienced as virtually
instantaneous‖ (Sober, 1998, p. 211). And if means-end reasoning can happen so quickly, how
much more quickly should one expect trigged pre-rational emotional responses to a belief to be?
In short, even if a small but potentially evolutionarily significant time difference were
granted in favor of the altruistic mechanism, the third rebuttal in the previous section would
survive for the most part unscathed. Nevertheless, it is worth looking at the time efficiency
objection more closely because the evolutionary arguments being considered (both for and again
psychological altruism) are designed to show that, all things considered, one theory is more
likely than the other. Thus, it is worth debunking the time efficiency argument because accepting
it may add some small weight in support of the psychological altruism thesis if it is taken
together with other arguments of similar or lesser weight.
6_8.1.1 The Brain is a Parallel Processor
Apart from the fact that Sober and Wilson admit that the brain can process even complex
means-ends calculations almost instantly (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 211), another problem with
the time efficiency argument is that, unlike single core computers which can only process one
instruction at a time, the human brain represents parallel processing through and through. It is
difficult to estimate to what extent the processing of the development of a belief and an
emotional response to a belief are streamlined with only present day knowledge about the
neurology of belief formation and the neurology of emotion. But, given the fact that each neuron
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in the brain is a simple information processor, it is not too much of a stretch to suppose that, if
belief formation and emotional responses involve many neurons, then much if not all of the
processing involved in these two responses to information could go on in parallel. Further, if the
potential time difference between parallel and sequential processing were significant enough for
the time efficiency argument to have any strength, then, starting from hedonistic monism, there
would be selection pressure for the parallel design. On the other hand, if only very few neurons
are involved, then one should expect any additional processing time involved in triggering an
emotional response to be so trivial as to make little or no difference from a fitness perspective.
Thus instead of the representation of the process that Sober and Wilson present (duplicated from
their book in figure 6.2), a more detailed and accurate representation may look like this:
Under this representation, any time delay one might think results from the extra function
of S feeling badly is either greatly reduced or eliminated as the feelings are being formed in
parallel to the formation of the belief.172 Of course, too little is currently known about the
neurology of beliefs and emotions to say which, if either, image is correct, but the fact that the
brain is highly integrated and naturally processes many bits of information at the same time at
least hints that the diagram presented in fig 6.3 may be more accurate than Sober and Wilson‘s
172
The interaction arrows are dotted since interaction may or may not be necessary after the each process is
triggered.
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version presented in fig 6.2. At the very least, there seems to be no reason to presume that Sober
and Wilson‘s version of events is correct, and therefore the time efficiency argument gives no
reason to suppose that a hedonistic mechanism is less time efficient at any evolutionarily relevant
level.
6_8.1.2 Sober and Wilson’s Diagram Oversimplifies Altruistic Reactions.
There is yet another way in which Sober and Wilson‘s representation of events in fig. 6.2.
may be in error. This is because Sober and Wilson‘s diagram is oversimplified in favor of
psychological altruism. Consider this alternative:
In their original diagram, Sober and Wilson leave out an essential step for acting on an
altruistic desire. While the hedonistic parent acts only on her own hedonistic state, the altruist, if
she is going to be effective, must first attempt to calculate the best method to help her child.
Since there is no reason to suppose that it is any less time intensive to calculate the benefits of an
action for another than it is to calculate the benefits for oneself, the argument from time
efficiency fails. If anything, calculating the benefits for another appears to be the more complex
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of the two calculations because it involves an attempt to view the world from another
individual‘s perspective. Such a feat would, at the very least, require the parent to try to imagine
the world from the perspective of her child and attempt to evaluate information that she has
limited or only indirect access to. The psychological hedonist and the psychological altruist both
have the same number of cognitive steps to go through, but those required for psychological
altruism appear, if anything, to be more time intensive than the hedonistic alternative, not less.
A critic may wish to object here and say that the hedonist too must attempt to calculate
what is best from her child‘s perspective, but I think that this isn‘t necessarily true. A hedonistic
parent need only consider the child‘s condition insofar as doing so affects her own hedonistic
desires, and no further. Sober and Wilson appear to support this view when they say that:
If the ALT organism has outrageously false beliefs about the welfare of its
children, then this organism is quite unlikely to perform A*. It is quite possible
that a HED organism would do much better. For example, suppose that the ALT
organism believes that crying is good for children and that cooing is bad for them,
whereas the HED organism believes that nursing its children was pleasurable in
the past and seeks to repeat that pleasurable experience. In this instance, HED‘s
children will be better off than ALT‘s. (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 313)
This statement suggests that hedonists, at least sometimes, can bypass direct calculations
regarding their children‘s welfare. Sober and Wilson object that parents are good judges of their
children‘s welfare, but this is in support of their argument from D/I asymmetry in respect to
reliability not time efficiency (Sober & Wilson, p. 313) and this criticism has already been
addressed in section 6_6.
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6_9 Summary
This chapter used Sober and Wilson‘s example of an anaerobic bacterium as a
springboard to demonstrate numerous evolutionary principles relevant to the psychological
altruism/egoism debate. Two methods of triggering oxygen avoiding behavior for the bacterium
were discussed. The first and more direct mechanism would be for the anaerobic bacterium to
detect oxygen directly and use that information to trigger a retreat. The second, but less direct,
mechanism would be for the oxygen to detect something that is correlated with the presence of
oxygen and then use that information to cause the organism to flee; in this case it was proposed
that the anaerobic bacterium might use a magnetosome to detect water depth, a factor which is
correlated to oxygen concentration.
But, given both a direct and an indirect option, which mechanism would be more strongly
favored by natural selection? Assuming that both mechanisms work equally well at detecting
oxygen and depth respectively, it may seem as if the direct mechanism will always have the
selective advantage because water depth is only imperfectly correlated with the fitness relevant
factor of oxygen presence. It turns out however that many evolutionary considerations can
interfere with this prediction. Five evolutionary considerations were then discussed in detail.
These were availability, reliability, energetic efficiency, time efficiency, and pleiotropic fitness
effects. It turns out that an equally reliable direct mechanism (to trigger a fitness enhancing
behavior) does not necessarily have an advantage over an indirect one when one of these factors
comes into play. Nevertheless, if all other evolutionary considerations between the two
mechanisms are held equal, and if the subject of indirect detection is less than perfectly
correlated with the fitness relevant factor being considered, then the direct mechanism will have
a selective advantage. Sober and Wilson call this the direct/indirection asymmetry principle.
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Sober and Wilson attempt to use this principle as leverage to support an evolutionary
argument in favor of psychological altruism. In the same way that an anaerobic bacterium may
have detection mechanisms that trigger a fitness enhancing behavior, an organism may have
different psychological mechanisms that trigger behaviors that enhance the fitness of their
offspring. In the case of parental care, the more direct mechanism would be for an organism to
have an ultimate desire for the wellbeing of its offspring. This would be a psychologically
altruistic solution. The more indirect mechanism would be for the organism to ultimately desire
pleasure (and absence of pain) and be constituted in such a way that it has pain and pleasure
responses appropriately associated with the wellbeing of its offspring. This would be a
psychologically hedonistic solution. Using the principle of D/I asymmetry, Sober and Wilson
argue that, all other things being equal, natural selection would favor psychological altruism over
psychological hedonism.
While there is no fault in the principle of D/I asymmetry itself, it was shown that Sober
and Wilson‘s argument fails in two ways. It fails first in that psychological discount effects for
particular types of pleasures and pains can be such that an ultimate desire for pleasure perfectly
correlates to parental care. For example, an organism might completely discount hedonistic
factors not related to its offspring when they are in need. In such a case the conditions for
direct/indirect asymmetry are not met and Sober and Wilson‘s argument from direct/indirection
asymmetry fails. The result is that there is no longer any reason to suppose that psychological
altruism would be favored over psychological hedonism.
An even stronger counterargument lies in the fact that the case of the anaerobic bacterium
and that of parental care are disanalogous. All other things being equal, selection would favor the
direct mechanism over the indirect mechanism for the anaerobic bacterium because avoiding
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oxygen is always the most fitness enhancing behavior. Maximizing oxygen avoidance is
therefore selectively advantageous for the anaerobic bacterium. The same is not true in the case
of parental care however. The best level of parental care, from an evolutionary perspective is that
level of care which would be optimal given a cost-benefit analysis of fitness (call it action A**).
For example, it would not be fitness enhancing for a mother to risk a 50% chance of death to
save one child if, statistically, she is likely to have three more children during her lifetime.
Because maximizing parental care behaviors is not as fitness enhancing as maximizing
A** behaviors, psychological altruism actually becomes a disadvantage (compared to
psychological hedonism). Regarding parental care, a psychologically hedonistic mechanism,
through an optimization of discount rates and pleasure/pain effects, can be adjusted so as to
always produce action A** or an action very close to it, but a psychologically altruistic
mechanism can only ―aim‖ at maximizing parental care. In this way it can be shown not only that
psychological altruism does not provide a fitness advantage over psychological hedonism
through the principle of direct/indirect asymmetry, but that psychological hedonism has the
advantage instead. Psychological altruism can more directly cause responses that maximize
parental care which, absent an alternative mechanism, would likely improve fitness overall. But
psychological hedonism can more directly cause actions that optimally balance of self care and
parental care in terms of fitness, which would provide an even stronger selective advantage.
Though neither of these counterarguments require the principle of pre-established
hedonism, the principle gives both these counterarguments additional force in the sense that it
shows psychological hedonism would have had a chance to optimize before psychological
altruism. This improves the evolutionary case for psychological hedonism (over psychological
altruism) because a system of psychologically altruistic motives would not only have to
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overcome the disadvantages demonstrated in the counterarguments but would also have to
develop and integrate itself into an already deeply ingrained and fine tuned system of hedonistic
motivations.
A possible rebuttal to these counter arguments could claim that psychological altruism
isn‘t superior because it provides a more fitness enhancing level of parental care, but because it
is faster. Two counterarguments to this time-efficiency rebuttal were then presented which gave
reason to doubt that psychological altruism would be faster at all, much less fast enough to
outweigh the benefits of psychological hedonism over psychological altruism discussed in the
second counterargument to the argument from direct/indirect asymmetry.
Sober and Wilson‘s second major evolutionary argument for psychological altruism is the
argument from the Two are Better than One principle. Though this chapter has shown that
psychological altruism is inferior to psychological hedonism in terms of direct/indirect
asymmetry effects, it is nonetheless possible that psychological altruism in conjunction with
psychological hedonism may be superior to either mechanism individually. This will be the
subject of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER VII:
THE ―TWO ARE BETTER THAN ONE‖ PRINCIPLE, AND WHERE IT GOES WRONG AS
AN ARGUMENT FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL ALTRUISM
Numerous problems exist for any evolutionary argument for psychological altruism based
on the two are better than one principle. The purpose of this chapter is to expose and explore
these problems. Sober and Wilson use the two are better than one principle to argue that having
dual mechanisms to trigger functionally equivalent fitness enhancing behaviors (such as
providing parental care to offspring) would provide a fitness advantage for the organism, given
that all other things are equal. They argue that a supplementary mechanism can provide a benefit
in terms of reliability in three ways. First, a secondary mechanism could provide greater
reliability by working together with the primary mechanism to provide more information to the
organism. Second, the secondary mechanism could work as an additional trigger for a particular
fitness enhancing behavior. Sober and Wilson call to pluralistically triggered mechanisms as
multiply connected control devices (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 320). Third, a supplementary
mechanism may provide additional reliability in a case where the primary mechanism breaks
down or otherwise fails (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 320). These three reliability benefits may
appear together or separately. For example, if uni-causal pluralism is true, any particular
behavior is caused by a single type of mechanism. Nevertheless, it is still possible that an
organism might gain an advantage if the primary mechanism breaks down and a secondary
mechanism is engaged instead. On the other hand, if poly-causal pluralism is true, all three
benefits may work together at the same time.
This chapter provides several arguments to show that the two are better than one
principle, as part of an evolutionary argument for psychological altruism, is unconvincing. Some
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of these arguments are designed to show that psychologically altruistic mechanisms (PAMs) are
unlikely to provide fitness benefits as a result of greater reliability, while others are designed to
show that even if PAMs did produce some fitness benefits, those benefits would likely be so
mild that they would be overcome by the costs of establishing, developing, and maintaining the
secondary mechanism itself.
Section 7_1 describes the specifics of the two are better than one principle and section
7_2 shows how this principle can be used as an evolutionary argument for the psychological
altruism thesis.
Section 7_3 contains three general areas of criticism against the two are better than one
principle as an argument for psychological altruism. Section 7_3.1 is designed to show that the
presence of a psychologically altruistic mechanism is unlikely to provide additional benefit for
an organism that already has a psychologically hedonistic mechanism that works towards the
same ends. Section 7_3.1.1 specifically attacks the backup mechanism aspect of the evolutionary
argument from the two are better than one principle.
Sections 7_3.2.1 and 7_3.2.2 attack the two are better than one argument for
psychological altruism by working to undermine arguments which claim that maintaining a
psychologically altruistic mechanism in addition to a psychologically hedonistic one would carry
with it almost no additional costs in terms of fitness, an assumption required to make some of the
arguments for psychological altruism based upon the two are better than one principle seem
plausible. Section 7_3.4 rebuts the arguments that one should expect psychologically altruistic
mechanisms to evolve because of benefits gained by having certain fitness enhancing behaviors
(such as parental care) set up as multiply connected control devices.
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Section 7_3.3 introduces a third line of attack against evolutionary arguments for
psychological altruism through the two are better than one principle by asking why, even if all
the other rebuttals against the two are better than one argument are ignored, one should expect a
secondary psychological mechanisms to be altruistic rather than hedonistic, egoistic, or
something entirely different. Finally section 7_5 provides a brief summary of what has been
accomplished in this chapter.
It should be noted before continuing to the main text of this chapter, that many (though
not all) of the arguments to be presented here depend in part on arguments that were made in
chapter six. Specifically, the arguments that psychologically hedonistic mechanisms can track
fitness enhancing behaviors more reliably than psychologically altruistic ones as well as the
principle of pre-established hedonism come into play in this chapter more than once.
7_1 The Two are Better than One Principle
From their argument from D/I asymmetry, Sober and Wilson tried to show that a more
direct psychological mechanism such as psychological altruism would receive favorable
selection pressure over a more indirect mechanism such as psychological hedonism. The
previous chapter presented reasons to doubt both whether the conditions for D/I asymmetry hold
in the case of parental care and whether psychological altruism really is a more direct
psychological mechanism in terms of evolutionary fitness. This analysis of the D/I asymmetry
argument showed first that there is no reason to believe that psychological altruism has a
selective advantage over psychological hedonism, and second, that one should suspect that
psychological altruism is actually at a selective disadvantage in terms of D/I asymmetry. These
arguments were strengthened further by the principle of pre-established hedonism which was
also argued for in the previous chapter.
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However, it is not always the case that natural selection needs to choose between
functionally equivalent mechanisms. It is entirely possible that, even though psychological
hedonism by itself would be the superior mechanism to produce the optimum level of parental
care, the fitness of an organism could be improved further by including psychologically altruistic
mechanisms as well.
Referring back to the case of the anaerobic bacterium, this could happen if the oxygen
detector does not do a perfect job at detecting oxygen. In such a case, an indirect mechanism
might supplement the direct mechanism so long as these two devices do not interfere with each
other. Alternatively, a second mechanism might improve fitness simply by being available for
use if the first doesn‘t get triggered or in some other way breaks down. Sober and Wilson call
this the Two are better than one principle (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 306). They lay out the
principle like so:
(TBO) The two devices D and I acting together will be a more reliable guide
concerning which behaviors are fitness-enhancing than either D or I acting alone,
if each device is positively, though imperfectly, correlated with oxygen level, and
if the two devices operate with a reasonable degree of independence of each other.
(Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 307)
This statement can be made more general by replacing the term ―oxygen level‖ with the
term ―fitness relevant factor‖. The ―reasonable degree of independence‖ clause is necessary
because ―It is nonetheless possible that these two devices would perform very poorly if they
were placed together in a single organism. This might happen if the two devices interfere with
each other‖ (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 307). For example, suppose that the oxygen detector
produces an electrical field that throws off the accuracy of the magnetosome. This could result in
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the magnetosome doing more harm than good by causing the organism to swim into danger
rather than away from it.
Like D/I asymmetry, the TBO principle is limited by the five considerations for
predicting the evolution of proximate mechanisms outlined earlier in this dissertation. In the case
of the TBO principle, the third condition, energy efficiency, is especially important (Sober &
Wilson, 1998, p. 307-308). After all, an organism that develops, maintains, and operates two
proximate mechanisms is likely to use up more energy than an organism that only has to
develop, maintain, and operate one. However, if the additional energy spent on the second
mechanism is small enough, or if the extra reliability gained by the second mechanism is large
enough, then one should suspect that there would be selection pressure in favor of an organism
that has both mechanisms over an organism that has just one.
7_2 The Two are Better than One Principle as an Argument for Psychological Altruism
Sober and Wilson‘s characterization of the TBO principle (above) could be restated more
abstractly like so:
Two devices D and I acting together will be a more reliable guide to activating a
homologous fitness enhancing behavior than either D or I alone if each
mechanism is correctly triggered by either a factor that is directly relevant to
fitness or a factor that part of a chain of factors correlated to a fitness relevant
factor.
The term ―fitness relevant factor‖ allows for a mechanism to respond to conditions other
than the presence of oxygen or conditions correlated with the presence of oxygen. In the case of
parental care, for example, the fitness relevant factor might be ―perceiving one‘s child to be
hungry‖ or ―hearing one‘s child cry‖. Of course the generalization of the TBO principle above
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must have an ―all other things being equal‖ clause and must also specify that the two devices do
not interfere with each other just as the version specific to the anaerobic bacterium did.
One of the weakest points for an argument for psychological altruism based on the TBO
principle is energetic efficiency. For an anaerobic bacterium, producing an oxygen detector and a
magnetosome is likely to be costly both in terms of the calories required to build these
mechanisms and in terms of the calories required to use and maintain them. The higher the cost
of building and maintaining both D and I the less selection pressure there will be in favor of
having both mechanisms even if, absent energy concerns, possessing both mechanisms would
provide a benefit over having just one of them. Indeed, if the advantage to having both
mechanisms is small enough compared to the costs of developing and maintaining both
mechanisms, the organism with two mechanisms may be at a selective disadvantage over the
organism with just one.
But, according to Sober and Wilson, while energy costs might be a problem for the
development of extra biological mechanisms in general, the nature of psychologically altruistic
mechanisms (PAMs) is such there are no, or almost no, extra energy costs attached to having the
right kind of additional psychological mechanism. They say:
What requires energy is building the hardware that implements a belief/desire
psychology. However, we doubt that it makes an energetic difference whether the
organism has one ultimate desire rather than two People with more beliefs
apparently don‘t need to eat more than people with fewer. The same point seems
to apply to issues of how many, or which, ultimate desires one has. (Sober &
Wilson, 2000, p. 203-204)
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For the sake of future reference, this argument will be called the thesis of free
psychological software. As Sober and Wilson‘s argument goes, the brain takes calories to build
and calories to run, but once the brain exists and is operating, it doesn‘t matter whether egoistic
or egoistic and altruistic ―software‖ is running in terms of the amount of energy used.
Sober and Wilson believe that a similar argument applies to the evolutionarily relevant
consideration of availability. Sober and Wilson argue that psychologically altruistic desires and
beliefs were available as soon as the elements necessary for psychologically hedonistic
mechanisms became available. They say:
With respect to availability, we make the following claim: If hedonism was
available ancestrally, so was altruism. The reason is that the two motivational
mechanisms differ only in a modest way. Both require a belief/desire psychology.
And both the hedonistic and the altruistic parent want their children to do well;
the only difference is that the hedonist has this propositional content as an
instrumental desire while the altruist has it as an ultimate desire. (Sober &
Wilson, 2000, p. 203)
Since the brain already has the capacity to use ultimate desires and form beliefs and
generate instrumental desires, Sober and Wilson reason that the addition of another ultimate
desire doesn‘t really require the evolution of a new function, but simply puts a new spin on old
ones. They say:
A hedonist must formulate beliefs about whether its children are doing well. It
must form the ultimate desire to attain pleasure and avoid pain. And the organism
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must construct the instrumental desire that its children do well.173 (Sober &
Wilson, 1998, p. 321).
For future reference, this argument will be called the thesis of similar psychological
software availability.174 This argument has already been dealt with to some extent in chapter six
in proposing and defending the principle of pre-established hedonism.
Sober and Wilson use the thesis of energy free psychological software and the thesis of
similar psychological software availability to show that pluralistic mechanisms for psychological
altruism are cost-free (or almost cost-free), presuming that altruism exists and that
psychologically altruistic mechanisms were as available as psychologically hedonistic ones.
If Sober and Wilson are right, then it seems to follow that if there was any consistent
selection pressure in favor of psychological altruism, even if only very slight, one should expect
psychological altruism to have evolved. The role of the TBO principle is to show that there
would be selection pressure favoring two mechanisms over one, and the principles of free and
available psychological software are used to argue against the existence of any selective friction
that might interfere with psychological altruism developing as an adaptation.
The fact is, however, that there might be more selective friction against the development
of psychologically altruistic mechanism than Sober and Wilson recognize.
Note that saying ―It must form the ultimate desire to attain pleasure and avoid pain.‖ makes it sound as if the
brain has the capability of generating ultimate desires on the fly. Of course they could mean ―form‖ as a biological
developmental process, governed primarily by the genes, that occurs at the time of embryonic development or
naturally under most environmental condition as a child develops. But the use here seems strange if that is what they
meant. On the other hand, infants find pain aversive at their birth, so saying that this ultimate desire is learned and
not guided by very strong genetic tendencies seems extremely implausible.
174
This thesis, when it is taken to entail that psychological altruistic mechanisms became available to as soon as
psychologically hedonistic ones, has already been disputed in the previous chapter through the arguments for preestablished hedonism. Nevertheless, a weaker version of the thesis might simply say that ―Given psychological
hedonism of a sufficiently sophisticated kind, psychologically altruistic mechanisms must have been available to
natural selection.‖
173
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7_3 Why the Two are Better than One Argument for Psychological Altruism Fails
For the evolutionary argument for psychological altruism via the two are better than one
principle to work, at least the following must be true:
1. The combination of both a psychologically altruistic mechanism (PAM) and a
psychologically hedonistic mechanism (PHM) must provide a survival
advantage over either one individually.
2. The costs (in terms of fitness) of maintaining and operating two psychological
mechanisms must be less than the fitness benefit that results from an organism
having both mechanisms. In other words, the principle of free (or nearly free)
psychological software must be true for psychologically altruistic mechanisms
or the advantages conferred by having two mechanisms instead of one must be
proportionally stronger.
3. PAMs must, in principle, be available for selection to work on. In other
words, the principle of similar psychological software availability must be
true.
4. PAMs must either be the best secondary psychological mechanism available
in terms of fitness, or among a larger group of additional psychological
mechanisms would all enhance fitness via the two are better than one
principle which are all being selected for at the same time.175
Sober and Wilson‘s evolutionary arguments from the two are better than one principle
will be rebutted on all of these fronts except for the third. Nobody knows what the neurology of
psychologically altruistic mechanisms must look like, and therefore nobody knows if it is
175
In this later case, the two are better than one principle would be better named the More are Better than One
principle.
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naturally impossible for them to become available. The principle of pre-established hedonism
discussed in the previous chapter, however, gives one a good reason to suspect that
psychologically altruistic mechanisms did not become available until psychologically hedonistic
mechanisms had a chance to become firmly established. Even so, the principle of pre-established
hedonism does not show that psychologically altruistic mechanisms never became available to
natural selection. The remaining first, second, and fourth conditions will be considered in order.
7_3.1 It is Doubtful that Psychologically Altruistic Mechanisms would Provide a Fitness
Benefit when Combined with Psychologically Hedonistic Mechanisms
The rebuttals against the argument from Direct/Indirect asymmetry in the previous
chapter showed two things. First, it was shown that psychologically hedonistic mechanisms
(PHMs) responding to selection pressure could be expected to adjust by natural selection to
trigger those actions which maximize fitness. Thus, if maximizing parental care maximizes
fitness then psychological hedonism could do so176 just as well as psychological altruism.
Second, it was shown that maximizing parental care would seldom be fitness
maximizing. Since psychologically altruistic mechanisms for parental care can only work to
maximize parental care, these two rebuttals taken together indicate that psychologically
hedonistic mechanisms can be optimized to trigger a fitness maximizing level of parental care
where psychologically altruistic mechanisms cannot. Thus, if an organism could have only one
or the other of these two mechanisms, a PHM would grant a selective advantage over a PAM.
This same reasoning has fitness implications for the presence of both mechanisms for
parental care in a single organism. These implications follow most strongly if one accepts the
principle of pre-established hedonism. However, even if one rejects this principle, so long as it is
The term ―could‖ is used here, because chapter six also showed why maximizing parental care would not be as
fitness enhancing as more moderate parental care.
176
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accepted that psychological hedonism could have developed a significant amount of time (in
evolutionary terms) before psychological altruism became available, then the argument from the
two are better than one principle is weakened by whatever likelihood one would assign to that
possibility.
Assuming that (either by principle or chance) psychological hedonistic mechanisms for
parental care developed in an organism to the point where they reliably trigger those actions
which provide the an optimum level of parental care or something extremely close to it in terms
of average fitness, then the introduction of a new psychologically altruistic mechanism, if it has
the power to influence behavior at all, would almost always decrease fitness and be selected
against. This is illustrated in the following diagram:
In this figure it becomes obvious why the introduction of a PAM to trigger parental care
will cause a decline in fitness if a preexisting hedonistic mechanism is already developed to
optimality or near optimality. A well developed PHM for parental care would dictate action A**,
that action which maximizes fitness in relation to parental care, and a newly introduced PAM,
even if it worked perfectly upon introduction, would dictate action A* (that action which
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maximizes parental care). Thus, if both mechanisms have influence over the behavior of the
organism in question, the newly introduced altruistic mechanism would change the vector
representing behavior away from the outcome that would have been caused by a PHM alone,
which, by hypothesis produces optimal or near-optimal behavior. In this way, a new PAM
introduced into a psychology where psychological hedonism is already well established would be
a selectively disadvantageous feature. Thus, all other things being equal, one should expect that
no PAMs developed for parental care if psychological hedonism was already well established
when psychologically altruistic mechanisms became available and if both mechanisms would
have influence over some of the same behaviors. There are some possible exceptions to this case:
It is possible that if psychologically hedonistic mechanisms were not yet fully optimized,
and if the optimal level of parental care was very near the maximum, that the sudden appearance
of a psychologically altruistic mechanism would generate a benefit, as seen in figure 7.3. But
there is little reason to assume that the optimum level of parental care would be that close to
maximal parental care for five reasons. First, if the optimal level of parental care were placed
randomly within the spectrum, the odds are low that it would end up very close to one end or the
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other. These odds remain poor even if the minimal 1/4th of the scale is eliminated. Second,
human beings do not seem to behave as if they are providing maximal parental care. Third, by
the arguments given in chapter six, there are good reasons to doubt that optimal parental care
would be very close to maximum parental care. Fourth, if the psychologically hedonistic
mechanism were less than perfectly optimized but directed the organisms towards actions of
greater parental care, the introduction of a psychologically altruistic mechanism would only
make things worse. Fifth, the closer the psychologically hedonistic mechanisms are to being
optimized, the closer the most selectively advantageous action (A**) would have to be to
providing maximal parental care for a PAM to provide a benefit. If psychologically hedonistic
mechanisms appeared long before psychologically altruistic ones (as was argued for in chapter
six) then it is reasonable to assume that PHMs were functioning to produce very near optimal
behaviors regarding parental care before PAMs became available to natural selection.
Returning attention back to figure 7.1, it should also be noted that the scenario presented
within this diagram assumes that both psychological mechanisms have equal influence over the
behavior of the organism and, as a result, the new vector of behavior produces an action directly
between the vectors of each. However the problem remains for the introduction of
psychologically altruistic mechanisms even if they are presumed to have a reduced level of
influence, although the amount of fitness lost if the influence PAM mechanism were reduced
would decrease. If the PAM has no influence then there would, of course, be no fitness loss, but
at that point the PAM is no longer a behavior influencing mechanism at all.177
If the principle of pre-established hedonism is weakened to merely a principle of preexisting hedonism, which is to say that PHMs developed first but were followed quickly (in
177
The PAM could still possibly provide a fitness benefit as a backup mechanism or because it is part of a multiply
connected control device, but these arguments will be taken up later.
291
evolutionary time) by PAMs, then the introduction of psychologically altruistic mechanisms
might result in improved fitness as it relates to parental care. The diagram below shows how this
might be so:
In this diagram it is presumed that psychologically hedonistic mechanisms predated
psychologically altruistic ones but had not yet had a chance to optimize before psychologically
altruistic mechanisms developed. If this assumption is granted, this diagram shows how PHMs
and PAMs working in tandem could theoretically optimize fitness as well as an established PHM
alone. This can happen if it turns out that the action generated by the relatively new PHM alone
provided less parental care than is fitness maximizing, and if the result of both the PHM and
PAM working together cause an organism to take those actions which tend to maximize fitness,
or at least come closer to doing so than the PHM alone would. Though the diagram above
represents a possibility, the assumptions required to actualize it are doubtful for all the reasons
given in support of the principle of pre-established hedonism.
Further, even if the principle of pre-established hedonism was rejected as a predictive
rule, to the extent that it is reasonable to believe that psychologically hedonistic mechanisms
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evolved significantly earlier than psychologically altruistic ones it is also reasonable to reject the
argument from the two are better than one principle as positive support for psychological
altruism. If one believes it is a 50% tossup as to which type of psychological mechanism had a
chance to develop first (hedonistic or altruistic), that implies that, at best, and ignoring all other
arguments, psychological altruism and psychological hedonism are equally likely to have
developed. But this conclusion is contrary to the conclusion that Sober and Wilson argue for in
Unto Others.
To make matters worse for the defender of psychological altruism, their defense must be
able to explain the presence of psychologically hedonistic mechanisms as well as
psychologically altruistic ones, or else must hold the highly doubtful position that PHMs either
do not exist, or have no causal influence over behaviors that are influenced by PAMs. Rejecting
the causal influence of PHMs would put the defender of psychological altruism back into the
position of the uni-causal pluralist (discussed in the previous chapter ) in regard to a set of
particular behaviors such as parental care. But in the case of uni-causal pluralism, it became
evident that PHMs could potentially do a better job at picking out fitness maximizing behavior
than PAMs, and would therefore be more likely to evolve.
If the defender of psychological altruism chooses to deny the principle of pre-established
hedonism, she does have a couple of options left open to her that can account for the presence of
psychologically hedonistic mechanisms along with altruistic ones. These are revealed in the
diagrams below:
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These two diagrams presume that psychologically altruistic mechanisms developed
before hedonistic ones. In the figures above, the selection of PHMs could be favored by natural
selection in the presence of PAMs if the introduction of a PHM causes an organism to behave in
a way which comes closer to maximizing fitness in regard to parental care than it would by
responding to the PAM alone. This can happen in three ways. The presence of a newly
introduced PHM could work with the PAM to produce behavior that is less than fitness
maximizing, but still maximizes fitness better than the PAM alone (Fig. 7.4). The presence of a
newly introduced PHM could work with the PAM produce behavior that provides more parental
care than is fitness maximizing, but still produces an amount of parental care that is closer to
maximizing fitness than the PAM alone would produce (Fig. 7.5). Or, finally, the newly
introduced PHM could work with the PAM to produce optimal fitness maximizing behavior
where the PAM alone could not (Fig. 7.3 with the order of evolution reversed).
However, the prospects for these three possibilities being true are not as good as they
might at first seem. In the scenario depicted in figure 7.4 it is obvious that, if the psychologically
294
altruistic mechanism were to disappear, the organism would do an even better job at maximizing
fitness in regard to parental care. This would be true in any circumstance where the PHM alone
would trigger an action that provides more than the optimal level of parental care but less than
maximum parental care. Under such a scenario, one should expect selection pressure against
preserving the PAM and favoring of preserving the PHM alone. Therefore, only under the
scenario described by figure 7.5, and in the case where the newly introduced PHM works to
produce optimal fitness could a poly-causal pluralist explain the continued presence of PHMs.
To make matters worse for the pluralist, it should be noted that the introduction of a PHM
in an organism with an existing PAM doesn‘t guarantee an increase in fitness. This can be seen
in the diagram below:
Figure 7.6 shows that, if psychologically altruistic mechanisms preceded psychologically
hedonistic ones, PHMs would fail to develop if they appeared in a such a way that the behavior
resulting from the PAM and the PHM working together is further from optimization of parental
care than the action arising from the PAM alone would be. This possibility can be trouble for a
pluralistic theory such as Sober and Wilson‘s because they assert that psychologically hedonistic
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mechanisms exist along side of psychologically altruistic ones. Their story, therefore, has to be
capable of explaining both the existence of PAMs and PHMs. Yet there is no particular reason to
prefer the stories depicted in diagrams 7.5 or 7.3178 over all the other scenarios that would disrupt
selection for PAMs. With so many ways for the combination of a PAM/PHM combination to go
wrong, there are many good reasons to doubt that pluralistic decision making would improve
fitness in cases relevant to the psychological egoism/altruism debate. To be sure, it isn‘t
impossible that psychological pluralism could improve fitness, but without further reasons to
think otherwise, such a case seems to be against the odds.
To summarize: In order for PAMs and PHMs to work together and provide a selective
advantage over PHMs alone, the arguments for pre-established hedonism must be rebutted and a
scenario such as that depicted in diagram 7.5 or 7.3179 must be true. Without further argument on
the part of the defender of the psychological altruism thesis, the odds of these requirements being
met do not appear to be as likely as the odds of them failing to be met. In the face of this, one
should suspect that PAMs failed to evolve, or at least failed to evolve for the reasons given by
the two are better than one argument for improved fitness.
Finally it should be noticed that defenders of the thesis of psychological egoism
(including the hedonistic variety) do not face a similar problem. Since they do not have to
describe a scenario in which another psychological altruism could have evolved consistently with
a scenario in which psychological hedonism evolved, a defender of psychological hedonism (or,
more broadly, a defender of psychological egoism) need not explain the existence of PAMs in
the same way that a poly-causal pluralist defender of the psychological altruism thesis needs to
explain the existence PHMs. Further, presuming that some level of parental care is better than
178
Diagram 7.3 here refers to both 7.3 as it is drawn and 7.3 with the order of evolution reversed, as it was
referenced later.
179
See previous footnote.
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none, the presence of a PHM for parental care, where there were no mechanisms before, will
almost always be fitness enhancing. Consider the following diagrams:
In the scenarios depicted in both figures 7.7 and 7.8, the psychologically hedonistic
mechanism would provide a selective advantage over inaction. Indeed, unless the behavior
caused by the PHM is actually harmful to fitness in some other way, this will always be the case.
Furthermore, the action tracked by the PHM can be expected to adapt towards the selectively
optimal level of parental care as it is fine-tuned by natural selection.
7_3.1.1 Computer simulation.
Section 7_3.1 provided reasons for believing that a psychologically hedonistic
mechanism is likely to produce behavior closer to optimal fitness than poly-causal behavior.
Though the arguments presented were intuitive, a computer simulation in which an optimal
parental care value is randomly generated (between 0 and 100) and where a hedonistic
mechanism produces a random amount of parental care (between 0 and 100) confirms that the
hedonistically motivated behavior will tend to be closer to the optimum level of care than pure
altruism (value = 100).
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There are several possible interpretations as to the meaning of the numbers on the 0-100
scale. For example, one can take it that the highest level of parental care (value = 100) represents
a parental care action that will certainly kill the parent but save its offspring.180 If so, then
assume that the lowest level of parental care (value = 0) indicates that the parental organism
would not accept any reduction in personal fitness to aid its offspring. The value directly in the
middle, 51, means that the organism would risk an approximately 50/50 chance of death to save
its offspring, and so on. An alternative way to view the 0-100 scale is to assume that the numbers
0-100 represent the amount of resources the parent is willing to give up to its offspring. I prefer
the former framework to the latter because in that scheme each outcome represents an individual
act. There are other possible interpretations of the 0-100 scale as well. Regardless of the
interpretation, however, 0 should represent no parental care and 100 should represent total
sacrifice for the sake of the organism‘s offspring, while all of the numbers between should
represents a steady and gradual gradation between the two extremes.
Because both the optimum level of parental care and the behavior indicated by a
psychologically hedonistic motive first arriving on the scene are unknown, both variables were
assigned a random number between 0 and 100. The value of an altruistically motivated behavior
was set to parental care level 100.181 The numerical ―distance‖ between the hedonistically
motivated action and the selectively optimal parental care action was then measured as was the
―distance‖ between the altruistic parental care action (value = 100) and selectively optimal
parental care action. These two ―distances‖ were then compared to see whether psychological
180
In truth, actions can be more altruistic than that. A parent might take certain death to only give its child a
possibility of survival, and at its maximum that possibility can be infinitely small. Of course organisms are unlikely
to do this, but parental care 100% is supposed to represent the level indicated by psychological altruism when no
other motivators, such as psychologically egoistic ones, are a factor.
181
The altruistic value is always maximized because it is abstracted away from any other non-altruistic influences
that might influence behavior.
298
hedonism or psychological altruism would have produced a behavior closer to optimal parental
care. The program repeated this procedure one million times and then averaged the results and
formed a percentage for each type of psychological mechanism.
The results showed that psychological hedonism produced an action closer to optimal
fitness than psychological altruism roughly 83% of the time. Even if the boundaries of optimal
parental care were narrowed so that optimal parental care was always assumed to be greater than
50 (and there is no reason for this extreme assumption), hedonistically motivated actions were
closer to optimal actions roughly 56% of the time.
In a second simulation, a third contender, an action produced by a combination of both
psychological altruism and psychological hedonism, was added. The results of the
psychologically altruistic mechanism and the pluralistic action were then compared for closeness
to optimal fitness against the results psychological hedonism alone. Again, the simulation
favored the psychologically hedonistic mechanisms more than 62% of the time. When the
optimum level of parental care was assumed to be at least 25 but less than 90, hedonism still
came out on top approximately 56% of the time.182
These simulations show that if both the optimum level of parental care and the starting
level of hedonistic care are unknown, one should expect psychological hedonism to produce
actions closer to optimum parental care than either altruistically motivated actions, pluralistic
actions, or both taken together.
Before moving on, it is worth noting one more thing. None of these simulations took the
principle of pre-established hedonism into account. If it is granted that psychologically
hedonistic mechanisms evolved long before psychologically altruistic mechanisms were
It should be kept in mind too that in the second set of simulations the percentage of non-hedonistic ―wins‖ were
shared by both the pluralistic result and the altruistic result. Individually, pluralism always came out ahead of
altruism.
182
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possible, then it is probable that, through variation and natural selection, hedonistically
motivated parental care would be in a ―starting position‖ much closer to the optimum level of
parental care than random positioning when and if psychologically altruistic mechanisms became
available. The source code for the program used for these experiments can be found in
Appendix A.
7_3.2 The Backup Mechanism Argument
A defender of the ―two are better than one‖ argument could object that the previous
arguments fail because the fitness advantage that the presence of a psychologically altruistic
mechanism confers does not stem from a combined vector-like influence over the behavior of an
organism. The defender might argue that the benefits of having a PAMs for parental care (and
other types of behavior that sometimes require self-sacrifice) are derived as a result of having a
secondary mechanism in case the PHM breaks down. Only then would the PAM gain influence
over an organism‘s behavior, and this behavioral guidance, while inferior to that of the PHM,
would be an improvement over having no guidance at all.
There are a number of weaknesses to this alternative approach, however. The first
weakness is the fact that a backup system which only becomes relevant in case the first system
breaks down it is likely to produce a very weak fitness advantage if the primary mechanism is
dependable. This is because the altruistic ―backup mechanism‖ would only provide a fitness
benefit in those organisms in which the PHM failed to operate correctly and in which the PAM
triggered an action that would be more fitness enhancing than whatever action would have been
produced by the error.
If one had reason to suspect that PHMs break down all the time, then the two are better
than one principle might show that organisms that also have a PAM would gain a significant
300
fitness advantage as a result of having a PAM as a failsafe. But there is no reason to suspect any
such thing. Indeed, one should suspect that psychological pleasure and pain should be even more
reliable motivators than physical pleasure and pain, and physical pleasure and pain are generally
reliable motivators.
Physical pain as a motivator does sometimes fail. Sometimes organisms do not feel pain
when injured due to nerve damage, or sometimes an injury might avoid pain receptors all
together. Even some parasites attack in a way that first numbs the pain receptors of the victim.183
Nevertheless, physical pain has proven to be a very reliable method of deterring behavior, and
cases of complete failure are rare. It does no good to count modern anesthetics against the
effectiveness of physical pain as a motivator, for these were not available during most of human
evolution, and, now that they are available, they more often enhance fitness than lower it. There
would be no selective advantage for a human being who is resistant to modern anesthetics all
other things being equal. Nor do cases such as brain tumors, which often do not cause pain (since
there are no pain receptors in the brain), provide a workable counterexample, because it would
have done no good for an animal, even the human animal, to know that it has a brain tumor prior
to the development of effective brain surgery or other modern therapies. Indeed, feeling pain in
the case of something like a brain tumor would actually decrease fitness because, if severe
enough, such pain would seriously interfere with the animal‘s activities, including reproduction
or providing for its young.
183
An example of the latter can be found in the vampire bat which attacks sleeping herd animals. The spittle of these
creatures contains both an analgesic and anti-coagulant.
301
Physical pain works very well as a motivator, and there are reasons to suspect that
psychological ―pains‖184 would be even more dependable. After all, in the case of psychological
pain, there are no pain receptors than can be avoided or fooled. Indeed, there are only two
obvious things that could interfere with a psychologically hedonistic mechanism in response to
psychological pleasure or pain (assuming that pleasures, pains, and discount-rates are already
finely tuned for fitness).
The first possible cause of interference falls under the category of psychological defense
mechanisms. A good example of such a mechanism is denial. In cases of extreme psychological
torment, a person may come to deny that the painful event ever took place to avoid continuing
pain. In most cases, though, this would fail to give psychologically altruistic motivation an
advantage. Denial usually occurs when it is too late to do anything about the source of a
particular psychological pain. In such a case, a psychologically altruistic backup mechanism
would not be triggered either and therefore provide no obvious selective advantage.
The second possible cause of interference for a PHM in relation to psychological
pleasures and pains would be cases in which the brain miscalculates or malfunctions. Perhaps in
some cases, a parent does not understand what is happening to her offspring and thus is not
subject to psychological pain, for example. But in such a circumstance, psychological altruism
would also fail to function because the same beliefs required for psychologically hedonistic
mechanisms to be effective are required for psychologically altruistic mechanisms to be effective
as well. Along similar lines, a parent could be suffering from a brain injury, exhaustion, sickness,
fever, or be cognitively disadvantaged for some other reason and, because of this, miscalculate
regarding using its hedonistic motives. This surely could interfere with a PHM, but in these cases
The term ―pains‖ is only in quotes here to distinguish it from pains caused by nerves in the body. Psychological
―pains‖ are real pain insofar as psychological hedonism is concerned. These quotes will be omitted from this point
on.
184
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it is reasonable (though not logically required) to think that psychologically altruistic processes
in the brain would malfunction as well. After all, Sober and Wilson‘s main argument to show
that psychologically altruistic mechanisms were available to natural selection was that both
PAMs and PHMs use the same basic machinery (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 321). And though the
principle of pre-established hedonism denies this claim, it does so because PAMs have
requirements in addition to those for PHMs, not the other way around. To the extent that a
defender of the psychological altruism thesis makes the argument that PAMs are significantly
different structurally than PHMs, their assumed availability comes into question.185
In order for psychological altruism to provide a real advantage as a pure back-up
mechanism, the organism would have to be injured or malfunctioning in such a way that the
PHM fails to function but the PAM continues to work.186 Certainly this is possible. A rare and
very specific brain injury might do the trick. But the rarer the conditions that are required for a
psychologically altruistic mechanism to provide fitness benefits are, the smaller that fitness
advantage will be when averaged out over time. Given the above considerations, a
psychologically altruistic mechanism (which provides fitness benefits only as a backup
mechanism) might be activated on so few occasions that it provides virtually no fitness benefits
at all.
At this point an objector might point out that saying ―virtually no fitness benefits‖ is just
another way of saying ―some fitness benefits,‖ and that therefore selection pressure would still
favor having both psychologically altruistic and hedonistic mechanisms for parental care over
185
Additionally, the likelihood of a PAM failing to function when a PHM fails to function is even greater if
psychological hedonism is simpler and more deeply rooted than psychological altruism as is implied by the principle
of pre-established hedonism.
186
If the psychologically hedonistic mechanism could simply be fooled by states that the psychologically altruistic
mechanism isn‘t fooled by, the same selection pressure that would exist for an entirely new psychologically
altruistic mechanism would exist for modifying the already existing psychologically hedonistic mechanism so it no
longer would make such mistakes, and such changes could probably be made more cheaply in terms of fitness costs.
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either one singly. However, this is not strictly true. If a mechanism which causes a very small
fitness benefit is only triggered very rarely, then it might be selected for in an organism on those
rare occasions when it activates, but it would not be selected for at all during those generations in
which it fails to trigger. During those generations, mutations or other developments which could
interfere with the backup mechanism would not be selected against at all. If the benefit of having
a backup mechanism occurs rarely enough, the genetics of the backup mechanism could decay
through non-selection faster than it is built up by the rare occasions when it is favored by
selection.
Furthermore, a very small fitness advantage can be overcome by an equally small fitness
disadvantage. This means that if the thesis of free psychological software proves not to be
strictly true, which is to say that there are, in fact, small costs to an organism for developing and
maintaining two psychological mechanisms over one then what is arguably the very small
benefit that having a PAM as a backup mechanism could be overwhelmed if producing and
maintaining both mechanisms generates costs that are small but still a little bit higher.
Though the potential costs of a second psychological mechanism will be studied more
thoroughly in the next section, there are some obvious reasons to believe that developing and
maintaining a PAM in addition to a PHM would not be entirely cost free. Regardless of how a
psychologically altruistic mechanism works, it must work through the activation of neurons.
Neurons require energy to fire, to make new connections within the brain, to grow, to develop in
the first place, and to maintain. Once this is realized, it becomes clear that a secondary
psychological mechanism for parental care cannot be literally cost free in terms of energy,
although it may cost very little in comparison to how much energy it takes to develop and
maintain the entire organism as a whole.
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Second, in a case where a PAM only activates when a PHM fails, there must either be
some third mechanism which is capable of determining when the PHM is malfunctioning and
substituting the PAM, or the PAM must be capable of doing this itself. Furthermore, this new
mechanism (or additional function of the PAM) must be active (and thus using energy) any time
that the primary psychological mechanism would be activated. In addition, this function must be
present in an organism before the PAM can provide any selective advantage, because the PAM
would otherwise not trigger at all or else generate the energy costs associated with detecting
whether or not it should trigger itself constantly. Why would such a mechanism be selected for in
an organism that did not already have active psychologically altruistic mechanisms? One
possible solution would be if the PAM or the PHM failure-detector provided some other function
that was selected for. But without any evidence at all to back up this claim, this is as bad as a
just-so story can get. Furthermore, even if such a story could be fleshed out in a believable way,
the number of contingencies required for psychologically altruistic mechanisms to become viable
seems to increase with every new consideration.
Finally, even if a backup psychological mechanism would provide a fitness advantage
after all these drawbacks are considered, why should a PAM evolve over some other kind of
mechanism? Since PHMs are capable of picking out the fitness maximizing level of parental care
and the PAM is not, a more fitness enhancing approach might be for an organism to have two
psychologically hedonistic mechanisms, one as primary and one as a backup.187 More will be
said on this possibility and others in section 7_3.3.
187
This point becomes even more important when it is considered in conjunction with the fact that Sober and Wilson
argue that PAMs and PHMs only require the same basic psychological machinery (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 321).
If PAMs and PHMs are extremely similar, and if PHMs are, as was argued in chapter six, more reliable than PAMs,
then a PHM would almost certainly make a better backup mechanism than a PAM, even if the mechanism being
backed up is a PHM itself.
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7_3.2.1 Why the thesis of free psychological software fails.
The two are better than one argument relies on what I have called the thesis of free
psychological software. This principle is especially important given the arguments in the
previous section which show that it is likely that the two are better than one principle could
provide only a very weak selective pressure in favor of psychologically altruistic mechanisms. If
these arguments are successful, even a very small disadvantage from the energy cost of
developing and maintaining an additional psychological mechanism could be enough to
outweigh the benefits of such a mechanism.
Sober and Wilson believe that the addition of altruistic ultimate desires to the psychology
of human beings was not costly in the same way that growing a new organ would be costly.
Since the brain is already capable of generating beliefs and ultimate desires, they reason it would
cost nothing, or next to nothing, in terms of energy for the brain to generate altruistic ultimate
desires. They say:
Although it is energetically more efficient for a bacterium to have a magnetosome
than to have both a magnetosome and a separate oxygen detector, it is hard to see
why motivational pluralism should be more energetically burdensome than
hedonism... Mechanisms for representing beliefs and desires are required by both
hypotheses, both require that the organism be able to experience pleasure and
pain, and both require the organism to have both ultimate and instrumental
desires. What pluralism requires is that the device for representing the organism‘s
ultimate desires encode an extra representation—namely the desire that its
children do well. (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 322)
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I earlier labeled this the thesis of free psychological software. From the thesis of free
psychological software and from Sober and Wilson‘s argument from the two are better than one
principle, their argument can be distilled and stated more directly:
1. There is at least some advantage (and therefore, selection pressure) in favor of
redundant mechanisms if all other things remain equal and if the
supplemented mechanism can either sometimes fail or be damaged.
2.
Having an altruistic ultimate desire is essentially cost free because the brain
already has all the basic components necessary for generating and acting upon
psychologically altruistic desires.
3. Therefore, it is more likely that psychological altruism evolved than
otherwise.
The most serious problem with this argument can be found in its second premise, for
there are a number of reasons to believe that the introduction of altruistic motivations would not
be cost free in terms of energetic efficiency and that, further, other evolutionary considerations
may stand against it.
7_3.2.2 Energetic efficiency
Sober and Wilson say, ―We doubt that people who have more beliefs need more calories
than people who are less opinionated; the same point applies to ultimate desires‖ (Sober &
Wilson, 1998, p. 322). However, there are good reasons to doubt the truth of this claim.
If it is granted that beliefs and desires (including ultimate desires) are the product of
neural structures, then it is not too difficult to see why there would necessarily be some cost
associated with developing, maintaining, and utilizing a psychologically altruistic mechanism.
This is because of three basic facts:
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1. Neurons take energy to create.
2. Neural cells are alive, and thus take at least some amount of energy to
maintain.
3. Neurons require energy to fire as well as to make new connections within the
brain.
Even if it is argued that the brain has to create and develop neurons regardless of whether
or not psychologically altruistic motives exist, the problem presented by point 3 remains. The
neurons responsible for a psychological mechanism must become active to have any effect on
behavior. Thus, however many additional neural cells a PAM/PHM combination system of
motivation requires over a PHM system alone, those cells are using up energy that an organism
could use in other ways.
Sober and Wilson say, ―Here‘s an analogy that we find suggestive: Once you buy a
computer, the difference in cost between writing one sentence in a file and writing two sentences
there is trivial‖ (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 322). This is true, as far as it goes, but a trivial cost is
still a cost. This means that the two are better than one principle alone does not guarantee overall
selection pressure in favor of psychological altruism. An additional argument must be
constructed to show that the level of selection pressure favoring the presence of PAMs and
PHMs in the same organism is greater than the energy costs required for the additional
mechanism.
Since PHMs do not seem to fail often, the small fitness advantage conferred by having a
PAM as a backup mechanism might easily be overwhelmed by even small energy costs.
Additionally, the analogy Sober and Wilson make when comparing a computer writing a file and
a brain developing, maintaining, and using a second psychological mechanism under emphasizes
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the issue of energy consumption. While a PAM might need to ―write to memory‖ it also needs to
do much more than that. The brain of an organism with both PHMs and PAMs, even if PAMs
only serve as a back-up mechanism, would have to test whether or not it was the proper time to
apply a PAM over PHM whenever a relevant situation (such as one calling for some level of
parental care) arose at the same time as a malfunction of the PHM. This constant testing requires
that additional neurons fire as part of those computations. This would be a much more
continuous drain on energy that single ―write‖ to memory.
Just as running software requires a computer to use more energy than sitting in an idle
process, it takes more energy for the brain to ―run‖ a piece of psychological software than not. In
a paper entitled Evaluation of a “Mental Effort” Hypothesis for Correlations Between Cortical
Metabolism and Intelligence, Gerald Larson, Richard Haier, and Lori LaCasse say the following:
Several previous studies (e.g., Boivin et al., 1992; Charlot et al., 1992 Haier et al.,
1998 Haier, Siegel, Maclachlan, et al., 1992; Haier, Siegel, Tang, et al., 1992;
Parks et al., 1998) found that high aptitude is associated with low brain glucose
utilization during problem solving. Different results were found in our study (i.e.,
high intelligence was associated with relatively high cortical metabolic rate during
cognitive task performance. The details of the experimental design would seem to
provide the most obvious explanation of why past and present results diverge.
Whereas previous research involved the use of standardized cognitive tests or
tasks in which all participants received identical items, this article utilized items
that were tailed to participants‘ own ability levels, thereby standardizing
difficulty. (Larson, Haier, Lacasse, & Hazen, 1995, p. 276)
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In other words, more glucose is used by the brains of smarter people (considering more
possibilities) than those not so engaged. What is more, Larson et al., say:
Interestingly, our findings may support theories that link individual differences in
cognitive ability to the activation capacity of working memory ( e.g., Cantor &
Engle, 1993; Just & Carpenter, 1992; Woltz, 1988). …If level of cortical activity
correlates with the amount of activated information in working memory, and if
brighter participants have the capacity to activate more information, then one may
anticipate positive correlations between cortical metabolism and intelligence
rather than negative correlations.188 (Larson, Haier, Lacasse, & Hazen, 1998, p.
276-277)
Thus a person who generates and accesses more beliefs does in fact burn more calories
than a person who produces and accesses fewer if all other things are held equal. Additionally,
the number of neurons that a brain has on average is itself an evolutionary adaptation. If the
neurons required to keep a PAM functional did not exist, then an organism would not have to
expend the energy to develop or maintain them. Sober and Wilson seem to assume that there are
extra neurons just waiting to be put to use as new psychological mechanisms. Yet, if this were
so, one would still expect evolution to reduce the number of such ―extra‖ neurons present in the
human brain to an optimal level. Therefore the advantage conveyed by a PAM would have to be
greater than the disadvantages of using extra energy to grow, activate, and maintain additional
neurons required for the PAM.
This is not to deny the possibility that selection favors having ―extra‖ neurons in case
they are needed. But, even in this case, the most fitness enhancing number of neurons to develop
188
The alternative hypothesis is that highly intelligent people use less energy because their brains are more efficient.
Note that both positions tacitly acknowledge that the firing of neurons require the expenditure of energy.
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and maintain would be less for a psychologically monistic organism than for a pluralistic one,
and the pluralistic organism would therefore have to have an advantage strong enough to
outweigh these costs.
The energy costs required for having psychologically altruistic mechanisms in addition to
psychologically hedonistic ones might be very small when compared to the amount of energy an
organism such as a human being uses overall. But that isn‘t the correct point for comparison. The
comparison that is important for the psychological altruism vs. egoism debate is whether or not
these small additional energy costs are outweighed by the benefits of having psychologically
altruistic mechanisms.189
The arguments in section 7_3.1 showed that it is unlikely that a pluralistic organism gains
any fitness advantage from reliability as a result of having dual psychological mechanisms. The
other source of selection pressure that is described by the two are better than one principle
makes a case for the benefits of having a backup-system to cause fitness enhancing behavior.
But, given that pleasure and pain are extremely dependable motivators for behavior, this should
lead one to suspect that any pressure favoring PAMs as a result of the two are better than one
principle would be very weak. Thus the energy costs of maintaining a second mechanism should
cause one to doubt the likelihood that psychological altruism would have evolved for this reason.
Indeed, these arguments seem to show that it is more reasonable to believe that psychologically
altruistic mechanisms did not evolve than that they did.
189
It is also worth noting that the energetic costs of having a secondary psychological mechanism may be larger than
one would first expect. A secondary mechanism may require additional memory access and processing tasks which,
though they might use parts of the brain that already exist, still require extra energy to ―run‖.
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7_3.3 Why Should the Two are Better than One Principle Favor Psychological Altruism?
For psychologically altruistic mechanisms to evolve, it is not enough that they provide a
selective benefit greater than the costs developing and maintaining them. There are other
evolutionary considerations as well. In addition to determining that the fitness benefits of
possessing a PAM minus the costs to develop and maintain it are greater than zero, a
psychologically altruistic mechanisms must either be the best available choice for natural
selection to favor, or must be one of several available possibilities that are receiving positive
selection pressure. Given this, it is a very reasonable question to ask why one should suspect that
a psychologically altruistic secondary mechanism would be more fitness enhancing than any of
the other options available for selection to work on (especially if some of the other options were
available to natural selection earlier).
Section 7_3.2 pointed out that, since psychologically hedonistic mechanisms are able to
track fitness better than psychologically altruistic ones, a second PHM as a backup mechanism
might be more fitness enhancing than having a PAM as a backup. If there are two brands of hard
drives for a computer and drive type-A is more reliable than drive type-B then, even though there
would be an advantage in terms of preserving data to backing up all information onto a type-B
drive, there would be an even greater advantage to backing up all data on an additional type-A
drive.
One might object that it is possible that whatever goes wrong in the brain that would
cause a psychologically hedonistic mechanism to malfunction would cause a second
psychologically hedonistic mechanism to malfunction as well. But this isn‘t necessarily so any
more than it is in the case of the backup hard drives. It is possible that a single problem could
affect two mechanisms of the same type, but it is also possible that those particular types of
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errors are so rare that having the more reliable mechanism as a backup provides a greater fitness
advantage than having a backup mechanism of a different type.
Having two psychologically hedonistic mechanisms isn‘t the only possible alternative to
having a psychologically altruistic backup mechanism. An organism might have an egoistic but
non-hedonistic psychological mechanism as a backup. For example, an organism could have an
ultimate desire to be the parent of healthy children instead of having an ultimate desire to keep
its children healthy. The distinction between these two ultimate desires is a subtle but important
one. In the case of an organism having an ultimate desire to keep its children healthy, the
organism has an altruistic desire. This is because the desire is ultimate, other-regarding, and
benevolent. In the case of an organism that has an ultimate desire to be the parent of healthy
children, the ultimate desire is not altruistic. Instead it is instrumental, self-referential, and while
it in all likelihood would be just as beneficial to the children as the psychologically altruistic
alternative, it is not benevolent towards them. If a person, for some reason, had an ultimate
desire to wade in the Atlantic Ocean, that person, if in possession of enough accurate information
to act on her desire, must also have the instrumental desires to travel to the Atlantic Ocean and to
enter the water.190 But this doesn‘t mean that this person must have any additional ultimate
desires in this regard than to wade in the Atlantic. The additional desires are instrumental in both
the case of the organism that wants to have healthy children and the person who wants to wade in
the Atlantic.
Indeed, there is no good reason for a defender of psychological altruism to claim that
even a non-egoistic backup mechanism must be altruistic. If a defender of the thesis of
psychological altruism objects that there would be no reason for an organism to want to be a
190
It is very unlikely that any person would have such an ultimate desire if ultimate desires have a strong genetic
component, but this example is meant only as a heuristic device.
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parent of healthy children unless it receives some sort of pleasure or relief, then she leaves
herself vulnerable to this same attack when she suggests the existence of altruistic ultimate
desires. Pleasure and pain are either required as motivators or they are not.
One could continue listing examples of non-hedonistic ultimate desires for parental care.
An organism might ultimately desire to be a protector of its own children when no better
protectors are around. An organism might mistakenly (or just instinctually or automatically)
think of its children as extensions of itself and merely have a self-referential ultimate desire to
stay safe. An organism might ultimately desire to see or otherwise know that its children are
unharmed but only because it ultimately desires that type of knowledge not because it cares in an
ultimate way about its offspring. In all of these cases the ultimate desire in question is selfreferential and therefore not altruistic. In cases such as these the welfare of the organism‘s
children becomes an instrumental desire for the sake of a self-referential end. Nevertheless, an
organism with such a desire would strive to fulfill the instrumental desire to keep its children
safe as surely as it would if those desires were ultimate. Thus any of these ultimate desires work
in conjunction with the proper beliefs to produce a backup psychological mechanism in case the
primary mechanism breaks down or otherwise fails to function, and they could do so with no net
loss of fitness.
Further, there is another type of ultimate desire that a psychologically pluralistic
organism might have that is not hedonistic, egoistic, or altruistic. An organism could have a
desire that simply references the world in such a way as to cause it to provide parental care. For
example, an organism might ultimately desire that the external world does not have any of its
[the organism‘s] offspring‘s bodies lay lifeless upon it. Or an organism might ultimately desire
that an abstract rule be upheld such as ―take care of my offspring‖ and yet only care about the
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rule, not the children themselves. While ultimate desires that do not reference the self or others
may seem a bit odd, they are at least as possible as altruistic ultimate desires, and they could just
as easily be combined with beliefs in such a way as to create psychological mechanisms for
parental care that are neither altruistic nor hedonistic.
Considering all of these alternatives to PAMs as additional psychological mechanisms for
parental care, one is justified in doubting that psychological altruism evolved based on this
alone—at least until a reason can be given to show why PAMs should would work better in
terms of fitness than PHMs, psychological egoistic mechanisms, and non-self/non-other directed
psychological mechanisms as backups in case a primary mechanism breaks down.
Pointing this out should not be taken as an endorsement of pluralism. This dissertation
has argued that psychologically hedonistic motivations seem to be superior in terms of fitness
and that additional psychological mechanisms adapted to serve the same function would more
likely detriment fitness or leave it unaffected than improve it. This section was meant to show
that, in addition to all of the arguments that came before, even if organisms would benefit from
having two different types of psychological mechanism, there is no reason to assume that they
would evolve psychologically altruistic mechanisms over mechanisms of some other kind.
Even if all the other arguments against psychologically the existence of altruistic
motivations are ignored, so long as there is at least one more equally viable non-altruistic
psychological mechanism available to natural selection than there are available psychologically
altruistic mechanisms, psychological altruism would have less than a 50% chance of evolving
and therefore the chances are that the psychological altruism thesis isn‘t true.191
There is one exception to this conclusion. It is possible that an organism might have
many additional psychological mechanisms adapted to serve a particular function and that
191
This, of course, assumes that all other evolutionary considerations remain equal.
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psychologically altruistic and psychologically hedonistic motivations only make up a small part
of the number of backup mechanisms the brain has. This is, of course, a logical possibility. But
working on this premise leads to an unacceptable proliferation of psychological mechanisms for
behavior. Not only does it seem absurd that the human brain would have so many mechanisms
―designed‖ by evolution to do the same job, the more mechanisms the brain has to maintain the
more energy it has to use, and the more likely it is that the competing mechanisms will interfere
with each other. Further, with each additional non-optimal mechanism that is introduced, the less
selection pressure there would be for an additional mechanism that‘s sole fitness benefit is to
provide a backup in case all the other mechanisms fail. PAMs do not fare well under this
scenario since, by the principle of pre-established hedonism, they would not have had a chance
to be selected for as backup mechanisms until long after many of the other possibilities were
available to natural selection.
Additionally, if the backup mechanism argument from the two are better than one
principle holds, then why shouldn‘t this same principle carry through for all adaptive
mechanisms in the brain? All biological mechanisms have an inherent possibility of error (even
when that possibility is very unlikely). Given this, why shouldn‘t we expect that the brain has a
backup mechanism for all of its important functions? But such an expectation leads to a reductio
ad absurdum. If every mechanism in the brain is duplicated just once, the amount of calories
required by the brain would double, and this isn‘t counting the other fitness costs have having
such a large brain such as (perhaps) slower calculations, maintaining a stronger neck, extra
oxygen requirements, additional risk to women giving birth, and so forth. And the problems
don‘t stop there. Backup mechanisms themselves may fail when needed, and so why not expect
that the brain has tertiary backup-systems with all the additional fitness costs those would incur?
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So, while one should not expect duplicates (or triplicates or more) of all of a brain‘s
functional mechanisms based on the backup-mechanism aspect of the two are better than one
argument, one should still expect a large number of such redundancies if this same argument is
accepted as a reason to believe that psychologically altruistic mechanisms developed.
This is not to argue that no psychological functions have back-up neurology. Perhaps
some do. But it seems highly doubtful that all brain functions with significant fitness
functionality have such backups. Without either some evidence that the brain usually has backup
mechanisms of important evolutionary functions or some additional argument to show that
having a back-up mechanism for parental care is more important than the thousands (or hundreds
of thousands) of other fitness enhancing mechanisms of the brain, it seems that accepting the
backup-mechanism aspect of the two are better than one argument commits one to asserting,
without much evidence, that large portions of the human brain are redundant.
7_3.4 Multiply Connected Control Devices
Another evolutionary argument from the two are better than one principle is that
pluralism allows for what Sober and Wilson call ―multiply connected control devices‖ (Sober &
Wilson, 1998, p. 320). Such mechanisms might be best understood by example, so take the
physiological mechanisms that enable blinking as an illustration. Blinking is an important
mechanism to keep the eyes of many different organisms safe. What is more, blinking can be
triggered in many different ways. People, for example, blink when their eyes become too dry,
when an object comes too close to their eyes, when encountering a sudden bright light, when a
foreign object touches their eyes, when their eyes tear up, when they sneeze, and from other
causes. If blinking enhances fitness in all of these cases then it could be disastrous if the blinking
mechanism could only be triggered by a single cause. For example, if an animal only blinks
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when its eyes are dry, then it would fail to blink (unless by coincidence) when an insect flies too
close to its eyes, or when a foreign object has landed on the eye.
Sober and Wilson argue that multiply connected control devices are relevant to the
psychological egoism vs. altruism debate (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 307). To continue to use
parental care as an example, their argument would be that it would be better for an organism if
its parental care activities could be triggered by multiple psychological mechanisms, including
both psychologically altruistic and psychologically hedonistic ones rather than only one or the
other.192 Just as an organism‘s eyes might be caused to blink by a bright light or a quickly
approaching foreign object, an organism might perform actions of parental care when doing so
would provide pleasure or when the organism‘s ultimate desire to help its children is triggered.
Sober and Wilson say:
PLUR [pluralism] postulates two pathways from the belief that one‘s children
need help to the act of providing help. If these operate at least somewhat
independently of each other, and each on its own raises the probability of helping,
then the two together will raise that probability even more. … PLUR is superior
because it is a multiply connected control device. (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 320)
Sober and Wilson further note that there are biological precedents for multiply connected
control devices.193 They say:
192
Of course, if such a device was triggered by both a psychologically hedonistic and a psychologically altruistic
mechanism at the same time this could pose a problem for the organism if both triggers wouldn‘t lead to exactly the
same behavior. At that point the organism would need to somehow decide which behavior to choose or to somehow
average them together and suffer from the problems posed in section 7_3.1.
193
The examples Sober and Wilson provide here do not work if the intent was to give examples of devices that
benefit an organism by having multiple triggers for different situations. The examples of the fight-or-fight response
and the temperature regulation of endotherms both describe how multiple physiological responses can be triggered
for a single purpose, but they are not examples of how multiple triggers can instigate a fitness enhancing action that
is beneficial under multiple circumstances. This is why I have provided the example of blinking. If Sober and
Wilson are only saying that some actions require multiple physiological changes, then that is no argument against
monistic psychological hedonism. Defenders of the thesis of psychological hedonism need not deny that the desire
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Multiply connected control devices have often evolved. Consider the so-called
fight-or-flight response. When an organism believes that it is in danger, this belief
triggers a variety of physiological responses. Adrenaline flow increases; so does
heart rate. There are psychological consequences as well, wherein the organism
explores possible courses of action. All of these factors come together to produce
the resulting behavior. Another example is provided by the mechanisms that
endotherms (warm-blooded organisms) use to regulate body temperature. When
an organism is too cold, it starts to shiver, its hairs stand on end, and its blood
vessels constrict. These separate pathways conspire to help the organism return to
its optimal temperature. (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 307)
But pluralism for parental care via both hedonistic and altruistic mechanism would not
add much in the way of reliability. Consider the way that Sober and Wilson describe the causal
pattern of parental care. Below is a duplicate of figure 6.2 from the last chapter which itself was
a copy of the diagram Sober and Wilson used in an attempt to show that psychological altruism
would be more reliable than psychological hedonism alone on page 318 of Unto Others (Sober &
Wilson, 1998, p. 318).
to avoid pain can trigger a whole plethora of physiological responses, including those involved in a fight-or-flight
response such as increased heart beat, tensing of muscles, etc.
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In a case such as blinking, an organism gains a fitness advantage because there are many
situations in which blinking provides a fitness benefit, and some of these triggers are entirely
unrelated to each other. For example, dry eyes and an object approaching the eyes can happen
completely independently of one another and yet blinking is a fitness enhancing response for
both of these situations. Looking at the above diagram reveals that psychologically altruistic
mechanisms and psychologically hedonistic ones are not independent in the same way. Both
psychologically hedonistic and the psychologically altruistic mechanisms, under this picture,
require interpreting sense data, and forming a belief.194 If the above description is accurate, then
any fitness advantage that comes from parental care being a multiply connected control device
does not come about in the same way that additional fitness is secured by having multiple
mechanisms responsible for eye blinking. This is because parental care wouldn‘t be triggered
from the detection of two separate cases in which parental care is beneficial, because both the
psychologically altruistic mechanism and the psychologically hedonistic mechanism require the
formulation of the belief that one‘s children are in danger as a more proximate trigger.
194
Actually, it is possible that hedonistic responses might sometimes bypass beliefs, such as when a parent
automatically feels compelled to respond to the cry of their child. But this would only help the case for
psychological hedonism, as its mechanisms could be triggered by other factors besides belief.
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An exception to this general rule might occur if an organism, perhaps even a human
being, sometimes has a sense of fear for their offspring or experiences discomfort at something
their children are doing which is dangerous without first formulating the belief that the child is in
danger. If this is the case, then psychological hedonism could trigger a parental care response
both through the belief that one‘s children are in danger and through a response to discomforts
that sometimes bypass this belief. This fact is not beneficial to the defender of the psychological
altruism thesis, however, because psychologically altruistic mechanisms cannot work in this
way. Indeed, this line of reasoning only provides one more reason to believe that psychological
hedonism provides superior fitness benefits over psychological altruism.
A defender of psychological altruism might object that psychologically hedonism has one
extra step to deal with (feeling bad for one‘s children), and that this extra step provides an extra
place for PHMs to go wrong, or causes them to be less efficient. However, these arguments have
already been dealt with in section 6_8.1 and subsections in the previous chapter (concerning time
efficiency) and also in section 7_3.2 of this chapter in the section concerning the dependability of
pain as a motivator.
7_4 Summary
The two are better than one principle can be used to argue for motivational pluralism in
three primary ways. First, the proponent of psychological altruism could argue that having two
mechanisms controlling an organism‘s behavior is more reliable or more accurate than having
just one. This argument was rebutted in section 7_3.1 by showing that, while it is possible that
psychologically altruistic and psychologically hedonistic mechanisms can appear in an order and
at the proper points relative to optimal parental care (A**) in such a way as to improve fitness,
the odds of his happening relatively poor.
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Second, the proponent of psychological altruism could argue that having two mechanisms
provides a selective advantage because the primary mechanism might break down. This ―backup
mechanism argument‖ was rebutted from sections 7_3.2 to 7_3.4 where it was pointed out that
the argument fails for several reasons. It fails because the benefits of having such a mechanism
are likely to be very small while the costs of developing and maintaining such a mechanism are
likely to be higher than Sober and Wilson estimate. It also fails because the proliferation of
backup mechanisms leads to a reductio. Finally, even if it was the case that there would be
strong enough selection pressure for backup mechanisms to make them worth the cost, there is
literally no reason at all to suppose that such backup mechanisms would be altruistic in nature
over all of the other possibilities.
Third, the proponent of psychological altruism might claim that parental care would
benefit from being a multiple connected control device. Section 7_3.4 rebuts this argument by
pointing out that both psychologically altruistic and psychologically hedonistic mechanisms
would be triggered by the same belief, and that only psychologically hedonistic mechanisms
have the possibility of triggering parental care through a means that bypasses this belief.
This chapter concludes the rebuttals against Sober and Wilson‘s positive arguments for
psychological altruism. Both their arguments from Direct/Indirect asymmetry and the two are
better than one principle have proven to be inadequate to show that psychological altruism
evolved more likely than not. Additionally, an examination of the evidence has revealed that not
only do these two sources of argument fail to justify believing that that psychological altruism
evolved, they, in many instances, show that one should suspect that psychological altruism
would have failed to evolve over non-altruistic, and in most cases purely hedonistic, possibilities.
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The next chapter will present an independent reason for doubting that psychological
altruism evolved.
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CHAPTER VIII:
INDEPENDENT ARGUMENTS AGAINST PSYCHOLOGICAL ALTRUISM
AND CONCLUSION
8_1 Introduction
The previous two chapters dealt with positive arguments in favor of psychological
altruism. They should have shown two things. First, and most importantly, they should have
shown that neither the principle of Direct/Indirect asymmetry nor the two are better than one
principle is strong enough to show that one should suspect that psychological altruism or
motivational pluralism evolved over hedonistic monism. Second, they should have further shown
that, given what we know about natural selection, these same principles give us reasons to
suspect that psychological altruism actually failed to evolve.
This chapter will move beyond rebutting arguments that claim that psychological
altruism is more evolutionarily likely than the alternatives by presenting a stand-alone argument
against the existence of psychological altruism.
8_1 Can Desires Exist without Associated Pleasures and Pains?
One argument against psychological altruism (as Sober and Wilson define the term) is
that once the hedonistic elements are removed from an ultimate desire there seems to be nothing
left but the propositional content. That is to say that removing pleasure and pain elements from a
desire also seems to remove any driving force that a desire might have to motivate an organism
towards some action.
For example, having an ultimate desire for E seems to imply two things:
1. Feelings of frustration will arise if the desire for E remains unfulfilled.
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2. Feelings of pleasure will accompany the satisfaction of the desire for E (or at
least the desiring organism believes that this will be the case).
Having a hedonistic ultimate desire simply means that one desires pleasure and desires to
avoid pain. Note that the two implications above seem to fall quite naturally out of the concepts
of pleasure and pain themselves. After all, what would a pain that one didn‘t wish to avoid (all
other things being equal) be like? If an experience is not aversive then it is not a pain, and if an
experience is aversive then one wishes to avoid it, all other things being equal.
But what can be said about altruistic ultimate desires or the instrumental desires they may
generate? If altruistic ultimate desires exist, and if they are in some fundamental way different
from hedonistic desires, then if one, as a thought experiment, removes every element of
hedonism from such desires, there must remain something other than propositional content
which has the ability to function as an impetus to action.
Suppose, for example, that a human mother has an ultimate desire to feed her baby when
she believes that it is hungry. As a desire this implies that:
1. If she cannot feed her baby she will be frustrated, saddened, agitated, etc by
this fact.
2. If she satisfies her baby‘s desire for food she will feel pleasantly relieved, or
perhaps even happy.
But what is left of items 1 and 2 after all the hedonistic elements are removed?
Frustration and sadness are forms of pain (broadly construed) and relief and the state of feeling
happy or satisfied are forms of pleasure. It appears that all that would be left of a mother‘s desire
to feed her children once all the hedonistic elements have been removed are the beliefs that her
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child is hungry and that feeding the child will alleviate its hunger. But these are just facts, and
facts alone do not motivate one to action.
Of course a ready objection to this line of reasoning is that the preceding argument only
included two items and both of them were hedonistic in nature. A defender of psychological
altruism could simply say that this is stacking the deck. This seems a fair enough objection, but
only if the defender of psychological altruism can add some additional thing to the list that
remains after all hedonistic elements are removed which is capable of generating some
motivating force when combined with beliefs of the proper sort. Pleasure and pain, by their very
natures, have the power to motivate an organism when combined with proper beliefs. But what
similar possibility is there for altruistic ultimate desires?
Since in the situation described above the mother is consciously aware that her child is
hungry, natural candidates for an altruistic impetus would be other mental states, particularly
feelings or sensations, that would tend to cause the mother to feed her child. But whatever the
feelings or sensations left over from an altruistic ultimate desire might be, they cannot rely on
any pleasurable or aversive sensations for motivating force. But absent all hedonistic elements,
one cannot say that the mother would feel frustrated if she did not manage to feed her child or
that she would feel happy if succeeded.
For the psychological altruism hypothesis to remain plausible, however, the defender of
altruism must be able to point to something that can motivate an organism when conjoined with a
belief that can also count as an altruistic desire. Information is not psychologically motivating on
its own. This leaves the defender of the psychological altruism thesis with the problem of
answering two questions:
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1. That is left of a feeling or sensation, or any other conscious experience, absent
any accompanying feelings of pleasure and pain?
2. How could this hedonism-free residue (of a supposedly altruistic ultimate
desire) be an impetus for behavior?
Perhaps the defender of psychological altruism could answer the first question by saying
that feelings without associated pleasures and pains are quite common. Seeing the color orange,
she might say, is not necessarily pleasurable or painful, it is merely the conscious presentation of
information. While one may argue that even the conscious presentation of orange information
will contain elements of pleasure and pain, the important point is that it seems likely that if all
pleasure and pain elements of the experience could be removed from some orange experience,
there would still be some conscious elements left over. So let‘s grant that this is a sufficient
answer to the first question.
A far more difficult task for the defender of psychological altruism is to provide an
answer for question two. Certainly the mere experience of ―orangeness‖, removed of any
hedonistic content, doesn‘t have any inherent qualities that could drive an organism to action. If
one were sick of seeing orange, one might turn one‘s head, but that would indicate the presence
of pain. If one delighted in seeing orange, one might maneuver to get a better view, but that
would indicate the presence of pleasure. What impetus to action can an orange experience have
all by itself?195
The defender of the psychological altruism thesis might claim that I am knocking over
straw men here. After all, nobody makes the claim that an orange experience (combined with a
belief) has motivational force. True enough. The qualitative experience of orange was just an
195
An organism could perhaps be wired to, for example, eat orange things. Thus seeing orange may cause the
organism to eat. But if eating in this case is a hard-wired response of the organism it isn‘t, properly speaking, caused
by a psychological motivation. The organism isn‘t motivated to eat when it is presented to orangely; it simply eats.
327
example. But what possible conscious experience could be put in its place that can do the work
of psychologically spurring an organism into action when combined with the right propositional
content? Any sensation that comes to mind either seems as odd as the suggestion of orange
qualia having this property, or smuggles in elements of psychological hedonism in some subtle
way.
Of course my lack of imagination in this regard is not an indication that there cannot be
some possible conscious experience that would do the trick. Nevertheless, until defenders of the
thesis of psychological altruism propose an experience that qualifies, the very notion of a
psychologically altruistic ultimate desire seems to be hopelessly confused.
A defender of psychological altruism might reply that there is an obvious candidate that
will serve the needed function and that I have been stubbornly ignoring it. She might say that,
besides the propositional content, what is left of an altruistic desire once all hedonistic properties
have been removed is consciously experienced altruism or a consciously experienced urge to act
altruistically.
Such a claim is difficult to counter, in large part because it is not at all clear what type of
conscious experience one must argue against to counter it. The defender of psychological
altruism arguing that there is a conscious experience of altruism seems akin to a born again
Christian claiming that she has had a fundamentally religious experience that cannot be reduced
to the types of experiences people readily agree exist. The defender of psychological altruism
can claim to have had such an experience (or claim only that that others have had such
experiences), and then further claim that such experiences are not reducible, but that provides no
convincing argument for their existence. Those who have never had this experience (or have had
it but believe it to be a combination of other experiences and beliefs—e.g. a reducible
328
experience) have been given no reason to change their position by the mere assertion that they
are wrong.
But, putting this aside, consider that the solution of ―consciously experienced altruism‖
absent any hedonistic elements seems to have the following implications:
1. A mother experiencing altruism (or an altruistic desire) with the appropriate
associated beliefs towards feeding her child would not feel frustrated if she
could not do so.
2. A mother experiencing altruism with the appropriate associated beliefs
towards feeding her child would not feel pleasure if successful.
Some defenders of the psychological altruism might simply say ―So what?‖ and object
that, ―Of course there are no feelings of pleasure and pain to accompany an altruistic desire if
you stipulate that all elements of hedonism are removed! Your rendition of our proposal only
seems odd because in real-life psychologies pleasure and pain are interwoven with altruistic
desires. Nevertheless altruistic desires are distinct, separable in theory, and instantiated by
different mechanisms in the human brain.‖
The problem runs deeper than this however. The objection to a non-hedonistic desire here
isn‘t just a note about how strange it would be to have a desire with no associated pleasures or
pain. Instead the objection is a demand for an answer to the question of what it would even mean
for something to be a desire absent those sensations. What is consciously experienced altruism
like, and why does it qualify as a desire, and from whence does it gain its motivating force?
Sober and Wilson seem to notice this as a possible objection and attempt to head it off
early. But they do so in an odd way. Rather than providing an argument to show how
consciously experienced altruism alone could provide a motivational force when combined with
329
the appropriate set of beliefs, they retreat from psychological altruism as a consciously
experienced state all together. They say:
The concept of desire we have been describing does not mention any feeling or
sensation. To be sure, feelings sometimes accompany the desires we have.
Hunger sometimes accompanies the desire to eat, but a moment‘s reflection
shows that one can occur without the other. Desires need not be accompanied by
disagreeable sensations that disappear once the desire is satisfied. {Sober, 1998
#1, pg. 211} [Emphasis mine]
By this definition it seems that Sober and Wilson mean that altruistic desires need not
entail feelings or sensations—that they can exists in total absence of qualia, or conscious
representation. Why do they feel that a moment of reflection makes this clear? They say:
The term satisfaction gets used in two ways. One can say that people feel satisfied
and also that their desires are satisfied. If Nancy wants it to rain tomorrow, her
desire is satisfied if and only if it rains (Stampe 1994). Of course, even if it rains,
Nancy may not learn that it has, so she may not get to feel good. Her desire is
satisfied, though she does not obtain a feeling of satisfaction. To see whether
Nancy feels satisfied, you must know what is going on in her mind. To know
whether her desire for rain is satisfied, you must look at the weather.
If you lose sight of this point about the concept of satisfaction, you run the
risk of being taken in by a fallacious argument about human motivation. {Sober,
1998 #1, pg. 212}
Sober and Wilson are correct in noting that the term ―satisfaction‖ can be used in two
ways, but this doesn‘t solve their problem. For the sake of an easier discussion let‘s call the
330
feeling of satisfaction that might accompany fulfilling a desire (or believing that desire has been
fulfilled) f-satisfaction, and call correspondence with the truth conditions that satisfy a desire
factually t-satisfaction.
It is correct to say that desires can be t-satisfied without being f-satisfied. If a desire is
only t-satisfied then no hedonistic elements, no psychological elements at all for that matter,
need to be affected. But now that the distinction between t-satisfaction and f-satisfaction has
been made, one must further ask whether it correct to suppose that t-satisfaction is the relevant
form of satisfaction for the psychological egoism altruism debate. It seems unlikely that it is
since a proposition being t-satisfied need have no psychological consequences one way or
another.
Splitting the term ―satisfaction‖ into its two uses, therefore, doesn‘t make any headway in
solving the problem in favor of psychological altruism because only f-satisfaction is
psychological, and f-satisfaction requires conscious experience.
Yet, in spite of the unsatisfactory nature of Sober and Wilson‘s response, one can accept
it arguendo in order to determine what follows from it. So, let‘s grant, for the moment, that
altruistic desires require no conscious experiences and yet still have the ability to motivate action
when combined with beliefs. Continuing with the thought experiment in which all elements of
psychological hedonism are stripped away, altruistic desires would have the following
characteristics:
1. No pleasurable or painful experiences accompany those elements that are
essential to being an altruistic desire.
2.
The desirer can truly say that she wishes her altruistic desire to be fulfilled,
but she can only mean by this t-fulfilled, not f-fulfilled.
331
3. At least at the time it is active, the desirer has no conscious experience of an
altruistic desire.
4. If one accepts the premise that being aware of X entails having a conscious
experience of or properly related to X, then it follows (from 3) that, at the time
an altruistic desire is active, one can have no conscious access to it.
These implications are not internally inconsistent, but what a strange thing desires have
now become! They seem to bear little or no resemblance to what the term ―desire‖ means in
daily speech, and no clear specialized definition has been given to replace the common usage of
the term. To see how odd these four implications are, let‘s consider a few examples.
If implication one and two are true then a person who is motivated by altruism to help
somebody (in a world where all her hedonistic elements have been stripped away), might have a
conversation like the following with the subject of her altruism:196
Subject: Thank you for driving off that bear! It was about to eat me!
Altruist: You are welcome.
Subject: So why did you do it?
Altruist: Because I am an altruist.
Subject: Knowing that you could have prevented the death of another human being but
didn‘t would be disturbing wouldn‘t it?
Altruist: No, that wouldn‘t bother me at all. I‘d just prefer that it didn‘t happen.
Subject: You mean, had you discovered I needed help and ignored that fact you would
not have been disturbed?
196
The following dialogues are not meant to serve a purpose by putting words into the mouth of the defender of
psychological altruism. Rather they are meant to serve as a heuristic that invites the reader to ask herself what could
the altruist say and realize that the psychological altruist seems to be short on even providing suggestions for
answers to some very important questions.
332
Altruist: Disturbed as in having an unpleasant feeling? No. But I‘d wish it didn‘t happen.
Subject: What if you tried to save me but made some mistake that cost me my life?
Altruist: That would have been unfortunate.
Subject: Would you feel guilty or haunted by the fact?
Altruist: No, but I‘d—
Subject: --wish that it didn‘t happen. Ok, but now that you saved me you feel good about
yourself right? Or, if not that, doesn‘t it feel good to have been helpful to another?
Altruist: No, I feel neither good nor bad about it.
The purpose of this imagined conversation is to serve as an intuition pump. The altruist in
this case is completely emotionally disengaged from her own actions. She acts on what she
would call a desire to help others on one level, but doesn‘t seem to care emotionally about others
at all. Would the supposed altruist in this case truly be altruistically, or would she merely posses
some sort of compulsion to help others? If the alleged altruist truly has what can be called a
desire to help others, it must be a very alien conception of desire, since she is not consciously
aware of the desire at all and cannot be.
The position of the altruist becomes even worse when one considers implications three
and four. Considering just these two implications, if the conversation took place again the altruist
would not even be able to say as much as she did the first time.
Subject: Why did you do it [save me from that bear]?
Altruist: I saved you from the bear.
Subject: I know! And thanks. But what was going through your head at the time?
What were you feeling? What moved you to action?
333
Altruist: I wasn‘t really feeling anything. If anything moved me to action I wasn‘t
conscious of it at the time, although I did think about the best way to save you.
Subject: But why did you decide to save me at all?
Altruist: I…didn‘t?
What can the altruist say here? She can‘t say that she felt motivated to save the subject. If
altruistic desires are not part of conscious experience she felt nothing at all. She can‘t even
(truthfully) say that she wanted to save the subject at the time, because that would require a
conscious awareness or feeling which Sober and Wilson argue are not necessary parts of an
altruistic desire. She had no conscious motivation to help the subject. She simply found herself
saving him.
Now the term ―desire‖ is being used in an even more alien way. It can occur entirely
outside of consciousness, and, apart from the fact that it can supposedly motivate actions when
combined with the right beliefs, it bears no real resemblance to the term ―desire‖ as it is used in
regular language. Indeed, one might ask how a non-conscious ―desire‖ is any different from
other non-conscious causes of behavior. Sober and Wilson might reply that it has propositional
content, but this does not solve the problem. Propositional content by itself has no motivating
force, nor is it clear that other unconscious causes of action do not also have or depend on
propositional content.
8_1.1 More Implications of Having only Non-Conscious Altruistic Desires
Even if one were to accept such a strange conception of ―desire‖, doing so would open
the possibility of a new form of psychological hedonism that would raise many of the same
concerns as the familiar version does. An adversary to psychological altruism could propose a
weakened but still moderately strong version of psychological hedonism defining it so:
334
Moderate psychological hedonism: All conscious decisions are made on the basis
of pleasure and pain (broadly construed), and for no other reason.
This still seems to be a very potent version of psychological hedonism. What teeth have
been pulled from the theory of psychological hedonism even if it is agreed that on a nonconscious level people can be caused to act altruistically? The moderate hedonistic theory
(MHT) would still entail that when people actively engage in moral reasoning they do not
behave in altruistic ways. It would still entail that the most important part of human nature, our
conscious natures, are not, and cannot be, altruistic.
If altruistic desires are non-conscious, and if altruism is linked to positively to morality, it
would imply that people are potentially more moral when acting from non-conscious motives
rather than when they deliberate. A victory for defenders of psychological altruism based upon
this definition of altruistic desire would be a pyrrhic one. Here, for example, are five questions,
the answers of which depend on results of psychological egoism/altruism debate. I do not claim
that the questions or answers below favor a particular proponent of any of these theories. Rather
the questions and answers are meant to get at some of the important implications derived from
one theory of motivation being true over the other, as well as to contrast the implications of a
theory dependent upon non-conscious altruistic desires to a more standard version of
psychological altruism.
In the following list of questions ―P-Hed‖ represents psychological hedonism, ―P-Alt‖
represents psychological altruism and ―NC-alt‖ represents a version of psychological altruism in
which motivational portion of altruistic desires are all non-conscious:
335
1. Can people behave altruistically?
2. Can people have altruistic ultimate
desires?
3. When people behave altruistically
do they ever consciously decide to
do so?
5. Is being altruistically motivated
relevant to morality?
P-Alt
P-Hed
NC-alt
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes197
Yes
No
No
Yes/No
No Probably not198
Fig. 8.1
Considering these five questions there is only one instance in which the psychological
hedonist and the NC-altruist would typically disagree. They disagree over whether or not people
can have altruistic desires. The psychological hedonist says ―No‖ while the NC-altruists says
―Yes‖. This apparent different, however, is tempered by the fact that the NC-altruist must define
―desires‖ in such a way that there is no necessary conscious access to them.
For the questions concerning the implications of the three theories, NC-altruism gives the
psychological hedonist almost everything she wants. People may have psychological
mechanisms that have access to propositional content (non-consciously) that can cause them to
act in behaviorally altruistic ways, but behavioral altruism was never in question to begin with.
The defender of non-conscious altruistic desires can claim that psychological altruism is true (if
The defender of the non-conscious psychological altruism thesis can say ―Yes‖ but only if the term ―desire‖ is
defined in an unusual way.
198
The psychological hedonist must answer ―No‖ since she believes there are no altruistic motivations—though she
could hold the position that if altruistic desires existed they would be relevant. In that case she would have more in
common with the standard psychological altruist in this regard than the NC-altruist. Since the theory of
psychological altruism makes a claim about persons and not ethics, a defender of psychological altruism could
answer this question either way, however many defenders of psychological altruism are interested in the
psychological egoism/altruism debate precisely because they believe it is relevant to ethics. The defender of nonconscious psychological altruism must answer negatively under most moral theories. It is possible that she could
have an ethical theory that claims that non-conscious psychological causes, even those not originated by a conscious
psychological cause (such as building a habit), are relevant to an individual‘s morality while non-psychological
causes of behavior are not, in which case she could answer ―Yes‖.
197
336
one agrees that the notion of a non-conscious desire of this kind makes any sense) but only
through an extremely odd use of the word ―desire‖.
Now the defender of NC-altruism might object here that acting on non-conscious desires
isn‘t all that odd at all. She might suggest that often people are affected by their subconscious
desires, or dreams they have had, or information they have consciously forgotten. However there
is an important difference between these cases and a conception of desire such as the one that the
NC-altruist defends. In the case of subconscious desires, the desires, or the motivation that leads
to related instrumental desires, were conscious at one point and can, at least in theory, be
consciously accessed. A person may, for example, be afraid of dogs and not know why, and later
discover that she was attacked by a dog at a very young age. But in this case the fear of dogs and
the desire to avoid them was at one time a conscious one. The same thing is true for dreams,
forgotten memories of various kinds and so forth.
There are also cases where a person might be only subconsciously aware of some
environmental stimulus that nevertheless triggers a desire which triggers an action. For example,
a person might begin discussing a movie she once saw with a friend because the theme song for
that movie is playing on the radio, even though she never consciously connects the two.
Nevertheless, in such a case the person is still conscious of her desire to talk about the movie.
Additionally she was also probably conscious of the song on the radio, but just didn‘t make the
connection between the song and the movie consciously.
Both of these types of cases are different from what the NC-altruist proposes in two
important ways. First, the NC-altruist must maintain that an altruistic desire is not conscious,
while in the cases above the person is aware of her desire, just not the cause of it. Second,
337
subconscious desires, if they were generated through conscious experiences originally, would be
significantly different than desires that supposedly bypass consciousness entirely.
What all this boils down to is that the theory of psychological altruism (as Sober and
Wilson define it) is in trouble. If the psychological altruist claims that altruistic ultimate desires
must contain some conscious experience that has nothing to do with pleasure or pain, then it is
incumbent on her to propose a conscious mental state (other than pleasure or pain) that can
provide a motivational force. On the other hand, if the psychological altruist goes the other rout
and denies that ultimate desires depend on a conscious state, then the term ―desire‖ becomes
something utterly different than the notion of desire which has historically been the central issue
of the psychological egoism/altruism debate.
8_2 Summary
This chapter concludes my discussion of the psychological egoism vs. psychological
altruism debate. Chapters 6 and 7 undercut the strongest arguments for concluding that evolution
favors the development of psychologically altruistic motivations. These chapters further showed
that the principles upon which those arguments were based, Direct/Indirect asymmetry and the
two are better than one principle, showed instead that psychological hedonism is much more
likely to have evolved alone. This chapter then supplemented the previous two by providing an
argument against altruistic ultimate desires which, if successful, defeat the theory of
psychological altruism. These arguments further suggest that any type of non-hedonistic desires
would lack the motivating force which is central concept of ―desire‖ itself.
Through the arguments presented in this dissertation I take it that the view that evolution
favors the development of psychological altruism has not only been placed in doubt but turned
on its head so that one should now suspect that evolutionary principles show that it is improbable
338
that psychological altruism ever evolved. In spite of this, it is important to recognize that the
arguments that I have presented only undermine those views which hold that psychological
altruism is inconsistent with psychological hedonism.
While at first it might seem odd to suggest that psychological altruism can be consistent
with the notion that all motivations are depend upon desires that are ultimately hedonistic, this is
only because the psychological altruism/egoism debate has largely come to be seen as a debate
about the possibility of altruistic ultimate desires. But it might at least be argued that another
conception of psychological altruism could be employed which accepts psychological hedonism
and yet does the same sort of work as the more restrictive version of psychological altruism
argued against in this dissertation. Under such a view an action could be considered
psychologically altruistic if and only if the pleasure (or relief from pain), which is the ultimate
desire of the actor, were most proximately caused by the perceived desire (or perceived
wellbeing that would be desired) of another and if the hedonistic desires so caused would be
sufficient to motivate the subject to action.
Under this definition a parent who was motivated to aid her child because she both sees
her child in pain believes her child would not want to be in pain would be altruistic. This is
because the pain that motivates the parent in this case is most proximately caused by an
understanding that her child desires to be removed from the painful situation. Alternatively, if a
parent knew she were being observed by others and saw her child‘s discomfort which caused her
to feel discomfort because she knew that her reputation would be harmed if she didn‘t
immediately go care for her child, she would not be acting as a result of psychological altruism
because the most proximate cause of her hedonistic state would not have been caused by a
perception of what her child‘s desires were—instead her hedonistic discomfort was caused only
339
by the consideration of non-hedonistic consequences to herself. In a case where the parent‘s
hedonistic condition was caused by both realizations, she would only be considered altruistically
motivated if she would have been motivated by the perceived desires of her child alone.
If it were accepted that psychological hedonism is true, a definition such as the one
proposed would still allow for a distinction between selfish and selfless desires through the
definition above. Further, to the extent that such distinctions are morally relevant, I see no
persuasive reason why the hedonism-compatible definition could not work just as well as the
incompatibilist version.
The fact that ―I see no persuasive reason…‖ is not, of course, an adequate defense of the
theory. Alternative versions of psychological altruism would have to be defended on their own
merits, and such defenses lie beyond the scope of this dissertation. Though any notion of
psychological altruism that requires altruistic ultimate desires has been shown to be
evolutionarily suspect, the purposed alternative definition of psychological altruism is here
meant only as a concession to the fact that this doesn‘t rule out the possibility that much of the
traditional role of psychological altruism could be preserved through an alternative concept of
what it means to be psychologically altruistic.
340
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APPENDIX A
What follows is the Visual Basic code for testing whether a random level of hedonistic
parental care is more or less likely to be closer to a randomly generated optimal level of parental
care than a completely altruistic level of parental care (which has a value of 100 on a scale from
1-100). All ties are recalculated. The numeric values for the vLowestValue and vHighestValue
can be modified to exclude certain beginning or end points if they seem unrealistic. Also the
variable vLoops can be changed to alter the number of iterations of the test—the higher the
number the greater the accuracy. I currently have it set to one million, but this might be taxing
for some machines. A delay should be expected between pressing the calculate button and the
complete output of the data.
To enter the code simply make a button in Visual Basic with the name and caption of
―calculate‖ and then just cut and paste the following lines of code into the ―Private Sub
Calculate_Click‖ function for that button. If you already have a ―Private Sub Calculate_Click()‖
then paste the lines between ―Private Sub Calculate_Click()‖ and ―End Sub‖ into your already
existing function.
Private Sub Calculate_Click()
vLoops = 1000000
vLowestValue = 0
vHighestValue = 100
vAltValue = 100
cHed = 0
cHedAlt = 0
cAlt = 0
cTies = 0
Cls
' Number of iterations in the test.
' The lowest optimum value of parental care
' The highest value of parental care
' altruism = maximum parental care
' counter
' counter
' counter
' counter
' clear screen
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Print "Boundaries at "; vLowestValue; " and "; vHighestValue
Print
For i = 1 To vLoops
redo:
vOldChkSum = cAlt + cHed + cHedAlt
vHedValue = Int((101) * Rnd) + 0
' A random hedonistic value is generated
between 0 and 100
vOptimumFitnessValue = Int((vHighestValue - vLowestValue + 1) * Rnd) +
vLowestValue ' An optimal fitness value is randomly generated between the high and low
values
vBehaviorValue = (vHedValue + vAltValue) / 2
vHDist = Abs(vHedValue - vOptimumFitnessValue)
vAdist = Abs(vAltValue - vOptimumFitnessValue)
vHADist = Abs(vBehaviorValue - vOptimumFitnessValue)
If (vHADist < vAdist And vHADist < vHDist) Then cHedAlt = cHedAlt + 1 ' comment
this line out to only compare hedonism and altruism
If (vAdist < vHDist And vAdist < vHADist) Then cAlt = cAlt + 1
If (vHDist < vAdist And vHDist < vHADist) Then cHed = cHed + 1
vNewChkSum = cAlt + cHed + cHedAlt
If (vOldChkSum = vNewChkSum) Then
cTies = cTies + 1
GoTo redo
End If
Next i
Print "Hedonism percentage: ";
Print (cHed / vLoops) * 100
Print "Altruism percentage: ";
Print (cAlt / vLoops) * 100
Print "Pluralistic percentage: ";
Print (cHedAlt / vLoops) * 100
Print "Pluralistic + Altruistic percentage: ";
Print ((cHedAlt / vLoops) * 100) + ((cAlt / vLoops) * 100)
Print
Print "Total: ";
Print (cHedAlt / vLoops) * 100 + (cAlt / vLoops) * 100 + (cHed / vLoops) * 100;
Print "Ignoring "; cTies; " ties."
End Sub